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**Title: Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan**

**Author: Heather J. Sharkey**

**Journal: African Affairs, Volume 107, Number 426, January 2008**

**Abstract**

In what is now Sudan there occurred over the centuries a process of *ta'rib*, or Arabization, entailing the gradual spread of both Arab identity and the Arabic language among northern peoples. After the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of 1898, British colonial policies favoured narrow elite from within these 'Arab' communities. Members of this elite went on to develop a conception of a self-consciously Sudanese Arabic national identity, in the process adapting the term 'Sudanese' (*sudani*), which derived from an Arabic word for blackness and previously had servile connotations.

**Title: Beyond 'Dragon in the Bush**

**Author: Daniel Large**

**Journal: African Affairs, Volume 107, Number 426, January 2008**

**Abstract**

In the wake of China's Year of Africa in 2006, China–Africa relations are currently the subject of unprecedented attention. However, although those relations are widely covered they are also under-researched. This article offers an introduction to China–Africa relations, covering background to the history and politics of Chinese involvement in the continent and identifying areas of further research.

**Title: Combating Climate Change in the UK**

**Author: Neil Carter**

**Journal: The Political Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 2 - April–June 2008**

**Abstract**

There is a curious disjunction between the Labour Government's international actions and its domestic policy. Although Tony Blair did much to promote the climate change agenda on the international stage, domestically, with carbon emissions rising again, the Government will fail to meet its target of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by 2010. This article examines the weaknesses in the Labour Government's domestic record and assesses the significance of the recent transformation of climate change politics. Several obstacles to the design and delivery of more effective policies are identified, which can be categorised as either problems of 'environmental politics' or 'environmental governance'. It is argued that the recent politicisation of climate change has overcome some of these obstacles - albeit temporarily - but whether

the pressure for further policy measures can be sustained, with a long-term impact on environmental governance, remains uncertain.

**Title: Immigrants into Citizens.**

**Author: Patricia White**

**Journal: The Political Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 2 - April–June 2008**

**Abstract**

This paper examines the citizenship test which is part of the UK naturalisation process. The test is based on the government publication *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship*. A detailed analysis of its two editions (2004 and 2007) reveals that the conception of the citizen and the picture of British government and society underlying each are very different. There is, additionally, a mismatch between the rationale offered for the *Life in the United Kingdom* test and what the latter can in fact test: the attitudes and civic virtues mentioned in the rationale are untestable on-line. A society which aspires to be a democracy, it is argued, needs to scrutinise carefully the fairness and democratic appropriateness of its procedures for admitting new citizens.

**Title: Foucauldian perspective on international 'governance indicators'.**

**Author: Oded Löwenheim**

**Journal: Third World Quarterly, Volume 29, Issue 2, 2008**

**Abstract:**

This paper offers a critical perspective on the growing phenomenon of governance indicators in international politics. I employ a governmentality approach to shed light on the political meanings and outcomes of the increasing tendency of various international actors to rate and rank the governance capacities and performances of states. In particular, I argue that, beyond being an analytic tool or an advisory system for governments, this practice in fact reproduces structures of authority and hierarchy in the international system. Power and knowledge are bound together in many governance indicators, as powerful states either examine themselves, the quality of governance of Third World states, or adopt the examinations carried out by other agents. Consequently, poor and developing states cannot simply ignore these ratings and rankings.

**Title: Transformation and Decay: the de-institutionalisation of party systems in South America.**

**Author: Omar Sanchez**

**Journal: Third World Quarterly, Volume 29, Issue 2, 2008**

**Abstract:**

This article surveys the evolution of party systems in South America in terms of their level of institutionalisation. In recent times political competition in much of South America has become less structured by political parties proper and has moved in the

direction of candidate-centred movements and electoral vehicles led by political entrepreneurs. Most countries in South America (Brazil, Chile and Uruguay are exceptions) have experienced party system de-institutionalisation during the 1990s and 2000s, as voters have systematically punished traditional parties, often rendering them marginal or forcing their disappearance. The scale of decomposition varies across cases but it has affected countries with historically well institutionalised party systems (Colombia, Venezuela) and those with inchoate party systems

**Title: De-Constructing the French Wars: Napoleon as Anti-Strategist**

**Author: Charles J. Esdaile**

**Journal: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.31, No.4, August 2008**

**Abstract**

The Emperor Napoleon I is regarded as one of the greatest generals of all time and, as such, he has attracted an immense bibliography. In spite of this, there have been few studies of him as a strategist: instead, it is simply assumed that it was enough for the Emperor to have conducted an operation for it to have had a logical strategic goal. In this article, however, Napoleon is shown to have been primarily an opportunist, who was frequently guided by the needs of the moment and swayed from his course by circumstance, while it is further suggested that, even considered on their own merits, many of his decisions were faulty in the extreme.

**Title: British Strategy and the Struggle with France 1793-1815**

**Author: Jeremy Black**

**Journal: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.31, No.4, August 2008**

**Abstract**

This article examines the various constraints under which the conduct of British strategy operated during the French Wars - examples include its political and geographical situation, its far-flung colonial interests and its limited military resources and its need to maintain a strong alliance system in continental Europe - and shows how the direction that it took closely mirrored a variety of campaigns in the eighteenth century. That said, the position in which Britain found herself in the struggle against the French Revolution and Napoleon was frequently contradictory, and it is no coincidence that it was some time before the ideal combination of strategies was found that marked the period 1808-14. The fact that the difficulties involved were overcome said a great deal for the underlying strength of the British state.

**Title: Self-Interest versus the Common Cause: Austria, Prussia and Russia against Napoleon**

**Author: Philip G. Dwyer**

**Journal: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.31, No.4, August 2008**

## **Abstract**

This essay re-examines coalition warfare during the Napoleonic era by looking at the three eastern European powers - Austria, Prussia and Russia - how they interacted over time with France as well as each other, and how they managed French preponderance on the Continent. Before 1812, coalition warfare was dominated by eighteenth-century military and diplomatic attitudes: overall foreign political goals were ill-defined and were characterised by deep mistrust. The result was that the eastern powers pursued their own interests with little regard to coalition cohesion. If the coalition held together in 1813 and 1814, on the other hand, it was largely because individual powers' self-interest coincided with the overall objectives of the coalition - an increased determination to defeat Napoleon - along with a never before seen numerical superiority in allied troops. In this, Austria and especially Chancellor Metternich's role in juggling conflicting interests between the allies so that they could present, for the first time, a united front against France was fundamental.