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### COLOMBO PLAN

#### External Assistance Under Colombo Plan: India's Contribution

Of the eleven countries which provided training facilities to their Colombo plan partners in 1959-60, India comes fifth after the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

India's contribution under the Colombo Plan has been in both capital aid and technical assistance. During the year 1959-60 she offered capital aid of the value of Rs. 180 million to Nepal.

This information is contained in the 9th Annual Report for 1959-60 of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee which has been released Jan 11, 1961@. The Report says that assistance under the Plan comes, for the most part, from member countries outside the Colombo Plan area, viz. South and South-East Asia. These are Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States. But countries in the Colombo Plan region are also providing assistance to each other in an increasing measure.

The voluminous 9th Report which was finalised by the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee at its 12th meeting in Tokyo in November last says the total value of external assistance under the Plan up to the end of June, 1960, directed to the countries of the region on an inter-governmental basis, amounted to over \$ 8,000 million (æ 2,857 million). In 1959-60 the value of such assistance was over \$ 1,750 million (æ 625 million). The development expenditure incurred by the countries of South and South-East Asia increased from æ1,187 million in 1957-58 to æ1,272.4 million in 1958-59 and æ1,309.8 million in 1959-60. The estimated outlay for 1960-61 is æ1,546.3 million.

The total Australian contribution--capital aid and technical assistance--since the beginning of the Colombo Plan amounted to A. æ 35.16 million. During the year 1959-60 Australia's total expenditure amounted to A.æ 4.44 million. Her capital aid expenditure during the year A.æ 3.147 million and expenditure on equipment provided during the same period was nearly A.æ200,000.

From the beginning of the Colombo Plan to the end of the fiscal year

1959-60, Canada has made available \$281.7 million for grants of capital and technical assistance to member countries of the Colombo Plan. In 1960-61 a further \$50 million was appropriated for this purpose by the Canadian Parliament.

In the period 1954-55 and 1960-61 inclusive, Japan's budgetary appropriations for technical cooperation to the Colombo Plan region have totalled 1,043 million yen. Of this amount, 380,923,000 yen was appropriated during the fiscal year ending March 1961.

Upto the end of March 1960 New Zealand had appropriated  $\text{œ}9.315$  million for capital aid and technical assistance under the Plan. In 1960-61 a further  $\text{œ} 1$  million has been provided, bringing New Zealand's total contribution for the period from 1951 to March 31, 1961 to  $\text{œ}10.315$  million.

From 1951 to June 30, 1960, the commitments of the United Kingdom Government for development in South and South-East Asia by way of capital aid and technical assistance totalled  $\text{œ}170.7$  million. Actual disbursements in this period totalled  $\text{œ}146.9$  million. The annual rate of capital expenditure for development purposes by the United Kingdom has increased and in 1959-60 was  $\text{œ}44.5$  million, as compared with about  $\text{œ}30$  million in the previous year. During the year ended June 30, 1960, the United Kingdom spent  $\text{œ}1.156$  million on technical assistance compared with  $\text{œ} 1.058$  million in 1958-59.

The total aid committed by the United States Government to the countries of South and South-East Asia during the year 1960, approximately \$ 1,538 million, is about 270 million dollars greater than that committed in 1959. The cumulative total of this direct United States aid since 1951 is about \$ 7,378 million. The Report says that private United States activities also contributed significantly to the economic development of the countries of South and South-East Asia.

The Report says that outside the Colombo Plan but for the Colombo Plan region, the World Bank has made loans amounting to \$ 85 million ( $\text{œ} 30.3$  million) in 1959-60. Altogether, the World Bank has made 49 loans totalling over \$ 1,107 million to countries in the area. By September 30, 1960, over \$ 727 million of these loans had been disbursed. Twentyfour of the 49 loans were made to India, whose borrowings totalled \$ 662 million.

The Report observes that the very favourable

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world economic situation during the year provided a climate for continuing progress in the Colombo plan area. The volume of exports increased and raw material prices improved, though food prices continued to decline. Although trends were somewhat mixed, there was a marked improvement in the export earnings of the Colombo Plan countries as a whole. Imports showed no corresponding increase in

1959 as a result of measures taken in some countries to conserve foreign exchange, but in the first half of 1960 some fairly large increases in imports were recorded. Despite this, the level of reserves in most countries was considerably higher in June 1960 than in June 1959, partly because of the maintenance of a high rate of capital inflow into the area.

In the area as a whole, there was an increase in the production of food grains in 1959-60 compared with 1958-59. The production of export crops increased steadily. There was a substantial increase in iron ore production in some countries in the area, such as India and the Federation of Malaya. In India, Pakistan and Indonesia coal production increased. The rising trend of crude petroleum production in the area continued.

Industrial output in the region increased rapidly during 1959-60. The output of cement and electric power showed marked increases. In India, the rise in industrial production in 1959-60 was about 11 per cent, as compared with an increase of 2.4 per cent in 1958-59 and 1.7 per cent in 1957-58.

The output of electric power continued to rise throughout the region. In India, which accounted for most of the increased output of the area during the year, 10 per cent more electricity was generated than in the previous year.

Discussing the task ahead the Report points out that while all countries have achieved increases in investment and production, income levels and per capita incomes remain low. This is neither surprising nor necessarily discouraging. There are no short-cuts to success in the tasks of raising the rate of economic growth and of stimulating the various sectors of economies so that growth may continue. These are tasks which call for financial stability and fiscal and monetary discipline to maximise savings and mobilise resources for development. The task remains of continuing and strengthening measures which will contain inflationary pressures and avoid disruptive changes in the volume of money. The dangers of inflation, the uncertainties of the weather, shortages of technical skills and capital, and balance of payments fluctuations, all indicate the continuing need for a flexible and realistic approach to the planning and implementation of development policies and programmes.

SRI LANKA INDIA AUSTRALIA CANADA USA NEPAL JAPAN NEW ZEALAND PERU INDONESIA  
PAKISTAN

**Date :** Jan 11, 1961

**Volume No**

COLOMBO PLAN

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Growth of Mutual Assistance Under Colombo Plan

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A distinctive feature of Colombo Plan cooperation, according to the 9th Annual Report for 1959-60 of the Consultative Committee released Jan 12, 1961 is the growth of mutual assistance by the countries of South and South-East Asia for the economic development of one another.

Of the total of 4,268 Colombo Plan training awards made during the year under the technical assistance programme 309 training awards were made by member countries inside the area. The number of new Colombo Plan experts provided during the same period was 535. Since 1950, training has been given to over 23,000 trainees and the services of nearly 11,600 experts have been provided to countries of the area by members of the Colombo Plan and agencies of the United Nations.

Since the inception of the Plan, the total expenditure on technical assistance alone has amounted to over ₹ 46.4 million of which over ₹ 16.8 million was spent in 1959-60. Nearly half of the total expenditure of ₹ 46.4 million on technical assistance was spent on the supply of experts, about one-fourth on provision of training places and the remainder on equipment.

The Report says that since the inception of the Colombo Plan India has provided training places for 1,442 nominees in various subjects including 267 during July 1, 1959 to June 30, 1960. The trainees came from various countries including Nepal (964), Ceylon (138), Philippines (79), Thailand (47), Indonesia (44), Burma (42) and Pakistan(39). 169 candidates received training at the International Statistical Educational Centre, Calcutta.

During the year, training facilities were provided in India in the fields of Engineering (57), Forestry (14) Statistics (23), Community Development and Co-operative (18) as also in other fields including technology. India provided experts in the fields of taxation, potato growing, road research and leather technology. The

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services of experts have so far been provided to Ceylon (23), Singapore (4), Indonesia (3), Burma (2) and Viet Nam (1). India continued to give financial and technical assistance to Nepal. During the year 1959-60, the monetary value of India's assistance to Nepal was of the order of Rs. 18.0 million including the cost of over 100 experts in the fields of education, village development and irrigation. During the year, India offered aid to Nepal for its

Second Plan projects to the extent of Rs. 180 million, including Rs. 40 million for construction of East Kosi (Chhatra) Canal.

Since 1951, Ceylon has trained 65 participants under the Colombo Plan, mainly in the fields of health, agriculture, engineering, transport, public administration and cooperative development. Of the 65 placements, 12 were provided in 1959-60.

During the year under review, Indonesia provided, scholarships for 18 students from member countries--2 from India, 13 from Malaya, 2 from Singapore and 1 from Viet Nam.

Upto the end of June 1960, Pakistan had provided 105 training awards under the Colombo Plan. Besides, some equipment was made available by that country to Australia and the services of an expert to Ceylon.

The Philippines has extended assistance to member countries under the Colombo Plan and other programmes. It made a number of fellowships available in 1960 to member countries.

Burma also continued to provide technical training facilities during the year under review.

SRI LANKA INDIA USA NEPAL BURMA INDONESIA PHILIPPINES THAILAND PAKISTAN REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE LATVIA AUSTRALIA

**Date :** Jan 12, 1961

## Volume No

1995

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

President's Republic Day Greetings to the Nation

The President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, broadcast the following greeting to the Nation on the eve of the Republic Day on January 26, 1961

Today, the Indian Republic enters into its 12th year, and as I greet my countrymen on the eve of this great National Day, I am filled with joy and hope. Ours is a very young Republic but we are an ancient people whose history goes back to thousands of years. Establishment of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of India in 1950 is undoubtedly a great landmark in the history of this great land bound by the Himalays in the North and the East and the wide seas in the South and the West.

These eleven years form but an infinitesimal part of the history of

India but they are for us today of the utmost importance. For, it is a period in our history when we are busy laying the foundations-- sound and secure--of a Democratic State of Socialist pattern, whose guiding principles are human dignity and freedom and in which poverty and ignorance are outlawed. Our concept of a Welfare State is one in which every citizen, without any distinction or discrimination, has a chance of honourable existence and of full growth.

It is to that end that all our planning is directed. The work that we are doing today and what we have done since independence, is going to determine our future. Therefore, we must marshal all our resources, spiritual and material. And this we cannot effectively do unless there is the silken thread of fellowship unifying and strengthening all our national endeavours. If we pride ourselves on the fact that we had attained a high degree of culture at a time when a large part of the world was passing through the Stone Age, we should also ask ourselves why we are where we are today, while many of the erstwhile backward nations have laboured hard and gone ahead. Is it wise to be oblivious of the lessons of history? The darkest spots in our history have been those when our people lost a sense of proportion and attached undue importance to things that were secondary, in fact, petty and ignored the demands of the country. Let us not forget the lesson which our history teaches us and let us make sure that the causes, which brought about our downfall do not operate in our national life today or ever again in future.

This year the Nation embarks on the Third Five Year Plan. We have, of course, achieved much in the last 12 years, but we have yet to go a long way before we can claim that we have given economic content to our freedom.

We, in India, are faced with many internal and external stresses and strains. We should take

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them as a challenge to our national will for survival and every year on the cause of the common man and to India's age-old mission of furthering the cause of peace, goodwill and friendship among nations.

The world--especially Asia and Africa--is changing with a somewhat baffling speed necessitating constant vigilance and adjustment. If life is a challenge and an adventure, living in an atomic age with all its perils and potentialities is a greater adventure. If man must survive the self created dangers, he will have to make a departure from his old stand. A fresh sense of man's mission in this universe, a reassessment of values and a reaffirmation of faith in the `vishwatma'--the world spirit--are the needs of the present time. Old patterns of thought and behaviour, individual, national and international, call for revision and reconsideration. May be, they have to give place to new patterns in keeping with the spirit and temper of the new age of space travel.

Our task is great but so also can our national will be mighty. All we have to do is to inspire a sense of belonging, a sense of comradeship in our people. For, are we not engaged in the glorious adventure of building a better India of tomorrow--an India, which will count as a force for peace, progress, freedom and happiness for all mankind? A fresh dedication to the service of the country, an all-India vision and a general social awareness are the imperative needs of today. Let us draw inspiration from our past achievements but let us also guard against old mistakes. And let us apply ourselves, heart and soul, to the task which awaits us. Let everyone feel that his personal contribution is as important as the collective effort for our national regeneration. And so, I should like to offer my greetings and sincere good wishes to my countrymen for a better and happier life.

INDIA USA

**Date :** Jan 26, 1961

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1995

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

President's Republic Day Message to Indian Nationals Abroad

The President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, addressed the following message to the Indian Nationals abroad on the occasion of the Republic day on Jan 26, 1961

On this day of national rejoicing our thoughts naturally go to you all who are not in our midst today.

I should like to take this opportunity to speak to you about the state of our country. Probably, you know that we are in the midst of the last phase of our Second Five Year Plan and are soon going to take the Third Plan in hand. The implementation of the first two plans has been an exhilarating experience. We have covered much new ground in most of the fields of our major hydro-electric projects, community development and basic industries like iron and steel, as also small-scale industries. Whatever the difficulties, we are determined to carry out our programme of national reconstruction. I am sure you have many pleasant surprises in store for you whenever you happen to visit the Mother country next.

The world situation being what it is, some of you may have to make new adjustments. I have no doubt that you will always, give a good account of yourself in such circumstances. The interests of the

country of your adoption should ever be your guiding light. Besides, do not forget that every Indian abroad is an unofficial ambassador of his country and the world judges India by how he conducts himself.

I should like now to greet you all on this auspicious occasion of the 11th anniversary of our Republic. May the New Year that begins today bring good luck and happiness to us all!

INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Jan 26, 1961

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PAKISTAN

Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of Indus Waters Treaty, 1960

India and Pakistan exchanged Instruments of Ratification for the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960, at a brief function, held in New Delhi on Jan 12, 1961.

Shri N.D. Gulhati, Additional Secretary, Union Ministry of Irrigation and Power, and leader of the Indian delegation to the talks on Indo-Pakistan Canal Waters represented India.

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Pakistan was represented by Mr. G. Mueenuddin, Secretary, Ministry of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and leader of the Pakistan delegation to the talks on Indo-Pakistan Canal Waters.

Among those who attended the function were Shri M.R. Sachdev, Secretary, Union Ministry of Irrigation and Power, and senior officers of the Union Ministries of External Affairs and irrigation and Power.

Officers of the Pakistan High Commission were also present.

PAKISTAN USA INDIA LATVIA

**Date :** Jan 12, 1961

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PAKISTAN

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Pension Claims of Displaced Employees of Local Bodies

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The Government of India and Government of Pakistan have agreed that the displaced employees of local bodies (other than those of the local bodies in the former provinces of Punjab, Bengal and Assam) who migrated from Pakistan to India and vice versa upto Jun 30, 1955 and had completed service or age entitling them to a retiring or superannuation pension under the normal rules, but who migrated without having put in formal application for retirement or whose applications for retirement were not admitted by the authorities in either country, may be allowed pensions in accordance with the pension rules of the respective local bodies, as if they were permitted to retire on the date from which they ceased to be in the employment of the local bodies, and their pension transferred to the other country through the Central Claims Organisation.

The displaced employees of local bodies, who, as a result of this agreement, become entitled to the grant of pension and its transfer, should send their claims to the Officer-in-Charge, Central Claims Organisation, Indra Bhawan, Mussoorie, so as to reach him not later than March 31, 1961. The claimants should give the following information:--

- (a) Name in full with present address or the claimant in India.
- (b) Name of the post and office in which the claimant was last employed in Pakistan.
- (c) Total length of qualifying service entitling the claimant to a Retiring Superannuation pension with dates of commencement and ending of service.
- (d) Date of migration to India.
- (e) Approximate amount of pension due.
- (f) Name of treasury in India from which pension is sought to be drawn.

PAKISTAN INDIA USA

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UNITED KINGDOM

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President's Speech at Banquet in Honour of H.M. Queen Elizabeth II

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Speaking at the banquet held in honour of H. M. Queen Elizabeth II and H. R. H. The Duke of Edinburgh at Rastrapati Bhavan on Jan 21, 1961 the President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad said:

Your Majesty, Your Royal Highness, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen--

May I, on behalf of the Government and people of India and on my own behalf extend to Your Majesty and Your Royal Highness a most cordial welcome to our country. Almost to a day, two years ago, Your Royal Highness paid India a visit; and now, on this auspicious day of Basant Panchami, the traditional harbinger of Spring, it is our pleasure and privilege to welcome Your Majesty with warmth and cordiality, as the monarch of a great nation and the Head of the Commonwealth.

This is not, of course, the first time that a ruler of the United Kingdom has visited this country. Exactly fifty years ago, your grandfather came to Delhi. But the circumstances were then very different. We are mindful of the fact that it was during the reign of your well loved father that we attained independence; and I am sure that I am not alone in voicing the opinion that we have been looking forward to the day when we should receive you as the honoured and welcome guest of the Government and people of this country.

The events of 1947 changed the whole aspect of the relations between our two countries; and

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the Indian people, as much as the British, elected to keep alive only the pleasant memories of their long association. This happy result has been achieved on the one hand by the timely action of the British in parting with power effectively and gracefully and, on the other, by the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, the philosopher and leader who guided us to this new destiny, the destiny of peaceful relations, relations of friendship rather than strife, with those who had ruled over us. And this became possible, no one can doubt, because there was no strife in his heart, there was no ill-will and no rancour, not even when he was leading us in this struggle for Independence, for long years before 1947. To his name and to his memory, I wish to pay homage once again today.

Our relations with the United Kingdom are part of our own history of the last two hundred years; and the British impact on India has been

in many ways an abiding one. But, thanks mainly to the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, who taught us that nationalism should never acquire an exclusive character, we have also sought to strengthen the finer aspects of our relations. English language and literature play a prominent part in our lives, and the whole English tradition colours and conditions some of our ways of thought. The influence of British jurisprudence can be seen in our laws. Above all, we have sought to develop the British methods of politics and government, adapting them to our own context. I can confidently assure Your Majesty that in many ways you will feel at home during your sojourn in our country.

Perhaps the most striking result of the goodwill with which the transfer of power was effected in 1947 is the fact that the institution of the Commonwealth has been so developed that both our countries, without any limitations on their sovereignty, can continue to be members. It is a multi-racial association for consultation on matters of common interest that the Commonwealth has come into prominence and it is in this form that the Commonwealth has served not only to strengthen relations between its members but also, if I may venture to say so, provided an example to the world. It is, perhaps, the most suitable and effective organisational expression of the world's interdependence that exists today. It places no trammels on its members, but fosters an intimacy beyond the formal communications of diplomacy. We do not all of us have the same viewpoint and we need not minimise the differences. But the very fact that they are expressed in friendly and informal discussions is, in this loud and raucous world of today, a matter for satisfaction; and the association itself, based as it is on equality, tends to mutual advantage and benefit.

During your stay in our country, Your Majesty will have an opportunity of seeing something of our ancient past, as well as of our present adventure of building a prosperous India. This is a gigantic task, and we appreciate the generous help in various fields given to us by the Government and people of the United Kingdom and the other members of the Commonwealth, of which you are the Head. Particularly do we appreciate the assistance in science and technology given to us by the United Kingdom, who is in this field one of the leaders of the world. Your Majesty will, among other places of interest be visiting Durgapur, where the great steel plant is a joint effort of Indo-British co-operation and a striking symbol of our continuous and close association.

I feel confident that the present visit of Your Majesty will further strengthen and enrich the friendship between India and the United Kingdom. I assure Your Majesty of the friendship of the Indian people for the people of the United Kingdom, and their heartfelt good wishes to you for long, happy and peaceful years in the exalted position you occupy.

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to join me in drinking to the health of Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth head of the Commonwealth, and that of His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.

UNITED KINGDOM INDIA USA

**Date :** Jan 21, 1961

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UNITED KINGDOM

H.M. Queen Elizabeth's Reply

Replying to the toast proposed by the President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad at the banquet given in her honour at Rashtrapati Bhavan on Jan 21, 1961 H. M.

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I thank you, Mr. President, for your kind and generous words, and for the pleasure of enjoying your hospitality in your house tonight.

For nearly ten years you have carried the heavy responsibilities of President of the Republic of India with dignity and a distinction which is universally acknowledged. That decade has been a stirring and significant period in India's history. The achievements of your time will stamp the future developments of this great country. Many tasks and many problems still lie ahead and to them India will, I know, bring

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the same clear vision, the same compassion, and the same initiative which have helped her already to surmount so many difficulties and score so many successes in the process of building a modern nation.

Mr. President, I know these coming weeks will be some of the most rewarding and instructive of my life. You have arranged that I should see India in all her diversity--the old and the new, the cities and the countryside, and people from all walks of life. My husband and I will travel from North to South and from East to West. He will renew acquaintances with many places--for me it will all be a new and very fascinating experience.

I know I shall have a wonderful story to tell our children when I see them again and I am sure it will make them just as keen to visit India as I have always been.

In India as in Britain it is the family group which is the vital and continuing factor in our country's social structure. Families are the bricks from which all human societies are built. If the bricks are

sound the edifice will endure.

In a larger sense the Commonwealth is a family of nations, and this is an apt way to describe the relationship between Britain and India. No other nation knows India so well, and you for your part are well acquainted with the British, their frailties and their strengths, their foibles and their standards. There are in Britain many men and women who served and worked here and who remember India with respect and affection. The welcome I was given to-day makes me sure that this affection and respect are reciprocated. I hope we will always allow this friendly and personal relationship to colour all our contacts and transactions.

In this second half of the twentieth century there is a great surge throughout the world to improve conditions of human life. Britain, and the other Commonwealth partner-countries of India, have sought to help you in that great task here, and to benefit from the pace of technological progress in the world. The people of Britain and of other industrially advanced Commonwealth countries are deeply conscious of India's needs and potentialities.

You, Mr. Prime Minister, have constantly urged the need for India to take full advantage of modern progress and to match the advances in technology, engineering and science which are being made elsewhere in the world. India has responded nobly to your lead and inspiration, and her achievements in science and the development of industry during recent years have aroused admiration everywhere. Yet I know that you and your Government also have a deep and abiding feeling for the past, and that you do not wish India in all the fierce rush and strain of the modern world to become oblivious of the best traditions and the great legacy from former generations. I understand and sympathise with you in this. I am sure that in combining scientific and technological progress with the ancient Indian values of toleration, compassion and wisdom, India will be an example to the world. May God aid you in your task.

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USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC INDIA

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AFGHANISTAN INDIA BURMA CANADA CONGO NEPAL PAKISTAN USA CHINA YUGOSLAVIA

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### AFGHANISTAN

#### Indo-Afghan Trade

The review of the working of the IndoAfghan trade arrangements concluded in New Delhi on Feb 15, 1961 and agreement was reached on the steps for further development of trade during the remaining part of the current, Trade Agreement period, which expires in July 1961.

The seven-member Afghan Delegation was led by Mr. M. R. Younossi. The Indian team of officials was headed by Mr. D. S. Joshi, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

The two Governments have reaffirmed their desire to promote trade between India and Afghanistan and to take such special steps as might be found necessary. As a result of the talks held in Delhi during the last. few days, it is expected that there will be further exchange of

goods between the two countries. The main imports from Afghanistan into India will consist of dry and fresh fruits, asafoetida, cumin seeds and hides and skins. Exports from India will consist of cotton and woollen textiles, tea, coffee, vegetable products, agricultural products, chemical products, engineering goods, household and building requirements, hardware, rubber manufactures and leather manufactures.

AFGHANISTAN INDIA USA RUSSIA

**Date** : Feb 15, 1961

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ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

Address by Attorney General of India.

Addressing the fourth meeting of the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee which opened in Tokyo on Feb 15, 1961 the leader of the Indian Delegation and Attorney General of India, Shri M. C. Setalvad, said:

Your Excellency Foreign Minister, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have the privilege as the head of the Indian Delegation to the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee to express to the Foreign Minister and the Government of Japan our appreciation and gratitude for inviting the Committee to hold its Fourth Session in this great city and historic country. I am sure, I am voicing the feelings of all my colleagues when I say that we are happy to be able to be present in Tokyo in response to your kind and generous invitation. This great country is a happy blend of the ancient and the modern. With her ancient history, philosophy, art and aesthetics she has also made an enormous advance in modern technology and science. She is, thus, truly a leader of modern Asia. When Western countries were making vast economic and scientific progress, the Asian and African countries lagged behind. They are now rapidly growing industrially and economically. It was Japan who showed them the way demonstrating to the world that given the right opportunities there was little difference between countries in the East and countries in the West. It would be true to say that in the early days Japan symbolised the self-respect and dignity of Asia and Africa.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are meeting here for the purpose of discussing a number of very important matters of mutual

interest in the field of International Law. This Committee was inaugurated in 1957 for the purpose of viewing problems of international law from the angle of Asia and Africa. We have met and exchanged ideas and information in regard to the development of International Law in our region. We may well claim that in the course of our years we have in our own humble way tried to make useful contributions in the field of international law.

The Session which will start today will, I am sure, be an important and useful one. Apart from discussing matters of common interest in the field of International Law, the Committee has been a very useful forum for bringing together persons in Asia and Africa dedicated to the cause and spirit of the rule of law in international relations.

Today the world is facing a crisis where dedication and conformity to values and standards can alone save it from catastrophe. These values and standards have to be related to the fundamentals of international law. I am sure, Ladies and Gentlemen, that in our own small way we will be able not only to discuss problems of International

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Law but to create a healthy and peaceful climate in international relations. To achieve this end has been my country's constant endeavour.

May I close with repeating our expression of gratitude to the Japanese people and Government for their very kind hospitality.

INDIA JAPAN USA PERU

**Date :** Feb 15, 1961

## Volume No

1995

ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

Attorney General of India on Legality of Nuclear Tests

Speaking at the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee Conference at Tokyo on "The Legality of Nuclear Tests" on Feb 23, 1961 the leader of the Indian Delegation and Attorney General of India, Shri M.C. Setalvad, said:

In his inaugural speech at the first Session of the Committee in April 1957, the Prime Minister of India asked whether tests in connection with nuclear devices, which were being carried on by

various powers and the effects of which had been established by scientific data to be harmful to mankind, were permissible according to International Law. These tests have since continued. Scientific and medical opinion has, on the other hand, increasingly emphasized, their evil effects as is evidenced by numerous recent publications. Indeed, 900 scientists from 43 countries are stated to have requested the United Nations to take steps to put an end to these tests. Realizing the grave importance and urgency of the subject from the point of view of the health and well being of the peoples of the world, we decided at our last session to direct the Secretariat to prepare background material on this subject, so that we may be able to discuss it at this session. May I on behalf of our Delegation express our appreciation of the manner in which the Secretariat has discharged the task entrusted to it. Not only has it put before us a careful study from different points of view but it has indicated in a detailed bibliography further sources which can be looked into for an adequate treatment of the subject.

It is essential at the outset to appreciate the scope of the subject which we have decided to discuss. We should, we think, be clear that we are not concerning Ourselves with the very controversial and much debated question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. That subject on which writers and students of International Law have expressed divergent views is, we think, a wider and a different though a connected subject. That subject concerns the legality of the use of certain weapons and devices when fighting a war. What we are concerned with is a topic of a much lesser scope. Are nuclear tests conducted by a country within its territory or elsewhere which are likely to cause harm to inhabitants of other countries permissible according to International Law? We are, as I have already said, not concerned with the question of the legality of nuclear warfare; nor with the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons. What we have decided to discuss is the carrying on of the nuclear tests, whether for military or peaceful purposes, by countries in a manner which would danger the health, life and property of the citizens of neighbouring or distant countries

It may be said that it is difficult to isolate the question of the validity of nuclear tests from the larger question of the legality of nuclear warfare. But would such a view be correct? A closer examination of the two problems reveals that their solutions depend on distinct legal principles. The question whether nuclear warfare is permitted by International Law will have to be determined by ascertaining whether it is prohibited by any of the well accepted sources of International Law, viz. customary International Law, conventions or treaties entered into by States and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. On the other hand, the legality of the carrying on of nuclear tests in one's own territory if such tests cause harm to persons outside the territory will depend on the application of the rule of international customary law which imposes an obligation on a State "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States". If the rule applies the testing State will have committed an

international tort and will be responsible to other States and persons for the consequences of its illegal action.

The distinction between the two problems--the legality of nuclear warfare and the legality of nuclear tests--will become clearer still if one remembers that the first problem can arise only in the case of war. Whereas the latter is capable of arising and has, in fact, arisen in times of peace and even in reference to nuclear tests carried on to further peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Therefore, what we have to discuss and ponder over is first whether any known and accepted principles of International Law can be applied to the situations arising out of these tests. If none are applicable or if such as are applicable are not adequate to meet the situations which are developing, the further point to consider will be whether any extensions of the existing principles can be worked out so as to impose responsibility

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on the testing States. Finally, it will be a matter for consideration whether International Law which has in several cases in the past met new situations by evolving new principles cannot in the present case similarly attempt to counter the grave threat to which States generally are exposed by the making of these tests by the formulation of suitable doctrine. Before, however, we can enter upon these questions with advantage, we need to have a clear idea of the extent and nature of the threat to the very existence of man which these tests involve.

Though some States which carry out these tests do it secretly, so that it is not possible to know of their consequences and though others have boldly denied that any evil consequences at all follow them it can, we think, be said that the known results of some of the tests, scientifically and technically examined leave little room for doubt that it is not possible to confine even the direct effects of these tests to the territory of the testing State. The indirect effects are naturally more widespread in the shape of pollution of air by radio active material, economic effects on residents and industries in distant regions, meteorological effects over wide areas, interference with the freedom of air and sea navigation and the destruction of the living resources of the sea. It would, therefore, we think, be safe to proceed on the assumption that the adverse biological and genetic effects and the widespread economic damage resulting from the fall out of the radio active tests can not be denied.

In this connection, the questions of the responsibility of the testing State in respect of its own nationals and the aliens within its territory may well arise. But it appears to us that the more important question is that of the responsibility, of the State in respect of injury of different kinds of persons and property outside its territory.

A State has no doubt sovereign authority over its own territory. But can such rights of sovereignty extend to possessing something or doing some acts on its own territory which will injure or destroy or adversely affect the citizens of other States? The sovereignty of each State can be exercised by it only consistently with the sovereign rights of other states. This is the basis of the doctrine well accepted in International Law that a State may not use its territory contrary to the rights of other states. Anglo-Saxon Municipal Law and doubtless other systems of Municipal Law prevent an owner of property from doing acts on his property and dealing with it in a manner dangerous to the neighbouring owners. A similar doctrine should broadly speaking be applicable in international Law and the State harbouring dangerous things on its territory, or entering upon adventures on its territory likely to cause damage outside its territory should incur legal responsibility to other States. The responsibility should extend to every kind of damage whatsoever--biological meteorological, economic and otherwise--which can proximately be traced to the acts of the State on its own territory. Such acts would be international torts.

Would in such cases the occurring of actual damage be necessary before a State can be fixed with responsibility? Would not the certainty or probability of damage be enough? Could not, as in many systems of Municipal Law, a State be compelled to desist from its dangerous acts by appropriate action? By what agency or in what manner can a State be made to desist from such action? Here one more aspect of this question requires our consideration. In the Municipal Law relating to the tort of negligence or nuisance, compensation or damages for the harm caused may be an adequate remedy in some cases; in other cases, relief by way of compensation of the intended threat or danger is the appropriate remedy. In the matter of nuclear tests, the direction of the danger is often unpredictable, e.g. miscalculation of the weather conditions etc. In view of the unpredictable nature of the harmful effects likely to be caused, it is a matter for consideration whether prevention of such tests fraught with great danger to mankind is not the appropriate remedy.

Another aspect of the question which has recently assumed some importance is the likelihood of unforeseen accidents in the matter of these nuclear tests resulting in adverse effects which cannot be controlled by any human agency.

Another approach to the problem is a consideration of the action of some States in virtually depriving other States temporarily of the use of the high seas on the ground that certain areas on the high seas would be for a time danger zones. A similar disability in the navigation of certain air spaces is also imposed. Is it permissible to these testing States to deprive other States even temporarily of the freedom of navigation of parts of the high seas and air space by declaring them to be danger zones? The question is not free from difficulty and the answer would perhaps depend on whether these rights of navigation are absolute rights or "relative rights which

must be exercised in a spirit of reasonableness and moderation".

These are only a few of the problems which States who do not indulge in these tests will have

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to consider by reason of the ever growing competition in "cosmic irresponsibility" which is reaching "a point when it, threatens to affect seriously the life and health of the populations of the rest of the world". We may not, however, forget that legal solutions and legal restraints are hardly an adequate or constructive answer to a race in nuclear tests on a large scale which is bound to result in the gradual pollution of the air, water and soil of our planet. What may be a solution "is, a world public order which any of the parochial states can flout only at its own risk."

INDIA JAPAN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC USA RUSSIA

**Date :** Feb 23, 1961

## Volume No

1995

BURMA

Prime Minister's Statement on Sino-Burma Border Treaty

Speaking in the Lok Sabha on Feb 15, 1961, on the calling attention notice on

"The map attached to the Sino-Burmese Border Treaty and Government's reactions thereto,"

the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Sir, this question relates, I take it, to this map which is attached to the recent treaty between Burma and China. It affects a certain corner of India, the North-Eastern corner, which impinges on Burma and which a little further up touches China. Three countries are involved in it. What kind of treaty two independent countries like Burma and China may make between themselves about their boundary is their concern. But where that touches our interests, naturally, it becomes our concern also.

There has been no argument about our border there, in so far as Burma is concerned. First of all our northern border has been defined, as we have often said, by natural boundaries which have been accepted by

tradition, custom and practice. Our boundary runs along the high Himalayan watershed which naturally separates the Tibetan plateau from the Indian sub-continent. In the Eastern sector, this traditional boundary of India was confirmed in 1914. That is what is known as the McMahon Line. When surveys were conducted in the implementation of the McMahon line agreement it was established as early as 1918 that the alignment met the Burma-India boundaries at a point near Talu pass coordinates I need not mention here.

Successive Governments of India and Burma have accepted this location of the tri-junction and not as had been erroneously assumed to be five miles further south near Diphu Pass. As early as 1957, it was noticed by the Government of India that in certain communications and published statements made by or on behalf of the Chinese Government references were made to suggest that the Chinese Government considered that the tri-junction lay not at the Talu Pass but at the Diphu Pass. We drew the attention of the Burmese Government to the error and the Burmese Government confirmed that the northern boundaries of India and Burma meet near the Talu pass a few miles north of the Diphu pass.

A joint committee of Burma and China met in pursuance of the agreement signed between the two countries and they conducted some surveys. As a precaution to ensure that this committee did not commit the earlier error and take any decision bilaterally in respect of the tri-junction with India, the Government of India in an informal note presented to the Burmese Government in August 1960 recalled the previous correspondence and specified the exact coordinates of the tri-junction, so that no decision was taken which might have an adverse effect on the boundaries and territories of India.

The Boundary Treaty was signed on the 1st of October 1960 between Burma and China. In this no definite coordinates of the tri-junction had been mentioned. Thus in the treaty itself there is no mention of all this.

We were informed by the Prime Minister of Burma that the Chinese Government did not agree that the tri-junction lay near Talu pass, but reaffirmed that it should lie near the Diphu pass. It appears that ultimately the representatives of the Burmese and Chinese Government agreed not to describe the precise location of the trijunction in the treaty and left the point vague.

The House will recall that Premier U Nu in his speech before the Burmese Parliament delivered on the 5th December, 1960, suggested that the actual tri-junction could not be determined until the boundary question between India and China was settled and therefore had been

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purposely left, undetermined. It was, however, explained by him that the Burmese and Chinese Governments had to indicate the tri-junction

in the maps attached to the Treaty and for the purpose of the maps Diphu pass was taken as the meeting point between the western extremity of the Burmese-Chinese boundary and the eastern extremity of India-China boundary,

Premier U Nu, in his speech, added that should the agreed boundary between China and India meet the Burmese boundary not at the Diphu pass, but at some other point, not only will the specific geographical location of that point have to be entered into the treaty but the map also will naturally have to be altered. The Burmese Government argued that because of the difference of views as regards the exact location of the tri-junction, the agreement which had been reached on all other points could not remain unsigned and the Burmese Government were obliged to accept the Chinese contention as far as the cartographic delineation was concerned. We appreciate that the exact location has not been specified, but this vague mention and the fact that the treaty maps showed the line as starting from Diphu pass, five miles south of the watershed is likely to have prejudicial effect on 75 square miles of Indian territory. The Government of India, therefore, in notes presented to the Chinese and the Burmese Governments at the end of December, 1960, made clear once again the exact co-ordinates of the tri-junction stating that the traditional boundary running along the Himalayan watershed passed through the point near Talu pass and not the Diphu pass which had been shown as the western extremity in the maps attached to the treaty. The Government of India could not recognise the erroneous depiction of the tri-junction since it has an adverse implication on the territorial integrity of India.

BURMA CHINA INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Feb 15, 1961

## Volume No

1995

BURMA

Detention of People of Indian Origin

In reply to questions:

(a) whether it is a fact that a number of Indians are being detained in solitary confinement in the Rangoon Central Jail on account of their alleged failure to pay the foreign registration fees;

(b) if so, what is their number and the period of their detention already undergone; and

(c) what steps Government have taken in the interests of these Indian detenus?

the Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Shrimati Lakshmi N. Menon told the Rajya Sabha on Feb 16, 1961

No person of Indian origin is detained under solitary confinement in the Rangoon Jail for mere failure to pay foreigners registration fees. There are, however, about 100 people of Indian origin who are detained in the Rangoon Jail, as general prisoners, for continued failure to take out or renew their Foreigners Registration Certificates. Some time ago, there were about 200 such persons in the Jail but as a result representations by our Embassy in Rangoon the Government of Burma instituted a special Screening Committee, which after interviewing the detenus, ordered the release of well over 100 persons who were classified as too aged and infirm to earn sufficient towards the payment of the registration fees. All such persons have, after release, been exempted from further payments.

The persons who are now in jail are those who could not be classified as old and infirm and the Embassy is continuing its efforts to bring about some arrangement for the relief of these persons.

During the last week of January, several persons of Indian origin are reported to have staged a demonstration in the Rangoon Jail which was against the rules of the institution, As a punishment for violating the jail regulations, 18 detenus were placed in solitary confinement for a few days but have since all been returned to general imprisonment.

BURMA INDIA USA

**Date :** Feb 16, 1961

## Volume No

1995

BURMA

Indo-Burma Border Conference

In reply to questions whether

(a) any boundary dispute was

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referred to the Indo-Burma Border Conference at District Officers' level held at Moreh from 10th to Jan 12, 1961

(b) the Lokchao boundary post dispute has been settled in the conference;

(c) the Naga rebel activities and the Teak extraction dispute also were discussed; and

(d) the conclusions of the conference,

the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs, Shri J. N. Hazarika, told the Lok Sabha on February 28, 1961:

There is no boundary dispute as such. From time to time, District Officers on the Indian and Burma sides of the border meet to consider questions of mutual interest. In January 1961, District Officers of the Burma Government and the Manipur Administration met at Moreh and, among other matters, agreed that as the boundary between India and Burma at the sector near Moreh followed the middle line of the Lokchung river, the boundary post now placed on the Indian side of the Lock-chung river should be correctly shifted to the middle of the bridge. They were also of the view that encroachment by cultivators from one side of the border on to the other and the unauthorised extraction of timber might be more easily checked when the existing boundary pillars, which are temporay, are replaced by permanent pillars. Other questions, such as the removal of the scrap iron of the Bailey bridge at Moreh, as well as, the construction of a road through Burma territory to eliminate the diversion across Indian territory, for a distance of about 1 1/2 miles, of the Tamu-Kalewa road were also discussed and settled. There was no specific discussion of Naga rebel activities.

BURMA USA INDIA

**Date :** Jan 12, 1961

## Volume No

1995

CANADA

Capital Assistance from Canada

Following discussions between Canadian and Indian officials, allocations have been made for \$ 25 million which Canada has given as capital assistance to India for 1960-61.

Seven million dollars have been made available for the import of wheat while a sum of \$11.7 million has been allocated for the import of urgently needed non-ferrous metals. \$ 0.6 million has been set apart for the completion of the Canada-India Reactor Project which is in its final stages. An amount of \$ 3.5 million will go to the third stage of the Kundah Hydro-electric in Madras State which has already received financial assistance from Canada under the Colombo Plan. Discussions are proceeding for the allocation of the balance of \$ 2.2 million.

In all cases where Canadian aid takes the form of commodities, the Government of India have agreed to establish counterpart rupee funds out of the sale proceeds of such commodities. As in the past, these counterpart funds will be utilised to cover the local costs of economic development projects agreed upon by the two Governments.

CANADA INDIA USA SRI LANKA

**Date :** Jan 12, 1961

## Volume No

1995

CONGO

Prime Minister's Statement in Rajya Sabha

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Rajya Sabha on Feb 15, 1961 on the Congo situation.

Mr. Deputy Chairman, I take it that you desire me to say something about the Congo situation. It is rather difficult and perhaps not necessary for me to go back into the occurrences, mostly tragic, of the last few months. Hon. Members here will be aware broadly, of what

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has been happening there. We, that is, the Government of India, have been greatly distressed. not now only, but during the last few months, and even when I went to the United Nations, I spoke on this subject and expressed our distress at the way things were being done there. We have always thought that in a situation like that in the Congo, the United Nations should go there to help, because the alternative was the country going to pieces, of civil war, or intervention by other powers. So we accepted intervention, not in the sense of a foreign power coming in, but of helping them to put their house in order. In fact, the U.N. has done very good work there, so

far as health, feeding etc., are concerned, because the whole structure of government had collapsed and people were starving and everything was, more or less, closed. But on the political front, the record of the U.N. has not been a very happy one. It is said that it is not the fault of the United Nations but rather of the world as it is today. Whatever that may be, the fact is that the United Nations authority there had largely to look on while all kinds of wrong things were done. The second report of the U.N. Representative which was distributed here, indicated how the Belgians who had, to some extent gone out of the country after the first Security Council Resolution, returned in ever increasing numbers and the result was, it may be said, I think with complete truth, that the Katanga administration was specially run by the Belgians in the name of some other people, or they were the advisers of Mr. Tshombe. They did things and more and more of them came in there. That applies to some extent, to Mr. Mobutu also. Meanwhile the United Nations tried to check abuses and sometimes succeeded in doing a little here and there. But broadly speaking, they did not make much difference. And this gentleman, Mr. Mobutu, it should be remembered, came in by a coup d'etat. He had no legal basis. Mr. Kasavubu had legal basis, just as Mr. Lumumba had legal basis. So all performance that has been happening and we were distressed at the inactivity, passivity and the inertness of the U.N. Authority there.

No doubt, the real reason was that the U.N. activity there was not being backed as it should have been, by many countries. The Belgians- I say Belgians Sir, repeatedly, because though it was voluntary, and they were not sent by the Belgian Government, I cannot conceive of large numbers of Belgians of all types, including military people, going to the Congo without the approval or at least the acquiescence of the Belgian Government. So while on the one side this was happening, the U.N. Administration in the Congo was rather helpless. It is a very unsatisfactory and frustrating experience and we pointed this out repeatedly. Not only we, but even the Representative of the United Nations there, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, himself pointed out this in his reports. Well, I cannot go back into all this. Now we are confronted with a very very serious situation as a result of the murder of Mr. Lumumba.

One rather sad aspect of this is that just when it appeared probable that the instructions given to the United Nations would be varied, that new policies would be pursued by the U.N., new and effective policies to check Belgian infiltration and interference and to check Mr. Tshombe and Mobutu etc., just when this was likely to happen as we judged it, this whole thing has been upset. It is a legitimate inference that because there was likelihood of a change in policy, of a more effective policy being pursued by the U.N., things came to a head in the Congo and those people like Mr. Tshombe and others who did not want a change, wanted to do something to forestall that change and they possibly organised all these developments which resulted in the murder of Mr. Lumumba.

There is another aspect of it. Mr. Mobutu and Tshombe are at the

present moment, with such forces as they possess, marching to Orientale Province, to crush all pro-Lumumba elements. And it is reported--it is not secret information--that Mr. Tshombe's armies are led by Belgian officers. Sir, this is very extraordinary, when the chief complaint for the last six months has been of Belgians there and the first Resolution of the Security Council was for the removal of the Belgian military people there, military and paramilitary forces. They did go for a while but then more and more persons came back and in ever increasing numbers. There is no doubt about it that these Belgians are responsible, that they must shoulder the responsibility for all that has happened.

The second unfortunate fact is that while Belgium was directly concerned in this, or rather Belgians, other powers, great powers, important powers, tolerated this, may be, even encouraged it and that was the reason why no clear line could be taken by the United Nations.

Well, Mr. Lumumba has been murdered. Mr. Lumumba, it is well known and acknowledged, was the most popular figure in the Congo. He was the man who built up the national movement a few years back. Members may have read the other day that those whom I consider responsible for that murder in the Katanga Province

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have said that they were not going to inform the public as to where he was killed and where he was buried. Why Lest the place should become a place of pilgrimage. That itself shows their own realisation of the fact of the popular hold he had. But in spite of his great popular pull, these people got hold of arms from foreign sources chiefly, armoured cars and all that, and built up their authority, not on any popular support, but just on the few guns that they possessed and the foreign help that they got and the foreign officers that they had. And because they were afraid of their removal in case any popular representatives came into the picture, they refused to allow the Congolese Parliament to meet even.

We can, of course, express our anger, because we do feel angry at all this, and we feel angry because month after month, week after week, day after day, attention was being drawn to this deteriorating situation there and yet it was allowed to deteriorate till it went completely out of hand. The new administration in the United States, as soon as it came in, did give intensive thought to that situation and we were happy to learn that they were themselves dissatisfied with past policies and had decided to propose a new policy which was, if not exactly our policy, but anyhow approached what we had been suggesting, and approached it considerably. We were happy. But then all this has happened in the last few days. Probably I imagine, there was some resistance to that from other countries and now this has happened. Now, it is difficult for me to say what we shall do in the matter or what the other developments there might be because a great deal depends upon the result of the present Security Council's

meetings which are being held from day to day. We feel that if at all possible, it should be made possible for the United Nations to continue to work there but it would only be possible or desirable if they work ....

Shri Bhupesh Gupta: Continue to work under whom? Is it continuing to work under Hammarskjöld?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: They can continue to work only under their own organisation, that is, the Security Council. The Security Council should lay down explicitly the policy and give them a fresh mandate as to how it should work. That policy should inevitably mean working for a unified, united independent sovereign Republic, that is number one. There should be no interference, more particularly the Belgian interference should be stopped and they should go back, so far as military or para-military personnel are concerned. The forces of the Congolese army and all factional forces should be brought under control, may be neutralised, may be--preferably--disarmed and brought under control and neutralised. The Congolese Parliament should meet and decide upon its Government. There are many other things but these are the main things I have suggested. The United Nations forces should not be kept immobilised as they have been in the past for lack of clear direction but they should have recourse to military action to carry out their policy because in the last few weeks or more, the United Nations has been repeatedly insulted by Mr. Tshombe, by Mr. Mobutu and others. A conciliation committee went there and is still there but they were not allowed to meet Mr. Lumumba; obviously, Mr. Lumumba may have been dead but that is an inadequate reason but the way they have been treated, when Mr. Lumumba was brought to this new place, it was not alleged but definitely stated that he had been very badly beaten. When the United Nations wanted to send a doctor to him, he was not allowed to go there. The whole affair is nauseating, the way these people have been behaving there like complete gangsters and they have been supported by others. That is the extraordinary part. Unless this policy is completely changed, it is difficult, I think, for the United Nations to do anything effective. The result would be deterioration and it is better, if the United Nations cannot function properly, than for it not to function at all but I think, for it not to function, to be withdrawn, will be a tragedy for the United Nations and for the world but as I said, the tendency just before this tragedy was for opinion, including the opinion of a great country like the United States, to change and to be in favour of this positive policy to put a stop to civil war but now that this death has taken place, and strong passions have been aroused, I do not quite know what the future will bring. We still think that the situation can be saved if strong action is taken by the United Nations, that is to say, by the Security Council laying it down and the Secretariat, etc., implementing it. I do not see any way out apart from that. I can, of course, in my acute resentment express that resentment strongly but I do not see any constructive way out because the alternative is war, civil war and other war, international intervention and the whole thing going to pieces and not being confined to the Congo. It would spread to other countries

in Africa. Naturally, one should try one's utmost to prevent that from happening. A request came to us about two weeks ago from Mr. Hammarskjöld saying that in view of the fact that some countries were withdrawing their Armed Forces from the Congo, we should send some Indian

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Armed Forces. Our reply was, we recognised the necessity of the United Nations functioning there but the way it had been functioning was not to our liking nor was it effective, and if they could take up a positive line more or less on the lines suggested, in spite of our dislike, we would send them help in the shape of Armed Forces but not till we are satisfied that it could be used in the right way. We do not want to send our people to be insulted and without being able to do anything. That is the position still and we are now awaiting the Security Council's decisions, whatever they may be to judge of our own attitude in this matter. There were hopeful signs that in the Security Council, what with the Afro-Asian countries who feel very strongly on this subject, and the new policy proposed by President Kennedy's administration which appear to us not far removed from the Afro-Asian proposals--though I cannot say definitely because these things are rather vague--something might still emerge there on the lines I have indicated. If so, strict action should be taken along those lines immediately and insofar as we can help, we shall help. Otherwise, most of us should become helpless spectators of the destruction of the Congo.

Later replying to interpellations, the Prime Minister said:

We are not having a debate here but I do not wish to take advantage of technical pleas. About what the Hon. Mr. Bhupesh Gupta has said, I should like him to examine these matters from the point of view of effectiveness. He used the word 'effective' very much. We in India cannot take any action in the Congo except in two ways. Firstly we can express our opinion, if that is action; of course we can express it; we can condemn or approve of something...

Secondly, by acting through the UN. There is no third way for us. If the UN does not function there, we do not function in the Congo. It is obvious to me. It is not a question of one's wishes in the matter. We just cannot function. Do we go there to carry on a war there against the people we dislike all by ourselves or may be in co-operation with other countries? It is an inconceivable proposition to me. We can only function there through the UN. Of course it is always open to us to express our opinion; that we can do. The Hon. Member spoke about our controlling Mr. Mobutu or Mr. Tshombe. How we can control them, I do not know...

The only party that can control them is again the United Nations or countries functioning through the United Nations; or else there is a free fight between the Powers there, between those against Mr. Tshombe and those in his favour and whatever results may accrue from.

it, the Congo will be partly destroyed in the process and the other African nations will also suffer.

He then asked me why we did not recognise the pro-Lumumba Government in Stanleyville. I do not see exactly how the question or recognition arises and how it would profit anybody by our recognising a Government. This is a habit--a relatively recent habit--of recognising Governments which do not function. I do not understand that at all. Now the present position is this. Unless the United Nations--and nobody else--takes immediate or quick action, some day Mobutu's troops will overrun the Orientale Province and we shall be recognising this and that and then it ceases to be. So we have to take into account the realities of the situation. We are not prepared to recognise anybody there merely because we like his face or like his policy. We say that the Parliament of the Congo must meet and decide upon the Government and that is the Government to be recognised. Otherwise this argument will always go on; may be I am right in my argument or may be I am wrong but the only way is for the Congo Parliament to meet and decide who are its leaders, president, etc. All these other things are legal quibbles. I think that Mr. Lumumba, according to a certain interpretation of the law, was--I won't say--acting as Prime Minister because he was imprisoned but anyhow he had the right to be there until he was pushed out legally which he was not. Mr. Kasavubu merely saying so is not adequate. It has to be done by Parliament. Parliament has to approve of it. But apart from these legal issues, in fact they have reached a stage of barbarity and callous cruelty which it is difficult almost to conceive of and so there it is.

And I submit that I shall always be glad to have any advice or help but I do not personally see that there is much room for our adopting any other policy than we have adopted thus far or that we are suggesting now. And whenever any occasion comes for any little change, I shall certainly come to this House and place my submissions before it.

CONGO INDIA USA BELGIUM CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC FALKLAND ISLANDS

**Date :** Feb 15, 1961

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1995

CONGO

Prime Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following

statement in the Lok Sabha on

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Feb 15, 1961 on the situation in the Congo:

For the last many months, as the House very well knows, the situation in the Congo has been a worsening one, a deteriorating one. I shall not, at the present moment, go into the details of that, but throughout this period, we have been drawing the attention of the countries concerned, and of the United Nations, towards the situation, and suggesting various steps and measures to be taken. One of the principal ones that I suggested, and I myself mentioned it in the United Nations when I was there, was the reconvening of parliament there to decide what kind of Government they wanted, and to prevent outside interference. The Government or the authorities that were functioning there at the time were the President, Mr. Kasavubu, and Mr. Mobutu. Mr. Mobutu came on the scene by a coup d'etat and not by any legal or constitutional method. Mr. Kasavubu had a certain legal standing because he had been elected as President just as Mr. Lumumba had been elected as the Prime Minister. They both had certain constitutional standing. Subsequently they fell out and attempted to take action against each other, each one of them trying to dismiss the other from his high office. The Parliament met--that was the last occasion that the Congolese Parliament met--and they did not agree with these respective dismissals and asked both of them to carry on, one as President and the other as Prime Minister. That was the last time when the Parliament came into the picture. Then other things happened which have no semblance of legality and Mr. Mobutu came into the picture with control of the so-called National Congolese Army.

Since then, every attempt was made by Mr. Mobutu, first of all that Parliament should not meet, and secondly, to make Mr. Lumumba ineffective. Some checks were put on this by the United Nations authorities there and Mr. Lumumba was protected even to some extent by the Lumumba forces, but anyhow this attempt continued. It is a long story and I shall not go into that.

One fact that has to be borne in mind is, one of the first things that the United Nations decided, when they came into the Congo, was that the Belgian military and para-military forces should be withdrawn. In fact, most of them were withdrawn. That was in August last or thereabouts. But soon after, the Belgians started coming back in very considerable numbers. Reference was made to this in the second report of the United Nations Representative, which was distributed here among members. But this was challenged and it was stated that the Belgian Government was not doing this but the private parties were doing this at the invitation of the authorities there, the authorities of Katanga or Mr. Mobutu. Our own opinion has been, and it has been confirmed completely, that these authorities more especially Mr. Tshombe, was in effect functioning for practical purposes as a representative of the so-called Belgian advisers. There

were a large number of Belgian officers in the civil field and it was really they who were carrying on and dictating policies to the Katanga Government chiefly and, may be, to some extent to the Leopoldville Government also. They were protected in doing this on the plea "Oh! we should not interfere with the independence of the Congo". So, this curious fact remained that the very persons who were interfering most with the independence of the Congo were taking shelter under the plea that no one else should interfere.

So, this has gone on, Sir, till various attempts were made by the United Nations. But, somehow, the interpretation of the United Nations mandate was so limited that they could not function there. All kinds of disgraceful things happened there and the plea was that the United Nations mandate prevented them from interfering. So, a great deal of resentment arose among the members of the United Nations, among those who have sent forces to the Congo at the request of the United Nations, and several countries even decided to withdraw their forces because they did not agree with the policy that has been pursued by the United Nations or rather the absence of policy, the passive inertness of the United Nations there. But it was not quite inert. The United Nations has done quite a very fine piece of work there in the field of feeding people and looking after them. But in the political field it had become very passive and its passivity naturally was all in favour of those people who had seized power and were exploiting it to their own advantage, more especially in Katanga and elsewhere.

Now another crisis arose because of these forces being withdrawn; because, if all the United Nations forces were withdrawn from there, the United Nations ceases to function there and will withdraw itself. If that happened, if the United Nations withdraw, the consequence was not only that there would be continuing civil war but there was the danger of outside powers coming in in a big way to help their respective coteries or those whom they acknowledged, which was a very serious thing. Also, the failure of the United Nations there would redound to the great discredit of the United Nations and make it difficult for it

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to function in future in any like emergency. All this has happened,

Now, some time back, Mr. Lumumba, who was in some kind of detention in Leopoldville, escaped from there. He was captured by Mr. Mobutu's forces somewhere, brought back and put in a prison. From that prison a few days back he was removed to Katanga in spite of many protests, because the Katanga people were, rather Mr. Tshombe was, his bitterest enemy.

Then, about this time a commission went there, the so-called Conciliation Commission and everyone in the Commission agreed that their principal activity should be to meet Mr. Lumumba to have any kind of conciliation, because he was the person who counted most

there. It is a fact that he counted a great deal and that he was a popular leader. They were not allowed to meet him and ultimately they were practically on the point of coming back before meeting him. Mr. Tshombe informed them--it is rather significant that they were informed through a Belgian officer or Belgian adviser of Mr. Tshombe--that they could not meet Mr. Lumumba. It was a few days ago only.

Then came the news of the escape of Mr. Lumumba. This news was given by the Katanga authorities. Very few people believed this, hardly any person, and they feared that this meant possibly some attempt at liquidating Mr. Lumumba and his advisers. Two or three days later it turned out to be true.

Now there are many aspects of this tragedy. There is no doubt that Mr. Lumumba was murdered and the kind of explanation that the Katanga authorities have given was so extraordinary and so audacious that it surprised one that any of these people should have that audacity to say things; while completely disclaiming, rather indirectly, that they are responsible for the murder, they have done everything to make people suspect that they are directly responsible for this. It is interesting to see that they refuse to permit even now any inquiry. They refused even to indicate where he was murdered or to indicate where his grave was, as they say they have put him in a grave, the reason being, and this is to be noted, lest that place becomes a place of pilgrimage, It shows what his bitterest enemies think of Mr. Lumumba--his grave would become a place of pilgrimage by the Congolese people. It would indeed have become so because Mr. Lumumba, in a sense, was the founder of the national movement. It is not a very old-established movement but he was the founder and there can be not a shadow of doubt that whatever his failings or weaknesses may be that he was by far the most popular figure in the Congo not only among his own tribes but among others too. The tribal elements conflict with each other but among them he was the most popular figure. And it should be remembered that it was Mr. Lumumba who invited the United Nations to come to their help six months ago. It was at his request that the United Nations decided to send their contingent there.

So, now we have this situation. Mr. Lumumba was murdered. He was murdered in a brutal and callous manner. He was murdered by people who in doing so, apart from the fact of murder, defied the whole process of the United Nations, its previous resolutions and even the present demands. They insulted the United Nations and the Conciliation Commission in every way. It is a picture which naturally angers one and which is going to have, and is having in fact, very far-reaching and serious consequences.

As regards the policy of India, our policy in such matters must necessarily be limited by our capacity. Obviously, we cannot go and fight a war in the Congo. We have helped the United Nations, although we did not send any combat troops, in other ways and, if necessary, and if really we thought it was necessary from the world point of view or from the point of view of the Congo, we would even send

combat troops. But we cannot possibly send them except through the United Nations. We cannot stand by ourselves there to right all and sundry. We can only do that if we are convinced that they will be used rightly for the freedom of the Congo people and not to support the gangster regimes that function there.

It is most unfortunate that when there was a chance of some better and more effective policies being pursued by the UN this tragedy should have occurred. It is possible that it was the fear of these better policies being pursued that hastened Mr. Lumumba's death, that is, his opponents did not want him to live longer lest the other policies should come into play. It is a fact that in the United Nations even those who had been reluctant to take any effective step were coming round to the belief that some thing effective should be done and not this inert policy and passive support of the existing conditions there. The United Nations themselves were thinking of this and the United States of America under the new regime--we were informed--had definitely decided to change the old policies and do several things--I do not say all things, but many things--which we had been asking for these many months and which not only we but others too had been asking.

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So just when here was some hope of this new policy coming up, which included of course naturally the release of Mr, Lumumba and the factional forces there being brought under control or disarmed as also many other things which probably the House knows about, namely, summoning of the Parliament, and just when opinion was veering round to that and--I cannot say because of the opposition there also possibly some such step would have been taken by the UN there that this tragedy occurred.

Now this morning further developments have appeared in the papers--in fact, every day will bring these developments--and I should have thought it better for us and for the other countries to await the decisions of the Security Council which is meeting from day to day before finally deciding on its own policy. Speaking for my Government, in spite of all our dismay at all that has happened and our disagreement on many of the policies that the United Nations have pursued in the Congo during the last few months, it would seem to us that if the United Nations withdraws from the Congo it would be a disaster because then the field is left open to civil war and large-scale foreign intervention in various ways, not on one side only but on every side. On the other hand, if it is not effective, there is no point in its being there if it cannot take action and punish the guilty persons;

One of the actions that is quite essential in the circumstances is the withdrawal of these foreign elements from there, chiefly the Belgians. It is not good enough for the Belgian Government or for anyone to say, "We did not send them. They have privately gone at the invitation of the Katanga Government". What the Katanga Government is

in reality is not quite clear--whether it is Mr. Tshombe or the Belgian advisers. So if they like themselves to go there there is no difficulty about that. But it is clear that the foreign elements there chiefly the Belgians must withdraw if there is going to be any attempt at a control of this problem; otherwise it will go on.

Therefore we feel that the United Nations should not retire. But--and there is a big 'but'--it can only stay on if it changes its past policy very largely and if it insists on these basic matters. It is no good now trying to get poor Mr. Lumumba released because he is not there, but these foreign elements must be controlled and must be made to withdraw specially--I repeat--the Belgians.

Today apart from the death of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Tshombe's and Colonel Mobutu's armies, such as they are, led by Belgian officers--at least Mr. Tshombe's army; I am not quite sure about Mr. Mobutu's army--are marching across the Congo and are dealing with all opposition in their own brutal and callous way. Their attempt apparently has been to crush and put an end to all pro-Lumumba elements before the Security Council comes to any decision so as to forestall it and present it with an accomplished fact. That was the idea and probably this killing of Mr. Lumumba was a part of that grand design.

So we have made our position quite clear not only to the United Nations but to other countries concerned. In spite of our anger and our great resentment at all that has happened--one cannot merely be swept away by anger and do something which may create more difficulties--we have restrained ourselves although we felt strongly and we do feel strongly. We hope that it may be possible for the Security Council to come to firm decisions so that the UN authority there can function there effectively and strongly. This means that it should function even if it is necessary to use armed force and not merely look on others using armed force for a wrong purpose; that the foreign elements must go from there and that the so-called Congolese army should be controlled and disarmed.

These are the immediate issues. Then, having got the situation under control, it should try to get Parliament to meet for deciding what kind of Government they will have, the object being that there should be unity and that the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo should be preserved, that their own people through their elected Parliament should decide what kind of Government they will have and no one else intervening except to help them. If any help has to be given to them it should go through the United Nations and not through other sources. There are other matters too, but this is the broad position.

We were asked, may be about two weeks ago, by the United Nations to send further combat troops there--not further because there were no combat troops there. We have about 800 personnel there doing hospital and supply work and signals. Because some countries were withdrawing their forces from there we were asked by the United Nations to send some armed forces. In our answer we made our position clear. We said

that we do believe that the United Nations should function there because as soon as they withdraw there will be a collapse of everything and one does not quite know where this disaster will take the Congo. But in the way the UN had been functioning we completely disagreed with their method and we pointed out the various things that I have

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mentioned there and some others. If that could be done we would get over our reluctance and help even by sending some combat troops to the Congo. That is the position we took up then.

That holds still. So now we are waiting for what ever the decisions may be during the next two or three, or four or five days and will then fashion our policy accordingly.

CONGO USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC INDIA

**Date :** Feb 15, 1961

## Volume No

1995

FOREIGN AND HOME AFFAIRS

President's Address to Parliament

The President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, delivered an Address to the Indian Parliament on Feb 14, 1961.

The following is the full text of his Address:

Members of Parliament,

I welcome you to your labours in a new session of Parliament.

The year we have left behind has been one of considerable stress and strain both internally and externally. My Government have faced the problems that arose by their strenuous endeavours and by firm adherence to the principles of their basic policy, and with confidence in the future. Though many and stubborn problems still await solution, or are in the process of being solved, the situation both at home and abroad shows signs of improvement and justifies hope and cautious optimism.

The problems of aggression on and incursions into the sovereign territory of the Union have yet to be resolved, but my Government is

well alert to them and to all their implications. Defensive arrangements, including the opening up of areas by better communications and development, receive their continuous and careful attention.

While China has withdrawn from the military post it had established at Longju and not attempted any further violations of Union territory, her intransigence continues. It is the constant endeavour of my Government to maintain our defensive strength in the face of this continuing hostility from across our frontier. My Government will, however, seek to adhere firmly to the principles which this Nation regards as basic in our relations with nations. They cannot accept the results of unilateral action or decisions taken by China.

This peaceful but firm policy and progressive preparedness, for defence, has the support of our people and has also profoundly influenced world opinion. We firmly hold that the frontiers between India and China have been for long well established by treaties, custom and usage. In spite of present unwillingness, or even intransigence, my Government hope that, sooner rather than later, China will persuade herself to come to a satisfactory agreement with our country in regard to our common frontiers. Friendly relations with our great neighbour, which my Government have always sought to promote, can then become a reality which will endure and contribute to our common good and to stability in Asia and the world.

In pursuance of the agreement announced in the joint communique, issued in April last at the end of the meeting in Delhi between the Prime Minister of China and my Prime Minister, designated officials from their respective Governments have been engaged in talks in New Delhi, Peking and Rangoon. These talks have now concluded. The report submitted to my Government by their officials will be laid before Parliament.

My Government have welcomed the emergence of many independent countries in the continent of Africa to full statehood and their admission as full members in the United Nations. This awakening of Africa and the emergence of many sovereign republics is a matter of gratification to us. We welcome especially their declarations to remain unaligned and not to become involved in the cold war conflict. This constitutes a welcome vindication, on merits, of the policy consistently followed by my Government in regard to international relations.

The situation in the Congo continues to cause my Government deep concern, involving as it does the freedom and integrity of this recently liberated country, the progress and development of the African continent itself, as well as both the prestige and potency of the United Nations as an instrument for settling international problems and the protection of the weak against aggressive

countries. The pressure of Belgian arms, military and semi-military personnel, and their aid to some of the rival groups in the Congo, in defiance of reiterated decisions of the United Nations, are the main disturbing factors in the Congo situation.

My Government will continue to follow a policy based upon their dedication to the purposes of the United Nations and their desire to see the Congolese people in the full enjoyment of their newly-won freedom. To this end, my Government have consistently urged the withdrawal of the Belgians, the release of political personalities and more particularly those who have parliamentary immunities, the neutralization of factional forces and armed groups, and the summoning of Parliament and the restoration of constitutional authority.

Nearer our own country, in Laos also a situation has developed that causes grave concern. My Government continue to use their best endeavours for the reactivation of the international Commission with the consent and authority of all concerned, to prevent further deterioration of the situation. Spread of conflict there might have serious repercussions in Asia and the world, and it is the policy of my Government to endeavour to avert it.

Goa continues to be under the colonial domination of Portugal. My Government stand committed to the peaceful liberation of this part of India where a decadent colonialism still survives.

India's relations with her neighbours and other countries have continued to be peaceful, My Government, firmly adhering to the policy of peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness, seek to promote these relations without becoming entangled in military alliances with one country or another.

To promote goodwill, there have been exchanges of visits with other countries. I visited the Soviet Union to return the courtesy of the Visit of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to India. I am grateful for the warm welcome which the President, his Government and the people of his country extended to me. The Vice-President visited the United States of America and France.

My Prime Minister paid visits to the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Turkey and Pakistan. Other Ministers and some special representatives of Government have visited various countries either on missions of goodwill or for definite purposes. These countries include Ceylon, Mexico, the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana and the Mongolian People's Republic.

Diplomatic representation was established last year with the Republics of Uruguay, Paraguay, the Congo and the Malagasy Republic.

My Government welcomed the emergence of Cyprus as an independent Republic, thus terminating the long period of colonial domination.

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and His Royal Highness the Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, kindly accepted my invitation to visit India. We have been happy to have them with us, and they are the honoured and welcome guests not only of myself, but of my Government and our people.

We have also had the privilege of welcoming to our country Their Imperial Highnesses the Crown Prince and Princess of Japan, representing His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Mr. Khrushchev, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, His Majesty the King of Nepal, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, President Soekarno of Indonesia, President Sekou Toure of Guinea, Professor Theodore Heuss, former President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Vice-President Macapagal of the Philippines, and the Prime Ministers of China, Burma, Poland, Nepal and Ceylon. We are also happy to receive Their Highnesses the Maharajas of Bhutan and Sikkim as our distinguished guests. The visits of all these high dignitaries have been a great honour to us.

The main issue before the world today is that of disarmament. My Government have persevered on every occasion, more particularly in the United Nations, to assist to formulate a basis of agreement among nations, more especially among the Great Powers, in this regard. To this end, my Government have placed proposals before the General Assembly of the United Nations, the purpose of which is that disarmament negotiations should be definitely directed to the outlawing of war as an instrument for settling disputes between countries.

The Union of South Africa persists, much to our regret and in spite of every effort that we make, to discriminate against her nationals of Indian origin and to build her society on the basis of total racial discrimination, that is, apartheid. The disregard of human dignity, the

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violation of human rights and the policy and practice of apartheid have shocked the world more than ever before.

The outline of the Third Five Year Plan has been completed by the Planning Commission with the co-operation of the State Governments and has been approved in principle by the National Development Council. As soon as the Draft Report is ready, it will be placed again before the National Development Council, and later before Parliament.

The national income for 1959-60 is estimated to be Rs. 12,210 crores at 1952-53 prices, as compared with Rs. 10,920 crores in 1955-56. The annual rate of increase has not been as much as we had hoped. This was due to severe setbacks suffered by agriculture in 1957-58 and 1958-59. This year's crops, however, are expected to be good, and industrial production is rapidly rising.

Price levels have registered a rise of about 6 per cent. as compared to the previous year. Various measures that my Government have taken have checked this rise and, in some cases, such as cloth, prices have shown a downward movement because of Government action. In spite of the difficulties encountered and the decline in our foreign exchange reserves, the outlook, both in agriculture and industry, is definitely promising.

Panchayati Raj, or village democracy, has made rapid strides. My Government hope that before the end of 1961, Panchayati Raj institutions would have been introduced in all the States. An elaborate programme for the training of non-officials to help these institutions efficiently, has been inaugurated. Service Co-operatives have increased their membership by approximately 18 million and are expected to disburse loans to the extent of 190 crores of rupees.

Agricultural production has again shown definite improvement in 1960-61. The production of Kharif cereals in 1960-61 is now estimated to be more than two million tons higher than that in 1959-60, and it is expected to be higher than even in 1958-59 when our production figure was the highest on record. The prospects of the Rabi crop are also bright. On the whole, 1960-61 may turn out to be a very good year from the point of view of agricultural production. The increase in internal production, along with the measures taken by my Government to build up substantial reserve stocks, has already brought about a healthy trend in foodgrain prices. The targets of minor irrigation and seed multiplication farms, laid down in the Second Five Year Plan, are expected to be realised almost fully. Intensive cultivation is being encouraged throughout the country, and, more especially, in selected areas. Under the Third Five Year Plan, agricultural development is being given a high priority, so as to provide a strong base for the economic development of the country. The aim is to achieve self-sufficiency in foodgrains, and to increase considerably other forms of agricultural production.

Industrial output has risen, in some cases, spectacularly. For the first ten months of 1960, the production index was 167 as against 149 for the corresponding period of the previous year. The three steel plants in the public sector have been almost completed and are now in progressive production. The manufacture of industrial machinery and machine tools has made satisfactory progress. New sources of oil have been discovered, notably in Ankleshwar in Gujerat and in Sibsagar in Assam. It is expected that trial production will commence this year. Work on two refineries is proceeding, and a third refinery is also going to be established.

The prospects of the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes, as well as for medical and agricultural uses, have advanced by the inauguration of the third reactor, the Canada-India reactor, which came into operation recently.

Among multi-purpose river valley projects, the Chambal River Project,

the Gandhi Sagar Dam and the Kotah Barrage were inaugurated, and two of the five units of 90,000 kilowatts each have been commissioned at Bhakra. The remaining three units are likely to be commissioned in the course of the next few months.

Labour relations, apart from the recent regrettable strike by Government employees, have improved. The Code of Discipline has exercised a healthy influence, and there is an appreciable fall in the number of days lost. The Employees' State Insurance Scheme has been extended to further areas to cover about 15.8 lakh factory workers. Tripartite wage boards have already dealt with major industries of cotton textiles, cement and sugar and have been set up for jute and tea plantations. Pilot schemes for workers' participation in management have been introduced in some industrial units.

Progress has been made in regard to the introduction of Hindi in the administration. A Central Hindi Directorate has been constituted to carry out the decisions of Government regarding

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the development and propagation of Hindi.

As Members of Parliament are aware, in July last my Government decided in consultation with the Naga leaders to constitute a separate State of Nagaland within the Indian Union. As a first step, I have promulgated a Regulation under which representatives have been elected to an Interim Body to assist and advise the Governor in the administration of Nagaland during the transitional period. My Government are determined to put down the hostile elements which are creating so much hardship and suffering for the people there.

A statement of the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Government of India for the financial year 1961-62 will, as usual, be laid before you.

Two Ordinances, namely, "The U.P. Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Ordinance", and "The Banking Companies (Amendment) Ordinance", have been promulgated since the last Session of Parliament.

Members of Parliament, since I addressed you last, your two Houses have passed 67 Bills. There are 16 Bills pending before you from the last session. My Government will take steps to seek the passage of these Bills during this session.

My Government propose to take appropriate steps for the convening of a joint session of Parliament for the consideration of the Dowry Prohibition Bill in regard to which the two Houses have differed in some respects.

My Government will place before you the following Bills, among others; for your consideration:--

1. The Income-Tax (Amendment) Bill.
2. The Extradition Bill.
3. The Indian Patents and Designs Bill.
4. The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Bill.
5. The Sugar Export Promotion (Amendment) Bill.
6. The Narcotics Bill.
7. The Apprenticeship Training Bill.
8. The Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill.

Members of Parliament, I have drawn your attention to some of the main events and achievements, for the past year. I have also projected before you my Government's programme for the coming year. I have drawn your attention to the great tasks and burdens that are in front of us all. I have no doubt that these will engage your dedicated attention. Your understanding, vigilance and co-operation in respect of the many problems of our economic planning, our defence, world peace and the struggle of still dependent peoples, will, I feel sure, be available to my Government and help to reassure our people. The resources of our country and the qualities of our people stand engaged in the historic and tremendous tasks of national reconstruction and progress that are part of our destiny.

My Government will constantly endeavour to initiate and promote efforts and schemes to shorten the time between their decisions on policies and the implementation thereof. They will seek to enable our democracy to share and participate at all levels in the great economic and social developments that must progress, if we are to survive as an independent nation with dignity and a sense of fruitful function. The unity and the social well-being of our entire people, the rapid progress to a democratic and socialist society, wherein changes must be timely and progress grow from more to more, must be attained peacefully and by consent.

Members of Parliament, I now bid you to your arduous labours and wish you success in them. I am confident that wisdom and tolerance and the spirit of co-operative endeavour will be your guide. May your labours yield a rich harvest and thus advance our country and people and the world which we are all pledged to serve.

INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CHINA CONGO LAOS PORTUGAL FRANCE LEBANON  
PAKISTAN TURKEY ETHIOPIA MEXICO GHANA MONGOLIA NIGER NIGERIA PARAGUAY URUGUAY  
CYPRUS UNITED KINGDOM JAPAN NEPAL GUINEA INDONESIA GERMANY PHILIPPINES BURMA  
POLAND BHUTAN SOUTH AFRICA LATVIA RUSSIA CANADA

**Date :** Feb 04, 1961

## Volume No

1995

FOREIGN AND HOME AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Statement in Rajya Sabha

Intervening in the debate on the President's Address in the Rajya Sabha, on Feb 20, 1961 the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Mr. Chairman, Sir, in the course of this debate a good deal of attention has been given to matters pertaining to foreign policy, the Congo or our north-eastern border. In the course of my remarks

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I shall mainly deal with these matters.....

Now, I need not go into the background of the Congo question because the House knows it and we have discussed it in the past. Since then, of course, much has happened, notably the assassination, the murder of Mr. Lumumba. Now, may I here refer to a type of criticism which sometimes is made in this House on various occasions. Why have we got so excited about the murder of Mr. Lumumba when we were composed and calm when Mr. Imre Nagy was condemned to death in Hungary or when something else happened in some other part of the world's surface or when the Tibetans were being dealt with in some other way? I am sorry this kind of criticism is made, whether it is justified or not, it is for the House to determine, but it does show a peculiar and a perverted mentality, a mentality which is more loyal than the King, a mentality which has nothing to do with India, India's case, India's thinking. It is thinking in cold war terms and bringing those terms to India. In India, we have rejected this and we think and act, rightly or wrongly according to our own wishes in the matter. Mr. Imre Nagy's case was pointed out. We did not jump about; we condemned that and we disliked that but to bring that in the present Congo crisis is to do something which cannot be justified by any logic or reason or thinking except the acceptance of a cold war outlook, and not even that but in a degree much more than the principal areas of the cold war are doing in the world today. It is quite extraordinary that this kind of thing should crop up again and again. Take Tibet. Everything was discussed here. People say, "We told you that you were wrong ten years ago when you did that". I wish Hon. Members would move up to this year, 1961, and not remain stuck up in the past, whether it was ten or hundred or thousand years ago. We have to

function today, in the circumstances of today. Am I to repeat everytime the reason why we took that action in regard to Tibet in 1950? I have explained, and I believe that most people not only in India but in the wide world, except small coterie here and there, have understood that that was the only possible action which we could take as a nation, whatever we might feel about it. But the argument is repeated again and again for lack of anything else, I suppose, or for lack of thinking as to what the world is today and what we have to face today.

Now, Sir, to come back to the Congo, it is clear that this is not a question of my likes and dislikes or anybody else's; the question is today of trying to prevent a world catastrophe in the Congo, trying to help the Congo to preserve its integrity and independence, trying to prevent foreign forces, whoever they might be, from going and dominating over the Congo, trying to prevent the cold war coming--it has come but to prevent it coming more fully--into the Congo, trying to prevent civil war and all that. We have no interest in the Congo, although some people, I regret to say, have even presumed in the Congo, not the Congolese but some outsiders in the Congo, and have started a whispering campaign that India wants to send a million or two of her people to the Congo to settle down because we have too much of population. We have hardly a handful of persons in the Congo and even in our wildest imagination we have not thought of sending our people to inhabit the Congo but this kind of charge is made, whispers, just to irritate the Congolese people or others against India. We have no interest in the Congo, no selfish interest at all. We have interest, of course, in the countries of Africa becoming prosperous and independent and also the Congo. The Congo will become the test for the other countries of Africa also and for itself. It stands on the verge of disorder and now the Congo has become tied up with the world situation. It is already to some extent being affected by this cold war attitude which sometimes is represented by a few Members in this House too.

Fortunately, the great powers concerned are trying their utmost to avoid this but there is that great danger and, as I said perhaps on a previous occasion, it was unfortunate that when this tendency to solve the problem in the right way grows, when President Kennedy had, among other things, endeavoured to follow a new policy in regard to the Congo and in other countries, which was a hopeful policy, just then this killing of Mr. Lumumba took place. The House realises, I hope, from even the news in the newspapers what reaction there has been all over the world, everywhere, about this. Why? Probably, nobody here had heard of Mr. Lumumba six months ago or a year ago, but somehow or the other, he became the symbol of African nationalism, fighting for freedom. He may have made number of mistakes; probably he did but the fact is he became a symbol in the eyes of the world and because of that symbol, when he was murdered, there was that powerful reaction in Africa, in Asia, in the countries of Europe and everywhere.

We have to deal with that live entity, African nationalism, not

something slowly asking for reforms but something alive, kicking, and sometimes misbehaving but something very much alive. This live entity is kicked suddenly in this way and as a culminating process to all kinds of things that

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were indulged in. It upset the mental balance, it angered the people and it was not a matter of disliking this or not. Somebody said, some Hon. Member, why do we speak in this language? Why do we talk about gangsterism and the like? We should be more neutral in this matter. We are not neutral in this matter, so far as this is concerned. We are not neutral and we feel strongly. If I may say so, in the last year or six or eight months since we have been connected--we have sent some of our Forces there, we have repeatedly stated a certain policy in regard to the Congo. Now, it is not my habit--and it is a wrong habit--to say, "Oh, we warned you previously. We did this previously and if you had followed my advice, it would have been well." This is a foolish way of proceeding but the fact of the matter is that much of the trouble that has come has been there because the policy India had suggested was not followed, and they are going to do now when it may be too late to go back because things have advanced and what was acceptable three months ago is not acceptable anymore to multitudes in the countries of Africa or elsewhere. Things have changed. Any country, any major country, can bring about a war; destruction is easy to begin but the final settlement of the Congo problem is not going to take place in the Chancelleries of the great powers; it would be done in the Congo, in Africa, but before that, if other things happen and if they are destroyed in vast numbers, well, things would be different, of course. The whole picture is changed today and whether it is the Congo, East Africa, Central Africa or Northern Rhodesia, in all these places they are being dealt with in a different way, I admit, by the countries concerned but not fast enough to move with the tempo of the times.

So in the Congo other countries are catching up to what we said six months ago or four months ago and meanwhile the fact that a policy was pursued or allowed to be acted upon without the United Nations coming down upon it or stopping it has led to all these difficulties. Some months ago President Kasavubu went to New York and he was accepted in the United Nations. There was justification for his acceptance; I do not deny that but there was no justification to consider him the one and only representative of the Congo and functioning as a dictator. That is, while his position was correct, his functions did not become dictatorial because of that. At that time we pointed out--and other countries also--that this position should be defined. There was supposed to be a Conciliation Commission going from the United Nations to the Congo; let us wait for their report. But no; it was insisted that this must be done immediately--a kind of aftermath of the cold war thinking--and that was done with the result that that set in motion a chain of events there and with the help of this backing of the United Nations--the United Nations did not do much but it just gave that little spurt in one direction--

other countries, notably Belgium, went in there; not officially sent by the Government, but anyhow they went in there, military people, advisers and the rest.

About Katanga now if anybody tells me that Katanga is a semi-independent province run by the Congolese I have my grave doubts. I think it is the Belgian advisers there who run it and the Belgian officers who have control--such control as is there--over the forces of Katanga. So this kind of thing happened and the iron entered the soul of the people. They saw this kind of thing happening and then they saw the United Nations sitting helplessly by and the methods of liquidating people, which are not, well, normally done in the modern age, being adopted. You heard about Mr. Lumumba but only yesterday news came in newspapers--I am merely quoting the newspapers; I have no special information--that three planeloads of pro-Lumumba people, important people no doubt, were sent by air from Leopoldville to the Kasai Province. You will remember--the House may remember--that Mr. Lumumba was also sent from where he was kept in prison to Katanga Province to be liquidated and people warned them then that he had been sent there to be murdered there, killed there, and he was killed. Now some very important people, pro-Lumumba people, are sent in three planeloads to Kasai. Now, the present leader of Kasai Province, who is functioning there as such, is one of the bitterest enemies of Mr. Lumumba and so these people are sent outside the immediate scope of the United Nations functioning there presumably to be liquidated, murdered, assassinated, call it what you will. This is what is happening even in Leopoldville, where the United Nations is there, under presumably the authority of President Kasavubu.

Now, we have not formally acknowledged President Kasavubu's Government just as we have not acknowledged any other Government there. The fact is, there is no Central Government there; may be President Kasavubu's Government and the forces at his disposal are relatively stronger than others because they have got the Belgians and other countries and arms to support them. That is the position and that has led to a number of African, European and Asian countries to give recognition to the Stanleyville Government which is a big Province of the Congo, and they recognised it as the Congolese Government. It is open

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to any country to recognise any Government but factually it has no control over the Congo; it has some control over that Orientale Province. Now we have some great powers and some other powers in Africa recognising the Stanleyville Government and saying that they will support it with arms and other things while the other people are being supported by some other great powers and so you see civil war, international war, everything coming into the picture and once that kind of thing starts, no man can say where it will end. So one has to take as calm and objective a view of this as possible and not be led away by likes or dislikes.

There are various matters; we have said that. I need not repeat what we have said about this position there but it is perfectly clear that things as they are can lead the Congo and the world to disaster. It is perfectly clear that the so-called armies functioning there on behalf of Mr. Mobutu, Mr. Tshombe and others and largely officers from abroad, are dangerous to peace and security and they function in a manner which can only be described as gangsterism. I repeat that word not in a fit of emotion but deliberately because that describes their activities there, what they have done there. And they have to be checked; they have to be disarmed; they have to be controlled and this kind of thing, this major activity of some of the local governments there of liquidating their opponents by having them murdered has to be stopped. And I think there will be no peace in the Congo till the foreign elements go. I do not mind--I do mind but I prefer it--the Congo being left completely to its resources even if they fight and kill each other but these foreign elements must be withdrawn. Of course the right thing would be for the foreign elements to be there under the U.N. and none outside the U.N. because if the U.N. goes, everything goes there. I must make it perfectly clear; much as I have disliked many of the activities of the United Nations or lack of activities rather than activities, their passivity, because they have bound themselves hand and foot by their own interpretation of the resolutions of the Security Council and could not do anything, but nevertheless if the U.N. goes from the Congo there is no hope for the Congo in our lives. A vacuum will be created which undoubtedly will be filled in by the great powers sending their armies and they will fight each other. So these foreign elements must go except those that are under the control and direction of the United Nations. How to do it is another matter. There may be difficulties, difficulties really which have grown in the last five or six months by the weakness shown by the United Nations. Six months back the situation was fairly under control; it may be difficult now. However, I will not detail the separate events.

Now, the Security Council has been considering this matter from day to day, and not--I am glad to say--in the usual atmosphere of just abusing each other but of trying to find some way out. There is a resolution before the Security Council; there are several but, I am referring to the one, proposed by Ceylon, the U.A.R. and Liberia. Now, the House knows that India is not in the Security Council. We are not there to propose, amend, submit or oppose any resolution. But on such important occasions sometimes other countries not in the Security Council are allowed to be present and even to express their views or the views of their Governments. Because of that India, in common with a number of other countries, have been invited to express their views, but they cannot propose anything or vote. Now, this resolution of Ceylon, the United Arab Republic and Liberia, if I may say so, with all respect to the countries concerned, is not exactly the type of resolution which, if I had been given the drafting, I would have drafted. But, nevertheless, broadly speaking we agree with it. I am not criticising the drafting of others, because that itself is the result of an attitude to bring together numerous ways of thinking. Obviously when a number of people come together, the

ultimate draft is not one hundred per cent representative of any one country. Therefore, one must accept it. Realising that difficulty and realising the necessity of doing something effective and there not be in any arguing about words and phrases here and there, broadly we accept this draft of Ceylon, etc. Now, there are two or three matters which have been suggested. Some amendments have been suggested about that.

The first thing is, it has been suggested, that there should be a mention of the Secretary-General in this resolution. There is no specific mention, although there is mention of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo. Now, the idea is that one should not imagine, because of the recent controversies, that the Secretary-General is out of the picture. Well, it is obvious that he is not out of the picture. He is there. He is the Secretary-General and if the United Nations is to function, it can only function, as it is established today, through the Secretary-General. One may add to this Whatever one may do in the future is a different matter, so that the authority given to the United Nations to function in accordance with the terms of this resolution is an authority to the Secretary-General. There is no doubt about it, whether you mention it or not. There is mention, as I said, of

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the Secretary-General's Representative in the Congo.

Then, there is an important matter. This resolution, as originally worded, calls upon all States to take immediate and energetic measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Congo from their territories and for the denial of transit and other facilities to them. That is, it calls upon States not to send people there. It is perfectly right. But it is suggested that there should be an addition to it, directing the United Nations to take all necessary action to prevent the introduction of unauthorised personnel and aid. I should have thought that all this is understood and it flowed even from the earlier Security Council's resolutions which said that the Belgians should withdraw, that the United Nations should do this and that. But somehow owing to a very restricted interpretation of those resolutions by the U.N. people, they have felt rather helpless. Now, when you call upon people to go and tell the other States not to send any, it follows that if they send any, the United Nations should stop them, prevent their coming in. But some people feel that this should be spelt out clearly. We have no objection if it is to be spelt out clearly.

Now, there are some proposals about some minor amendments and others. Now, we do not mind minor amendments to it. But we hope that, broadly speaking, this resolution will be adopted and acted upon and that quickly, because every day's delay creates new problems, like this problem of three planeloads of pro-Lumumba people being sent to the Kasai province, presumably to be slaughtered there.

Dr. Ragu Vira: It is 'Kasai' province. 'Kasai' means slaughter.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Now, I come briefly to our border question. I have noticed, reading the reports of their speeches--I did not have the privilege of being here all the time and I had to go through the reports--that practically every section of the House has praised, has given commendation for our team of officials who went to discuss the border question with the Chinese officials. That report has been circulated. I am glad of that, because I have been conscious during these months not only of the hard labour but also the ability and scholarship that they brought to bear upon this difficult task. Now, basically this kind of conflict between India and China is obviously a matter of grave import to us and I should say to the world. We are criticised for not taking certain steps. It is said: Why don't you go and have this territory vacated which the Chinese have occupied. While I admire the patriotism and the emotional upsurge of Hon. Members who tell us to go and push the aggressor out, I do not always admire the thought processes which bring about this sudden demand. What is supposed to be the practical aspect of it? The Government has to think of these practical aspects also and not only of the emotional urges that affect us and which the Government also feels. And I would beg this House to consider this question from the practical point of view. It is not an easy matter to indulge in a policy of action which step by step almost inevitably leads to war. A war between India and China, a war anywhere, according to our thinking, is undesirable. Even a small war may lead to a big one. But a war between India and China is something which no one can welcome. If it is thrust down upon us, that is a different matter. Also, if it is to be war, one has to prepare for it. One does not in a Don Quixotic way go about with a lance in hand to drive out the aggressor. One prepares for it. It is a big thing which, if started, may last our whole lifetime. It is not some police action or an order to a police station to take an area. We have to prepare for it, strengthen ourselves, in many ways. And the main thing is to be clear in our minds and to be firm and determined in our resolves. That is the main thing, clear in our minds, not merely emotionally--emotionally we are--but otherwise to be firm and determined as to what our position is, what we want done and to prepare for it, whether it takes a month or a year or several years not to give in and ever to keep that in mind, and meanwhile always to seek methods on one side of solving the problem peacefully and on the other strengthening ourselves by other methods. That is broadly the policy.

According to our thinking our trouble at the border is not a dispute with China. It is a question of words perhaps. It is a dispute of course. When we argue about something, it is a dispute. But my point is, it is not a dispute because we have no doubt about our own position in this matter. So far as we are concerned, we are clear that it is not a normal dispute but it is just a claim on our territory which is ours, and we are convinced that it is ours. Therefore, this has to be clearly understood. Now it is very difficult, even in regard to such matters there may be two opinions. Obviously, rightly or wrongly, the Chinese opinion is different, and

presumably most of them believe in it.

This series of talks between the officials of India and China has, I think, very largely put an end to any doubt that there might be in people's minds about the real facts of the case. That was

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necessary. We in India being moved just by emotion hardly knew the facts. Perhaps many people who are most moved knew least about the facts. It is necessary, it was necessary, for this to be built up, this factual case, supported by documents, etc., before the world, before other countries, and indeed before even the people of China though unfortunately I do not know how many of them will have occasion to study it this way. Therefore, this great gain has come to us. Let us realise that our case in regard to this border stands, if I may use the word, proven, proved for anybody to see. People, let us say, even in Pakistan have made very extraordinary charges against us in the newspapers and other things, and even some others, in regard to this border problem with China. If they do not accept it, all I can say is that they have not cared--to put it mildly--that they do not know the facts and they do not care to study them. They merely give effect to their animus against India because in the ultimate analysis we have to try to settle this, try our utmost not once but many times, peacefully even though it takes time, because the alternative to it, to any kind of peaceful approach, is war, and if war comes down upon us, we have to defend our country of course, but we should avoid war anyhow and more especially in the present context of the world.

Some mention was made by some Hon. Members about China or Chinese forces extending their occupation area in Indian territory. Now I want to make this perfectly clear that the major advance of the Chinese forces into Indian territory in Ladakh took place in the summer of 1959, about a year and half ago. Ever since then there has been no advance anywhere. I cannot guarantee, some little curve in a waste land they may have marched in again, but broadly speaking they have not advanced anywhere, certainly not in NEFA, certainly not in the middle sector and I think not in the Ladakh area either. Now what is this talk then about 2,000 Sq. miles of more territory being claimed by China? That is an incorrect thing.

One very extraordinary fact which stands out during these past years is the changing position of the Chinese Government in regard to these matters and, what is more, the changing maps that come out from time to time. Premier Chou En-lai in a letter addressed to me on the 17th December 1959 stated that the 1956 map published in China represented the correct boundaries as conceived by the Chinese Government. Throughout this argument we have been asking them to tell us what exactly they stand for, what is their claim, to tell us precisely, not vaguely, and generally, to tell us by the precise longitude, latitude, etc., this place, that place, etc. They have never done that. Their maps are vague and so are the claims they advance. So

Premier Chou En-lai said this to me in December 1959. He relied on their 1956 map. This was in response to my letter in which I had pointed out to him the bewildering variety of the delineation in the Chinese maps. The scrutiny of the map which was provided to our officials showed that the line drawn was further west in Ladakh of the 1956 line, that is the map which Premier Chou En-lai had stated as showing their position. That itself was a variation of the previous position which was to some extent set aside by the new map and the new line which the Chinese Officials claimed in the western sector specially and to some extent in the middle sector. Again, another thing happened. Take the middle sector, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh and Punjab, etc. They claimed previously odd villages in India on this side of the border, Now they have gone one step further and joined up the odd villages. Previously a village was a bulge in the line. Now they simply joined them up, a series of villages there, so that it becomes a small area rather than a few bulges. That is how these 2,000 sq. miles extra in their claim come about. But, as I said, there has been no advance on any territory being occupied ever since the autumn of 1959.

Another thing they claimed, which goes rather counter in regard to the Niti Pass, etc. to the treaty we had with them, Tibetan treaty, I mean. Of course in regard to this border matter our position has been clarified by this report. Some Members said, I believe, that this report brought out certain facts that were not placed before the House previously, that is, that we had hidden them or some such thing. I should like this House to consider one aspect of these questions.

Questions are asked in this House and the other House, questions which we find it difficult to answer because any answer to the questions is giving information to people to whom we do not want to give it, to our opponents, to those who are opposing it. It becomes difficult. We do not want to keep anything from the House. What the House knows, the world knows. So we cannot always give precise information in regard to border matters, what we are doing, what steps we take to protect ourselves, what roads we are making, where our armies are situated and so on. We do not sometimes want the opposite side to know even an argument lest they might take some other steps in regard to it, if they know it too soon. So there is this difficulty.

Apart from the broad lines of our approach,

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this involved the collection of material and tremendous labour by way of examination of documents, and many things have come to our notice; many papers have come to us from distant countries, which has gradually added to our information. And there is the vital difference between our stand and the Chinese stand. The Chinese stand has been that our border has not been delimited, has not been marked, let us sit down and consider it, mark it wherever it may be, Having said

that, at the same time, they claim large chunks of territory. Suppose a border is not marked but broadly it is well known. A marking of it may involve, let us say, a few hundred yards this way or that way, a mile this way or that way. There is that possibility. But by no stretch of imagination does that involve large chunks of territory being occupied. But apart from that, our stand is that the border is known, is a defined border, it is not an unknown border. It is not marked down or delimited on the ground everywhere; in small bits it is, because it is frightfully difficult in these glacier regions to go about marking them. Anyhow, it was not considered necessary in the past during the British times, and since we became independent, we did not and could not easily do it. Anyhow, our position is that it is a defined border, it is a known border, known by custom, by practice, by usage, by treaty and so on and so forth. So the question of sitting down with the Chinese people to define it and consider the whole matter afresh does not arise, so far as we are concerned. And our case has been strengthened powerfully by the Report presented by our officials. I was glad to find that the Hon. Member opposite who spoke on behalf of the Communist Party gave a great deal of credit to our officials who prepared the Report and said that they had presented a very strong case--I forgot his Words--almost a case proved to the hilt. I am glad this realisation has come even to doubting minds. But I would add this. It is not enough to realise that and then to proceed to suggest some course of action which does not fit in with that realisation. We must be logical. If that is so, the course of action should fit in with that. It is not good repeating like a Manthram, "Oh! let us sit down, embrace and be friends." I am always in favour of a sitting down and talking and embracing and being friends and all that. But when we are considering a problem like this, we must know the nature of the problem and not give any wrong impression to the public of India or to the public of the world as to where we stand or how this is going to be solved. It is not going to be solved merely by some pious declarations or by pure goodwill. I want goodwill always. The fact of the matter is that our case in regard to the border is almost foolproof. It does not require high intelligence to realise how strong this case is and that--whatever the reason may be for the Chinese to do it, it is up to them--they were wrong in doing so, in occupying our territory. The question will only be settled when they leave this territory. That is the simple issue and it is not a question of horse-trading, "All right. You take this, I take this. Let us halve this." It is not a question of that.

Now, another question has been, whether I am going to China to discuss it. I say I have no immediate intention of going there. I do not quite know myself about the future, about the steps we may have to take from time to time, and whether any of these steps may involve my having to meet Premier Chu-En-lai or going to Peking for this purpose, I cannot say. I cannot obviously commit myself saying 'yes' or 'no' to something which will depend on various developments. But in order to settle this question peacefully, I am prepared to go as far as I can, and it is not a question of my prestige being involved. I may go to China or some other place but the point is there would be

no justification for my doing so unless some situation arises when a talk is likely to be fruitful. There is a test. If I say that I will go because I am eager to settle it, that does not help; my saying that I will not go there at all, I am too proud to go, is not a right position which I am not prepared to take. But the question of talks only arises when there is justification for it by something emerging out of the talks and what we say in regard to this matter being acknowledged, particularly acknowledged by the Chinese Government. That is the position.

I have spoken at some length about this matter because I wanted to make it clear what we stood for. It is a difficult matter, very difficult. It is a burden on us, and I should like to share that burden with this House. I would submit that whether it is the Congo or whether it is our border, an approach, an adventurous approach is not helpful; it is very dangerous, and instead of solving problems, we make them even more difficult. I think that even though unfortunately Chinese forces still sit on parts of our territory, in Ladakh chiefly and in other parts, even so, India's case is now much better understood and will be understood in the world, and that is a good background for us to take whatever steps we have to take.

I might mention one matter, relatively small, but in a sense, important. Some questions were asked--I forget whether in this House or the

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other--about the evacuation of Longju by the Chinese. Longju, as the House will remember, is in, the N.E.F.A. area, about two or three miles from where our forces are present. Longju in fact is a little village, is the only part of N.E.F.A. territory which is occupied by the Chinese forces. And a report came that Longju had been vacated by the Chinese. Also a report came that probably this was done because of an epidemic. I have information from Tibet and this indicates that a rather bad epidemic is raging in many parts of Tibet. What exactly the nature of the epidemic is, I cannot say. But it is raging--there, and probably it is the same that occurred in Longju. We have to take care, apart from political and other reasons, to prevent that epidemic coming down through the Himalayan passes to India, and we are taking steps to that end.

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Prime Minister's Reply to Debate in Lok Sabha

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Replying to the debate on the President's Address in the Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said on the Feb 23, 1961

I cannot go into our defence dispositions, obviously, but they were based originally largely on our north-western frontier, and east too. To be frank about it, they were based on our unfortunate position vis-a-vis Pakistan. Then comes the China trouble and we have had to think afresh. We have given a good deal of thought to it, and made such arrangements, and are making them, as are within our capacity. Take roads. We are building roads pretty fast, much faster than the normal procedures allow.

Some Hon. Member said why don't you start doing this? As Acharya Kripalani is smiling, he must have said it!

Acharya Kripalani: You are building roads much faster than the PWD which is very notorious for its delay.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I think Shri Asoka Mehta especially asked this question. His question was: when and how and during what period the Chinese aggression took place?

When the Chinese forces first entered Tibet, that is ten years ago in 1950-51, frankly we did not expect any trouble on our border but, naturally, looking at things in some historical perspective, we thought that the whole nature of our border had changed. It was a dead border, it was now becoming alive, and we began to think in terms of the protection of that border, that is, the border with Tibet at that time.

Our attention was first directed, naturally--at least it was directed, naturally or not--to these borders and a high-level, high-power committee was appointed, the Border Defence Committee, right then in 1951 or 1952, I forget. This Committee presented a comprehensive report, and many of the suggestions were accepted by Government, some were not. This was ten years ago.

Also, when we thought of our border, we thought the danger was more probable in the North. East Frontier Agency border. It may have been a mistake of ours in calculating this, but we thought of that first, to protect it. I am taking about 1951, remember that, ten years ago.

In 1950, that is before this had happened, there were five checkpoints, only five checkpoints on the border--two in Himachal Pradesh and three in NEFA, along the northern border. Within a year, because of these changes that took place in Tibet, by April, 1951, this number had been increased to 25, and most of the important

routes were covered. I am talking about NEFA. A little later, this number was further increased all along the NEFA border and the middle sector, i.e., Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh etc. In 1954 these checkpoints moved closer to the actual border in NEFA and the middle sector. I am mentioning this, that this fact was given thought to by us even in those days.

In Ladakh, again, in 1951, some checkpoints were established. This is a vast area. In these checkpoints, army units were stationed at various places in Ladakh, rather distant from each other, and expeditions were sent to the farthest limits of our territory from 1951 onwards both by the police and the army. These expeditions were in the nature of mountain expeditions, mountaineers and others, a group of ten or 15 persons going ahead. In 1954, in order to strengthen the administration--there was no immediate threat to us. but nevertheless, in order to strengthen the administration--checkposts were taken over by the Central Government in Ladakh, and further checkposts were established. The only area where we did not establish checkposts was the uninhabited area, the Aksai China area--not that we did not want to, but we were busy with the other areas, and also it is a very difficult area. Even there, expeditions

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were sent. Between 1950 and 1959, 16 such expeditions were sent to various parts of Ladakh.

There were some seasonal caravan routes in the Aksai Chin area which had been used for a long time past by caravans. The Chinese used them also in the past, when we did not connect it with any kind of aggression. It was a common practice. This is right in the northeastern bit, about the road which came up here. This was not supposed to mean sovereignty. It was a caravan route being used by any party. This is a central Asian route. There were very few roads or routes there, and it was supposed to be open traffic.

In 1955--we did not know this date then, we found out later--the Chinese started levelling the caravan route for the purpose of using it as a motorable tract. It took them about a couple of years. It was not clear to us then whether this proposed motor way crossed our territory. The first suspicion that this might be so came to us in 1957, from a map published in Peking.

Shri Braj Raj Singh: It took two years.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Two years, probably two years.

We did not even then know definitely whether this transgressed our territory. The map was a small map, about half a magazine page. We did not know, but we began to suspect it. As we did not have proof, we did not protest then.

In the following summer, that is in 1958 summer, two patrol parties

were sent to locate the two extremities of this road, about which we had heard. A patrol party which went to the south located the road as actually crossing our territory, a corner of our territory. The other party did not return for some time. We thereupon drew the attention of the Chinese Government to this party which had not returned, and enquired from them, and to the fact of the road having crossed our territory. This was first on the 18th October, 1958. The first party had returned about a month earlier and the second party had not returned. It was only when the two parties returned that it was confirmed that the Chinese were using this corner of Indian territory as a highway. Even then, no Chinese posts were established west of the highway. The route parallel to this road was used by our army expedition in 1958, and they did not detect any evidence of any Chinese intrusion. After that October letter, we were corresponding with the Chinese Government, we were waiting for their reply to our protest. Replies take two or three months in coming, and I think the first one came either in December or January. Then this went on. In March, 1959, disturbances took place in Tibet, this uprising in Tibet; and other correspondence with the Chinese Government took place. In June, 1959, one of our patrols was sent towards Lanak La along the Chang Chenmo Valley, but no Chinese were found there. It thus appears that the major consolidation of the Chinese hold west of the highway took place between June and October, 1959. This was detected by some of our patrols which were moving north to establish posts at Chang-lung Lungpa and other places; this led to the Kongka Pass expedition where shooting took place and a number of our policeman were shot down.

Thus, the ordinary caravan route across the Northern Aksai Chin area was gradually used by the Chinese in the early fifties, first as a pure caravan road and then as a motorable road. Later, it was improved for motor traffic.

The real Chinese advance, however, took place after the Tibetan uprising and in the middle of 1959. This, of course, has nothing to do with the maps. About the maps, we have been protesting for a long time previously. So far as the maps were concerned, we have been protesting about those for some years past, but an actual protest was sent to them about the Aksai Chin area specifically in October, 1958, as I have mentioned, after we had received information about this motorable road. Correspondence about this was being carried on with the Chinese Government when the Tibetan uprising took place in 1959. It was about this time that the Prime Minister brought this matter up before Parliament in August, 1959.

Since the autumn of 1959, there has been no further aggression on our territory by the Chinese, even though their maps had varied.

Now, there are two points that I should like to mention. One point, as I have just stated, is that since August, 1959, the position might be said to be stabilised where it was then. There has been no further intrusion by them, and we are fairly well protected to prevent such an intrusion.

The second point is that the charge made against Government that we hid this fact of Chinese aggression, is, I submit, not quite fair or correct. The fact is that it was known to us for the first time when the two patrols returned; it

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became definitely known to us about that little conner, that the carvan route was being changed into a motorable road. And we wrote to the Chinese Government in October, 1958. And we were waiting for their reply. We did not wish, in a matter of this kind, to come to Parliament without investigating and finding out what their reply was. Their reply came, rather an inadequate reply came--I forget now, I think,--probably in January. We replied again, and enquired further, and then suddenly, in March came the whole Tibetan uprising, which became a larger issue to which this was tacked on, because we were always talking about this. And in 1959, when this major advance took place we brought this matter immediately before the House.

As a matter of fact, we have been taking steps all along from 1951 onwards, on this border. We had taken steps much more effectively on the NEFA; it was a very defficult border; there was no administration for hundreds of miles; and we concentrated on that, and concentrated with such effect that we have been able to prevent any incursion on that border; apart from that little village, that Longju business, otherwise, there has been no incursion, because it has been prevented. Since then, we have taken other steps to strengthen our posts everywhere, and our road programme has been getting on very well.

I have not touched upon the various other matters, and I have taken a long time already. About the Congo, the House may have seen that yesterday, a resolution was passed by the Security Council; yesterday or rather the day before, for the first time, the Security Council has passed a resolution on the Congo, since its resolution, I forget, in August or September or somewhere then. In spite of these troubles happening in the Congo, the amazing thing was that the Security Council looked on and remained silent. That was not because they were not interested but simply because in the Security Council itself, there was a tug of war, and this was reflected in the operations in the Congo, but there it was. For the first time, they have passed a resolution which, in our thinking, is a good one, in so far as it goes. In some matters, we would have liked it to go a little further, but in so far as it goes, it is a good resolution. Now, the question is how far it would be acted upon.

Unfortunately, the previous resolutions of the Security Council passed last year, to begin with, were not bad resolutions, but by what we thought as a strained interpretation of them, it was said that nothing could be done under those resolutions. I trust that the present resolutions would not be interpreted in that very limited and restricted way.

The question does arise now, and I said something about it this morning here in answer to a question, about our sending the Indian armed forces there. The Secretary-General of the UN asked us to send some forces some time ago, about three weeks ago or so. On the one hand, we felt that the United Nations must continue to function in the Congo; their withdrawal would mean disaster. On the other hand, the UN was actually not functioning; it was sitting there merely; we did not want to send our people there to be insulted from time to time, and to do nothing, to waste them there in a sense. So we were in a difficulty, and we pointed out this difficulty to the Secretary-General and said that if we would be convinced that the UN was going to adopt a vigorous policy there, then we might consider sending some of our forces. Well that position remains the same except that the recent resolution of the Security Council has made it appear that a vigorous policy will be pursued, and, therefore, the possibility of our sending some armed forces has come nearer.

I am afraid that although I have taken a great deal of time, I have not touched on many of the criticism etc. which have been made. But there is one thing more, Sir, which I might explain, if you would permit me, and that is about this trijunction between India, Burma and China. First of all, I should like to say that it is not right for any Hon. Member to criticise Burma in regard to this matter. Burma has done nothing, unless, of course, Burma could simply refuse to deal with China; that is a different matter. Burma has been carrying on these negotiations with China for three, or four or five years, I forget, for how long, since quite a long time ago. And step by step, they have proceeded and come nearer. Actually, the terms of the future treaty were fixed when General Ne Win as Prime Minister went to Peking long before the present Prime Minister U Nu came back to the Prime Ministership. And so it is a long process, a gradually developing process, till it was absolutely finalised on this occasion, and it was signed when Mr. Chou En-lai went there. We could have no grievance, no objection, to what was done there. We cannot ask any country not to make a proper treaty with China because China and we have fallen out. That would not be a legitimate reason to say that, unless that treaty affects us. But this does not affect us except to the extent that a map, was attached to it. The wording of the treaty does not affect us at all. A Chinese map was attached to it, and that

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shows that comes with two passes; the Chinese line shown there is not as shown in our maps, in accordance with our line. This was pointed out to the Burmese Government and to the Chinese, of course. The Burmese Government made it perfectly clear to us, before the signing of the treaty and after the signing of the treaty, that they were not accepting that interpretation of the map; that was none of their business, that was a business for India and China to determine, and they are bound by the terms of their own treaty and their own boundary. So they adopted a perfectly straight forward attitude in

this matter, and I was a little sorry to find a trace of criticism of Burma in this House because of this.

There was mention made of Nepal too. One Hon. Member spoke with some warmth about recent happenings in Nepal, that is, not approving of them. Another Hon. Member accused me of saying something in regard to these recent happenings which it was not right for me to do--I should not say anything about Nepal. Now, it is always difficult in such moments what to say and what not to say. All I said in this House was that I was deeply distressed at the turn events had taken in Nepal and this failure of democracy etc. That was all that I said, although, I must say, I felt much more strongly about it.

But Hon. Members sometimes imagine that we should issue directives to other Governments, tell them what to do and what not to do. That is a kind of thing which obviously we neither want to do nor can do but which irritates the other Government very much. Whenever Members in Parliament say anything like that, it does no good; it does not advance the cause of India; it has the reverse effect.

I hope, therefore, that Hon. Members, will when dealing with our neighbour countries, with whom we are friendly, we want to be friendly and we are going to be friendly, remember this suggestion that I am submitting to them, that we cannot treat them as if the fashioning of their policies must necessarily depend on our good wishes.

USA CHINA PAKISTAN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC INDIA CONGO BURMA NEPAL

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INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri C.S. Jha's Statements in Security Council on Congo

Shri C.S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, made the following statement in the Security Council on Feb 02, 1961 on the situation in the Congo:

Mr. President, permit me first of all to thank you and, through you, the members of the Security Council for the courtesy of extending an invitation to my Delegation to sit round this table. I can assure you and members of the Council that we asked to participate in these meetings of the Security Council in full realization of the seriousness of the situation and in the hope that we might be able to

make a humble contribution to the solution of the problem before us.

Six months ago the Security Council became seized of the situation in the Congo. At the request of the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, the Council adopted a resolution on July 14, 1960 (S/4387). The main elements of the decisions embodied in that resolution were, first, the demand that Belgium should withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo, and, secondly, the provision of military assistance through the United Nations to the Republic of the Congo.

In its subsequent resolutions of July 22 and August 9, 1960, the Security Council elaborated the decisions taken on July 14. Both these resolutions confirmed the earlier decisions calling upon Belgium to vacate its aggression by withdrawing its troops immediately from all parts of the Congo, including the province of Katanga. These also confirmed the role of the United Nations in assisting in the maintenance and restoration of law and order without intervening so as to influence the outcome of any internal conflict.

The purpose of the United Nations was thus clear. The United Nations operations in the Congo were undertaken at the request of and with the full concurrence of the Congolese Government. Indeed, there was a specific agreement between the United Nations and the then Government of the Congo. One should have thought therefore, that the United Nations, in effective co-operation with the Congolese Government, would be enabled to carry out its purposes and that the United Nations forces and other personnel in the Congo would be an effective instrument

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not only for helping in the maintenance of law and order and in the preservation of its independence but also in providing sorely needed technical assistance, all of which would give the young republic an excellent start in its career as an independent State.

Six months ago the United Nations undertook responsibilities in the Congo. It was a moment of great expectations. Here was an opportunity--a unique and unprecedented one--for the United Nations to play a constructive role in the maintenance of peace and in the building up of the newly emergent countries of Africa. Success in these undertakings was expected to add enormous prestige and strength to the United Nations and to its purposes and principles. For the Congo, and indeed for the whole of Africa, this was the beginning of a co-operative endeavour with the United Nations and a chance to consolidate their freedom and build up their economy and administration.

The progress of this matter in the United Nations since and the tragedy and deterioration in the Congo are a matter of recent history. It is not my purpose here to go through every phase or every detail of the Congo experience during the last six months and to take

on the role of a political analyst. It is sufficient to say that the United Nations has gone through many crisis and vicissitudes through this period. All this would have been worthwhile and would indeed have given cause for satisfaction if there had been progress in the realization of the objectives of the resolutions of the Security Council.

The situation today, however, unfortunately is such that one has to admit frankly that not only has the United Nations been prevented from pursuing the objectives of this Council, but the situation in the Congo itself has so deteriorated as to cause imminent danger of civil war, with all its dangerous consequences for Africa and the world, and of possible collapse of the efforts of the United Nations.

Let us look more closely into the present state of affairs. There is no effective Central Government of the Congo. The Republic of the Congo faces the danger of disintegrating. Parallel groups have been set up controlling different parts of the country. My Government has no interest in any individual or group in the Congo nor do we even know them, but in our opinion the authorities who pose as the lawful government of the Congo in Leopoldville have no constitutional sanction behind them, nor have they any moral or political strength. The lawful Government of Mr. Lumumba, which was elected by a Parliament freely elected on the basis of adult franchise and which has still, as far as one can see, the support of the Parliament, was arbitrarily dismissed from office. Mr. Lumumba and his supporters are under detention and are being subjected to the most cruel and humiliating treatment in violation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Similar is the situation of other political leaders and members of Parliament. There is a systematic violation of such rights and freedoms in the Congo, perpetrated by all kinds of people including those who pass as the lawful Government of the Congo. The powers which under the fundamental law were distributed between the Chief of State, the Prime Minister and his Government and the Parliament have all been assumed by the President of the Republic without any constitutional sanction. Parliament has been suspended indefinitely, contrary to the fundamental law of the Congo. Secessionist tendencies have grown stronger, thanks to foreign intervention and assistance, military and other, and succour to secessionists, particularly in Katanga. There is a complete absence of the rule of law, and personal and tribal vendetta and struggle for power in all their nakedness are the order of the day.

Rival authorities in the Congo are in a state of undeclared war against each other. According to the latest reports, even aerial bombings of defenceless civilian populations have started. Private armies flourish. Arms and ammunition are coming into the Congo in increasing quantities in jet-loads in four-engine planes. Belgian military officers, in spite of repeated prohibition by the Security Council and the General Assembly and contrary to the pledges given by Belgium, are pouring into Leopoldville and Elisabethville. According to our information dozens of Belgian military officers and advisers have come into Leopoldville and Elisabethville in recent weeks. The

Congo has become a happy hunting ground for foreign mercenary military personnel who are descending into the Congo in increasing numbers.

According to a United Nations spokesman there are over 200 of them in Katanga apart from the 140 Belgian armed personnel. Even the mere enumeration of their reported nationalities bodes ill for the problem of the Congo. Belgians, South Africans, South Rhodesians, British, French and Germans. An extraordinary state of affairs.

In such a situation, the United Nations has become increasingly ineffective in the Congo. The policy pursued by them has the appearance of having no definite aim. United Nations action

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apart from technical assistance which, despite adverse conditions appears to have been useful, has largely consisted in attempts to, thwart misdeeds here and there by various groups including those which owe allegiance to Colonel Mobutu. These have had little success and the situation has deteriorated progressively. It appears that the regime headed by President Kasavubu has neither the will nor the ability to deal with the situation satisfactorily or to follow the decisions of the United Nations. Without any constitutional basis it often sets itself in direct opposition and hostility to the United Nations and its representatives. As a result of the passive attitude of the United Nations which is partly forced upon it in this chaotic situation and partly results from the inadequacy of its mandate, the impression gains ground that the United Nations presence helps the regime to consolidate itself.

Mr. President, the malady from which the Congo suffers is all too evident. Let us try to diagnose the disease itself. The whole basis of the United Nations action in the Congo was a request by the Central Government of the Congo. The effectiveness of the United Nations action pre-supposed the continued existence of an effective and lawful government working hand in hand with the United Nations, co-operating fully with them and deriving the fullest advantage from the massive technical assistance likely to be available from the United Nations.

Secondly, the central purpose of the Security Council resolutions was the withdrawal of the Belgian forces from the Congo. Such a demand finds place in all the three Security Council resolutions of July 14, July 22 and August 9, 1960 with increasing urgency. Members of the Security Council, out of politeness or some other reason refrained from using the word "aggression," but the plain meaning and purpose of the Security Council resolutions was the vacation of the aggression involved in the injection of foreign Belgian troops in an independent State.

As I have indicated earlier, both these fundamental assumptions have been belied. No effective central government of the Congo exists, and

Belgian military intervention in the Congo continues with increasing vigour and ruthlessness and disregard of world public opinion and the dicta of the United Nations.

Here, Mr. President, if I may digress for a while, with your permission I should like to add that even the complete withdrawal of the then Belgian troops, did not take place at the end of August though the Secretary-General has told us that Belgian combat troops were withdrawn by the end of August. The continued presence of Belgian military officers, in Belgian uniform, long after, as brought out in the second progress report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo, only goes to show that Belgian withdrawal was never complete or bona fide. Since then Belgian military intervention in the Congo has continued with increasing vigour and ruthlessness.

The situation indeed is serious. The Secretary-General in his important statement of February 1, has in no uncertain terms and language brought this to the attention of the Security Council. The possibility of withdrawal of large contingents of forces which had been voluntarily contributed by some African States to the United Nations--and some of these withdrawals have already started--threatens, as the Secretary General has himself admitted, the collapse of the entire United Nations operations. We feel in all earnestness that the situation must be remedied. The success of the United Nations effort is dear to us all and none of us can afford to let it suffer an irrecoverable setback which is what the failure and collapse of the United Nations efforts in the Congo would mean. Therefore it behoves all, big and small Powers; members of the Security Council and others, States which have contributed to the United Nations effort in the Congo and those who have not, to take stock of the whole situation and perhaps undertake some self-examination. This seems to us particularly necessary for the Security Council which has been ineffective since August 9, 1960. It is the view of my Government that there should be a cold, clear and objective examination of the causes of the present situation in the light of which effective action should be undertaken.

The main reason for inaction in the Security Council has been the failure of the Big Powers to agree. It is obvious that unless they are in agreement no decision can be taken by the Security Council. It appears to us, therefore, that the Big Powers should agree on a minimum policy for the Congo without loss of any more time. In this connexion, may I take the liberty of quoting the very wise words uttered by the President of the United States in his inaugural address the other day. He said:

"Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belabouring those problems which divide us."

I submit, Mr. President, that this is the right approach and the process can and ought to start

here and now in the Security Council, in regard to the question of the Congo.

Permit me, Mr. President, to express the Views of my delegation on what should be the basis of agreement for future United Nations action in the Congo. As I said earlier, the United Nations has been handicapped right from the beginning because of the non-fulfilment of the two postulates on which the Security Council resolutions were based. It is obvious that if the United Nations is to continue its work in the Congo with any reasonable chance of success the basic assumptions of the three Security Council resolutions must become a reality; that is to say, there should be a complete withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary personnel and a complete prohibition of the influx of any such personnel in the Congo, in whatever guise. There is no doubt in our minds that so long as Belgian military and paramilitary personnel are in the Congo and Belgian intrigue prevails therein so long will there be no solution of the Congo problem. In conjunction with this I would add that Belgium must cease to misuse the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi as a base and jumping ground for sending troops into the Congo for whatever purpose it may be.

Secondly, there must be an effective Central Government of the Republic of the Congo. The United Nations went into the Congo at the invitation of the Central Government of the Congo, which was a lawfully constituted government with the sanction of the Parliament and the people behind it. It is such a government which must be re-established in the Congo, namely, a constitutional government deriving its authority from the will of the people, having legal and administrative authority and, may I add, the capacity for maintaining law and order in the entire Republic of the Congo, and cooperating with the United Nations. In the absence of such a government, the United Nations would inevitably find itself between the cross-fires of rival governments and factions indulging in civil war. Indeed, as the Secretary-General has said, the presence of the United Nations forces in the Congo will become untenable in the event of any civil war.

It is obvious that such a government should be a legal and constitutional government having the sanction of Parliament and based on the will of the people. Any government the source of whose power is a coup or an unconstitutional fiat of the Chief of State cannot be regarded as an effective and constitutional Central Government of the Congo. In practical terms too, as experience in the Congo during the last few months has shown, there can be no such government without conciliation and without a constitutional basis.

It is a matter of common knowledge that bitterness and internal conflict in the Congo have gone on increasing ever since the President of the Republic suppressed Parliament and dismissed the lawfully elected Prime Minister. The seizure of power in Leopoldville

by Colonel Mobutu's forces, under patronage of the President, is not acceptable to large sections of the people of the Congo, especially to the nationalist elements who stand behind Mr. Lumumba. The detention and cruel treatment of Mr. Lumumba by the Leopoldville regime has only served to rouse the deepest emotions and bitterness and increasing opposition by the Lumumba supporters, and indeed has strengthened Lumumba's position. Today it does not need a political prophet to say that unless there is a return to the path of constitutionalism and conciliation, it will be impossible to prevent a civil war in the Congo.

Mr. President, I would like to express the deep sense of shock and disgust felt by my Government and by public opinion in my country at the treatment to which Mr. Lumumba has been subjected. Not only has he been arrested and is being kept in detention without any lawful authority and even worse his transfer to Katanga--which amounts to pushing him into the lair of his mortal enemies and these points my delegation agrees with the legal analysis made by the distinguished representative of the United Arab Republic on February 1--he and his supporters are being manhandled and mistreated and humiliated in a manner which offends all concepts of civilized behaviour and amounts to the worst form of tyranny.

Such a treatment would be indefensible in respect of any person, but it is worse in the case of someone like Mr. Lumumba whom many in his own country still regard as Prime Minister of the Congo and who is without doubt a great patriot and perhaps the only truly national figure in the Congo. It is reported that other persons in custody, including members of Parliament and political leaders, are also being subjected to cruel treatment by different authorities in different parts of the Congo. We equally and unreservedly condemn such action.

It is our view, therefore, Mr. President, that Parliament should be reconvened without delay. It is Parliament which must become the forum for conciliation and for constitutional settlement. It

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is obvious that there cannot be a meeting of the Parliament unless all members of Parliament at present in detention, especially Mr. Lumumba and other political leaders, are released. When I say this, I mean all such persons wherever and in whatever custody they may be. Where necessary after their release at their request or with their consent, such persons may be taken under United Nations protection. There should be an immediate cessation of all practices which constitute a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

It is obvious that without conciliation there can be no peace or stability in the Congo; and there can be no conciliation unless Mr. Lumumba and his followers, who obviously command a large following in the Congo, and other political leaders, are freed to take part in the processes of conciliation in the Parliament and outside. Indeed, in our view, Parliament would be the best forum for conciliation, and

once Parliament is convened, a government having the support of Parliament will not take time to emerge.

The sort of round-table conference which President Kasavubu has convened without the participation of Mr. Lumumba and other most important political leaders who are still in detention, can in our view not only not succeed in bringing about conciliation, but will make future conciliation much more difficult.

The Parliament has, of course, to be convened by due constitutional process. We believe, however, that the Security Council should urge the immediate convening of the Parliament. The combined effect of any such resolution of the Security Council and of the persuasion exercised by those who are in the confidence of the Head of the State will, we feel sure, result in the restoration of Parliament. It is the view of my Government and we believe that it is also the view of the African countries--that the Congo should be kept out of the cold war. None of us wishes to see the development in the Congo of a Korean situation. It is imperative that the Congo should be insulated from the supply of arms and military assistance of all kinds to the various factions contending for power. It is therefore necessary that all arms supplies to the Congo, from whatever source, except what is channelled through the United Nations, must stop. Paragraph 6 of resolution 1474 (ES-I, V), adopted by the Fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on September 20, 1960, without a dissenting voice, clearly calls upon all States to refrain from direct or indirect supply of arms and other materials, except upon the request of the United Nations.

It is time that all States were reminded of the injunction contained in the resolution of the General Assembly and of their obligation to observe faithfully the prohibition contained in that resolution. In our view, there can be no solution of the Congo problem as long as private armies flourish in the country and the ANC itself is broken up into warring elements and factions and is being used as an instrument for political purposes. All Congolese armed personnel, including the ANC and private armies, should, be disarmed or neutralized. The United Nations should be entrusted with law and order functions until such time as the ANC is forged with the assistance of the United Nations (as contemplated in the Security Council resolution of July 14, 1960)--with a disciplined force, subject to the authority of a constitutional government.

I would like to repeat what I said earlier, that in order that the Security Council should be effective, there should be a basic agreement among the big Powers. It is our belief that such a basis can and must be found and that it should be possible for agreement to be reached on the essential points that I have just enumerated.

Mr. President, we heard with great attention the important statement made yesterday by the Secretary General. We are in general agreement with his analysis and assessment of the situation. We also agree with him that the influx of arms, ammunition and military personnel etc.

in to the Congo must stop and that all private armies should be neutralized. We are, however, firmly of the opinion that piecemeal measures will not do in the Congo.

The suggestion of the Secretary-General are well worth consideration, but only in conjunction with other measures which I have stated before. These are the release of all political leaders and members of Parliament, in particular Mr. Lumumba and his supporters, the immediate reconvening of Parliament, and the immediate withdrawal of all military and para-military personnel.

All these measures, as a matter of fact, hang together. For example, if the ANC is neutralized without the Parliament meeting or without Mr. Lumumba and others being released, or without the Belgian withdrawal, the festering sore of discontent, bitterness and struggle for power will continue, and out of these will spring up again warring groups and factions. It is the focus of the trouble that must be attacked, and that can only be done by the re-establishment of the rule of law

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and the setting in motion of the processes of conciliation, without which any piecemeal measures will, in effect, be lending support to unconstitutional regimes.

We are firmly of the opinion that without the elimination of tyranny and lawlessness that at present prevail in the Congo, the measures proposed by the Secretary General, useful as they may be, will not solve the problem. The rule of law must replace the arbitrariness which today prevails in the Congo. There is no other way, and this cannot come about without the Parliament and without conciliation, which, as I have already stated, cannot be effected unless the important political leaders of the Congo are free to participate without any restriction in the process of conciliation.

It only needs the casting aside of mutual suspicion by the Big Powers and the realization of the imperativeness of the success of the United Nations effort in the Congo for the Members of the Security Council to come to an agreed decision on the lines I have already outlined. The alternative to a more decisive policy is the fizzling-out of the United Nations operation for both political and financial reasons and the Congo becoming involved in large-scale civil war with outside intervention. The time for decision is now; later it may be too late.

Shri C. S. Jha, Permanent Representative of India at the United Nations, made the following statement in the Security Council on February 20, 1961, on the situation in the Congo:

Mr. President, when I asked for the inscription of my name on the list of speakers, I had hoped to speak on the substantive aspects of the question which was raised before the Security Council some two or

three weeks ago. I wished to state the position of my Government on the incidents that had happened since, the most important of which was, of course, the murder of Mr. Lumumba, Mr Mpolo and Mr. Okito, and to state our position on the draft resolution that had been submitted to the Council by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic.

But this morning we have had news in a statement from the Secretary General which has filled all of us with the deepest sorrow and anxiety and--I hope I am not putting it too strongly--with a deep sense of shame. Nevertheless, we must keep before us the perspectives in the Congo, the basic problems there. I should therefore still like to make the substantive statement that I had earlier decided to make. At the same time however, I shall take the opportunity of commenting on the latest events as they affect not only the Congo but the Security Council and the United Nations itself.

Nearly three weeks ago I had the honour to make a statement before the Council in which I indicated my Government's position in regard to the situation in the Congo. We stated then that the situation was fraught with the gravest danger to the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo and constituted, in the circumstances of today's world, a threat to international peace and security. Much has happened since then. The tragedy of the murder of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Mpolo and Mr. Okito has taken place, as feared--and all this under the very nose of the United Nations. And this morning, as I said earlier, we have heard reports of more murders, more assassinations, on exactly the same pattern. Divisions in the Congo are much deeper today than they were a fortnight ago, and the most profound feelings of indignation have roused millions of people in the Congo and in other parts of Africa, and indeed in far-away countries of the world: in Asia, Europe, North and South America and Australia. The situation, dangerous before, has now almost reached a point of no return.

All through these weeks the Security Council has continued its discussions at a pace which, against the background of the latest developments, would appear to be leisurely and somewhat unrealistic. Perhaps, however, these tragedies will not have been in vain if they spur the nations of the world and the members of the Security Council to take up a united position on what is admitted by everyone to be not only a grave threat to Congo but a great challenge to the United Nations itself.

One can understand the feelings of those dedicated to African nationalism and the independence of the African continent at this most shocking and deliberate murder of one of Africa's great national leaders and the subsequent murder of others, but the repercussions of and the reactions to these tragedies have transcended the borders of the African continent, and it can truly be said that world public opinion in its entirety has been shocked and horrified by these brutal murders. Not only public opinion but governments on all continents have reacted. Leaders of governments and world opinion

have given expression to their shock and horror. The Prime Minister of India gave expression to the feelings of the people and

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the Government of my country, in a message of February 14 to the Secretary General, from which I quote:

"The news of the murder of Mr. Lumumba and others in Katanga is an international crime of the first magnitude. It has come to us as a great shock. Unless immediate strong measures are taken against those who are responsible for this murder and who have consistently insulted and opposed the United Nations and are now carrying on practically a war against the United Nations, the consequences are going to be very grave indeed. The United Nations must meet this challenge. Foreign elements supporting Tshombe and Mobutu must be withdrawn."

It is the view of my Government that there should be an impartial, international investigation into the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of the outrage should be punished. In some quarters surprise has been expressed at the intensity of feeling and demonstrations all over the world. The representative of Belgium attributed the demonstrations against Belgium and Belgian diplomatic missions in a large number of countries to a campaign of hatred and violence against his country. Others have called these organized or inspired by groups following a particular ideology. These are over-simplifications of tremendous facts and forces which cannot be ignored. Much as one may deplore the violations of diplomatic immunities, one has to grasp the real significance and not try to find facile or make-believe reasons for the tremendous upsurge of emotion throughout the world.

Perhaps one of the most significant developments in the past decades and through two world wars has been the emergence of the concept of international morality. The human rights declaration, in its preamble, refers to "the conscience of mankind." It is this conscience of mankind that has been shocked beyond measure by these murders. Grave violations of human right anywhere today have international repercussions which, to those whose minds are set in the grooves of old concepts of international law and domestic jurisdiction, may seem strange and hostile. Indeed, the recent murders in the Congo, apart from their grave political consequences, are a gross violation of the conscience of mankind and international morality. If only for this reason, there should be an impartial, high powered international investigation and the offenders must be brought to book.

What is the situation in the Congo today: With Lumumba's murder the chances of conciliation which previously did not appear impossible have virtually disappeared. The country is deeply divided. There is grave fear of violence in the Congo and serious danger of clashes and vendettas. In this connection we cannot but approve of the appeal for

calm issued by the authorities in Stanleyville after the announcement of Mr. Lumumba's death. Latest information, however, indicates serious danger of violence in Leopoldville, and the Secretary General told us this morning what has been happening in Leopoldville--how political leaders have been catapulted from there into hostile areas, into Katanga or Kasai, just for the sake of being murdered. According to the Secretary General's representative in the Congo, arrests and liquidations of political opponents in large numbers are now being made. This is really a serious development. Katanga authorities are openly congratulating themselves on having been able to get rid of Lumumba, and those who killed Lumumba and his companions have been rewarded. The Katanga authorities have refused investigation by General Iyassu of the United Nations Command. There is no word of regret, to our knowledge, from those in Leopoldville who were responsible for the detention of Lumumba and for delivering him into the hands of his mortal enemies. The Chief of State appears to have kept significantly silent, and all this has happened while the Security Council itself has been debating the situation in the Congo and has been applying its mind to finding solutions of the difficult problems in the Congo. Indeed, there has been no parallel to such a situation--such a defiance, such a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms--anywhere at any time. There has been no parallel to such a situation before, and the United Nations itself has been dealt a blow to its moral prestige and authority from which it is the duty of the members of the Security Council, each and all, and indeed of all Members of the United Nations to redeem it.

We have before us a very important report (S/4691) from the Secretary General's Special Representative in the Congo. This report brings clearly to light a serious civil war situation which has already developed in the Katanga province with evidence of similar impending developments in other parts of the Congo as well. The report brings to light the massive build up of arms in Katanga and a force of 5,000 men led by nearly four hundred Belgian and other foreign military

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officers. This force has unilaterally abrogated the neutral zone in north Katanga and has now embarked on an offensive action against the population of northern Katanga. Villages have been attacked and burned by this advancing army. According to latest information, clashes have already taken place between the Katanga troops and those under the control of Orientale and Kivu provinces. It is also reported that Mobutu's troops, which owe allegiance to President Kasavubu, are proceeding up the River Congo for an attack on Orientale province. Here, then, we have already a civil war on. Already there is an attempt to find a military solution of the Congo problem and to present another fait accompli to the Security Council.

The Security Council has to act quickly to prevent this. Otherwise the Congo and large parts of Africa will be engulfed in the most serious conflict, and the door will be inevitably opened to direct or indirect foreign military intervention. Military solutions are never

durable; in particular, they are no answer to the rising tide of nationalism against colonialism. Those who wish to cash in on Lumumba's death in this way are grievously mistaken. Lumumba dead is infinitely more powerful than Lumumba alive, as Prime Minister Nehru has said. The lessons of history are more often forgotten than remembered, but the World Organization and its principal organ for the maintenance of peace and security, namely, the Security Council, cannot afford to forget them.

The principal task of the Security Council, therefore, becomes the prevention of the development of a civil war without any delay. Once this is achieved time will have been gained for the cooling off of tempers and abatement of emotions, for the dawn of good sense and for the initiation of the processes of conciliation and the restoration of the rule of law, including primarily the convening of the Parliament. These alone can ensure the unity, territorial integrity and independence of the Congo.

May I quote the statement of the Prime Minister of India before the Indian Parliament on February 16: Prime Minister Nehru said:

"In spite of our anger and our great resentment at all that has happened one cannot merely be swept away by anger and do something which may create more difficulties. We have restrained ourselves, although we felt strongly and we do feel strongly. We hope that it may be possible for the Security Council to come to firm decisions, so that the United Nations authority there can function effectively and strongly. This means that it should function even if it is necessary to use armed force, and not merely look on others using armed force for, wrong, purposes, that foreign elements must go from there and that the so-called Congolese Army should be controlled and disarmed. These are immediate issues. Then having got the situation under control it should try to get Parliament to meet for deciding what kind of Government they will have, the object being that there should be unity and that the unity, integrity and independence of Congo should be preserved, that their own people through their elected Parliament should decide what kind of Government they will have and no one else intervening except to help them. If any help has to be given to them, it should go through the United Nations and not through other sources."

Herein are indicated the lines on which the problem of the Congo can be solved, namely that the approach to the Congo problem must be governed by the imperative necessity of maintaining the unity, integrity and freedom of the Republic of the Congo, with no foreign intervention and avoidance of a cold or hot war in the Congo, and the establishment of a representative government through and with the approval of the Parliament.

The Security Council is no doubt aware of the strong feeling among many countries that the United Nations has failed in the Congo, and this failure is related particularly to its inability to prevent the murder of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues, and now of some others, in

spite of indications that these outrages might be committed. My delegation shares this feeling, but we consider that the failure must be laid to the United Nations as a whole, to the cold war approaches by various Powers and to wrong or inadequate decisions of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

In the last category we have in mind particularly the grave blunder of seating the Kasavubu delegation at a time when there was constitutional crisis in the Congo, as brought out in the Second Progress Report (A/4557) of the Secretary General's Special Representative, and there were rival claimants for the seat in the General Assembly.

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We ourselves have not hesitated to criticize, sometimes rather strongly, the actions of the United Nations in the Congo or their inaction on particular occasions. We do not however feel that the United Nations actions in the Congo could have been more firm and purposeful, but at the same time one cannot forget that agreements have been impossible to achieve either in the Security Council or the General Assembly. However, the Security Council now has a chance, and indeed the duty, of thinking a new and of taking constructive steps. Past experience should be a guide in laying down correct policies and objectives for the future. The alternative we would not like even to contemplate. As the Prime Minister of India has pointed out:

"If the United Nations withdraws from the Congo, it would be a disaster, because then the field is left open to civil war and large scale foreign intervention in various ways."

It is for the Security Council in its wisdom and in realization of the gravity of the situation to take firm and positive decisions which will meet the needs of the present situation. The draft resolution (S/4722) tabled by the delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic--and I am referring to the first draft resolution tabled by them, because I understand that there is another resolution on the way--in our view is the minimum answer. It substantially reflects the views of my Government.

The draft resolution seeks the immediate withdrawal of Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and mercenaries, the stoppage of civil war, and the creation of conditions in which the lawlessness by undisciplined armed units and personnel can be made impossible, and through their neutralization Parliament can meet and a constitutional government can be set up based on conciliation, and free political life, and on the preservation of the unity, integrity and full political independence of the Congo.

We have been closely associated with the prolonged and earnest consultations which have resulted in this draft resolution. We believe that the resolution embodies the greatest common measure of agreement and gives real hope for the United Nations to assist in the

solution of the problem of the Congo and save its own prestige and moral authority. I use the word "assist" advisedly because in our view it is for the Congolese people themselves to solve their problems. Others, including the United Nations can only help. We further believe that this draft resolution, if sincerely implemented by all concerned, can make a real contribution to the solution of the complex problem of the Congo.

It is needless to emphasize here that the carrying out of this resolution in so far as it concerns the machinery of the United Nations, must be impartial. The United Nations, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. If the draft resolution is adopted, India would be willing to make whatever further contributions it can to the success of the United Nations operation in the Congo. My delegation would commend the acceptance of the three-power draft resolution by the members of the Security Council.

Now I would like to say a few words on the situation that developed this morning and on the draft resolution which I understand the delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic, are placing before the Security Council. We feel that this is undoubtedly the greatest crisis, the greatest challenge to its authority, that the United Nations has ever been faced with. We believe that if this challenge is not met, if hesitation is still to be the order of the day, if procrastination bedevils the work of the Security Council then I am afraid that all of us, and perhaps future generations, will have cause to rue the inaction of the Security Council. Something must be done, and very, very quickly. The minimum that the Security Council has to do in the present situation is to condemn unreservedly the brutal murders, the political assassinations, the medieval barbarity, that is being committed in the Congo.

It should state in no uncertain terms that the World Organization will not permit this to happen. It should state unreservedly that all those who have perpetrated these crimes and are flaunting these murders, in the very face of the Security Council and the United Nations must be brought to justice. Otherwise I fear that the consequences will be grave indeed. I fear that if the Security Council is unable to reach decisions, there will be unilateral decisions reached by members who feel very strongly in the matter, and that is something which we do not wish to see.

Therefore, my delegation fully supports the views of the delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic. We have had occasion to see the draft of the resolution. That resolution should be given top priority. It should be adopted as a priority resolution, as an emergency resolution, and the call must go out from the Security Council to the Congo and all over the world that

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this World Organization is not prepared to put up with evil and tyranny and lawlessness and political assassinations which have

become the order of the day in the Congo. Therefore, I would fully support that request. I think that the Security Council has to vindicate itself. We have been far too long dillycallying over this problem. Let us be firm and definite and clear for once.

INDIA CONGO USA BELGIUM CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SOUTH AFRICA KOREA LIBERIA AUSTRALIA FALKLAND ISLANDS

**Date :** Feb 02, 1961

## Volume No

1995

NEPAL

References to India in Nepalese Press

In reply to questions:

(a) whether it has come to the notice of the Government of India that false propaganda is being carried on in Nepal-Press against our country;

(b) if so, the steps being taken in this regard; and

(c) whether any protest has been lodged with the Nepal Government,

the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs Mr. Sadath Ali Khan told the Lok Sabha on Feb 15, 1961

There was some irresponsible anti-Indian propaganda in the Nepalese Press after the change of Government there on the 15th December, 1960. The attention of the Government of Nepal was drawn to it, and they have issued two Press notes appealing for a cessation of the campaign. Since then anti-Indian propaganda has somewhat subsided.

NEPAL INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Feb 15, 1961

## Volume No

1995

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**Prime Minister's Statement in Rajya Sabha on Anti-Indian Demonstrations in Karachi**

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The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Rajya Sabha on Feb 28, 1961 regarding the demonstrations in Karachi before the Office of the Indian High Commission:

Mr. Chairman, Members of the House are no doubt deeply interested and much exercised about the news that has come front Karachi in the last two days, especially about the demonstrations in front of the Indian Chancery building. So, I should like to place before them the facts as we know them.

There were demonstrations before the Chancery building on two days, 24th February and the 25th. On the 24th February, there was a small demonstration at 3.30 p.m. in front of the Chancery in Karachi protesting against the Jabalpure riots. This procession consisted of about 25 street urchins carrying a single banner and one black flag. They shouted objectionable slogans. A large contingent of police, on duty who had warned the High Commission in advance of the demonstration dispersed them after half an hour of ineffective slogan shouting. On the 25th February, there were two demonstrations, the first led by a procession of about 400 school children and a few college boys. They shouted slogans in front of the Chancery for about half an hour, from 12.30 p.m. to 1 p.m. and then dispersed. A second procession consisting of about 600 people composed principally of goondas came later to the Chancery at 3.30 p.m. and after a few minutes of abuse and slogan shouting against India and the Prime Minister, started throwing stones and brickbats at the Chancery practically breaking all the windows and seriously damaging the cars of the High Commission and of our officers parked outside in the compound of the Chancery. A funeral pyre was then lit in front of the Chancery and burning sticks and rags were thrown into the building, although the compound gates were closed and the mob was not allowed to come into the Chancery premises by the police. Some of our personnel were hurt by stones thrown into the Chancery and by glass splinters. The High Commissioner reports that the injuries were superficial. He himself received a minor scar on the nose from flying glass splinters. What appears to be most objectionable about the incident is that all this was done with

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some sort of obvious police connivance or complicity. The police had advance information and they had indeed warned the High Commission of the possibility of the demonstration. The major demonstration lasted for full thirty minutes with nearly 100 policemen present and looking on. About 40 policemen had come to the spot in advance and others arrived apparently after the demonstration started. The police allowed a truck and one or two more donkey carts filled with stones

to be brought into the locality and unloaded in front of the Chancery while all other traffic was diverted from the area. The demonstrators helped themselves to these stones with which they pelted the Chancery premises while the police looked on. The High Commissioner's telegram says--I am quoting the telegram--

"Finally, at 4.40 p.m., the police blew their whistle and the crowd melted away, leaving our compound littered with thousands of stones, broken glass and burning rags".

Our Acting High Commissioner in Karachi called on the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan immediately after the incident and protested strongly against all these happenings. He also handed over to the Pakistan Foreign Office an aide memoire requesting the Foreign Secretary to enquire into these incidents and ensure that full protection is given to the Indian High Commission and its officers. He also added that the Pakistan Government would no doubt offer appropriate restitution and adequate compensation for the damage suffered. Mr. Ikramullah, the Foreign Secretary, told the Acting High Commissioner that he was sorry to hear of the incident and he was surprised at what had happened. He would make enquiries into the matter and promised to speak to the Foreign Minister in Rawalpindi on the telephone. He is reported to have added that whatever be the rights and wrongs, there should have been no violence and the Indian High Commission was entitled to protection. I gather that next day our Acting High Commissioner met the Foreign Secretary again who told him that the Foreign Minister who was at Rawalpindi had also expressed his regret and anxiety on this incident. And he was apparently taking some further steps to give protection. The Pakistan High Commissioner here was also asked to come to our Foreign Office and he was told, more or less repeated, of our concern and our protest at what had happened in Karachi. It was also pointed out to him that apart from those incidents, for about a week or ten days previously, there had been a spate of rather virulent anti-Indian, propaganda in the newspapers and practical excitements to violence. This is the position, Sir. Subsequently, I understand, the Pakistan Government or the Karachi authorities enforced section 144 or some section equivalent to that to prevent people from collecting and forming processions. This was violated and some trouble took place. It is not quite clear, and I have not got full information about yesterday's events. There is something in the newspapers. It appears, however, that there were two different and distinct activities of this kind. One was, a small crowd was going to a temple. I think the other had nothing to do with this matter; they were demonstrations by pro-Lumumba people and it was stopped by the police. These are the facts such as we know them.

Mr. Jaswant Singh: We would like to know--this is a serious matter indeed--what steps the Government would take to see that at least our nationals not only in Karachi--wherever such things happen they are beaten up and the Government cannot do anything--but whether it is in China, Pakistan or Congo are protected. Are we absolutely helpless in such matters? Can't we express our regret to show that if this kind

of thing is done we take a serious view of it. I would be very happy if the Prime Minister could tell us in what way the interests of our nationals outside would be safeguarded.

Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru: That is what I have said. Obviously the Government of India cannot protect its nationals there just like the Government of the United States or China or Pakistan cannot protect their nationals in Delhi. It is the Government of India's duty to protect those nationals or their embassies here; they cannot protect them here. This is the legal position, the constitutional position and the practical position. This is why we protest when this kind of thing happens. We cannot take any other measure for their protection. They have admitted it and we cannot do anything more in regard to that except of course extreme steps which is a different matter.

(A similar statement was made by the Prime Minister in the Lok Sabha on February 28, 1961.)

PAKISTAN INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CHINA CONGO

**Date** : Feb 28, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PAKISTAN

Indus Waters Treaty

In accordance with Article V of the Indus Waters Treaty, a sum of ₹ 6,206,000 had been

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paid on Feb 14, 1961 to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for credit to the Indus Basin Development Fund, as the first of the ten equal annual instalments. No payment was due to be made by the Government of India direct to the Government of Pakistan under the provisions of the Treaty.

This information was given in the Lok Sabha by Shri Jaisukhlal Hathi, Union Deputy Minister for Irrigation and Power, in reply to a question by Dr. K. B. Menon, Mr. Raghunath Singh, Mr. B.C. Mullick and Mr. Bishwanath.

PAKISTAN USA INDIA UNITED KINGDOM LATVIA

**Date :** Feb 14, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PAKISTAN

Hindu Displaced Persons Occupying Muslim Property

In reply to questions:

(a) whether it is a fact that an enquiry was made under the Evacuee Property Act in connection with complaints made by Muslim citizens of West Bengal that their property had been taken over by Hindu migrants from East Pakistan;

(b) if so, what was the number of complaints made and how many of them were found to be genuine;

(c) action taken to restore the properties to the Muslim owners;

(d) whether it is also a fact that steps to solve the problem arising out of East Pakistan refugees squatting upon houses of Hindus and Muslims in various parts of West Bengal are under the consideration of the Government of India; and

(e) if so, details thereof and progress made in connection therewith,

the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs Shri Jawaharlal Nehru told the Lok Sabha on Feb 28, 1961

Under the West Bengal Evacuee Property Act of 1951 which regulates the restoration of properties to Muslims who had left for East Pakistan in 1950 but returned to India by the 31st March, 1951, 35,349 applications were received upto June, 1960. Of these 12,808 cases were found to be genuine.

Of the 12,808 genuine cases, properties have been restored in 12,550 cases. In most of the remaining 258 cases, restoration of possession has been ordered, but implementation has not been completed pending arrangement of alternative accommodation for the refugees occupying the premises.

The restoration of such properties is regulated by the Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons and Eviction of Persons in Unauthorised Occupation of Land Act of 1951. There are 834 such properties belonging to Muslims, at present occupied by 5,257 families, and 941 such properties belonging to Hindus and others at present occupied by

14,335 families. It has been decided to have a detailed survey of all these properties, to be completed within a month or so, after which the several aspects of the question will be examined.

PAKISTAN USA INDIA

**Date :** Feb 28, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Treatment of Indian Officials

In reply to questions:

(a) whether it is a fact that the Indian Ambassador and his staff in Peking are being subjected to constant harassment and humiliation;

(b) whether it is a fact that the Chinese chauffeur of the Indian Embassy and the cook were recently arrested, and if so, for what reasons and whether they were put to trial and what was the result thereof;

(c) whether the Indian personal assistant of the Ambassador in Peking

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was subjected to flogging in public and if so, for what offence, and whether he was allowed a fair trial, and what was the nature of alleged offence against him; and

(d) what action, Government have taken in the matter,

the Deputy Minister of External Affairs Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon informed the Rajya Sabha on Feb 16, 1961 that

(a) This is not a fact. But it is true that the Indian Mission in Peking has noticed in recent months an unsympathetic attitude towards its functioning.

(b) No information has reached us about the cook, but the Chinese chauffeur of the Indian Embassy and a clerk, both of whom are Chinese nationals, were removed from the service with the Indian Embassy, presumably under instructions of the Chinese Government. The Government of India have no present knowledge of their whereabouts or the reasons for their removal.

(c) This is not true, but it is true that the Personal Assistant was subjected to insulting and unseemly behaviour, without justification, by Chinese officials.

(d) In so far as the chauffeur and the clerk are concerned, as they were Chinese nationals, no formal protest has been made, but informally the attention of the Chinese Government has been drawn to the embarrassment and inconvenience caused by their sudden removal.

In regard to the Personal Assistant of the Ambassador, strong protests have been lodged with the Chinese Government.

CHINA INDIA USA

**Date :** Feb 16, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNESCO

### Extension of Research Centre's Activities

The UNESCO Research Centre on Social and Economic Development in Southern Asia will continue its activities for a further period of four years from 1961 to 1964 under an Agreement signed in New Delhi on Feb 04, 1961 between UNESCO and the Government of India.

The Agreement was signed on behalf of UNESCO by Dr. M. S. Adiseshiah, Assistant Director-General, and on behalf of the Government of India by Mr. P.N. Kirpal, Secretary to the Union Ministry of Education.

Located now in New Delhi the Research Centre was started initially in Calcutta in January 1956. The principal tasks of the Centre have been to collate and interpret the existing research material on the social sciences; provide documentation to assist social scientists to co-ordinate their work; undertake pilot studies to stimulate further research; organise research on behalf of Governments; Universities and other institutes and provide training facilities for research.

The terms of reference of the Centre have been recently extended to cover research activities on the economic and social development of South Asia in general.

The Centre is administered by the Director-General of UNESCO assisted by an Advisory Committee composed of representatives from Member States in South Asia and observers of the U.N. and Specialised

Agencies including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Till now the Centre has carried out many important studies including the study of social and cultural factors affecting the productivity of industrial labour in India; the social and economic consequences of rural electrification in Burma; problems connected with the rapid growth of Khulna in East Pakistan and problems of small industries in the Philippines, Pakistan and India.

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INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC USA BURMA PAKISTAN PHILIPPINES

**Date :** Feb 04, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Prime Minister's Statement on Soviet Premier's Letters

Replying to a question in the Rajya Sabha Feb 27, 1961, the prim Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement:

Sir, I have received two letters from Mr. Khrushchev in the course of the last week or so--fairly lengthy documents dealing with a variety of subjects. It will not be fitting for me to refer to confidential letters and the answers I sent to them. An answer is being sent to that letter. If really the Hon. Member wants me to refer to our policy, I can refer to that, quite apart from the letter. The policy had been stated only very recently in this House in connection with the debate on the President's Address. In our policy, the most important things today in regard to foreign affairs are the question of the Congo and the question of disarmament, and we think these should be given first place. If they are not served, then the world drifts in the wrong direction. Now the Soviet Union has taken up a certain attitude in regard to the United Nations and the Secretary General of the United Nations--I do not wish to go into that question. There are many things which the United Nations did or did not do in the past few months which we did not approve of, and we have said so, but in so far as the Congo situation is concerned, there was the recent Resolution passed by the Security Council, a Resolution sponsored by the United Arab Republic, Ceylon and Liberia, and although we are not a member of the Security Council, broadly speaking, we supported that Resolution. If we had drafted the Resultion, it might have been somewhat different here and there, but nevertheless we supported it, and we think it does offer a way out of

the present unfortunate impasse in the Congo. Now we feel that, if attention is concentrated on or diverted to other issues, however important they may be, say, the issue of the Secretary General of the United Nations, then inevitably, the Congo issue will go into the background; disarmament will go into the background, and all attention, international attention, U. N. attention, would be concentrated on that issue, which itself can be divided into two parts, that is the personal aspect of it, and the larger aspect-- apart from personalities--of the functioning of the United Nations. Therefore we feel, Sir, that the raising of that issue in this form at the present moment would be unfortunate as it will come in the way of the other highly important issues on which it is agreed action must be taken. There is the Congo issue. Now, there is no country which has laid more stress on disarmament than the Soviet Union. Mr. Khrushchev has been, with a degree of passion, pleading for disarmament. Now, if the disarmament issue, because of other matters coming to the front, is pushed to the background, that would be most unfortunate. So also the Congo issue. Therefore, we feel that any question involving the reorganisation of the United Nations or of the office of the Secretary General or of the present Secretary General, if any country wishes to raise it, it should be raised separately later and not at this stage when it will come in the way of all effective activity by the U.N.

USA CONGO LIBERIA

**Date :** Feb 27, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Rs. 600 Million Soviet Credit to India

In the presence of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru the First Deputy Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., Mr. A. N. Kosygin, and the Finance Minister of India, Mr. Morarji Desai, an agreement was signed in New Delhi on Feb 21, 1961 for further economic collaboration between the Governments of India and the U.S.S.R. The agreement provides for the establishment of industrial enterprises and other projects in india under a long term credit of 112.5 million roubles (approximately Rs. 600 millions) extended to the Government of India by the Government of the U.S.S.R.

The agreement follows a series of discussions between representatives of the two Governments in New Delhi which began on the 8th February 1961, in a cordial atmosphere and with mutual understanding.

The enterprises and projects which will be financed through this credit are:

1. Hydroelectric Power Station on the right bank of Bhakra with a total capacity of 480,000 KW by the establishment of four complete units of Hydro-generators with a capacity of 120,000 KW each.
2. Oil Refinery in Gujerat with a capacity for refining two million tons of crude oil per year (Fuel Scheme) together with a

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Thermal Power Plant for the Refinery.

3. Washery for Coking Coal with a capacity of three million tons of coal per year at Kathara in Bihar.
4. Refractories Plant near Bhilai for production of about 125,000 tons of magnesite and fire-clay products per year.
5. Exploration, development and production of oil and gas by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission in Cambay Ankleshwar and in other areas.
6. Production of Pumps and Compressors--Preparation of techno-economic report.

The Soviet organisations will prepare detailed project reports and working drawings required for the establishment of the above enterprises and project, supply equipment, machinery, spare parts and other materials as well as render technical assistance in the establishment of the projects and putting them into operation.

Mr. S. A. Skachkov, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Minister of the U.S.S.R. for Foreign Economic Relations, signed for his Government and Mr. L.K. Jha, Economic Secretary, Ministry of Finance, signed for the Government of India.

The signing of this Agreement will further strengthen Soviet-Indian cooperation and will serve the cause of further development of the freindship, between the peoples of both the Countries.

INDIA USA

**Date :** Feb 21, 1961

**Volume No**

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Indo-Yugoslav Cultural Agreement

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As his last official act before leaving Belgrade, Nawab Ali Yavar Jung Bahadur, Ambassador of India to Yugoslavia, exchanged on the afternoon of Feb 10, 1961, the Instruments of Ratification of the Cultural Agreement signed between India and Yugoslavia last year at a brief ceremony at the Foreign Office in the presence of officers of the Indian Mission and the officers concerned of the Yugoslav Foreign Office.

In transmitting the Instruments of Ratification signed by the respective Presidents of the two countries, Dr. Milan Bartos, Chief Legal Adviser in the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs, and Nawab Ali Yavar Jung, both stressed the importance of continuing and promoting close cultural relations and expressed the hope that these would grow in the future.

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YUGOSLAVIA INDIA

**Date :** Feb 10, 1961

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### COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

#### Final Communique

The following is the text of the final communique on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, issued in London on Mar 17, 1961:

The meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers was concluded today (March 17). Pakistan, Ghana and Cyprus were represented by their Presidents. The other Commonwealth countries were represented by their Prime Ministers.

It had been agreed that on this occasion the Prime Ministers would concentrate their main attention on a limited number of specific problems which are currently of common concern to them all—namely disarmament, the structure of the United Nations, and certain constitutional problems affecting the Commonwealth itself, and a general review of the international situation as a whole, in order to set these particular problems in the perspective of current world events. They also considered, in the course of the meeting, the recent developments in the Congo and South-East Asia.

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed the support of their Governments for the efforts of the United Nations to restore order in the Congo and to secure the independence and integrity of the republic. They deplored outside intervention in the Congo, and recognized that many of the problems which had arisen were due to such intervention. They considered that United Nations forces in the Congo should be strengthened and that the Security Council resolution of February 21 should be fully implemented.

The Prime Ministers noted with concern the situation which had developed in Laos. They expressed the hope that the parties would be able to reconcile their differences, that intervention from outside would cease, and that Laos would be enabled to enjoy an independent, neutral, and peaceful existence.

The Prime Ministers held a full discussion on the problem of disarmament. They recognized that this was the most important question facing the world today, and considered that a favourable opportunity was now at hand for a fresh initiative towards the settlement of it. They agreed that the aim should be to achieve general and complete disarmament, subject to effective inspection and control, on the general lines indicated in the statement in Annex I of this communique. They recalled the resolution on general and complete disarmament which was adopted unanimously at the 14th session of the General Assembly. They agreed that every effort should be made to implement this resolution by agreement between the major Powers, and that further negotiations for this purpose were necessary. Certain proposals designed to promote such negotiations have been put by various countries before the United Nations.

The Prime Ministers expressed the hope that negotiations on cessation of nuclear-weapons tests, which were due to reopen at Geneva on March 21, would lead to the early conclusion of an agreement, on this subject. Such an agreement, apart from its importance in itself, would provide a powerful impetus towards an agreement on disarmament generally.

The Prime Ministers considered various proposals which have recently been put forward for changes in the structure of the United Nations including, in particular, the structure of its councils, the position of the Secretary-General, and the organization of the secretariat. They recognized that such changes could only be made with general consent. They agreed that whatever adjustments might be made, it remained vitally important to uphold the purposes and principles of the United Nations charter and to preserve the international and independent character of the secretariat. They further agreed that members of the Commonwealth shared with all nations the fundamental common interest in maintaining the integrity of the United Nations as a force for orderly political, economic, and social progress throughout the world.

The Prime Ministers also discussed certain constitutional questions relating to Commonwealth membership. The conclusions reached were announced in the communiqués issued on March 13, 15 and 16 relating respectively to Cyprus, South-Africa, and Sierra Leone. The text of these communiqués is reproduced in Annexure II.

#### ANNEXURE I

Aim: (1) The aim must be to achieve total, worldwide disarmament, subject to effective inspection and control.

(2) In view of the slaughter and destruction

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experienced in so-called "conventional" wars and of the difficulty of preventing war, once started, from developing into nuclear war, our aim must be nothing less than complete abolition of the means of waging war of any kind.

Principles: (3) An agreement for this purpose should be negotiated as soon as possible, on the basis of the following principles:

(a) All national armed forces and armaments must be reduced to levels agreed to be necessary for internal security.

(b) Once started, the process of disarmament should be continued without interruption until it is completed, subject to verification at each stage that all parties are duly carrying out their undertakings.

(c) Elimination of nuclear and conventional armaments must be so phased that at no stage will any country or group of countries obtain significant military advantage.

(d) In respect of each phase there should be established, by agreement, an effective machinery of inspection which should come into operation simultaneously with the phase of disarmament to which it relates.

(e) Disarmament should be carried out as rapidly as possible in progressive stages, within specified periods of time.

(f) At an appropriate stage, a substantial and adequately armed military force should be established, to prevent aggression and enforce observance of the disarmament agreement; and an international authority should be created, in association with the United Nations, to control this force and to ensure that it is not used for any purpose inconsistent with the charter.

(4) On the basis of the above principles it should be possible, given goodwill on both sides, to reconcile the present differences of approach between the different plans put forward.

Negotiations: (5) The principal military powers should resume direct negotiations without delay, in close contact with the United Nations, which is responsible for disarmament under the Charter. Since peace is the concern of the whole world, other nations should also be associated with the disarmament negotiations, either directly or through some special machinery to be set up by the United Nations, or by both means.

(6) Side by side with the political negotiations, experts should start working out details of the inspection systems required for measures of disarmament applicable to each stage, in accordance with the practice adopted at the Geneva nuclear tests conference.

(7) Every effort should be made to secure rapid agreement to a permanent banning of nuclear-weapons test by all nations, and to arrangements for verifying observance of the agreement. Such an agreement is urgent, since otherwise further countries may soon become nuclear Powers, which would increase the danger of war and further complicate the problem of disarmament. Moreover, an agreement on nuclear tests, apart from its direct advantages, would provide a powerful psychological impetus to an agreement over the wider field of disarmament.

(8) Disarmament without inspection would be as unacceptable as inspection without disarmament, disarmament and inspections are integral parts of the same question and must be negotiated together; and both must be made as complete and effective as is humanly possible. It must, however, be recognized that no safeguards can provide 100 per cent protection against error or treachery. Nevertheless, the risks involved in the process of disarmament must

be balanced against the risks involved in continuance of the arms race.

(9) It is arguable whether the arms race is the cause or the result of distrust between nations. But it is clear that the problems of disarmament and international confidence are closely linked. Therefore, while striving for the abolition of armaments, all nations must actively endeavour to reduce tension by helping to remove other causes of friction and suspicion.

## ANNEXURE II

CYPRUS: Communique issued on March 13, 1961: At their meeting this morning, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers accepted a request from the Republic of Cyprus for admission to Commonwealth membership. They invited the President of the republic to join the meeting.

SOUTH AFRICA: Communique issued on March 16, 1961: At their meetings this week, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers have discussed questions affecting South Africa.

On March 13, the Prime Minister of South Africa informed the meeting that, following the plebiscite in October 1960, appropriate constitutional

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steps were now being taken to introduce a republican form of constitution in the Union, and that it was the desire of the Union Government that South Africa should remain within the Commonwealth as a republic.

In connexion with this application, the meeting also discussed, with the consent of the Prime Minister of South Africa, the racial policy followed by the Union Government. The Prime Minister of South Africa informed the other Prime Ministers this evening that, in the light of the views expressed on behalf of the other member Governments, and indications of their future intentions regarding the racial policy of the Union Government, he had decided to withdraw his application for South Africa's continuing membership of the Commonwealth as a republic.

SIERRA LEONE: Communique issued on March 16, 1961: The Prime Ministers noted that Sierra Leone would attain independence on April 27, 1961.

They looked forward to welcoming Sierra Leone as a member of the Commonwealth on completion of the necessary constitutional processes.

UNITED KINGDOM CYPRUS GHANA PAKISTAN USA CONGO LAOS SWITZERLAND SIERRA LEONE  
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SOUTH AFRICA

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### COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

#### Prime Minister's statement in Lok Sabha

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on Mar 24, 1961 on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference:

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I should like to place on the Table of the House a copy of the final communique issued by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

A great part of this probably has appeared in the press, but I think it would be desirable to have a correct and full copy of it for reference by Hon. Members.

I went to this Conference with considerable hesitation. Normally, I do not like to be away from India, when Parliament is meeting, more especially, during the Budget Session. Also, at that time a very dear and valued colleague of ours was lying seriously ill. Nevertheless, ultimately, I thought that I ought to go, as this was an unusually important meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and as events proved, it was an important meeting, and it came to several decisions which have a much wider significance than normally our decisions had previously.

This meeting was held, not in the normal course, but for special reasons, and it was confined to the consideration of certain specific major problems, among them being disarmament, the structure of the United Nations, and certain constitutional problems affecting the Commonwealth itself. In addition, we considered a matter of urgent importance, that is, the Congo situation. We confined our attention to these matters.

USA INDIA CONGO

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South Africa

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But, one matter, in a sense, overshadowed all our proceedings. This was the question of South Africa. We discussed it at some considerable length there, but apart from our discussions, it was a matter which was in the minds of all of us present there, even when we were discussing other matters, because the whole future of the Commonwealth depended upon that.

It came up, as perhaps the House knows, because of an application of the South African Union Government for continuing its membership of the Commonwealth, even though it is becoming a Republic on the 31st May this year. Normally, internal matters are not considered by this Commonwealth Conference. Also, the fact that a country becomes a Republic has ceased to be a novelty in the Commonwealth; for us, especially, to oppose a country becoming a Republic would be rather odd. There was no question of our opposition to that matter.

Nevertheless, all this was connected in people's minds with the racial policies of the South African Union Government, and it was not possible, even though technically it might not perhaps have fitted in, to ignore this major fact in considering any matter related to the South African Union Government.

As a matter of fact, the Prime Minister of South Africa, who was present, himself agreed to this matter being considered or taken up, and it was discussed at some length. All the other Prime Ministers present there felt that one of the basic conditions of the Commonwealth continuing or surviving was a strict adherence to the policy of racial equality, and that the policy of the South African Government was not compatible with it. In fact, it was definitely opposed to it, as we all know. And, therefore, this deadlock arose, and as the South African Government, that

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is, its Prime Minister, was completely unwilling to make the slightest change in the policies pursued by them in South Africa, there was no way out of the deadlock, except some kind of cleavage in the Commonwealth itself. It was clear that if these policies were pursued even by one Member-Government of the Commonwealth, they would react on many other Members who would find it difficult possibly to continue in the Commonwealth. I need not go into this matter, because everyone here, not only in this House but in this country, feels strongly about these matter; it is a question not only of fundamental human freedoms, but of national self-respect.

And it seemed quite improper for us to be a member of an organisation which itself tolerated this kind of racial policies which are pursued

by the South African Union Government. On the other hand, the Prime Minister of the South African Union was equally certain about his own position and justified it. There was no meeting ground at all on that issue. There had, therefore, to be some kind of a break.

Now, no one likes--at least most people do not like--breaking something. It is always easier to break than to construct. It was not easy for us, therefore, to view the prospect of breaking this up, but events were such that there was no alternative left, and ultimately the Prime Minister of the South African Union withdrew his application for continuing membership. Thus this question, in so far as the Commonwealth is concerned, was solved for the moment.

This was a very significant step that the Commonwealth took, but I believe that has strengthened it and certainly not weakened it. It has even a wider significance than it might appear at first sight, because thereby the question of racial equality has been put on the highest level in the world context. As a matter of fact, the United Nations Charter itself contains this, and what the South African Government has been doing was in direct violation of that Charter.

So this decision itself in regard to South Africa has made this session of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference a very special and unique one. This has attracted world attention, and its consequences will be far-reaching. It must be realised, however, that by South Africa going outside the Commonwealth, the South African policy of apartheid or segregation or racial discrimination does not diminish at all. In fact, the Prime Minister of South Africa made it quite clear that he would pursue it as vigorously as ever. In fact, it was because of that that the break came.

So that the evil continues and will continue in an aggravated form, The only satisfaction we can have is that we are not associated with it in any form through any organisation. That is some satisfaction, no doubt; here it is not a question of India only when I say 'we', but many other countries also. And the fact that this has evoked comment in almost every country in the world favourably to the Commonwealth insisting on racial equality to the extent even of South Africa leaving it itself shows that in this matter at least, the South African Union Government is almost completely isolated from world opinion.

It is not right for me to say what happened inside the meetings of the Commonwealth Conference. But it is Well-known that the issue, as it came up there, was not an issue supported on the one side by Asian and African members only, but it was supported really by all the members in varying degrees, and the South African representative stood alone by himself in his particular views.

Therefore, while this, I think, has been a good development from every point of view, we must remember that the policies under which vast numbers of Africans as well as people of Indian descent suffer in South Africa are continuing, and will continue till other

developments take place or other pressures of world opinion or world organisations result in changes being brought about. We have, therefore, to be wide awake in these matters and not be complacent. It is surprising that in Africa which is today in a state of great ferment and change and where many independent countries have emerged in the last few months even, and will continue emerging in the next year or two, in that great Continent which is undergoing such vast changes, in South Africa these policies of racial segregation and suppression should still continue. It is impossible for me to imagine how this can continue for long without bringing about conflicts, and vast conflicts, involving many countries, because it is quite intolerable for the new countries of Africa, as indeed of Asia too, to tolerate such a situation.

So far as the Commonwealth is concerned, this odd fact emerged, that these independent countries of Africa which are members of the Commonwealth will not even be permitted--and I suppose that applies to Asia too--to have their Missions in South Africa, normal diplomatic Mission, because, apparently, they belong to a different race. The Prime Minister of South Africa pleading for or trying to explain his own policy, denied that this was racial inequality at all.

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He said this is a policy of separate development of different races.

Now, the looking at this South Africa development in the context of events in Africa specially, it has the greatest importance. In this connection, may I add that South West-Africa, which was a mandate given by the old League of Nations to the South African Government through the British Government, has been practically absorbed governmentally and otherwise by the South African Union. That has been a violation of that mandate. This question only recently came up, was going to come up, before the United Nations, and it is an important matter that this mandate should be honoured.

Then looking at Africa again in another context, in the context of the continuation of colonialism, we find that while great progress has been made, and is being made there and free countries are emerging, there are still some countries which are not only completely under colonial domination but are probably experiencing the worst forms of colonial exploitation, more particularly the Portuguese colonies there.

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COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

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Congo

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Africa indeed today in a variety of ways is attracting a great deal of world attention. There is the situation in the Congo which we discussed there at some length, and the House, no doubt, has been following these developments in the Congo. In the Communique, there is a brief reference to the Congo where it says that they approve of the recent resolution of the Security Council passed, I think, on Feb 21, 1961, and want it to be implemented fully and rapidly. The general impression in the Conference there, and elsewhere, indeed wherever I went, was one of great appreciation of the Indian action in sending our armed forces there, sending them more particularly at that particular time when the United Nations were facing very grave difficulties in the Congo.

I should like just briefly to mention that in discussing the Congo, the affairs of the Congo, we pointed out quite frankly our own opinions on the subject, and how the United Nations had not been allowed to function properly by not only people in the Congo, but people outside, great countries outside and their representatives in the Congo. The United Nations even now is in the extraordinary position of being condemned and criticised by various countries which are opposed to each other in world politics, but which, to some extent, agree in criticising the United Nations; or, if they do not criticise it, they act against the working of the United Nations in the Congo.

What the United Nations is doing in the Congo is itself a rather new adventure for the United Nations. If that fails, it will be a bad day certainly for the United Nations, and possibly for the world as a whole. If it succeeds, it will enhance the prestige of the United Nations, and make it clear that the kind of things that have happened in the Congo in the past cannot happen because there is this great world organisation to come and deal with it. So, it is a very important matter that the United Nations should succeed, and should succeed, of course, in the right way.

It was this consideration that led us to send our forces abroad. We did so with great reluctance, because, as the House knows, we have never done this kind of thing before. It was a novel enterprise an enterprise full of difficulties and even risks, but because of this, and because of the fact that the resolution passed by the Security Council was one with which we agreed, we felt in honour bound to go to its support, and we have sent them.

Some of our troops have landed there, and some are on the way. I may point out, however, that even now there are all kinds of risks

involved in this, and difficulties, because only recently one of the principal ports there, Matadi was forcibly taken by some of the factional authorities in the Congo, by Mr. or Gen. Mobutu, I think. That is a serious matter for us and for our forces in the sense that the ships carrying supplies from India for the Congo have to go to that port, and if that port is not fully in the occupation of the UN, there may be trouble; there may be difficulties in landing our people and supplies. It is essential for a proper carrying out of the UN's work there that the airports and the ports should be in their possession and under their control. We have pointed that out, and we are watching the situation very carefully.

We sent these forces naturally, if necessity arises, to take armed action, but in the hope that this will not be necessary. They have gone there really on a mission of peace, and to help the UN in preserving order there, in establishing peace, and allowing the Congolese Parliament to meet, and then decide about its Government etc.

We have thus far not recognised any Government in the Congo. We have dealt with the authorities as they are. Most of these Governments in the Congo have appeared on the scene

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through some kind of coup d' etat, which hardly has any constitutional or legal basis. The only legal basis there was originally was to the Government of which Mr. Kasavubu was President and Mr. Lumumba, was Prime Minister. Jointly, they had a certain basis. Singly, their powers were limited. Anyhow, with the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, and even before that, Mr. Kasavuba started functioning by himself as if he was the entire Government, which had no legal justification. Nevertheless, he was supported in this attitude, and was even taken into the United Nations as representing the Congo. It is not for me to criticise the United Nations General Assembly, but that was an unfortunate step that was taken then and it resulted in unfortunate consequences. I think step by step it led to the deterioration of the position in the Congo.

Now, I believe that the crux of the question in the Congo is not so much armed forces, although they may be necessary, but the presence of the Belgians there, of Belgian mercenaries, or call them what you like, supporting some of those factions there, especially in Katanga province and in Leopoldville, Mobutu and some others. Right from the beginning, the United Nations have asked for the withdrawal of the Belgians. In spite of their demand some six months ago, they are still there, and they are in much larger numbers than they were ever before. It is true they withdrew to begin with, to some extent, but they came back rapidly thereafter, and not only came back but sent arms, armoured cars, armour, and even, I believe, aircraft. Now, when I say "they", I do not mean to say that the Belgian Government did this, but chiefly Belgians and some other nationalities who did it. But I cannot myself understand how this can be done in a large way

without the Belgian Government being aware of it, or conniving at it. They did not do it directly, but certainly they must have known about it, if not encouraged it. Large-scale recruitment took place to send these people, not only in Belgium, but else-where too, and at present we find thousands and thousands of Belgians even in the army, and of course in other capacities also. They have trained them, they have trained them in the use of modern weapons, and they have incited them, I believe, not to co-operate with the United Nations, but to work against it. That has been the chief difficulty. If the Belgians had not been there, if the Belgian and some other mercenaries had not been there, then the opposition to the United Nations on the part of these factional leaders would not have any effect or much effect.

It has come to this as appeared in a question asked today I think, one of the questions, that we have been challenged by, I think, Mr. Tshombe that if Indian forces go to Katanga, there will be war. Well, the Indian forces will do, within the ambit of theirs, whatever they are told to do by the UN, subject to the conditions we have laid down. If it is necessary for us to go to Katanga, they will be sent there, and the threat of Mr. Tshomba will not deter them from going there, but the fact is that we do not, as far as possible, want to get entangled in these internal conflicts. There will be no reason for any internal conflicts at all if our advice, given six months ago, had been followed, that is, the summoning of the Congolese Parliament, and the Parliament deciding about their Government. I especially mentioned this in the General Assembly myself when I was there. It has been an extraordinary fact that in spite of this obvious way of dealing with the situation, this has not been adopted. Now I can understand Mr. Mobutu not adopting it. Mr. Mobutu was the outcome of a coup d'etat, he has no legal position. But the surprising part is that great and important powers have encouraged Mr. Mobutu, Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Kasavubu in maintaining an attitude of this kind which was directly opposed to what the United Nations was going to do. Now, it is surprising that some of these gentlemen, Mr. Mobutu and others, do not like the idea of Indian forces going there.

It may be remembered that when Mr. Lumumba was assassinated and brutally killed, many charges were made against these very leaders, the local leaders, of having been involved in the murder. And, the Security Council Resolution of the 21st February specially lays down that an inquiry should be held--investigations should be held--into Lumumba's murder. If such an inquiry is held, it is possible that it may not come out to the advantage of some people and authorities in the Congo today. And, if they dislike any such inquiry or any shift in power in the Congo it is not surprising. So, the conditions there are rather complicated. But, essentially, they are complicated because of foreign intervention; and the foreign intervention, in the main, has been of Belgians.

Originally, 6 or 7 months ago, some other countries also came in. The Soviet Union sent some people, I think about 500 or so, not soldiers but they were supposed to be technicians. I do not know if there were

a few military officers or not; but, they were mostly technicians. Anyhow, they sent them; but they did not remain there long because of the Mobutu coup d'etat taking place. He had sent them all back so that, in the past 6 months or so there has been no one from the Soviet

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Union or any of their allied countries there as they have not been allowed there. That disposes of--whatever they may do outside. Congo--any charges of their having done anything in the last 6 months in the Congo itself because they are simply not there--whatever their intentions might have been previously. But those who are there, the representatives of powers who are there, have a certain responsibility for these conditions; and I regret to say that they have not functioned rightly or in aid of the United Nations. Even though their governments support the United Nations, their representatives in the Congo have worked with different aims, which is very surprising and even indulged in some campaign against India. And it is this really that encourages those elements like Mr. Mobutu, Mr. Tshombe and others to take up these strong attitudes.

This is what the Security Council Resolution says in its very first paragraph that Belgian withdrawal is essential before any improvement can take place. If the Belgians withdraw, not only their armed and para-military forces, but individuals or their political advisers also, then the situation changes immediately. Then the whole strength and background of these elements there which are opposing the U. N. weakens; and I do not personally think-any need arises then for strong military action. Petty action there might be. That is in regard to the Congo which was considered at some length.

Going back to South Africa, may I remind this House, that it is almost exactly 50 years ago that Mahatma Gandhi started his first campaign in South Africa against racial discrimination? This was in 1911; about the middle of the year. And this fact was before me all this time and I reminded the Prime Minister of South Africa about this.

Therefore, if I may add about the Congo, as I have said, the Belgian withdrawal is the most important. How is that to be brought about? Obviously, we do not want this to be a warlike measure, forcible. But Belgium is an ally of many countries like the United States and United Kingdoms and other countries. And, I am quite sure, if these great powers wanted to and were keen about it, they could bring adequate pressure on Belgium to withdraw its people from there. I know, to some extent, that has been done; and the reply of the Belgian Government has been that these people who have gone there have not gone on their behalf; they are adventurers not under their control. Possibly, it might be true to some extent in regard to a few persons who formed foreign legions and the like. But I find it difficult to believe that the Belgian Government cannot exercise its authority on a large number of its nationals who go abroad and create

these international situations. I trust, therefore, that these great powers, the allies of Belgium will exercise their authority and will bring pressure to bear on the Belgian Government and on the Belgians to withdraw from the Congo, because until that withdrawal takes place there will be no peace in the Congo.

In the last 6 months attempts were made somehow to consolidate these people, Kasavubu, Mobutu and Tshombe etc. They have failed simply because they have really no popular backing. And, this habit of trying to put up people without any popular backing, with external help, may succeed for a while but does not succeed in the long run.

CONGO USA INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BELGIUM SOUTH AFRICA

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COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Disarmament

I come to the third important point considered by us. That is disarmament. Now, in regard to disarmament, there is an appendix attached to this final Communique on Disarmament. If the Members have examined the various proposals for disarmament put up before the United Nations or the Disarmament Conference, proposals by the Soviet Union, the U. K. and the U.S. Governments, by the Canadian Government, by India and 10 other countries which is called the Eleven Power Resolution, if you read them fairly rapidly, you will feel that there is a very great deal of agreement in all these proposals. And yet the fact is that agreement has been lacking because somewhere or other, in so-called minor matters, there is so much disagreement--minor or major matters--and agreement escapes us.

Anyhow, after careful consideration and consultation, we had put forward a Resolution in the U. N. in common with ten others, called the Eleven Power Resolution. We hold by it still, though it is not a solution of the problem. It is the approach to the problem laying down certain principles and hoping that, if an advance is made on these lines, an agreement will, probably, come. Ultimately, an agreement on this matter depends, primarily, on two countries, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. If they agree, then the others will probably fall in line. I do not ignore the others because all of us are interested. I do not accept the proposition that if the United States and the Soviet Union agree, all of us must necessarily agree--I mean all the countries of the world. But the

fact is in this matter it is they who count principally in this stage

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of the world's history and therefore, we have always suggested that they should discuss this matter among themselves and find some way of agreement. The others will come in later. There has been some talk of a larger disarmament conference and larger committees. India's name has been mentioned. Well, India has played a fairly important part in the UN in regard to disarmament discussions. Our part has always been not a destructive one, of criticising or condemning but trying to put forward constructive proposals and even the proposal we have put forward with ten other countries was one which was largely agreed to, I believe I am correct in saying so, by the other powers concerned, like the United States and the Soviet Union. They did not wholly agree with it here or there but they were not totally opposed to it in any vital matter. So, we discussed this disarmament matter and proposals--you may call them resolutions or proposals--which are given in the appendix to the communique. They are not the same as our resolution but they are not in conflict with it and partly they cover the same ground because our resolution goes into much greater detail and I think what the Commonwealth has said in this is a good approach in so far as it goes and it is to be worked out a little more. One can go into the details in this resolution. But because we want the principal countries to come to an agreement, if we make a rigid approach, it makes it difficult for these countries to come together. I hope that the two super-powers, as they are called, will come together on this basis.

We know that there has been a change of administration in the United States and the old rigidity has gone and they are making every effort to have a common approach in regard to many matters including disarmament to which, I believe, President Kennedy attaches great importance. We know also that the Soviet Union has been exceedingly anxious to get some agreement on disarmament. If there is this anxiety on both sides, it should not be too difficult to find some way out and some agreement.

But I should like to make one thing clear. Disarmament today must aim at complete disarmament. The talk of partial disarmament today is almost out of date. That does not mean that complete disarmament will take place overnight; it has to be phased but that is a different matter. That has to be phased and we have to go step by step. But any partial disarmament does not put an end to the tensions and fears that exist today. If we reduce, let us say, the number of nuclear bombs--you give fifty per cent less; there is, suppose, a fifty per cent disarmament in regard to nuclear weapons--the dangers of nuclear warfare still remain. Instead of, let us say, 1000 bombs, each will have 500 and the dangers remain and the fears remain and they can be manufactured rapidly again.

Therefore, one must aim at complete disarmament and that is a very big thing and it has powerful reactions. It will apply of course to

conventional weapons as well as nuclear weapons. The House knows that for some 3 1/2 years past, a committee of scientists has been sitting in Geneva, I think, considering the banning of nuclear tests, There is strong hope now that in the course of the next few weeks, they may come to an agreement. Anyhow, every effort is being made to come to an agreement and if that is done, it will not only be a good thing in itself but it will help in changing the tensions of the world and reducing them and improving the whole international atmosphere. So, let us hope that this will happen.

Apart from these matters, there are some other matters considered by the Commonwealth. Conference. There were some domestic matters, Cyprus was taken in as a Member and that was to be welcomed because there has been a bitter war in Cyprus for many years and the ending of it in a friendly and co-operative way was a good thing. The President of Cyprus later joined the conference. Another member, not now but in the next five weeks' time, would be Sierra Leone.

Finally, one other subject was discussed--Laos and Indo-China, where the situation continues to be critical. Recently one leader of Laos, prince Souranna Phouma was here and we had some talks and some proposals have been made. There is some reference to them in today's papers. Some proposals were made by the UK Government with the concurrence, I believe, of the United States. Now, the UK and the Soviet Union have a particular place in this matter because they are the two co-chairmen of the old Geneva Conference. We, India, which was the Chairman of the International Commission in Indo-China, have to get our instructions from the two Co-Chairmen. If the two Co-Chairmen ask us to do something, that is our authority for doing it. Long ago, we suggested that there should be a revival of the Commission in Laos; it had been suspended about two or three years ago. Mostly, they did not agree but gradually they have been coming round to that. This proposal was made for a conference after the pattern of the old Geneva Conference. This was made by Cambodia and later on supported by the Soviet Union. Now, the proposals that the UK Government made appear to be very near the proposals made by the Soviet Governments--not precisely the same, but they have suggested a

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meeting of the Commission first and then of the conference too, after that. All this is dependent on the immediate and early cease fire. This has been communicated, I believe, to the Soviet Government and if they also agree with this, then, presumably, they will ask India to take action about convening the Commission and we shall, in that event, do so, probably, to begin with, in Delhi itself but later the Commission will have to go to Laos and at some time later, probably, the international conference meet, at some place and time which have not been fixed yet. I hope that these efforts would meet with success and the fighting there will end and there will be a cease fire. It must be remembered that the whole basis of the Geneva agreement was that the countries in Indo-China must not join any military bloc and must be more or less neutral because the moment they try to do so,

the other side came into the picture and challenged it. This applies to Laos. And the difficulty in Laos has been the attempt of various sides to push them or to pull them into some kind of policy which is more allied to one or of the policies or military blocs on either side, and that has led to fighting there. The only solution of Laos can be that Laos should be what is called the neutral country--I do not like the word "neutral" as applied to India, I reject it, but so far as Laos is concerned that would be a correct description--in which the Various parties or groups are represented in the Government and they follow a policy of not committing themselves to any of these military alliances. Unless that is aimed at I do not think there will be any solution. That is what Prince Souvanna Phouma who came here stood for. He was Prime Minister sometime, but ultimately he was more or less pushed out by other developments and these different pulls by different military factions, one on one side and another on the other side. As soon as that happens arms come in from outside. There have been plenty of arms coming in from both sides of these military blocs, and that makes the situation very serious. One of the things that should happen for the cease fire is stoppage of arms coming in from outside, from both sides of the conflicting parties.

USA INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC RUSSIA SWITZERLAND CYPRUS SIERRA LEONE CHINA  
LAOS UNITED KINGDOM CAMBODIA

**Date :** Feb 21, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Prime Minister's statement in Rajya Sabha

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Rajya Sabha on Mar 27, 1961 on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference:

Mr. Chairman, the recent meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers held in London was rather an unusual one; at any rate, it was not the normal meeting which is held to consider various problems in which the Commonwealth is interested. It was specially convened to consider specific problems like disarmament and, to some extent, the future of the United Nations. As it happened, when it met, there were one or two very important and urgent matters like the situation in Africa and more particularly in the Congo which were considered at some length.

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### COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

South Africa

Although these problems were considered rather fully, throughout this meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, the thing which seemed to overshadow the proceedings of the meeting was the question of South Africa and the racial policy followed by that country. We have discussed this matter before on many occasions, and reference has been made to it almost annually in our debates on foreign affairs and annually this matter has been raised in the United Nations also on behalf of India and other countries, and resolutions have been passed there by overwhelming majorities. We have been interested in this naturally for a long time past. In fact, it is well to remember that it was in South Africa fifty years ago, almost fifty years ago from now, that is, in 1911, that our leader, Mahatma Gandhi, started his first campaign against racial inequality and racial domination and suppression. We have been deeply interested in it, and ever since we became independent, our interest has grown, so also that of other countries. Originally we were largely interested because of the fact that the number of Indian descendants is considerable. I say, people of Indian descent because they are not our nationals; they are South African nationals but people who are descendant from former Indians who went there. Normally, as they are not our nationals, we would take no interest in them but this is a very much more intricate problem and there is history behind it in our relations with the South African Union in regard to these people. Apart from that the question of racial inequality is not a question of merely the internal affairs of a nation. It raises wider, international issues.

Now, Sir, this matter came up in a particular way. The South African Government have recently had a referendum on the issue of a Republic and by a small majority it has been decided to have a Republican form of Government there. So, the Prime Minister of South Africa made a

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statement before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference informing them of the result of the referendum and requesting that the South African Union might continue in Republic. We could take no exception to any country becoming a Republic; we ourselves are a Republic and we approve of the Republican form of Government

everywhere, but because this application was made, the allied question or the other question of racial relations in South Africa arose and it was discussed. Even the Prime Minister of South Africa agreed to its being taken up. So, while we did not oppose at all of a Republic being taken into the Commonwealth, we did lay stress, many of us, on the incompatibility of any country being in the Commonwealth which followed racial policies of the South African Union Government. I would like to add here that the main thing was that in South Africa this is the official policy; it is not the failure of an official policy. In many countries, it would be easy to point out undesirable happenings which are opposed to the policy of Government. Government tries to put an end to them. It is not an easy thing to change social practices, and even in India there are many things that I am sure this House strongly disapproves and which still happen in the social sphere but our policy is against them. We try to suppress them, to liquidate them and to end them. We have largely succeeded, but in South Africa, there is this policy of what has been called apartheid, of suppression, separation and segregation. This is the official declared policy of government. This matter was discussed and this incompatibility became quite obvious to all. It became a question, practically speaking, of whether the South African Union Government should continue in the Commonwealth or whether a number of other countries should continue in the Commonwealth. As a result of this, the South African Prime Minister decided to withdraw his application for continuing membership of the Commonwealth and this was agreed to.

As soon as the South African Union becomes a Republic, that is, on the 31st May, South Africa will cease to be a member of the Commonwealth. This was an unusual and far-reaching decision for the Commonwealth organisation to take up. It is an important one and I think that it has strengthened the Commonwealth as this very tenuous and vague association has thus developed certain basic formulae on which it stands and one of them is equal treatment of races, equal opportunities, no racial suppression and certainly no segregation. I might add that, Mr. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister of the South African Government, in presenting his case stoutly denied that there was any racial suppression but he based his case on what he called separate development of different races. I am merely informing the House about it; a great deal can be said about it but he said that, no doubt trying to win over those who are opposed to this policy. He laid stress on this that the South African Government's policy was separate development and not of suppression, allowing them to develop equally. Of course, that does not happen there but there it is. He might almost have gone a step further, I thought then, and said that this policy was one of peaceful co-existence, but perhaps that did not strike Mr. Verwoerd at that time.

I think this is a very significant happening, this decision of the Commonwealth Prime Minister's meeting which will no doubt have far reaching effect not only on the Commonwealth but on racial questions all over the world. At the same time, I should like to remind the House that this mere fact shows that the South African Government's

policy is going to continue. That Government is going to continue this policy as it has been doing in the past, this policy of apartheid, although they may not call it apartheid in the future, and they have officially said that it shall not be called apartheid; nevertheless, it is one of segregation and suppression. This policy obviously is going to continue. In fact, it is because of that that this break or split came in the Commonwealth Conference. If they had said that they would vary this policy even to a small extent, it would have had some effect on some members of the Conference but they were completely rigid. They would not vary it or change it at all and they would hold on to it in its entirety. Therefore, it should be realised that the major problem continues and the fact that the Commonwealth has given its opinion rather forcibly against it is helpful no doubt, but it has not solved the question. It continues in a variety of ways. It will no doubt come up before the United Nations as it has done annually, and the question may well arise as to what the United Nations should do about it, about a country which violates the very constitution and Charter of the United Nations in regard to this vital matter.

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South West Africa

Also, there is one aspect of this question relating to South West Africa. Now, South West Africa was a mandated territory. A mandate was given by the old League of Nations to the United Kingdom Government to His Britannic Majesty, who handed it over to the South African Union Government. Now, South Africa has treated

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this practically as part of its own territory, and not as a mandated territory, which is very improper. And even in this referendum the votes of the Europeans only in South West Africa were taken for the Republic but it is very improper. This matter has gone up in various forms to the World Court and we may have to deal with it in its various aspects because obviously we cannot accept the fact of South Africa merely absorbing a very large area by reason of the mandate given to it. This was one of the dominating features of the conference.

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COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Disarmament

The other points that arose in the conference were disarmament and the Congo situation and also to some extent Laos and the future of the United Nations. So far as disarmament is concerned--that was the main purpose of the conference--in the Resolution and to the final communique that was issued is attached an annexure about disarmament which Hon. Members may have seen. This covers very largely the ground covered by some of the Resolutions put forward in the United Nations, and more especially the Resolution put forward by India and ten other countries. That is called the 11-Power Resolution. It is not exactly the same because the Resolution is a more detailed one but the main principles laid down in this are the same.

In dealing with the problem of disarmament we have not considered it desirable to take up too rigid a line about the various steps to be taken. We are rigid I hope in regard to the main problem of disarmament, that there must be disarmament and further that there must be comprehensive and total disarmament, not merely some kind of partial disarmament because the time for partial disarmament is now gone. It has no meaning. Of course, even total disarmament has to be brought about in phases; that is inevitable. You can't do it overnight. But one must think in terms of total disarmament because the halfway house to disarmament at the present juncture and in the present state of armaments would have reall no particular meaning. It would have no meaning if countries possessing, let us say, nuclear bombs said that instead of 1000 bombs we shall have 500 each in future. That is 50 per cent disarmament, a big advance but really all the tensions and fears will continue with the 500 bombs. They have to go, and that applies even to what is called the conventional arms. And may I mention that gradully the conception of conventional arms is changing? That is to say, some of the things Called conventional arms now are really some tactical nuclear weapons. Almost we might say we are coming to a stage when the kind of bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima might be almost considered conventional arms; not quite yet but there are certain tactical nuclear weapons that are coming within the scope of conventional arms because the real nuclear weapons have grown so tremendous in their power to

destroy the hydrogen bombs and others.

So, Sir, I would commend the attention of the House to this disarmament part of this communique which I think lays down right principles in so far as it goes. It does not go into every detail because essentially the problem of disarmament, although it concerns each one of our countries whether we have big armies or not, is a problem in the first place of the two super-Powers, that is, the United States of America and the Soviet Union and we have always advocated that they should discuss it themselves and try to come to some basic agreements and then the other countries should be brought into the picture to work out the details. I do not mean to say that the future of the world should be handed over to these two great countries much as we respect time. Nevertheless, it would not be safe for any 2, 3, 4 or 5 countries to be put in charge of the future of the world in regard to disarmament or any other matter. Still facts have to be recognised and today as armaments are in a sense concentrated--nuclear arms especially--in these two countries especially, it is their consent that is essential for any progress to be made and therefore the first step appears to be a general agreement about the basic principle, about the basic objective of total disarmament--that indeed has been accepted by the General Assembly of the U.N.--and other steps to be taken and then, later, to worked out in committees because this cannot be worked out in a large assembly like the General Assembly of the U.N.

There is one thing also in regard to nuclear tests. There has been a committee of scientists and others working in Geneva I think for 3 1/2 years or so and we understand that there is some possibility, some probability even, of their coming to an agreement in the course perhaps of the next few weeks. That would be very good indeed. If they succeeded in this, it would be good and it would clear the way for an agreement on the subject of disarmament.

CONGO LAOS INDIA USA JAPAN SWITZERLAND

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COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Congo

Then the question of Congo was considered at considerable length because it was an immediate and dangerous issue. In this matter the Security

Council of the U.N. passed a Resolution a little more than a month ago--I think on the 21st February--and while broadly we accepted that Resolution--we meaning the conference; there we all accepted it--we called for its full implementation. There certainly were differences of approach to this problem: Our own approach in India has been that it was right for the United Nations to go to the Congo--when it went there--to help and it is essential that it should continue because, if the United Nations comes out of the Congo, it will do enormous harm to the future of the United Nations and the Congo will go to pieces in a series of not only internal racial wars, tribal wars and factional troubles but because in all probability there will be intervention by some of the major powers of the world and then it will become something even bigger. Having admitted that we felt also that the United Nations has been functioning in the past few months there often in a very weak and ineffective way. In fact it is because of this weakness that many of the problems there have become more difficult of solution. It is true that the United Nations functions naturally only to the extent it can function in the existing conditions in the world; it can't go beyond the world as it is today and the difficulties of the United Nations are often the reflection of the difficulties caused by the major conflicts and the cold war etc. in the world. Nevertheless we do feel that it is the ineffectiveness of the functioning of the United Nations there that has led to the serious situation which we have to face in the Congo today. Because of it we felt that the time had come for a strong lead to be given and the Security Council did give a certain lead. The problem then became one of implementing that lead in that Resolution. It was about that time--or a little before that perhaps--that we were asked by the Secretary-General of the U.N. to send some Armed Forces from India. This was a novel proposition for us.

Although we have sent previously some Armed Forces to Indo-China and to Korea, the House will remember that it was under a different set of circumstances so that this request to send forces to the Congo was entirely a novel approach to us, a novel question for us to consider. We had even then a thousand men in the Congo but they were dealing with medical--we have opened large hospitals--supplies, signals and the like but not combat troops. It was not an easy decision for us to take.

But at the same time, we felt strongly that in the circumstances as they were, it was essential for the United Nations to be strengthened. If the United Nations failed in the Congo, it failed elsewhere also. In fact, it would gradually fade away almost in importance. The United Nations, therefore, should not be allowed to fail in this matter. At the same time, we made it perfectly clear that we could not send our forces there merely to sit there and do nothing or to be insulted and vilified, as has been the case before.

Then came the Security Council Resolution more or less on the lines

we had ourselves advocated and we felt, to some extent, in honour bound to support that. Even so, we made it clear to the Secretary-General that we could only send our forces if we were assured that that policy laid down by the Security Council Resolution would be implemented thoroughly. We do not want our people to be wasted by sitting there and doing nothing or to go into a wrong kind of conflicts. We made it clear that our forces should not be used against the people or force of any member-nation of the United Nations, except, of course, the Congo, where they had gone, except against the factions in the Congo, if it was necessary, as well as against the mercenaries from abroad who are serving these factions in the Congo, because the major problem in the Congo has been and continues to be these mercenaries, chiefly Belgian mercenaries and some others.

Right from the beginning of the Congo trouble, the U.N. has laid stress, the Security Council has, on the withdrawal of the Belgians. They did withdraw to a slight extent in August last or thereabout, but then they came back in much larger numbers thereafter and the place is swarming with Belgians today--soldiers, officers, trained men, technical personnel, advisers, political people and all kinds of people there--against the decision of the U.N. And they are supporting some factions in the Congo, which are working definitely against the United Nations.

The crux of the problem in the Congo today is the presence of Belgians there and I do not think the problem will be solved until the Belgians are withdrawn. I am not referring to every Belgian. They may be doing technical work there. They may continue to do that, but I am talking about the military and para-military forces, and political and like advisers to those Governments of Katanga and Leopoldville. In fact, I think we would be justified in thinking that the Katanga Government is--just formally it may be a separate Government--otherwise practically carried on by Belgians, Belgians from top to bottom almost. Therefore, this is the crux of the problem and I repeat it because, if the Belgians go from there, as they must, there will not be any real question of fighting

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there. It is through Belgium's support, and their officers, men and armies especially, that all this trouble has arisen there. Anyhow if there is some trouble afterwards, it can be easily dealt with.

Now, an unfortunate feature of the situation has been, in the past few months, that the presence of Belgians has, in effect, been directly and indirectly supported by some of their allies in Europe and America, because they are in the NATO alliance, and because I cannot imagine that, if these great powers had made it perfectly clear that Belgians must withdraw, they would have continued there. Yet, they have continued and when the U.N. has tried to take some action, it is the U.N. that has been criticised or the U.N. representative there who has been criticised. So, it is an

extraordinary state of affairs. They go on passing resolutions in the Security Council and some of these powers then come in the way of the implementation of the very resolutions they have approved of, and the result is confusion or weakness. And until this is removed, nothing much can happen there. We agreed ultimately, as I said, to send our forces there. A part of them have reached there by air and a part of them are going by sea. Meanwhile some other development have taken place. That is, the port of Matadi, which is the port for Leopoldville, has been forcibly occupied by Mobutu's forces and the Sudanese, who were holding it on behalf of the United Nations, were driven out. Now, this creates a new complication because, unless the port of Matadi is occupied by U.N. forces, it will not be easy for them to get supplies or even for the people who go there by sea to land there. The United Nations must, therefore, necessarily occupy the port of Matadi and, if necessary, to use force in such occupation. I have no doubt about that and certainly we cannot go on sending troops there, if they are not assured of a safe landing. These problems arise.

Again, the other problem arises, which has been the always, as to the attitude of the great powers--as I said, I am not referring to the small powers--who pass resolutions in the Security Council and then yet permit the Belgians to remain there or do not encourage the U.N. taking steps to bring about the withdrawal of the Belgians. These are issues which will have to be solved soon, in the next few weeks or even days.

CONGO USA INDIA CHINA KOREA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BELGIUM SUDAN

**Date :** Mar 27, 1961

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COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Laos

Then, Sir, the question of Laos has become a very urgent and important one and almost one might think that the issue of war and peace in a big way depends on what happens in the next few days there. Laos, again, is a peculiar example of wrong policies being pursued deliberately till they take one to the very edge of disaster and then an attempt being made to retrieve the position. Laos and all the Indo-China countries are position examples of countries which can only subsist, can only continue, if they remain uncommitted to the major blocs and if they follow what is called a neutral policy. That was the decision of the Geneva Conference five or six years ago. It

is only when an attempt is made to change that position and to draw Laos into one group of other that conflict occurs. That attempt was made, and as a result the so-called neutralist Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who was in Delhi a few days ago and passed through Delhi, was pushed out. His Government was broken and others came in. Always when a military solution is sought in favour of one group and it is aided by a foreign power on one side, another power aids the other group and the conflict increases. This is what has been happening and the military situation has been a changing one.

Now, on behalf of the British Government, which are one of the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conferences--the other being the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union--an offer has been made, which is a constructive offer, I think, and which is very near the proposals made some little time ago by the Soviet Union, not quite the same, but very near it. Therefore, I might hope that some agreement will be arrived at. I hope so, because anyhow a solution by military means will be no solution and if these conflicts continue, the result will be disastrous for Laos and the conflicts may become very much bigger. The prestige of great powers becomes involved, each side wanting its own protege to succeed. That is the position, Sir, and I earnestly hope that some way out to a solution will be found. But it can only be found if it is fully recognised that these attempts to rope in these small countries into one sphere of influence or other will lead to war, because one attempt to do so leads to the opposite attempt and then the big powers come in.

LAOS CHINA SWITZERLAND USA

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COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

United Nations

Then finally the question of the future of the United Nations was discussed at this Conference. We could not go very far into this matter. But two facts are clear. One is that the present structure of the United Nations is rather out of date. In 1945 when it was formed, I am not sure of the exact number but I think there were about 47 or 48 members of the United Nations, under

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50. Today there are 99 members. The only constant quantity both today and 15 years ago is the figure for Latin America which remains the same I think at 22 or 23. But in Asia and Africa many new members have come, and Asia and Africa are therefore very much unrepresented in the various organs of the United Nations. Therefore, the U.N. does not reflect the world position as it is, and if it does not reflect it, then it cannot deal with it properly. Therefore, the structure has to change.

How and in what ways it is rather difficult to say, because that structure can only change by mutual agreement, by agreement at any rate of the great powers. Otherwise you cannot change the Charter. It is for this reason that we in India have not pressed for the change, because we did not want to introduce another bone of contention there, at this stage when there were so many other quarrels, and it seemed to us essential that the change should come by agreement among, we might say, the permanent members of the Security Council. But then among the permanent members is, as we know, what is called China, the Nationalist China, that is Formosa, and it is a remarkable position therefore that the Nationalist China or the Formosan Government has got the right to veto every change. Obviously the United Nations cannot go on functioning when one of the principal subjects that comes up before it from time to time is that of representation of China, and the present representative is never going to agree to his own elimination from there as it is.

As a matter of fact about three years back there was a general agreement in the United Nations on a package deal of representation. A number of countries were accepted by both the contending parties and in that list was the Mongolian People's Republic. We in India of course have a Mission there, we recognised it for some time past. That was agreed to by every country, but this Nationalist Chinese representative at the Security Council vetoed that even though all the big powers and others had agreed to their coming in. It is an impossible situation in this way and something will have to be done. But again, the question is how to do it and the timing of it.

We are so anxious for the disarmament proposals to go through that we would not like delay to take place there by another argument which might almost split up the United Nations, an argument about the future of the United Nations itself. It is therefore that we thought that those matters should be considered at a later stage when some of these had been removed from the realm of our present disputes. But anyhow we feel that the United Nations if it has to function, has to function effectively. It is not merely a body to pass pious resolutions. If it has to function, let us say, in the Congo, it must function effectively, and therefore the executive apparatus of the United Nations must be an effective apparatus, not one which pulls in different directions. That seems to us essential, and that will become even more essential if the question of disarmament comes to implementation. That raises very difficult points, the implementation of a disarmament agreement. Obviously the present United Nations as it is, the Secretariat etc., cannot easily deal with such a vast

subject as the implementation of a disarmament agreement. At the same time it must be within the scope of the United Nations, this agreement, and they must be connected with it. Therefore, presumably some authorities connected with the United Nations but different will have to be built up to deal with disarmament. Those authorities must necessarily be such as to create a sense of confidence in all the countries concerned because, if they do not, they would not disarm. Therefore, all these various aspects of the disarmament problem are now before the U.N. and the world generally, and I hope that they will lead to some successful agreements. There has been, as the House knows, a marked change in the approach of the United States administration to these issues, and it does appear that this change may lead to successful results.

USA INDIA CHINA MONGOLIA CONGO

**Date :** Mar 27, 1961

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CONGO

Prime Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha on Combat Troops to Congo

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on Mar 06, 1961, on the Government's decision to send combat troops to the Congo.

About a month ago, the Secretary-General of the United Nations asked us to send Indian armed forces to the Congo. We informed him in reply that we had not approved of the way in which the United Nations had been functioning

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in the Congo. We had no desire, therefore, to send our armed forces to the Congo unless the policy of the United Nations was changed and brought more in line with our views on that subject. With passage of the recent resolution of the Security Council, which was sponsored by the United Arab Republic, Ceylon and Nigeria, the position has changed to some extent and it appears to us that a more correct and more effective policy would now be pursued. This resolution was drafted in consultation with many Afro-Asian powers and we were also consulted. A certain responsibility, therefore, is cast upon us.

The situation in the Congo has been a changing and confusing one and we were reluctant, as we always are, to send our armed forces outside

India. We gave careful thought to these matters and communicated our views about the policy to be pursued in the Congo to the United Nations Secretary General. When his reply was received it was considered generally satisfactory. After giving a very careful thought to all aspects of the question, we decided to place an army brigade at the disposal of the United Nations for service the Congo. In doing so, however, we informed the Secretary-General that we did not want our forces to come into conflict with the forces of any member country of the United Nations, apart from Congolese and Belgian and other mercenaries engaged in the Congo and further that the brigade should function as a unit by itself and not to be attached to other units. We laid stress on the very early withdrawal of the Belgians who are serving in the Congo as this appeared to be the crux of the problem there. We made it clear also that our troops must not be used in any manner against popular movements in the Congo. The transport arrangements will have to be made by the United Nations.

CONGO INDIA USA NIGER NIGERIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC LATVIA

**Date :** Mar 06, 1961

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### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### Shri C.S. Jha's Statement on Problem of People of Indian Origin in South Africa

Shri C. S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Special Political Committee on Mar 21, 1961 on the problem of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa:

Mr. Chairman,

Once again the Special Political Committee is considering the problem of people of Indian origin in South Africa. At every session of the General Assembly since 1946, this matter has been brought before the General Assembly by the delegation of India. The Assembly has adopted a number of substantive resolutions proclaiming and enjoining on the Government of the Union of South Africa that the treatment of the people of Indian origin in South Africa should be in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, that the maltreatment and discrimination against South African nationals of Indian origin constitutes a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, that such treatment impairs friendly relations between Member States, and that negotiations should take place between the Union of South

Africa and the Government of India with a view to arriving at a satisfactory solution of the problem in conformity with the Charter and with international obligations under the agreements concluded between the two Governments.

Mr. Chairman, I have tried to summarize the substance of the various resolutions. It is true that the resolutions of the last few years have mainly emphasized the need for negotiations and have invited-- which indeed in General Assembly parlance almost amounts to an injunction--the Government of the Union of South Africa to enter into negotiations; but all the resolutions of the General Assembly on the subject over since the resolution adopted by the 2nd part of the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946, stand unrevoked; and it is the totality of these resolutions which represents the unequivocal stand of the General Assembly on the problem of the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa.

Permit me to quote, Mr. Chairman, the historic resolution 44(I) of the 2nd part of the First Session of the General Assembly. It reads:

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INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

"The General Assembly,

"Having taken note of the application made by the Government of India regarding the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa, and having considered the matter:

1. States that, because of that treatment, friendly relations between the two

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Members States have been impaired and, unless a satisfactory settlement is reached, these relations are likely to be further impaired;

2. Is of the opinion that the treatment of Indians in the Union should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded between the two Governments and the relevant provisions of the Charter;

3. Therefore requests the two Governments to report at the next session of the General Assembly the measures adopted to this effect."

I said that this resolution was historic. It was so for many reasons. For the first time it brought to the world forum in a dramatic way the whole question of racial discrimination, from which millions of people in Africa, including of course the peoples of Indian origin, had been suffering for decades. It exposed in all its ugly nakedness the policy of apartheid and racism practised by the Government of the Union of South Africa--a Government which was composed of representatives of the white minority in South Africa without any representation or voice or influence of the 8 or 9 million non-white people of South Africa. The resolution constituted the expression of world opinion and the reaction of the United Nations to the denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms to the people of Indian origin in South Africa and, indeed, became a guiding precedent for the United Nations' attitude on questions involving denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It became the beacon of hope for millions of people all over the world. The bringing up of the question of treatment of persons of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa was itself a demonstration of the deep anger, anguish and humiliation of the 400 million people of India and of resurgent Indian nationalism at the denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms and racial discrimination in South Africa against persons related to them by ties of blood and culture whose only fault was that their forefathers had been Indian and they had been invited by succeeding administrations in South Africa in the 19th century and the then Government of the U.K. which was the metropolitan power, to work on sugar plantations and build up the prosperity of Natal and South Africa. Finally, the Assembly recognised that the treatment of persons of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa should be in conformity with the international agreements between the Governments of India and the Union of South Africa, such an agreement being the Capetown Agreement of 1927 and other declarations

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, Resolution 44(I) of the General Assembly was a milestone in the history of the United Nations. The members of the United Nations, even in the first year of the United Nations' existence, proclaimed in unequivocal terms that the human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Charter and, indeed, the emphasis on the aspect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the discussions in San Francisco was not merely academic, but a reality intended to govern the relations of States inter se and of governments of States with their own citizens.

Mr. Chairman, for 14 years, we have brought this question before the General Assembly. Many think of it as a hardy annual. It is no pleasure to us to bring up the same matter again and again and meet the solid wall of intransigence, complete non-cooperation and even defiance of the United Nations presented by the attitude of the Government of the Union of South Africa. But we feel that it is not only our duty but an act of faith for us to bring up this matter year

after year before the United Nations. Where great human principles are involved, where there is a question of denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms, where there is the instance of a Government which refused to heed to the signs of the times and whose policies, in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations and rules of decent and civilized behaviour, moves vast masses of men and lead to bitterness and potential danger of international friction, there can be no let up by us or by the United Nations. The United Nations must go on giving expression to world opinion on a question of this nature, until the conscience of the rulers of South Africa is roused and they recognize that the only thing to do, as much for its inherent rightness as in the interest of South Africa itself, is to remodel society and government in South Africa on the basis of equality for all and freedom from racial discrimination. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the question of the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa and on the question of Apartheid indeed keep faith with humanity and with the Charter of the United Nations.

The item under discussion is a facet of Apartheid and racial discrimination, of which those who at present rule the destiny of South Africa are high priests. The question of racial discrimination, which hangs like a dreadful pall over the Continent of Africa and which deeply

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moves not only vast numbers of Africans on the Continent but the vast majority of the human race elsewhere, is among the most potential dangers of strife and international conflict. Persons of Indian origin in South Africa, though small in numbers, are equally victims with the African People in the intensity and depth of humiliation and discrimination. In some ways, they have been pioneers in the fight against racial discrimination in Africa. If the objectives, which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and indeed form the very basis of the Charter, are to be realised, racial discrimination and Apartheid in South Africa and wherever else it exists in Africa, must be banished and made an ugly memory of the past. Continuing positive reactions and expressions of the United Nations unyielding opposition to the policies of Apartheid of the South African Government must eventually through sheer weight of world public opinion help in the solution of the problem of the persons of Indian origin in South Africa. Likewise, the solution of this problem in conformity with the Charter and with international agreements on the subject through a process of negotiation and conciliation would greatly help in realising the objectives of the Charter and in the solution of the much larger question of Apartheid and racism in South Africa and in other parts of the Continent of Africa, to which I have earlier referred.

Mr. Chairman, as I have said earlier, the Assembly is committed over the years to unequivocal condemnation of racial discrimination and racism wherever it may exist. On the questions of treatment of

persons of Indian origin, the Assembly has repeatedly asked that negotiations take place between the Government of the Union of South Africa and that of India. We on our part, while unyielding in our insistence on equal citizenship rights without any discrimination for the South African nationals of Indian origin, have been always ready and willing to negotiate with the Union of South Africa. This is because my Government believes in the methods of peace and negotiation. In fact, the attitude adopted by my Government has been modest and reasonable. We have even gone to the extent of offering to negotiate "without prejudice to the position adopted by any of the parties concerned in respect of the issue of domestic jurisdiction under Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations." We regret, however, to say that although we have approached the Government of the Union of South Africa many times in pursuance of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly since the Tenth session, the response of that Government has been absolutely negative. And the Members of the United Nations are faced now with a completely blank wall of non-cooperation and disregard of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions in utter disregard of the provisions of the Charter by the Government of the Union of South Africa, I would further add that my Government has never sought any special privileges for Indians in South Africa. All that we have asked for is that they should have the same rights as any South African citizens. We have equally strongly championed the right of the African people in South Africa to equality of citizenship. Indeed, we think that the Indians' and Africans' problems in South Africa are part of the same larger problem of freedom and equality of peoples in South Africa. We have no desire to intervene in the int affairs of the Union Government; we seek only to provide an honourable living to all people there, including Indians on the basis of equality, and we feel that this matter can be discussed and negotiated between the Government of the Union of South Africa and that of India in an honourable way and in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the international agreements between these Governments.

It is not necessary for me to go into the details of the disabilities suffered by persons of Indian origin in South Africa or into the history of the Indian settlements in South Africa. These have been narrated in detail on many occasions in the past before this Committee. It would, however, be well to recapitulate briefly how persons of Indian origin came to be in South Africa, in what circumstances they went to South Africa and the disabilities and discriminations suffered by them.

There are at present 450,000 persons of Indian origin in South Africa. Their forefathers went to South Africa in the second half of the 19th century as indentured labour for the sugar plantations; that is to say, they were recruited in India on the basis of indenture or contract, which provided that if after the period of indenture, they settled in South Africa, they could live like free men, "free to engage in any ordinary occupation and should not be subject to any discriminatory legislation." The labourers and their descendants settled down in South Africa and in due course became the nationals

of South Africa. But from the very beginning, measures were taken by the South African Government to discriminate against them and to impose on them various kinds of disabilities. These were so manifestly unjust that even the representatives of the British Government having control over South Africa were constrained to consider such measures unjust and iniquitous. As early as 1875, the member of the British Government concerned with these

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matters said:

"Above all things, we must confidently expect, as an indispensable condition of the proposed arrangement that the Colonial laws and their administration will be such that Indian settlers who have completed the terms of service to which they agreed, as the return for the expense of bringing them to the colonies, will be free men in all respects with privileges in no way inferior to those of any other class of His Majesty's subjects resident in the Colonies."

The Secretary of State for India noted in his despatch of July 21, 1897:

"We are therefore entitled to demand fair and equitable treatment involving complete equality before the law for those Indians who have already been allowed to settle in Natal, or who might hereafter under the new immigration law be permitted to do so."

Later in 1918 -- at that time legislation by South Africa, although it had become self-governing some years earlier, had to be referred to the Imperial Government -- the then Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury said in reference to some proposed legislation by the Union of South Africa--

"It would be a matter of greatest difficulty to enumerate any conditions under which it would be possible to justify the interdiction of a particular class in the State from engaging in normal legitimate and necessary occupations; and it would be still harder to justify dispossessing them from their existing means of livelihood, however liberal might be the terms of compensation. But the imposition of such disabilities on a class which owes its presence in the Colony to the Colony's own necessities, and whose numbers have been augmented by the voluntary action and indeed the settled policy of successive Colonial Governments, over a period of 16 years since the advent of self-government, would appear on its merits to constitute a hardship of a specially grievous character."

Thus there was a systematic erosion of the rights of the Indian settlers through successive and multiple discriminatory laws, but it is significant that the representatives of the British Government who then had responsibility for the various colonies and later of the Union of South Africa, even at that time protested against such legislation as being inherently unjust and also against the

understanding and agreements under which Indians had come to South Africa.

I may add that in our view these attitudes of the British Government and the liberal traditions of the people and the Government of the United Kingdom would appear to make it a matter of course for the representatives of the United Kingdom, to speak out in favour of equality of rights for the people of Indian origin in South Africa and to vote in favour of any resolution, the purpose of which is to settle this question through peaceful negotiations.

The great and noble spirit of Mahatma Gandhi rebelled against the discrimination and humiliation meted out to Indians, and in the early years of this century South Africa, where he was practising as a lawyer, became the venue of one of the most significant movements in history, namely the passive resistance movement for the vindication of fundamental human rights. That was veritable the beginning of the movement for equality and freedom of down-trodden peoples everywhere; and from it blossomed forth the mighty freedom movement of India based on passive resistance and truth and non-violence, which resulted in the freedom of the 350 million people of India and accelerated the freedom of the dependent peoples elsewhere. Gandhi's movement in South Africa was a partial success. It succeeded not so much in removing all discrimination against Indians, but it led to the famous meeting between Gandhi and Smuts and the Smuts-Gandhi agreement of 1914. This was in the main a gentlemen's agreement which offered temporary relief but was soon violated by the Union. This was indeed a successful process of negotiation and opened the way for the consideration of this problem in future years. The matter was subsequently raised at several Imperial Conferences, and I have already quoted the view of the Marquis of Salisbury in the Imperial Conference of 1918. The British Government of India never failed to raise this question at Imperial Conferences and elsewhere and backed by the public opinion of India worked heroically for the amelioration of the conditions of Indians in South Africa and for their treatment on a basis of equality. In 1926-1927, there was a Round Table Conference between the representatives of the Government of India and those of the Government of the Union of South Africa. The Conference resulted in the well-known Capetown Agreement. This agreement was concerned mainly with the assisted repatriation of those Indians willing to return to India and included an

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undertaking to "uplift" those who decided to remain and become part of the permanent population of South Africa. The "uplift" clause of the Agreement read:

"The Union Government firmly believe in and adhere to the principle that it is the duty of every civilised Government to devise ways and means and to take all possible steps for the uplifting of every section of their permanent population to the full extent of their capacity and opportunities, and accept the view that in the provision

of education and other facilities the considerable number of Indians who remain part of the permanent population should not be allowed to lag behind other section of the people."

This clause of the Agreement was never honestly implemented. However, the representatives of the Governments of India and the Union of South Africa again met in Capetown in 1932 to review the working of the 1927 Agreement. They reaffirmed the latter in view of its "powerful influence in fostering friendly relations between the two Governments." Such prospects were destroyed by the Union Government's continued enactment of discriminatory measures which violated the Capetown Agreement. Not only has the Capetown Agreement been ignored, it has been continuously violated. We are aware that the Representative of the Union of South Africa, some three or four years ago, characterised this Agreement as a "fairy tale". We would leave it to the judgment of the members of the Committee as to whether an agreement so solemnly reached between the plenipotentiaries of two Governments should be treated as a fairy tale or as a repository of the rights and obligations of the parties intended to be faithfully observed.

During the last 20 years, the situation regarding the persons of the Indian origin in South Africa has progressively become worse. The doctrine of the master race and of white domination is operating in South Africa in all its ugliness, and South Africa is indeed a prison-house for the vast majority of its population. Along with Africans, persons of Indian origin are relegated to the position of semi-slaves in their homeland. In 1943, the so-called Pegging Act was passed by the Union Parliament which prohibited the acquisition or occupation of land in Durban as between Europeans and Indians except by special consent. Three years later, this Act was replaced by the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act (1946), popularly known as the "Ghetto Act".

Asians were prohibited from buying or occupying property in Natal except in designated areas; the "unexempted areas"--and these were the better areas--were reserved exclusively for acquisition and occupation by the European Community. As if this was not enough, the Group Areas Act (1950) laid down that all land in the Union of South Africa would be divided and controlled by the Government for purposes of ownership and occupation by the different racial groups, including people of Indian origin. The Capetown Agreement was thus finally demolished arbitrarily and unilaterally.

What is the present position of the Indian Community in South Africa and what are the developments that took place last year? The people of Indian origin in South Africa are now believed to be 95% South African born. Professor Leo Kuper, Dean of the Faculty of Sociology, University of Natal, has calculated that in a city like Durban less than 5% of the Indians were born outside South Africa as compared to the 25% of the whites. Thousands of Indians of Indian families have members amongst them who are now the fourth and fifth generation of South African born Indians.

The year 1960 was the centenary of the arrival of Indian emigrants in Natal. The first batch of Indian labourers sailed from Madras on October 13, 1860 arriving at Port Natal (Durban) on November 16. They were the founding fathers of a community which has contributed much to the growth and development of South Africa and its economy; its rewards have been an ever-increasing measure of social and educational inequality, economic discrimination and political dismemberment all of which are contrary to the solemn undertakings given and agreed to by South Africa from time to time.

Emotionally and economically, if not technically (the Union Government discourages such integration), the Indian community identifies itself fully with South Africa. Two recent opinions on this matter from White and African sources may be cited. The Mayor of Cape Town, Mrs. Newton Thompson, in accepting a cheque for over œ 1,000 from the Cape Peninsula Indian community for her Coalbrook disaster fund, said: "As far as I know, the people involved in this disaster are Europeans and Bantu. So it did not really touch your community personally. This, however, proves to me that you look on yourselves as real South Africans. (Cape Times, 30.1.60).

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In noting the overwhelming response from the Indian community to the call by the African Congress for observance of March 28 as a day of national mourning for the Sharpeville dead, Mr. Moses Mabhida acting President of the Natal branch of African National Congress, said that he was "proud of the Indian community...my heart was warmed by the knowledge that we have the full support of the Indian people in our fight for freedom for all". (Indian Opinion, 1-4-60). Africans have also been going out of their way to defend the few rights that are left to Indians.

The South African Institute of Race Relations, a non-political body which furthers inter-racial peace harmony and co-operation in the Union by seeking the truth in all inter-racial situations and believes that such problems can be solved only on the basis of facts found by dispassionate, objective, scientific inquiry, has stated in the course of its findings on the hundred years of Indian settlement and development in South Africa:

"The legislation regulating the Indian Immigration Scheme clearly envisaged the prospects of permanent settlement, thereby historically conditioning legitimate Indian expectations of full and free citizenship, to which their initial political status gave support until their subsequent disenfranchisement ..... The subsequent imposition, contrary to explicit assurances, of further restrictions by the Union Government on the members of the community already lacking in status and opportunities has caused general despair and a loss of faith by the Indians in integrity of their White compatriots and the Christian government of their country."

Addressing the South African Institute of Race Relations, Dr. S. Coopan, a prominent South African Indian economist, reviewed the "process of crushing the Indian personality" in the Union. He has listed the following as the three major breaches of faith committed against the Indians in South Africa:

- (a) The promise of land, which was written into the law governing Indian indentured immigration, was repealed.
- (b) Persistent efforts had been made to expatriate the descendants of Indian labourers who had saved Natal from economic ruin. This repatriation policy betrayed "an astounding moral depravity".
- (c) The Natal Indians were deprived of the parliamentary franchise, and this act was witnessed by a British Government which had guaranteed equality of status for Indians and Whites.

Dr. Coopan concludes:

"The human hopes and aspirations of the Indians in South Africa are being gradually snuffed out in an attempt to demoralize them as a self-respecting, industrious and forward-looking people. The Indians in South Africa have become a small but powerful centre for the radiation of high human values. If it is the cynical intention of the rulers to bring about the disintegration of this centre then they will stand charged before the world with genocide."

On another occasion he stated before the Institute:

"South Africa is hell under sunshine for the Indian today, as it is for the other non-Whites. It is not the atomic bomb, nor the alleged danger of Communism that one talks about in Indian and non-White circles, but about the Colour Bar and Apartheid, because these are the facts of their everyday existence. They come face to face, at every turn, with the ugly spirit that is manifest in these devices to keep them down. The only relieving feature in this situation of unrelieved tension, bottled-up resentment and hate, is the presence and association of a small band of White missionaries, social workers, upholders of democratic traditions and liberal politicians who try to assist them." (Indian Opinion, 15.1.60).

Another South African Indian, Mr. N. T. Naicker, General Secretary of the Natal Indian Congress, described the plight of the Indian people as far more serious today than it had been at any stage since their arrival in South Africa. He observed:

"It is our centenary year and we are confronted with several grave problems but the all dominant question of life and death is held in balance by the obnoxious Group Areas Act ..... Group Areas will mean an end to all progress in every sphere of life. It will mean a life without hope and purpose, a life cut off from the moorings of civilization and a life at the mercy of those who rule ..... We bear no hatred or malice towards the European people but we do oppose

bitterly any policy which seeks to suppress a community for all times and make it mere chattel."

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Group Areas Act

The inflexible implementation of this act continued to be a source of hardship and economic frustration for the Indians. In no part of South Africa are the effects of the Group Areas Act more serious than in the smaller towns and rural areas of the Transvaal. Among the more distressing developments were:

Pietersburg--The entire Indian community in Pietersburg has been ordered out of their homes and shops to a stretch of barren veld two miles from the town. The first Indian people came to Pietersburg in 1884, two years before it was proclaimed or named as a town. They set up shops, they helped the White farmers in times of drought and depression. They will leave behind business worth over two million pounds. According to the Cape Times (16-3-60), most of the 850 Indians were descended from settlers who trekked to the town by ox-wagon in 1884.

Rustenburg--The entire Indian population, nearly 1,000 men, women and children have been given notice to leave their homes and shops. The Indians, who have traded and lived in the town since 1887, say "this means economic ruin for us." They will have to start their lives again on undeveloped land 2 1/2 miles from the Town Hall. The Deputy Mayor of Rustenburg said, "they could not remain where they are, because they are surrounded by Whites." The town's Coloured population--about 200--will also have to move, taking up land adjoining the new Indian group area.

The Cape Times, a distinguished newspaper of South Africa on March 15, 1960, editorially commented on "Rustenburg":

"The Indians are not recent arrivals. They came in republican times, and remained and multiplied because they provided a service that the local farmers valued. But now they are arbitrarily thrown out to

start life again in the open veld two miles from their customers. Having no vote, they have not been able to influence the course of events at all. They have not been consulted. The Group Areas Board's proceedings are in private. In other words, a voteless group is economically ruined by a stroke of an official pen. How do you explain or condone this oversea?"

The same story is being repeated in the areas of Durban, such as Cato Manor, Cavendish and Greyville. It will cost Durban at least 20 m. to uproot the settled Indian community (over 30,000) living at Cato Manor. Indians (together with Europeans) will have to pay higher taxes for their own eviction. The Indian community in the Umhlatuzena-Cavendish farm areas has invested considerable sums of money in developing land, which was originally covered with bush, as far back as 1900. The first land sale in Greyville could be traced back to 1891; there 4,000 Indian families would be painfully affected if forced to move. The Most Rev. Denis Hurley, Archbishop of Durban, has condemned the proposals to move Indians from Greyville as unjust, unnecessary, immoral and unchristian.

Natal Mercury (22-2-60) commented editorially on the Group Areas Act, as affecting the Durban areas particularly:

"On humanitarian grounds alone it is impossible to defend the callous uprooting of thousands of respectable Indian citizens and depriving them of occupational and ownership rights which they have held uninterruptedly, without let or hindrance, over the years. What is to be done with this mass of law-abiding citizens if they are to be summarily evicted from their homes? But on financial grounds also both the Cato Manor and the Greyville proposals are impossible."

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I do not wish to weary you with further such details. Permit me to recall at this moment the operative paragraphs of resolution 1460 XIV) adopted by the XIV Session of the General Assembly.

1. Notes that the Government of India has reiterated its readiness to enter into negotiations with the Government of the Union of South Africa in accordance with the expressed desires of the United Nations, and with the express declaration that such negotiations would not in any way prejudice its own position or the position taken by the Government of the Union of South Africa regarding their respective juridical stands in the dispute;
2. Regrets deeply that the Government of the Union of South Africa has not replied to the communication from the Government of India on this subject;
3. Draws the attention of the Government of the Union of South Africa to the repeated appeals of the General Assembly in this matter;
4. Appeals to the Government of the Union of South Africa to enter into negotiations with the Government of India;

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5. Invites Member States to use their good offices in such manner as may be appropriate to bring about the negotiations envisaged by the General Assembly in this matter;

6. Invites the parties concerned to report to the General Assembly, jointly or separately, regarding any progress which may be made."

In compliance with this resolution, the Indian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom on instructions from the Government of India, addressed a letter to the High Commissioner of the Union of South Africa in London. A simultaneous approach was made by the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations to the Permanent Representative of the Union of South Africa. The Government of Pakistan also made a separate, but simultaneous, approach to the Union Government. In the Government of India's communication of 4th April, 1960, the Government of India again expressed their readiness to enter into and pursue negotiations with the Government of the Union of South Africa in accordance with resolution 1460 (XIV) of the General Assembly. In order to make it easier for the Union Government to participate in talks with the Government of India, the latter reiterated their further desire "that such negotiations will be without prejudice to the position adopted by any of the parties concerned in respect of the issue of "Domestic Jurisdiction" under Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations. The Government of India earnestly trusted "that the Government of the Union of South Africa will welcome the initiative now taken and accede to the request made in pursuance of the General Assembly of the United Nations."

The Union Government have again ignored this resolution. They continue to treat a scrap of paper the numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on the subject. It will be recalled that at the 3rd Session the Assembly invited the Government of India, Pakistan and South Africa to enter into a discussion at a round-table conference, taking into consideration the purposes and principles of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. The negotiations for holding such a conference fell through and India again raised the question at the 5th Session. The Assembly once again recommended the holding of round-table conference and failing agreement on it between the two Governments by April, 1, 1951 decided to establish a three-member commission to assist the parties in appropriate negotiations. South Africa refused to accept the resolution on the ground that its terms constituted intervention in a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union Government.

At the sixth session, the Assembly again recommended that a commission of three members, one to be nominated by India and Pakistan, one by the Union, and the third to be nominated by the other two members or failing agreement between them by the Secretary-General, be established to assist the parties in facilitating

negotiations. The Secretary-General was also required to provide assistance to this end. There was no progress on the basis of this recommendation. At the seventh session, the Assembly established a Good Offices Commission, consisting of Cuba, Syria and Yugoslavia, to arrange and assist in negotiation between the parties. South Africa cast the only negative vote.

At the eighth session, the Good Offices Commission informed the General Assembly that it had been unable to carry out its task in view of the lack of response of the Union Government. The Assembly adopted a resolution continuing the Good Offices Commission and urged the Union Government to cooperate with the Commission. South Africa's was the only dissenting vote. At the ninth session, after the Commission had again reported failure, the Assembly adopted a new approach. It suggested to the parties "that they should seek a solution of the question by direct negotiations" with the assistance of an agency or person mutually selected. If the parties did not reach an agreement on the latter within six months, the Secretary-General was asked to nominate a person. The Secretary-General in fact, designated Ambassador Luis de Faro, Jr. of Brazil in June 1955 to discharge the functions called for in the Assembly's resolution. He reached the conclusion that in view of the Union's attitude there was nothing further he could do to facilitate negotiations between the parties. The Secretary-General reported to the tenth session of the General Assembly accordingly.

Since the tenth session, the General Assembly has adopted the basic approach that the parties should hold direct negotiations and report to it. (Also since the tenth session the Union Government, has not participated in the debate on this item). At the eleventh session, India and Pakistan reported failure of their efforts for negotiations with South Africa. The Assembly again urged the parties to enter into negotiations and appealed to the Union Government to cooperate to this end. At the twelfth session, the Assembly renewed its appeal to the Union Government to participate in negotiations with a view to solving the problem in accordance with the Charter and the Universal

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Declaration Human Rights. At the thirteenth session, the Union was assured by the Assembly that it could enter into negotiations without prejudice to the Union's juridical stand on this issue. India had in the debate expressly declared its intention of entering into negotiations without any commitments in regard to the juridical position. At the fourteenth session the Assembly drew the attention of the Union Government to its repeated appeals in this matter and again appealed to the Union to enter into negotiations. It also invited Member States to use their good offices in bringing about negotiations.

It is for the Committee to consider now what further action should be taken. It is a matter of great regret to my delegation that the Delegation of the Union of South Africa has consistently chosen to

boycott the discussion on this item. We should have expected them to attend the meetings in a matter which so vitally concerns them and involves moral issues of the highest importance on which depends the very future of the Union of South Africa, and receive the full impact of world public opinion as expressed in this Assembly.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to have taken so much of the time of the Committee. My delegation has, however, no apologies to make for bringing up this question. The question of persons of Indian origin in South Africa is an aspect of one of the most momentous issues of our times. The issue is whether the colour of a man's skin will determine his status in society and the opportunities that may be open to him or whether the people who do not belong to the white races in South Africa and in other parts of Africa have a right place under the sun. The treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa involves deeply moving moral and humanitarian issues apart from the fact that the conduct and policies of the Government of the Union of South Africa is a breach of international agreements and understandings and a breach of Union

Government's obligations undertaken in the Charter--solemn obligations to promote "Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." and reaffirmation of faith in fundamental human rights in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small" (Preamble to the Charter)

As I said at the beginning, we feel bound to bring up this issue again and again before the Assembly. We shall not rest content until inequity and racial discrimination have disappeared from South Africa. In this we have the mandate of the millions of people of India and elsewhere and the clear sanction of the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, as in other years, we do not ourselves propose to submit a resolution; we shall have this to other members of this Committee to find a suitable expression of the views and the reactions of the Committee. I would like to make it clear that we do not accept the position taken by the Union of South Africa that a consideration of the question of the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa constitutes intervention in the domestic affairs of South Africa. We have no desire to intervene in any country's internal affairs; we are zealous of and respect the sovereignty of every Member Nation here as much as our own, but we do not accept the proposition that any such gross violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms which so deeply moves millions of people and divides humanity can remain a purely internal matter. All that the Government of India wants is that the question should be resolved by peaceful negotiations in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. My delegation trusts that the members of the Committee will not fail to insist on such a solution.

INDIA USA SOUTH AFRICA UNITED KINGDOM PAKISTAN CUBA SYRIA YUGOSLAVIA CENTRAL  
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### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri C.S. Jha's Statement on South West Africa.

Shri C.S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made the following statement in the fourth Committee of the General Assembly, while introducing a draft resolution on South West Africa on Mar 21, 1961

Mr. Chairman,

In presenting yet another draft resolution on the vexed question of South West Africa, it is appropriate to recall that since the founding of of this organisation, the Assembly has adopted, on an average, five resolutions concerning South West Africa every year. A striking though tragic aspect of this question is that the Government of the Union of South Africa has not seen fit to implement or to show any inclination to implement in part or in full, even one single resolution so far.

This Committee and the Assembly have adopted these resolutions in the discharge of the

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United Nations, obligation of supervision over the Mandate, and more particularly towards the people of South West Africa, who were placed under international trust as early as 1920, the administration of that trust being vested in the Government of the Union on behalf of His Britannic Majesty. It should also be recalled that the mandate for South West Africa was not only C class mandate which was intended to be administered as an integral part of the territories of the Mandatory. Western Samoa, far smaller in size and population than South West Africa, was placed under the administration of New Zealand as a C mandate. It was later placed under Trusteeship, and at the end of this year that territory will achieve independence. So far as the Union Government is concerned these are lost examples, but we cannot afford to lose sight Of them.

In sharp contrast to the attitude and behaviour of other former

mandatory powers are the attitude and behaviour of the Government of Union of South Africa. Despite that, however, the Assembly has endeavoured over these last fifteen years to obtain the co-operation of the Union Government in the implementation of the mandate. When disputes arose between the United Nations and the Mandatory Power, these were referred to the International Court of Justice for their advisory opinions so that the responsibilities of the General Assembly and the obligations of the Mandatory Power could be juridically defined and established. In each case, the Assembly accepted the advice of the International Court of Justice. In each case that advice was either ignored or rejected by the Union Government.

In the negotiation that took place between the United Nations and the Union Government, the latter maintained the impossible position that it would not recognise the United Nations as the other party concerned, and that in clear defiance of the opinion of the International Court of Justice to the contrary! Much to our regret those negotiations failed as they were destined to fail in the face of the attitude of the Union Government. As a consequence, last year, two former members of the League of Nations, which conferred the mandate upon His Britannic Majesty to be administered by the Government of the Union of South Africa on his behalf, instituted contentious proceedings against the Union Government concerning the breach of the mandate in several respects. The institution of these proceedings did not and could not in any way imply the suspension of the United Nations powers of supervision of the mandate, its obligations towards the people of South West Africa, or its capacity to discuss this matter. The union Government raised the sub-judice plea to gain time and to push forward its own sinister designs in South West Africa, a territory with a distinct and welldefined international status. During the interval between the first and second parts of this session they have rushed through with a so-called referendum, in which the mandated territory was arbitrarily involved. The United Nations cannot accept the validity of that referendum in so far as South West Africa is concerned, and our draft resolution seeks to state that position.

Coming back to the plea of sub judice as a reason for barring discussion in the General Assembly, my delegation is of the view that such a plea is inapplicable. The proceedings before the International Court of Justice have been instituted not by the General Assembly or any other organ of the United Nations but by two members of the world organisation qua past members of the League of Nations which sanctioned the mandate for the territory of the South West Africa. One could plausibly make out a case, if so minded, against discussion by these two members, namely, Ethiopia and Liberia, though even in their case, they have done so not as members of the United Nations. There can, however, be no justification for citing the plea of sub judice against discussion by the Fourth Committee or the General Assembly as a whole.

and diplomacy by conference is an inherent right of the members of

the United Nations and must continue in full effect without any diminution or delimitation by reason of the proceedings before the International Court of Justice.

Thirdly, the plea of sub judice by the Union of South Africa is not maintainable as there is no acceptance in advance by it of the decision of the Court whatever it may be.

It is obvious that in raising the sub-judice, the Union Government was not showing any deference to the International Court of Justice. Only the other day the Representative of the United States addressed a question to the representative of the Union of South Africa asking whether his Government "was prepared to and

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would agree to accept the decisions of the international Court of justice and to abide by them. The answer the representative of the Union made to question is masterly in so far as it evades the issue. He said, and I quote in full:

"We have all respect for the Court and for the principles--here, for one, the principle of the sub judice rule to which I have referred. It is a rule which, I quite accept, is not so strongly adhered to and accepted in the United States as, for instance, in my country and that, I think, is one of the basic reasons for a fundamental difference in approach between our two delegations; and any aspect that is pending before the Court would, in our opinion, be ruled by that rule and therefore it would be out of place for me here to comment upon it."

This attitude is no different from the one adopted by the distinguished Foreign minister of the Union Government at the first part of the Session. This Committee of the Assembly felt--and we believe rightly--that it was not in any sense trespassing on the privileges and prerogatives of the International Court of Justice in continuing to discharge its own obligations and responsibilities as the organ of supervision of the Mandate when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1568(XV).

In that resolution the Committee on South West Africa was authorised by the Assembly, "in addition to its normal task, to go to South West Africa immediately to investigate the situation prevailing in the Territory and to ascertain and make proposals to the General Assembly on:

- (a) the conditions for restoring a climate of peace and security;
- (b) the steps which would enable the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa to achieve a wide measure of internal self-government designed to lead them to complete independence";

As in numerous previous cases, the Assembly urged the Government-of

the Union of South Africa "to facilitate the mission of the Committee on South West Africa". The Committee on South West Africa was asked to submit a preliminary report at the resumed session concerning the implementation of that resolution. That report has been circulated in Document A/4705. It is stated in that report that, in the words of the Union Government "it would not be possible for the Union Government to accede to the request contained in paragraph 5 of Resolution 1568" namely that the Union Government facilitate the mission of the Committee on South West Africa. This refusal of the Union Government to cooperate with the United Nations is based on the grounds:

- (1) the sub judice rule, which I have already dealt with, and
- (2) here I should like to quote the Union Government itself:

"It is necessary to point out that while the General Assembly had accepted the 1950 Advisory Opinion of the Court, the action now envisaged in operative paragraph 4 of the resolution would exceed the degree of supervision which applied under the mandate system."

It is this second part that I now wish to deal with briefly. While it is true that the Assembly accepted the 1960 advisory opinion of the Court, it could be recalled that the Union Government did not. Had the Union Government done so, and administered the Territory in accordance with the mandate and that opinion of the International Court of Justice, the present position might perhaps not have arisen. It ill becomes that Government to remind us that the Assembly accepted an opinion of the International Court of Justice, which it has itself flouted.

Moreover, it cannot be maintained that by asking the Committee on South West Africa--or another body for that matter--to investigate on the spot certain charges concerning the maladministration of the mandate, the Assembly has attempted to exceed the degree of supervision envisaged in the mandates system. First of all, I should like to point out that neither the Covenant, nor the text of the mandate rules out the possibility of investigations being made on the spot. The League Council never ruled such investigations out as inadmissible in principle. While views in the Mandates Commission differed on this matter, the Chairman of that Commission stated, in 1925, that the Commission was entitled to ask the Council "to send a Commission into any mandated territory about which the Mandates Commission desired more information than was available through the ordinary sources," In this particular case, practically no information is available through ordinary sources. On the other hand, the Union has seldom hesitated to suppress information. The view of the Chairman of the Mandates Commission was supported, strangely enough, by the Portuguese member of the

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Commission, who expressed the opinion that, "in view of the fact that

the Council, in the dispute between Greece and Bulgaria had just decided to send Commission to those countries, though they were not Mandated countries, a fortiori, the Council had the right to send a Commission to a country administered by a mandatory power."

It should also be remembered that, in actual fact, the Council had decided, in several exceptional cases to send special commissions to mandated territories. On September 30, 1924, it decided to appoint a Commission to collect on the spot facts and data required to enable the Council to reach a decision on the question of the frontier between Iraq and Turkey. On January 14, 1930 the Council decided to entrust a Special Commission with the settlement of the question of the rights and claims of the Jews and Moslems with regard to the Wailing Wall of Jerusalem. Under a Council Resolution of December 9, 1931, a Commission was appointed to study on the spot the question of the frontier between Iraq and Syria. On December 16, 1936, the Council decided to send three observers to the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Syria) who were to observe and to keep in touch with the facts in order to be able to inform the Council if necessary. Finally, on May 29, 1937, the Council decided to appoint a Commission to organise and supervise the whole of the elections in the Sanjak.

While the circumstances of the appointment of the Commissions might have been different, in the case under consideration a dispute of farreaching significance has arisen between the Mandatory and the very people placed under its charge. Complaints have been received here by the hundred concerning brutal military action directed against those people, of their forcible removals from one place to another in callous disregard of their right to property. The despatch of an investigating body is rendered necessary furthermore, by the very fact that the Government of the Union has persisted in its refusal to submit annual reports on the administration of the Mandate. In all these circumstances, is it too much for the Assembly to say that an investigation on the spot should be carried out by the Committee on South West Africa which has to deal with these complaints? In view of the fact that all the other former mandated territories have become independent, or are about to achieve independence, is it too much for the Assembly to ask this Committee, as it did ask in Resolution 1568, "to make proposals on the steps which would enable the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa to achieve a wide measure of internal self-government designed to lead them to complete independence as soon as possible"?

The position today, in brief, is that the Union Government has, once again, categorically refused to cooperate with the United Nations in the implementation of the Assembly's resolutions; and this position the Assembly must totally reject. In the face of this refusal we cannot sit back and accept that it is the inherent right of the Union Government to flout the mandate, to flout the will of the people and to flout the Assembly in the discharge of its obligations towards those people. We have to carry forward the purposes of resolution 1568 (XV). And, that is exactly what the draft resolution, which I have the honour to introduce now, seeks to do.

We have reason to believe that the Committee on South West Africa as a whole, wishes to discharge the tasks allocated to it in resolution 1568. We have reason to believe that the Assembly continue to consider the full and effective discharge of those tasks as essential. This draft resolution, therefore, requests the Committee on South West Africa, in operative paragraph 5 immediately to proceed to discharge the special and urgent tasks entrusted to it as fully and expeditiously as possible. And if the discharge of these tasks is essential, as indeed it is, these tasks have to be carried out with or without the consent or the cooperation of the Government of the Union. For, the will of the Assembly cannot be subjected to the intransigence, and the territorial greed of the Union Government.

Now, we are content at this stage to leave it to the Committee on South West Africa as to the manner in which it will discharge these tasks. We believe that it will be necessary for the Committee to attempt to visit South West Africa. We also believe that under the mandate the Union Government cannot refuse entry to the agents of the organ of supervision. We hope, therefore, that the Union Government will not aggravate the situation or the course of events by adopting an impossible attitude. For by so doing, it will only precipitate further the dangers to international peace and security which already exist, in large measure, on account of the application in the mandated territory of South West Africa of the policy of Apartheid, the implementation of which in the Union's own territory itself the Security Council has adjudged in the resolution of April 1, 1960, as one "that led to international friction and, if continued, might endanger international peace and security." It is, therefore, that we have thought it necessary to call the attention of the Security Council to the draft resolution that I

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am now submitting for the Committee's consideration. THE Union Government is not sovereign in South West Africa. Even with respect to sovereign government there are precedents here of setting up Commission of investigation and enquiry. It has, therefore, seemed desirable to the co-sponsors to address an appeal to Member States to cooperate with and assist the Committee on South West Africa in the discharge of its special tasks.

Mr. Chairman, the situation in respect of South West Africa in part of the complex of apartheid perpetrated by the Union of South Africa. The actions of the Union of South Africa amount to an extension of area of apartheid; they have the effect of extending the venom of apartheid into the large territory and population of South West Africa which, in terms of the mandate and of the Charter of the United Nations, as indeed by the terms of the declaration for the granting of independence to colonial peoples and territories, are entitled to immediate independence so that they may fashion their destiny according to their own wishes and genius. The South West African problem in fact raises the important issue whether the area

of freedom and justice should be extended or be subject to curtailment and the with-ering blast of apartheid and racial discrimination.

I beg formally now, Mr. Chairman, to move the resolution which stands in the name of 23 sponsors. I am sorry to say that by error the name of Afghanistan has been left out from the list of sponsors, and this may be added. My delegation considers it an honour and privilege to be asked to sponsor and move the resolution before this Committee. The resolution is selfevident and is a necessary corollary to the resolution adopted at the first part of this session and its predecessors. The problem today is not so much of South West Africa but of South Africa itself. It is the duty of the General Assembly to bring South Africa by persuasion and argument and by unrelenting pressure of world opinion as expressed in the resolutions of the General Assembly to a realisation of its responsibilities and to an observance of the letter and spirit of the mandate which in no circumstances could permit a trustee to misappropriate the territory which was placed in its charge as a sacred trust.

We believe that the implementation of this resolution is necessary to end the deteriorating situation in South West Africa, which is likely to aggravate international friction and to endanger international peace and security. It is my hope, and the hope of the other co-sponsors of this draft resolution that the Fourth Committee and subsequently the Assembly Plenary will adopt this proposal with an overwhelming vote.

INDIA SOUTH AFRICA USA WESTERN SAMOA NEW ZEALAND ETHIOPIA LIBERIA PERU  
BULGARIA GREECE IRAQ TURKEY ISRAEL SYRIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AFGHANISTAN

**Date :** Mar 21, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri B.K. Nehru's Statement at ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development

Shri B. K. Nehru, India's Commissioner General for Economic Affairs in Washington, made the following statement at the Committee for Industrial Development of the ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) on Mar 30, 1961

Mr. Chairman,

Mr. Said Hasan pointed out in his opening remarks the potential

importance of this Committee and the significance of its institutions by the ECOSOC. The United Nations Organisation has shown a remarkable aptitude to grow new limbs to meet special wants and we agree that it is in the hands of this Committee so to develop it that it makes an important contribution in a field hitherto not adequately covered by the United Nations. This Committee is fortunate in its Chairman with his immense experience, and in its principal co-officials the Vice Chairman and the Rapporteur with their special talents whose guidance and help will greatly assist the Committee in its work.

The scope of that work is immense. Industrial Development is an important, even the most important, aspect of the problem of economic growth. Both are continuous historical processes and must inevitably present problems of different natures and of different intensities in the different material circumstances and in the different stages of historical evolution of the various national communities. Thus, as our distinguished and learned colleague from the German Federal Republic has pointed out, the problems may be so dissimilar between one country and another as to lead to a conclusion that a generally applicable blueprint for industrialisation is well-nigh impossible. Yet, the definitions of the problems each national community has faced or is facing and the nature of the solution to each such problem cannot but be useful to others; our Committee is charged with the work of setting out a task-programme for the Secretariate that would draw reference to these problems and solutions in appropriate priority.

The first problem of the underdeveloped

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countries is the fact that their resources in practically every factor of production--except perhaps natural resources--are extremely limited and their due husbanding becomes a most imperative matter. Economic planning, as an instrument of national growth, thus becomes most necessary and most important and, ideological considerations apart, becomes as much a necessity as domestic budgeting in a normal and prudent household. It must, however, be pointed out that the allocation of scarce resources to priority needs is but the start of economic planning; unlike the situation in advanced countries, the tools of economic growth are yet in the making in underdeveloped countries and, therefore, the institutional aspects of economic growth and industrial development and the close dovetailing of progress and achievement in different sectors become essential parts of economic planning. Further, as the distinguished delegate from the United States pointed out, economic irrationalities play an important part in economic decisions and planners have to take into account these nonmaterial considerations which their communities allow to influence economic development. Thus, when an economic plan is prepared, it becomes an integrated projection of activity, no one part of which is independent of the other and the whole of which is based on the national resources, the national genius and the national traditions of the people concerned. Industrial Development is an

important sector of this integrated whole but we should remember that a pattern of industrialisation in any underdeveloped country makes sense only to the extent that it is a consistent part of a comprehensive programme of economic action. This fact is occasionally not fully appreciated namely that in the development of an underdeveloped country it is not individual projects of one or another type or description that form, or should form, the crucial issue but the whole plan as such. Thus in India, it is not a petrochemical industry here or a steel mill there that is a project; it is the whole Five Year Plan that is a project, just as to quote our esteemed colleague from the United States, in Puerto Rico the whole "Operation Bootstrap" is one operation.

Assuming that the other constituents of economic growth are properly welded, industrial development, which must to the economic planner be mainly the employment of machines to promote the output per man and to generate fresh utilisable resources, becomes the fulcrum of overall growth. Much has already been said in the last two days about industrial development in India, particularly by the distinguished delegates from the U.S.S.R. and the German Federal Republic. Also unlike the United States, the U.S.S.R. and many other countries, that have spoken before me, India, which has travelled a long way since its independence, has yet quite some way to go. But I feel it useful to summarise the salient points of our economic planning so far as industrial development is concerned.

First, we believe that a well based and operated social, economic and monetary system is a prime requisite for industrial development: it is necessary to ensure a stable society by a sound democratic system, by affording growing chances of education and better hygiene and by ameliorative social reforms as in the case of land holdings; further it is necessary to guard against uncontrolled inflation and for this purpose, it is necessary to devote sufficient attention to agriculture and to the adequate supply of foodstuffs and of textiles which are, in underdeveloped countries in the tropics, the main elements of consumption; it is necessary to mobilise internal resources to the fullest extent possible and a sound fiscal and monetary system is absolutely necessary for this.

Second, against the background of a well-knit overall economic plan, we regard heavy industries as a key sector of industrial development. We recognise that, just as in the case of what have come to be known as "public utilities", the State cannot leave the growth of heavy industries to the happenstances of private enterprise and indeed that it cannot leave their operation open to the more short-term concerns of private enterprise. With this objective, we have assumed State responsibility for not only the public utilities and strategic industries but also for petroleum development, mining and metallurgy, iron and steel and heavy machinery plants. Our Five Year Plans detail the further activity in these industries necessary from time to time and the projects we have to put through.

Third, we believe that in the rest of the industrial field private

enterprise should be welcomed; but it cannot have a right of pre-emption for all time; in other words, if in respect of basic needs, like fertilizers, there are short-falls in production, the State has the duty to step in.

Fourth, we recognise that the organisational capacity of individuals has a very useful role to play in development and industrialisation but this should be consistent with the directions, purposes and allocations of each Plan. Thus private enterprise is encouraged by the prescription of targets, and by positive incentives, to organise industry towards clearly defined national goals. Regulation of private industry is by such guidance and not by close operative control.

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Fifth, we recognise that mobilisation of financial resources is primarily an internal task and that we have to do all we can in our tax and loan programmes and by our export trade before we can justify our seeking foreign aid. In this aspect, and indeed, as I have already said, in the other aspects of an integrated socioeconomic programme of action, we note with satisfaction the criteria enunciated by the President of the United States in his Foreign Aid message to his country's legislature a few days ago. While we are greatly and sincerely appreciative of the foreign aid we have in such ready measure received--and continue to receive--from the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., some of the Commonwealth countries, Germany, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries, we know that these contributions while being vital can only be incremental to internally generated resources.

Sixth, to conserve scarce foreign exchange, we approve of private sector industrial schemes with foreign exchange implications only if they save imports, promote exports or can be financed in respect of import requirements out of long-term foreign investment.

Seventh, we place every great stress, with our present limitations of human resources, on sound institutional arrangements for industrial development like industrial estates, efficient corporate arrangements both in public and in private sectors, training institutes and the like.

Eighth, we recognise that a rational programme of industrial development must also be consistent with employment and so encourage the growth of small scale and cottage industries.

previous speakers. We also believe that some suggestions can usefully be made to the Secretariat on how these studies are to be undertaken. Our own comments and recommendations we shall make after this general discussion when the subject is taken up in detail whether Committee or otherwise.

The second duty to which my delegation attaches even greater

importance, is not one that has been entrusted to us by ECOSOC but one which I feel we owe to ECOSOC, namely, a determination of what role this Committee could usefully play in future apart from the gathering and the dissemination of information. This important aspect has been referred to by many distinguished delegates, particularly those from Poland the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. Economic growth and development, per se, and industrial development as part thereof, have not been the special concern of a special limb of the U.N.

Organisation itself though the Regional Commissions and one of the U.N. Specialised Agencies, namely, the World Bank--which I incidentally notice is not represented here--have dealt therewith.

There is a wide variety of possibilities in this context: it may be useful, for instance, to have a Standing Sub-committee of this body to fill the present lacuna in respect of Industrial Development. We feel that this and other possibilities should be studied by a Subcommittee and reported back to the Committee which may then, if it deems appropriate, submit suitable recommendations to ECOSOC.

To discharge these two duties, I would recommend the setting up of two--and not more than two--sub-committees or Working Parties-- one on the Task Programme and the other on Recommendations on Future Activities. I believe that the Task Programme can be adequately handled by one sub-committee. We have also to remember that some delegations, as mine, have only a limited number of members, and cannot serve in many sub-committees. I also propose that these two sub-committees be asked to report back by Wednesday or Thursday next.

I believe that the two Resolutions referred to us can also be considered by the Second Subcommittee suggested by me.

INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC GERMANY YUGOSLAVIA NORWAY POLAND SLOVAKIA

**Date :** Mar 30, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PAKISTAN

Indo-Pakistan Property Talks

The Union Rehabilitation Minister, Shri Mehr Chand Khanna, informed the Lok Sabha on

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Mar 16, 1961, that though some progress was made in regard to less

important items, no progress had been registered in respect of more important items at the meeting held under the Indo-Pakistan Movable Property Agreement at Rawalpindi from February 22 to 25, 1961.

Shri Khanna, who stated this in reply to a calling attention notice by some Hon'ble Members of the House, listed these subjects on which no progress had been made: transfer of lockers and safe deposits, transfer of bank accounts of evacuees in the agreed areas and declaration of displaced banks as non-evacuees. Progress was made in regard to items like exchange of sale proceeds of movable property and court deposits.

The representatives of India and Pakistan at the meeting, Shri Khanna added, had, however, agreed that the matters on which no decision could be arrived at, would be further discussed at the next meeting of the Implementation Committee likely to be held after two or three months.

Following is the text of Shri Khanna's statement:

A meeting of the Implementation Committee set up under the Movable Property Agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan was held at Rawalpindi from February 22 to 25, 1961. Besides the normal review of progress in regard to restoration of movable property or its sale proceeds, verification of claims in respect of Post Office Savings Bank accounts and Certificates and claims of contractors; exchange of court deposits and gold loan accounts etc., the main items for consideration at the meeting were the assets of the Joint Stock Companies, transfer of lockers and safe deposits, transfer of bank accounts of the evacuees in the agreed areas and declaration of displaced banks as non-evacuee concerns.

"Some progress was made in regard to the exchange of sale proceeds of movable property of evacuees, verification of claims in respect of Post Office Savings Bank accounts and Certificates and exchange of court deposits'. Regarding contractors' claims and gold loan accounts, the Pakistan Government undertook to expedite the verification of pending claims and to hand over the valuables in the case of gold loan accounts already adjusted to our Deputy High Commissioner at Karachi.

"So far as the assets of the Joint Stock Companies are concerned, out of a list consisting of 176 Joint Stock Companies which was handed over to Pakistan over four years ago, they gave details of verification only in respect of 18 companies. Even in regard to these 18 companies the Pakistan delegation took the stand that since they were evacuee concerns, their movable assets only were restorable. India's stand was that these companies were not evacuees, as they had shifted their headquarters to India before August 15, 1947, in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Law. and as such they were entitled to the restoration of both their movable and immovable property. It was agreed that India would collect the necessary information proving that these companies had legally shifted their

headquarters to India before August 15, 1947, and send the same to the Pakistan authorities for further consideration of their cases. It was also agreed that the Government of Pakistan would expedite the verification of the assets of the remaining companies.

"No progress could, however, be made in regard to the transfer of lockers and safe deposits, transfer of bank accounts of evacuees in the agreed areas, and declaration of displaced banks as non-evacuee concerns. All these items are closely interlinked.

"Under the Movable Property Agreement, the transfer of lockers and safe deposits was linked with the transfer of bank accounts of evacuees in the agreed areas. Under the Banking Agreement also, provision has been made for the transfer of bank accounts of evacuees in the agreed areas, but this agreement also stipulates that banks would be treated as non-evacuee concerns and given facilities to realise their assets and after discharging their liabilities to repatriate their surplus assets to the other country. As Pakistan had not given the agreed facilities to the Indian banks and had, on the other hand, frozen the assets of a number of them under their Evacuee Property Law, India has been pressing Pakistan to declare these banks as non-evacuee concerns, so that they may be able to function normally, realise their assets and discharge their liabilities.

The Pakistan Government was prepared to declare the functioning of Indian banks in Pakistan as non-evacuee concerns, subject to India permitting the bank accounts of evacuees in the agreed areas being transferred to Pakistan along with their funds. In regard to these banks also, Pakistan stipulated that they would be allowed to function only after they had satisfied the State Bank of Pakistan about their bonafides etc. to function in Pakistan. Regarding the banks which were not functioning in Pakistan, they said that they had not been able to take any decision. India

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could not accept this position, because the Banking Agreement, to which Pakistan was a willing party, clearly stipulated that all the displaced banks in Pakistan, whether functioning or not functioning, would be treated as non-evacuee concerns. But, mere "treatment" as non-evacuee in the light-of the past experience was not enough. India; therefore, urged that all banks should be declared as non-evacuee concerns. The Pakistan Government stated that they would consider the matter further after going into the question of the assets and liabilities of the various Indian banks in Pakistan.

"Thus the position is that though some progress was made in regard to less important items like exchange of sale proceeds of movable property, court deposits, etc, no progress was made on the more important items like transfer of lockers and safe deposits, transfer accounts of evacuees in the agreed areas and declaration of displaced banks as non-evacuee concerns. It was, however, agreed that the matter on which no decision could be arrived at will be further

discussed at the next meeting of the Implementation Committee which is likely to be held after 2-3 months.

PAKISTAN USA INDIA

**Date :** Mar 16, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PAKISTAN

Review talks on Trade Agreement

The following Joint Communique was issued at New Delhi on Mar 28, 1961, 1961 at the conclusion of the talks between Indian and Pakistan Trade Delegations:

Meetings between the Indian and Pakistan Trade Delegations to review the Trade Agreement took place in New Delhi from March 22 to March 28, 1961. The agreed minutes of the meeting were signed on March 28 by Mr. I. A. Khan for Pakistan and Mr. K. R. F. Khilnani for India. The progress made was noted and the difficulties experienced in the working of the Agreement were examined in detail. It was agreed that steps would be taken to facilitate further movement of trade. The ceilings agreed for the first year have been repeated for the second year in addition to the carry-over of the balances of the first year except in the case of live stock. The groups have been re-arranged and one group has been deleted, but the commodity (betel leaves) mentioned therein has been moved to another group, i.e. miscellaneous commodities. The ceilings for the current year would be as follows:-

- Group A--Fresh fruits, fruit plants and seeds ... Rs. 40 lakhs
- Group B--Raw cotton from) Pakistan bidi leaves, cement stone boulders and railway materials etc. from India ... Rs. 150 lakhs
- Group C--Live stock including horses from Pakistan. ... Rs. 5 lakhs
- Group D--Jute cuttings from Pakistan Steel materials and coal from ... Rs. 100 lakhs

India.

Group E--Miscellaneous commodities ... Rs. 115 lakhs

Total Rs. 410 lakhs.

It is expected that as a result of the detailed review, the flow of trade will increase.

PAKISTAN INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Mar 28, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MONGOLIA

Cultural Agreement Signed

A Cultural Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of Mongolia was formally signed in New Delhi on Mar 09, 1961

The Agreement aims at further strengthening the existing ties of friendship and promoting better understanding and closer cooperation between the two countries in the fields of science, education and culture.

His Excellency Mr. Mangalyn Dugersuren, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in India of the People's Republic of Mongolia, signed the Agreement on behalf of Mongolia and Prof. Humayun Kabir, Union Minister for Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, on behalf of India.

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MONGOLIA INDIA

**Date :** Mar 09, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MONGOLIA

Text of Agreement

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, Desirous of strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries, promoting cultural between them and developing mutual on in educational, social and cultural

Have decided to conclude an Agreement on cultural co-operation and to this and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

MONGOLIA INDIA USA

**Date** : Mar 09, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MONGOLIA

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA

Shri Humayun Kabir,

Minister of Scientific Research & Cultural Affairs,

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic

His Excellency Mr. Mangalyn Dugersuren,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, who having exchanged their credentials and found them good and in due form have agreed as follows:

Article 1. The Contracting Parties declare their desire to encourage and promote co-operation in the fields of culture, science, education, literature and art.

Article 2. The Contracting Parties shall, within the available financial resources, promote in every possible manner the development of close co-operation between the cultural, scientific, arts, educational, health, sports and other similar institutions of the two countries, especially by means of:

(a) exchange of exponents of culture and arts, professors, scholars, educationists and students;

(b) organisation of exhibitions on educational and cultural aspects of each country, staging of theatrical and dance performances and film shows and music concerts;

(c) translations and exchange of books, periodicals and other publications of scientific, literary and artistic value.

(d) exchange of films, newsreels and gramophone records, photographic and written material on science, art, literature, etc., and

(e) reciprocal visits of sports and athletic teams.

Article 3. The Contracting Parties shall consider the question of establishing cultural institutes in their countries according to the laws prevailing in each country.

Article 4. The Contracting Parties shall offer their good offices to facilitate the mutual recognition by universities and other educational authorities in the two countries of the degrees, diplomas and certificates awarded by them.

Article 5. This Agreement shall come into force immediately on the date of the exchange of the Instruments of Ratification which shall take place as soon as possible at Ulan Bator. It shall remain in force for a period of five years and shall continue in force thereafter until it is terminated by either party by giving notice of not less than six months in writing.

In witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed this Agreement in duplicate in Hindi, Mongolian and English, all texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

Signed at New Delhi this ninth day of March Nineteen Hundred and Sixty one.

For the Government of the Republic of India (HUMAYUN KABIR) Minister of Scientific Research & Cultural Affairs.	For the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic (MANGALYN DUGERSUREN) Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
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MONGOLIA INDIA USA

**Date :** Mar 09, 1961

## Volume No

1995

RUANDA-URUNDI

Prime Minister's Reply in Lok Sabha

Asked about the attitude adopted by the Government of India about Ruanda-Urundi, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following reply in the Lok Sabha on Mar 29, 1961

Ruanda Urundi is administered as a Trust territory by Belgium under a mandate of the United Nations. The Government of India look forward to its early independence and hope proper conditions can be brought about for the holding of elections under U. N. supervision. Until then, the Government of India would emphasise the obligation of the administering Power to act in accordance with its mandate and the principles of the U. N. Charter; Government are particularly anxious that no unilateral action regarding the future of Ruanda-Urundi should, be taken, without the approval of the United Nations, and furthermore that the territory is not used as a base for the accumulation of arms or armed forces, not strictly required for the propose of maintaining public order.

INDIA BELGIUM USA

**Date :** Mar 29, 1961

## Volume No

1995

SWITZERLAND

Indo-Swiss Agreement on Instrumentation Mechanics

An agreement was signed in New Delhi on Mar 24, 1961., between the Swiss Foundation for Technical Assistance, Zurich (Switzerland) and the Council of Scientific & Industrial Research for the establishment and operation of an Indo-Swiss centre for training precision mechanics in the fields of instrumentation. The centre will be a co-operative effort between the Swiss industry and the CSIR and is being established as a part of the Central Scientific Instruments Organisation which has, as one of its aims, the organisation of advanced training of technicians and specialised personnel for the

Indian scientific instruments industry.

The Swiss Foundation is an organisation of the private Swiss industry and has over 200 enterprises as its members. Under the agreement, the Foundation will provide free of cost to the CSIR equipment worth one and a half million Swiss francs and the services of six to eight Swiss technical experts for a period of five to eight years. The total cost of this assistance will be over six million Swiss francs. The CSIR will be responsible for providing the buildings, the Indian staff and the necessary supplementary equipment, besides meeting the recurring expenditure for the Centre and the local cost of the experts.

The offer for the establishment of the Indo-Swiss Centre materialised as a result of the discussions last year between Prof. M.S. Thacker, Director-General for Scientific and Industrial Research and Dr. Fritz Real, Minister Plenipotentiary and Dr. Hans Schindler, Director and Chairman respectively, of the Swiss Foundation for Technical Assistance.

A three-year practical and training course will be offered at the Centre to apprentices recruited from all over India. Specialised training will be given to selected craftsmen already working in industry. Programmes of technical training at the Centre will be drawn up by mutual consultations between the Council and the Swiss Foundation. This will meet a long felt need for highly trained precision mechanics for the growing instrument industry in India.

The Centre will also provide consultative and advisory service to Indian instruments industry and may undertake production of selected instruments to help in its training programme.

Scientific instruments needed for teaching, research and industry in India are mostly imported and only a fraction of the growing demand is being met by indigenous manufacture. In view of the increasing tempo of industrialisation and technical education and scientific research, the demand for scientific and industrial instruments is increasing considerably. Realising this, the Planning Commission set up in 1957 a Committee headed by Prof. M.S. Thacker, Director-General of Scientific & Industrial Research, to formulate specific proposals for the development and manufacture of different types of scientific and industrial instruments in the country. At the instance of the Planning Commission, the Council of Scientific & Industrial Research decided in October, 1959,

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to set up the Organisation.

Signatories to the agreement are Prof. M.S. Thacker, Director-General, and Mr. P.M. Sundaram Secretary of the Council of Scientific & Industrial Research and Dr. H. Schindler, President and Dr. F. Real, Director of the Swiss Foundation for Technical Assistance.

**Date :** Mar 24, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

#### Communique on Visit of Mr. Kosygin

At the invitation of the Government of India, Mr. A.N. Kosygin, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and Madame Kosygin paid a visit to India. Mr. Kosygin was accompanied by Mr. S.A. Skachkov, Chairman, State Committee for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, Mr. G. M. Pushkin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Ivanov, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Mr. Plotnikov, Director of the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences, and M. Sergeyyev, Member of the State Committee on Economic Relations. In Delhi Mr. Kosygin had talks with the Prime Minister of India on the present International situation with particular reference to Disarmament, Congo and Laos. He also had detailed discussions with the Planning Commission of India on the current Indian Five-Year Plan and the draft Third Five-Year Plan. The members of the Planning Commission were particularly interested to hear Mr. Kosygin's views on the principle and technique of short term and perspective planning.

Mr. and Mrs. Kosygin and the other members of the party later paid visits to Calcutta, Bhilai, Madras, Bombay, Ankleswar and Baroda. The party was accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador in India, Mr. Benediktov, and the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Shri S. Dutt. At Bhilai, Mr. Kosygin had talks with the Indian and Soviet engineers and other experts on the production of steel and plans for future expansion of the Bhilai Steel Mill. He had similar talks with the Soviet and Indian oil experts at Ankleswar and Baroda on the problems of oil production in the Ankleswar area. Mr. Kosygin was greatly impressed by the progress in oil operations already made at Ankleswar.

The Government of India are glad to have had an opportunity of discussion with Mr. Kosygin who dealt with the question of planning in the Soviet Union for a long time. They have no doubt that the discussions which Mr. Kosygin had with the Indian experts will not only assist them in the execution of the tasks, but will also open the way to further collaboration between India and the Soviet Union in wider fields.

## Volume No

1995

UNITED KINGDOM

H. M. Queen Elizabeth's Farewell Broadcast

The following is the text of the farewell broadcast over All India Radio by H. M. Queen Elizabeth II on the eve of her departure from Delhi:

Tomorrow my husband and I are leaving India, and I have already said good-bye to many of the people who have looked after us with so much kindness and efficiency while we have been here. But I also want to thank as many of the people of India as I can reach through this broadcast for the wonderful reception you have given us.

I have always hoped that sooner or later I would have the good fortune to come to India. Now that this wonderful visit is drawing to an end, I have been thinking over all those things which will stay in my mind.

My husband and I will take with us the most vivid impressions of places, events, and people. We shall remember some of the great modern buildings of India of the last few years--the splendid building of the Indian Medical Institute here in Delhi, for instance, and the great industrial plants of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Many

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of your famous ancient building were already known us in pictures and photographs, so we looked at them with an added pleasure and interest. No less fascinating is the contract of your landscapes from the Himalayas, which we saw from the air, to the plains of Central India and the hills of the South.

Of events, there were so many that they form a kaleidoscope of infinite colour and variety. Most of all we were thrilled by the wonderful welcome which was given to us, wherever we went, by such great and friendly crowds. There was the splendid Republic Day parade in Delhi, which, together with the folk dances and the ceremony of Beating Retreat, gave us an idea of the unity and diversity which together make India. There were the crowds of villagers in the countryside, the textile workers of Ahmedabad, the massive

demonstrations of affection in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. I cannot hope to enumerate all the other occasions, I would only say how happy and moving they all were.

It is much too soon for me to form any clear impression of what I have seen and experienced, and I realize that 23 days in this vast country is too short a time in which to form any reliable opinions, but one thing is perfectly obvious. No one can fail to recognize that this country is dedicated to bringing about, within a democratic framework, a better, richer, and happier life for every citizen. This is an immensely difficult and challenging task, and there would be no hope of success unless everybody was prepared to work and, if necessary, sacrifice themselves in this cause.

It is plain to see that, however much personal outlooks or backgrounds may differ, there is a deep underlying unity of purpose and effort. I can assure you that for someone like myself, who has the experience of travelling widely and seeing many people, the efforts being made and the achievements are truly impressive. I know that the people of Britain join me in wishing you rapid progress and the fullest success.

I am also particularly heartened by the spirit of inquiry and of ambition which is to be found everywhere among your younger people. All over the world there is so much to be done for the less fortunate, and it is upon the young generation in every country that tremendous responsibility will fall in days to come. We always welcome to Britain those from India who come to live and study among us, and who not only learn but also teach us something of their country. I hope to see even wider and deeper friendship developing between the youth of all our Commonwealth countries, so that the great varied talents which we have may be shared to our mutual advantage and to the advantage of the world.

I wish I could thank personally all the people who have been so kind and generous to us during our visit. I thank the President, who has been such a thoughtful and kindly host. I thank the Prime Minister and Government of India who have made it possible for us to see so much of your country in such a short time. I thank also the state governments for the care with which each visit was prepared and managed. Our special gratitude is due to the many members of the airlines, the railways, the post and telegraphs administrations, the defence services, and the police who worked so hard for us in so many ways.

But, above all, I express my thanks to the people of India as a whole. This visit, and your great welcome to us, have set the seal on the new relationship between India and Britain and on the abiding friendship between the two peoples. It has also shown that the new Commonwealth which came into being in 1947 is firmly based in the hearts and minds of the people as a means of co-operation for the peace and progress of mankind.

My husband and I send you our warmest thanks for your kindness and hospitality, and we wish you all the greatest happiness and prosperity in the years to come.

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INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Mar 24, 1961

**April**

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CUBA INDIA CONGO ANGOLA LAOS

**Date :** Apr 01, 1961

# Volume No

1995

CUBA

Prime Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on Apr 21, 1961 on the situation in Cuba:

The House is no doubt not only greatly interested but anxious about the developments in Cuba. I really cannot throw very much light so far as facts are concerned. We have no special source of knowledge. We get, of course, some pieces of information but mostly we ourselves have to rely on what is appearing in the newspapers. One of the difficulties about the accounts appearing in the newspapers is to sort out what is likely to be correct and what is likely to be incorrect. Because, there are a number of radio stations about--not here I mean--in that area, some public, some known and some unknown, some secret, which give out news constantly "this has happened". And that news is not particularly reliable.

Anyhow, for some time past, some weeks past, long before this particular development in Cuba, there were reports in the American press about the likelihood of some such thing happening, about people being trained, and the possibility of some kind of an invasion of Cuba. Now, there are, I believe, a very large number of Cubans, Cuban exiles and other Cubans, living in the United States. I should imagine there are about a hundred thousand Cubans living in the Carribean area outside Cuba. I do not know what their sympathies are. Many of them may be pro--the present Government, pro-Castro as it is called; many of them may be against, some undoubtedly are against.

There is one fact. Preparations have been made for weeks and months past for some activity of this kind, that is from the mainland. The mainland may be the United States territory or some other territory on the mainland. And it is rather difficult to conceive that all this could take place without the acquiescence and, perhaps, the help of the authorities there concerned.

Then this invasion took place--of course, there is no doubt that there has been an invasion--and on a fairly big scale, armed invasion, by air, by sea and by land--land, that is by forces which were landed.

President Kennedy has stated very firmly that he does not wish to intervene and that no Americans are taking part in this. We must accept that.

But the other point arises, that Americans as such are not taking part. But these people are coming from areas from the American mainland, and they could not very well have come or been trained or armed without the consent of the authorities there who undoubtedly sympathise with these people. That has been publicly stated many times. Now, this raises very difficult questions as to what exactly is intervention. One may not go oneself, but one may encourage others to go. And it is a bad precedent, I think, because in other cases, elsewhere this may be utilised in a particular way.

Anyhow, we think it has been a very unfortunate development which has not only created all this turmoil and civil war in Cuba but rather bedevilled other international questions that were being discussed. There is this question of Laos. We appear to be fairly near some progress in regard to Laos, in regard to cease-fire and the Commission meeting in Delhi and a Conference meeting in Geneva afterwards; we were very near it; may be today, maybe tomorrow some agreement may be arrived at; only small details and dates have to be discussed. Well, the sooner it is done the better. But I am quite sure that even the Conference on Laos that will meet will now meet unfortunately in a little more strained atmosphere than it might have met a little previously, because of this. And all these things depend so much on the background, on the countries' faith in each other's bona fides etc. All these things have happened.

I cannot say what the future developments in Cuba are likely to be. The newspapers today have announced that the rebel forces, that is the invading forces, have been defeated. Possibly that is correct. But, again, it is stated these were the fore-runners and others may come afterwards. So it is difficult to say.

All that I would submit, with respect, is that there should be no interference in Cuba by outside countries. If the Cubans themselves want either to do something to their present Government or not, it is up to them to decide. Others should not intervene.

So far as we are concerned, we have recognised, for the last two

years, the Government in Cuba.

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Their Ambassador is here in Delhi; our Ambassador in Washington is also our Ambassador in Havana. We want this Government Resulting out of the revolution in Cuba to Function. and we sympathise, and we do not want the people of Cuba to destroy themselves in a civil war. In fact, it is not up to us to interfere or intervene there in any way. And I would suggest that no outside country should intervene or interfere on either side.

CUBA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC LAOS SWITZERLAND

**Date** : Apr 21, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### Shri Krishna Menoh's Statement in General Assembly on Congo

Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations made the following statement in the General Assembly on the situation in the Congo on Apr 05, 1961

My delegation takes this rostrum today for the first time since the untimely death of one of our colleagues during the progress of this session. We join in the many expressions of regret and condolences which have been set forth from this rostrum, and we request our colleague from Cuba to convey them to his Government and to the family of the late Ambassador.

We are today debating a subject which, on account of the fact of its rather frequent appearances before the Assembly, the large number of speeches which have been made and because it comes in a session of the Assembly that has already lasted five or six months, is perhaps likely not to project itself before our minds with the importance and urgency that should be connected with it. Therefore, my Government desires that, in spite of the fact that a great deal has been said about this matter, it places the view before the Assembly that there is a danger of not seeing the woods on account of the trees.

Through all these details that have been brought about, it is necessary at this stage to have a look at the problem of the Congo as it faces the Congolese people, as it faces the United Nations and, also, the problems of world peace and security.

It is worthwhile to recall that this question came before the General Assembly seven months ago in an emergency session, an emergency session that was called four days before the regular session of the Assembly began, meaning thereby that we regarded this matter with extreme urgency, on which action had to be taken.

Prior to that, for two months the Security Council had this matter under consideration. And the general decisions with regard to the-- "intervention" is the wrong word--United Nations role in this Congo problem was a matter of decision for the Security Council. I think it is worthwhile to remember that, because there would have been no role of the type that the United Nations has at the present time in the Congo except for the fact that the Security Council resolved to do so without dissension.

Even at the risk of repetition, one has to go back to this issue, because the position today is such that, unless we constantly remind ourselves of the circumstances in which the United Nations became involved in this matter, we are likely to wonder whether our actions are right or wrong or whether we should go faster or slower or in one direction or another,

Therefore, I refer briefly to these documents of 13 July 1960, when the United Nations was requested by the then Government of the Congo to take action, the legitimacy of which Government there was no doubt whatsoever. What is more, it was not as though the United Nations was left to decide for itself as to the type of intervention that should take place, because the Government of the Republic at that time requested the urgent despatch by the United Nations of military assistance. Therefore, there has been a great deal of, if I may say so, unfactual talk, which perhaps might be regarded as robbing the Charter of its adequate sense of responsibility; that is to say, that this was a military adventure on the part of the United Nations or on the part of its officials or, perhaps, by virtue of the inspiration of certain countries, which countries seem to change from time to time.

The cable went on to say that this military assistance was asked for by the Congolese people, and the purpose of this request is totally justified by the Charter. The second sentence reads:

"This request is justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed between

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Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on 29 June 1960." (S/4382)

The document further states:

"Under the terms of that treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on

the express request of the Congolese Government. No such request was ever made by the Government of the Republic of the Congo and we therefore regard the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our country." (Ibid.)

We may well be asked whether the United Nations or all of us exercise foresight in not taking up this question at that time as an act of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter. But, then we can deal with the situation only as it is today. But so far as the Congolese Government was concerned--and at that time there was no question as to who was the government because it was signed by both Mr. Kasavubu, who is President of the Republic, and by Mr. Patrice Lumumba, who was Prime Minister at that time--the document goes on to say that the cause of the trouble in the Congo is the machinations of the colonial Government and the attempt to create movements of secession in their own country challenging the integrity of the Congo; that is to say, it was an attack on the Congolese people, their independence, their dignity and their integrity.

This Government said at that time that it refused to accept this as an accomplished fact and submit to the imperialist machinations of a small group of Katanga leaders. Therefore the request came to us, first of all, because of an act of aggression. Then there was the fear of dismemberment of the territory and its effect upon the sovereignty of the country. What is more, it was followed by other economic and social factors. Now, that is one part of it.

The other part, which is highly relevant today, is contained in document S/4389/Add. 5, dated 29 July 1960, where the Secretary-General, in reporting on the implementation of Security Council resolution S/4387, sets out the agreement reached between the Republic and the United Nations.

Now, let us leave alone, for the purpose of understanding this issue, the question of the legitimacy or legality of this or that other government, and so on.

I think it is a well understood proposition in international behaviour that administrations and governments have to take on responsibilities and commitments under agreements and treaties, and here, in Add. 5, the following is stated:

"The Government of the Republic of the Congo states that, in the exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the presence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military assistance from the United Nations..." (S/4389/Add. 5)

Now, so far as the United Nations is concerned, that position has not been altered. Neither assistance nor military intervention nor the introduction of military personnel has taken place except in accordance with the previous request. Therefore, we are entitled to

continue to except this good faith.

The document further states:

"...it likewise states that it will ensure the freedom of movement"--this is very important at the present time--"of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the activities of the Force." (Ibid.)

I am quite free to confess that a government may put forward this kind of agreement and, under certain circumstances, that it may denounce it, because treaties are denounced. There have been no denunciations of this agreement. In fact, many times it has been ascertained that there will be no denunciations.

It may also be expected that while a government undertakes to ensure freedom it may not have the competence or the capacity to do so. Now, that also is understandable. While the present position is not one of ensuring freedom but of assisting this freedom and, therefore, there is this basic document--on the one hand, the request, and, on the other hand, the agreement by the United Nations--this is one part of it which comes from the Congolese; the other part comes from the United Nations.

The document further states:

"The United Nations takes note of this statement of the Government of the Republic of the Congo and states that,

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with regard to the activities of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the task assigned to the Force in the afore-mentioned resolutions;" (S/4389/Add. 5)

What are those tasks? They are to obtain the withdrawal or the evacuation of the Belgian forces, to prevent the dismemberment of the territory, and also to assist in the non-emergence of factional disorder. Now, those three things are still being carried out by the Force.

The document further states:

"...in particular the United Nations reaffirms, considering it to be in accordance with the wishes of the Republic of the Congo, that it is prepared to maintain the United Nations Force in the Congo until such time as it deems the latter's task to have been fully accomplished." (Ibid.)

In other words, on 14 July of last year the Republic accepted that the decision of the termination of these tasks was a matter for the United Nations. Therefore, there can be even no unilateral

denunciation.

I will not read the rest of this but my Government desires that these basic matters be referred to us again at some time in the future. The Security Council having taken into consideration the conditions under which the United Nations will participate in the solution of the problem of the Congo, it came before the Security Council and neither the legality nor the admission of this item, nor the decisions at which they arrived, have been challenged either by this Assembly or by the Security Council, or by anyone elsewhere. In other words, all the action taken thereafter is consonant with the Charter.

So on 14 July and 22 July, the Security Council passed resolutions. The effect of those resolutions was to set out the purposes of the participation of the United Nations in the general difficulties in the Congo which were, as I said, to obtain the withdrawal of the Belgian aggressors, as the Congo Government would say; to request other States to refrain from any action that would promote this trouble; to offer to the Congolese people economic, technical and other aid; and to assist in the maintenance of law and order and, what is more, to help them maintain the integrity of the Congo' Therefore, the position of the United Nations was consistent with the position of the Congolese people and their Government, that their country was not to be dismembered, their independence was not to be violated, their future was to be decided by themselves.

It may be asked why the Government of India desires at this particular time to go into what some may regard as ancient history. The reason is that all that happens at the present time, whether it emanates from the President of the Republic or one of the factional leaders who side with him, or from one of the secessionists who do not side with any of the factions as such but generally challenge the entire authority of the United Nations, the agreement, and what is more the independence of the Congo itself, is disturbing and contrary to all of these basic ideas.

There then came a time when the matter again came before the Security Council, just before the emergency session. The Security Council confirmed the authority given to the Secretary General by its resolution of 14 July. The Secretary-General has just made a statement in reply to various, what he called side issues, but whether they are side issues or not, they are issues and they are part of the main problem. Therefore they become connected with the main problem.

My Government does not desire to become involved in an unnecessary dispute in this matter. At the same time, we must consider matters where grave issues are involved in the Congo, where military personnel of different countries are involved, a considerable amount of money has to be found for expenditure, the prestige and the future of the United Nations is in jeopardy if the outcome is bad. It is the hope and the desire of my Government, so far as is possible, not to allow other issues, however strongly felt by various parties, to so

far intrude as to weaken the authority of the United Nations. My Government has never concealed the fact that in their view certain things might have been done differently or that certain organizations might have had a different character, and so on. That is why we are here. But in our opinion, the resolution of 9 August places upon this Organization as a whole, and certainly upon the Security Council as a whole, until such time as the authority given to the Secretary-General is withdrawn, the responsibility for what has happened. Equally, it places upon the Secretary-General, under the article which he has quoted, the responsibility for executing its mandate. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council are entitled to charge the Secretary-General that the interpretation of the authority may have been excessive or wrong, his execution of it might have been wise or unwise,

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might have been weak or strong. All those criticisms are possible in regard to an executive authority. But the originating body, the Security Council from whom this authority emanated has never invalidated that authority and, so far as I can see from my papers, that authority has not been withdrawn.

We are very much concerned in this matter because, while the Secretary-General, is sometimes regarded as one individual, according to the Charter he is nevertheless an organ of the United Nations. It may be that if ever we rewrite the Charter we will have other ideas in that regard. There are six organs of the United Nations: The General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the World Court, and the Secretary-General. This Charter was largely formulated, not by humble people like ourselves, but by the great ones who were responsible for its founding. That being so, the Secretary-General in this matter, at the present moment, and his office is something which concerns us all. It is quite true that at times we may differ as to whether his actions proved to be too weak or too strong, wise or unwise, or whatever it might be, and when those actions must be considered, remedies must be sought, and so on. But since the office of Secretary-General in this connexion is operated by so many people who are not under the delegation of the authority in the sense of the abdication of the Secretary-General, but only under the delegation of the execution of matters, and since one of those who are on the spot happens to be a national of my country and has come under the unfair and gross criticism, it is necessary for us to treat this in a very impersonal way. Later in the course of these observations, my Government would seek to ascertain from other countries where public opinion is expressed so strongly in this matter, whether that opinion really reflects the views of their Governments, because in private and as between Governments, we are given a contrary view.

We now proceed from August to September. In September of that year, the emergency meeting took place and they passed resolution 1474 which is more or less the charter of action so far as the Assembly is

concerned. I said at the beginning that the United Nations participation began in order to attain certain objectives. Therefore we are entitled, after the passage of seven or eight months, to see what distance was travelled, how far away we are from the objectives, whether the gap between the objectives and the conditions which prevailed at that time have been narrowed or otherwise.

Looking at the Congo picture today, we find that first of all, the moment for the disintegration of the Republic of the Congo, that is say, the attack on its sovereignty, is stronger than it has ever been. In one part of the Congo Mr. Tshombe, to whom I shall refer later if there is time, largely and mainly with the assistance of Belgian and foreign mercenaries in personnel and resources, has challenged the existence of that Republic. What is more, he has offered a frontal challenge to the United Nations. Therefore, we are not faced merely with the question of whether we like this or that person or some small legality, or something of that character. We are faced with the basic and fundamental position that it was the common desire of the representatives of the Republic as it was at that time when they came to us, and on the basis of our sense of responsibility, that the integrity of the Congo should not be violated. Today, after eight or nine months, we are faced with a movement of secession of a considerable character and what is more, there are suitable constitutional processes that are put forward with all the appearance of constitutionality except that they are not in conformity with the fundamental law of the Congo or any other published and declared legal documents which from the structure of government and organs of that territory, which would divide it up. That is on the first aspect, whether the gap is wider than it was before.

Second is the question of foreign intervention, with which I shall be dealing at such length as I can in the time I have. Let us look at the position today. After eight or nine months, the main military resistance, not only to the United Nations but to the dignity, the unity, the future of the Congo as well, comes from foreign intervention. In other words, the aggression complained of by Mr. Kasavubu and the late Mr. Lumumba at that time, has become almost permanent, and in spite of the various guarantees, assurances and hopes given to the United Nations, the core of support given by the Belgian Empire to assist the enemies of Congolese national independence in maintaining their selfish positions, is stronger than ever before. Therefore, while there may have been withdrawals, there have been no withdrawals of Belgian military power or intervention in such a way as to make a peaceful solution of this problem possible. So then, on the second point also, after eight months we are very far away.

Then we come to some other matters which are of perhaps a more detailed character and which follow from the others. While in July of 1960, the Republic, as a unity with perhaps the exception of

Mr. Kasavubu, was not only appealing to the United Nations but expected the United Nations to do many things--and the United Nations acted in response to its appeals--today we have a situation of non-co-operation of the United Nations with which I propose to deal in detail later on. What is more, the forces of the world Organization, as represented by either its civil servants or, in this particular case, its military arm, are incurring active hostility and sometimes hostility of a character which, but for the restraint exercised by the United Nations, might well lead to more ugly situations. So on this third point also we are far away.

Then we have the situation that if the United Nations is to render aid in order, at least, to deal with the conditions of famine and economic distress in the Congo, it should be in a position where it enjoys ingress and egress with regard to this territory, as promised in the agreement between the United Nations and the Congolese Government, where it says that the Government

"...will ensure the freedom of movement of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the activities of the Force." (S/4389/Add. 6).

All that has disappeared, and we have now reached a situation in which, for example, the seaport that gives access to Leopoldville is being denied to the United Nations. And I want to tell my African and Asian friends, this is not a question of violation of the sovereignty of the Congo, and it would be a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding of the facts, to think that the United Nations is a kind of imperial power that is trying to protect itself. Under the agreement it is entitled to the use of these places, and if that use is denied, then there is a breach of the agreement, and, what is more, a situation in which the purposes cannot be implemented. So, whether it be at Banana or Matadi, these are situations which cause great distress and which would prolong the present state of affairs and prevent the peaceful solution that otherwise might be achieved.

Over and above that, we have in Katanga, one of the richest areas of the Republic, a state of civil war. It is often thought that it is only a question of Katanga having an irredentist or secessionist movement, under the leadership of Tshombe. If that were so, it would be bad enough, because, after all, there is civil war in the Congo as a whole. But that is not the whole situation, so far as we know from all the debates and all the material available to us; for, in addition to there being a civil war--an irredentist, secessionist civil war--there is civil war in Katanga itself. That is to say, there exist in various parts of the territory of Katanga, north, south, east and what-not, fights among factions of such character that the progress of the country and its unity are very violently threatened--and all this with the inspiration, the active assistance, of the former colonial Power.

We come now to a more recent instance where my Government feels it has to express itself without any fear of being open legitimately to the charge of interference in the internal affairs of a sister State; that is, the proposals put out before the world by what is called the Tananarive Conference. It would not lie in the mouth of any one of us nor would it be within the competence of any one of us to say that a Member State could not change its character, its constitution, its structure or anything of that character. But when the purposes of the United Nations intervention and when their participation is to maintain the integrity of the Republic, and when, what is more, the agreements have been on that basis on the initiative of the Republic itself, then, obviously, for a section of the people to go to some place and have a conference and make a decision unilaterally appropriating to themselves certain parts of this territory and breaking up its unity, is not a thing that this Organization could accept, because the Republic was admitted to the United Nations under entirely different conditions. When the Republic is admitted to the United Nations under these conditions, and when practically without exception everybody here recognizes Mr. Kasavubu as the President of the Congolese Republic, my Government accepts Mr. Kasavubu and the Republic of the Congo. But it does not accept the functional competence of Mr. Kasavubu in many matters. It is one thing to say that a President is the constitutional head; it is something else to say that everything he does is constitutional. But the first is more important in this context, that Mr. Kasavubu is the Head of the Republic; and at the same time Mr. Kasavubu appears party to a conference that wants to break up the Republic. Now, these things do not go together.

So, when we take these five aspects, we find that today, after seven months before the Assembly and nine months before the United Nations, the Congolese problem presents the spectacle of the United Nations still having to assist in the prevention of the break-up of this territory, of assisting the people of the Congo to be able to

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have a form of government under constitutional liberties for themselves and to enjoy their freedom in peace and dignity. And what is more, have to see that the prestige and authority which arise from the agreements so far as the United Nations is concerned are maintained in this area.

There has been so much censorious criticism of actions of both the United Nations and various countries, criticism coming from various quarters, that if we were to go into all of that we would be likely again to get lost and not be able to see the wood.

There have been tragic events in the last few months. In the first instance, as Mr. Hammarskjold pointed out to us, the Army entered politics; that is to say, instead of being an arm of the law, it took the law into its own hands: Mobutu became a law unto himself, and while the President, as I said, was constitutional, he acted

unconstitutionally in conferring authority upon him. We then had a situation wherein, as the Secretary-General told us in one of his reports, they had begun to participate in matters which were not their concern, thereby creating a different situation. That has gone on, and during the few months just before we met we had the tragic situation that not only had factional forces become the determining authorities in legislatures and constitutional assemblies, but the strong arm and not the law had become the authority.

That was succeeded by the use of political assassination as an instrument of political settlement. All countries have passed through various vicissitudes. Sometimes they have had civil wars, revolutions, constitutional changes. But there is nothing that is more reprehensible as a method of political transformation than political assassination. Political assassination is a euphemism for dastardly murder. That is to say, when there is no public opinion behind a party, then that party or a group of individuals, instead of organizing mass forces, tries to stab its opponent in the back. That is political assassination. With the murder of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues, and the murder of the other people, there was introduced into the Congo situation something that is totally inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter or with the purposes of the United Nations.

In those circumstances, we were getting no nearer to the five objectives laid down. The Belgian forces were not only disrupting the unity of the Congo but even making the economic functions of the United Nations difficult, so that the prestige and authority of the Organization were being challenged--and not in a small way. What I mean is that, if the United Nations fails in the Congo, it fails in Africa--if it fails in Africa, it fails in the world--and that takes us nearer and nearer to a situation of a threat to international peace and security.

In February of this year, the General Assembly having recessed, the matter was again brought up before the Security Council. At that time, we were confronted not only with the shocking murders and with the threat of civil war, but with another factor which is not often mentioned--the conditions of economic distress. As early as last December, the Secretary-General informed this Assembly that each day 200 people died in the Congo because of lack of nutrition. If that was the situation then, things are worse today. With the salaries paid to these factional armies and the various advisers and what not--and the figures are available to us--there is no doubt that the value of money has gone down, and therefore the distress of the people must be greater than ever before.

Thus, the matter came up before us once again in February of this year, and the Security Council was called upon to address itself to this problem. Here my Government desires to make a few observations, partly to clear our position and to inform the Assembly and also to draw the attention of the Secretary-General. It was our view at all times, which we reiterated in this Assembly, that the original

resolutions passed by the Security Council gave this Organization the necessary legal authority to take the steps which were required to attain the objectives. At that time, there were doubts about it. But, in any case, those doubts have been cleared by the resolution of 21 February. On that date, the Security Council adopted the resolution contained in document S/4741, which reiterated the previous objectives and urged the United Nations to:

"take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort".

That is to say, the United Nations accepted the responsibility for using such force as was necessary to maintain the purposes and the objectives of the agreement reached with the Republic of the Congo. It reaffirmed the previous resolutions, called again for the convening of Parliament and for the reorganization of the armed personnel, who were undisciplined and not under

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Proper control, and it called upon all States to extend assistance.

I will not go into that resolution in great detail. My country is not a member of the Security Council. However, in view of the interest generated by this problem and the concern felt by a large number of countries, for the first time in the history of the United Nations the Security Council became so enlarged that it was almost the same size as the Assembly three or four years ago. At any rate, this resolution which was proposed by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic, was adopted by the Security Council without opposition--and, under the Charter, any resolution of this character which is passed by the Security Council becomes binding on this Organization. Secondly, while normally it is not the business of a non-member of the Security Council to move a resolution, we were aware of the time and in full co-operation with the three movers of the resolution and fully appreciative of the results reached.

We are glad to know at least some of the permanent members of the Security Council, like the United States and the United Kingdom, approved of the resolution. Mr. Stevenson said that, while he did not agree with everything, he thought it a good resolution. He said:

"Although we have some reservations about certain aspects of the draft resolution, which we have made known to various members, including the sponsors, we think it is basically a good resolution...". (S/PV. 941, p. 41)

Basically, what does the resolution say? Basically, it reaffirms all that was said before and says that we must put more steam into this, more force into it, and get it implemented. We must be in business. Mr. Stevenson said that "it is basically a good resolution and we

believe it should be adopted".

The same thing was said on that occasion by Sir Patrick Dean. He asked:

"Can we not now lay aside our partisan feelings...(and) join together in approving this draft resolution?" S/PV. 942, p. 11)

Therefore, at least two of the permanent members of the Security Council, which have a great deal of responsibility for world security, supported this resolution. The Soviet Union did not oppose it. If the Soviet Union had objected basically to the resolution, it had the right and the duty--and, what is more, it has been the practice of the Soviet Union in such cases--to cast its vote against the resolution. That would have meant a veto, and then that resolution would not have passed. Therefore, irrespective of the voting on this resolution--an abstention or two--the fact is that this is the law of the United Nations at the present time. In this connexion, my Prime Minister has said:

"It is true that the United Nations...in existing conditions cannot go beyond the world as it is today, and the difficulties of the United Nations are often a reflection of the difficulties caused by major conflicts and cold war... Nevertheless, we do feel that it is the ineffectiveness of the functioning of the United Nations there that has led to the serious situation which we have to face in the Congo today. Because of it we felt that the time had come for a strong lead to be given, and the Security Council did give a certain lead. The problem then became one of implementing that lead in that resolution."

My Government has always taken the view that resolutions, if they are passed, must be implemented. If there are ultimatums given or time-limits set or courses of action outlined, it is necessary that they be followed to the full.

In pursuance of that resolution, therefore, the Secretary-General made an appeal to various Governments, including our own, to supply the resources that were required for purposes of implementation. I propose to deal with our response to this at a later stage. But it is our view that there can be no going back on this resolution of February unless the United Nations is to abdicate its responsibility and plunge the Congo into a phase of dismemberment and the loss of national dignity and national prosperity, and, what is more, create a permanent challenge to its sovereignty.

Meanwhile, in the August resolution, it had been suggested--either expressly or implicitly--to the Advisory Committee on the Congo that some conciliatory processes should be undertaken. As a result, a Conciliation Commission was sent to the Congo. Members are aware that the Advisory Committee on the Congo has had a large number of meetings. Its membership includes countries which do not have identical views either on the detail of the Congo question or on

other matters. Despite that fact, the Committee appointed the Conciliation

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Commission, which went to the Congo and produce a report.

My Government yields to no one in its appreciation of the hard work done by the Conciliation Commission. We yield to no one in an understanding of the difficulties faced by the Commission. I am sure that the members of the Commission agree with us that the Congo situation is a dynamic one--that is, that many of the problems which were dealt with belonged to a period slightly earlier than the present. However, that is not the issue to which I wish to address myself at this time.

In the report of the Conciliation Commission which has been circulated to the Assembly there is a chapter entitled "Conclusions". So far as I am aware, even before the report was published these conclusions were communicated to the Security Council or the Secretary-General--in any case, they were communicated to the United Nations. Hence, the final part of the conclusions contains a concluding observation. We must therefore examine these conclusions and the concluding observation as one piece.

I shall refer to the conclusions which, to our mind, have not been challenged either by the flux of time or by the events, to the conclusions which are strictly covered by the Commission's terms of reference. The terms of reference of the Commission were to deal with the facts as they were and to use its good offices to assist towards a solution.

In paragraph 124 of its report, the Commission states that it considers that, despite the criticisms made of the Loi fondamentale and despite the fact that it is incomplete and ill-adapted to the needs of the Congo, it is the law of the land; and that unless and until there has been an amendment to the Constitution, and in the absence of any other basic law in the Congo, everyone concerned should uphold the Loi fondamentale as the basic law of the Republic.

Now, that sounds like a truism. It arises from the fact that, when he suspended Parliament, Mr. Kasavubu overthrew the Constitution and appropriated the powers for himself. He said that parliamentary institutions were not in the sociological pattern of Africa. That used to be said by the Europeans, but that we should say so ourselves does not seem right. In any event, although, in my Government's submission, the Conciliation Commission exceeded its province in going into the future constitutional questions, it was entirely correct in saying that the Loi fondamentale is the basic law of the Congo, the Charter of the Congo.

In paragraph 126 of its report the Commission makes the following point. No provisional arrangements--that is to say, provisional

arrangements resulting from the murder of Mr. Lumumba factional fighting, the flux of time, and so forth--can be considered as legal until they are approved by Parliament in accordance with the Loi fondamentale. Thus, the Commission comes back to the position that, even if factual situations require certain arrangements, these arrangements can have no validity unless the Loi fondamentale is respected.

In paragraph 128 of its report the Commission deals with the provisions of the United Nations resolution with regard to averting the danger of civil war. To avert such a danger and to obviate the danger of foreign military intervention, the Commission:

"recommended and still maintains that attempts by Congolese leaders to achieve a military solution of the present crisis must be checked immediately", A/4711, paragraph 128)

The reference is to a military solution by fratricidal war--that is, one section of the Congolese people fighting another section and, what is more, sections of the Congolese people either collectively or individually fighting the United Nations, of which the Congo itself is a part.

In paragraph 129 the Commission unanimously asks that the armed groups in the Congo should be reorganized and insulated from politics. That is a direct denial of the rightness of the action taken by Mr. Kasavubu, through Mr. Mobutu, in introducing the army into politics and transferring political powers and authority to the armed forces of the Congo. The Commission says that the armed groups in the Congo--including Mr. Mobutu's--should be reorganized and insulated from politics. In paragraph 130 it goes on to say that the reorganization should be carried out by the United Nations. The Commission states in the preceding paragraph that:

"It is also of the opinion that these various armed groups, indisciplined members of which may at any moment break loose from their command and terrorize the population, constitute a constant threat to law and order". (Ibid., paragraph 129)

As I said earlier in this statement, one

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of the purpose of our participation in the Congolese problem is to assist in the maintenance of law and order.

The Commission, I repeat, considers that the reorganization should be carried out by the United Nations. We read:

"...it suggests that this reorganization be carried out with the assistance and under the guidance of the United Nations through a comprehensive training scheme under a national defence council to be set up...". (Ibid., paragraph 130)

Assistance in training of this kind was one of the earlier tasks undertaken by the Organization. As any Government understands it, the import of this paragraph of the Commission's report is that, if Congolese factions or the Congolese people as a whole looked for partisan assistance from outside, they would be importing into the Congo all the troubles that exist in the outside world, including the blast of the cold war.

In paragraph 131 the Commission merely repeats the agreement. It says:

"...the United Nations forces in the Congo should assist the authorities in the Congo in the maintenance of law and order throughout the entire territory of the Republic"--

Katanga not excepted--

"in co-operation with the Congolese authorities, and also help to protect unity and territorial integrity of the Congolese State". (Ibid., paragraph 131)

As I have said, it is quite true that factual authorities have arisen in the Congo. I repeat that this afternoon I am not arguing either legitimism or legalism. The United Nations authorities in various places have from the beginning dealt with the people who are there, factually. So far as Katanga is concerned, however, Mr. Tshombe has never offered any co-operation; he has always offered resistance and attacked the United Nations--I shall deal later with the more recent incidents.

In paragraph 136 of its report the Commission states that nothing can:

"replace, bypass or circumvent the Parliament, which alone is the authority empowered under the Loi fondamentale to take the steps necessary...". (Ibid., paragraph 136)

Thus, despite the heterogeneous composition of the Conciliation Commission, which, broadly speaking, represents the various Views of the Asian-African countries which set it up at the behest of the United Nations, there is an adherence to the constitutional position.

In paragraph 139 the Commission states:

"The present crisis will not be solved unless Parliament is reconvened. The Commission realizes that in the present conditions of unrest, many Members of Parliament may fear for their safety"--

they have every reason to do so, because some Members of Parliament were murdered. The Commission:

"feels that adequate measures should be taken by the United Nations

Force to give protection to such Members of Parliament as may desire it, so as to guarantee the exercise, of the rights and immunities to which they are entitled...". (Ibid., paragraph 139)

In paragraph 140--probably the most important part of this report--we read:

"All the Congolese leaders interviewed by the Commission"--and I must say that when one looks at the list one notes that the Commission did not go into the question of legitimism or otherwise; it interviewed practically everyone it could see--

"referred in forthright terms to the necessity of putting an end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Congo". (Ibid., paragraph 140)

So long as the Republic of the Congo is part of the United Nations, and so long as we are participating on the basis of a voluntary agreement, on the basis of an appeal made to us--and once an agreement has been accepted it can be terminated only by the consent of the parties--the United Nations cannot be regarded as foreign interference.

The "end to foreign interference" therefore means the interference by other people, either by arms or by personnel, to assist this party or that

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party or the other party, to try to make havoc among a people who for years have endured colonialism, and partly as a result of their own efforts, and partly by the impact of the liberation movements in the rest of the resurgence of Africa have shaken off the empire.

The report continues:

"... the Commission cannot emphasize too strongly the need for the United Nations to take urgent and effective measures for the immediate enforcement of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling upon all States to refrain from sending military assistance..." (A/4711, para. 141)

Now, sending military assistance is bad enough, but if those people who have been giving military assistance have been asked to go away and to allow this State to function in the context of the freedom to which they are constitutionally pledged, if that cannot take place, then how can we ask for anything else? Therefore, the failure on the part of the United Nations or of the Member State or of other Member States to bring this about, is in the opinion of my Government, as repeatedly stated by my Prime Minister to our Parliament and to the United Nations, the crux of the situation.

There will be no solution of the Congo problem unless Belgians, in

the way of military personnel military advisers., the supply of arms material--all these things--are stopped; unless the Congo ceases to be a scene where the cold war projects itself; where the allies and the friends of those who are largely responsible for these troubles--if they do not exercise their unquestioned influence with their friends, then we cannot expect to get much peace over there.

We, ourselves, have very friendly relations with Belgium as a State and extremely friendly relations with the Belgian people as a people. We have very close economic, cultural and other relations. We have had no domination of the Belgian empire over us. But I am sure the whole world has a feeling in regard to Belgium which has been the victim of aggression twice in the last half century, where its territory had been trampled upon, where, instead of being a country, it had been used as a road by the marauding armies of the German empire or of the Hitler regime. Therefore, all our sentiments, all our moral alignments, are in that way. Therefore, when we speak in these terms, it is not the indictment of a people or some irresponsible statement without taking into account the facts of the case. We are, therefore, opposing a situation where the empire which happily went out by the front door, has tried to get in by the back door and used the same methods of dividing the people, of setting one lot of people against another.

There is only one thing an empire can decently do, and that is to end itself. Suicide is not justifiable under our human system for individuals, but suicide is justifiable for empires. The best thing they can do is to end themselves. That is the only kind of glorious termination which as a great British statesman in the past said, that the proudest day of their empire will be when it comes to an end. So, this idea of coming back by the back door and thereby, as this Commission points out:

"The deliberate violations of this injunction, open or secret, are largely responsible for the continuing deterioration of the situation and the drift of the country towards civil war and disintegration," (Ibid., para. 141) The Commission then comes to the Belgians themselves:

"The Commission deplores the continued presence in various parts of the Republic of the Congo of large numbers of Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel, political advisers, and mercenaries. The Commission feels that immediate steps should be taken to remove forthwith all such personnel not under the United Nations Command from the territory of the Republic of the Congo". (Ibid., para. 142)

And finally the Commission says:

"The Commission has noted with special interest the Security Council's resolution (S/4741)..." (Ibid., para. 145)

That is to say, these people are on the spot. The Security Council

passes a resolution from here. And while it is quite sure even if the Commission did not approve of the Security Council resolution, it would still remain the Security Council's resolution, but it is a good thing to be reinforced by the people who are dealing with this difficult problem;"... which it welcomes as a positive contribution" (Ibid.) to the settlement. And what is that resolution? That we must do everything we can to bring about these five-fold objectives. It says:

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"welcomes as a positive contribution towards the attainment, in co-operation with the Congolese people, of solutions of present difficulties in the Republic of the Congo." (Ibid.)

It is glad to note that its own recommendations are of that character.

Then there is the reference to the murder of Mr. Lumumba and asking for an investigation.

As I said a while ago, the representative of Ghana, in his annex, points out that the whole of this report has been overtaken by events which have taken place in the Congo. It is quite true that the whole of the report has been overtaken by events; and very largely one subscribes to it in the sense I mentioned. But the factors remain that these are basic things, what I have read out now with regard to Parliament and with regard to foreign intervention.

Therefore, we come here today with the view of submitting to this Assembly a draft resolution in regard to the withdrawal of foreign personnel which today are not only the Belgians -- in the course of the observations I shall give you the figures in it is not only a question of a handful of Belgians. No one has any objection to a Belgian as a Belgian. It is because they are military advisers; it is because they are the leaders and the fomenters of trouble; it is because they give direction and point to this; it is because they make the task of the United Nations, and therefore, of peace more difficult, and so on.

We have had various assurances which I have read out to the Assembly time after time with regard to these withdrawals; but these things have not taken place. I am not saying that there has not been any change, but historically one could go into this as from 12 July, and on each occasion when the Secretary-General has written, they have said that they are going and going--and still they are there. The Security Council found it necessary--and it is not composed of Powers that have no responsibility for the peace of the world or do not know the position of the movement of armies and so on. My Government has never been able to understand why it takes a longer time for intruding forces to come out than to go in. We had this once before in the Assembly. If it takes a certain time to go in, it cannot take very much more to come out. No army with any sense of logistics goes

into a place where it cannot get out. The present situation is that this military and para-military personnel, the political advisers and mercenaries have caused grave concern to the Security Council's latest resolution--they should Come out.

The presence of Belgian nationals, including military personnel in the Congo, has been highlighted in the second progress report of 2 November 1960 (A/4557), which was submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary General. This report has been so long before us that it is not necessary for me to go into great detail except to point out that,

"... there has been increasing evidence of the return of Belgian nationals into many phases of public life in the Congo. Some Belgian nationals are believed to have been actively arming separatist Congolese forces, and, in some cases, Belgian officers have directed and led such forces... Advisers of Belgian nationality have been returning to governmental ministries both in Leopoldville and the provinces, partially through what seems to be an organized recruiting campaign in Belgium." (S/4557, para. 7)

We read in the report:

Soon after a measure of security had been re-established in the Congo, a recruiting agency for the Congo, was set up in Brussels and supported Leopoldville," (Ibid., para.42).

"As a result of the concerted activities of the recruiting agencies, the task of ONUC has been made more difficult." (Ibid., paragraph 45).

"Belgian influence is also seen in the military field." (Ibid., para 48).

"In Katanga,"--Katanga is today practically the Belgian Empire--"Belgian influence is omnipresent. Virtually all key civilian and security posts are either held directly by officials of Belgian nationality or controlled by advisers to recently appointed and often inexperienced Congolese officials. Significantly, within the security forces, there are, according to the latest available date, 114 Belgian officers and 117 Belgians of other ranks in the gendarmerie, and 58 Belgian officers in the police. These figures do not reflect any significant recent increase, although several officials have been brought from Belgium recently to fill specific key posts." (Ibid.. paragraph 49).

"In the so-called 'Autonomous State of South Kasai' there is also a considerable Belgian presence."

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These are the position as of November 1960 and also of today. I shall not continue to read from this report.

The Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 has not been implemented because the only way the personnel can be withdrawn is by the exercise of the responsibility that the Member State of Belgium owes to this Organization to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

So far as we know--these are United Nations figures on which I place reliance--there are twelve Belgian officers in Leopoldville; twelve for eigners, mostly Belgians, in Kasai; 350 Belgian officers and foreign mercenaries in Katanga. In addition, Congolese officers of an unspecified number have been sent both into France and Belgium for training with a view to participating in these troubles. There are more than 100 of these officers from Katanga who are training in Belgium and France. It is very difficult to understand how a Member State, in view of its responsibilities under the Charter, can use the operations of its military machinery in accepting from a territory that is not a State military personnel for the promotion of trouble of this kind.

In addition to this, it is now said that nationals of the Union of South Africa and of Rhodesia have been enlisted in the Foreign Legion. I am quite certain that my colleagues of the African States will take this into account. These elements are bad enough in their own countries, but if they project their apartheid policies and their general authority and outlook in order to participate in adventures of this kind, then the future of the Congo must be bleak indeed. If these people are not representing their States, according to the positions of their Governments, then what is their status? Are they stateless citizens? Are they military adventurers? If that is so, then what is the position to be taken in regard to them?

Now we have in addition to that the fact that there was a conference at Tananarive which, if it had resulted in some kind of agreement acceptable to all people in the Congo and was in conformity with the principles of the Charter, would have been welcomed, irrespective of whether or not it was under the *Lot fondamentale*. We have no reason to believe that it represents the views or the interests of a large number of the Congolese people.

So long as the Republic of the Congo is a part of the United Nations, we must examine the position of the delegation that was admitted here. We would say that the proposed remedies, such as the Belgian forces, the giving of greater economic and other assistance and removing the army from politics, are the responsibility of the United Nations as a whole, and without in any way trying to discriminate between the great Powers and the small Powers and I say this in all humility--it is the particular responsibility of those countries which, at a time when it would have been wiser to leave things as they were, conferred upon Mr. Kasavubu and his nominees the prestige and authority of being represented in this Assembly. It must be assumed that they have some influence with these authorities. My Government is completely satisfied with the good faith of the

countries that took this action, but at the same time we believe that we have the right to ask them, having regard to the consequences of this action and to the fact that they are closely related to these people who are behaving in a way that is inconsistent with the United Nations position, to use their influence, political, moral, economic and otherwise, to bring them into line with the policies and resolutions of the United Nations.

The answers given by these authorities who have found their place in the United Nations, are something like the following. "There can therefore be no question of imposing solutions on the authorities of the Republic...". "My Government can only decide on the possibility of cooperating in the implementation of the resolution of 21 February subject to the reservation of the interpretation placed on that resolution above." "It is not for the United Nations to require a State to follow one particular procedure with regard to the employment of foreign technicians. The Congo intends to recruit the technicians it requires wherever it thinks fit." This is the wrong way of putting it. What the United Nations has said is the implementation of the agreement which the Republic of the Congo made with the United Nations. And his letter comes from the very authority which has been supported by some Member States here, a support which has been responsible for the added strength of these authorities. They state: "The Security Council may not conduct any investigation in the territory of the Republic except with the preliminary agreement of the Government of the Republic". Apart from the question of whether the Security Council can make such claims, this is covered by the undertaking given by Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Lumumba, the Heads of the Congolese Republic at that time, when they said that they would carry out these agreements in good faith, and, what is more, would allow the United Nations freedom of access in all that it required. They state: "A

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decision to convene the Parliament will be taken by the Congolese themselves."

I would like to ask myself and every Member of this Assembly, when one says "a decision to convene the Parliament will be taken by the Congolese themselves, who decided to abolish Parliament? It was not the members of the Congolese people. The Congo people neither in Parliament nor in convention decided to deny themselves the privilege of acting as a legislature. The United Nations has not said that we will convene Parliament. We have said that if there must be some solution in the Congo, it is necessary that these matters should come before Parliament. Therefore, since Mr. Kasavubu has the authority to convene Parliament, it would be a good thing if he did so. We are requesting countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and others, who have undoubted influence with Mr. Kasavubu, to try and help the United Nations, apart from helping Mr. Kasavubu's own country, to carry out the mission of the United Nations and to fulfil the purposes of the Charter as applicable to this particular

problem by allowing Parliament to be convened. After all, Parliament was part of the arrangement made between Belgium and the Congolese people at that time. As the Commission has pointed out it is all incorporated in the *Loifondamentale*, which is the one thing that remains.

They state: "The Government of the Republic of the Congo"--that is to say the Government of the Republic of the Congo, so far as we are concerned, has no legal basis, but it is the Government with which we must deal because it is factual--"energetically protests to all free and sovereign peoples who are States Members of the United Nations against the infringement of the sovereignty of the Republic." We are ninety-nine nations that adopted these resolutions in August of last year; and the Security Council which again adopted its resolution in February of this year, and one Member State says that we have violated its sovereignty and it appeals to us against an infringement that we have committed. These are the very people who came to us and said that one State had infringed its sovereignty and asked us to help them.

They state the Government of the Republic of the Congo "emphasizes that the Congolese people will never permit the implementation or attempt at implementation of the provisions of this resolution". I would like to ask if the Republic of the Congo, which is a Member State at the present time and which, thanks to the intervention of certain States, has a delegation seated here under the authority of Mr. Kasavubu is going to say to us that it will not permit the implementation of United Nations resolutions, then is this a state of complete hostility between one Member State and the whole of the United Nations? There has been no expression of opinion either in the Conciliation Commission or the Advisory Committee or here that these resolutions are *ultra vires* or are unwise, illegal, unjust or anything of that character. In fact, as I said a while ago, the Security Council, in spite of its heterogeneous character, passed this resolution.

Thirdly, Mr. Kasavubu says:

"Reaffirms the determination of the Congolese people to defend its sovereignty by all the means at its disposal."

That is a consummation which we all hope for, but whether fratricidal war, the secession of parts of the Republic or opposition to the rendering of assistance which they themselves have asked for--not only military assistance but also economic--form part of the legitimate sovereignty is a question that this Organization is entitled to enquire into on the basis of the agreements and the Charter provisions and not otherwise. He goes on:

"Appeals to the whole Congolese people in their regional diversity and with their sense of common Congolese nationality to stand ready at all times to carry out any measures for the defence of the Congolese sovereignty."

In the sense of the defence of nationhood, we could all express the same sentiments, but not against the United Nations.

I shall not go any further with this, but all this is a direct challenge to the United Nations. What is more, the President of the Congolese Republic, in the exercise of his great authority and having the control of the radio as he has, tells the country things that are entirely untrue:

"Our country is threatened with being placed under United Nations trusteeship."

Has any Member State here any knowledge of any proposal to place the Congo under trustee-ship?

"Our Army will be disarmed if we are not vigilant ...verbal protests are not enough, action is required..."

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That is a threat of physical war against the United Nations.

"The United Nations is betraying us..."

That is hardly the right thing to say about the United Nations after the sacrifices that many Member States have made in order to bring about peace.

"The Government has decided to mobilize all the resources of the nation ..... Faced with the threat of United Nations trusteeship, I am giving every unit and every soldier three commands. Defend the sovereignty and honour of the Congo, defend the honour of the Army and let every soldier defend his weapon ..... Let the leopard, symbol of the Congo, show his claws, make his mighty voice resound and leap forward towards the foe."

The foe is in Katanga. The foe is in foreign intervention. The foe is in pestilence and famine. The foe is in the challenge that is made to the United Nations. The foe is not in the United Nations itself.

Here we have a Head of State who has been ushered in here with the assistance--and, I believe, the well-meant assistance--of very responsible Members. We hope that their undoubted influence, their desire to establish peace in the world and bring about a termination of this state of affairs and their realization that a projection of the "cold war" into the continent of Africa would not do anybody any good, all those things will combine in order to change this attitude on the part of the President of the Republic.

Here we come to our own position, I have said very little about Matadi because I understand from the Secretary-General that various negotiations are in progress whereby the use of the port of Matadi

will be available to the United Nations in accordance with the agreement. So far as I understand, there has been no question of the United Nations wishing to become an army of occupation or anything of that character. From 5 March until 28 March the Secretary-General or his representatives have sent various messages to Mr. Kasavubu, to Mr. Bomboko and to other people--I will not read them, because I do not wish to take up the time of the Assembly--repeatedly asking not for the evacuation of Matadi but to allow the presence of the United force in Matadi. This is a vital condition for the carrying out of the United Nations operation in the Congo, especially for the the last resort. It is again my firm expectation, that, if the situation in Matadi should not be redressed, the matter will, of course, become the urgent concern of the Security Council.

I should like to submit that it is the view of my Government that if, in spite of all the negotiations and all the goodwill that is shown by the United Nations authorities and all the attempts at conciliation, it is not possible for this resolution to be carried out, then the Secretary-General has the responsibility to place the situation squarely before the Security Council and ask for further instructions, because those of us who have troops in that region cannot be placed in a position where their logistics are adversely affected and where their morale is affected in such a way that any future call by the United Nations for the support of these countries would not produce the same responses. However, in certain letters they have said that they had no objection to the presence of the United Nations Force in Matadi, but then they go on to say that unless certain apologies are made about the way things are done this will not be allowed. I am anxious not to rub this in very much, because I understand from the Secretary-General that delicate negotiations are going on, and if in any way results can be obtained we should not like to say anything that would create a difficult situation.

Before I leave this rostrum, I have the difficult task of saying something with regard to the presence of Indian troops. It has been a matter of great grief, not only to our Government but to our people, that the despatch of Indian troops to the Congo, while I do not think it has been misunderstood by anybody, has been misrepresented, and misrepresented very deliberately, both in Africa and elsewhere, by interested sections. We are happy to think that the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, our neighbours and other countries have communicated to us their appreciation of our response to the call for placing armed forces at the disposal of the United Nations for the furtherance of the purposes of the Charter; but we are unhappy to think that, while we recognize the presence of a free Press in these countries, things like this appear in important newspapers:

"The central issue is no longer the Belgians, employed by all leaders as technicians and advisers, but rather the United Nations representative, Mr. Dayal of India, and now the arrival of Indian

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troops. It is no reassurance that Prime Minister Nehru, in his concept of an international police force, makes their support dependent on their being `utilized as we intend them to be."

I want to say that this is an entire travesty of the facts. The Government of India does not interfere with the functions, the discretion, the movements or anything of that kind of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. He happens to be an Indian national, in the same way as Mr. Hammarskjold is, I believe, still a Swedish national! I have no information that the Swedish Government gives him directions. I have no information that various nationals of the United States or of the Soviet Union or of any other country performing the duties of international civil servants take orders from their respective Governments. If they did, it would be very wrong, and I am sure that does not happen.

The same newspaper also stated the following:

"Congolese leaders have protested against the arrival of the Indian forces on two counts."

Of course, naturally every anarchic force will protest against the appearance of the arm of law and order. Indian forces do not go there as Indian forces. Once they leave our shores, once we have placed them at the disposal of the Secretary-General, they are part of the international forces of the world. Like the personnel of the Indian Army on the very ticklish boundary line between Israel and the United Arab Republic they are not personnel or officers of the Indian Army when they are functioning there. It is my responsibility to say that they have been placed at the disposal of the United Nations to carry out the orders of the United Nations Command. But we have naturally imposed certain conditions in the sense that we do not wish our troops to be engaged in any conflict with Member States as such or to be used for the suppression of any popular movements or things of that character. These are legitimate conditions which the United Nations has accepted.

This newspaper went on to say:

"First, they"--that is, the Congolese leaders--"take the position that reinforcements for the United Nations, regardless of nationality are unnecessary since the Congolese proved at the Tananarive Conference that they are capable of running their own affairs."

If that came from some rag, I would not mind. But it is not my custom to cite the names of newspapers; they can find out the names for themselves. Some of these newspapers give themselves an air of respectability and they keep on doing so for a long time and they become respectable. If they think the Tananarive Conference has shown the capacity of the Congolese people to run their own affairs, that is their judgement. I am quite sure the Congolese people are capable

of running their own affairs, as any people are, but the question is that there is a constitution, there is a Government, there are agreements, and all these things have to be honoured.

The newspaper continued:

"Second, the hostility between the Congolese leaders and Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian who is head of the United Nations mission here, has been transferred to the Indian troops. Leaders of the Congolese Central Government suspect India of supporting the rival regime of Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville."

My Government does not recognize any of these governments in the Congo. They recognize Mr. Kasavubu as the elected President of the Republic. As I said, we do not recognize the way he has functioned. We have not recognized any of these governments. If they are popular movements our forces are not likely to be used in their suppression. It is not only an unfactual statement; I think it is rather malicious for people who ought to know better than to say this sort of thing. I am happy to think that the governments of these countries, those statesmen, my Prime Minister and others who are interested, who are concerned, are in daily contact.

We are entirely satisfied that this does not represent the view of the American Government or the American people, but at the same time we are entitled to ask the United States delegation to make it clear to the world that these are individual opinions that must come in the conduct of what is called the freedom of the Press, which I suppose means freedom for the owner of the Press.

Then it goes on to say in another paper, "The despatch here of Prime Minister Nehru's Indian troops"--Prime Minister Nehru has no troops. He is a Prime Minister of a democratic country--"is an example of an action taken by the United Nations in defiance of the publicly expressed opposition of President Kasavubu and

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everyone of his Ministers." No responsible expression of opinion can mean that the United Nations must carry out the behest of one Member State and not of the Security Council. "The Congolese object for the simple reason that they believe that India, being allied to left-leaning Ghana, this country's bitter enemy, simply is not neutral." It is very odd. Until very recently these papers accused India of being neutral; now they say we are not neutral.

The same paper goes on to say:

"Mr. Kasavubu personally made known his Government's objection to the Indian forces--the Congolese call their arrival an `invasion'--during a courtesy call paid to him by Mr. Abbas.

"It was noted that the United Nations, in tacit recognition of the

explosive situation, has been in no hurry to reveal where the Indian troops are to be stationed."

Anybody who knows anything about army movements knows they are not published in the newspapers.

"For the moment they are to be concentrated in a camp....."

"The airlift of Indian troops, the vanguard of a veritable army of 4,700, is doubly troublesome to the Kasavubu regime, whose protests were made in the name of the entire confederation....."

Here I want to say it is not my business, because it is not a United Nations arrangement. This airlift has been made possible by the good offices of the United States Government, and it is surprising, therefore, that there should be this expression of opinion on the character of the allegedly responsible quarters.

Even more than all this are matters, small as they may seem to some of you--but there have been references to the Gurkha troops that are in the Congo, in terms that are entirely uncomplimentary for the very gallant band of people who have many war honours to their credit, who have served the cause of freedom in two wars, even though they are a comparatively backward illiterate people coming from a country like ours but to dub them as mercenaries from the Government of India is, I think, a gross libel. They are citizens of our country. They are honoured men and officers of the Indian army, and it is up to me to repudiate this libel. So far as the Indian troops are concerned, we have placed them at the disposal of the United Nations, and their movements and use will be regulated by your command as such, Mr. Secretary-General, under the terms of the agreement that has been reached.

In the midst of all this comes the news of yesterday, where by all definition, whatever may be said by any other faction, there can be no question that Mr. Tshombe of Katanga in no way comes under any kind of definition of the principles and purposes of the Charter. He is a secessionist who wants to break up the integrity of the Congo to the support of which the United Nations is pledged, and what is more, Mr. Kasavubu proclaims he will defend the sovereignty of the Congo. Therefore, this secessionist movement led by mercenaries from outside with the assistance of large numbers of Belgian officers, the list of which I read a while ago, cannot be permitted, in the opinion of my Government, under the terms of the United Nations resolution.

It is not for us to say from this rostrum what action, how and when it will be taken. We have no desire to introduce into this any prestige line of any character, but if any part of the Congo were to break away, even if it were permitted, and the United Nations forces are to be carried in this manner, then the whole authority of the United Nations and of the Charter is called into question. It is our submission that the way of dealing with this in the hope of avoiding violence is the way which is highly commendable. We would not want

force to be used unless they are forced to do so, but no army in the world is going to sit idle when it is being attacked by regular forces.

I submit that all those who have been endowed with authority in this matter, irrespective of what might be said, if it is not possible to carry out the resolutions of 21 February within a reasonable time--the crux of which is the withdrawal of the Belgian forces--then this Organization should rightfully expect to come before the Security Council with categorical requests for direction, so we know where we stand.

For those reasons my country, along with fourteen or fifteen others, have submitted a draft resolution, document A/L. 399. I will not read it. It has been circulated. The operative part of it states:

"1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to accept its responsibilities as a Member of the United Nations and

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to comply fully and promptly with the will of the Security Council and of the General Assembly;

2. Decides that all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and mercenaries, shall be completely withdrawn and evacuated within a period not exceeding twenty-one days, failing which necessary action should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

My own Government did not want a long time-limit to be put on it, because it has been going on for seven or eight months. The view of our Government was to request the evacuation forthwith, but many people who are wiser than we--and we accepted their wisdom and agreed to this period being put down; but if the general wish of the Assembly is that it be forthwith, we shall be willing to accept that, it being understood that it is the curtailment of the period, not an extension.

The draft resolution also "calls upon all States to exert their influence and extend their co-operation." That is to say, we are concerned with having responded to the call made by the United Nations, which other people also have done, and we are glad to see that some of the other countries which have withdrawn their troops are gradually thinking of sending them back. We hope that without military action, by good sense on the part of all concerned, that the response of Belgium which is one of the founding Members of the United Nations who, as I said a while ago, twice in a half century has seen its own mother territory torn by aggression, will come to the rescue of all of us by the voluntary action of complete withdrawal, because any excuse, any argument that these are not official soldiers, either by the Union of South Africa or by Belgium

or by the Rhodesian authorities--these will not satisfy the public opinion of the world. That is the first resolution.

My country and other countries also submitted another draft resolution at the same time which deals with other matters. For example, the reconvening of Parliament, and appealing to the Congolese authorities to desist from attempting a military solution of these problems, and to resolve them by peaceful means, the immediate release of all members of Parliament, and urging Mr. Kasavubu as Chief of State to take the necessary steps to reconvene Parliament without delay so that Parliament may make the necessary decisions concerning the formation of a government of national unity, and the future constitutional structure, and so forth. No one is suggesting that we decide for the Congolese people.

This resolution also seeks to request the President to appoint at an appropriate time, in consultation with the State Members of the United Nations, some sort of body which will assist in implementing some of these resolutions for some of these purposes.

Therefore, while I do not read this resolution, which I do not think has been circulated yet, my colleagues--other Member States and ourselves--also intend to submit this resolution.

Perhaps I have bored this Assembly with a reiteration of many things that have been said before. My country and my Government feels very strongly that the continuance of the trouble in the Congo will only lead to greater and greater misery and hardship for the Congolese people.

We have no desire to intrude in any way into their affairs. With regard to the calumny that has sometimes been uttered in various countries, and which has been repeated by others, that the Government of India or the Indian people have an ulterior purpose in going to Africa, it is quite true that we have a large population, but we have lived there for six or seven thousand years. And when we have gone somewhere we have gone not as colonizers but for the purposes of adding to the labour force, through our powerful people, or otherwise. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to make any kind of confession of faith in saying that we have no ulterior motives in this matter.

We were glad to be able to respond to the resolution moved by our sister countries, the United Arab Republic, Liberia and Ceylon, where certain responsibilities were placed upon members. We think it is the equal responsibility of all members to contribute according to their strength and capacity and their understanding of the situation.

We do not think a special burden should be placed upon great countries, just because they are great, for the purpose of implementing the purposes of the Charter. We have no doubt that, by virtue of the support of the permanent members of the resolution, an understanding of the policy will lead from now on to greater efforts

to obtain the withdrawal of the Belgian forces and foreign forces from this area.

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There are large numbers of mercenaries there from the Union of South Africa and neighbouring territories, such as Rhodesia, which are really anarchic forces, and which, even when a solution is found, will be disturbing factors in Africa. In respect of the policies which they follow in their own countries and in relation to their territories--for example, South West Africa--I am certain that the African countries are quite awake as to what is happening in this regard.

We submit these resolutions to the verdict of this Assembly. We have no doubt that, while full discussion is required, with the unanimous support which will be given to them through the good offices of the powerful countries which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; which countries have been responsible for assisting Mr. Kasavubu in gaining a certain amount of prestige in his country, these powerful countries, which desire peace more than anything else and know the consequences of the threat to international peace and security surrounding this problem, will use their wisdom and their unquestioned influence to bring about the consummation of these resolutions.

INDIA CONGO CUBA USA BELGIUM CHINA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC LIBERIA GHANA  
FRANCE SOUTH AFRICA ISRAEL FALKLAND ISLANDS MALI

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INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri Krishna Menon's Statement in Special Political Committee on Apartheid

Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement at the Special Political Committee on Apr 04, 1961 on the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa:

The Assembly is now debating the subject of apartheid in the Union of South Africa for, I believe, the ninth successive year.

As early as the seventh session my delegation, with others, brought

this subject to the Assembly for consideration, because it felt that the narrower issue of the treatment of persons of Indian and Pakistani origin in the Union of South Africa covered certain aspects of the policy of apartheid but did not include the whole question.

Now this afternoon my delegation intends, with your permission, to deal both with the general debate and with the draft resolutions on this subject because, so far as we know, the only draft resolutions that are forthcoming are now before us.

My delegation wishes to address itself especially to the basic issues in this matter because, during the many years of debate, we have dealt with specific grievances. We have appointed committees to inquire into those grievances; we have made appeals; we have asked people to use persuasion; last year we asked the Secretary-General to go to South Africa; and each year, on returning to the Assembly, we have found the situation worse than when we left it. So the question will soon arise--though perhaps not during this Assembly session, in this particular form--with regard to the obligations of membership in the United Nations of Member States.

Now there is no Member State--and I do not wish to speak for others, but each can speak for his own--which cannot in one way or another be regarded as having fallen below the ideals of the Charter, or even, perhaps, of having committed transgressions in regard to it. But all this is increased or decreased by the character of the action concerned, as regards its quantum.

So the time will come for the Assembly to consider, and for the Union of South Africa to consider--as, indeed, it did at the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers--whether that State can feel comfortable in the company of those who have rather different view of life. We are not, at the present moment, dealing with that; but I should like to look at the Charter itself and study it, even though it is, perhaps, well known to everybody. We should look first at the Preamble where it speaks of "the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small". It does not simply say "the equal rights of nations large and small"; it speaks of "men and women", of "nations large and small." That is what apartheid deals with. Then let us turn to Article 1 (3), which speaks of:

"...international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion".

Now if this Charter were something which South Africa did not understand, or had no part in formulating, perhaps the onus upon it would be far less. But in looking through old records one comes across a name that is very much respected in the United Nations, in spite of our

individual differences on many matters that is the name of one of the people who tried to put this Charter into words--though I am not saying he is the father of the Charter--the name of General Smuts. And General Smuts in San Francisco said that this Charter should not be a mere legalistic document for the prevention of war. He suggested that the Charter should contain at its very outset, in its Preamble, a declaration of human rights and of the common faith that had sustained the allied peoples throughout the prolonged struggle for the vindication of those right. He went on to say, "Let us in this new charter for humanity give expression to this faith of ours; let us proclaim to the world and to posterity that this was not a mere brute struggle of forces correlating to the last war"

Now if there was one factor that, whether we were independent nations at that time or not, characterized the last war to which General Smuts refers it is that it was a fight against Hitler whose position in Germany was based upon the racial doctrine, that policies for which he was responsible were also based upon that racial doctrine. Here we have an appeal on behalf of the Charter which puts at rest any idea that the issue that we are discussing is not covered by the Charter as a matter of domestic jurisdiction and so on, but makes clear that this is basic to those who accept the Charter.

Having said that, we ought now to look into the position as it stands today. It is sometimes forgotten that, out of every seven people in the Union of South Africa, six are people who have no civic or political rights, who have no position as civilized human beings. It may well be that some of them are well treated; so are some animals in some places; indeed, some animals are better treated than some humans. Though there are 12 million people in South Africa the population of South Africa used to be given as 2 or 3 million, which means that the other people were not taken into account; in fact, it even outbids the old city states of Greece and other places, where liberty was confined to the few and the others were slaves. Now it is not sufficient for us to treat this merely as a sentimental issue, or even one which concerns human rights in a narrow sense. We must understand, to a certain extent, how it basically affects the equality of nations in this place and also to what extent it is related to the late resurgence of Africa and its necessary march towards a society where in each of those communities there will be respect for human life and human dignity and the capacity for them to develop industrially, economically and socially.

Now, if you will take the Union, therefore, and look at the economic and social consequences of apartheid; it is not a question merely of the white person not liking the non-white person or vice versa; that is not it. So far as my Government is concerned, it stands fully and squarely against all forms of racial discrimination, however much it may fall behind in practice from day to day, in matters which we try to correct. Whether it be the apartheid that discriminates against the non-white races, or the apartheid that sometimes may tend to do

the reverse, both are equally bad.

Now, therefore, we look at the incidence of this policy on economic conditions--I do not have the latest authoritative statistics here; the latest that are available are more in favour of the Union Government's policy, as things have since deteriorated--and we find that the average income of the white family in the Union is £115 per month--that is about \$400 per month. When it comes to the African family, the 100 disappears and the 15 remains; that is to say the difference is as between £15 per month and £115 per month. These are the economic consequences of a situation which, as I shall point out later on, excludes the African--it is not because he does not want to earn; it is not because he does not have the capacity: that has yet to be proved, but because he is shut out from all occupations where he can lead a life or follow a profession which would enable him to have a higher income and better standards of life.

So when we turn round and look at the average wages paid to these people, we find that there again not only is there a distinction between African and non-African, between the white and non-white, but even among the non-white populations there is a graduation of castes, though it may--in this particular list--be to the advantage, shall we say, of the Asiatic populations. Now this is one of the worst features of this kind of racial domination: you always find that where there is a system of castes, there is an attempt to put what may be called a slightly higher caste against a slightly lower caste--that is the way that a hierarchy is maintained, so that the top person can use the middle person to suppress the person still lower down. Thus if you take the Bantus, who are the pure Africans, their wages would at the very highest be about 25 per cent of the European wages; yet, apparently, they have the same kind of stomachs, they have to pay the same amount of money for food, they live under the same economy and, therefore, their expenditure must be the same. The only inference one can draw, therefore, is that the Bantu has to be satisfied with 25 per cent, or whatever privileges

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and enjoyment in life he can have in comparison with the white populations. Then come the Asians, whose wages are about 42 per cent, and then comes the mixed population, which is slightly better off. I point this out to show that, just because some of the non-white populations do better than some others, it does not reflect a state of affairs which conduces to prosperity or to social justice in this area.

Now, again, if one took the whole of the Union, one could probably find that some 87 per cent of the total population--that means practically all the non-white populations--are, excluding of course what are called the "poor whites", have incomes far less than what is required to keep themselves together according to the various surveys made at that place, that is to say, to pay for their food and their rent, and so forth. And one would also find that a great number, 61.6

of the population, of the working people--I do not have the figures right before me--are not able to pay their rent for the places in which they live. I could go on multiplying such examples to show that the economic and social consequences of apartheid are of a character that can only produce social conflict, ultimately resulting in a threat to international peace and security--if it is not already doing so. For these reasons, we look at this not merely as a sentimental issue, as something which we have already overruled; this is something concerning the interests of the African people.

Now, when you then come to what is normally regarded as more accessible to populations which have been there for the longest time--the tenure of land--you will find in the Union of South Africa 92 per cent of the land is owned by the white populations; and 8 per cent is owned by the Africans. There is no evidence--biological, racial or scientific--of any kind to show that the African requires either less fresh air or less room to move about or that he can do with less amenities or anything of that character.

Therefore, while there is no colonialism in South Africa in the sense that another State controls the affairs of the State of South Africa, there is a State within a State--that is to say, a hierarchy of people who are privileged, who normally are called South Africans, and the others are forgotten. In fact, I remember reading that at the time of the League of Nations the South African representative was asked: "What is the total population of South Africa?" And he had said: "One and a quarter million". And the Indian delegation asked him at the time: "We thought there were 5 or 6 million others". "Oh, yes," said the South African, "you mean the natives"; that is to say, they did not take into account even the existence of these people.

Now, then, all these things are sustained not only by social practices--as they are in many of our countries. There is not, perhaps, one of us here who can say: "in our country, there are no discriminations between the various kinds, whether black, brown, white, or whatever it may be". But the difference between the worst of us and South Africa is this: that we recognize this evil, and we try to get away from it. In apartheid, South Africa not only does not say that it has to adopt these policies because of historic reasons, or because the flesh is weak, or anything of that kind; it says that this is the ideal for mankind to follow. The ideal for mankind to follow is to have different kinds of people, in different compartments, preventing people from progressing from one to the other or of having equality of opportunity. And that is more, it is reflected in all their legislation.

One will find, if one takes what is called "discriminatory legislation", that it often has very interesting titles. The interesting titles, apart from the Pass Laws, are: "Bantu Self-Government Act"; now, that is a very good thing, is it not? Does it not confer self--government on peoples? It really means: discriminating against the Bantu having equal rights with the others. Similarly, one will find the Bantu Education Act, or the Bantu

Investment Corporation Act: all this means that they are not allowed to participate, in the general context of legislation, in whatever should accrue from the normal State organization.

Although it has been mentioned so many times in the General Assembly, even we may not forget the conditions that exist there, conditions that are difficult to believe, unless one is already familiar with them. Not only do they not belong in the twentieth century, but they do not belong to any kind of civilized order of society. The first of these is the Pass Laws where--even as Hitler did with certain sectors of the German population--there is stamped upon a man the mark of inferiority, and which is spoken of by writers as torture and humiliation.

And what is more, it is the instrument of oppression in the hands of the ordinary enforcement authorities. It is not as though you were told that you had committed a crime, and you go to court and do something about it. A policeman stops an African in the street--he may be an old African or a young one. A young policeman may stop an elderly African and say: "Kaffir,

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where is your pass?" The African is struck in the face if he is slow in producing it--that is to say that, not only under these laws is the taking of the law into its own hands left to the executive, but they live in what is much worse than a slave State in that way.

Now, I do not think that we should pass from these occasions without paying a tribute first of all to those Africans themselves--that is to say, the non-white Africans themselves in the Union--who in spite of all these discriminatory laws, in spite of the penalties that threaten them, the danger to their lives, have put up a very bold struggle and continue to do so. And after all, we in the world who have these meetings and these resolutions, we do not suffer from them. They have for years resisted to submitting--a great many leaders of the African people, their organizations and what not. One mentions with a great deal of gratification and a sense of gratitude those others who are of white descent or are whites themselves who have participated in the resistance to these discriminatory laws, sometimes to their material and other disadvantages, who have come out with proclamations--whether they be outside Africa or inside--they have fought these acts and have become the common victims of the various types of legislation that have been introduced to stop protests of this character.

Now, more recently, I am told that--I believe it was last year--these pass laws have come to be operated more rigorously against women--largely, I suppose, with the advance of women in the world and their participation mainly in Africa--particularly countries like Ghana and Nigeria and so on, where women have such a high position in their society and their economic system, they with that impact must be there--and therefore, now they have enacted that it will be

compulsory for African women to possess reference books with effect from December 1960 although under local laws and administrative regulations such as government notification, African women will be already forced to come within the scope of this system. The fact that women have now become liable to summary arrest, to possible molestation by any policeman, and detention in gaol while their children are uncared for at home, has caused much indignation. This is from the African press itself.

Again I should like to pay a tribute to sections of the African press which, in spite of the press legislation, in spite of the social system that obtains, have given publicity to these matters. So that here we have a situation where one can imagine the social consequences of placing so much arbitrary power in the hands of individual enforcement authorities, where physical force, summary arrests, all these kinds of things can be used.

The net result of this is what I think I quoted to the Assembly years before: There was a South African judge -- a white person -- who said once that the statutory legislation in South Africa was of a character that everything had been made into a crime, that if an African stepped out of his house he started committing crimes. I suppose that if he breathed he would be committing a crime, because they have produced statutory crimes of this character and they have produced such a feeling of insecurity: the undue restriction, the freedom of movement, interference of family life and considerable friction between the Africans themselves.

Now this has been the position for a long time, and times without number the various types of discriminatory legislation applying to everyone have been brought before the Assembly. Now, during the last two or three years, particularly since the advent of the present Government--I am not trying to compare evils, as the previous one was not basically better, but of course there can be bad and worse and so on and so on--there has been more and more legislation of this character, all sometimes having these rather highfaluting titles such as University Acts, Investment Corporation Acts and so on, which if we look at the title, we could think they were beneficent legislation.

Now, having dealt with these things in the past I should like to deal with some of the more important ones that have come about in the present time which affects citizens of other countries, which affects international philanthropy, if you like, which affects internationally things of that character, and since I have not got the time to take every instance, I shall take one item--education.

Let us look at the University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act. This university was founded by American money, by the money of philanthropists in Africa itself--I believe some non-European people and so on contributed towards the founding of the University College of Fort Hare, which was a mixed college in the sense that there was no discrimination against non-white people going there. Now the

objection in apartheid is not merely to non-white people going to white colleges, but the white people going to non-white colleges. It works both ways. Any way, there is this insidious legislation which is called the

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University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act. This is the preamble by the present Prime Minister who, as a previous representative I believe said, has a history behind him of being one of the ace supporters of Hitler in the early days and he said "education must train and teach people in accordance with the opportunities in life and according to the sphere in which they live"--that is to say it is based on apartheid to start with. "Good racial relations cannot exist where education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations on the part of the Natives themselves"--that is people like Mr. Ralph Bunche, for example, who have nothing to do with education, he might create wrong expectations. "Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the State"--now a more authoritarian thing you cannot think of. "Racial relations cannot improve, even without a native education, with the creation of frustrated people". I agree with this gentleman that there should be no frustrated people, but the question is who creates the frustration.

Now we come to the Act under this preamble. Clause 8 of this Act says:

"8. Under the terms of the University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act (1959), the Minister of Bantu Education took control of Fort Hare as from January 1, 1960. This University was established in 1916 as an inter-racial university, thanks to much community effort, and private generosity, especially on the part of church groups, of those in the United States and Canada and in the Union itself."

Now Fort Hare has been reduced to the status of a tribal college. Admission of white, coloured and Asian students has been prohibited, unless Ministerial exemption is granted in individual cases beforehand. The Vice-Principal, Professor Mathews, left as he would not resign from the African National Congress. Seven other staff members were dismissed because of their opposition to apartheid. This caused great concern in South African academic circles. The Council of the University of Cape Town issued a statement pointing out that the dismissal of these teachers for their political opinions was against academic freedom. And the answer of the Government was to create an all-white College Council at Fort Hare to replace the old Council which had both African and white members. The college will be financed from the Bantu Education Account, which in effect means that the poorest section of the population is to be compelled to pay for its own colleges.

That is to say, the Government takes over institutions supported from its own population and from outside parts of the world--even apart

from the moral and other issues involved--takes over that college, takes it away from its original purposes and wants it to be financed by the Bantu Education Account, and that means that if the Bantus want education, let them pay for it themselves on the wages, which as I have said, in regard to 88 per cent of the population, are below subsistence level. This came under very serious protest. Even in a country like the United Kingdom in 1959 long before there was any idea that South Africa was likely to leave the Commonwealth, when a former Prime Minister like Lord Attlee, a great jurist like Mc Clair, a former Secretary of State, like Lord Halifax, and the leader of the Parliamentary opposition, Mr. Gaitskell, and so on, wrote to the Prime Minister of South Africa and said that this strikes at the very root or the conception of a university because a university must be universal in its membership.

Now this question of discrimination in education, preventing any mixing in this way, and, what is more, when education is separated in this way, it means the Bantu population get a type of education which is far lower in quality, and there is a reason for it.

They do not want the African population to be trained in any type of education that will fit them for trades or professions so it can be claimed they are qualified--no skilled occupations, nothing of that character. The Minister of Education, as late as the end of 1959, said that he would not pay a penny to any person known to be destroying the Government's apartheid policy. This is the kind of thing that is being done to the educational system. What is more, it is a matter which affects not only those who are in South Africa but also others who participate in this. Notice the results of it. It does not affect those people who do not want to attend mixed colleges; they are allowed to stay out and other provision is made for them. But if there were a white South African who wanted to send his child--his son or his daughter--to a mixed college, he is prevented from doing so. It becomes a crime to be decent. That is what it really means. It becomes unlawful to behave in a decent fashion.

Section 32 of the Act debars a non-white person from registering at or attending any white university. Upto the present time--although

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several Cape Colony Indian students have been given permission to attend universities--all but two of the 153 Bantu applicants who wanted to attend universities have been refused. It is of course possible that there may be some individual who for some special reason becomes a favourite of the Government, or of some official, and he can get into a university. However, this has been the subject of universal protest not only in South Africa but in various other parts of the world.

I have selected the subject of education because its effects are very far-reaching. As I have said, it is not merely an antagonism to

complexion, or anything of that kind. Surely the South African population, cannot, any more than any other people, have any objection to complexion, because there are men and women there of all shades--black, white, yellow--so it cannot be any optical objection to a colour as a non-aesthetic one. It is simply a desire to keep populations in economic, social and spiritual slavery in such a way that they with function merely as producers of goods and services for other people.

We come now to a whole series of new acts of legislation which are the gift of the present Government. Now here, again, the titles are interesting and I hope my African colleagues, if they have not already looked at them, will do so. They are all either innocuous. or they look very pro-African. As I have said, the Bantu Investment Corporation is a good thing. The Factory Act has been amended, but with one of the worst amendments--and I hope those who have been paying special attention to the law of the sea will take note of this--because South Africa has now by law enforced segregation in the sea up to the three-mile limit. Not only does segregation prevail on land but now also in the territorial sea which, for South Africa, extends to a three--mile limit which it may later extend further, as other countries, including my own, would like to do.

And what does this mean? It means that the law now applies to a very large proportion--numerically a very large number--of African labour on the ships that sail the African seas, or even in the African services which are world wide. Not one of them would be permitted to pursue an occupation of a skilled type; certainly he would not be paid a skilled man's wage, which means that even on a ship, they must live as though they were sub-human; they would be permitted to follow any occupation other than, perhaps, stoking coal or, perhaps, they might be allowed to clean the deck--I am not sure, perhaps they would be--and do other jobs of that type.

The whole idea is to force them down into a kind of "lower level" of working people. Also, in every factory, as in every post office, there are separate amenities, separate entrances, separate places for whites and for non-Europeans, as provided in previous laws--that sort of thing has only been increased.

On top of this, they have passed what is called the Unlawful Organizations Act. On 8 April of last year, following the Sharpeville killings, a ban was placed on the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress for one year. The Act supplements the Suppression of Communism Act, amended in 1951, under which African leaders can be charged with bringing about political, industrial, social or economic changes, by the promotion of disturbance or disorder. Under this Act, every religious leader in every democratic country would be judged subversive, under that law, because they are all trying to change either the economic or the political order or to make industrial changes. Now these titles do not mean anything--for example,--Mr. Patrick Duncan, who is the son of a former Governor-General, was arrested and, I believe, convicted under the suppression

of Communism Act, and, as far as I know, he was almost a fanatical, pathological anti-communist. The only trouble with him was that he stood for racial equality and I suppose racial equality is interpreted in South Africa as a form of communism.

I shall now deal with another piece of new legislation which concerns forced labour. It is usually thought that the only part of the world where forced labour obtains is Portuguese Africa. However, the Portuguese are to be congratulated in the sense that they have some people who agree with them. The Farmers' Prison Cooperatives--nice name, is it not?--in the different district collects money--œ20,000 to œ75,000--and builds prisons. They build prisons in places that are convenient to the farmers. "Farmer" might give you an idea that he is a hard-working person; that is not so in South Africa. The bulk of the Afrikaner element comes from these farmers who put the indigenous population to work. In any case, the farmers collected this œ20,000 to œ75,000 in what are called "Farmers' Prison Coops." They do not mean co-operative stores or factories or anything like that--they build prisons. The Prison Department--that is the Government--collects the men. African men on short-term sentences are packed into these gaols; many of them are arrested on trivial technicalities such as being found without their pass, an efficient little book giving all personal details. One thousand African men are

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arrested every day for this reason--that is to say, because they live in their own country. That is all there is to it.

In a sense, they are worse than domesticated animals because domesticated animals do not have to carry a pass. No African society woman's poodle is ever arrested for not having a pass but an African citizen or an African servant would be.

Every morning before 7 the farmers come to the gaols to pick up their forced labour. They deposit 1 shilling and 9 pence a day per convict and they supply their own armed guard. For 2 shillings a day they get a guard from the Prison Department. The convicts normally work until about 5 p.m. Their conspicuous red shirts make it impossible for them to dash to freedom without being seen. I confess that when one reads these things, it is almost impossible to believe that they exist in the modern world.

I have referred to African citizens--white African citizens--who take a different view of it. It is to the credit of the Union, and it is to the credit of the judicial system in that part of the world; of which we are, in a sense, a part--that, in spite of all this executive action, in spite of all this fanatical, pathological persecution, the judiciary in South Africa--the higher judiciary--by and large has upheld the rule of law. When these reason trials came up, Justice Rumpff said:

"It is conceded by the prosecution that if it fails to prove a

treasonable conspiracy there is no case against any of the accused".

In other words, they have not done anything. The objection to them is that there was a meeting of their minds for the contemplation of something which is alleged to be wrong. Now, the whole system of law in South Africa is partly British, partly Dutch, and neither of them permits in actual practice penalties in regard to mere thoughts. It is the performance--it is either the likelihood of doing something that is wrong, or the doing of something wrong -- that is regarded as criminal. Judge Rumpff went on to say:

"On the evidence presented and on our findings, it is impossible for this court to come to the conclusion that the African National Congress had acquired or adopted a policy to overthrow the state by violence--that is, in the sense that the masses had to be prepared to be conditioned to commit direct acts of violence against the state".

In other words, what the Judge is saying is that all these people have done is to join a political movement in order to bring about changes.

Now this is not as though there has not been this tendency in the past. Field-Marshal Smuts, for whom we cannot say that everything that happened under his Government was sensible--but as I say you compare bad with worse, that sort of thing--and Smuts, in the preparatory stages of the Act, the Population and Registration Act of 1950--every country has got a people's registration act but the essence of this thing is exclusion. The registration act provides for the exclusion of people or for the representation of Africans by non-Africans, as the case may be. And it so happens that the majority if not all of the non-African persons who have been nominated by Governments in the past to represent Africans have been totally opposed to the policy of the Union Government. I speak subject to correction--may be one or two were different, but by and large that has been the case.

Now Smuts at that time said:

"I think all this problem, all this probing into private affairs, this listening to informers, this effort to classify what is unclassifiable, what is impossible to achieve, will create a situation which will hit this country hard in years to come."

This is before he died, some ten years ago.

This Population and Registration Act of 1950, which was passed at that time, classified populations in South Africa as white, coloured or native--namely,

"a 'white person' means a person who in appearance obviously is or who is generally accepted as a white person but does not include a person who, although in appearance obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a coloured person."

It simply means the executive decides this.

"'Native' means a person who is in fact or is generally accepted as a member of an aboriginal race or tribe in Africa."

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Now the funniest part of this is that the Bantus are the people who come most under this definition. And if you ask Mr. Louw when he is here, he will say "Oh, no, the Bantu came after me. We, the Afrikaners, went there and a few years later the Bantus traced their way back into the Union."

But now he says here "native means a person who is in fact or is generally accepted as a member of an aboriginal race or tribe in Africa."

"'A coloured person' means a person who is not a white or a native..."

"A person who in appearance obviously is a member of an aboriginal race or tribe in Africa shall for the purposes of this Act be presumed to be native unless it is true that he is not in fact."

That is again a violation of the idea. You have got to prove something if you are to escape from the consequences. We could go on in this way looking at the legislation because so much has appeared in the newspapers recently, that it has become unnecessary for us to recapitulate these instances. I have kept away from that type of legislation which has more special application to the Asian population such as the Group Areas Act, etc., who are people who are simply bodily taken away from the roots of their existence, from their economic life and everything else and sent somewhere else.

There are certain very extraordinary consequences that follow from these things. I believe it was the Archbishop of Capetown, who I think is Dutch by origin, the Most Reverend Joet de Blank, who wanted to dedicate a church to Christ the Carpenter. Then he found that Africans were not allowed to become carpenters and the poor Archbishop was in a difficult position. How can he dedicate a church in Africa to Christ the Carpenter, and here it is. The Archbishop in an interview with Stephen Barbar of the News Chronicle, London, told him that the Union Government was "pursuing a policy of pinpricking and goading the non-whites to the point of explosion." The Archbishop further said with a bitter laugh: "You know, we recently thought to dedicate one of our new churches to Christ the Carpenter until we realised that the work of carpenter is now reserved for whites only."

At the present moment they are not allowed to go into any kind of occupation except of an unskilled character, which means all the men will labour inside the mines and so on. Now since we are not debating the conditions of what is virtually forced labour, I do not want to go into it. But those conditions are such as to effect the status of

people all over the world. It would be interesting to know what the International Labour Office does about these matters, but the great wealth of South Africa, which I believe at the present time amounts to the export of somewhere about 4 million metric carats of diamonds or something of that kind--all that is brought to the surface by the African people and under very strict conditions and often conditions of cruelty; and so is the coal that South Africa sells to the world and so will be the uranium and the gold and everything else. South Africa is one of the wealthy countries of the world and is gradually becoming more and more industrialized. In that industrialization this apartheid plays a role which is a matter of concern for all of us, certainly for the countries with advanced levels of labour and for countries like ours which want levels of labour to be advanced. That is to say, unless the standards of lives of peoples who work in the industrial system, then it means that industry must rest on sweated labour. And out of this 12 million population, over 9 million are the non-white population of Africa and they are the large numbers of people who are there employed.

It is interesting that in spite of all this apartheid, from beginning of this century, half the population employed in industry has been non-European; that is to say, it is interesting both ways, because half the European population that is employed covers all of the skilled occupations. At the same time it has not been possible to conduct industry without the unskilled labour of the indigenous population. So while it used to be somewhere about 20, 21 to 41, something of that kind, now it is 234 to 400, more or less the same level is maintained.

That is why one sees some sense in what the Australian Prime Minister said the other day in London when this question of the continuation of the membership of South Africa in the Commonwealth arose. Well, I am not here to discuss or debate the merits of this question, but he said that apart from everything else it was unworkable. You see, because the white population want African labour and the presence of a mixed population itself is evidence of the fact that some day humanity has to mix in this way. So it is unworkable. I am not subscribing to it. I think it should be abolished not because it is unworkable but because it is inhumane, unjust, is inimical to the peace of the world and of international conditions of security.

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For all these reasons we have brought this matter here year after year and tried to draw the attention of the United Nations. We have been one of the countries who have always argued for a degree of patience, perhaps for a degree of restraint in regard to the attack on South Africa. And I am free to confess I have a certain reluctance to participate in this debate because the Union is not here. I can understand their feelings. I am quite certain they feel out of water among a community of people who do not recognise apartheid. For them they must be outcasts. They must be all people who transgress the law of God and man and therefore they are not here. But it does not

embrace one to pronounce criticism against a Member State, against an elected Government, however narrowly elected, of that State without their being here either to listen or to answer.

But the fact that they are not here is not only not our responsibility. I was here when this item came before the General Committee and all that Mr. Louw, the Foreign Minister said, so far as I recollect, was that he reserved his position as he had already stated on clause 2 (7), but he did not object to this item being admitted. Now a Member State, having allowed an item to be admitted and then treating us to the discourtesy of not even participating in this, leaves itself open to certain relationships in regard to all of us. Therefore, one tries as far as possible not to exaggerate these things or even play them down a little. I have, here, a vast quantity of material which if one were to read out or refer to them would create considerable amount of disgust in the minds of people.

When this matter was first brought here, a large number of Member States felt that, bad as these things may be after all they will right themselves and we must make appeals. I believe in the first year also we even found it difficult to make a pronouncement, because people said "Let us discuss it and leave it there". And then we came to resolutions. My country took its part in them, and we always subscribed to the position that it is better not to overstate our criticism but to make appeals. Then we tried to assist South Africa by the appointment of a Commission, presided over, not by a European or an African, but by the representative of one of our colleague countries, namely, Chile, of South America. And soon we were faced with the fact that this gentleman, who no doubt had an open mind on this matter, would not be allowed to go to South Africa. Although he was not allowed to go there, the United Nations records contain the reports of Mr. Santa Cruz made over the years, and I cannot say that conditions have not changed--conditions have changed much for the worse. Today South Africa is not only a police State, it is a State which is a menace to the whole of the African continent. It has become a menace to the whole of the African continent for two or three additional reasons. First, that in this great continent of Africa, with its ancient civilizations which some of us ought to be able to appreciate more than we have done in the past, we are not dealing with what may be called a primaeval state of affairs--they are people with civilizations going back long before other parts of the world had absorbed them, people who participated in the early European civilizations, in whose countries are now dug up archaeological and other remains which prove the antiquity of civilization, people who had representatives and ambassadors representing their countries, as in the case of the Congo in Portugal, which country enslaved them after the visit of one of their missions in 1482.

Not only have we all this in mind, but we have now come to a situation in South Africa where apartheid has come to be a war of examination of one side or the other.

Secondly, there has been in the continent of Africa the emergence of twenty-five or so independent States seated here as Member States. Are we to content ourselves with the position that there are here representatives of many new countries and the representative of an older country which assisted in the formulation of the Charter, whose sentiments I read out to the Committee, and what is more, one of the founder member of the League of Nations, and who was entrusted, in wisdom or otherwise, with the trusteeship of territories in Africa. Are the representatives of the new countries not to feel that they are equal either way? Of course, we older ones have probably become accustomed to it, but here in the continent of Africa the difference is sharply posed. Many international obligations were undertaken, either in the economic, the political or the communications field, or others, and the United Nations assumes special responsibilities; there is an item on the First Committee's agenda with regard to the development of Africa. Now, are we to have two Africas, two separate worlds of this type, two different laws in this way. These are the problems that worry us very much.

We have now come also to the position where the whole relationship of the Union with regard to what should be the Trust Territory of South West Africa assumes a different complexion. Although it is too late to do it this year, my Government will take into consideration this new

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factor, that is to say, this territory of South West Africa was conquered from the Germans in the First World War and, under the impact of President Wilson's opinions, there were no annexations; these territories were declared to be A, B and C mandates--South West Africa became a C mandate, and the King of the United Kingdom being at that the "King, Defender of the Faith, of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the Dominions beyond the Seas", as it was called at that time, conferred the mandate which was vested in him. In 1914 the authority for exercising the mandate was vested in the Crown of the United Kingdom. At that time there were not five Crowns as there are today, and the Government of the United Kingdom in its wisdom vested the mandate, shall we say, in the King of the Union of South Africa. The League of Nations never gave a mandate to South Africa; they gave it to the King of the United Kingdom, and he, because it was part of his dominions, conferred it as he did.

Now that South Africa has become a Republic, a new position arises. It can no longer plead that the League of Nations placed a mandate with it, because it did not. It was an arrangement and if it is raised in that way we shall take that up. However, that is not the main point I want to bring up. We are arriving at a situation when South Africa, apart from the Empire, within its own territory, is building another colonial appendix to it in the Trust Territory where there are large numbers of peoples and, where a further misfortune, they discovered, in the year 1890, large pipes of diamonds in that place. With diamonds come trouble to Africa. It was a large discovery

of diamonds which was preceded--or succeeded, I forget which--by the great massacres of that time.

The resistance offered by the African people and all those who agree with them, whether they are of African descent or otherwise, whether they are on a ruling basis or otherwise, the great resistance offered to the South African Government, we hear very little about. And I think, even apart from passing these resolutions, on behalf of my Government I would like to express our sense of tribute to these men and women of whom we hear so little. We may hear about some of the notorious or famous trials, and so on, but day after day there are those who martyr themselves in the cause of freedom. They fight our battles, not theirs. That is to say, they fight the battle against racial discrimination for the dignity of the human being. We pass resolutions on the Declaration of Human Rights; they fight for them. This is the difference. It is up to us--the least we can do is to stand in solidarity with these people who are fighting against these laws. And of some importance--though I did not want to bring it up here--is the position that transpired in London a few days ago.

I think it is common knowledge that it was not the desire of the majority of Commonwealth countries, black, white or brown, to expel South Africa, because they thought it was far better that it should remain there and be taught a lesson, but all, including Australia and the United Kingdom--each, for different reasons, has, not a soft view, but a different view from others, I suppose--were unanimous that there should be an expression of opinion, which expressed abhorrence, or, as Macmillan said, that it was inconsistent with the ideals of parliamentary government and so forth, and we decided therefore that there should be some expression of opinion condemning apartheid. That settled the issue, because the Prime Minister of South Africa, rather than agreeing to this condemnation, decided not to continue. We ourselves in a sense may feel sorry because the impact of other countries upon it, particularly of the new African States like Nigeria, Ghana, and I suppose soon Tanganyika, East Africa and various other countries--Sierra Leone, and all the ones which will come--would perhaps have corrected future Governments. But there was no option left. As I said a while ago, the Union obviously looks upon us as indecent people, people who do not respect it. I believe it was once said on behalf of one of their statesmen that God had created people in this way, with different complexions, in order to put them in different places, and so on and so on. So that one great step has taken place in South Africa.

We are also concerned about the fact that there are other territories on that continent, such as Portuguese Africa, with its 1.3 million square miles and a very considerable population living in conditions of semi-slavery or worse, and the territories that lie between the Congo and the Union itself, where so many things are taking place, where there are struggles going on unknown to the rest of the world, in which the African people themselves are resisting all these things. That is why, once again, in spite of the fact that so many resolutions have had no effect, we have brought this up here again.

I said that I would deal with the resolutions at this stage, partly because they are before us, and I myself, who opened this subject, will not be able to be here when this debate is concluded.

There are two draft resolutions in documents A/SPC/L.59/Rev. 1 and A/SPC/L.60. The first resolution (A/SPC/L.59/Rev. 1) stands in the name of three countries of which mine is one:

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Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya and India.

I do not want anyone to believe that there is any fundamental difference of opinion between these two groups of countries, if you would like to put it that way, in regard to the intensity of this matter or the question of dealing with it mildly or otherwise. We are all entitled, as sovereign States, to put forward before the Assembly such proposals and such solutions as appear to us consistent with principle, which are strategically or otherwise wise, which fit the needs of the case. For example, we have time after time disagreed even among our own colleagues with regard to the language to be used, one way or another. And so, there are these two draft resolutions.

First of all, let me dispose of one preliminary matter. Our friend and colleague from Ghana, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, has asked us this afternoon whether we, as a sponsor of one of the draft resolutions, would have any objection to his resolution receiving priority. Now we have consulted our colleagues and conveyed our view. We have no objection to this having priority because, after all, the Assembly must decide on the substance of these things and come to its own decision. We shall naturally vote for our resolution, which I confess is couched in stronger language than previous years because of the changes in South Africa and because I forecast, although I have not at the present moment the authority of my Government to say so but I assume it will come in due course, that we shall have to consider seriously what things are consistent with membership of the United Nations. I do not go any further than that at this stage and we shall not only naturally vote for our own draft resolution but we hope there will be no vote recorded against it and, without naming countries, my Government would like to make a particular request to those three or four countries which we have in mind which, normally, while they do not vote against such resolutions, for various reasons abstain. Such abstention in the present context of affairs, especially after the result of the Commonwealth conference, is likely to be misunderstood. There is nothing here which is of a character inconsistent with the Charter and in fact many of our colleagues and friends feel that perhaps the draft resolution does not go far enough. This item was sponsored by some forty or forty-five countries, I forget how many, representing all parts of the world, North and South America, Asia, east, west, north and south, all of Africa--anyway, most of the continents of the world--and so far as I am aware, and I speak subject to correction, whether this draft

resolution goes too fast or too slow it meets with the approval of the sponsors of the item; if not, they will say so here.

Now we therefore make a very fervent appeal not only that this should be passed without opposition but that there will be no absentees on a rollcall because, whatever South Africa may say, whatever bravado it might practise, however much it might walk out of this meeting or of the commonwealth, there is one factor which is total in the world and that is the will of human beings. That is what public opinion is. That is all that we are trying to put into motion the support that has increasingly come to the expression of opinion by the United Nations year after year; and each time we have tried to find ways and means whereby South Africa would not feel humiliated or would not even be compelled to discuss in the context of a resolution. Times without number, year after year, our negotiators have told them that discussions do not mean that you accept the authority of the United Nations in this matter or anything of that kind, as in the earlier days. Now I want to draw attention to certain general statements here, for example, operative paragraph 3: "Requests all States to consider taking such separate and collective action as are open to them to bring about the abandonment of these policies."

My Government has stated it in this way because we feel that, irrespective of the enormity of any crime or the insistence on any policy, we shall not be a party to doing anything which appears to be an infringement of the legitimate, sovereign and constitutional rights of countries. We may have the right to request but we have no right to prescribe what shall be done, what shall not be done. Therefore, all we have done is to say that States should consider for themselves what separate or collective action they can take in the implementation of their wishes. It may be writing a letter, it may be an economic boycott, it may be breaking all diplomatic relations, it may be the organization of a voluntary organization or body or whatever it is. That is, we feel that in any appeal of that kind, the right, correct thing to do certainly at the present stage in the General Assembly is for us to make individual appeals, is to appeal to individual States to take either their own action or collective according to their own procedures. We are also mindful of the fact that each of our countries is tied up in so many international agreements and also that any action we may take may affect something else.

That brings us to the next resolution (document A/SPC/L.60) with which we are in complete sympathy, because the bulk of it, namely, the

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operative part, practically says the same thing as the other resolution--I do not know whether word for word it does or not--because it comes from the same circumstances. We have no objection to any of these operative parts, in fact, we have no objection to the whole of it, but I must say in all frankness that I have no

instructions and my Government will find it very difficult to vote for operative paragraph 5 as it stands. I do not say we will vote against it; we cannot vote for paragraph 5 as it stands, because it specifies what each country should do; and, while we may express a general wish in this way and request countries to take individual or collective action, not wanting to interfere in their internal affairs, we feel we should not be right in our relations with other countries to say that they must break off diplomatic relations, that they must close their ports, that they must enact legislation, that they must boycott South African goods, that they must refuse landing facilities and so on. I have no desire to go into the merits of this thing. It might even be that the United Nations may decide on action under the military provisions of the Charter. That is a matter for the United Nations to decide. At the present moment we do not feel that we can vote for items (i) to (v) under operative paragraph 5 set out seriatim. That does not mean that we as a country would not practise it and, so far as the Government of India is concerned, no question of pulling our punches arises in this matter.

As early as 1946 we broke off diplomatic relations with the Union Government. We carry on no trade with them. We do not allow their citizens to work in our country, and our citizens do not work in their country. We have condemned apartheid and dissociated ourselves from it at every turn. Large numbers of our nationals or peoples of Indian origin have, from the time when Gandhiji went to Africa fifty or sixty years ago, participated in direct action movements and are today members of African and other organizations in the country protesting against things of this kind. So we have no reservations on this. We have no diplomatic relations with the South Africans, we have no trade relations with them, we have no communications relations with them and so on except as may be under world radio agreements or something of that character. So we have nothing to lose by it.

But we are not here merely as one country; we are here as one ninety-ninth of the United Nations and when we put forward a resolution, so far as at present advised, we had to put forward something which in our judgment, right or wrong, would be in all conscience acceptable to the majority of the people who agree with us in principle. Those who object to it in principle, naturally, will vote against it. And therefore it is on that basis that we have put forward this resolution.

At the same time, we recognize the strength of feeling in Africa. There was a conference at Accra in 1958 which asked for all this and more. Then there was a conference at Monrovia which did not ask for more but still reiterated it. There was a conference at Cairo and there was a conference somewhere else afterwards, and then there was a conference at Addis Ababa nine months ago which asked for all these things.

We should be very glad to see no ship bearing, shall we say, the Liberian flag go to South Africa, then that would cut away one-third

of the shipping of the world. But I cannot dictate to Liberia that its ships should not go there. It would be interference in its internal affairs, even by suggestion. But the general principle has laid down. We are not in any sense opposed to the second resolution but we have, in all conscience and out of the frankness with which we state our positions in the United Nations, to point out that we could not vote for these sub-paragraphs (i)-(v), not because we have any objection to them singly but because we think that the principle of it has been met by the paragraph, which.

"Deprecates policies based on racial discrimination as reprehensible and repugnant to human dignity;" and

"Requests all States"--not only Member States--"to consider taking such separate and collective action as are open to them to bring about the abandonment of these policies".

Finally, one of the reasons that actuated us--you may think it is a rather small, tactical reason--is that we do not want any resolution in this Assembly this time to receive even a single vote less than last year, because in the sensitive state of South Africa everything is likely to be construed, and any kind of slowing down on this matter would be working against the Africans, the mixed population, the Asians and the Europeans who are fighting against the Verwoerd Government, and create a still different situation in the country.

What is more, having regard to the implications of apartheid to the rest of Africa, this common approach by a large number of countries--and I hope there will be no one left out--would be something that might assist the progress of Africa forward, as against all the inequities and

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discrimination of which it has been the victim for generations.

If you would like it put another way, our country is quite prepared to have two blows delivered at this policy instead of one, so that no one is left out.

We are therefore quite willing that Mr. Quaison-Sackey and his colleagues should have the benefit of priority if it is the wish of the Committee, because of course it is not in our hands. We shall not object to it, although this resolution of ours was drafted and submitted earlier and has been in circulation for a long, long time. But out of courtesy to our colleague from Ghana more than anything else, and knowing very well his desire to rally opinion as widely as possibly, we shall, if he sees any tactical advantage to be derived, not stand in his way. It is in justice to him, as well as to ourselves, that we should express our reservations in regard to those five recommendations which we shall not be able to support in their present form.

Finally, we have a feeling that we should not apply remedies which do not lie entirely within the four corners of the Charter. Also, we should not pass resolutions unless we are all prepared to implement them; and if, in the trade that is carried on by African countries with the South African Union were to drop off it would mean £12 million less for them. We have seen no evidence of that so far, because these things take time; and also, boycotts produce counter-boycotts which must affect the economy. All these things, however, must be decided by them for themselves. I am not saying that there are no circumstances in which one must put all these considerations aside and go on.

Having said that, I also think that any application of economic sanctions--and here I state the position of my Government--must emanate from the Security Council, because sanctions, if they are applied, are not child's play. They must conform to Article 41 of the Charter; and there is no reason why that Article should not be invoked. My country would not lag behind anyone else if it were the general desire of the Security Council or the United Nations to invoke those provisions. If the matter goes to the Security Council, its implications and all the economic and other factors will be taken into consideration.

We are not in any way opposed to this draft resolution; we merely state our position.

Finally I would say that all of us must remember that we have come to a stage in this world which, on the one hand, has become so shrunken, and on the other hand is conscious of such wide implications, that it is a world at once larger and smaller that we inhabit. And in these circumstances--in the words of Abraham Lincoln--we cannot have a world that is half enslaved and half free. So long as South Africa remains in this condition, we in the rest of the world are exposed to all the dangers that arise from racial discrimination; we are exposed to all the dangers that hatred creates; we are exposed to all the dangers that inequality of conditions of labour, and of near-slavery, provide; we are exposed to all the dangers which arise from the affront to human dignity; and, what is more, from the application in its fulness of the doctrine of universalism to the United Nations.

INDIA SOUTH AFRICA USA PAKISTAN GERMANY GREECE FRANCE GHANA NIGER NIGERIA  
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CANADA OMAN UNITED KINGDOM AUSTRALIA CHILE CONGO  
PORTUGAL IRELAND SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA EGYPT ETHIOPIA

**Date :** Apr 04, 1961

**Volume No**

1995

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Shri C. S. Jha's Statement in General Assembly on Angola

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Shri C. S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative in the United Nations, made a statement in the General Assembly on Apr 20, 1961 on the situation in Angola.

Following is the text of his statement:

The subject of discussion before the Assembly is one that moves vast masses of men on the continents of Asia and Africa. It is not my intention to speak at any great length, but the matter is of such importance that I claim the indulgence of the Assembly to take a little time in stating the position of my Government on this question.

The item of the situation in Angola has been proposed by forty Asian and African Members of the United Nations. Such a large sponsorship of the item indicates the concern of peoples all over the world, particularly in Asia and Africa, over the continuance of the colonial system and, in particular, Portuguese colonialism with all its intransigence and ruthlessness. It is unfortunate that due to various circumstances this item could not be taken up earlier for discussion, with the result that we have hardly time to give the question the attention it deserves.

Many representatives, particularly from Africa, have participated in the debate before me. They have expanded the case thoroughly and in detail. They have enumerated the facts, many of

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which they have personal experience with.

An explanatory memorandum contained in document A/4712 explains the reasons that prompted the sponsors of this item in making the request for inscription. I refer in particular to resolution 1514 of the fifteenth session, that is, the first part of this session, which the General Assembly adopted without dissent on 14 December 1960. As other representatives have stated, this resolution marks a milestone of the efforts made in the United Nations ever since its inception to put an end to colonialism and assist the peoples of dependent territories to emerge as free and independent people and take their rightful places in the comity of nations.

By this resolution the United Nations declared that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights, was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and was an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. The resolution recognized the rights of all peoples to self-determination, and asks that all steps be taken in

all territories which have not yet attained independence to transfer all powers to the peoples of these territories without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

This resolution is a landmark in the history of the United Nations. It is an expression of faith in the ultimate destiny of man and human dignity, and it is expected that all Member States which have responsibility for the maintenance and administration of dependent territories shall take immediate steps for the implementation of this resolution of the United Nations.

We are happy to note that most of the colonial Powers have accepted the principle of the right of self-determination of the peoples of the colonies, and are even now taking steps towards the fulfilment of this objective; and it is further gratifying to note that such steps are now, especially after the passage of the well-known anticolonial resolution, being taken with increasing zeal. In this regard my delegation would like to pay tribute to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France for the steps they have taken and continue to take in regard to the freedom of dependent peoples and of their charges especially on the African continent.

In the case of Portugal, the amazing contrast is a sad and utterly disappointing exception. I should at this stage like to push out of the way the ridiculous contention of the Government of Portugal that territories in Africa and Asia under their domination are not colonies but provinces. In this connexion, I should like to quote from a publication by the Government of India on this subject.

"History is replete with instances of various stratagems adopted by colonial Powers to continue to hold on to their empires. Portugal is, however, unique among the colonial countries in having called to her aid legal wit and wisdom, the jugglery of words and subtle quibbling to designate what were once termed colonies as provinces. The change of terminology took place in 1951 when the Colonial Act which had been in force since 1930 was incorporated in Portugal's Political Constitution. From that year the Portuguese colonial empire took on a new shape and lost its special character.

"The detestable word 'colony' was therefore dropped and the word 'province' took its place in what came to be known as the 'Ultramar Portuguese'."

In the Foreign Affairs of April 1961, James Duffy, the well-known authority on African matters and especially on Portuguese Africa, writes:

"Historically, the three areas have always been colonies, no matter whether they were called 'overseas provinces', as in the nineteenth century, or 'colonies', as in the early days of the Salazar regime, or as in the 1950s when the regime began to build up its face for

remaining in Africa, 'overseas provinces' again. The fact is that more than 95 per cent of the population of Portuguese Africa are not enfranchised citizens of Portugal; they have no civil rights and are legally regarded as wards of the State governed under a regime de indigenato administered by officials of the Overseas Ministry, formerly the Colonial Ministry."

The United Nations has categorically refuted the contention of Portugal that Angola, Mozambique, Goa and other Portuguese colonies are provinces of Portugal. During the first part of the current session, the Assembly adopted resolution 1542 (XV) in connexion with the transmission of information under Article 73 (e) of the Charter. Under the first operative paragraph of this resolution, the Assembly stated clearly that the "territories

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under the administration of Portugal listed hereunder are Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of chapter 11 of the Charter", and there followed a list of Territories in Asia and Africa under the administration of Portugal. In other words the United Nations recognized these Territories only as colonies of Portugal.

The resolution I quoted just now states clearly that Angola, Mozambique and other territories under Portuguese administration are Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter 11 of the Charter. This chapter is in the form of a declaration regarding the Non-Self-Governing Territories. It is hardly necessary for my delegation to state as far as Portugal is concerned, it has completely failed to fulfil the obligation under Article 73 and she has consistently refused to furnish information as required under Article 73 of the Charter. Instead, by resorting to a play with words--which incidentally can deceive nobody--she is endeavouring to hold on to her colonies without the slightest respect to the wishes of the people of these Territories and their aspiration.

In this connexion, reference should also be made to a very important resolution that was adopted during the first part of the current session. This is resolution 1541(XV) on principles which would guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73(e) of the Charter. The twelve principles that are annexed to this resolution explain very clearly the content and implications of Chapter 11 of the Charter.

I do not propose to take the time of the Assembly to analyse the principles in demonstrating their applicability to Angola and other Portuguese colonial territory.

But it is quite clear that the plea of integration, the plea of the treatment of these territories as overseas provinces of Portugal, cannot hold water for a single minute in the context of these principles which have been accepted by the United Nations.

We have often told of Portugal's historic mission in colonizing the land, of the discoveries, etc. In the process of fulfilling this historic mission the colonial peoples were divided into what were known as the assimilados and the natives. On this process of assimilation in Portuguese Africa, a book by James Duffy has this to say:

"The system of assimilation, which in a period of twenty-five years has affected the legal status of one-half of one per cent of the African population, has little to recommend it as an instrument of native policy, unless the purpose of the policy is to maintain the degraded status of the greater part of the population."

After the detailed interventions in this Assembly in regard to the situation in Angola which were so ably presented by several representatives from Africa, it is not my intention to deal in detail with this particular aspect of the question.

In spite of the rigid censorship regulations which prevail not only in Angola but throughout the Portuguese empire, the news that the outside world receives from Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies gives a picture of colonialism at its very worst. One author who was recently in Angola had this to say about what he saw:

"The black man in Angola is checked by a regime as ruthless as it is vigilant. Mere talk about independence can lead to years in prison. The regime bared its iron hand when it mercilessly quashed recent uprisings through opposition elements". He is talking about Angola. "Portuguese officials in Lisbon had told me I would find whites and blacks living in harmony equalled nowhere else. They said no bars prevented Africans from enjoying all the fruits of Portuguese civilization. There was no clamour for freedom in Angola, they added, because Africans there already had their rights. What I saw in Angola was quite different. Instead of a bias-free society, I found a rigidly stratified people topped by 200,000 whites and a handful of assimilated mulattoes. At the bottom are 4 million Africans, exploited and powerless. Instead of a civilizing mission, by which the Portuguese say they are advancing a primitive people, I found exploitation. Portugal avows a policy of racial equality, yet it is sending thousands of white immigrants to Angola to settle on choice land from which Africans have been uprooted. Africans are torn from their families and are forced to labour under conditions that often even lack the most elementary humanity.

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This is not an isolated quotation from one author. There are many books, many publications, many newspaper articles and many personal diaries which are full of descriptions of this nature; and the veracity of these monstrous conditions can no longer be denied.

The May 1961 issue of Harper's magazine, which as everyone knows is a

highly respectable publication, has in it an article which is very significantly entitled "The Kingdom of Silence--The Truth about Africa's Most Oppressed Colony". I should like to quote a few extracts from this revealing article, which refers to some of the most shocking aspects of colonial oppression and domination. On the subject of education in Portuguese colonies in Africa, this writer had this to say:

"Since this method of 'civilizing' the native is the accepted policy in the colony, it is not surprising that more conventional education has been neglected over the years. The principle laid down by the Royal Commissioner for Mozambique at the turn of the century is as applicable today as it was then. 'Formal education was nonsense', he declared. 'What we have to do in order to educate and civilize the indigena is to develop in a practical way his aptitudes for manual labour and take advantage of him for the exploitation of the province.' These are his own words, the words of this Commissioner. And, according to James Duffy, the illiteracy rate among the Africans in Portugal's colonies in 1950 was 99 per cent."

About the medical facilities, the same writer says:

"I cannot say about medical facilities in Angola because except for those few small infirmaries I have seen at some of the larger plantations and at missions, I have never come across any hospitals or other medical centres in my travels in the interior. I have been to areas, however, where people were sick and dying without medical attention. In the deep interior I once visited a small village and found a young woman stretched upon the sand outside her hut, so ill that she could hardly move or speak. My Portuguese companions showed no interest in her case, but I did make a casual inquiry, only to learn that the nearest medical aid was 100 miles distant."

The same writer has this to say about the oft-repeated theory of racial equality:

"The colonial populations are classified legally into two groups: the indigenas or the unenlightened peoples of the Negro race who have no legal status under Portuguese law, can own no real property and are subject to all the abuses I have described; and the nao-indigenas, comprising whites and those people of African ancestry who by reason of education and upbringing are culturally separate from the mass of native peoples ... During recent years I have noticed an increasing deterioration in the attitudes of the whites even toward the mulatto and assimilated African, a change brought about by the great influx of Portuguese colonists since the early 1940's."

Speaking about life in general of the African people in Angola, the writer goes on to say:

"These people are the product of an environment that has endured four centuries of slavery and forced labour, of a native authority and tribal custom broken by despotic administrative control, of swift

punishment for recalcitrance or resistance. Where no man is secure in his own home, he is insecure everywhere. One has only to visit the senzala, the native quarter of Luanda, where 120,000 people live in filth, poverty, or depravity or to watch the daily early morning sifting of garbage on the streets of Luanda, to realize the depths to which a rootless people can sink."

I could go on with quotations from newspapers and periodicals, as well as from books by competent authorities, but I shall not do so particularly in view of the short time the Assembly has before it at this stage. I could refer to the forced labour practised in effect in Angola and Mozambique about which the International Labour Organisation had this to say in the review published in July 1958:

"The Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour set up jointly by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of the International Labour Office found that in the

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African territories administered by Portugal there are certain restrictions and exceptions in the legislation which permit the exaction of forced or compulsory labour and that the labour of workers in San Tome was of considerable economic importance to the territory and their situation appeared to be similar to that of workers under a system of forced labour for economic purposes."

In making these quotations, I do not want it to be understood that these conditions are singular or peculiar to Angola. It is the Portuguese colonial system which unfortunately is of such severity, such depravity and degradation for those whom the Portuguese citizens; Portuguese nationals--the indigenous population--that really involves the provisions of the Charter and calls for action by this august body.

We in India are familiar with the Portuguese colonial system. Thank God we have shaken off that system. But on our territory there exists today the remnants of colonialism in the so-called Portuguese overseas territory of Goa.

After India became independent, the Government of India made a strenuous and continued effort to talk to the Portuguese authorities and arrive at a negotiated settlement in respect of Goa, as we did in the case of French Possessions in India.

I mention this to explain the nature of Portuguese colonialism, not so much to place before the General Assembly the case of Goa, which I understand is not on the agenda. However, I think the parallel is very interesting and reveals in its true colours the nature of the domination Portugal exercise over its provinces, Portuguese intransigence and the brutality with which the Portuguese authorities repress the nationalist feelings and aspirations of the inhabitants of Goa, to such a degree that my country was forced to break off

diplomatic relations with Portugal.

In Goa the resistance to Portuguese imperialism goes back some 300 years. In 1787 an uprising known as Pinto's rebellion faced Portuguese domination with a great and concerted challenge. This was a movement led by a group of priests in Goa and aimed at overthrowing the Portuguese Government. Through the centuries nationalists in Goa have made numerous attempts to drive the Portuguese out of their territory. Between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries ... (interruptions).

I was actually expecting the President's gavel earlier. But now that it has come I will not proceed to say anything more about Goa. As I said, it was not my intention to bring this matter up now; we expect to deal with it in a proper way but I do submit that when one makes out a case against a principle, parallel illustrations are permissible and although it is possible to argue that a particular illustration is not specifically on the agenda I hope the President will bear with me if I say that rather wide parallels have been drawn on this very rostrum and many statements have been made which, strictly speaking, have not had a pointed reference to particular matter being discussed. However, I will abide by the President's ruling and leave my references to Goa, merely requesting the Members of the General Assembly to imagine the similarity of the conditions in Goa, the censorship and the ruthless suppression that goes on there, to the situation in Angola.

I do not have much more to say, but I would like to add a few words about the background of facts and events against which this question has been brought before the General Assembly. It is recognized the world over that we are living in the most dynamic age--and in saying that one is not uttering a truism--that humanity has ever encountered or ever passed through. It is not only an age of undreamed of scientific and technological achievement, it is an age in which the minds of men have been moved, have been freed from the prejudices and the bonds of centuries. No longer is humanity prepared to submit to domination. No longer are human beings prepared to forego their dignity and the worth of the human person for any reason whatsoever. On the African continent, as indeed before in Asia, there have been great revolutions, there have been great movements for human freedom and liberty. In my own country, where one of the great souls of this century or of any century flourished--we had the good fortune of being led by him in the non-violent passive resistance movement--there have been great changes, and today the winds of change are sweeping the continent of Africa. The African people are awake and in this particular wind that is blowing, this particular wave which is now irresistible, there are no considerations of geographic frontiers, there are no considerations of overseas provinces. Men and women everywhere are thinking the same things, and the first thing they are thinking of is their liberty and the shaking off of domination by foreign rulers, getting back their human personality.

But, unfortunately, Portugal has not paid heed to the signs of the

times. Today in Angola there are serious disturbances. The indigenous

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population is fighting for its freedom. The example of neighbouring territories where Africans have attained independence and sovereignty and the right to decide their own destiny, fires their imagination.

What is the result, according to newspaper report? Ofcourse, it is very difficult to obtain any authentic reports from Angola because of censorship, but hundreds of people are being massacred and the most ruthless oppression is being exercised. According to reports, large armies have been sent into Angola to suppress the so-called rebellion, which is the name given by colonial Powers to all freedom movements. In the resolution adopted during the first part of this session it was specifically laid down, without a dissentient voice, that there should be no armed action for the suppression of freedom movements, but all this has gone by the board so far as Portugal is concerned.

We, along with other sponsors, have ventured to bring this matter before the General Assembly as a matter of urgency, as a matter involving human freedom, as a matter calling for the vindication of the highest principles of the Charter and resolution which was adopted during the first part of this session, the anti-colonial resolution which is a landmark in the history of the United Nations. We, along with our friends, have co-sponsored the draft resolution contained in document A/L.345; it is a moderate draft, it is constructive, it allows all the initial steps to be taken and we feel sure that it will commend itself to the large majority of the Members of this Assembly. Indeed, we hope that it will be adopted unanimously.

INDIA ANGOLA USA FRANCE PORTUGAL MOZAMBIQUE OMAN

**Date :** Apr 20, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri C.S. Jha's Statement in Political Committee on Cuba

Shri C.S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative in the United Nations, made the following statement in the Political Committee, on Cuba on Apr 19, 1961

My country is situated thousands of miles away from Cuba. Our interest and anxiety in the specific situation that prevails there is not the same as the natural interest of countries of the Western hemisphere, to which the representative of Mexico gave expression in a remarkable statement yesterday. But we have a common interest with all other nations of the United Nations to see that nations live in peace and justice, that international peace and security are not put in jeopardy by the events anywhere and that the chances of rapprochement in the solution of the vital problems of the day are not prejudiced.

The Cuban situation has now been debated for some days in the First Committee; and even while the subject was being debated, events have in some ways tended to outdistance our discussions. Rapid and dangerous developments have taken place which have enormously increased its gravity and, indeed, have left many delegations here, including my own, rather bewildered and confused. One must sort out the facts first, and then assess their implications and dangers. It is only then that we can decide what decisions the United Nations can or ought to take.

The indisputable facts are that armed action is proceeding on the soil of Cuba. Such action is aimed at the overthrow of the present Government of Cuba. It does not appear to be an internal uprising, at any rate in its origin, but is an attack from outside, from across the seas. Such external attack on Cuba appears to have taken the form of a serious military action, including fairly massive landings in several places, aerial bombing of cities and military installations and strafing of defenceless areas.

A member of the United Nations has the right to approach this Organization in the event of such external attack. Such attack, in our view constitutes unjustifiable armed intervention, from whatever quarter it may come. Even if such attack from outside should be organized and committed by dissident nationals of the country, seeking to overthrow an extant regime, it is no less an unwarranted intervention, particularly when there is outside assistance and succour, and it becomes then the duty of the United Nations to deal with the situation.

Another indisputable fact is that there is a great deal of organization behind such attack. The landings of hundreds of armed persons on the shores of any country requires ships and naval craft, military organization of a fairly high standard, equipment etc., and since any preparations for such armed attack must be made on terra firma, it is obvious that the preparations for the attack on Cuba must have been made on land constituting the territory of another State, not too far from the shores of Cuba. And it is also obvious that Cubans who are said to have fled their country must have received outside assistance.

While we recognize the inherent right of

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peoples in a free society to change the government by means of a revolution, including sometimes armed revolution, however much we may regret the use of violence, we at the same time consider that any outside assistance for such purpose is inadmissible, just as it is inadmissible for a State to assist actively in the suppression of an internal uprising in another State. The norms of international behaviour are clear in these matters. They derive from the basic necessity of good neighbourliness and non-intervention, principles which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Departure from these norms always creates a dangerous and confused situation and would make peaceful and friendly relations between States difficult.

This principle is not affected by considerations of whether a particular Government is good or bad, whether it is progressive or not and whether its international behaviour is approved by some other countries or not. The Government in Cuba may be controversial and may not be liked by some of its neighbours in the Western hemisphere, but the fact remains that it is the present, lawful Government of Cuba, whose delegation sits in the United Nations and which is recognized by and has diplomatic relations with a large number of States Members of the United Nations.

We should like to add that in today's world, which from the point of view of communications is a small world, it is not possible to avoid public reactions in any country to events or happenings in other parts of the world. The world of today has truly become indivisible in the sense that events and political currents and controversies in one country cannot be isolated and are necessarily noticed in another, and sometimes produce reactions, even strong reactions. The right of the people or the public opinion of any country to approve or disapprove of events, actions and even regimes in another country cannot now be denied. It is also not possible to deny the right of extension of moral support to any movements, even if such movements relate to the territories and peoples of other States; but beyond this point we cannot go. The legitimacy of the right of a State or of its people to interfere in the affairs of another State cannot be admitted. The United Nations cannot acquiesce in assistance in terms of arms, equipment, finance, organization, training etc., by governmental or even non-governmental organizations to dissident groups belonging to another country. That would be contrary to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, which are so clearly set out in Articles 1 and 2.

Having stated these as the understanding of my delegation on the question of principles, we cannot ignore implications and dangers of the Cuban situation. The Prime Minister of India has described the latest development in Cuba as very distressing and said that it was unfortunate in itself and also because of its repercussions on the broader world situation. Situations of this nature, in any part of

the world, have unavoidable repercussions in another, and increasing tensions in one part, particularly when these tend to involve big Powers, create difficult situations elsewhere. We fear that unless the Cuban situation is controlled, there may be serious repercussions on larger questions and situations of conflict elsewhere, and the repercussions will be felt not only outside but within the United Nations itself in the treatment of the very difficult and vital problems that confront us.

It is therefore our hope that the situation in Cuba will be ameliorated and the armed conflict that is raging now on the shores of Cuba--in our view, unjustifiably, if there is any outside assistance, and, as I have indicated, there must be outside assistance, otherwise such landings would not have been possible--will cease and that nothing will be done which will widen the rift and the gulf that already seems to have been created by the situation in Cuba and the incidents occurring there, not only between neighbours but between the big Powers. We would be extremely disturbed if the situation is not contained and leads to a deterioration of the world situation, with its dangerous impact in many spheres.

It is in the light of these views and solely guided by the desire to contain the situation and to prevent it from developing into one which might endanger peace and increase world tensions, not only in this hemisphere but elsewhere too, that we would examine the various proposals before this Committee and decide to cast our vote.

INDIA CUBA USA MEXICO

**Date :** Apr 19, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Indian Army Personnel under U.N. Command

When asked to state the number of Indian army-men and other personnel sent to various countries abroad to work under the U.N. Command, and the nature of work entrusted to them country-wise, the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following

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reply in Lok Sabha on Apr 19, 1961

Personnel of the Indian Armed Forces have so far participated in four United Nations Operations in the following numbers and for the following purposes:

(i) A total of 6, 112 officers and men served in in Korea between August 1953 and March 1954. Of these 331 formed a field ambulance unit under the U.N. Command, 232 served on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, which was responsible for the disposition of the prisoners of war held by both side in the Korean War, and 5,549 officers and men participated in the Indian Custodian Force which took custody of the prisoners of war and acted as the executive agents of the Repatriation Commission.

(ii) In 1958 a United Nations Observer Group was established in the Lebanon, in response to an approach by the Lebanese Government to the Security Council, to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders. A total of 71 Indian military officers served in this Group between June and December, 1958.

(iii) A United Nations Emergency Force has been deployed in Gaza, in the United Arab Republic, since November 1956, first to enforce a cease-fire and cover the withdrawal of the Anglo-French and Israeli forces after their invasion of Egypt, and subsequently to prevent violations of the Armistice between the United Arab Republic and Israel along the Armistice demarcation line. An Indian contingent has participated in the Emergency Force since its inception, with periodic rotations of personnel. At the end of February 1961 a total of 1,255 all ranks were serving with the Force.

In addition, the services of Lt. Gen. P.S. Giani have been made available to the United Nations to act as Commander of the Emergency Force.

(iv) United Nations Force has been sent to the Congo to assist in the United Nations Operations there in accordance with the directives of the Security Council. Between July and October, 1960 a total of 783 all ranks were sent from India to work under the U.N. Command; in addition, since February 1961 a Brigade Group is being provided for service under the U.N. Command; this Group will total 4,844 officers and men, some of whom have already been air lifted while others are en route.

In addition, the services of Brig. I. J. Rikhe have been placed at the disposal of the United Nations to act as the Military Adviser to the United Nations Secretary General on Congo Affairs.

INDIA USA KOREA LEBANON ISRAEL EGYPT CONGO LATVIA

**Date :** Apr 19, 1961

# Volume No

1995

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### Prime Minister's Reply in Lok Sabha

The Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made a statement in the Lok Sabha on Apr 03, 1961 while replying to the debate on the Budget grants of the Ministry of External Affairs. Shri Nehru said:

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I am always grateful to Hon. Members in this House. When subjects relating to our foreign policy come up here, I benefit by their advice and their criticisms even though I might not always perhaps agree with them. More specially it is always a pleasure to listen to the Hon. Member Acharya Kripalani even though sometimes he repeats almost textually what he has said before and not paying much regard to changing conditions or the world situation. It is almost pleasing to listen to him because there is a touch of romance about what he says and reality, the hard facts of this world of ours are often ignored.

Now, Sir, to begin with, may I deal with one point he raised, because that is a personal matter? He suggested that perhaps there is too great a burden on me and I should attach some Minister or senior Minister to the Ministry of External Affairs to share that burden. Now, as the Hon. Member himself knows, I am a very modest person and any criticism of me is always welcome. I certainly cannot judge of it myself; others are better judges of my virtues or my failings. As a matter of fact, so far as all these major matters are concerned in our foreign policy, they have not only come up before this House again and again during the last dozen years but, apart from that, they are constantly under review by various very important committees of the Cabinet and the Cabinet itself, and I take it that the matters are too important for them to be dealt with without the full consideration of the Cabinet. If not the Cabinet, there are two committees of the Cabinet.

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One is the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet and the other, in matters of this kind like the sending of troops to Congo, is the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. both consisting of senior members of the Government. Apart from formal meetings of these committees, informal consultations are fairly frequent. So I do endeavour to share that burden because it is a heavy burden and involves very important policies.

But, apart from my own failings etc., I should like to say something

in justification of all those large numbers of people--thousands of them--who work in the External Affairs Ministry in our different missions abroad. Of course, they have grown greatly, and they go on growing because the independent countries go on growing although we are not represented in every one of them. We have to spread our representation much more. We cannot ignore, for instance, the new countries in Africa. It is of importance that we should be represented there. And, we have, unfortunately, in the past many years not been properly represented in South America although the countries of South America are important. We are gradually trying to fill those gaps. But, apart from the extent of our work that our External Affairs Ministry does--the extent need not carry us very far--as Hon. Members would no doubt agree, much depends on the quality of the work. I think I can say with considerable assurance that, broadly speaking, the quality of the work of our Ambassadors and others abroad is of a high order as compared to any foreign service of any country including some of the oldest foreign service in the world. It is not only very senior members of the service but the next in rank, if I may so, have also proved to be efficient and persons who wherever they go command respect and attention. Naturally, I cannot speak of thousands of people, putting them on the same level. There are persons who do not come up to that degree. But I think it may be said that our Foreign Service is respected by all the Foreign Services in the world, and wherever they are situated, they are consulted by others representing other countries, and their voice and their advice carry weight.

There is one matter which also deserves consideration. Frequently, when some particularly difficult service is required, Indians are sought after; usually, the Indian representatives on our Foreign Service are sought after and selected. This is a matter which certainly has some significance and some meaning. Why should these various countries, big or small, and the United Nations try to get Indians to perform very responsible and difficult tasks? Because, they are considered, I take it, of a high order, their intelligence, their application, their understanding of world events. That has happened repeatedly in the past, and it goes on happening. In fact, sometimes we are put to some difficulty because we cannot always spare them. Yet, it is our desire to serve the larger cause wherever we feel that they can be of good service.

Then again, it is said, as if it was an admitted fact, that somehow we have failed in regard to countries who are our neighbours. Our neighbours are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, Malaya and Burma; these are the nearest neighbours. Acharya Kripalani, I think, was under the impression that we sent our best people to Europe or America and our second-rate people to these other countries, who are our neighbours. Well, I should like to disabuse him of this view because, in our own list, these neighbouring countries are given the first place. Of course, there are some countries which should inevitably have the first place, like the United States of America, like the Soviet Union like the United Kingdom, because they occupy a position in world affairs which is of great importance. So, we keep

this in mind in choosing persons to these countries. In the Soviet Union we have one of our senior most men for many years, Shri K.P.S. Menon, who has done very good work. He is retiring after a very good record of distinguished service. We are sending to take his place one of our senior-most and most respected persons in the Foreign Service, Shri Subimal Dutt. It is not an easy matter for us to spare him from here, but we felt that the work in the Soviet Union is of such importance that we must send one of our best. That applies to the United States or to the United Kingdom also. But, apart from these, we have always tried, and we always try, to send our leading and most distinguished Ambassadors to the neighbouring countries, more especially to Pakistan, Burma, China and to other countries round about.

Our Ambassador to China has played a good part. Perhaps there was a hint that our representation in China might not have been up to standard. I should like to say that our Ambassador in China is one of the persons whose work and whose general advice we respect very highly. He is working in a very difficult position in China and, as the House can very well appreciate, he is performing that task with great ability and forbearance.

So far as some of our younger people in the Foreign Service are concerned, the House has had some occasion to see their work. It does not often come up before the public but we have seen their work in the Indian and Chinese officials'

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report. In regard to these our troubles with China, they had occasion to judge the quality of their work. So I would like this House to appreciate that. It is not only our opinion, but it is a general opinion among those people who come in contact with them, that is, the foreign service of other countries and the foreign missions in other countries and here who hold our Foreign Office and its Ambassadors and others in the highest regard.

USA OMAN CONGO CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC INDIA AFGHANISTAN NEPAL PAKISTAN  
BURMA CHINA

**Date** : Apr 03, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Nepal

I just mentioned Nepal. Before I venture to say something which is not in full agreement with Acharya Kripalani, I should like to express my agreement with him in regard to what he said about the report of a hunger-strike undertaken by Shri B.P. Koirala who was till lately the Prime Minister of Nepal. When this change-over in Nepal took place, I expressed my broad regret at the democratic structure having been changed. But apart from expressing my regret, naturally it was not up to us to go to interfere in any way with what was happening in Nepal. It is not a matter of our liking something or disliking it. It is for the people of Nepal to decide what they should do or what they should not do. So, there has been strong criticism sometimes in the Nepalese press and sometimes that criticism has been completely beside the mark and without the least foundation. Take for instance a statement that was reported to have been made, namely, that some kind of a secret understanding had taken place between India and Nepal, that Shri Koirala had brought about that secret understanding, which was completely untrue. It was so untrue that nobody had ever mentioned it. There has been no mention or thought of it and it was practically also quite out of the question. We could not possibly think of it. We do not desire that type of thing. So, many of these things have happened but we have not interfered in the slightest in Nepal. The kind of works that we are doing in Nepal which are developmental works we have carried on and propose to carry on in the normal way. But it is obvious that when news about the hunger-strike of a person like Shri B.P. Koirala and his fast deteriorating health comes to people in India, they are troubled by it. They are distressed by it. They are distressed for the larger reason that wherever such a thing occurs we would be distressed and for some personal reasons also, personal in the sense that Shri Koirala was a comrade of ours in our own Indian struggle for independence. Naturally, we do feel that. We have been distressed about this matter because apart from rumours appearing in the newspapers there been no Nepalese official intimation about it. When representatives of the Nepal Government were asked about it, they neither confirmed it nor denied it. It was not a very satisfactory reply specially when such a positive statement is made in the press and elsewhere. We have been distressed about it. Just as I was speaking here news came to me this afternoon that some time today Shri B.P. Koirala broke his fast and took some fruit juice and, I think--some milk. I do not know the conditions, how and in what way this was done and what other things happened. But there it is.

Another fact I should like to mention is that one of the present Ministers of the Nepal Government had openly stated that interviews would be allowed to the members of the family of Shri B.P. Koirala. On the other hand, I learn that his own wife was not given the permission to interview him. I hope that the Government of Nepal will appreciate that our interest in such matters is not interference in their internal affairs but an inevitable feeling that we have about the people who have played an important part in public life and who have been associated with us in the past. And, whatever else may be done or may not be done, normal amenities and facilities should not

be denied to opponents of the present regime.

Again, in Nepal, I would say, coming back to Ambassadors, one of our senior-most Ambassadors has been sent there. Before him also we sent an outstanding person. So that, we have always treated Nepal as a very important post for our foreign service. And that applies, to some extent, to Burma also and to round-about countries.

Day before yesterday when I ventured to place these demands before the House I said something. I begged the House to consider these questions relating to foreign affairs in their broad context. It is easy of course, and sometimes necessary, to separate an item and examine it in greater detail. Nevertheless, they are all inter-connected, inter-linked, and you cannot really exercise a full judgment about any particular matter isolated from the rest. And therefore I ventured to suggest that this dynamic in the concept of history in making in the world should be kept before us. Because, history is always in the making. But perhaps the pace--is much swifter today, Life is faster today. People rush about. Conferences seem to be held every few days, international conferences. And as consequence of the technological development in the world, the speed of international events also has been made much faster. Also, the fact that somewhere in the background looms the atomic and the hydrogen

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bombs has also made people think more swiftly, more rapidly and attempt from time to time to grapple with these problems that have arisen. There are so many new things, new type of things. Whether it is the hydrogen bomb or nuclear warfare, whether it is the great changes that have come about after the Second World War including the emergence of China, whether it is the new things that we are seeing every day, the emergence of Africa, the African people and the tremendous problems that have arisen, all these are major historical events. It is not a question of liking or disliking them, just as it is not a question of your liking or disliking an earthquake or a hurricane. There it is. One deals with the hurricane or the earthquake in the best manner possible. There is no question of liking or disliking it. Some you may like, or some you may dislike. We like the emergence of the African pepople. We do not like everything that is happening in Africa, and the conflicts within Africa, apart from those imposed upon it.

NEPAL USA INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BURMA CHINA

**Date :** Apr 03, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Congo

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It was in this context that we decided, after much thought, after a great deal of thought, to send our armed forces to the Congo. It seemed to us that a grave crisis had arisen not only in the Congo but in the whole United Nations and its future. And it so happened that it was given to us, to some extent, to deal with this crisis, to ease it

have done it; but the fact of the matter was that, obviously, European countries or American countries as a whole could not do it; because, the intrusion of European forces or American forces would have not been welcomed. First of all, the intrusion of any great power forces would not have been welcomed anywhere. Secondly, countries which are normally associated in military alliances are not welcomed, because they give rise to counter-forces coming into, so that by a process of exclusion, or call it what you will, it fell to us to take a step. We were invited to do so, and if we did not take it up, there was grave danger of the whole of the United Nations structure in the Congo not functioning, or even collapsing, at a time when oddly enough, the United Nations was being attacked from both directions, that is, the so-called two major military blocs, both of them, were attacking the United Nations for entirely different reasons, of course. And we decided, therefore, to do something which we had not done previously in this way. And it was a serious decision, serious not only for us but serious, one might say, even in the brief history of the United Nations.

May I say here that I agree with Acharya Kripalani that our sending troops to the Congo was different in quality? The nature of the thing is different from our sending them to the Gaza Strip or to Indo-China or elsewhere; they were different, except for the fact that we sent them, some troops in Indo-China, to help the International Commission there and to serve as test-teams to find out what was happening, or in the Gaza strip, to help in observing the ceasefire line between Israel and the United Arab Republic. This is of a different kind, and admittedly so. That was why it caused us so much worry and difficulty to decide. But we came to the conclusion entirely from the wider point of view, not merely from a narrow point of view of India, but from a wider point of view, that it was our duty to undertake this responsibility, more especially because we had associated ourselves just a little before with the resolution passed by the Security Council in regard to the Congo--I think it was passed on the 21st February or so. Having done that, it seemed rather craven-hearted for us, for narrower reasons or just for fear of the consequences, not to shoulder that responsibility, apart from the other reasons that I have mentioned, such as the consequence on the United Nations, and so, we shouldered it. Having shouldered it before we decided to do so

fully, we made clear the preconditions on which we were sending these troops to the Congo. I do not exactly remember all of them, but broadly speaking they were as follows.

First of all, we wanted to be assured that the United Nations was going to consider the Security Council resolution seriously and to implement it, and not as previously to leave it largely unimplemented or with doubts raised about its meaning. This has happened previously, and I think many of the difficulties in the Congo have been due to the fact that previous resolutions of the Security Council were not given effect to. But we did not want that to happen, and we were assured that certainly it was meant for implementation.

Secondly, we said that we did not want our Forces to come into conflict with the Forces of any other member-country of the United Nations. Obviously, we were not going to fight other countries there. They could be used, if fighting was necessary, because the main purpose was the establishment of law and order and a Government of the Congolese properly elected Government of the Congolese. Therefore, they might have to be used between factional fights in the Congo to bring about a measure of security and law and order, otherwise not. We added certainly that as regards the people who were there apparently as

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mercenaries from abroad, chiefly from Belgium, some from other countries; who were supporting some of the factions in the Congo, notably in Katanga province, to some extent in Leopoldville and in Kasai also, if it was necessary, our people will have to fight them, if these mercenaries continued functioning there.

The very first part of the resolution of the Security Council was that the Belgian Forces there should be withdrawn. And that still remains the crux of the Congolese problem. When that is done fully, I have not the shadow of a doubt that the rest would be easier of solution. The only solution can be not the imposition of any power, even the United Nations, but the taking charge by the Congolese themselves of the Government and being in full control. The United Nations would come in to give help, economic help, food, medicine and that kind of thing. That is what one aims at. We do not want our people to remain there a day longer than is necessary.

So we decided to send them. Part of them have arrived there and some of them are on their way. Even after sending them--this decision to send them--other difficulties have arisen and they are constantly, daily, arising. It is not very easy even to keep pace with changing events there. Everyday we get a sheaf of telegrams from the Congo and from the United Nations about this matter and we send replies. It is a difficult matter and not without risk, but nevertheless, I am quite sure that we did the right thing. One cannot run away from risks, if one feels that that is one's duty to undertake.

Then about the various governments in the Congo, as Hon. Member opposite asked why we had not recognised the successor government to Mr. Lumumba's Government, that is, the Gizenga Government. As the House knows, we have not officially recognised any government there. We did not recognise at any time any government except right at the beginning when to some extent we did recognise the Government which was represented by Mr. Kasavubu as President and Mr. Lumumba as Prime Minister. That was a government under the Constitution and the President had limited powers and Mr. Lumumba had powers of a head of Government. After that nobody has had those full powers, because Mr. Lumumba was eliminated first; that is, long before his death, he was eliminated from government and put in prison chiefly by Mr. Mobutu who came in, not under any Constitution or law but by coup d'etat, and who was later, more or less supported by Mr. Kasavubu.

Now, one may say Mr. Kasavubu was a part of the Lumumba Government because he was an elected President; but under their own Constitution, that part cannot become the whole. The President cannot become the Prime Minister and all the government, with all the powers of the full government. But as a matter of fact, he has been functioning more or less as a complete government, and he was encouraged to do so by the fact that in September or October when he went to the United Nations, he was taken into the General Assembly of the U.N. which was, I think, rather unfortunate, partly because he did not have those full powers and secondly because, because of that the very delicate balance in the Congo was rather upset, and some of those gentlemen there like Mr. Tshombe, Mr. Mobutu and others threw their weight about and practically started opposing the U.N. much more than they had previously done. I have little doubt that they were encouraged to do so by Mr. Kasavubu being taken in into the General Assembly of the U.N. and also because they have been functioning very much under Belgian advisers--apart from Belgian officers and other forces, under Belgian political advisers. And one may presume that their activities against the U.N. were due to Belgian advice to act against the U.N. So we have had a very peculiar situation. That is about Mr. Kasavubu.

Now about Mr. Gizenga. When Mr. Lumumba was first kept in prison, he was not functioning for many months. Then he escaped and was caught and ultimately, as the House knows, he was brutally murdered. To consider that in the strictly legal sense somebody has succeeded him as the legal successor Government for the whole of Congo is rather stretching the law. I do not mean to suggest that we should function in these matters under some very strict legal code because conditions are very odd there and one cannot be quite rigid. But one must be guided either legally or morally or both possibly. I feel that as a matter of fact when the Congo was divided up into 3 or 4 major provinces or parts, the authority of one part did not extend to the other. But, further, we felt that it would be more helpful if we did not attach ourselves to one particular group or party there even though we may have sympathy with that group, than if we did attach ourselves in this way. Anyhow, these are the reasons and I think they still hold and we feel that, ultimately, only the Parliament there

can organise a government, can fix a Government. That was what I suggested when I went to the U.N.

It would have some kind of legal or constitutional basis and the U.N. would be justified in supporting it fully. As it is, nobody has any

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constitutional basis there. I have suggested that if the U.N. supports one party, it is inevitably supporting a faction and throwing its weight in favour of it. That has been our difficulty about these matters, because U.N. is in a peculiar position. The Security Council passed a Resolution six weeks ago which we naturally supported and because of which we have really sent our forces there. That Resolution was passed not by the Security Council at the instance of its members but at the instance of a large number of other countries who are not in the Security Council. Some, of course, who formally moved it, were there; but many others were outside who were consulted. We were outside the Security Council and we were consulted. The Resolution was sponsored by the U.A.R. and two other countries, Liberia and Ceylon. But, really, there were a dozen other countries who were consulted before it was put in. That Resolution was passed.

Among various things in that Resolution there was a part, the very first part, about Belgian withdrawal, about dealing with the Congolese Army, which is a very peculiar Army, hardly with any discipline or control and which has done what it chose. The idea was that it should be disciplined and controlled, and, if necessary, disarmed.

There were several other matters. One was an investigation into Lumumba's murder. It is very important. Now, some of the authorities at present in the Congo, like the authorities of Katanga and Leopoldville are charged by some people with being accessories to this murder. To charge them, to have an investigation and yet to recognise them as functioning authorities brings about a certain confusion, obviously.

These very authorities have recently, in the last 2 weeks or so, been openly declaring something very near war with the U.N. So, we have this peculiar position with the United Nations policies as covered by the Security Council's Resolution. But, at the same time, the United Nations is, to some extent, recognising and encouraging the very people who are opposing it and opposing this Resolution.

In the nature of things one cannot have two contradictory policies which cut off each other. That has been the difficulty of the U.N. But that is not so much the fault, perhaps, of some official or other. The U.N. itself reflects the conflicts in the world. That is the difficulty. Some of these conflicts are sometimes resolved; sometimes they are not resolved. So, they affect the action. That is the difficulty. We are quite convinced of the steps to be taken by

the U.N. Firstly, there must be the withdrawal of Belgian mercenaries. They are not being sent by the Government, so far as I know, but they have come to Mr. Tshombe and the other gentleman there. They spread their net fairly wide. They recruit them from Belgian and from France,.....(An Hon. Member: From South Africa)..... and, to some extent, from South Africa even. So, if that is done the whole problem becomes simpler. There should be some kind of disciplining of the Congolese Army and then they should proceed with the investigation of the murder of Lumumba. These are the most important things.

We are in some, I would not say, 'apprehension', but nevertheless difficulties come up every day. Here are our forces going, some have gone by air and some by sea. Only day before yesterday I think they sailed. We sent what we call an integrated unit with all arms. That is, if you separate one part, the rest is unbalanced. It is a balanced unit; we do not want unbalanced units to go there. But apart from that, here is a ship going and normally it would have gone to that port of Matadi. Meanwhile, the Matadi port is occupied by Mr. Mobutu's henchmen after driving out some Sudanese troops functioning under the U.N. It is of urgent importance not only for ourselves but for the U.N. functioning there that this port, through which supplies come, should be occupied and fully controlled by U.N. I hope it will be--very soon.

Again the same difficulty arises by contradictory policies being followed and pressures being exercised in the U.N. in this matter. Naturally, a good deal of responsibility attaches to the major powers in the U.N. because it is not a question of merely a boot here and there but of throwing their weight in the furtherance and in the implementation of a certain policy.

In this connection, I may mention something which is rather distressing and that is the campaign against Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal against his continuance in the Congo. We are not anxious to send our best men there for them to remain there indefinitely. But in the context of things as they are, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal's removal from there would mean, inevitably, shall I say, a new balance being created there against the implementation of the Security Council resolution, which of course will affect the situation very much. Therefore, we are entirely opposed to this in the present context or in the near future. And it may have some effect on our maintaining our forces there. If we feel that they are not being properly utilised as we intended them to be then it is for us to consider what to do and I hope that it will not happen.

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So, Congo is a very big matter today in the world affairs; in itself it is big because it affects the future of the UN and because it affects the whole of Africa, and naturally all the newly independent and other countries of Africa. As you have just heard among other people who are functioning there, there appears to be South Africans

too and we can well imagine what kind of spirit they bring to that adventure.

CONGO USA CHINA ISRAEL INDIA BELGIUM LIBERIA FRANCE SOUTH AFRICA SUDAN

**Date :** Apr 03, 1961

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1995

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Laos

Now, there has been Laos where it would appear that the possibility of some kind of agreement and cease-fire has become greater. It is a pity that these questions are often considered under the shadow of threats, whether it is the threat of the SEATO conference sitting there, or the threat of some other opposite party because as soon as threats come in, prestige comes in and the policy of each country becomes much more rigid.

Fortunately, however, there is some hope of, I shall not say entire, but some kind of cease-fire coming about some time. May be the International Commission may meet probably first in Delhi and then they will have to go to Laos, very soon after. Where that international conference will meet, we do not know yet. So, there it is among two of the major problems affecting Asia, Africa and the world.

LAOS USA

**Date :** Apr 03, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

China

A great deal has been said by Acharya Kripalani about China and he

has pointed out again with much force what he has done previously in almost identical language. I do not know; I am sorry that what I said on the previous occasions, endeavouring to explain to him what had happened and how he had reacted to it, unfortunately has had no effect on him. Therefore, probably what I might say today will equally have no effect on him, because as I said, the Hon. Member is a person of a romantic temperament and rather averse to examining the facts of life as they are.

He mentioned the words 'change of heart'. I have not said anything about change of heart. What I said was something very much different. I said that the broad policy we have pursued, including very much the result of this officials' report, this investigation, etc., has brought out the basic facts so clearly that I thought that even the Chinese Government would be affected by them, not suddenly but gradually. Governments are not affected suddenly, but gradually it may affect even their rigid mind, when they feel how strong is India's case in this matter. That is what I said. That by itself will not affect them, but other accompanying factors, our own attitude to this whole matter, the way they have realised that we cannot be pushed this way or that way, how we have adhered strongly to the position we have taken up, which is continuing, which is not a thing which they can look upon with any measure of contentment.  
(interruption)

Every nation changes its policy because of the logic of circumstances, facts and pressures. Acharya Kripalani thinks that the only pressure worth considering is the pressure of war. Short of war, I do not know what the middle stage is, which the Hon. Member may have in mind. The normal policy for a country or a Government to adopt even in the most serious circumstances is not to jump into war, but to avoid war and also prepare for it, if necessity comes. That is the only policy, and meanwhile one has to try all other means, all other pressures. And, in the modern world or any world there are pressures of various kinds. Does the Hon. Member realise the pressure on the Chinese Government which is being constantly exercised by the facts, by India's attitude supported as it is by all these facts? The House must realise that while it may be completely clear to think about the facts, those facts were not clear to many people outside India. Even people who are entirely opposed to the Chinese Government—let us take the United States of America; they are entirely opposed to them, they are not friends of them—when asked did not give a clear reply. That is not because of our not explaining to them. Governments do not function in that way. They do not get their facts from others. They get their facts themselves. They have got vast establishments to find out. We have got a historical section here. They have got armies of historians and others constantly pouring over these matters. They come to a judgment themselves, not because of our publicity or anything like that. That does not count very much. I was merely pointing out that a country like the United States was a little chary; they will not be chary any more because of this marshalling of evidence that has been done on our part.

Peopple have said that somehow we have become isolated, that China has isolated us. I do not understand this. I suppose they have come to a border treaty with Burma or possibly a treaty with Nepal which has not been finalised yet. It is because of this, I suppose, that they think they have isolated us. I do not understand this. We are not isolated. I cannot speak of Nepal, there is a new dispensation. But in Burma

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there is no question of isolation or any question of any lessening of the close contacts that we have with Burma. If I may say so when we were asked, when we were consulted at an early stage about their dealings with China, we told them to go ahead and get a good border settlement if they could. We told them that they should not just please us not take it or not accept it. Of course, we told them not to do anything which would affect our interests. That is a different matter. But our advice to them was to get a good settlement if they could. We do not complain at all about what the Burmese Government has done. We do not complain about Nepal either--I do not quite know what the facts are and, therefore, I cannot say much about the future.

But it is wrong to imagine that we have become weaker in these areas, our neighbouring areas, because of something that is happening there, which is happening in China. There are of course big facts. The mere fact that China being there is a fact which none of these countries can ignore, and nothing that we can say can eliminate Chinese presence in a big way. That is a different matter. That is what I venture to suggest to Acharya Kripalani, that these are certain facts, certain developments, and one of the major developments of the post-war period has been these changes in China, in Africa etc., which have a powerful effect upon the world situation and which affect us in some ways more particularly.

I ventured, I think, to give some data in the last session of Parliament about what steps we had taken in regard to our border from 1950 onwards, because it was imagined that we had been completely ignorant or impervious to what was happening and we had done nothing at all till they had occupied a good part of our territory in the north-east of India. But I ventured to give some dates as to what we had done. It may be said, of course, perhaps, that we did not do enough. That is a different matter. It is a question of judgment, balancing of things, but the fact of our cognisance of this possible danger is there. We concentrated more particularly on our NEFA border which we considered more easily capable of being threatened.

Replying to a question put by an Hon'ble Member the Prime Minister said: Longju has no importance, if I may say so with all respect; excepting a certain psychological and sentimental value.

An Hon'ble Member: I would request the Prime Minister not to say like that. In respect of Ladakh he said that not a blade of grass grew

there. The Prime Minister was very sad when Mr. Chou En-lai quoted that statement of our Prime Minister against him.

Prime Minister: If the Hon. Member asks me a question, I have to answer it. What I said about Ladakh was from another point of view. I said that these territories are so high up that they are hardly inhabited; there is no communication, there are hardly any trees or any blade of grass. It does not lessen the Chinese guilt in coming in. It is a fact, that from the point of view of the action we might take or not Longju, as I repeatedly said, is a matter of, perhaps, I think, 2 1/2 sq. miles, a village, a little part of the village this side and a part of it on that side, which is annoying that it should be there. But it is a different matter. In the larger scheme of things, it has no importance to them or to us. One must not lose the perspective. Ladakh stands on a completely different footing.

An Hon'ble Member: In Longju we had our troops. But they were pushed out (Interruptions).

The Prime Minister: I am very sorry. I cannot argue this out. We have to look at these things in some perspective. It is right that we had a small platoon there, which was driven out forcibly by the Chinese. It was highly objectionable. There is no doubt about that. But I am merely looking at it from the broad perspective of events. If it is a question of Longju, it can be settled in no time. In fact, when Mr. Chou En-lai came here, we did not talk of Longju, but we broadly referred about that part of the area and he said that, in the circumstances, he would accept the McMahon line. His point was not that of accepting or not accepting the McMahon line, but this particular village was on the other side of the McMahon line; it was on that side of the McMahon line. That is another matter.

An Hon'ble Member: It is three miles inside the McMahon Line.

The Prime Minister: This has no importance whatsoever. We must not lose ourselves in these petty things. But Ladakh has vast importance, both in regard to extent of the area and other consequences that may come from the Chinese occupation.

Anyhow, from 1910 onwards we took steps to strengthen our position in NEFA, and very successful steps as subsequent events have shown. It is much more difficult to take those steps,

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although we took some steps in the Ladakh side too. They were not adequate, not enough, and when the Tibetan rising came two years ago, they crept in from various directions. That story or whatever it is, is given in the correspondence, white paper and the rest. Excepting that particular bit, the Aksai Chin road in the north, which took place a little later, apart from that, the rest took place after the Tibetan rising two years ago.

So, my point is I am not putting forward this as an excuse—that we had in mind all the time, ever since the Chinese came to Tibet, that the whole frontier position has changed and we have to take steps in regard to it and very extra—ordinarily difficult steps are involved in this. Even from 1950 we have been building roads, mostly, again, on the NEFA side, because we attached more importance to it as being more threatened, and especially checkposts. We built some road in the Ladakh side too. In the main, whatever roads we have built in the Ladakh side, they are all controlled by one road, and that is the road which goes from Jammu to Srinagar in the valley, and the tunnel. That is a bottleneck. If that is not there then all the roads in Ladakh do not count because you cannot reach them. Therefore all this business of building the Banihal tunnel, improving the road there and the next road from beyond Sonemarg to Baltal—all these were preliminaries. We did think of that in building that road to Leh for the last few years. May be, we could have done it quicker and sooner. Things were hastened by the Tibetan rebellion and what followed. But there it is. Since then, during this last year or a little more than a year, we have hastened our road programme and have achieved very considerable results in that. It is going much faster than normally any PWD establishment of the Government functions. This has made a great difference both from our defensive point of view and from other points of view.

Again, I repeat, as I want to be quite frank with this House, that we have considered this matter. Acharya Kripalani talked about ten years. It was not clear to me in what connection and whether he was referring to the past ten years or the future. But the fact is that we do not propose to take any adventurist action not for and psychological reasons but for strictly practical and military reasons. At the same time we must be prepared for every kind of action and we are preparing ourselves for that. It is no good shouting following which one might come under certain circumstances.

I say so because the Government is accused of having a defeatist mentality. Again, I would beg to submit that much that is said or something that is said here is more defeatist than anything can be. I have no defeatist mentality. I can assure them that I am quite confident. If you want me to march an army across the Himalayas and seize that territory, I consider that not a very wise or sensible proposition to make. If that is not there then the alternatives have to be considered. Those alternatives having been considered we are taking certain action. I am preparing for the future apart from building up, which is a very important thing, in the eyes of the world, of other countries in Asia, Europe, America, etc., a certain momentum of feeling, of knowledge in regard to this matter. It is no small matter that the Chinese Government has to face a certain criticism from these other countries—I am not talking about the countries which are opposed to China, but other countries in Asia, which they do not like at all. Their prestige suffers. They accuse us India, of imperialist ambitions and what not. That very charge is being made against them. We do not go about shouting these things because we are conditioned and built differently. Other countries,

many countries in Asia are throwing that at them. It seems to me that that is the only proper course to follow from the point of view of India's dignity, prestige, maintenance of our strength and building it up more. Every step that we take we have to measure the consequences. After all, a Government and Parliament have to think and function with a measure of responsibility.

Acharya Kripalani referred to "the rings of spies" surrounding us and wanted me to give full information. Well, I mentioned previously that there are three countries involved. In this particular matter, if I go a little further back, there would be half the countries represented here involved not directly or indirectly--and some very important countries--it is not in small ways or big ways. It is difficult always to get evidence. If we have full evidence, we take action. But this kind of thing one has to judge in the context in which it has occurred.

One thing I would like to say. An Ambassador is a very important person, of course. But many things happen without the least knowledge of Ambassadors. That I got to know some years ago, not today, many years ago, when this happened--the big agencies in fact. It is deliberately done that the Ambassadors should not know. And many of these so-called information agencies, information services are not even under the direction of the Ambassador; they are directed from the headquarters of the home country. It is an extraordinary state of affairs.

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Of course, every country tries to gather knowledge. Some do it by rather clever methods, some by rather crude methods. That is the main difference. Some information may be harmful, some may not be. One has to keep all these factors in mind. And we felt that no useful purpose would be served for us to put all the details of this matter before the House or the public. Because, it so happens that our relations with those countries are very friendly, and then it had no particular direct relation with that, although it was undesirable obviously, and that is why we took action.

I think Hon. Member opposite wanted to know of the conditions of service of our armed forces in the Congo. I have already mentioned about this. First of all, we wanted them to function in terms of this resolution of the Security Council. Secondly, they are not to fight the forces of any other member-country of the United Nations excepting the Congo itself. Thirdly, they were not to be used against any popular movement in the Congo. Fourthly, they were to function under their own officers as a unit. That is to say, they had to function, of course, under the general command of the General Commanding there, the broad command; but otherwise they were not to be dispersed in small packets, thereby losing their identity.

I shall touch upon one or two minor things before I finish. An Hon. Member seemed to have said, I am told, that I went to the United

Nations last year because the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom decided to go, and that, he said, proves that our policy follows, and is linked with, that of the United Kingdom. Well, he had forgotten; he may be thinking as well that my going there might be partly due to the fact that the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union went there too; so, from that one might draw the impression that our policy is linked with that of the Soviet Union. In fact, there was quite a good crowd of Prime Ministers and Presidents present there at the United Nations: there were the representatives of a large number of African countries, such as the President of the United Arab Republic the President of Indonesia and the Yugoslav President and so on, apart from smaller fry like Prime Ministers. But, instead of judging by this, it would be more helpful to him, I suggest, if he sought to find out exactly what happened there when we were there, and how far my policy or our policy was linked with that of any other; it was certainly linked because our effort is always to link it up with that of other countries; one does not function by oneself in the United Nations.

CHINA USA OMAN INDIA BURMA NEPAL ANGUILLA CONGO INDONESIA

**Date :** Apr 03, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha

Prime Minister Nehru made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on Apr 01, 1961 while placing before the House the budget demands of the Ministry of External Affairs:

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, I beg to place before the House the demands on behalf of the Ministry of External Affairs. At this stage, I shall endeavour only to make some preliminary remarks. Perhaps, at a later stage, I shall be in a better position to deal with remarks of criticisms of Hon. Members.

The External Affairs Ministry is a Ministry which not only deals in a sense with the world at large, in so far as India is concerned, and as such it is inevitably involved in many of the world problems, and it is involved during a period when the dynamic of change and history is working at an unusually fast pace. The burden on the External Affairs Ministry, not merely of carrying on the routine administration of a great department of this Government but of facing novel problems is very considerable. I should like that fact to be

kept in mind by Hon. Members not in excuse of any error, but because, to understand the problems that face us, some kind of a wide and large-scale view has to be taken. Naturally, there may be much in the working of the Ministry which may be criticised; errors may have been committed, but the big picture has to be seen to understand it in its full context.

The Ministry's work has grown considerably and it goes on growing. It grows because of various reasons. One, of course, is that more and more countries become independent. It is a happy development--and we have to face the problems of our representation there and their representation here, more particularly, from the countries of Africa newly independent but it grows more especially because the problems facing the world become more intricate and more difficult.

The biggest problem of all that we have in the world today is that of disarmament, and it affects us chiefly because it affects the world, not because it directly affects us so much, and also, merely because of our size and various reasons which make our country rather important, relatively speaking, we have to play a part in many

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matters which otherwise perhaps we might not have played.

I should like, therefore, first of all, this House to consider and keep in mind this larger scheme of things in the world in which the External Affairs Ministry is functioning and judge of our broad policy accordingly, whether it is correct or not, whether it has succeeded or has not measured up to what we hoped for it.

USA INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date** : Apr 01, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Broad Policy

Speaking for myself, I may be partial, perhaps, to something with which I have been connected for so long, I think that in spite of the great difficulties which the world has faced, and which we have faced, the broad policy followed by us in external affairs has justified itself to a tremendous degree. In fact, even those, many of those, who criticised it have begun to appreciate its rightness and

its justification. By a mere test of numbers, at the time when we talked about our being a non-aligned nation and not lining up with military blocs and powers, when we began saying so, there was hardly any other country which said so, or which acted on these lines; today, I could not exactly give the number, but I think it goes into the twenties or perhaps more, and what is more so is that the great countries which themselves appreciate--and say so,--the value of a country like India being unaligned.

USA INDIA

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Laos

Here is a simple case, topical case in point. There is Laos, which is one of the problems of today, and where difficulties have arisen in the past few years because of pressures exercised on the Government of Laos to throw its weight on the side of one military bloc or alliance and not to remain totally unaligned, or neutral, if you like. Today, every party recognises including the very people who are leaders of those big blocs that the only future for Laos is as a neutral country, and it is because of that recognition that it may be said that there is some hope of the question of Laos being settled in a peaceful way, I only say hope; nobody can be certain yet, because there are so many hurdles in the way.

LAOS USA

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Dynamic Process

So, generally speaking, not only has this broad policy which India has followed met with recognition and appreciation, but there is a feeling even among those who follow different policies that this deserves the world in many ways, and it is peculiarly fitted for India. That is the broad approach to this problem.

Then, if we look at the actual state of the world, we have to realise two or three things; first of all, that in external affairs, we have to deal with not only a changing concept but with, if I may say so, history being written or acted, which will be written later. It is a dynamic process that is going on all over the world. Of course, even in our external affairs, that phrase may be used, but more so in our external world. That is happening and it is happening at a stage when it is difficult, more difficult than perhaps previously, to forecast the future. Now forces are at play, and a new dynamic is in action. Who could have said even twelve months ago or two years ago of the changes in Africa, tremendously rapid changes in Africa? Who can say what the new developments in nuclear weapons may bring, war or peace, or what the result may be? All these are factors which bring in not only a measure of uncertainty, great uncertainty, but at the same time consequences which may be extreme in their character. So even though we may look ahead and try to forecast the future, as one always tries to do, the actual facts which help one to forecast it are very limited and the uncertain factors are far more.

INDIA USA

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Basic Position

Of course, in the ultimate analysis, so far as any country's future is concerned, it depends principally on itself, on its own strength and ability, and partly on the rest of the world. Both factors play their role. Therefore, whether they are external affairs or internal matters, the first thing we have to think of is to build up our own nation, build up its economy, build up the general condition of its people, so that it may meet any problem with confidence. That, of course, is always the basic position. But even in building that up, much depends on what one does, apart from the economic aspect which will now come before the House again and again--our Five Year Plans and the rest--how one does it and what kind of relations it develops

with the rest of the world. Does it develop friendly relations, broadly speaking, or at any rate, does it succeed in avoiding hostilities and enmities with other countries--which is important, because they come in the way? We may well say that at the present moment, in many ways we are peculiarly fortunate in having the goodwill and the friendship of many of the countries of the world, certainly of the two super Powers, as they are called, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. I think I can say with confidence that our relations are not merely correct, as they are, but friendly,

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which is perhaps surprising to many people, because these two great countries themselves have not been in the past at all friendly to each other--in fact, they are the heads of great coalitions and great power blocs.

And so it is no mean achievement to carry on our policy, our independent policy, and at the same time have the goodwill and understanding of these two great countries, not agreeing with them always in what they do. But both our integrity purpose and the means that we employ in carrying it out have impressed these countries, and therefore, what we say they may accept it or not carries weight with them. They consider it fully.

That applies to other countries too. In fact, the only two countries to which that does not fully apply are the great People's Republic of China and Pakistan. So far as Pakistan is concerned, again our troubles are not new ones. I believe that as between the people of India and the people of Pakistan, there is very little ill-will left. But it is true that on the governmental level, there are problems which have not been solved and they create friction from time to time.

USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CHINA PAKISTAN INDIA

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China

So far as China is concerned, the House knows well how recent developments have created a gulf, a wide gulf, between our relations.

We have felt strongly about it and the House has also felt strongly about it. Nevertheless, we have tried to avoid, in so far as we can, taking any steps which may create unbridgeable chasms between these two countries. We have to look as I said in this dynamic of history not only to the present but to the future and the future of the two countries who are neighbours to each other like India and China, two countries with vast populations, is of the highest importance to both these countries and to the world.

So we have tried to steer a middle course between our strong resentment and the steps we actually take in this connection, and not allow ourselves merely in anger to do something which may create further problems and difficulties. Broadly speaking, our attitude has been to strengthen ourselves to prepare for any contingency and not in the slightest to give in in any matter which we consider important.

Some Hon. Members have sometimes criticised us, because they feel strongly about these matters, and asked why we have not taken stronger action. The answer to them would be, first of all, that one takes strong action when other actions are all precluded, and when one is prepared for the strong action. It would not be wise to talk about strong action where one cannot take it with any effect. But the further answer to them would be that when the consequences are so vast and far-reaching, one does not jump into that type of action unless there is absolutely no other way left.

What other actions that we have taken in regard to this matter, for instance, the reference of this to officials who produced an official report which was distributed here--were first of all in the nature of strengthening our position before everybody, before the world, certainly before the Chinese Government and people also, and preventing anything from happening which might weaken our position, holding on, because the mere holding on is a matter of strength--it is not a question of weakness--and it creates results. To think that you can only create results or achieve something by pure warfare is not correct. Warfare, of course, does produce results, good or bad, but the mere holding on of a position strongly without giving in, a right position, produces a certain continuing result; and I do not rule it out although it may seem difficult today, that the strength and correctness of our position may dawn on the Chinese Government's mind. I certainly do not rule it out. If so, I am going to try my best and see that it is appreciated by them and they realise that they have done a wrong thing from which they should withdraw.

The report that our officials have produced which many Members may have read--and many have complimented them--is itself a sign of patient, hard work on behalf of some of our officials, more especially the historical section of the External Affairs Ministry.

An Hon. Member: It could have been done long ago.

Prime Minister: I am sorry our people are not quite so capable of

doing these things as the Hon. Member who made this interjection. Some other people who are very eminent in history and other things have complimented them, in doing it as they have done it and when they have done it. It is a matter in which I do not wish to enter into an argument.

It required a tremendous deal of research. As I said on another occasion, even what we have produced now is the result of years of research, before this Chinese trouble came. Therefore, it was not suddenly done: it was being done

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throughout these years, hot at this pace of course; the pace became faster afterwards. But all this time our historical section, since it was founded has, in fact, been preparing these in innumerable notes that have been exchanged for the last ten years; plenty of notes on this very issue as to what might come. But then it had to function with greater speed when this occurred.

What I am venturing to place before the House, in a few words, is. I want the House to consider this question in this broad scope in this world which is ever near to war and tries to avoid it. It is in this scope I should like them to consider the other problems, the Pakistan-India problem which is in a somewhat different level and yet which has dogged our foot-steps all these years; or our sending forces to the Congo; or our getting entangled perhaps in the Laos situation—we were entangled long ago, it is not a new thing. Of course, these are different facets of this ever-changing world and difficult world.

Even the greatest powers in the world like the United States or the Soviet Union are constantly considering what action they should take in regard to a particular matter. Not even the greatest power can control or issue commands to the rest of the world: they have to adapt themselves to circumstances. And, surely, even if we are capable of doing so, which we are not, of ordering the world about, it would be an unfortunate day when any country aims at ordering the world about.

Now, sometimes it is said today, some people feel that lately we had perhaps been changing our broad policy. I should like them to examine this matter a little more deeply and they will find that the changes have often come in the policy of other countries, not ours. Not that this is a virtue, but I am merely stating that there has been a consistency in the broad policies we have pursued, and we have not changed basically. We have adapted them to circumstances. There have been changes in the policies of other countries which sometimes have brought them nearer to us.

If I may say so with all respect, take the policy of the United States of America. Undoubtedly, under the new administration there has been a marked change, a change which if I may say so with all

respect, we appreciate greatly and which has brought their policies nearer to our policies.

I would not object to changing my policy if it is for the good. But broadly speaking, it is our policy which is being accepted by other countries as the correct policy.

So for the present I do not wish to say anything more except to point out that we in the External Affairs Ministry are constantly dealing with this dynamic of history in a changing world and in a changing India and in circumstances which are without parallel in history. And we do not get much help from the past in trying to unravel the future. The Ministry had all kinds of new duties assigned to it, new problems. We deal with the problem of Tibetan refugees. It is not normally a problem of external affairs, but we do deal with that problem. We deal with other problems also which are not external affairs exactly. But they have been connected by historical process, and we shall continue to deal with them. And I hope that this House will individually and severally give its approval to these broad policies that we have been pursuing and which have met, I suggest with all respect, with very considerable success in this difficult world of ours.

We cannot have it all our way, nor is it very fitting for us all the time because the world does not go our way, to sit down like spoilt children and cry about it. It is not suitable for a grown up or mature nation: it is rather an act of immaturity. That does not mean that we do not make mistakes, of course, and we shall be happy for these mistakes to be pointed out, so that we may correct them.

CHINA USA INDIA PAKISTAN CONGO LAOS

**Date** : Apr 01, 1961

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Prime Minister's Statement in Rajya Sabha

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made a statement in the Rajya Sabha on Apr 20, 1961. He said:

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Congo

".....in the paper I am asked something about the treatment meted out to the Indian troops in Congo. Well, there has been no question of any ill-treatment to them for the last many weeks or months, but questions have arisen about their transport, about the delays in transport for them and, all that. The question of maltreatment of Indian troops has not arisen at all in recent weeks or months.

So far as the Belgians and other foreign mercenaries are concerned, we are quite sure the

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U.N. organisation has laid the greatest stress on this and it is continuing to do this. Some of the Belgian mercenaries had been withdrawn, and we understand that some other powers concerned are also bringing pressure to bear on the Belgian authorities.

Asked if it is a fact that the Belgian Government has agreed to withdraw the Belgian military and civil advisers under its control, the Prime Minister said: That is so, But the question is that that kind of answer is not particularly satisfactory because large numbers of them can be said to be not under its control. Most of them, as I said, are mercenaries not under its control. Lately we learn that there are quite large numbers of South Africans there and Mr. Tshombe's men. There are very few Frenchmen now. They are mostly Belgians, South Africans and very few Englishmen. The British Government at least has laid down that any person going there staying there in his individual capacity, will lose his pass port and steps will be taken against him by the British Government to penalise him. These are fairly effective steps. But I do not know if the Belgian Government has said so--I do not think it has--in regard to these mercenaries and others.

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Cuba

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The developments in Cuba, have obviously not only affected Cuba but affected the world situation. A very dangerous situation has arisen there. Apart from what is happening in Cuba, when two great powers issue statements which are of the nature of threats to each other and which involve inevitably national prestige, then the situation becomes very dangerous.

Now, Sir, it is very difficult for me to say what is happening within Cuba. News is scanty. There is censorship and other difficulties. But one fact is clear, and that is that some kind of invasion has taken place on Cuba from outside... and that the invasion could only have taken place from the American mainland. It may be from some part of the United States, Central America or some other place but it is fairly well known that Cuban exiles had been collected in various places in Florida or possibly in Guatemala also or elsewhere, trained there and supplied with arms, etc. and encouraged to go and invade Cuba. It is fairly clear because even before the invasion took place there were many references to it in the American press and pictures of their being trained and all that. And then this invasion took place. Now, if that is so, it does appear to be a case of intervention. I say so because in the recent statement issued by President Kennedy he has stated very clearly that he will not permit American armed intervention in Cuba on any account. That statement has to be welcomed but I find it a little difficult to understand the major difference between that type of intervention and an intervention of encouraging and supplying arms, may be training Cuban exiles to go over there and invade. It would be a bad precedent. It is a bad precedent which, if followed elsewhere, would create international complications wherever it may be followed. I am not for a moment saying what is happening in Cuba because I do not know except that some fighting is obviously going on between these invading forces and the forces of the Government of Cuba.

Now, so far as India is concerned, we in common with a large number of other countries have recognised the Government of Cuba which is represented there in Delhi. Their representative was even here. Our Ambassador to Cuba, in fact, is the same person as our Ambassador to Washington. He goes there from time to time. So the position has been that the Government we recognise and which is functioning there has been attacked by an invading force. If there had been some kind of internal turmoil, it is none of our duty or anybody's duty to interfere in their internal difficulties but where force comes from outside, it does make a difference and to encourage a force to come from outside does seem to us a kind of intervention which leads to

difficulties and which may lead to any other party intervening also. Then it becomes an issue beyond that of the future Government of that particular island; it becomes a world issue and that is the grave difficulty that has arisen in Cuba and is arising. We try and naturally we are so anxious to see that these matters do not lead to a tremendous increase of world tension. It is more important for us to see that tensions come down than merely to express opinions this way or that way. We have therefore refrained from saying much. Of course, to some extent our position is being clarified by our representatives at the U.N. We have also drawn the attention of the major powers concerned to this matter and to the anxieties we feel because we do think that this invasion and the manner in which it has taken place is dangerous, is a precedent which is bad for the future and is particularly harmful to international relations. I think perhaps it has immediately resulted in further difficulties in Laos when the Laotian issue was coming to some kind of a settlement. We were on the verge of it. Maybe it has come in the way of it, and this may happen elsewhere too. I cannot give any further details now but if anything very special happens I

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shall inform the House.

Answering questions put by Some Hon. Members, the Prime Minister said: I was under the impression that I had dealt with the very points raised by Hon. Members. I have clearly stated the position. I cannot be master of all the facts there at the present moment but one major fact stands out that there has been an invasion from outside and that invasion I cannot see how it could take place with the organisation, encouragement and help of the authorities, public or private, of the U.S.A....

I deliberately said that because sometimes private authority is there. They have been very powerful. Even they cannot go without the support of the public authorities. There are great industrial concerns there sometimes, who are very strong, very powerful, very rich, whose interests may be there, I do not know. Anyhow, this fact is a matter of the greatest import and of grave danger. We think so and think that there should be no intervention from any side. Cuba should be left to work out its own destiny. The fact is that a Government which is functioning there has been attacked by invasion and from all accounts it appears that that invasion was based somewhere out either in the U.S. or in Central America or some State there.

As for the U.N. there are several resolutions there in the U.N. and our representative has already participated in the debate and will no doubt do so more later.

CUBA USA GUATEMALA INDIA LAOS

**Date :** Apr 20, 1961

# Volume No

1995

## INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR LAOS

### Prime Minister's Speech at Vigyan Bhavan

Prime Minister, Nehru made the following speech before the International Commission for Laos at Vigyan Bhavan on Apr 28, 1961

Members of the Commission for Laos, Excellencies, gentlemen, we meet here this afternoon in a somewhat unpretentious way to consider or rather to give a start to the consideration of a problem which has become for the moment one of the major problems affecting us.

It is now seven years ago since the old Geneva Conference met and it led to the formation of these three Commissions in Indo-China and India was given the responsibility and honour of being made the Chairman of these Commissions. Some of you, gentlemen, have served in these Commissions previously. It was a difficult and delicate and often an embarrassing task. But I think it may be said that those commissions did function in a way which at least prevented the situation from growing worse. They did not solve problems, perhaps always, but they did manage to keep things going more or less without adding to the difficulties already facing us. I think it was perhaps rather unfortunate that two years ago the Commission from Laos was adjourned indefinitely. It is not much good, looking back and saying what might have been, but it is just possible that some of our present difficulties might not have arisen in this particular way if the Commission had been functioning there. However, we are now at the behest of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference again resuscitating and vivifying this Commission and we have met here just to give a certain, well, formal push to it to proceed with its labours.

It is just a few days ago that we received the decisions of the two Co-Chairmen, the directions which involved first of all a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities as it is sometimes put; secondly, a meeting of this Commission and thirdly a Conference to be held at Geneva from the 12th of May. Immediately steps were taken for this Commission to meet and I am grateful to the Governments concerned, namely, Canada and Poland, for their sending their representatives with speed and expedition. The first step, of course, in all this process was a ceasefire. Now, it is not quite clear to me yet, how far the ceasefire or cessation of hostilities has taken place. Obviously it is difficult for both either the Commission to function adequately much less the Conference later on if hostilities are going

on. An everchanging situation is arising. Therefore, it is of the greatest importance that there should be full cessation of hostilities as early as possible.

I have no doubt that this Commission itself will direct its attention to that matter and possibly make some suggestion which may be sent on to the two Co-Chairmen for their consideration but I would like to lay stress on this that in this difficult task, the difficulties are increasing enormously if fighting goes on. We just can't get to grip with

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the subject unless there is a certain measure of peace, at any rate, absence of fighting and that is the first subject in which all of us are interested. How the Commission will function, how long it will remain in Delhi and when it will go to Laos, that is for you, gentlemen, to determine in consultation with the two co-Chairmen whenever that is necessary. I take it that your real work does lie in Laos, not here, except that you may confer with each other and draw up your main lines of work and send a report to the two co-Chairmen. I have no desire whatever to push you out of Delhi but I do feel that the sooner you go to Laos the better it will be. It will enable you to tackle the problems much more speedily and easily from there. The position of India,--of course the fact that India is Chairman--does not give it any special position but it does add to the responsibility of India in this Commission and we have been conscious of that during the last few years since these Commissions have been working and it has been very often rather an embarrassing position but by and large the way these Commissions have functioned there have, well, helped in solving the problems that have arisen and not in adding to our difficulties. I am sure this Commission that goes there will help in that process and progressively lessen the headaches that many people in the world have suffered from because of conditions in Laos. One thing which was perhaps a little doubtful some years ago although it should not have been doubtful, is now pretty clear. The whole basis of the Geneva Conference, the last one, as I understood it, was that the countries in South East Asia in Indo-China could only, practically speaking, carry on as independent and sovereign entities if they remained unattached in the military or other way to any group of nations. They remained unaligned because the moment something else happened, it upset the balance there and the poor country was pulled in two directions at the same time with unfortunate results. That was the b

asis I think of the old Geneva Conference and on the whole, in some parts of Indo-China, this has succeeded; in other parts it has not succeeded. In, Cambodia, one might say that more or less there has been success in this. Now it is clearly understood, so far as I know, by all parties concerned and by all the powers concerned that Laos should be as they say--I don't particularly like the word myself--a neutral country. And it is only in that way that it can maintain its independence and sovereignty. Of course, it can be, I have no doubt,

will and should be helped by other countries to develop; it is a poor country undeveloped and deserves all help; but, otherwise should be left to develop according to its own thinking and genius. That is the only way; otherwise, as we have seen, it will become a place for hostilities which again are not confined to the local people but which get the backing of others. And really, these people, the Laotians, who, I believe, are as far remote from any kind of warlike people as any human beings can be, nevertheless have to suffer war with all its consequences and other nations give help and aid and make this local war in relatively small country, a major issue in the world. I hope, therefore, that the armistice will first of all be effective soon and then this Commission will be able to stabilise conditions there with its presence and advice and when the Conference is held in Geneva a more permanent basis will be given for Laos to settle down as a peaceful country not tied up in any military alliances but friendly to all and being helped by other countries to develop.

Now, this task--it is a difficult task--it would be difficult anyhow but it becomes much more difficult in the context of things as they are and the Commission will have to face these difficulties and proceed not only with wisdom but with enormous degree of tact all round.

I have no doubt that the distinguished members of the Commission will succeed in this difficult and onerous task.

I wish them all success.

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CAMBODIA

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**May**

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LAOS SWITZERLAND UNITED KINGDOM USA

**Date :** May 01, 1961

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### GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS

#### Shri Krishna Menon's Statement on the Opening Day

Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the 14-nation conference on Laos in Geneva, made the following statement on the opening day of the conference on May 16, 1961

Your Royal Highness, we are deeply beholden to you for graciously

inaugurating this session of the Geneva Conference, which the Co-chairmen have reconvened. It is now seven years ago, on the 24th of July, 1954, that the Conference in its Final Act expressed its satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Laos, and its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities will permit Laos to play its part in full independent sovereignty in the peaceful community of nations.

In our present difficulties, it would be wrong to forget that to a considerable extent this has been achieved because since then Laos became a member of the United Nations; and plays its part in the community of nations.

Unhappily although, the guns of war were silenced in the world on the 11th August 1954, after twentyfive years, conflict again broke out in that unhappy land, (Laos). The present phase starts on the 14th December, when the Prime Minister of India addressed a communication--not for the first time--but in different circumstances to the Co-chairmen of the Conference, to reconvene the Commission for Supervision--The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos.

It is not for me, at the present stage, to go into the history that led to this request, because I think we would all be wise in following your wise injunctions, Your Royal Highness, that at the present time it would profit us, Laos and the world more if we looked forward rather than backward, that we shall draw from the experience of the past and that we learn by our shortcomings or otherwise but we shall address ourselves to the task that is before us.

This is an occasion for the Government of India--and if I may say so, Sir, modestly, for myself, personally--to pay a tribute to the successive Foreign Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United Kingdom, who have had what in popular language would be called "the thankless task" of being Chairmen of this Conference.

As High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, later as a member of the Government of India, it has been my task--I won't say my "privilege"--continuously to approach these two Chairmen on various problems connected with this Commission. Theirs has been no easy role, and it is a great tribute to the dedication to the purpose of this Conference that in spite of the difficulties that exist in the world--and we cannot hide it--that these two Ministers and their countries have in so far as the agreement in Indo-China is concerned tried to find common solutions in spite of difficulties.

The present phase, of today's meeting, I consider begins on the 14th of December when, as I said, my Prime Minister addressed a request that in the circumstances prevailing in Laos, which threatened to disturb the peace not only of Laos and Asia, but of the world, it is imperative that the Commission should be convened.

And it was soon followed, Your Royal Highness, by your initiative on the 1st of January, 1961 when you suggested that the Geneva Conference might be reconvened with the members of the Control Commission, and what is more, with the states neighbouring to Laos.

While we regret the absence of some of them here at this particular meeting, we share your hope, Sir, that this is only a temporary phase, and we shall proceed to our work with only one object in view, that is the creating of the conditions which will enable Laos to fulfil the hopes expressed in the final act of the 24th July, 1954.

The Co-chairmen who have so remarkably performed their duties in spite of the vicissitudes, including sharing the responsibility for finding the resources for the work of the Commission--a task that I hope they will cheerfully bear hereafter--are the best persons to guide us in the conduct of these proceedings.

Your Royal Highness has kindly initiated it and now I will propose, on behalf of my Government, that the Co-chairman, the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, and the Right Honorable Earl of Home, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in Her Britannic Majesty's Government continue and function as Co-chairmen of these meetings.

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As far as they are Co-chairmen of the Conference and for the rest of the evening, if it is your wish, and that of the meeting, that since Mr. Gromyko's name comes first in the alphabetical order--which I am told does not produce any conflict in international affairs--he should take the chair. It might help us in these proceedings.

I have no doubt that these Chairmen, who have cooperated in the past in the conduct of the affairs of this Commission will make their own arrangements with regard to the sessions and other procedures.

I commit this submission to the meeting and I hope that you, Sir, will take the necessary steps in regard to it.

I thank you again for helping us to break the ice there has been in regard to this Conference by inaugurating it. I hope now we can go on afloat on smooth waters, even though it may be sometimes a little cold.

LAOS SWITZERLAND INDIA USA CHINA

**Date** : May 16, 1961

**Volume No**

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1995

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GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS

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Shri Krishna Menon's Statement on Settlement of Laos Problem

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Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the 14-nation Geneva Conference on Laos, made a statement at the Conference on May 18, 1961 on the settlement of the Laotian question.

Following is the text of his statement:

Mr. Chairman,

On this occasion, when you and your colleague, your Co-Chairman, have reconvened the Geneva Conference of 1954, there are two or three 'sets' of feelings and compulsions that come to one's mind.

One is the responsibility that our country bears in regard to the problem we have in hand. The second is the general improvement in the atmosphere that prevails in the world generally, and so far in here, which may assist us to attain the objectives we have in mind.

With your indulgence, I would like to refer to another aspect. It is fitting. Though my country was not associated with this conference, as a member in 1954, my Government and I have to a great extent "lived" with it at that time. With your indulgence, therefore, I would like to recall at this moment, and pay tribute to, some of those personalities who made comparative peace in Indo-China for seven years and also the convening of this conference today possible, when we were beset with difficulties which have to be overcome.

The first of these, Sir, is your former Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, who, at a very critical time of the history of this problem, by courageous action, averted war, and by patient negotiation brought about the situation to which I have referred.

I would like to refer to the Prime Minister of China, Mr. Chou en-Lai, and Mr. Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam, who right to the end exercised their influence for moderation, and what is more, when this particular problem of Laos was about to wreck the conference, came out with a degree of statesmanship, and also knowledge, which made the conclusion of the Geneva agreements possible.

But most of all--I say most of all--we may not forget to recall to our minds the one personality without whose effort the essential agreement at that time--though it may seem far remote with the present stage of this problem--by the Republic of France would not have been possible--that of the then Prime Minister, Mendes-France, who came to us and said whatever may happen he had told his legislature that there must be a date-line--the 20th of July--before

which the cease-fire must take place, and there must be a decision on this matter. And he kept to that line.

I hope you will not regard this irrelevant for it would be a bad thing in our world, Sir, if in moments of crisis and with the remoteness of time we are not able to recall the elements and the men who have helped to make the future in this way.

I would also like, before I address myself to the problem immediately before us, to express the appreciation of my government--which I am sure is shared by all around this table--that we have a fuller conference today, by the presence of our neighbour, and the more immediate neighbour, of Laos, Thailand, and also the distinguished leader of the delegation of South Viet-Nam.

We are here, Sir, as a Government and country, first of all, as a party interested in the peace in that part of the world, and the world as a whole, and with the concerns that go with it.

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Next, we have our responsibilities as the Chairman of the International Control Commission.

Thirdly, Sir, you will recall that right from the beginning, in these two years when there has been comparative unsettlement, and more particularly on the 14th of December last year, we were pressing you and your colleague, Mr. Gromyko, to convene the Commission and afterwards this conference.

And so at least in more or less a moral sense, as 'part conveners', we bear responsibility.

We look backward in this way not in order to find fault or to lay responsibilities, but to be warned by the failures of the past, and also take encouragement from the patience and the persistence with which people laboured to keep the peace in Indo-China.

We look forward because from all the appearances and speeches that have been made in this room and elsewhere in connection with this problem, there is comparative unanimity, at least in words, in the essential aims we have before us.

At the same time, my government also seeks clarification on many matters, because they would find it increasingly difficult to discharge their responsibilities in Indo-China or in relation to this problem, outside, unless certain things are clear.

To that we shall address ourselves today, and, if the occasion arises, later also.

The atmosphere of conciliation that prevails here, the general acceptance of the Geneva Agreement, and all that it stands for, is a

very hopeful sign, as I said, though the situation in Laos stands deteriorated.

I would like to state the position of the Government of India as I am instructed to do.

First of all, we come here, as I said just a while ago, with the sincere desire to assist in finding solutions. We are quite prepared and ready to think that there have been failures in the past, that the failures are of trial and error, or lack of experience and perhaps of the lack of full appreciation or full facts of a situation.

Secondly, we have come here, as I said, as the result of the request made on the 14th December for the reconvening of the conference, and with the meeting of the International Commission in Delhi, under your direction, and therefore as a partner to the Indo-China part of the proceedings, for which we are gathered here, and which has already begun in the field.

Then we asked you to join in the request to reconvene this conference.

The next point I would like to make is that the position of the Government of India is that it adheres to the principles and the provisions of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, and regards that as the sheet anchor on which the whole of this thing rests. We are glad to think that speaker after speaker has referred to this position.

Only two days ago the distinguished Foreign Minister of China, addressing this conference, said that the Chinese Government has "consistently stood for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. This conference is a continuation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement."

But even before that, we have made the request for the convening of an enlarged meeting of the Geneva Conference. You, yourself, as Secretary of State in the United Kingdom, writing to my Prime Minister on the matters here, said that you believed the Geneva Conference will be recalled by its Co-Chairmen.

Similarly, on behalf of your Co-Chairman, both from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as well as Mr. Gromyko, are many statements referring to the same position, that the Geneva Conference is being reconvened for this purpose.

The invitation extended to us also carries these words. "The Co-Chairmen thereby suggest it be reconvened, in order to restore peace in Laos, and in accordance with the Geneva Agreement, take steps to maintain sovereignty, etc."

I would not labour this point, except to place before the Conference the view that my Prime Minister has made it very clear to everybody

concerned, from the very beginning, as early as January last, that this conference on "a settlement of this problem is to be in terms of the Geneva Agreement, and a new agency would not be feasible and would even take a long time to take it up."

I go on now to say that in writing to His Royal Highness the Prince of Cambodia, he said that "the Geneva Agreement are based on the essential fact that Indo-China has not been allied to military blocs, and shall adhere to a neutral

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policy; any other policy would lead to conflict."

I cannot quote any more because we would have spent a too long time-- we have set a pattern of short speeches--otherwise I would have given you many more in this way.

The next of the main bases of our presence here is that this conference shall be concerned with Laos, and Laos alone. Of course, it will refer to other countries, maybe the West, or the East, or even more to the North, present here--but it can only be in relation to the Laotian problem. That is to say, we have not come here with a view to wanting to go on a fishing expedition all over the world, to drag in, or to bring in issues, however important, not strictly connected with this purpose.

This conference, in our view, is concerned with Laos and Laos alone. But having said that it is essential that from the point of view of my Government we make a distinction between the external aspects of this question and the internal ones.

As a sovereign nation ourselves, very much attached to our independence and very chary of external interference in our affairs, from wherever it may come, whether it be political, economic, or otherwise, we have no desire whatsoever to interfere in the internal affairs of Laos.

We think that the future of the Laotian people, even though they are very much smaller in number than we are, depends upon themselves. They must in that sense be the architects of their destinies, and all others, friendly or otherwise, whatever may be their motives, can only assist them towards this end.

Therefore, in making this distinction between external aspects and internal aspects, we shall be confronted more with the problems that enable Laos to develop according to her own genius, according to her own requirements, and according to her own will.

At the present time, only the external conditions which may come in the way of it, which may condition it, which may promote it or hinder it, are taken into consideration.

Thirdly, we have come here on the basis of the principle of co-existence, that is to say that nations large or small are entitled to follow their own policies, to form their own governments, and have the form of economy or political institutions that they desire.

It is only when the exercise of internal sovereignties so obtrude themselves so as to violate other people's sovereignty that it becomes an international problem. Therefore, we think the basis of this conference, which if we were dealing with the plan of it solely and making all the arrangements in connexion with it we would have sought to include in a preliminary statement, is that the sovereignty of Laos shall be respected, that there shall be no interference in her affairs by external forces, and that she must be--we don't say she must be "compelled" or she must be "made"--but must be enabled to remain a neutral country. We say she must be enabled to have the capacity to retain her neutrality, because otherwise it would be going against the conceptions I have mentioned. It recalls to my mind, Mr. Chairman, the famous French social philosopher who after writing a most energetic and powerful essay, a dissertation on tolerance, said at the end "Those who do not believe in tolerance should be hanged" So, we cannot enforce neutrality. We must create the conditions where neutrality is possible and we have no doubt, having regard to the conditions in Southeast Asia, having regard to the fact that knowing that interference from outside upsets the balance within that--given those conditions--they would remain neutral, not in the sense of not having opinions about good and bad, about right and wrong, about friends and opponents, or what is better and what is not so good, but they would remain nonaligned to the main contesting groups in the world today, and very largely concerned with their own development, in order to assist world peace and cooperation and to raise the standards of life of the people.

The fourth basis I am asked to put forward to you is that we must meet in this conference not as though we are starting on a clean slate, not only is the history of the eight years, seven years behind us, not only the Geneva Agreement, but also we met here--or we should have, anyway--only on the 12th of this month.

On the 12th of May, steps had already been taken in order to obtain a ceasefire. and what is more, on the basis of the machinery that has been set into operation, that is, it is not as though this Conference is settling those affairs, or considering the affairs of Laos, without consideration of the problems in the field.

And in regard to this cease-fire, Mr. Chairman, my Government takes the view that a cease-fire exists. It would not be in the best interests of the problem we are considering to qualify this. It is like a person, to see whether a plant is growing or not, pulling it out by its roots every morning to

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look at it. Then it's likely to have contrary results.

Then from our point of view, the efforts of the Commission in Indo-China is not by way of experiment, of hit-and-run. They go with experience, they are there with the support of the two Co-Chairmen of the Conference, not as individual nations, but as representing the countries that are associating with them in this endeavour, and also the various nations of the world.

And, what is more, as was said by Prince Sihanouk the other day, the large number of Laotians do not want violence, do not want fratricidal war.

Therefore, cease-fire exists, from our point of view-unless there are glaring incidents, which I have not the slightest doubt will be reported to you by the Commission consisting of the representatives of Canada, Poland, and ourselves, representing, if I must say so, the different points of view, and ideologies, or alignments that exist in the world. What is more, though I say it myself, the Commission have earned during the course of the work in Indo-China the right to be respected for their objectivity.

Therefore, we proceed from the position that a cease-fire exists. If there are certain reports that are from sources other than the report of the Commission, our deliberations may not be seriously affected by it.

In this conference, therefore, while at this stage we shall pull the curtain over so many of the vicissitudes and developments of the past, we would have on the more essential matters to speak with a good deal of frankness that assists in clarification. Therefore, we look at what are our aims:

Our aim, as has been repeatedly said--again, I will not keep on quoting-by so many delegations here and statesmen outside, is first of all to obtain an affirmation of these objectives, the affirmation which is the desire of the countries around here, and we hope, of those associated outside, to leave Laos free to develop for herself--that is to say, to enable the termination of hostilities and conflicts in that land, and for her to develop according to the provisions and ideas that have been embodied in the Geneva Agreement in 1954 in its terms. Sometimes, it is forgotten, when we speak, in what we put forward as new propositions for formulation, these are existing formulations! I will come back to this later, Sir.

So we want, first of all, the affirmation. But affirmations by themselves will not do. We will have to have some assurances that these affirmations will be implemented. Here, without being misunderstood, may I say we have been a little bit disturbed in the way that this question of assurances is looked at by different countries. Perhaps it may be the difficulty of appreciating the content of language. I want to make it clear that my country does not contemplate these assurances, or the ensuring of the capacity of Laos for neutrality, in a system of military guarantees. Therefore, we

would also like to keep away from analogies, whether it is to be a Swiss type of neutrality, or an Austrian type of neutrality. Our answer should be it should be a Laotian type of neutrality, based upon the genius of the Laotian people. Therefore, we would not want to be tied up in past history, either European or Asian or that of other countries. We do not even say it should be an Indian type of nonalignment.

What we are saying is that in our anxiety to keep this country more or less free from external troubles, we may not involve ourselves in military commitments, however implied they may be.

Thirdly, part of the aims of this conference is the implementation of it by machinery. About this, I will speak later.

At this stage, Mr. Chairman, may I take the first of these that come to my mind, and that is the question of the Commission.

There have been no allegations or direct criticisms of the Commission. But I believe that there is a subtle strain of thought that moves around as though the Commission had not performed its functions. Two of my colleagues here, from Canada and Poland, will no doubt take it in their time, but it is my duty to speak on behalf of my government and say that we believe that the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Laos has performed its duties fully and completely within the terms of its reference, and under very difficult conditions.

While I may not here refer to the other two countries in Indo-China, in the case of Laos, so long as the Commission functioned there was no civil war of this magnitude which threatened world peace.

What is more, in the period which I shall go into in a moment--Mr. Chairman, if I might interpolate here--I think it would be a good thing if, during the course of this conference, the

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reports made to the Co-Chairmen by the International Commission were circulated. Because it is often forgotten--it has been a long history--incidents that have occurred have been treated in a way that some of these controversies we are talking about today, about unanimity, would fall in its place.

From the first interim report of the International Commission, when one looks at it, one finds the Chairman reporting on behalf of his colleagues. First of all, he speaks about the full cooperation obtained from everybody at that time. He said, however, differences were not unexpected, civil strife having reigned in that land for years, leaving, indeed, scars on the body politic which time alone could heal. Despite these differences, it must be recorded that the parties have made a real effort that is, the Laotian parties have made a real effort to fulfil their major expectations in regard to the

military agreement.

Apart from minor lapses, the Commission did carry out these important tasks. Notwithstanding early delays, orders were carried out almost without incident for these parties, and deserve credit.

It goes on to say then, first of all, that the parties to the Geneva agreement, "in spite of differences of opinion between themselves, have generally shown willingness to listen to the Commission's advice and to assist the Commission in the International Geneva Agreement". It also refers to the cooperation--which at that time could not be taken for granted--of the Government of France in regard to what was then called the "Franco-Laotian Command".

When we speak, therefore, about the Commission in reserved terms, or, rather, when we have any reservations, or begin to wonder, or have apprehensions about it, one must take all these things into account, and, also, inquire whether if we are starting de novo, we would not be faced with all these problems.

And, moreover, if I may say so, the International Commission is not on probation there. It is performing duties which it is asked to do.

Then, we regard in its implementation what may be called arms control, the ingress of arms, or people who can promote or assist in hostilities, as important. And, in this connexion, Mr. Chairman, to what extent I can, I will make our position clear:

We regard this problem as a problem pertaining to Laos. It is no use in this conference asking whether one country or another--and I may not mention any by name--will do this or do the other. Countries concerned should be considered as part of the general agreement and binding by virtue of their adherence to it.

The work of the Commission would be to secure the perimeter of Laos; that is to say, its boundaries, and across those nothing shall come in except, as authorized; no evil influences, no influences adverse to the agreement. That is to say, we are concerned, as I say, with the perimeter of Laos, with regard to which the Geneva Agreement has also set the points of entry and ingress.

It is open to this conference--in consultation with the Laotian authority or authorities, as the case may be--or at the present time, to fix on these points, so that the Commission does not become a kind of super-government of the country, or a state within a state. Its duties are well-defined. In no country is there an impossibility of controlling ingress of goods or of people at denoted points.

Now if there had been a certain degree of lack of full control in this matter in the days gone by, Chairmen and colleagues, and I am saying this to both of the Co-Chairmen, you are not entirely without responsibility. I well remember in those years we were continually being asked to cut down expenditures, to thin the ranks of control

stations and what not--I do not say wantonly--because the progress that had been made in the territories made people feel that original establishments were unnecessary, and extravagant. The tightening of such control would make safe the perimeter of Laos, and it would be barred against ingressions of any kind.

Thirdly, Sir, in this implementation, we regard the totality of all non-Laotian elements, that is to say, more particularly, those who have come in recent times, since 1954, or just before, as important.

Whether they be of the Asian races or of neighbouring countries, or from far-off countries; whether they be people in uniform or those others who are in the position of advisers, who promote, who are likely to promote difficulties, they should be withdrawn. By agreement of the Commission and the Laotian Government there should be a total withdrawal of all foreign elements without any partiality or suggestion of it in any way. We say this, not without taking into account the difficulties that arise.

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In the 1954 period, in a very short time--we are speaking from memory--with regard to the French forces, somewhere about October or so, and with regard to the Northern Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, somewhere about the middle of November or so, that is, a few months after the functioning of the Commission, practically the bulk of them had been withdrawn, and the numbers that were left were small enough for the Laotian authorities to be satisfied.

If chapter and verse is required on this matter, my delegation will be prepared to give it later, unless people are prepared to read the reports of that time themselves.

This withdrawal is a practical problem and a necessary requirement.

We also think that the implementation of the work of the Commission must very largely rest on excellent cooperation not only within the Commission, but also with the Laotian Government. I say "Laotian" Government, because one likes to think that not long hereafter the Laotian Delegation, which in present circumstances represents two forces, but not all three forces in that area--one of them is not present--for from all that we have heard, from all that we learn continually, even as of this afternoon--it is that one may be cautiously optimistic in thinking that it would not be long before this problem is resolved. We have heard already that attempts are being made in Laos, and it appears accepted in principle, that there should be a coalition government and that, tomorrow, they are going to discuss these details. They appear to have reached some agreement with regard to the order of the items on the agenda at those talks. What is more, they have certainly agreed, all the three forces, to cooperate with the Commission in the maintenance of cease-fire.

Whatever may be the reservations in regard to these, all of us must

feel encouraged by this step forward that has been taken in Laos itself.

Therefore, we come to what we shall have to do in the future.

The distinguished delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has put forward proposals. There have been many proposals--not, perhaps, set out seriatim in the same way, but in the speeches that have been made. Now he, first of all, started from the point that today all countries from one side or another are wedded to neutrality. We don't like this word ourselves, but we know what that means in this context. I think it most encouraging that the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, in speaking to us said that "Promptly after assuming office President Kennedy said, 'We strongly and unreservedly support the goal of an independent and neutral Laos tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatened by no one, and free from and domination'". We may add to that the statements of two of the great countries of a different persuasion--the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. In both these cases we have the assurance given that their policy is similar and they have always said so. What is more, that they believe that in a neutral Laos (so-called) lies its future, and the prospects of peace.

You yourself, Sir, speaking yesterday made this very clear: that as long as seven years ago we agreed, you said, to respect the sovereignty and independence and the unity of the territory and integrity of Laos.

All this is contained in the Geneva Agreement, in terms. We now come to the question of the implementation of this, and various problems connected with it. If I take them, perhaps, in haphazard fashion, it is because some of them have come in speeches at various times in that way.

We take, first of all, the question of the Commission itself. We regard the Commission as an integral part of the Geneva Agreement; it is built into the Geneva Agreement, and those of us who were associated at that time know how difficult it was to get this balanced position. The present conference also meets on that basis.

It would be, so far as I am concerned, Sir, that I would require further instructions from my Government if there are any serious suggestions about rethinking on this problem.

We regard the Geneva Agreement as an international instrument to which those who have expressed their agreement are bound, as are also those others who have approved of it separately. I should have mentioned another name when I spoke about three or four formerly, that is the Representative of the United States of America here in 1954. At the Conference in 1954, you will see toward the the last but one document a declaration by the Representative of the United State, who had a very difficult time in regard to the conference to produce a declaration, that, on the one hand, did not keep the United States

out of it; and on the other, conformed to their then policy. To General Bedell Smith, who operated with great tact at that time, we owe a debt of

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gratitude.

With regard, therefore, to the Commission, we say it is built into the Geneva Agreement, and any changes in that would require also rethinking on the Geneva Agreement itself. That does not mean that any other body of people could not perform these talks, either the Laotians or all of you together; if, in your wisdom, you wanted other arrangements, then that would be a decision de novo.

What we are saying is that if we tamper with one of the basic decisions of the Geneva Agreement, it will stand shaken right through.

On this matter, both Poland and ourselves have taken a position on which we are agreed with some differences sometimes with our colleagues in Canada, which I believe are now resolved. At least, I believe they are now resolved. We have regarded, according to the Geneva agreement, and the articles in the Laotian agreement (they are in all agreements, Sir). In the Laotian agreement, you will find in Articles 38 and 39 that these three commissions are tied up together. We cannot withdraw one commission without withdrawing another; or make changes. In fact, it goes on so far as to say that even in the cutting down of teams and strength and so on, there should be mutual consultations. and, therefore, any basic alteration in this is something that will affect the position in regard to Cambodia and Viet-Nam, where, at least, in one case, a rather difficult situation exists.

So, having said that, the Government of India should not be regarded as having prescriptive desires or rights in this matter, not as regarding the situation in the seven years as unchanged. Certain strengthening revisions in enforcement and operations may be required. But, as I said a while ago, it is not terms of reference, it is not the statutes or the articles that have been set out there, that have been in the way of the non-implementation or any failure of them. It is because there have been breaches of the Agreement. Therefore, we should consider what should be done in regard to these matters.

We agree that there should be no physical handicaps in regard to the resources position. Especially, with the comparative withdrawal of the facilities that France was able to place at the disposal of the Commission at the beginning, this conference will have to consider the capacity that will be provided for mobility for the Commission in the area as required, without there being handicapped by either the lack of capacity on the part of Laotian Government or any small political difficulty that may arise from time to time. So far as the

manning of these facilities are concerned, the Commission countries, in spite of their difficulties, have made the necessary contributions.

The communications, so far as communications by signals are concerned, are maintained by us, by the three countries. I believe the communications of the Commission are being maintained by the Government of India. I am authorized to say that in spite of the considerable strains upon our defence forces, and upon our resources, in the event of it being necessary, we will within our capacity, place such personnel at your disposal as may be required.

Reporting by and to the Commission was suggested yesterday--I forget who it was that said that any complaint that comes from any part of the world should be taken note of by the Commission. These are matters which we should discuss in detail at a later stage. However, if this is too wide, the Commission will be in the position of a governmental authority that is to operate on large number of letters and petitions that come to it. There are well-defined procedures in this regard. First, the Laotian authorities themselves; then come the members of this Conference. There are the Co-Chairmen, who draw the attention of the Commission to this matter.

But, having said that, it should be said that even though military personnel are employed in Laos, as in other countries, they are not there on war duty. That is to say, it would not be proper, it would not be possible, for the Commission to take on police duties in the way of preventive action. Their action will be limited to finding facts, informing the parties concerned, warning them of it; diplomatic or other reference efforts. It would not be possible, and is outside the terms of reference of the Geneva Agreement, or anything that is practical, to safeguard this perimeter in any other way. And that means that any undertaking given here, particularly by the more powerful countries, should be strictly honoured to the letter; otherwise, it will create difficulties.

Much has been said with regard to the economic development of Laos. No doubt, the economic development of Laos is important to the Laotian people. But our own view would be that unless there is the initiative of the Laotian people themselves that may tend to become an interference in their internal affairs. But those at the present moment may look academic. I think

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we can consider it essential that the full co-operation, the full initiative of the Laotian people is required in this matter. Here, Sir, I would say, we would say, it is not a question, as has been suggested in one of the speeches, of giving aid without strings. There are many cases where aid is given "without strings", but the strings more or less grow. They have a capacity to do that; they are inherent in the thing itself. Therefore, the machinery, the arrangement, the conception, the lay-out should be of such a

character that no strings can come through it.

For example, during the period that we had these troubles, the devaluation of the Laotian currency had a considerable effect upon all of the internal troubles we had. And when, therefore, economic relations are thought of, the stability of that currency, of that economy, all these things had to be taken into account.

It is a practical problem how this is to be worked out. While my Government would be willing to co-operate with anything reconcilable, we like to put forward certain ideas and certain words of caution, perhaps, which we should all take into account.

There will be already two--I won't say two authorities, but two elements in the Laotian territory: one, the Laotian Government; and the other the apparatus of international assistance through the Control Commission. Part of aid refers to military aid, which also comes within the competence of the Control Commission. So, if there are to be other things to go with it, in order to ensure stability, social justice, as Mr. Rusk said yesterday, that all those conditions which would warrant them to make inroads into their own development, and adventures from abroad or be the subject of adventures from abroad, then those authorities are not likely to come into conflict. Because it may well be possible that aid may be given in such a way as to upset the military or cease-fire balances, and things of that character.

Therefore, it is worthwhile considering whether economic or other constructive commissions of this character have to be set up within the apparatus of this conference through the Control Commission; or, if that is not possible, if some other bodies independently set up should have some interlocking arrangements. If they do not, then there will be two authorities in the place which, in addition to the Laotian difficulties, will bring some of their own. We ourselves think that when this matter is discussed there would not be very great difficulty in finding a suitable method.

Then, Sir, I come to a problem that may be called controversial. I know I have a reputation of being controversial. But I never chase controversies--controversies chase me.

I read the newspapers that came from abroad just before I came here, and there has been an attempt to exaggerate things. I read in one of the papers that came from a particular country that the Americans and the Russians have a head on collision on this, that, and the other thing. I suppose, in order to justify these headlines, to please others, we cannot create conflicts!

One of these things is what is called "unanimous" decision and "majority" decision. If I may say so whatever may be the meaning in other contexts, in the context of the functioning of the Commission there is little of practical value in this.

Let us take one instance: We believe that the withdrawal of the Commission from Laos, and from its responsibilities, has been succeeded by all these difficulties.

I haven't got the figures at hand, but if you read the report to the Co-Chairmen, you will find there are really very few instances where the difficulties within the Commission have not been somehow or other resolved.

Therefore, it is a question not of putting these two views in juxtaposition, but of trying to find a way of working together. So far as the Government of India is concerned, we do not think any alterations of the provisions in the Geneva Agreement are necessary, or possible, or should be made with regard to the position existing therein. The Poles and the Canadians have worked together very well. And whenever the Chairman of the Commission had to vote on one side or another, there has been no ill-feeling. Usually, the voting procedures take so many days that usually the problem that the voting took place on is already left behind!

We have other elements to which reference can be made, e.g., the Co-Chairmen. If the two Co-Chairmen can agree, I believe the Commission will agree. It is easier to get agreement on the Commission, very often or at least as easy as agreement between the two Co-Chairmen. If there are difficulties within the Commission such reference will be made.

If there are difficulties of a character that cannot be settled in the Commission or by reference to the Co-Chairmen, then the Government

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of India has always been in favour of their ultimately coming to this conference. The Co-Chairmen function only as the executives or the heads or the mouthpieces of this conference as a whole. They are not isolated from the agreements of the decisions as reached here.

So, while I have no desire to make light of this matter, I hope we shall not get into a tangle as to unanimity or non-unanimity.

Then, Mr. Gromyko suggested yesterday that on certain things there should be unanimity; on certain others, decisions should be taken according to the United Nations procedure; and I suppose the question of whether it is procedural or non-procedural would be a procedural matter; otherwise, there would be a double veto. This was resolved in the United Nations some time ago. It was also provided in the Geneva agreement that for certain questions that are procedural, decisions should be taken by a majority vote.

I think instead of bringing about unanimity it will be the other way around, if it is expressly stated that things can be done by majority. The desire to come together-the Poles expressing their

views and the Canadians expressing theirs, Chairmen also doing the same and other expressing themselves similarly--would not bring unanimity. The capacity to work together will become less and less by non-exercise of the capacity for real agreement.

Therefore, I believe that, while the point is well-taken from both sides, it is necessary to consider it carefully. After looking at the experience of two or three years in Laos, and more years in other territories, it may well be decided that things may well be left alone. If the time comes when Poland, on the one hand, and Canada on the other, can't agree with each other or the two of us can't agree with the other one, then they will take this matter to the Chairmen of the Commission, and if the Chairmen cannot agree, then the conference will have to be called. There is no other way of dealing with this. And, if we spend too much time on this, we shall find that small differences will become bigger and bigger.

The distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union has put before us a declaration, and also what looks like a statute almost. Now we are not at the present moment in a position to say "yes" or "no" to these things in toto. We believe they have been presented with the best of intentions, and, on the whole, that they contain things that are acceptable.

I have no doubt, however, that before many days are past, perhaps before many hours are past, there will be other proposals of this or other character. Proposals have already come up in speeches, and it will be for the conference to study them. We would have to have "study groups" or something of that character to look at these various proposals.

On that, the Government of India would like one consideration taken into account; that is, the study of these should be side by side with the provisions made in the Geneva Agreement in regard to Laos. For example, there is the whole chapter on "Withdrawals". Of course, it is quite true there are certain changes now required, e.g., the Joint Committee no longer functions in this context. But the provisions that are made in the agreement, I believe in article 27, are terms provided with regard to the withdrawal of foreign personnel.

In setting down the functions of the International Commission it is said--I won't read the whole of it--"It shall fulfil the functions of control, observation, inspection, investigation, connected with the implementation of the provisions of the agreement on cessation of hostilities and shall, in particular (a) control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the agreement; (b) control the release of prisoners of war (that doesn't apply now, I hope);--(c) see that all air fields are supervised...supervise the clauses of the agreement."

The terms of the article are all there. It is a question of how they are implemented. So I come back to what I was saying before; it is not because we have found in the course of our functioning that there

are no provisions. It is because there have been breaches of the Agreement.

It is when--for example, the question of neutrality, which has been stated over and over again in declarations by the Indo-Chinese parties concerned, the Laotian being the concerned party in this case, and by other countries--it is when the provisions are more honoured in the breach than otherwise that trouble has arisen; when, for example, it was said that the military forces in Laos shall be in proportion--in relation to what the French were providing before 1954, they have been exceeded and there has been trouble.

What is more, when the Government of Laos itself has not kept to this obligation, that is the Laotian Government has not functioned

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in the spirit of it--that they will never join any agreement if such agreement included obligation for the Royal Government to join military alliance--it has then not been acting within the Geneva provisions.

I am not for a moment suggesting they entered formal alliances, but when there has been linking up for military purposes with one side or another from outside, then there is a breach of these agreements.

My only purpose in saying this is to point out that it is not because there are no rules; it is because people have not obeyed the rules.

A new set of rules or new wording of them would not take us any further unless there is a greater realization of the consequences of a breach of rules.

I have already spoken about economic machinery. The same things would apply to technical machinery. We are glad, we are all happy, as I said a while ago, that the distinguished representatives of Thailand, who are the nearest neighbours to Laos, and concerned in many ways in common operation in these matters, are here today. This issue deserves their close understanding.

In regard to technical development in this area, we have to warn ourselves against certain factors. As a Government, we will carefully consider whether anything that we propose does not upset the future plans or balance of economies in regard to the development of this area. Developments cannot be considered except according to their (Laotian) requirements.

What is more, dependence upon outside aid has to be limited by Laos in regard to herself. If anything we do reduces--I don't say 'reduces' in terms--this country to the position of a trust territory, or kind of ward, a ward in chancery or something of that kind, then we defeat our purposes.

The same thing applies to technical aid. Technical aid also in this sense has to be related to the nature of the population we are working with whether it comes from one country or another. It is not a matter of nationality, nor a political matter. It is a matter of personal adjustment.

All these things have to be considered in the days before us.

There is one point to which I must draw special attention; that is the present Geneva Agreement, Mr. Chairman, and any agreement we make hereafter in our view is an international covenant. Whether it is being registered with the United Nations, whether Oppenheimer takes note of it or not, it is an international covenant. It is an obligation in regard to everybody committed to it.

In a sense it is an obligation which is multilateral to ourselves. In another sense it is an obligation by which the Laotian authorities undertake to do and we undertake to do certain things.

My Government has not agreed in the past with the Canadian view, and disagreed with our Canadian colleague that the Laotian Government has the right to abrogate the Geneva Agreement by itself. We are not prepared at the present moment even to accept the position put forward from some quarters that this must be limited by time, or must be determined by the Co-Chairmen of the Conference. We should study this.

An agreement is an agreement. Unless it is denounced, it is still an agreement. That is why we said that the Geneva Agreement stands, and whatever we pass here will not take the Agreement over until the Laotian authorities, and various others who put their signatures to it, and by statements afterwards consider themselves committed to it, have abrogated the whole or any part of it.

Part of the difficulty in this matter has arisen because the view has been taken that the Laotian Government in the exercise of its sovereignty,--which we do not question--has the right to abrogate this agreement. In a communication--of May 22--the Prime Minister informed the Commission that the Royal Government now considered the Geneva Agreement (including the obligations undertaken by his Government at Geneva Conference) to be fully implemented, and he asked the Commission once again to withdraw.

We say this cannot be done unilaterally. I believe the large majority of the population of Laos felt at that time a kind of--I wouldn't say "support"--the kind of caution on limited wars in the shape that has been begun.

In this period we struggled a great deal and ultimately came to agreement with the Laotian Government, that the Commission should continue to function in an attenuated form of nine persons largely because of pressures to reduce costs to others. On the 22nd of May, Prime Minister Phouma, in writing to the Chairman of the Commission,

said that he agreed with this matter, and that the Commission also had agreed. But it

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changed when the Laotian Government asked the Commission to go.

That was the position: that of having an attenuated Commission of only nine persons functioning in the Kingdom of Laos even was given up. The position changed, because our colleagues from Canada, the then Government, took the view that once the Laotian Government says you are not wanted here, or your function here is over, that is the end of it.

Well, that is true from the point of view of personal relations, where I say to you, "If you don't want me to come to your home, I won't come".

That is a different matter. But this is an international covenant, and the Government of India, and more strongly the Government of Poland, made firm protests about it. We are not even now accepting the position that the Laotian Government can turn the Commission out. The Commission is a creature of an international agreement.

Events--whether they have not proved the law or not--have certainly proved that politically the result has not been very wholesome.

So in any arrangement that is made, we must very carefully consider the question of the termination of these arrangements. Whether they be economic, political, or in regard to control or whatever it is--obviously this can't go on to eternity. Then how is this to be brought about.

First of all, when the position of so-called "neutrality" is established, the arrangements probably would wither away--especially if the immediate neighbours of Laos, or the larger political forces in the world have no desire to intervene. In any case, however, it does require study of this matter, before we are able to express a definite view on the suggestions made at this conference, on the one hand with regard to time limit; and on the other, who should decide on termination.

Finally, in this matter we also regard this conference as being the parent body, the Co-Chairmen being the mouthpiece, or the presidents, or the heads of this conference, and that the Commission not merely performs a commissariat office, but also functions as independent governments have undertaken responsibility. But we have not ever argued, so far as I remember, none of the three countries, the Commission, has argued that they were policy matters outside the terms of the agreement. We carried out instructions that were given to us to the best of our ability.

Now, these are various submissions I have to make at this stage, and

I have no doubt that after the preliminary speaking is over, when we consider these matters in detail, we will have many points of agreement, and some points of difference, which we shall be able to iron out.

Once again, in concluding, Sir, I would like to point out we have come here only for one reason, that is consideration of problems of Laos in its international aspects. The Government of India pledges itself to strive for peace and co-operation in this area, as in the rest of the world.

In the tradition of our country, particularly with the legacy Mahatma Gandhi has given to it, we shall pursue our aims and our role in this Commission objectively, abjuring violence, or use of force, except as provided or in self-defence, which has not been necessary so far. We shall pursue our course without fear and favour and without considerations as to what party may in the short term be antagonized. It would be our duty to ourselves and to our colleagues.

Oftentimes, I would say that both our colleagues, Canada and Poland, have adopted reconciliation and without the contention that their country alone could be right. They perhaps would not take such courses if they were not in the midst of the facts that they saw and felt. They came to compromises and agreement when necessary.

With the assurance to the conference that the Government of India will do everything it can to promote its purposes, and that they will not allow any kind of small considerations to stand in the way, reiterating again our adherence to the Geneva Agreements, the fact that the Commission has undertaken responsibilities and that Commission looks to the conference for directives, we submit these observations.

We have sought, in the five days preceding--when we had not exactly conferences, but I suppose the preparations for them going on--we have tried to find whether it is possible to clear this question.

I would like to remind the two Co-Chairmen that in convening the Commission in Delhi, at the beginning of this month, they had instructed the Commission to ask for and inform you as to what was required.

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This process will take a little time to complete because the most important thing they have in front of them is to retain the cease-fire, to try without contravening any of the provisions of this Geneva Agreement, or the Charter, to assist, as far as possible, either individually or collectively, in allowing the forces of co-operation to grow.

With this assurance to the conference, Sir, I submit these observations for your consideration.

LAOS SWITZERLAND INDIA USA CHINA VIETNAM FRANCE THAILAND CENTRAL AFRICAN  
REPUBLIC CAMBODIA UNITED KINGDOM CANADA POLAND AUSTRIA RUSSIA TOTO

**Date :** May 18, 1961

## Volume No

1995

NETHERLANDS

Agreement for Transfer of Pilot Polder Signed

A memorandum was signed in New Delhi on May 19 between representatives of the Government of India and the Royal Netherlands Government to effect the transfer of the Pilot Polder (reclamation of low-lying land) of the Bhal Reclamation Project to the Government of Gujerat. The transfer will come into effect on May 01, 1961

The agreement was signed on behalf of the Government of India by Shri S. Mullik, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Mr. D. W. R. Los of the Royal Netherlands Embassy, New Delhi.

Technical and financial assistance to accelerate the desalinization of saline soils along the Saurashtra coast of Gujerat State was provided by the Netherlands Government under an agreement concluded in 1959. In addition the Netherlands undertook construction of the pilot polder at a cost of a little over Rs. 19 lakhs.

The total project, which aims at raising the standard of living of the population by increasing the productivity of local soils, is expected to benefit ultimately a net area of 55,800 acres and yield produce worth about Rs. 75 lakhs a year.

Netherlands assistance will be continued till 1963, by which time the Pilot Polder is expected to be brought progressively under cultivation. The Government of India and the State Government of Gujerat will provide funds and staff for the execution of the scheme.

INDIA THE NETHERLANDS

**Date :** May 01, 1961

## Volume No

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1995

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UNITED KINGDOM

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Indo-U.K. Loan Agreements Signed

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Two agreements for a credit of Rs. 53 crores (æ 40 million) from the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of India were signed in New Delhi on May 01, 1961 by Sir Paul Gore-Booth, U.K. High Commissioner, and Shri L.K. Jha, Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs.

The first agreement is for a loan of Rs. 40 crores (æ 30 million) as an initial contribution to India's Third Plan. The repayment period of this loan is 25 years, including a grace period of seven years before repayment commences. Expenditure of this development is expected to be spread over the period of the Third Plan. It is to be used for purchases from the United Kingdom. About half of it is to be used for individual projects and the remainder for other capital equipment and machinery. All the items to be financed will be selected by the Government of India, while the individual projects concerned will be expansion of heavy electrical machinery plant at Bhopal, the construction of a fertilizer plant at Nahorkatiya in Assam and a new security paper mill at Hoshangabad in Madhya Pradesh and the expansion of Hindustan Cables, Rupnarayanpur, West Bengal. The detailed arrangements of this loan take account of the nature of the projects to be financed and of India's requirements, during the period of development.

The second agreement covers a loan of Rs. 13.3 crores (æ 10 million) for the purchase of a broad range of goods from the United Kingdom. This loan is also for a period of 25 years and no repayments are required until 1966, the end of the Third Plan. Arrangements have been made

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between India and the United Kingdom for drawings on this loan to begin immediately. This loan is a part of British contribution to foreign exchange finance in the Third Plan. It will serve as a measure of support of the Indian balance of payments in 1961-62.

Both the loans signed today were agreed to in principle at a meeting between India's Minister of Finance, Shri Morarji Desai, and the Chancellor of Exchequer, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, in London in September last. The first loan of æ 30 million is the largest single loan ever made by the British Government as part of its programme of overseas development assistance.

When the discussions on the æ 20 million credit for Durgapur extension are completed the total of British Government loans for

India's development plan will amount to just over Rs. 186 crores (æ 140 million). Of this amount Rs. 80 crores (æ 60 million) will constitute specific assistance in various for the Third Plan.

The previous loans from the Government of the United Kingdom amounted to æ 80.5 million. Of these a major portion, æ 62.5 million, was untied loan for general balance of payments aid in 1958 and in 1959 and again in August 1960 and December 1960. The tied loan of æ 18 millions was for the Durgapur Project (æ 15 million) and for the pipeline project (æ 3 million).

With the loan of æ 11.5 million from a number of U.K. Banks for Durgapur Steel Plant the total previous loans from the United Kingdom amounted to æ 92 million.

UNITED KINGDOM INDIA USA

**Date :** May 01, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNITED KINGDOM

Oil Agreement Signed

An agreement was signed in New Delhi on May 31 between the Governmen of India and the Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. covering the grant to Oil India Ltd. of approximately 1800 sq. miles for further oil prospecting in North East Assam.

The agreement was signed by Shri S.S. Khera, Scretary, Department of Mines and Fuel, on behalf of the Government of India and Mr. M.J. Condon, General Manager, on behalf of the B.O.C. Shri K.D. Malaviya, Minister for Mines & Oil and H.E. Sir Paul Gore-Booth, High Commissioner for U.K. in India, were present.

This agreement, as far as applicable, will supersede the existing promotion agreement governing the formation of Oil India Ltd.

Under the new agreement the Government of India and B.O.C. will each hold 50 per cent of the shares in Oil India Ltd. and will be equal partners in this enterprise.

Foreign exchange required for development of any oil found as a result of new exploration will be provided by B.O.C. and the Government of India will make available the required rupee finance.

INDIA BURMA UNITED KINGDOM

**Date :** May 01, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dr. Radhakrishanan's Speech welcoming Vice-President Johnson

The U.S. Vice-President, Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson, accompanied by his wife, arrived in New Delhi on May 18, 1961 on a three-day visit. On May 19, a Banquet was held in his honour by Dr. Radhakrishanan, Vice-President of India, at Rashtrapati Bhavan.

Welcoming Vice-President Johnson, Dr. Radhakrishanan said:

Mr. Vice-President, Your Excellencies, Ladies & Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for us, Sir, to have you with us. Our regret is that you are here with us for less than two days, yet with your characteristic energy you have tried to get the feel of the country, met some people and learnt something of the projects and plans in which we are greatly interested.

We are doing what is essential for us to do at the present moment,-- carry out the unfinished revolution. We attained our political liberty but it is not of much value if we are not able to give economic opportunities and social dignity to our people. We are attempting today to free our people from the afflictions of poverty, disease and ignorance. I may assure you that many of the troubles we are having in this country which

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sometimes assume ugly forms are due essentially to the economic backwardness of our people as a whole. If there is real improvement in the economic conditions of our country, many of these problems will automatically solve them: selves.

It is a matter of great satisfaction to us that your country is taking a deal of interest in our economic development and we appreciate all that you have done, and your appointment of Prof. Galbraith as your Ambassador to this country is one sign of the great importance you attach to our economic progress.

We are in a conditional world where it is possible for us to give

abundance to all the people who are here. We are trying to reach the stars, we are flying into space. These things confront us with two possibilities--there is a bright side and a dark side. If man is able to rise to the responsibilities which a nuclear age, which a space age, imposes on him, the world may grow into a condition of progress and a fellow-ship. If we adopt the old prejudices, the old political attitudes, the orthodox military routines, we may fall into disaster. It is a crucial time in which we are. One of our ancient scriptures tells us: Where danger is near, salvation is also near. When you find this temptation to go the wrong way, there is the possibility to go the right way also. There is nothing inevitable in human affairs. If we make an effort of will, exercise our imagination, realise that any kind of military conflict in a world which has become too small and too great to allow any luxury of a conflict, it is not this nation or that nation which will suffer but it is humanity which will suffer. The future of humanity is at stake. In such conditions, it is essential for us to rethink our past attitudes, to break with the past traditions of nationalism and militarism. It is absolutely essential if we are to live in this world to exercise some patience, restraint, self-criticism. These are things which are necessary. None of us is entirely right, none of us is entirely wrong. No nation can claim to be righteous in all its ways and no nation can claim to be utterly unrighteous in all its ways. The rights and the wrongs are there. But it is essential in this complicated world where the opportunities are so great, where the dangers are also so great, that we should recognise that we belong first and foremost to humanity and then to our own particular nations and national groups.

Our great poet, Rabindranath Tagore, whose birth centenary we are celebrating this year, says:

"My home is everywhere;

I am in search of it;

My country is in all countries

I will struggle to attain it."

It is that vision that is held before us. A country is judged by the type of people whom it holds to be great. We in our generation look upon Gandhi and Tagore as the people who put before us the right ideals. Gandhi is a man who told us: "It does not matter if your country perishes. Do not deviate from the moral path." An ancient scripture told us: "Dharmarthakamascha".--economic development, political development. They must not deviate from the path of morality. We should not do a moral wrong even for attaining a material good. We do not say that we have succeeded in adopting that ideal. We strive, we try, we do not wish to do anything wrong consciously. We may make mistakes, we may have made mistakes but our attempt is to raise the material conditions of our country without breaking down the moral and spiritual values for which we have stood all these centuries, which have sustained us.

I would like you, Mr. Vice-President, to assure your President, your Government and your people, of our cordial greetings and good wishes and give them the assurance that they can depend on our whole-hearted co-operation in the pursuit of peace and establishing friendship among nations.

May I ask you to drink to the health of our distinguished visitor, Mr. Lyndon Johnson, the Vice-President.

USA INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** May 18, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. Johnson's Reply

In a reply to Dr. Radhakrishnan's welcome speech, Vice-President Johnson said:

Mr. Vice-President, and distinguished guests, I rise in response to your very kind and gracious and stirring remarks. I rise to offer my thanks and the thanks of my country for what you have said.

In my brief stay in your land, I have been moved by the friendship and the hospitality of India and its people. I have seen varied areas

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and levels of your society and I have found everywhere friendly faces and welcoming hands. I have been most grateful for this. And, may I add, so has my wife and the members of our party.

The friendship and welcome of villagers and city people that we have enjoyed has been paralleled by the abundant hospitality of official India. I may assure you that it has been most heart-warming to my countrymen.

I would like, Sir, as the representative of one great democracy, to add to my thanks a toast to the world's most populous democracy and to its Chief. Ladies and Gentlemen, I propose to rise to drink to India's revered and honoured president, Dr. Rajendra Prasad.

USA INDIA

**Date :** May 18, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

### Joint Communique

On the conclusion of talks between Prime Minister Nehru and Vice-President Johnson, a press communique was issued by the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi on May 19, 1961

Following is the text of the Communique:

The Vice-President and the Prime Minister have had full and highly useful discussions covering a wide range of subjects of interest and concern to the two countries. At the outset, Vice-President Johnson conveyed to Prime Minister Nehru the warm greetings of President Kennedy and told him of the President's admiration for the way in which India is waging its great battle against privation and poverty. He told of the President's interest in the Third Five Year Plan.

The Vice-President said that, while American assistance is dependent on the decisions of the Congress and also on parallel efforts by the other developed countries, it is the President's hope that American aid to the new Plan will be both substantial in amount and effective in form. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction at the President's interest in India's development plans.

The two leaders agreed that the common enemies of mankind, on which a major attack must now be mounted are ignorance, poverty and disease. The conquest of these everywhere is the first step to the assurance of peace and freedom.

The new American Administration agrees with the Prime Minister that the benefits of economic advance must accrue to those who need help the most. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of effective land reform in many underdeveloped countries as a vital step toward greater social and economic equality. The Vice-President agreed on the importance of such reform and noted that the United States was a strong believer in home ownership and in the wide distribution of ownership of land particularly by those who work it.

The Prime Minister mentioned to the Vice-President the Indian programme for establishing universal free and compulsory education in the Third Five Year Plan. Both leaders agreed on the fundamental

importance of education in economic development.

The Vice-President told of President Kennedy's concern for assuring an effective cessation of hostilities in Laos and for getting a truly neutral and independent government which would be neither dominated nor threatened from any quarter. He expressed satisfaction and thanks for India's past assistance in obtaining a cease-fire. The Prime Minister expressed his full approval of the goal of a neutral and independent Laos and assured his continuing assistance and support in achieving this end.

The Vice-President, who has long been associated closely with developments in exploration and research in space in the United States, stressed American concern for peaceful and concerted effort by all nations in the great adventure into outer space. He told of the imminent prospects for the development of a communications satellite with its promise of a possible break-through in the field of mass education. He outlined also the prospects for, and potential value of, the weather satellite. These developments will be of benefit not alone to Americans but to all mankind. They will belong to all mankind. The expense of development has so far been a barrier to participation by the scientists and engineers of the less development countries. The United States would like now to find ways to broaden interest and participation in these epoch-making activities. The Prime Minister expressed much interest on behalf of India and promised the matter his close attention.

There was discussion of the Peace Corps. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of voluntary workers being men and women of good training who are also otherwise well prepared for their new life and tasks. He expressed

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satisfaction with his talks with the Director of the Peace Corps.

Early in their conversations the Prime Minister and the Vice-President found a strong common interest in the field of electric power development. The Vice-President was one of the pioneers in rural electrification in the United States, having, at President Roosevelt's request, participated in the establishment of the largest rural electrification project in the United States. The Prime Minister told of his long-standing conviction that electric light, and all that went with it, were the greatest gift of modern industrial society. Because of the high capital costs and the heavy demands for foreign exchange that are involved, the development of power generating capacity has been an especially important area of American aid. The Prime Minister noted with satisfaction the accomplishments which could be attributed to this aid in the Second Five Year Plan and the two leaders reviewed the large demands for power to be met in the Third Five Year Plan. The Vice-President expressed his hope that during the Third Five Year Plan there would be particular success in getting electricity to rural villages.

In concluding their talks, the Vice-President and the Prime Minister returned again to hunger, illiteracy and disease which are basic problems of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries. The battle against them will not easily be won; but neither can it be longer delayed. The Vice-President stated that India's experience in dealing with these basic problems is of great value to the United States which wishes to use its resources for aiding the peoples of the underdeveloped countries. The Vice-President and the Prime Minister expressed a desire for close and continuing consultation on these problems.

The Prime Minister expressed his warm appreciation of Vice-President Johnson's mission and the opportunity the visit gave for frank and friendly exchange of views and ideas.

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USA INDIA LAOS

**Date :** May 19, 1961

## June

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NIGERIA KOREA NORTH KOREA POLAND

**Date :** Jun 01, 1961

## Volume No

1995

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Agreements Signed with Technoexport

Agreements were signed in New Delhi on Jun 07, 1961, between the Heavy Electricals (India) Limited and M/s. Technoexport of Czechoslovakia for the preparation of detailed projects reports for the Heavy Power Equipment Plant and the High Pressure Boiler Plant to be set up in

this country. The agreements were signed by Shri B.S. Bhatnagar, Secretary, Heavy Electricals (India) Limited, and Mr. K. Prochazka, Commercial Director, M/s. Technoexport of Czechoslovakia.

In the first phase of development, the Heavy Power Equipment Plant will manufacture 12,000 KW and 25,000 KW steam turbines and generators aggregating to an annual output of 620,000 KW. The High Pressure Boiler Plant will turn out every year 12 boilers to suit 50,000 KW turbines i.e. an annual output of boilers aggregating to 600,000 KW. The projects will also cover the production of various types of ancillary equipment.

According to rough estimates, the two plants together are likely to cost between Rs. 35 and Rs. 37 crores excluding the townships. The value of the products to be turned out annually from both plants in the first stage is likely to be of the order of Rs. 2 crores.

These two projects are covered by the economic collaboration agreement signed between India and Czechoslovakia on November 24, 1959 under which the Czechoslovak Government agreed to give credit of Rs. 23.1 crores. Preliminary discussions on the projects began in April 1960. A team of Indian technical experts visited Prague towards end of September 1960 to discuss details with Technoexport. A preliminary project report was submitted in November 1960. This was followed by talks with a team of Czechoslovak experts at which decisions were taken about the equipment to be manufactured in the first phase of the two projects.

NORWAY SLOVAKIA INDIA RUSSIA USA CZECH REPUBLIC

**Date :** Jun 07, 1961

## Volume No

1995

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Air Agreement Effectuated

An Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic relating to Air Services was signed at Prague on Sep 19, 1960, and thereafter it was approved by each country in compliance with Article XIV (1) of the Agreement. The Agreement came into force on June 7, 1961 as a result of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification/Note of Approval indicating the approval of the Agreement by each country in accordance with its legal procedures.

The exchange of the documents was done at New Delhi on June 7 between Shri M.M. Philip, Union Communications Secretary, and H.E. Dr. L. Simovic, Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

NORWAY SLOVAKIA INDIA CZECH REPUBLIC

**Date :** Sep 19, 1960

## Volume No

1995

FINLAND

Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income Signed

An Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation of income between India and Finland was signed in New Delhi on May 23, 1961. Mr. Kai Somerto, Charge'd Affaires a.i. of Finland to India, and Shrimati Tarkeshwari Sinha, Duputy Minister of Finance, signed on behalf of their respective Governments.

The Agreement now requires to be ratified after which it will become effective in India in respect of taxes for assessment years beginning on or after the 1st April of the year in which the exchange of instruments of ratification takes place.

The Agreement follows talks between the two Governments at official level in New Delhi in March, 1961 when a draft agreement was initialled.

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FINLAND INDIA

**Date :** May 23, 1961

## Volume No

1995

GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS

Shri Krishna Menon's Statement on Laos Problem

Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the 14-nation Geneva Conference on Laos, made the following statement at the Conference on May 13, 1961 on the settlement of the Laotian question:

Mr. Chairman, my delegation is glad to have this opportunity of intervening in this conference once again, although it does not come much too early. I think it is an illustration of the usual saying that "All things come to people who wait". And I suppose it may also be said, "Those who wait also serve".

Thanks to the co-operation and the agreement between the two Co-Chairmen--which in itself is a blessing--we are able to meet today and address this conference.

I want to say on behalf of my government it is not our intention either by the juxtaposition of convenient facts, or by the use of language which is not necessary, to aggravate any feelings that may already exist on one side or the other. But if in the course of the presentation of facts as we see them such effect is produced, upon anyone concerned, we hope they will not misunderstand our statements but regard them as being put forward only with the intentions previously mentioned.

There are three aspects to this question that come to one's mind. First is that though this conference, composed of fourteen nations, is a private conference in the sense that the press is not here, in the sense that it has no plenary session in the normal way, we have a very much larger audience.

That audience is on the one part nations of the world who, like ourselves, realize that the nonresolution of the problem of Laos would be catastrophic in regard to the rest of Asia and have repercussions on questions of international peace and security.

But these are not the questions that oppress one's mind most and immediately. It is that of the people of Laos, who for the last twenty years have been the victims of war, first by the Japanese, against whom their imperial rulers were not able to protect them, and afterwards eight years of colonial war, and then a small respite of comparative peace, when the Commission held the rein, so to say, and now civil war, which is the worst of all wars--Laotians fighting Laotians.

So, over twenty years, almost since Pearl Harbour, the Laotian people have been the victims of the ravages of war. Today about some 50 per cent of the bridges in Laos--a country in which there are so many rivers and communications depending upon them--have been destroyed.

Nearly a quarter of the houses and places of worship have been destroyed. The financial losses involved in this cannot be easily counted. But over and above all this, the progress that a country like this should make in the post-war years, after the fall of the

empires which in their time retarded the economic development in these under-privileged areas--is held back because the attention of the people, their energies, and indeed the concern of the rest of the world is all mixed up with the issue of the conflict in Laos.

So, in a sense, apart from the immediate problem that we are thinking of here, here is a country which is being kept back by these circumstances, her vast source of tin, iron, precious metals, her vast forest wealth, her potential in hydro-electric power are all incapable of exploitations, because unless on the one hand there is peace at home, and international quiet both in regard to neighbours and others, such developments are not easily possible.

So, in considering these matters, it is essential for us to have in mind, without regarding it as irrelevant sentiment, to think of the vast populations, though there are only about three millions in the country--small compared to ours. They are the entire population of a country and entitled to a better fate for themselves.

The problem of this conference thus really resolves itself into the very human issue of people and their fate. Twenty years of war is long enough for any country! We thought on the 20th of August 1954, when as a result of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, the guns of war were silenced in the world, since Japan bombed Manchuria, nearly twenty-five years before that, that was the end of trouble of this character. Unfortunately, Indo-China still witnesses difficulties in various parts, and in Laos even more than anywhere else.

The second issue that one considers is that this conference is concerned with the international aspects of the situation. To this, I shall refer

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again in a moment. These international aspects have received scant attention from us, apart from some of the proposals that have been put forward but which have not yet begun to be discussed on merits.

In other words, so many delegates have repeatedly said this. Only one of the delegations--who have not done us the privilege of attending here today--has in fact objected to discussion of the substance of these matters.

The third aspect is the progress we should be making. Mr. Chairman, I hope this will not be regarded as flippant. It was a month yesterday since we were officially convened, on the 12th of May. The Soviet Government and the British Government pressed the Government of India that their principal delegates should be here on the 12th, because they said the delay in starting the conference would not be good for peace in Laos.

Yesterday we completed not thirty but thirty-one days, out of which were twenty-two working days, and the total number of hours that we

sat in conference was twenty-eight. This is to say on an average we worked one hour a day. I am not saying no work is done outside this conference.

What with postponements, what with various other reasons, we have not given to this matter, in our humble opinion, that sense of urgency which is prompted not only by the situation in Laos, but is fortunately reflected in the arduous labours of the Commission, to which the two Co-Chairmen have, in very modest terms, paid tribute yesterday.

But Sir, even more than that, after the first initial difficulties, when we met four days after the scheduled date, we passed through a week when things looked almost too good to be true. Everybody seemed to agree with everybody else. The very effective, or, rather, the very welcome lead given by His Royal Highness, the Prince of Cambodia was followed. If you will read these earlier speeches, whether they be from the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union or China. wherever it is from, they have very much of a family likeness. All are concerned about the neutrality of Laos, the necessity of leaving the past behind, and looking towards the future.

But, as time went on, we find that each different party thinks in different terms of the content of these words. That is the problem we have to resolve here.

With regard to the delays that have taken place--I hope the United Kingdom Delegation, the Delegations of France and the United States will bear with me, because it is my duty as a representative of the Government of India to place these facts before you--we do not think that the suspension of the conference during the last so many days--I believe from the 6th of June until yesterday--was justified in the circumstances.

We say that not merely because of the loss of six days, but of the political and other content involved in this. I do not want to go any further at the moment than to look at the joint statement issued by the two Chairmen.

It says, "The two Co-Chairmen have received the reports of the International Commission for Supervision and Control, dated May 20, 27 and 5 June, and express appreciation for the information". They do intend, "they understand that the Commission now intend to discuss with the parties proposals for making the cease-fire more effective. The Co-Chairmen call on interested parties in Laos to respond to the appeal in their message".

It may be that I am ignorant about some matters, Mr. Chairman, but in the seven lines written there there is nothing that could not have been included with the information available on the 5th of June, because there have been no other reports from the Commission, no other reliable data of any kind. This statement is based upon the reports that have come, on the 20th, 27th and 5th of June. The

conference stopped working on the 6th. Therefore it is very difficult for me to explain to our public or to our government in what way one functions here.

The third aspect of the matter is this: The Government of India understood the position that from the very beginning the United States, the United Kingdom, France and various other delegations said quite expressly that they participated in the conference on the basis of an effective cease-fire. We said we accepted that. We accepted that to be their position.

Equally at that time--I forget the date now--equally at that time the Commission--the international Commission--had sent a statement which said there was an effective cease-fire, and they explained to them the meaning of an effective cease-fire. It should not be forgotten that this Commission consisted of representatives of Poland Canada, and India, and therefore of countries who are not or have been of one view in all matters in the world.

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What they said was there is an effective cease-fire, in the sense that there is a cessation of hostilities to enable us to function here. They made it quite clear that there would be incidents or there would be violations, either conscious or otherwise in this war, in other words, affecting the cessation of hostilities. The content of this was fully explained to the conference.

It is my submission that that situation has not changed, in spite of Padong or any other incident, because until today, when you have a new report, there is nothing even in that report to say that the Commission considers the cease-fire has been violated to the extent of our having to suspend our activities.

You may say, "What is the use of all this inquest". In the conditions prevailing in Laos, unless we are so far apart--not so far apart in our activities but this reflects on the meeting of the three Princes--as to get an agreement pretty quickly. It is not improbable that there may be incidents on one side or the other, and unless the real principals concerned in these matters, who are not in Laos, put very much more effort into preventing them. Therefore if there should be another of these incidents, may well be on the other side next time, and there would again be another week of postponement. We will be sitting here for quite a long time--I hope, however, we will be sitting here, and not break up in any case.

The next factor is that we met here, as I said a while ago, dividing up the Laotian question into two parts, the internal and the external issues.

Even the incidents that have been taking place have very little to do with our consideration or the external aspects of this question--that is the long-term problem of neutrality, continued neutrality, how

that neutrality is to be insured.

For these reasons, I would submit that we should now learn by our experience that it is far better for us to go on. We have not gained anything by giving up four or five days, and if anything we have lost more than a few days. I hope it won't be a permanent loss in the sense that unless there is progress here, unless there is a sense of urgency here, is it likely to have an adverse effect on the meetings that take place in Laos, on the one hand, and perhaps next week in Zurich on the other.

That is to say, our function here should be one of assisting these attempts at settlement outside, rather than be ones which impede them. The report that came on the 11th of May said the Commission has now been able to establish friendly contact with the principal parties in Laos. The principal parties of the recent hostilities ordered their troops to observe ease-fire.

We have had no communication afterwards from the Commission, either before the sixth or after the sixth, saying anything to the contrary. It has been also said to us that it is the unanimous conviction of the Commission, that since these orders were issued by the parties there is a general demonstrable cessation of hostilities.

Then the Commission has gone on to say that there have been other elements of progress, that the military teams on the three sides are in regular contact with each other. The Commission went on to say that on that date they were satisfied with the general de facto cease-fire.

I am not for a moment saying that either the incident at Padong or anything of that kind are matters that do not disturb our mind. It disturbs our mind but more in the sense that they should not keep on continuing. All the more reason why--if there are incidents of this kind--all the more reason that our activity should be speeded up, so we come to a position of settlement, rather than otherwise.

I have referred to the lack of progress not only in regard to the few days we have sat, or the stoppages that have taken place, but we seem to have deteriorated from this position of unanimity, from the position obtaining earlier of one of near general agreement. I shall deal with that more when I come to deal with the proposals now before us.

At the same time, one should look at the other side also. Many good things have happened. And most of this is in the field. Here I would like to say, Mr. Chairman--and I hope this will be considered by yourself and your colleague, your Co-Chairman--that the Commission is not an isolated body. The Commission is in a sense a part of this conference. It cannot be treated as a part of the membership of this conference--I don't mean they are members of this conference--but that the fact of the Commission can have no existence except in the context of things that we are discussing here, etc.

Therefore, while there is progress being made there and if our proceedings and our actions and our way of looking at things here are such as to impede that progress, then we are

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pulling in two different directions at the same time.

There has been very much progress in the field, and if the meeting will bear with me, I submit there has been no lack of sense of urgency with regard to the Commission itself.

Soon after the Co-Chairman asked it to meet in New Delhi, it met in record time, as fast as airplanes would carry the people to India. They came to agreement in New Delhi quickly. There was a knowledge of the position in Laos and also a degree of common sense and of give and take.

On the 5th of May, the Co-Chairmen ordered them to go to Indo-China, to go to Laos. There was great difficulty in obtaining the necessary facilities for travel from New Delhi to Laos, and even to Indo-China itself was difficult, but they were in Laos on the 8th. That stands very much in contrast to the way we work here.

On the 8th of May, they arrived in Laos. On the 11th of May, three days after their arrival, the Poles and Canadians agreed with the Chairman of the Commission that they could report there was a cease-fire. I would think that all this calls for an approach to this problem from us from a somewhat different point of view. At any rate, these are good things that have happened.

Secondly we have had--before I go into the reports--we have had the arrival on the Continent of Europe, of the heads of the three main groups in Laos, all travelling from their countries, not running away from the place of disturbance, but in the hope that their meeting together, perhaps away from the scene of troubles might lead to settlement. So we shall have the leader of Pathet Lao, the leader of the neutralist group, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and the leader of the King's Government, Prince Boun Oum, here in Switzerland. It is not unusual for Princes to take holidays in Europe, but in this particular case, they are here willing to meet on this problem. It appeared two days ago that this hope might be dashed to the ground because there was some trouble as to where they should meet. Fortunately this has been resolved and now the Princes--thanks to the intervention of His Royal Highness, the Prince of Cambodia and the good sense of the parties--have decided to meet in Swiss territory.

Even if, in the initial stages, there may be difficulties, the very fact that the heads of three warring parties in a conflict of this character, and more if one particularly inside their own territory, agree to meet, is positive gain, a factor for the good in the present situation. I say this not merely to strike a balance sheet but in

order to remind ourselves that the meeting of the Princes which, to a certain extent, is related to the crux of the whole of this problem. The crux of the problem is the emergence in Laos of an authority of a government which is accepted by the principal parties and groups, who can deliver the goods, who can pledge neutrality and implement it, a government or authority of national unity; this appears to be the crux of a solution, whether it be in regard to the cease-fire or to the more distant problems. Therefore this meeting of the Princes, while one may not be romantic about it, while we may not have exaggerated hopes in the beginning, we must not also be cynical about it. As far as the Conference is concerned, anything we do here to promote good feeling will be to the good. It is in this connexion that we must all regret the two-hour proceedings of this meeting yesterday. Here I want also to draw the attention of you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleague to what is happening in Laos itself on that issue.

I have no desire--I would like to follow the good example set by the delegate of Pathet Lao, and not pursue this matter. First of all, there has been agreement in the field that the three parties meet, both on military and political questions, but over and above that--and this is significant--the Commission's reports to you on the 16th day of May, Mr. Chairman, after some discussions, agreement was reached on important points of procedure.

They agreed that the three parties are equal. The three parties are equal and there was no need, they said, at least for the time being, to have any Chairman of the Conference. The Conference met three times a week and they are unanimous, that is to say, in the field itself, there has been agreement between the three parties.

Then the Commission, in writing to you, on the 5th of June, a little later, says the Commission also pursued, with the parties, the examination of the ways and means of dealing with trouble spots and reducing tension. Then they go on to say that, meanwhile, apart from the agreement between the parties, any agreed decision in the conduct of the Conference in Geneva would be most helpful. I would like to ask you, Mr. Gromyko and your colleague if the statement that you made to them yesterday that you received their report with appreciation, was it mere empty words?

In view of the effort that they are making, if they turn round to us and say they would like

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some assistance in this direction, we have to consider that, whatever happens, in the way of peaceful co-operation and progress here, is the best assurance we can give. I have referred to the more depressing factors on the one hand not in order to strike a balance alone but taking into account that for us to be cynical would not lead to good results. We think there are forces working for peace inside this conference, but not only inside this conference but

outside Laos as well and the world. All these factors, as I have said, are important. The fact that the Laotians, whether Pathet Lao or Royalist, Laotians are obsessed by the conditions and circumstances of the war, is something which we may not forget. It can be truly said of the Laotians and one cannot say they are war-scarred! They have had no time to have scars. They are wounded all the time. Their wounds remain continually fresh. They have had no time to heal.

From having made these preliminary observations, and I hope, not having taking too much time, my delegation likes to proceed to the substance of the problem, to some part of least of the substance of this matter. We are deliberately refraining from putting forward a formal memorandum or document or protocol or anything of that kind at this stage because we fear that any crystalized or rather too formalized presentation of that kind may add to our difficulties, create more problems of prestige and face-saving, create more problems of semantics, one way or another. It is far better therefore that we put forward what our ideas or what our position is in various aspects of this matter so that, in the consideration of the documents already before you, there may perhaps be means of finding agreement or bridging difficulties. On the other hand if after a study which my delegation had proposed in the earlier stages of the Conference--if it is necessary at that time--that the Government of India and we hope with the co-operation of our colleagues in the Commission will be able to put forward something helpful.

I come to what our basic position is. As our starting point in this matter, we take as the basis the 1954 Geneva Agreement. I am happy to think that whether it be the United States, United Kingdom or China or the Soviet Union or the French, they have all now agreed to this position. We start from the Geneva Agreement and I could put this no better than has been put by the Foreign Minister of France. His statement, however, is contradicted by the later French Statements. We are unable to reconcile them.

Our own starting point is easily defined. We begin with the Agreement which here, in 1954, put an end to war then in progress and provided the means of insuring the unity and neutrality of Laos in the future. The reason why successive crises have occurred in Laos is largely because these agreements have been lost sight of, ignored or violated. Thence we must return to them.

It is all the more appropriate as in Laos itself and in international opinion, it appears accepted that the proper objective in regard to Laos, is that the country should be enabled to pursue a policy of neutrality. If that is to eventuate peace has to be restored. These are precisely the objectives of the 1954 Agreement. What in fact do we mean now when we speak of their having been accepted by everyone. We do not mean quite simply going back to what was stated in terms in the 1954 agreement in every particular but of making such adjustments and adaptations as may be necessary. So therefore we start from that position which means that any decision which by this Conference

cannot be a departure from the basic agreement reached in 1954, and this does not mean that there could be no changes. We ourselves argue that there are some fundamental differences between the 1954 position and the present one. Therefore, while we claim to have no copyright in this matter, on behalf of the government of India, we pointed out at the outset of the conference that any resolution or any decision in the formulation of this conference must be part of the Geneva Agreement. So far as any instrument is concerned, it should be something that supplements, something that adds or modifies the previous agreement and not as substitute because if international agreements are denounced certain consequences follow. At the same time, international agreements have to be modified; having regard to the changes that take place in external circumstances. So our starting position in the 1954 agreement--it is from there we proceed--is that in it there are certain basic factors. One is the neutral position of Laos which Laotians specifically wanted and it is set out in the documents the reference of which I shall give for the record later. It was accepted but there was no concordat as such of any kind. What was done was the other countries concerned received these statements, "took note" of them. They are included in the documents of the time. This procedure, of course, may have to undergo certain modifications in the light of the present situation.

The second is the independence, and sovereignty of Laos and her right not to be interfered with by other people. These were accepted by the others concerned. All this is related to the

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discussions that will come hereafter. So, we think that, in any formula there should be a more categorical and unanimous definition in terms but the acceptance of the rights and/or the desire of the Laotian State to remain as a neutral country without being tied up to military alliance or blocs or subject to other forms of pressures from the various conflicting groups in the world. In regard to these groups one need not necessarily think of the so-called east and west blocs, but even if there were other groups who are not strictly military, the Laotians should have the fullest freedom to decide on their own.

I will repeat what I said on the previous occasion that neither this conference nor anybody has the right to force neutrality on Laos. If Laos is a sovereign country, then it is up to her to say "We want to remain neutral". That is what we said earlier at this conference and that was the position in 1954 also. In 1954 they asked for it and there is no doubt they will ask for it again. We have not subscribed to various known types of neutrality.

I will go so far as to say that any government of Laos, right or left or whatever it is--there is little doubt that in pure Laotian national interest they will find it better for them and they will realize for themselves that they do not want to be either a target or an arena or arsenal for others as they would be if they are involved

in entanglements.

This approach and position was not fashionable a few years ago, but it is becoming more and more accepted more or less all over the world. Therefore, that is the first proposition: that there must be a commitment by this conference and those participating in it that if the Laotian Government makes the same statement as it did before--which we need not doubt it will--would those become part of the obligations of the other countries. Thereby, this will become an International Covenant to which we are all pledged.

Now so far as the Government of India is concerned, as I said earlier, and I repeat it now--while we cherish the neutrality of countries, particularly in under-privileged areas and in areas in Asia, we think one of the greater danger to their development--a hostile factor to their development--is the projection of military alliances into their territories. At the same time we are not prepared for that, for we do not subscribe to, and we do not contemplate, the guarantee of this neutrality by military methods. That is, we are not prepared to go into a Locarno, or enter into any kind of military guarantee which ultimately will lead to war.

Therefore, by neutrality we mean a neutrality that is agreed in an international Covenant by responsible and civilized nations, which will allow and enable this country, after 20 years of sanguinary conflict, to develop for herself, while offering to give her such assistance as she may need.

Therefore, we mean that all these modifications must be and ought to be made, but built on the stem of the Geneva Agreement. I am not here borrowing this idea or terminology from anybody else--the Government of India put forward at the beginning of the Conference that Protocols may be added to the previous document of 1954. So there would be no throwing of the baby out with the bath water.

Then we come to the question of what are the contents of such a settlement. First of all, it is obvious that if there should be neutrality, independence, non-interference by anybody else, there has to be comparative stability at home. Because, if home waters are troubled, somebody is bound to fish in them. Apart even from this there is the general desire for peace and stability. If there is trouble in any of these countries today, the great powers and others become suspicious, one of the other; and, what is more, the parties that are at war within the country itself look to one side or the other for help and the present situation will be repeated. Therefore, the cessation of hostilities becomes very important.

Here, I want to take this occasion for stating our position on the cease-fire in the present context.

We think the cease-fire position in 1954 was different from the cease-fire position today. There, the cease-fire was between non-Laotian parties, But, today, we have the position of a civil war--

civil war that is never very civil, but that is what it is called. We have the position of a civil war--the bloodiest, the cruellest of all wars, and war where even members of the same family might be fighting one against the other.

We have a situation entirely different from this point of view, from that of 1954. This has to be reflected in any provisions we make now, to meet the present situation. Even at that time, Mr. Chairman, you were one of the people who were closely concerned in this matter--even at that time, the responsibility for the maintenance

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of the cease-fire was placed upon the parties to the conflict. During the last 12 years the Government of India has been drawn, not by its own desire to come into anything, but in the discharge of its international responsibilities, into many situations where it had to participate in supervising or assisting to maintain a cease-fire. But in each of these cases--whether it be in Korea in 1953, on the Gaza Strip today, or in the Lebanon episode, in any of these places--the responsibility for the maintenance of peace was placed, as it must needs be, on the parties to the conflict. This is not a theory--there is no other practical way of dealing with the matter.

If two people are fighting, either they must agree not to fight, or a third party must be so powerful as to hold the parties down--which means a military exercise of some kind. We do not subscribe or support military intervention. The one purpose, more than another, of this conference is to terminate and prevent such intervention, direct or indirect.

In 1954, the whole philosophy, the whole ideology of the "Joint Commission" (the Joint Commission with which the Vietnamese and the Laotian parties and the French were concerned), everybody insisted at that time, that the responsibility for maintaining the cease-fire must rest on the parties to the conflict and hence with the Joint Commission. Unless the parties to the conflict agree on cessation it is not possible. We are happy to think that even in the last few days there has been the seating of a "mixed military commission" in Laos, who have given the understanding on such an undertaking and the assurance to the Commission that they will try to keep the peace by their joint efforts. In practice, as I have said more than once this afternoon, there is no other way for the cessation of hostilities except by the people who are engaged on it. That does not mean that the authority invested in an international body has nothing to do in this matter. They can promote it. They can help to overcome suspicions. They can uncover deceitful or similar action. They can work, they can help to prevent provocations and misunderstandings and misinterpretations of events and incidents. They can promote harmony in various ways.

But the actual maintenance of the cease-fire and its supervision, especially in a country like Laos, where conflict in the jungle is

one of those things that even a regular army cannot easily cope with--there is no other way. I have already referred to the differences between 1954 and now. At that time the conflict, as I said, was between two non-Laotian parties; and perhaps one Laotian party. The French Empire was there. The agreement was between two High Commands. In the present case there cannot be agreement between High Commands. This is a civil war and what Laos and we seek is its end and Laotian unity.

My Government is of the view that any thinking on these lines of agreement between High Commands will ultimately lead to the division of Laos. If anywhere a cease-fire line is drawn--we are apprehensive of all such lines drawn anywhere--they may be drawn for one day, but they will be there for a hundred years--I don't know about 100 years, but perhaps less or more.

We shall not be parties to creating a situation in Laos where it is assumed or implied, even if not consciously, that there are to be even de facto territorial divisions in the country--which, in fact also is not the case. In the context of Geneva 1954, if then we had had the experiences that we have now, perhaps the division of Viet-Nam could have been avoided. Who can tell?

As I have said, we will not be a party to maintaining the cease-fire by extraneous military means. We do not regard it the function of the Commission to police the cease-fire. The function of the Commission is, as set forth in the previous documents, as it is functioning now. That is to say, where there is a difficulty they go to the two sides, or the three sides, as the case may be, and they say, "You must do this, or do that", and they seek to obtain agreement. Such common agreement between the parties concerned and their common action is vital. Happily, this is the position in Laos today after the Commission returned on the 8th of last month. We can see from the reports of the Commission to the Co-Chairmen, the cease-fire position is sought to be held by the three main parties in Laos itself. They themselves have agreed there should be a mixed commission, that they would maintain the cease-fire, as I shall quote to you in a moment, on one occasion they even said, "Now we would like you to come to the place of our conference, but we don't want you to take part in the conversations, because we seek and strive to come to an agreement but we don't want you to take part in it".

The Commission unanimously agreed to this. It is surprising to some, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, how much and more often the Commission agrees when it is outside the context of this conference. This mixed military commission is an index of how the cease-fire is to be held.

We do not think, however, that a mixed military commission can be a very convenient or

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a lasting arrangement. Therefore, we come back again to the position

that the crux of this problem is a coalition government in Laos. It does bear repeating--a government of national unit. It is not for us, and we refrain from offering any suggestions of personalities or groups. We think it is entirely wrong for any outside party to dictate to the Laotian people as to the composition of their government or as to how it should be brought about, or anything of that character. All that we say is that there cannot be peace in Laos, there cannot be any hope of non-intervention from outside, any hope of economic progress, or any other progress, unless there is a unified government. By any process of bringing people or parties together, this Princes' meeting, or whatever it is, such an outcome may be promoted.

Therefore, when, in the Russian proposal for example, it is said that the function of the Commission (that is in one clause, and I say this very guardedly but deliberately) is to be strictly limited by the cease-fire agreement, it is--if I may say so; and I want to understand the situation--probably a piece of drafting on which a little more care would have to be given, perhaps. That is the only explanation I can give. The cease-fire position will soon change, because either there will have to be an ad hoc arrangement of some kind, or a coalition government, or the civil war will continue. Therefore, it is a very temporary situation. What is the function of the Commission thereafter?

Then we come to the next aspect of the problem; that is, the external aspects of the situation. We believe the Commission is mainly concerned with the external aspects of the situation. That external aspect arises from the neutrality we all agree about. Neutrality and need for our consideration of the external aspect go together--one has to be "neutral" or one has to be tied to one of the power blocs in the world, or go into some other arrangement if a new situation arises. But we are all pursuing the goal of neutrality, because of what we have heard from the Laotians, and what is the common view here. Mr. Dean Rusk has said that it is the policy of the present U.S. Government. It has been said by the Russians and the Chinese, and by the British, and all else who have in reality a great deal to do with the determination of the affairs of the world! From this external aspect of neutrality follow certain things:

The first is the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Now, here, I will try to speak as carefully as possible. By the "withdrawal of foreign forces" the Government of India means the withdrawal of all foreign forces, whether they be of neighbouring nations, of Europeans, or Americans, or Asians, or anybody else or whoever it is. Those who are not Laotians, and who are not part of the constitutional force of Laos, as composed by their law, all those forces have to be withdrawn. In our opinion, when the articles for withdrawal are drafted there should be the agreement of the Laotian Central Government or authority, whatever it is then, as to how they are to be withdrawn, along what channels, so as not to create confusion by the very process of withdrawal, confusion of any kind. In certain contexts the mass withdrawal of troops may create difficulties.

So as is provided in the 1954 Agreement, these withdrawals should be of an orderly character, and should be accomplished in a given time. The Soviet draft has set 30 days. My Government thinks 30 days is too long. We have always held--for example, when we had the difficulty (I hope you don't mind my mentioning this), when we had the difficulties of the British and the French intervention in Egypt--that it should not take foreign troops more time to go out of a country than to get into it. Einstein or someone may say that the distance from A to B is not the same as from B to A. That may be so mathematically, but, for all practical purposes, the troops should not take longer to go out than to go in. So I think that Mr. Gromyko lent himself unconsciously to a big power complex in this matter and has given 30 days. The Government of India would be pleased to see them get out as quickly as possible. I think it is to the advantage of the intervening parties concerned, because everybody that is killed or any incident that takes place in Laos will be attributed to the interventionists of one side or the other. It is both to the reputation and the advantage of the powers, or the countries that have given assistance in the past, and are engaged on one side or the other, that they get out of this mess as quickly as possible, that is go out of it altogether. We mean all of them. Identification may be difficult with some of the personnel from some of the neighbouring countries. For that we have to rely on the Laotian Government. A Laotian Government, if it wants to maintain and be assured of non-intervention and neutrality, has to bend backwards to proclaim its determination with complete integrity in this matter. I have no doubt they will do so because if for no other reason their interest is to keep all foreigners out. After all, most of the policies that endure are built on the firm ground of interest and little else. We think, therefore, that this should and will be done.

In this matter, the United Kingdom has

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raised a point arising from the formulation made by the Russians, and which is partly the view we also have taken on this matter. That is to say, when it is said everybody must go out, the United Kingdom Delegation has said that this is a departure from the 1954 Agreement, since the 1954 Agreement allowed the French to have bases, personnel, training equipment and so on there. Before I analyse that, I want to point out to Mr. MacDonald that if he reads the 1954 Agreement carefully he will find it is set down there that the arrangement is for a certain time. Laotian independence does not mean that others should have these bases forever, or there should be intrusion of somebody else forever.

At the same time we also take the view that it is for the Laotian Government to say when and how. Because, if for the purposes of national security and in the exercise of their sovereignty, they seek to have armed forces, they have to look either to the United States or to the Soviet Union, or to France, for their assistance in

training and equipping them, because there are no others who are capable of rendering such assistance. These are the only ones who can give, and these are the people who have given in the past. The British no doubt can, but Laotian equipment, training, etc. are of a different kind, and it wouldn't suit them. So it will either come from the United States, or from the Soviet Union, or from France. Therefore, if there have to be the maintenance of foreign personnel, or training, or equipment for this purpose, it is up to the Laotian Government to take into account the formulation of the 1954 Agreement, which limits the time and also the conditions under which they are to be there.

Therefore, we say that we do not go all the way in this matter, in the sense of a mathematical "all". We have to take into account the requirement of the Laotian Government and their own determination in this. They cannot be left in the air without any provision for the support they may nationally require.

But, having said that, we divide the French support factor in this situation into three elements: One is a French base, the other is training and personnel; and the third is the entitlement, or rather, the capacity that the French may think they had or have to delegate their functions.

Now, with regard to the first, we do not feel, unless otherwise advised by the Laotian Government (which is to be formed in the future) that it is necessary to maintain a base in the country in order to assist them in military training. The base is purely the projection of the foreign country into the home territory of another. Therefore, while we are quite prepared to take into account the Laotian views in this matter; speaking as at present advised, we do not think the French base is consistent--that the continuance of a French base for more than the time that is required in practice to withdraw it--with the maintenance of the neutrality or the sovereignty of Laos, any more than the existence of the bases, shall we say near the Suez Canal was consistent with the integrity or sovereignty of Egypt.

With regard to the training of personnel, we think this is a matter--as has been repeatedly stated by the United States, by the United Kingdom, by the Socialist countries, and by everybody else--that this is a matter on which the Laotian Government has to state their requirements. And, on those requirements, we think it is difficult for this Conference or any external party to prescribe what size of arms, or what size of armies Laos should have except in the context of world disarmament. When great countries in the world are not prepared to give up their arms, or reduce their forces, it would be rather unrealistic of them to consider that it would be appropriate for them to ask others to do so.

But the Laotian Government would not want to carry the burden of heavy armament, having carried it so long, and, what is more, having discovered, I suppose, that large numbers of troops, very often, in

the conditions that exist there, may cause provocation to civil strife. No doubt they will put forward their requirements, because, after all, they have to pay for it ultimately; they have to bear the burden. They would have no use for training troops, or equipment, in the present, unless they intend to keep it until the world disarms. Therefore, they, no doubt, will only demand what is required for them, and what they are conveniently able to carry.

Therefore, it is entirely up to them to say what country they want to invite. On this particular matter, I think the cause of international cooperation and settlement, in this place, would be furthered if the present arrangements with regard to their friends in France--with whom, in spite of all their political relations, they understand each other--were to be continued.

Then, we come to the third aspect of this question, and we definitely hold that the French authorities, who are concerned in this matter, have no right under the Geneva Agreements (and I believe no moral position under international relations) to delegate this to anybody. That is to

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say, they couldn't say, "We have agreed to let them have 3,000 troops now; some other country can give them 1,500 of this". That upsets the whole arrangement.

Therefore, with regard to the first, we take one position; that is to say, we are against it--unless, of course, the Laotian Government has another view.

In regard to the second, we think that, as a matter of practical politics, practical organization, we would have to agree to some arrangement desired by Laos. Then, if these troops are withdrawn, then it follows as a corollary there should be provision against the re-introduction of foreign forces, the same or other. There would be no point in withdrawing some people one day and sending them back, or others the next day. Therefore, there should be provision with regard to re-introduction, which would also be in cooperation and agreement with the Laotian Government. It follows from this the corollary that the troops--because though Laos is not a very highly-populated country compared to ours--she still has enough people to join her armies--her main problem will be arms and equipment. On arms and equipment, beyond what is given under these agreements--any entry of arms and equipment into the Laotian territory, and therefore, contrary to the conception of neutrality; and contrary to the arrangements made here, would be a violation of an international covenant. Therefore, there should be a prohibition of the entry of such arms and equipment. It is for consideration in what way this prohibition can be maintained. I will come to that in a moment.

In the maintenance of this prohibition, the complete cooperation of the Laotian Government will be not only necessary but obligatory. It

is common ground that there should be such prohibition. The parties who subscribe to neutrality will, no doubt, see that, on the one hand, they don't subscribe to neutrality and then on the other they encourage or permit or do something themselves for the ingress of war material.

It is a great pity that in countries that require a great deal of economic development--and cultural and other relations have to, and can be promoted, and where we have an ancient civilization, and, in more modern times, they maintain contact with a very cultured and highly advanced country like France--that the contact with the outside world should be through armaments.

Having said that, there comes the question of comparing the present position to what it was in 1954. It is here that the conflict arises about control and supervision, and so on. We, ourselves, do not like these words which we have inherited from the 1954 Commission. This is not a question of control in the sense of controlling the Laotian Government. Any attempt, any arrangement, or any provisions in these agreements which require the Commission control the Laotian Government would be in opposition to the whole conception of the sovereignty and neutrality of Laos. What we shall be "controlling" is the ingress of arms from outside.

Now this word "control" is a frightening word. Unfortunately it has been used. Similarly, we think there has been a lot of controversy here about the "powers" of the Commission. Personally, and as a Government, we do not like the use of the word "powers".

As an organ, the I.C.C. is set up. That organ would be given certain functions, and if those functions are to be discharged, it must have the capacity to discharge them. That is as far as it goes. There should be no question of more powers or less powers in this matter.

The difference between 1954 and the present is even more in the context than of the cease-fire, because here it is not a question merely of prohibiting somebody to come in or not and in which the Laotians themselves have no interest or real concern. The Laotians themselves are the "host" country in this matter. The Commission is there by agreement. It is to prohibit arms going into Laotian country. So, in our considered opinion, any arrangement that is made by which the International Commission will be involved or have functions and duties must be an arrangement in which the Laotian Government fully cooperates.

If the Laotian Government itself is trying to violate neutrality, then it violates an international agreement and takes the consequences. What we are trying to do is to assist them to maintain their neutrality. Therefore, any system for supervision and control must be with and based on the cooperation of the Laotian Government.

We believe that if the Commission is to be involved in this matter, and to discharge its functions, then it has to be given adequate

capacity to do so. That adequate capacity, however, is one to be discussed with the Laotian Government and one on which there should be unanimity

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within the Commission itself, whether as under the previous agreement it works by a certain number of posts in different places, and a certain amount of mobile units, and what not, or whether the same thing would now operate otherwise. How many, and how and what, is not a matter which we are at the present time categorically able to postulate.

But as we have said this is a Laotian interest. Supposing there were to be check-points: in our opinion, not only should the three countries concerned in the Commission be represented, but the Laotian Government also should be represented in the interest of the Laotian Government itself, to point out that arms are coming this way or that way, or, if you will, there are likely to be arms coming this way-- what can the Commission do about it?

Having said that, I would like to point out that so far as the Government of India goes, any such prohibition as the entry of arms cannot be, and so far as our capacity and inclinations go, and our outlook goes in this matter--this cannot be done by any resistance, that is to say, we cannot put a body of troops across a point of ingress. It is not practical in a country like that, any way. Over and above that, we would not be willing to intervene in this way. It can only be done by pointing out to the parties that agreements have been or are being violated by them or by their friends, the neutrality of Laos is in danger, and if need be, bringing up the whole international aspect of this question before the Co-Chairmen, this Conference and the world as appropriate.

We think the perimeter of Laos, without the Commission having any access to any country from which anything may proceed should be the subject of vigilance. We believe, however, there is a difference in this matter between the 1954 position and the present position, the present position being one where the Laotian Government is deeply involved, and the Commission should discuss with them and come to an agreement as to what has to be done in this matter. Elaborations or other aspects of these arrangements would have to be commonly decided. The decision on that presumably would be reached by the understanding as to the degree of danger that exists in this way.

If the great powers who have been assisting one side or the other with arms, if as part of their policy they decided to stop it, then the problem becomes much smaller, and naturally much and elaborate machinery may not be necessary. But at the same time it is no use asking the Commission to sit in Luang Prabang or Vientiane and advise as to what to do, because by the time caution was taken the arms would have been introduced.

Therefore, if the Commission is being charged with the responsibility of assisting in the preventing of ingress of arms within Laos, the Laotian Government, without sacrifice of its sovereignty, without sacrifice of dignity, but in the exercise of them, can and will give such assistance as is required. Here again I think it is a matter of discussing it from a practical point of view.

Then we come to the various procedural points. One cannot escape this. Mr. Gromyko has said there can be only two kinds of people, those who agree with one and those who disagree with one. But I thought there were a third now in the world, nowadays, the intermediate section in this case. (Laughter).

But I am sorry that this otherwise difficult proposition has been abandoned in this very apt situation. We see the world exercised by this tripartite proposition. Why it should be forgotten in the one place where it is handy? We don't know. We wait for information.

Therefore, I think in the Soviet proposals if one article can be reconciled with any other, and if some of these ideas we have mentioned can be introduced, we can go very far.

Then we come to this question of unanimity-nonunanimity. The Government of India categorically states, not only here but in the context of the United Nations that unless there is great power unanimity, it is not possible to reach decisions on world issues. We have supported what is thus important, the so-called veto, introduced at San Francisco in a most powerful speech by Senator Connally, on behalf of the United States on the maintenance of great power unanimity. This is integral to a stable world situation and solutions of world issues.

We agree that there has to be unanimity on certain questions. It is also provided for in the 1954 Agreement. We also think we have often to seek unanimity even in procedural questions. In a situation like yesterday, the Chairman would not give a ruling and say, "This is it".

Therefore, while we are not at the present moment prepared to accept this difficult dichotomy between procedure and other, we are

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quite prepared to consider major and minor questions. We can think of procedural questions becoming major issues even of war and peace. We can also think of questions which some regard as of principle being minor issues in reality. We are quite prepared to see a solution having regard to the minor and major nature of issues.

In the last three or four weeks, without any theories or arguments about these matters, the Poles and the Canadians have agreed with each other. It is easy enough to agree with us! If we don't agree we will be squeezed from both sides!

The Poles and the Canadians seemed to agree on important matters. I have a suspicion, I hope Mr. Ronning would not mind my saying this, that the Canadians have learned a lot of wisdom in the last few years. (Laughter). We think the way, the practical way of dealing with this is to recognize the fact that there are some questions on which there must be unanimity. This is also provided for in the Geneva Agreement. I don't say that we need necessarily cover those questions or leave them alone with the requirement of unanimity. There are other questions on which it may well be a stark necessity. One knows of cases.

I hope the Polish Delegation would not mind my saying this. I know of cases of the work of this Commission, from intimate and personal contact with these matters. On occasions, either the Canadians or the Poles--not so much us, have resisted the decision, and have then said, "You get on with the majority vote. We don't agree. We have, however, no objection if it goes through". That is to say, it may be really a minor issue. Or they don't want to obstruct majority decisions even though they themselves may prefer another course. Therefore, to take away the majority decision method in all cases is not a safe thing.

From a practical point of view, what has to be done is to leave it more or less to the Commission to say: "There must be no compulsion about unanimity on all matters or what may be left the other way".

The Commission--I have forgotten the section now, says they may revise these procedures and submit revisions to the Co-Chairmen. Therefore I personally do not think--there is any need to drive theory too hard. It is possible to find agreement if it is left to the Commission to find agreements on ad hoc matters, provided the principle is accepted by us.

There are certain questions on which there must be unanimity. On the other hand, all questions do not require unanimity. There seems to be a common ground between the two schools. It is only the way the opposing views are formulated here that gives most of the trouble. We hope this is not going to be a rock on which agreement here may crash.

In our own country, there was difficulty when framing a federal constitution as to what functions a state should have and what function the Centre should have. As you know, states are very jealous of their status and functions. The Constitution ultimately provided for the best way out by placing the subjects on different and separate schedules and putting some things which are common to both on both schedules. With some such practical arrangement it should be possible to resolve this rather ticklish matter,

But we are in the present moment unprepared to accept the categorization of issues into those of principle and those of procedure, because I have seen this thing working in the United

Nations. It is very easy to say that something is procedural and something isn't. I have seen procedures being translated into principles by presidents of Assemblies, and also principles being matters of procedures.

For example, take the representation of China in the United Nations. Strictly, literally, it is a matter of procedure. No one argues its procedure. But a small matter of procedure may become a fundamental issue.

Therefore I appeal to our colleagues--countries on the Commission--to give thought to us, and whether it is not possible to recommend to the Co-Chairmen something they can accept, having regard for all these principles.

Then we have to deal with certain matters that have been put out from different sides. One is in regard to the functioning of the Commission itself. Our understanding of this Commission has been that there are three sovereign countries who have been invited by the Conference at Geneva. With great difficulty this was agreed in 1954. There are certain consequences that follow from this. It is a balance that may not be upset without consequences.

They cannot be regarded as administrative officials taking orders from the Co-Chairmen from day to day. Equally, the Co-Chairmen, neither the British nor the Russians, I hope, will forget that it took the Commission a lot of prodding to

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promote them into activity. That is to say, when there have been difficulties the Commission have invoked the Chairmen. Therefore while we generally agree that the Conference is the parent and the Co-Chairmen are the embodiment of this Conference, the Commission consisting of sovereign countries who accepted responsibilities must carry on their business within, and under, the marching orders that are inherent in the Agreement. This again must be a difficult formulation and wording. So there should not be any question of something happening in Laos, then sending it to New Delhi, and telegraphed to Moscow and the United Kingdom, and coming back through to them, and going back, and getting back to Laos, taking so many days over it.

Normally speaking, they would function on their own within the system of checks and balances that the constitution of the Commission itself represents. But if there were matters which appeared to be borderline of these functions, or as a result of the attitude of the Laotian Government, or one of the parties in the Commission, there are deadlocks, naturally reference has to be made to the Co-Chairmen, because the Co-Chairmen are the embodiment of the Conference.

We regard the Co-Chairmen as representing, particularly when the Conference is not sitting, the Conference itself. They are not just

the Russians and the British. They personalize in themselves the authority, the functions and the influence of this Conference. That is how we have regarded this issue. No doubt if there were issues they cannot resolve, they will take whatever steps they can, either by private consultations or open consultations or by reference to the Conference which may be called as now.

This takes me to the proposals put forward by the French Delegation. It is not that I am picking this out separately, but we find ourselves in diametrical opposition to some of the proposals. We are entirely in agreement with what M. Couve de Murville said in the beginning, but we find that the Protocols that have been put out, apart from our agreement with them, i.e. apart from our agreement in regard to their being "Protocols", we find that it is very difficult to recommend it to our government to accept them.

First of all we do not regard the Commission as anything but being a functional authority set up by this Conference, to assist the Laotian Government to take their place in the community of nations. So, no question of multidominium should arise. We may not reduce Laos--it is not to be reduced to a colony or trust territory. It has had enough experience of colonial rule not even to like the smell of it.

I do hope that particularly the countries of the West would not take offence at the observation. We would ask them to try to respond to emotional reactions in this matter. Any attempt to dress it up in any way that suggests Dominium--single or multiple--would at once create adverse reactions. There cannot be any question of multi-dominium, or a super Government.

What is more, once there is a common government in Laos, one of the main problems, the cease-fire, ceases to exist, because there cannot be a cease-fire problem between the three parties when they are in the Government. If the three Laotian parties are not supporting a government there will be no settlement, but a state of civil war. It would be a different situation.

It is not like the 1954 one. Actually, under the Russian proposals, the I.C.S.C. is limited to functioning under the cease-fire agreement. But with a government in Laos, the cease-fire agreement more or less melts away. The only cease-fire problem that can arise is, if some outside country not represented here promotes it by some fourth party being assisted in a new civil war. Then a new situation arises altogether.

Therefore, we are against these proposals, which in our opinion, would affect the neutrality of Laos in many ways. The Commission obviously cannot be a vassel of the Laotian Government. They are there, however, to assist, not to rule Laos. They are an international authority to assist, and their voice, I have no doubt--even today, in the contact with all the parties, even though there is no formality about some of their work or good offices--not only the two represented here, but the King's party also, listen to their

voice, and often accept their advice or take their counsel.

Therefore, we are definitely against this idea of introducing any conception of what may be called a "multidominium"--not even a "condominium", but a "multidominium". In fact, we ourselves used the phrase in our intervention first in that we are not agreeable to the Commission being "a state within a state",

Mr. Gromyko translated it into Russian and adopted it. But we claim no copyright in these matters. So we will overlook the borrowing. But we have said there cannot be a state within a state, or a superstate exercising its authority over Laos.

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Secondly, it will be understood that the neutrality, at least in constitutional theory, legal theory, is to be brought about by an invitation, or rather a proclamation from the Laotian Government, which other parties agree to. It has got to be put in that form if the Laotian Government's sovereignty is not to be affected.

Then it goes on to say here--I hope Mr. Chauvel would not mind my dealing with this in detail and seriatim.

Article 1 of the French draft protocol states clearly that the I.C.C. shall be responsible for supervision and control of the neutrality of Laos. Where is the neutrality then? Where is the independence, if somebody is going to control and supervise it.

Under the French draft protocol, it says that the ICC would supervise and control the will to live in a sovereign and independent state. That will be a curious kind of will. It certainly cannot remain as Laotian will which is what is ostensibly sought to be fostered.

Also, it will insure (Article I) free operation of the Commission in Laos--How?

Mr. Chairman, I don't know how it is in your countries, but there is more power in this than the police have in our own territory in a municipal context. In addition, the two parts of the statement, it appears to us, Couve de Murville's and this do not work together.

Then, Article 2 goes on to say "the absence of the representative of one" need not stop decisions. It is one of those things--to which I am sure not only the present members of the Commission, but even a new Commission would not agree.

The Commission is the unidentified ancestor of the present tripartite theory. It was, however, carefully thought out in 1954 to secure a balance. This happened in Korea also, with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, of equal forces from East and West and with a neutral Chairman.

Poland being in the Communist bloc, or in the bloc of the Socialist countries, and Canada, being a member of the NATO--they are the two powerful groups in the world of the so-called "blocs". The Union of India, being a non-aligned country, was invited to be Chairman of this Commission. There is a degree of responsibility and onerousness in being non-aligned. They are always in demand for such purposes. It is almost like a person who is a priest by caste or calling being called in for ceremonials even though he is not a practising priest.

To suggest that in a team two people alone can do something is almost like a man saying that a woman is 50 per cent in agreement about getting married to him because he is cent per cent in agreement. He wants to get married and the girl doesn't. Between the two of them, it is 50 per cent. (Laughter).

You can't say that sort of thing. It is a team of three a unit. I am sure there are enough people in Canada there are enough people in Poland, and certainly enough people in India to provide the personnel necessary. (Laughter).

There cannot be any majority decision in this matter. I am certain that Canada will not accept this. In saying this I am not abrogating Mr. Ronning's sovereignty, but I know his mind. Poland will not accept it. There cannot be only two people. As far as saying that this arrangement is not acceptable etc. we are not being dogmatic. It does reflect lack of understanding of the position with regard to the I.C.C. and the basis of it. Without offence, I would like to point this out.

Article 3--the Commission is given unrestricted rights of inspection in Laos. This I think, is part of the general fever about inspecting other people's countries. But this goes much too far. These rights claimed are greater than any courts of law or any police officers have in our country. We cannot go into Laos inspecting any place--including a private house, I presume.

Article 10--this again is a new suggestion which has come from France, to which I hope the Co-Chairmen themselves will violently object--is to install what looks like a standing committee of this Conference. It is a permanent multidominium in action.

First of all the Government of India would not be prepared to relegate its powers to a meeting of this type. If Ambassadors are sent to any country it would have to be especially for that Conference.

These Ambassadors, say, it may be in Cambodia, or Thailand, or Malaya, or Burma, wherever they are, are accredited to that country for particular purposes. So far as we are concerned, it is almost an unwritten rule with us that we do not normally like Ambassadors going into an international conference, when that conference

is going to be held in that country.

For example, if our Ambassador in the United States were going into an international conference, he might have to express opinions which are totally antagonistic to the U.S. positions and his personal relations with the U.S. become very difficult. Therefore, if there is to be a standing committee of this type, it has to be devised in some other form. But we object to the nation altogether.

Our fundamental objection to it is we think the present arrangement of the Co-Chairman being the embodiment of the Conference is adequate. This is quite unnecessary.

If a question is so important and cannot be resolved before the Co-Chairmen, then we think it is important enough to call the Conference itself. There are no half measures then. Either the Co-Chairmen will resolve such a question. If the Russians and British agree, I think the Laotians will agree. Therefore if the two Co-Chairmen agree on a question, I think the members of the Commission will be very happy and so will the Laotian country itself. The practice has been, when there is no agreement within the Commission then there is no agreement in the Laotian government, it is referred to the Co-Chairmen. It can go to the Co-Chairmen, wait for some time, and after a certain amount of delay the British and the Russians will agree on the thing somehow. The same thing will happen in the future. The French proposal is an entirely impractical proposition which, I have no hesitation in saying, the Government of India will accept under no circumstances.

Now, it was my intention, Mr. Chairman, to refer to some of the Articles of the 1954 Agreement and those of present proposals. We have already spoken too long. You will, however, appreciate that we have spoken only once before at this Conference. Ofcourse, if I raised a point of order, I could perhaps speak for two hours!

What may be the reason for a great many points on which there is no agreement in the Conference getting wide publicity. It is our contention that these reports from the Commission, which embody very considerable material that should be made available and in a bigger way, and therefore, in spite of tiring you with taking the time of the Conference, we intend to refer to some of the passages. We have already referred to the fact that the reports say that there is agreement in Laos, that three parties are equal and therefore there was no need for a Chairman-that is precedence for any one. I would like to know if Lord Home were here whether, in the light of this statement, how he could ask any member of the delegation to bring up the matter of Laotian representation again. The three parties have accepted they are equal and for the time being there need be no Chairman of their Conference.

They go on to say that, as a result of this, they hope there will be one delegation at Geneva. I cannot lay my hand on it at the present

time, but it is in the report where the three parties say that, as a result of this, it may be possible to have a united representation at Geneva.

Yesterday the delegation representing Prince Souvanna Phouma declared that since the principles of neutrality had to be accepted by all parties to these negotiations, all parties should agree upon a joint delegation of all parties. That is the idea, that there is an agreement between three parties about equality.

I want to go back to the question of the cease-fire. Mr. Chairman, in spite of the fear of boring the Conference about this I have to refer to this matter again in another way. On the 20th of May, the Commission informed us, the Commission received the clear impression that the parties had agreed in principle to consider the formation of a coalition government first, and then it goes on to say that in relation to the Padong incident that while the parties have agreed to the cease-fire they have as usual retained the right to the use of force when provoked or in self-defence. They also say that in the domain of military activity it is almost impossible to define what constitutes provocation.

However, it is clear that aerial transport passing over territory in effective control of a hostile group is always treated as provocative. Some of these flights may be innocent but others may not. There is, however, no way for a belligerent to know what the purpose or intent of a particular flight by the opposite party is. In these circumstances, all flights over territory controlled by the other party are treated as hostile or provocative by the party concerned.

The Vientiane group maintain that forces belonging to Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphannouvong have been violating the cease-fire in a deliberate and systematic way. On the other hand, the two Princes assert that incidents have always been provoked by planes flying over territory under their control in order to drop supplies and by other hostile activities by Vientiane authorities.

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The point of my reading all this is that even though an incident may be reported in a big way by the newspapers, in all the great countries, we cannot but take these factors into account. Then I return to page 4 (Laos/Doc/6) and the Commission go on to say. "Even if the Commission were in a position to investigate this type of complaint, results will not be conclusive in the context of the actual military situation in Laos. When forces are mixed together, particularly in the jungle, or are facing each other in close proximity, it is nearly impossible to say who shot first or who gave the first provocation. In the circumstances, the Commission believe that parties should take immediately such steps to avoid further troubles.".

"(a) Renewed orders should be issued to all troops not only to maintain the cease-fire but to desist from any provocation. Each party should ensure that these orders reached all troops with the least possible delay. At the same time the parties should formally assure the Commission that this has been done.

"(b) The Commission agree that garrisons of groups of soldiers, who find themselves in out-of-the-way places or are cut off in areas generally controlled by militarily hostile party or parties, should have some possibility of obtaining food and other necessities for their continued existence. This can only be achieved in present circumstances if the parties concerned would agree to such supplies being made under the control and supervision of the Commission to be exercised with cooperation of the opposing side or sides.

"(c) Such aerial flights which are not strictly controlled by the Commission for the reasons stated in (b) above should be discontinued when these flights are likely to go over any territory controlled by hostile groups.

"(d) As a result, the Commission feels that the parties could usefully discuss many of these incidents among themselves at their frequent meeting at Ban Namone. This could remove the misunderstanding on many complaints and counter-complaints.

"There seems to be a desire on both sides to consolidate or probe and gain new ground. According to information the Commission have received, some of the incidents have taken place because certain parts from which forces had withdrawn were re-occupied in the lull following the cease-fire.

"The loyalty of many troops wavers from time to time and this is often construed by the loser as a hostile act on the part of the gainer.

"The desire of the parties to seek local civilian support; for this they often depend on the local civilians or irregulars who do not come under strict control or orders of any regular command. (This is like the Congo for example).

"All civilian disturbances, burning of villages by bandits or robbers, are often treated as part of some military pattern. (That is to say any trouble that arises in Laos is put by one party as responsible to the other).

"Arming by the contending parties of tribes, with traditional hostilities among themselves and without firm loyalties to any government authorities.

"The Commission have examined these problems and consider that the present situation cannot be put right unless, in parallel with political negotiations, the sides agree to establish a machinery to deal with questions connected with proper maintenance of the cease-

fire. Such an agreed procedure would enable the Commission to exercise their supervision and control".

This is what is being done and reported to you in the ICC Report. Now it has been thought that, after the cease-fire there have been these incidents, and also there has been no agreement in regard to visiting on the spot. Therefore, we would like the Conference, if they have not received this Report, to await it--the latest Report which is dated the 9th of June.

"On the 6th of June, a complaint was received from Xieng Khouang authorities of various provocations, particularly of air-drops of men and supplies.

"In the military sub-committee an agreement was reached in principle for cooperating with the Commission with a view to enabling it to go and see different places where opposing forces are in contact and eventually to establish teams. The Sub-Committee's recommendations for selecting a few places to visit by the Commission were approved unanimously by the Conference".

So one gets unanimous agreement in Laos. Then it goes on: On the evening of the 7th, complaints were received from the Vientiane authorities--that is the King's party--and on the 8th of June, the Commission met and considered the situation and then the three parties said to the Canadian Commissioner, Mr. Meyrand, that "we

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would like you to be there but we do not want you to take part in the Ban Namone talks on this matter". "It would be easier for us", said the parties, "to get an agreement amongst ourselves". The Canadian delegate agreed that if it was the belief that the meetings should be restricted entirely to the parties in order to achieve results, he would certainly comply.

The Report continues: "The Commission has been deeply perturbed and concerned about recent fighting at Ban Padong and is anxious that similar situations should not arise at any other place where opposing forces in substantial numbers are in close proximity. In order to avoid such situations, as also to make the cease-fire more effective, the Commission will be grateful if at tomorrow's (June 9) meeting at Ban Namone some special arrangements, as indicated below, are made".

Then it was agreed there should be on-the-spot inspection, in one place denominated by Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphannouvong and another on spot denominated by Prince Boun Oum. This is important, Mr. Chairman, these visits were to be made on the 12th of June. These visits are necessary in the maintaining of an effective cease-fire.

The Report adds: "However on the evening of June 8 Commission was informed that meetings at Ban Namone planned for June 9 had been

postponed until Monday, June 12. Authorities at Vientiane explained through a press communique that postponement of the meeting at Ban Namone became necessary because they wished to consult Prince Boun Oum".

It is seen that it is not one party alone who is responsible, when these are taken into account. It may be one or the other.

I would like to say that there are two formal propositions, one by the Soviet Union and the other one by the Government of France. We have, in different ways, indicated our approach to these matters, but I would like to say once again that the Government of India does not consider that only these memoranda put in in a formal way are before the Conference. We have made our proposals in a less formalised fashion because we do not want to add to the number of documents in regard to the matter, so when they are being studied, our delegation will seek to put these forward because we think that they meet the contention of both sides. We think basically there is a great deal of agreement on even the point on unanimity and we think conciliation is possible. We think most of the things are reconcilable.

With these words, we say again in considering this problem, we at this Conference should think of that unhappy country that for twenty years has been ravaged by war. No place in the world seeks and requires peace and settlement more than Laos. We are afraid, at the present time, we cannot adequately deal with the economic issues raised by Mr. Dean Rusk and by Lord Home, on the first day of the Conference. We will do so on another occasion.

With these observations, I submit what are more or less our proposals for this Conference at this stage. We think that, in spite of all the differences that appear, the fact that the Princes are meeting, the fact that there is progress in Laos itself, the fact that there is basic agreement on neutrality and in the prohibition of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Laos--all these lead to hopeful prospects of a settlement. Smaller issues of prestige or misunderstanding should not stand in the way, and if our delegation can assist in any way, we are at your disposal.

LAOS SWITZERLAND INDIA USA JAPAN CHINA CAMBODIA FRANCE CANADA POLAND CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC OMAN MALI KOREA LEBANON VIETNAM RUSSIA EGYPT THAILAND BURMA CONGO

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Shri C.S. Jha's Statement in the Security Council on Angola

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Shri C.S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made a statement in the Security Council on May 07, 1961 on the situation in Angola.

Following is the text of his statement:

Mr. President,

Permit me first of all to thank you and Members of the Security Council for your courtesy in inviting my delegation to participate in the discussions of the Council on this important occasion. The fact that my delegation has co-sponsored, along with 42 other countries, the request for consideration by the Council of the situation in Angola as a matter of urgency, and has asked for participation, is a measure of our deep--almost oppressive--sense of responsibility and of awareness of the tremendous gravity of

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what has been happening in Angola; for in our view, these tragic happenings have overwhelming significance not only for the millions of dependent peoples in the world still struggling to be free, but for all peoples who realise the value of freedom as an indispensable factor for world peace, and who have been profoundly moved by the brutality with which Portuguese colonial power is trying to suppress the freedom movement of the African people in Angola.

It will be recalled that some three months ago the question of Angola was raised in the Security Council by the delegation of Liberia. The Security Council discussed the question but, unfortunately, by the narrowest of margins failed to adopt a resolution. The draft resolution on that occasion was a moderate one, since it merely asked for the appointment of a sub-committee under Article 29 of the Charter and urged the Portuguese authorities to introduce reforms and measures in Angola which would ensure the participation of the people of Angola in their country's affairs and would constitute an initiative towards the transfer of power to the people of Angola in accordance with the General Assembly's Resolution No. 1514 (XV) on the ending of colonialism which had been unanimously adopted by the General Assembly last year. Subsequently, the matter came before the General Assembly at its resumed session, as indeed it was bound to, since historic freedom movements and world reactions thereto, admit of no abatement or obstruction. The General Assembly in its wisdom adopted an excellent resolution by an overwhelming majority of votes at the resumed session of the XVth General Assembly. It will be recalled that this resolution, which in substance was the same which the Security Council had failed to adopt, had but two dissentients. Portugal refused to participate in the General Assembly debate.

Portuguese non-participation was indeed characteristic of its whole attitude towards its responsibilities as a colonial power under the United Nations Charter. For years now, Portugal has refused to transmit any information under Article 73 (e) of the Charter in respect of its colonies which have been euphemistically called Overseas Territories of Portugal. Unlike other members of the United Nations with Non-Self-Governing Territories under their charge, and in spite of General Assembly's resolution 1542 (XV) it has proved impervious to persuasion, plea or criticism. In that resolution after full consideration, including examination by a special committee of six which recommended the principles for determination as to whether an obligation existed or not for transmission of information in respect of a Non-Self-Governing Territory, the Assembly decided that the so-called Portuguese Overseas Provinces were to all intents and purposes Non-Self-Governing Territories or colonies. In respect of them, there was an obligation to transmit, information, and the whole basis of the United Nations Charter under Chapter XI, which clearly says that such territories are a sacred trust, was equally applicable. Portugal however still adamantly refuses to transmit information and has also refused participation in the Committee on information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

It was clear from the statement made by the Portuguese Representative before the Council last March, as indeed from Portugal's boycott of the General Assembly's subsequent consideration of this matter, that Portugal had no intention of budging from its position. One has only to recall the statement of the Representative of Portugal in the Security Council on March 14: "The Portuguese have been in Africa for five centuries and they intend to say whatever the cost." It has been clear as broad day-light that Portugal was determined to suppress the freedom movement in Angola at all costs. Indeed, the worst fears entertained in this connection have materialised; and since the adoption of the General Assembly's resolution. there has been a veritable holocaust in Angola. Despite severe censorship and expulsion of many foreign journalists and representatives of news agencies, information that has filtered through from Angola shows that the Portuguese authorities, and the European population of Angola with the knowledge and connivance of the authorities, have, contrary to the most elementary concepts of the Rule of Law, been engaged in the massacre of thousands of Africans whose only fault has been to demand freedom and to try to shake off the dead weight of colonial rule. These atrocities have caused a wave of indignation throughout the world, Leaders of Governments and public opinion, notably in Africa and Asia, have joined in condemnation of such outrages. The whole continent of Africa has been stirred and African people everywhere are deeply agitated and angered by the massacre of fellow Africans in Angola.

What are the elements of the situation which have impelled nearly half the membership of the United Nations to seek action by the Security Council so soon after the resolution of the General Assembly and what are the factors that not only attract the attention of the

Security Council but make suitable action by the Council imperative?

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As I have indicated earlier, the Portuguese attitude has been one of complete non-co-operation with the United Nations. There has been no sign on the side of Portugal of even the slightest move or intention to act in accordance with the General Assembly resolution of 21st April, such as introducing reforms, adopting the elective system with broad franchise etc. On the contrary during the last seven or eight weeks, news has reached the outside world, despite severe Portuguese censorship, of large-scale killings and massacres. Towards the end of May British journals estimated the number of Africans killed in recent weeks in Portuguese operations against the people of Angola at 20,000 to 30,000. According to the New Statesman and Nation "some 35,000 virtually defenceless Africans have already been butchered by machine-guns and napalm." A writer in the independent Conservative weekly Spectator quoted the figure of 20,000 as the most apparently trustworthy and by no means the largest of the figures that have slipped through the terror-struck censorship. The Economist, a weekly of high standing, says that the killing of Africans had been "indiscriminate" and puts the figure at "thousands or tens of thousands." A correspondent of the British Daily Mirror, who visited Angola recently, has stated in an article in that paper under the heading "Agony in Angola": "During past few weeks thousands of Africans have died in savage revolt and brutal repression in the Portuguese colony. The Portuguese claim to have slaughtered already 30,000 African men, women and children alike." The Correspondent goes on to say that "the African wind of change has blazed into a tearing hurricane of death and destruction."

The Daily Herald, another British paper, on May 16, said in an article captioned "After the Rain--Terror"! "Violence and terror on a scale never before known in Africa are expected any moment in the Portuguese colony of Angola, now that the rainy season has ended. For 25,000 Portuguese troops and airmen; with modern arms, will then be ready to start a death or submission campaign against the poorly-armed African rebels in the northern part of the country--estimated at a quarter million. And the death-roll of the past eight weeks--900 Europeans murdered, and possibly 20,000 Africans shot or burned to death by napalm bombs--will seem small in comparison when this promised campaign starts."

Be it noted that these estimates are by journals of a country which is commonly referred to as Portugal's oldest ally and the journals themselves are of such standing that they cannot be accused of prejudice against Portugal. According to a despatch in the New York Times, official figures released in Lisbon upto May 25 indicated that 8,000 Africans had been killed in addition to a thousand Portuguese whites and so-called "loyal Africans." In view of the accounts that have appeared in the press, it is almost certain that the official figure of Africans killed is grossly under-estimated and for obvious reasons the figure of a thousand Portuguese whites and other Africans

may be exaggerated.

I do not propose to tire the Council by reading out gruesome details from other newspapers and reports, many of which have already been cited by the Representatives of Liberia, UAR, USSR and Ceylon. Indeed, it is clear from what little information has reached the outside world regarding the situation in Angola, that a vast massacre of Angolans is taking place in Angola. As Prime Minister Nehru said recently "It is slaughter--just slaughter--and there is no mitigating factor". This is a result of the combined action of the Portuguese authorities and of the Portuguese population in Angola, and anyone who has lived in colonial conditions knows that the two are indistinguishable. Little wonder that nearly 80,000 refugees have fled Angola to seek asylum in the Republic of the Congo. It is an open secret that Portugal has sent and is continuing to send large-scale armed reinforcements into Angola. There are now said to be at least 25,000 modern and well-armed Portuguese troops in Angola and Portuguese armed units, have bombed and strafed and killed the African population indiscriminately and burnt villages and towns. The White Portuguese population numbering 200,000 has been allowed or connived at by the Portuguese authorities to take the law into its own hands. As has been pointed out by Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor of the Foreign Affairs magazine, who has just returned from Western Africa. in an article in the New York Times Weekly Magazine of May 25: "Army planes are strafing African villages, and civilians have been armed not only for defence but for revenge. Together they have disposed of at least five Africans for every Portuguese victim."

Much is made of the fact that some elements among the Angolan people have killed a fairly large number of Portuguese in various parts of Angola. While one cannot condone killings of civilians, whoever they may be, one has to understand the plight of the Angolan people. Muzzled, cruelly exploited, subjected to the most ruthless system of forced labour, denied any voice in the government of their own country and made to feel as strangers in their own homeland, provoked by mass killings of fellow Angolans, is it any

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wonder that many among them feel that they have no choice left but to take recourse to arms and to retaliate? Indeed, the fact that the Angolan people, a peace-loving African people, are in their present plight after hundreds of years of Portuguese rule and have been driven to take resort to arms for the vindication of their rights, is the greatest condemnation of Portuguese rule in Angola and proof of the severity of the Portuguese colonial system. The mass killings of Angolans in fact has no parallel in the recent history of colonialism. Portugal has unleashed a colonial war for the suppression and extermination of the indigenous people of Angola.

These then are the facts of the situation; facts which stare the United Nations in the face and cannot be ignored by the international community. One cannot forget that these outrages, these massacres

which virtually amount to genocide, are being perpetrated by a colonial power which by subscribing to the Charter of the United Nations and by virtue of the General Assembly's resolution 1514(XV) has responsibility towards the people of Angola as a sacred trust.

Much has been said by the Portuguese Representative at the Security Council to deny the competence of the United Nations and of the Security Council to discuss the situation in Angola. It is contended that the Angolan situation in Angola. It is contended that the Angolan situation is entirely a domestic issue and therefore its consideration is barred under Article 2(7) of the Charter. Inferentially, it is said that what the Portuguese authorities do in Angola, whether they commit mass killings or not, is no concern of anyone else, not even the United Nations. We are constrained to observe that these views reflect an outmoded and an almost mediaeval mentality. Such pleas are based on complete unawareness of the changes that have taken place in the concept of human rights and of the very fundamental thinking behind the formulation of the United Nations Charter. Apart from the scientific and technological progress registered in the last two or three centuries particularly during the last two or three decades, there has been a tremendous revolution in human thought, in international thinking and in the norms of international behaviour as between peoples and peoples, even though one may sadly admit that the stature of man has not grown nearly as fast as the pace of scientific achievement. The Charter of the United Nations itself crystallizes these changes. One would do well to recall some of the noblest ideas which inspired the drafting of the Charter. In the memorable words of Field Marshal Smuts in San Francisco:

"The New Charter should not be a mere legalistic document for the prevention of war. It would suggest that the Charter should contain at its very outset and in its preamble, a declaration of human rights and of the common faith which has sustained the Allied peoples in their bitter and prolonged struggle for the vindication of these rights and that faith.

"Let us, in this new Charter of humanity, give expression to this faith in us, and thus proclaim to the world and to posterity that this was not a mere brute struggle of force between the nations but that for us behind the mortal struggle was the moral struggle, was the vision of the ideal, the faith in justice and the resolve to vindicate the fundamental rights of man, and on that basis to found a better, freer world for the future".

"The peace we are striving for, and are taking such pains to safeguard, is a peace of justice and honour and fair-dealing as between man and man, as between nation and nation. No other peace would be worth the sacrifice we have made and are prepared to make again and the heavy responsibilities we are prepared to take under this Charter".

One of the most momentous results of the agony and travail of the two

world wars has been the quickening of the sense of human values and a realisation of the importance of human right and fundamental freedoms for the maintenance of world peace. Today, thanks to the mass media of information and world wide communications, there has developed what has been aptly described in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the "Conscience of mankind." There is no doubt that the events that are happening in Angola, the brutality with which the aspirations of the people of Angola are being crushed, have shocked the conscience of mankind and anything which does that necessarily becomes a source of international friction and conflict. Today freedom movements gather round them vast waves of sympathy. African nationalism does not merely inspire great numbers of Africans. Africans are not alone in their struggle to be masters of their own destiny. In their resolve to expurgate colonialism from the soil of Africa, many hundreds of

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millions on the vast continent of Asia are solidly and four-square behind them, and they have also the support, if I may say so, of large elements of public opinion in North America, Latin America and in Europe. Already some African countries have made no secret of their resolve to render assistance to the freedom fighters of Angola by all possible means including, if necessary, the supply of arms and to take unilateral action against Portugal. Therefore, the whole situation is one of extreme explosiveness and an actual and potential source of international friction and threat to international peace and security.

Time and again Portugese representatives have stated before the United Nations that Angola and other Portuguese colonial territories are "overseas provinces" of Portugal. The fact that on every occasion such a plea has been rejected is enough proof of the hollowness of such a claim. Yet Portugal seems to cling pathetically to this exploded myth. As a matter of fact, after examination by a Special Committee of Six, which laid down the new famous 12 Principles for determination as to whether or not obligation to transmit information in respect of a non-self-governing territory exists under Article 73 of the Charter, the General Assembly decided in its resolution 1542 (XV) of December 15, 1960, that the so-called Portuguese "overseas provinces" in Africa and Asia, were non-self-governing territories with the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. In the 12 Principles, which were adopted by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Special Committee of Six, in its Resolution 1541 (XV), it was laid down that--

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Principle VIII

"Integration with an independent State should be on the basis of complete equality between the peoples of the erstwhile Non-Self-Governing Territory and those of the independent country with which it is integrated. The peoples of both territories should have equal status and rights of citizenship and equal guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms without any distinction or discrimination; both should have equal rights and opportunities for representation and effective participation at all levels in the executive, legislative and judicial organs of government".

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Principle IX

Integration should have come about in the following circumstances:

- (a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so that its peoples would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes.
- (b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations could, when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes".

It is obvious that in the case of Angola not one of the conditions listed in Principles VIII and IX is fulfilled. Except the assimilades

who are but a small fraction of Angolan peoples the latter do not enjoy the elementary civic rights and have no voice in the government of their country. Portugal's unilateral declaration that Angola and its other colonial territories in Africa and Asia are part of Portugal cannot be regarded as anything but capricious and legal fiction. The sacred trust undertaken by a colonial power towards the inhabitants of a non-self-governing territory under chapter XI of the Charter necessarily creates the obligation of accountability to the United Nations. During the past two decades, there has been the development of a strong world attitude towards colonialism. Peoples and countries which have during the post-war period shaken off the colonial yoke have been increasingly vocal and articulate in matters concerning freedom of dependent peoples and have in no uncertain measure influenced international thinking and attitude towards the colonial system. A milestone in this development was the Declaration of the Bandung Conference: "That the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and was an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation." This was the voice of Asia and Africa, the

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unanimous expression of opinion on behalf of half the world's population. The Bandung Declaration came about in 1955 and stimulated and influenced the course of international relations; and five years later the General Assembly in its new famous resolution on the ending of colonialism--Resolution No. 1514 (XV) confirmed the same by an overwhelming vote. Thus colonialism which involves alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, is no longer an issue which can be confined within the strait jacket of old concepts of sovereignty. Progressive thinking in the world today holds that sovereignty in the colonial territories rests with the people and not with the metropolitan power. Colonialism is thus a world issue--one of the two or three greatest issues of our times, and a colonial war aimed at the perpetuation of colonialism such as Portuguese action in Angola, is necessarily a matter of international concern and a potential cause of international friction and threat to international peace and security. In the words of Prime Minister Nehru, "What is happening in Angola goes very much beyond the normal pale of human tolerance and political tolerance", and in conjunction with the other elements of the situation, the situation in Angola is one in which it is the duty of the Security Council to act.

Thus, Mr. President, the situation in Angola has the following serious elements:

- (1) The massacre of thousands of indigenous people, whose only fault is that they desire freedom, is a gross violation of Human Rights.
- (2) The perpetration of such violence in a non-self-governing territory by the Portuguese armed forces and others amounts to a colonial war for the suppression of the people of Angola, which is

contrary to the ethics of the United Nations, as clearly expressed in the Charter and re-affirmed in detail in the Anti-Colonial Resolution, operative paragraph 4 of which reads--

"All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected."

(3) The great wave of sympathy for the Angolan people and indignation at the indiscriminate killings of the African people throughout the Continent of Africa and Asia and the determination of peoples and governments of African countries to prevent such killings.

(4) The moral challenge posed to the United Nations by the outrage against the conscience of mankind being perpetrated in Angola.

(5) The denial of elementary civic rights to the African people of Angola including rights and opportunities for their effective participation in the Government of Angola;

(6) The inevitability of the people of Angola who like other African people still under subjection are yearning for freedom, taking recourse to violence in the absence of any other means for the redress of their grievances.

These are the circumstances which make the Angolan situation a highly explosive one likely to cause international friction and threat to international peace and security. It is imperative, in our opinion, for the Security Council to act in this matter. Action by the Security Council may make all the difference. It may put a brake on the ruthlessness of the Portuguese authorities in Angola and might induce Portugal to initiate immediately those processes which are contemplated in the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) which would lead the people of Angola to freedom and political independence. Only the initiation of such processes can afford any hope for peace in Angola and my delegation hopes that the friends and allies of Portugal will persuade it to budge from her hitherto negative and intransigent attitude. If the Security Council is for some reason unable to take action, we fear that the consequences in Angola and indeed for a large part of Africa may be very serious indeed. In this connection, we must point out that Portuguese colonial rule seeks to derive sustenance from its allies and its military alliances and partnership with some big powers. Under cover of its membership of the NATO, Portugal has been able to put up a front in the United Nations, where it has often been supported by her great allies. This is not the occasion, nor is it my intention to speak on the military alliances which honeycomb the world today, but we feel that those concerned ought to realize that alliances such as the NATO which has been invoked in the past for the defence of Portuguese Colonialism, become vitiated in the minds of millions of people in Africa and Asia. Fortunately, in very recent months, there has been a welcome realisation by some big powers of the danger of identification of the

NATO alliance with the Portuguese colonial system, and my government has whole-heartedly welcomed the change in the policy of the United States indicated by their support of the resolution

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on Angola in the Security Council in March and later in the General Assembly. We hope that the other powers concerned will see the situation in Angola in its true perspective. It is, of course, the sovereign right of any country to be an ally of another, but to let alliances, political or military, come in the way of a correct appreciation of the tremendous issues posed by the existence of colonialism would in our view not be conducive to true international co-operation and harmony. The world has to recognize that this century will live in the history of mankind as the one that sounded the death knell of colonialism and saw colonialism's end; and the quicker and smoother the exit of colonialism, the better it would be for all concerned and for world peace.

The draft resolution that is before the Security Council seems to us a good one and has the full support of my delegation. We believe that the Security Council in all the circumstances of the case would have been justified in adopting a much stronger resolution. We are conscious of the fact that a Sub-Committee has been appointed by the General Assembly in pursuance of resolution 1603 (XV). We think it very wise for the Security Council to adopt the Sub-Committee for their own purposes; that is to say, the same Sub-Committee may be asked to undertake an investigation and report to the Security Council as well as to the General Assembly. We feel that the gravity of the situation demands an urgent and expeditious report by the Sub-Committee. We trust that every facility will be given by the Portuguese authorities to the Sub-Committee to proceed to Angola. In our view, the investigation should be thoroughly done so that the Security Council may be able to come to definite conclusions when the report of the Sub-Committee is received. Meanwhile, the Security Council will be failing in its duty if it did not ask the Portuguese authorities to desist from the colonial war and from continuing their repressive measures, for we feel certain that if the repression in Angola does not stop, there will be an inevitable process of chain reaction and not only Angola but other areas may be involved in bloody conflict. The adoption of the resolution is, in fact, the least that the Security Council can do in order to meet the challenge of Angola.

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Shri C.S. Jha's Statement in Trusteeship Council on Trust Territory of Pacific Islands

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Shri C.S. Jha, Permanent Representative of India in the United Nations, made the following statement in the Trusteeship Council on June 21, 1961 on the conditions in the Trust territory of the Pacific Islands:

I should like, first of all, to extend to the newest Special Representative of the United States, Mr. Goding, the new High Commissioner for the Trust Territory, our warm welcome to the Trusteeship Council for the first time. Mr. Goding has had considerable experience in administration and in positions of high responsibility. We are confident that the Trust Territory will benefit from his experience. His opening statement and subsequent replies to the numerous questions put to him give evidence of a dynamic new approach to the problems of the Trust Territory which is very much needed.

Mr. Nucker, the former High Commissioner, is an old friend of this Council, and my delegation has had frequent opportunities for frank and free exchange of views with him in the past. We are indeed sorry to think that this is Mr. Nicker's last appearance before the Council. We wish him well in his future work, wherever that may lie.

The delegation of the United States has once again demonstrated its willingness to meet the wishes of the Council by bringing here as a member of its delegation a distinguished Micronesian, Mr. Nakayama, who is President of the Truk District Congress. We have taken note of what Mr. Nakayama had to say to the Council, and we trust that on his return to the Pacific Islands he will not fail to convey to his compatriots the deep and continuing interest of the United Nations in their welfare, prosperity and progress.

In addition to the annual report of the Administering Authority for the year 1960, the Council in its examination of conditions in the Trust Territory during this session has had the benefit of a very able and painstaking report by the Visiting Mission, and I wish to pay a tribute here to the Chairman, Ambassador Salamanca, and the other members of the Mission, one of whom, I am glad to say, was a colleague of mine.

The report is a comprehensive document and though critical in some parts, is constructively so. The members of the Council, including the delegation of the Administering Authority, have indicated their broad general agreement with the observations and recommendations of the Mission. My delegation welcomes this very comprehensive and constructive report and will be glad to join others in commending it

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Administering Authority's most careful consideration.

Of direct relevance to this Trust Territory, and indeed to the other remaining Trust Territory, and dependent Territories, is operative paragraph 5 of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples contained in resolution 1514 of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, which calls for the adoption of immediate steps for the transfer of powers to the peoples. There is no doubt that during the last decade or more this Territory had been steadily advancing toward the goal of self-government and independence, but it is our belief that with the groundwork that has been laid the pace of political evolution can and must be accelerated.

To come from the general to the specific, there is no reason, we feel, why fifteen or twenty instead of ten municipalities should not be chartered annually with a view to completing the extension of municipal local government to the entire Territory within the next two or three years. The municipal councils that exist with or without charters are working well and, with perhaps an exception here and there, peoples' response to this programme has been good. In all of the seven districts of the Territory, except in Saipan, district congresses have been established and have been functioning in a satisfactory manner for quite some time. The Saipan Municipal Council should be suitably transformed into a district congress and the Yap Island Congress should be extended so as to cover the entire district before long. While the powers and the scope of the functioning of these congresses are wide in theory, their financial capacity should be increased with territorial subventions so as to make them really effective instruments of district government. The control and expenditure of central funds allocated of the districts for public works, and other local needs should now be vested in these congresses rather than the district administrators as hitherto.

The Inter-District Advisory Committee has been in existence now for five years. It has worked well within its limitations. We are not clear, however, why the transformation of this organ into a territorial legislature should have to wait until 1965.

With regard to these and other aspects of the Territory's political advancement, it should now be possible to revise and modify the targets set earlier. On the basis of the observations of the Visiting Mission, we feel that such a transformation should be completed by the end of, say, 1962.

The Visiting Mission observed an underlying sense of unity in the far-flung parts of the Territory. There is no doubt that the institution of a territorial legislature will promote that latent sense of unity. This measure, therefore, seems imperative and need

not wait for the formulation of a vocal demand on the part of the people of all the districts.

In the past the orientation of the Administration's thinking seems to have been largely in terms of entities called districts, and a somewhat similar approach was evidenced by Mr. Nakayama. The emphasis of approach should, in our view, now shift from the district to the larger entity of the Territory as a whole. There is no evidence to cause us to think that the transformation of the Advisory Committee into a territorial legislature will be any more of an imposition on the people than was the setting up of the Inter-District Advisory Committee. After all, there is the superstructure of the territorial government which is located at present in Guam. It should be possible to have a legislative unit of the territorial government composed of the elected representatives of the people themselves.

The report of the Visiting Mission states that it did not find any evidence which showed that the transfer of senior administrative posts, which are those of district administrator and assistant district administrator, to Micronesians is contemplated in the near future. The Mission observed that special and urgent attention was necessary in regard to this matter. The Mission goes on to express its confidence that educated Micronesians are available who could be entrusted with at least some of these positions of high administrative responsibility after suitable training.

In the course of questions and answers the Special Representative stated that two Micronesians have been under training for the last six months and that one of them will be appointed as assistant district administrator by 1964. Obviously this programme needs to be intensified and accelerated. Urgent attention, as the Mission recommends, should be given to this matter with a view to transferring these posts to Micronesians in all districts within the next two or three years.

The attitude of the Administering Authority with respect to the secession moves in Saipan, aiming at that district's merger with the neighbouring Non-Self-Governing Territory of Guam, needs to be clearly defined. It is a matter of some concern to us that this question of the future of one district of the Territory, not of the Territory as a whole, should have been brought up

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in this rather premature way.

The view adopted by the Visiting Mission in respect of this entire matter meet with our approval. In particular, we endorse the Mission's feeling that

"it is important for the Administration to do all it can to take the heat out of this move for becoming part of the United States as a separate territory or as part of Guam by reminding the people in

strong terms that the future of Saipan cannot be regarded apart from the rest of the Trust Territory and by encouraging them to look to the rest of the Territory." (T/1560, pages 30-31)

We support the Visiting Mission's recommendation that the problems concerning their future should be clearly explained to the people of Saipan and to the people of the rest of the Territory. It is also necessary that explanations offered by the Administration's officials, irrespective of whether they are civilian officials or naval officials, in Saipan or elsewhere, should be so framed as to cause no doubts with regard to the separate identity and the oneness and integrity of the Territory as a whole. Responsibility in this as indeed in other matters vis-a-vis the United Nations, is not that of local administrators but of the Administering Authority itself, which is accountable to the United Nations.

My delegation has expressed the view in the past that a Trusteeship Agreement cannot be broken up so as to destroy the integrity of the Territory covered by the agreement itself. We would have wished that, when the preparations for a so-called plebiscite in Saipan concerning its future were underway, the Administering Authority and its officials in the district had apprised the people of the basic concepts of the United Nations with respect to international trusteeship and the modalities of the termination of trusteeship. At any rate, what is now needed is an expeditious implementation of all the measures recommended by the Visiting Mission for the administrative reintegration of Saipan with the rest of the Territory.

In this context, we welcome the information that from now on two Saipanese will participate in the work of the Inter-District Advisory Committee as full members. It is immediately necessary to bring this district under the civilian administrative authority of the High Commissioner, as is the case with all other districts.

The Council should also recommend that an increasing number of students from Saipan, financed through the civilian or naval administration, should be sent to the only territorial educational institution, the Pacific Islands Central School at Ponape, rather than to Guam.

It is clear from what is stated in the Visiting Mission's report, by way of opinions expressed to it by the people of the Territory, that the desirability of transferring the headquarters of the Territory's administration to somewhere within the Trust Territory is well established. It is not clear to us why the continuation of the headquarters in Guam is regarded to be in the interests of the Trust Territory. Guam is far away from two of the more populous and productive districts of the Territory, namely the Marshalls and Ponape. It is nearly as far away from Palau as is Truk, which otherwise has a central location, and there is a great deal more that commends it to serve as the site for the Territory's headquarters. A large number of islands and atolls of the Yap district are as close

or closer to Truk than they are to Guam. The district of Saipan and the small island of Rota are perhaps the only ones which might be deriving some benefit from Guam's contiguous location.

It may well be that air and sea routes converge in Guam, but that fact itself does not work to the economic or other advantages of the Trust Territory. If the headquarters' site were to be shifted to Truk, let us say on a provisional basis, no particular disadvantage will befall the Territory if the channels of commerce and traffic continue to flow to and from Guam as hitherto. On the other hand, the Kwajalein atoll in the Marshalls is connected with the west coast of the United States by regular air and shipping lines, and Truk can be logistically supported from there, at least partly. The Trust Territory's communications headquarters are already located in Truk, and the Special Representative has informed the Council that the construction of a deep-water harbour there has already passed the halfway mark. The transfer of the headquarters to the centrally located island will provide improved and more extensive work facilities for the inhabitants of the Trust Territory, which are now available only to the people of Guam or to the Saipanese.

These are ideas which my delegation puts forward for the consideration of the Administering Authority. Naturally, the decision as to whether the capital should be in Truk or elsewhere is one for them to consider by taking all the circumstances into consideration. But we feel that the establishment of the territorial headquarters in one

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of the islands of the Trust Territory itself will, above all, give, as nothing else, a sense of territorial and administrative unity to the scattered Trust Territory which is most desirable to foster and stimulate.

There may be differences of opinion among the inhabitants of the various islands as to the location of the administrative headquarters, but this matter could and should be settled by the Territorial Council or the Inter-District Advisory Committee. The Administering Authority could do much to foster and help in the attainment of an agreed solution. Of course, as I have said earlier, in the final resort it is for the Administering Authority to take a binding decision in this matter.

From chapter VII of the Visiting Mission's report, we note with concern that the people of Rongelap have not recovered from the shock they suffered at the time of the fall-out occurrence, and they are seized by fear and anxiety. The Visiting Mission has also reported continuing complaints of fatigue, listlessness, body aches and stomach disorders suffered by the victims of the fall-out. It is stated that these complaints were verified by the Administering Authority's health aide at a public meeting. It is therefore somewhat difficult to accept the assertions that no aftermaths of the fall-out

are discernible and that the general health of the Rongelapese is satisfactory. Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission specialists themselves indicate that the illnesses reported in Rongelap are indeed among those which may be expected in victims of nuclear fallout; these are, among others, fatigue, listlessness, aches, stomach disorders, skin rashes, frequency of miscarriage, stunted growth and premature aging. The 1960 report suggests, in fact, that the occurrence of leukemia and other diseases may be expected for the next few years, and there may also be adverse effects on the progeny of these originally affected.

Nothing can be done about these mishaps, however, except that the victims should continue to receive proper care and attention from the Administering Authority. Moreover, these people certainly have well-founded claims to suitable compensation for the calamitous experience to which they were subjected. It would not be unjust if a further grievance were to arise from the denial to these people of the means to seek satisfaction of their claims through processes of law. It would be quite proper, in our view, for the Administering Authority to settle these claims administratively. The Mission has pointed out that:

"Regardless of the difficulties of jurisdiction, which have so far prevented the inhabitants from being compensated, it is always open to the Administering Authority to give satisfaction to them in this regard by means of administrative action". (T/1560, paragraph 205)

We hope, with the Visiting Mission, that the Administering Authority will urgently find the most fair and equitable means of solving this problem.

We note the statement of the Administering Authority that it has no plans to resume tests in the Territory. This statement, so far as it goes, is satisfactory. However, we hope that the Administering Authority will find it possible to announce that it has no intention now or in the future of undertaking any further tests of this kind. The position of my delegation on the question of nuclear testing is well known. Whatever may be the legal nuances and interpretations regarding the right to hold nuclear tests in the Trust Territory, it is our view that such testing has no moral foundation whatsoever.

The people of Micronesia are not a primitive people in any sense. They are civilized, gentle and peace-loving people with profound cultural value and a well-developed code of social behavior of their own which command respect and admiration. The fragmented nature of their Territory and the lack of adequate means of communication resulted in the past in the isolation of one group from another and the task in the field of social advancement is essentially one of breaking down the barriers of isolation and of knitting these groups together into a larger unit. While there may be linguistic and other differences among these groups there are also many striking similarities in their basic beliefs and traditions. Therefore, such diversity as exists does not negate the essential social or cultural

unity of the people of Micronesia. The establishment of modern means of communication will necessarily play a very important role in social advancement, as indeed in economic development.

We are glad to note from the Visiting Mission's report and from the Administering Authority's own account that old traditions, whether in the matter of social organization or land ownership, are in the process of evolution on more modern line, and that educated youth of the Territory is exerting a healthy influence on the course of that development. The Administering Authority is to be commended for the noteworthy assistance and advice rendered by it to

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the people of the Trust Territory in furthering their social welfare and progress I feel sure that the Administering Authority itself, with its sense of freedom and of history, will regard the development of the sense of oneness, social and political, in the Trust Territory as a matter of pride in achievement.

In the field of health and health services, also, there is much for which the Administering Authority deserves the Trusteeship Council's gratification and appreciation. A network of hospitals with modern facilities, staffed by competent Micronesian personnel, exists. There is, however, need for improvement in the dispensaries on out-island, and we are confident that the Administering Authority will do what is needed without delay. We also hope that the requisite financial and other resources successfully to combat and eradicate tuberculosis, filariasis and parasitic diseases in Palau and other Districts of the Trust Territory will be provided by the Administering Authority. Measures for the training of health aides in out-island dispensaries and of nurses in much larger numbers also appear to be immediately necessary.

A notable advance has been made in the field of primary education, an advance which has been brought to the attention of the Trusteeship Council perhaps for the first time. The Mission states in paragraph 135 of its report that "almost every child of school-going age is in school". That fact does great credit both to the people of the Trust Territory and to the Administering Authority.

Perhaps the most pressing need is for a considerable increase in central funds for education, which would enable the recruitment of better teachers, their better training, the provision of better school buildings and more adequate school supplies, such as furniture and textbooks, from Government funds. The age of admission to elementary school, eight years, appears to be much too high and should, in our view, be lowered to six years. The adoption of this measure will itself require a considerable increase in expenditure to provide new classes and furniture, as well as more teachers.

The facilities for secondary as well as vocational and technical education are still very limited, and special attention should be

concentrated on expanding and improving these.

It is satisfactory to learn from the Special Representative that, as suggested by the Visiting Mission, a teacher-training institute is to be set up as an adjunct of the Pacific Island Central School, and that this school, which is the premier educational institution of the Territory, has already been placed under the direction of the Territory's Education Department. This is certainly a very desirable project and will no doubt yield excellent dividends in the field of education.

We also hope that the Administration will devise better means of ensuring uniformity not only in the standards of construction of school buildings, but also in the standards of instruction in schools all over the Territory. The payment of teachers' salaries should not be the liability of District Congresses or Municipal Councils, though a part of the taxes raised by these organs of local government might be earmarked for educational purposes. Primarily, however, the responsibility for the payment of teachers' salaries should be that of the Administration. There is much merit in the Visiting Mission's observation in paragraph 140 of its report that the present policy, which leaves local communities with the main financial responsibility for elementary education, gives rise to many unsatisfactory consequences, such as the wide variations between standards and quality of education from place to place. It is a normal expectation that the education of poorer communities should be subsidized by the more prosperous ones. This can be best achieved through the creation of a central fund for education, which should be disbursed by the Government in accordance with the needs of the communities.

The Administering Authority has generously provided a number of scholarships to Micronesians for higher studies in Guam, at the University of Hawaii, in the United States and elsewhere. The demand for higher education, however, is growing and will no doubt continue to grow in the future. We should therefore be glad to see an increase in the facilities already provided by the Administration for higher education. We should also recommend that within the next two or three years facilities for college education should be added to the Pacific Islands Central School. Such a project may appear somewhat more expensive, but the provision of at least the initial stages of general college education in the Territory is likely to prove cheaper in the long run than the grant of scholarships for study abroad.

The Visiting Mission has emphasized the necessity of starting the teaching of English from the very first grade in primary schools, and in the prevailing linguistic context of the Territory

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this view seems well taken. We were glad, therefore, to receive an indication from the opening statement of the representative of the United States of the general agreement of the Administering Authority with this view, and we hope that no time will be lost in implementing

the Mission's recommendations in this respect.

We are generally satisfied that the Territory is steadily advancing in social and educational fields, and that while there is room for improvement in or acceleration of programmes, the requisite effort for the purpose is being made and will continue. Except for the question of Saipan, there are no political problems of any great significance, and this question will also be satisfactorily resolved, we hope, in the light of the observations and recommendations of the Visiting Mission.

The pace of political advancement needs to be accelerated, and there is no reason to think that the Administering Authority will hesitate to put in the necessary effort and resources in that direction. The main problems of the Territory are in the economic field, and very appropriately the Visiting Mission devoted considerable time during its stay in the Territory to an exhaustive and penetrating study and examination of these problems. Its observations in paragraphs 73 to 118 seem apt to us and deserve the greatest attention.

In article 6(2) of the Trusteeship Agreement the Administering Authority undertook to "promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants, and to this end regulate the use of natural resources; encourage the development of fisheries, agriculture, and industries". There is not much evidence of any industry having been set up in the Territory, and the Mission, we are told, formed the view that the Territory's main natural economic resources have not as yet been exploited. Naturally, the internal revenue of the Territory remains small and what is worse, there has been a decline in this revenue in the last few years. All this calls for a highly concentrated effort in developing the Territory's economic potential in the next few years.

We endorse the Mission's view that "misgivings about the Territory's capacity in the future to sustain its own economy cannot be used as a reason for curtailing the level of investment which is now needed to enable the potential of the Territory to be fully realized". Obviously, transportation and communications pose a difficult problem financially and otherwise, but the Territory's requirements in these fields have to be met to provide the necessary framework for economic expansion and development.

The Administering Authority has been expending amounts of the order of one and a half million dollars annually on transportation services over the five or six years, and a considerably larger expenditure on this account should now be indispensable. We also recognize that the Administering Authority has contributed to the Territory's budget sums exceeding six million dollars annually, but a large part of these funds has gone for housekeeping purposes as distinguished from productive economic activity which leads to higher yields of revenue and greater incomes. It seems necessary that as large a sum should now be devoted to such activity on a planned basis for the next four or five years to bring the Territory's economy to a productive and,

as far as possible, self-generating level.

Perhaps for good reasons the Administration has not favoured the entry of private foreign investment in Micronesia. That in itself necessitates direct governmental investment in projects such as fishery development, the processing industry, and even specialized farming such as cacao and coffee growing. Furthermore, the Government should lend financial and technical assistance to co-operatives of indigenous farming and other enterprises in appropriate field to get them going in the first instance. Once the co-operatives develop a momentum, the Government's financial assistance can be dispensed with. We are glad to note that there is an all-round recognition of the importance of the co-operative movement in the field of economic development in the Territory.

We regret to note from the Visiting Mission's report that the development of fisheries in the Pacific Islands is still in an experimental stage. It should be recalled that a recommendation for the exploitation of the Territory's fishing potential was made by the Council at its fifth session and that this recommendation was accepted by the Administering Authority.

We recommend to the Administering Authority the revenue-raising measures suggested by the Visiting Mission, namely, the levy of import and other duties on a more uniform basis, the introduction of a Trust Territory income tax on all residents of the Territory, including United States personnel, the issue of territorial postage stamps, and the promotion of a tourist industry. From what is stated in paragraph 103 to 105 of the Visiting Mission's report, the levy of an income

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tax alone may be expected to yield something like 2 million dollars annually, which is more than the Territory's annual revenue. We also agree with the Visiting Mission that the provision of finances for development should be on a longterm basis rather than on an annual basis as hitherto. We are encouraged by the Administering Authority's assurances that the long-pending question of compensation for war damages will be settled shortly. It should be possible to utilize the total amount of compensation to be paid to the entire Territory for the furtherance of economic development projects in the districts where they are most needed.

It does not seem necessary to go into the details of each one of the Visiting Mission's analysis, observation and recommendations. The recommendations concerning economic development of the Territory, as indeed in all the other fields, are precise, and their general approach is one of realism and practicability combined with necessity. They are summed up remarkably succinctly in paragraph 118 of the report, and we commend the recommendations made therein to the Administering Authority's most careful consideration.

Generally speaking, it is difficult not to agree with or accept most of what the Visiting Mission has stated by way of observation or recommendation. Bearing that in mind, it seems somewhat unnecessary that the Council should adopt the usual method of appointing a drafting committee to prepare a draft of its observations and conclusions on the Territory. If other members should agree, it might be equally practicable for us in the Council to adopt a short resolution expressing our appreciation for the Visiting Mission's report and commending its conclusions and recommendations for consideration and implementation by the Administering Authority. At this stage this is not a formal proposal, but it can be so made at the appropriate time if it is favoured in the Council.

Before concluding, let me say again that the comments and suggestions made by me on behalf of my delegation do not detract from our appreciation of the very good work done by the Administering Authority in the discharge of its responsibilities. If we have ventured to comment or criticize, it is only in the context of the changing times and pace of attainment of freedom of dependent peoples and of their social and economic as indeed political development along the right lines in conformity with the objectives of the Trusteeship system. We live in an uneasy and impatient world. Where the freedom and welfare of peoples are concerned, delay is dangerous and speed is the essence of the matter. The fact that both the Visiting Mission and the Council have given more detailed attention to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands this time is not only because there are fewer Trust Territories now but also because of the increasing quickening of United Nations consciousness and interest in the whole field of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, and in newly emerging countries all over the world. The now famous declaration on the granting of independence to colonial peoples, resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly, is an expression of the new ethos of the United Nations. The Council has to be responsive to it. I hope that the Administering Authority will itself regard with great scrutiny and more detailed examination conditions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands as a constructive and helpful process towards the consummation of ideals, goals and objectives to which they and all the rest of us in the United Nations are dedicated.

INDIA USA UNITED KINGDOM CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PALAU

**Date :** May 21, 1961

**Volume No**

1995

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

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## Loan to India for Highway Development

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The International Development Association, an affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has granted a credit of \$60 million to India for highway development. This is the first credit granted by I.D.A. to India and the second since its inception. The earlier credit was granted to Honduras last month. This credit of the equivalent of \$9 million is also for highway development in that country.

The \$60 million credit granted to India was finalised under an agreement signed in Washington on June 21, 1961. The following are extracts from a press release issued simultaneously in Washington and New Delhi:

The International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank, has extended a development credit amounting to the equivalent of \$60 million to India for highway development.

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The credit will finance half the amount which will be spent on national highways during the first three-and-a half years of the Third Five-Year Plan which began on April 1, 1961. The funds will be used mainly for the construction of about 660 miles of highways, including 19 major bridges, which will open up some of the less developed parts of India, improving connections between important agriculture and industrial centres, and relieve traffic congestion in the vicinities of the two principal cities and ports of Calcutta and Bombay.

This credit constitutes part of the funds which will be provided by I.D.A. to help meet the external finance requirements of the Third Five-Year Plan. It is for a term of 50 years, interest-free. It is repayable in foreign exchange on amortisation to begin after a ten-year period of grace. Thus the first payment will be due on August 15, 1971. Thereafter, 1% of the principal will be repayable annually for ten years and 3% will be repayable annually for each of the final 30 years. A service charge of three-fourths per cent annually on the amounts disbursed and outstanding will be made to meet I.D.A.'s administrative costs.

At present, India has 393,000 miles of roads consisting of national highways, state, district and village roads; the 15,000 miles of national highways constitute a net-work of main roads connecting the centres of population. About 80% of the national highways are one-lane roads built to standards that require heavy maintenance. Numerous unbridged river crossings, congestion around cities and the poor condition of many of these roads hamper efficient road transport.

The road works for which I.D.A. credit is being extended will

eliminate some of the major deficiencies in the national highway system. All the works are allocated in the region of the gangetic plains in northern India and in coastal areas around Calcutta and Bombay where the density of population is the highest and which account for 40% of India's total vehicled registration.

The Roads Wing of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Government of India will be responsible for the design of the roads and for the supervision of their construction. The Public Works Department of the four States concerned, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa and Maharashtra will be in charge of construction.

INDIA HONDURAS USA

**Date :** May 21, 1961

## Volume No

1995

JAPAN

### Agreement for Manufacture of Tape-Recorders Signed

An Agreement for the manufacture of high quality taperecorders at th Bharat Electronics in collaboration with the Nippon Electric Company of Japan was signed in Bangalore on June 20, 1961, Shri B. V. Baliga, Managing Director, Bharat Electronics Ltd., signed on behalf of the factory and Mr. Saji on behalf of the Nippon Electric Company. This is the second agreement to be signed with the Nippon Electric Company, the first being for the manufacture of broadcast transmitters.

Under the agreement the Nippon Electric Company will provide technical know-how and other training facilities for the manufacture of 3 types of tape-recorders viz. console, portable and play-back equipments for use in broadcast studios.

The agreement marks another significant step in the manufacture of electric equipments in the country. The Bharat Electronics Limited which started with the manufacture of only 2 items in 1955 is now manufacturing 22 types of equipments including transmitters, receivers, amplifiers, and consoles. In the next two or three years many other items will be taken up to meet the needs of the Railways, All India Radio and Civil Aviation besides Defence Services. Production in the factory has risen from Rs. 5 lakhs worth of equipments to Rs. 170 lakhs a year. Manufacture of these equipments within the country goes a long way in reducing dependence on foreign supplies and saving foreign exchange.

JAPAN RUSSIA USA INDIA

**Date :** May 20, 1961

## Volume No

1995

NIGERIA

Joint Communique on Talks with Economic Commission

The following Joint Communique was issued in New Delhi on Jun 27, 1961, 1961 at the end of talks between the Nigerian Economic Mission and the Government of India:

An Economic Mission from Nigeria visited India from June 24 to 27, 1961, for the purpose of holding exploratory discussions in the field of trade between India and Nigeria and also of education, technical development and cultural exchanges. The Mission which was led by Honourable Chief F. S. Okotie-Eboh, included Honourable Z. B. Dipcharima, Federal Minister of Commerce and Industry, His Excellency Mr. A. A. Maliki, High Commissioner for Nigeria in the U.K. and other Ministers besides senior officials from both the Federal and State Ministries, and businessmen.

The Mission visited industrial establishments and some research institutions in and around Delhi. During their stay, the Mission called on the Vice-President of India and the leading members of the Mission were entertained to luncheon by the Prime Minister. The Mission held discussions with Ministers and senior officials in the Ministries of Commerce & Industry, Finance, Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, and Mines and Fuel and they also met the Planning Commission. Some members of the Mission also met businessmen.

The visits and discussions enabled the Mission to make a study of Indian economic development and technical advances made during the recent years with a view to benefit from India's experience in those fields, as Nigeria is now busy drawing up Five-year Plan 1962-67. The exchange of views and information with representatives of the Government of India in different Ministries were also appreciated by the Mission as a mark of good will and mutual understanding.

As regards trade and economic relations between the two countries, it was agreed that the same should be promoted in all possible ways on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. It was also recognised that

within the present framework, it would be possible for both the countries to expand the trade and extend it to many other articles of mutual interest. Representatives of the Government of India showed interest in particular in buying non-ferrous metals from Nigeria, while there was scope for export of manufactures and machinery from India to Nigeria. The Mission in their discussions, also referred to the possibility of Indian machinery and equipment being imported on suitable credit terms with a view to establishing new industries in their country.

In the field of technical personnel, specialized education and cultural affairs, the discussions were fairly detailed. Nigeria at the present stage of her development is extremely short of technical personnel and also had plans to establish a number of technical institutions. The Government of India have agreed to make every endeavour to assist Nigeria in the training of personnel although India herself is experiencing an acute shortage of such personnel, whether for teaching or other purposes on account of the large developmental programmes undertaken by it. As Nigeria was engaged in a technical manpower survey, it was agreed that they would make available in the near future a more detailed estimate of her requirements and would probably invite a survey team of experts from India for this purpose. It was noted that India had already sent a Railway Team to help Nigeria organize the railway system. It would be possible similarly to consider sending some expert teams in other fields like irrigation, agriculture etc.

Some members of the Nigerian Mission also met senior officers of the Ministry of Mines and Fuel and exchanged information and views about the oil industry. The Nigerian representatives were told of the valuable work done by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission and of the part played by the Indian Oil Company Limited and the Indian Refineries Limited. Various documents outlining the work of these Government-sponsored bodies were given to the Nigerian representatives. They were also assured that the Government of India would give sympathetic consideration to Nigerian request for training of personnel also in the field of oil industry and assistance wherever possible in making available the services of experts in the field.

Other members of the Nigerian Mission met members of the Planning Commission and were briefly informed of its set up, the procedure for drawing up plans at the Centre and in the States, and generally of the progress of the Indian economy during the first two Plans. Some of the principal objectives proposed for the Third Plan were also discussed. The Mission evinced great interest in the various aspects of the development programmes included in the Third Plan. At the

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request of the mission, the Planning Commission agreed to prepare a memorandum of its functions and working and to provide information regarding Indian development plans.

NIGER NIGERIA INDIA USA MALI UNITED KINGDOM RUSSIA LATVIA

**Date :** Jun 27, 1961

## Volume No

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NORTH KOREA

Letters for Trade Arrangements Exchanged

A Trade Delegation of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea led by the Vice-Premier Mr. LI JOO YUN visited India from May 18, 1961, to June 2, 1961. The Delegation had discussions with officials of the Government of India for promotion of trade relations between the two countries.

On the conclusion of these talks, letters were exchanged in New Delhi today between Shri K.R.F. Khilnani, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India and Mr. Kei Eung Tai, the visiting Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, setting out arrangements for the development of trade. The arrangements are for a period of one year commencing June, 1, 1961.

Under the arrangements, trade between the two countries will be in terms of non-convertible rupees and on a balanced basis. Available exports from India include ferro-manganese, leather goods, cotton textiles, handicrafts, vegetable oils, mica and shellac. Available imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are chemical fertilizers, electrolytic zinc, high speed and special steels, anthracite and various types of equipment. It is expected that trade between the two countries will be diversified and increased in volume as a result of the discussions.

Agreement has also been reached on the question of establishing offices of Trade Representatives in both countries for promotion of trade relations.

KOREA NORTH KOREA INDIA USA

**Date :** May 18, 1961

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POLAND

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### Indo-Polish Coal Agreement Signed

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An agreement between the National Coal Development Corporation and the Polish firm--CEKOP--for the development of deep-shaft mine project at Sudamdih in Jharia, in Bihar, was signed in Ranchi on Jun 17, 1961.

The agreement was signed by Shri R.C. Dutt, Managing Director of the Corporation and Mr. Komorowski, on behalf of CEKOP.

Under the agreement the Polish firm will prepare a project report for a colliery in Jharia consisting of two mines--a deep-shaft mine and an incline--with a common surface plant. The surface equipment will include a coal washing plant besides workshop, coal bunkers, etc.

The planned output of raw coal from the mines is 7,500 tons per day.

The underground mine is situated 12 miles from Dhanbad railway station and nearly 3 miles from Patherdih railway station with an area of 1.75 miles along the strike and nearly 1 mile along the dip. The area consists of 14 coal seams of varying thickness of 4 to 60 feet with a total reserve of nearly 250 million tons and with an ash content of 10 to 28 per cent.

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LAOS SWITZERLAND MOROCCO INDIA PAKISTAN POLAND UNITED KINGDOM

**Date :** Jul 01, 1961

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1995

### GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS

#### Shri Krishna Menon's Statements on Neutrality of Laos

Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the 14-Nation Conference on Laos in Geneva, made the following statement at the Conference on Jul 13, 1961

Mr. Chairman,

It is now two months since the Conference was convened and we are

today at our thirtyfourth meeting. It cannot be said that any one of the questions before us has received fuller and more precise attention than another. It is a matter of some relief, however, that elsewhere progress has been made in regard to Laos, and that while certain events might have retarded it considerably, they did not in fact have such catastrophic effects as might have been the case. I refer to the Padong incident.

We regret that, in some ways, the delays here have not been due so much to the difficulties and questions of substance, but to questions of procedure and as a result of misunderstandings. More recently, these have centred around the issue of which comes first, an objectives or its implementation, and some other matters of ways and means, that is to say, the aim or the method.

We in India are people who regard methods as not separable from aims. If Gandhi made any contribution to our history it was that it was not enough to achieve an aim unless by the right methods.

In an intervention just before mine a parallel was drawn between the disarmament discussions and our own. I think that this is a most unhappy parallel because it only proves the tragedy of what is happening here. There must be a neutrality to implement, before the machinery of its implementation, comes into question, just as there must be disarmament for it to be controlled. There cannot be disarmament without control or control without disarmament. I think similar troubles are reflected in this place, but this has little to do with Laos.

Therefore today my delegation intends to refer to the particular matter of the neutrality of Laos, and wants to present it, not as though it is a view of our delegation or of our Government only, but as the basis on which this Conference met and began functioning. I can do no better than refer to practically the first substantial statement at the Conference by one of the Co-Chairmen, the Right Honourable the Lord Home who spoke to us on 16 May.

He said that the first requirement in any agreement is a pledge by the Laotians themselves that their Government pursue a policy of neutrality and a pledge by all of the countries at the Conference that they will respect it.

These seemed to him to be two absolute essentials. The first requirement, in terms of strict formality, has not been met, that is to say, there is no statement before the Conference from a Laotian Government that they will pursue a policy of neutrality; but in fact we have before us the decision for neutrality by all Laotian parties. Neutrality in formative shape is possible, in the present circumstances, as stated by the three heads of the main parties in what has been called the Prince's Conference at Zurich. Over and above that, we hold the position that even afterward their representatives in the field have reiterated this. Otherwise it might be argued that it is an abstraction unrelated to actualities. But

immediately after the Zurich communique it was endorsed by the parties at Ban Namone. There has been no challenge to this position--no serious challenge to this position--by anyone around the table; in fact, even the more controversial part of it became one of the usual points of difference and conflict between what are popularly called the "West" and the "East"--the East being from the North of China to the Baltic and the West stretching, I suppose, from the Baltic to Formosa with a number of stretches of territory in the rest of the world! Formerly the East was from Constantinople to the Bering Sea. World politics have changed.

So while the formal commitment by the Laotian Government is before us, there can be no doubt in the mind of anyone here that the Laotians themselves are anxious to have this commitment. What is more, their State can survive only on this foundation. Over and above this, I believe it is the view of practically every delegation in this Conference, and certainly the very considered view of my own Government, that there can be no imposition of neutrality on the sovereignty of Laos. Neutrality must be a desire and a commitment--a desired commitment--by the Government of Laos itself, and we come into it only so that other people may not infringe on it.

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You may remember, Mr. Chairman--Mr. Co-Chairman, if you so wish it--you may remember, Mr. MacDonald--I have to say this because the Co-Chairman sometimes speak with two voices--you yourself, Mr. MacDonald, have pointed out at various times that the respect of neutrality can--more or less--only exist side by side with the sovereign State. There can be no imposition in this way, so that the controversy that has now arisen--that we shall consider neutrality only after we make up our minds how to implement it--is unreal.

It really is putting the cart before the horse, although I suppose it can be done that way, for a horse can push a cart, but it is not usually done. I think for the purpose of the record, I will refer to a statement of the British delegate, the principal delegate of the United Kingdom.

One advantage in quoting is that, first of all, it saves one having to work things out oneself; and over and above that, I believe some of you will accept it with greater credence and confidence.

If Laotian neutrality can be clearly and firmly established, then, surely, the temptation to interfere in the internal affairs of that country will be removed. Any pressure can plainly be seen then to be only from an aggressor.

Now, from there, we go on to Mr. Gromyko, who, although he belongs to the other--the "Eastern" - political hemisphere, seems to say the same thing: "It is obvious that, first of all agreement should be reached on...the neutrality of Laos...the Soviet Government believes the first need of all is that our Conference should adopt a special

Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos". Then he speaks about his draft resolution.

I believe that the most effective, and, in a sense, the most crucial of these statements comes from the distinguished delegate of the United States, Mr. Dean Rusk, who spoke to us on 17 May. He opened his statement at this Conference by saying that we have met here in order to consider the international aspect of the Laotian question; and the international aspect of the Laotian question is the relationship of other people to the Laotian State; and, therefore, its neutrality. What is more, he went on to say that the policy of his Government was a neutral Laos, and what we can do here is to discover whether we can agree that the people of Laos should be permitted to live in their own country without interference and pressure from outside. He (Secretary Rusk) goes on to say that: "Promptly after assuming office, President Kennedy said: 'We strongly and unreservedly support the goal of an independence and neutral Laos tied to no outside power or a group of powers, threatened by no one, and free from any domination'". He (Secretary Rusk) also went on to quote the King of Laos, who on 19 February declared: "We desire to proclaim once more the policy of true neutrality that Laos has always sought to follow. Once again, we appeal to all countries to respect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutrality of Laos".

That reminds me, Mr. Chairman, that, if we were to be fussy about this idea of Laos herself declaring her neutrality, for constitutional purposes, the declaration of the King should be taken as sufficient for form and substance of what has followed thereafter.

So we consider that this juxtaposition of what comes first, what comes afterwards, is rather unreal; not only for the reason that we have started in the way I mentioned just now, but because we think that the two are so closely interrelated that we cannot decide on them in isolation one from the other. There would be no reason for the Commission being in Laos at all, but for our commitment in regard to the international aspect. If the position of Laos as a neutral, sovereign State has not in some way to be looked after, in some way to be assured by the other nations, no question of this Conference considering the international aspect arises; nor would the Commission have its basic functions. Its (the Commission's) basic functions include, first, the cessation of hostilities; because no discussion can take place, no pacification can take place, unless there is a cessation of hostilities. The second function is the withdrawal of foreign elements, and the assurance of neutrality. The first two functions are really built into the neutrality.

Therefore all the other things, the substance as we call it, that we may consider are part and parcel of this neutrality issue, and we cannot consider them separately.

So my delegation for a long time was of the view that all of this would appear in one document, and that that document--when accepted--

would become the instrument of the Conference which would be respected by all the signatories, and therefore the decisiveness of one part would come about when the decision of the whole was assured.

But there is one difficulty in regard to this on the formal side; that is, the declaration of

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neutrality is intended to endure--even after, as we hope and trust, Laos settles down and there is no need for supervision and control. Because the Commission is only machinery, only an aid to the maintenance. For that reason, it may be necessary to have this formal, solemn declaration as a separate instrument. But, apart from that, for the purposes that we are considering, it cannot be treated in isolation.

So, in the last two or three days, when the Conference was getting more or less stalemated on this issue, and you, Mr. MacDonald, very ingeniously suggested that we might discuss neutrality one day and the method another day--not, of course, telling us which day should be the first and which the second--it recalled to my mind the trouble we had when the three Laotian delegations had to be seated. At one time it was suggested that they might all come here in the morning and take whatever seats they liked; until someone pointed out that someone might come much earlier than the opening of the Conference. So it was not a practical proposition, this idea of doing one thing one day, and doing another thing another day. If the objective is simultaneity, then that simultaneity could be obtained by having--as in the 1954 Agreement--the proposals put forward by France (which I understand are generally accepted by the Western hemisphere, the Western political hemisphere) and Mr. Gromyko's proposals, which are accepted on the other side.

We ourselves are not quite out in space, but somewhere on the earth, but away, politically, from these two, but we accept the order of the two proposals.

There was no suggestion at the time--either from the Western side, or from the side of the Socialist States--that these should be taken separately.

At the same time, France did submit this paper on neutrality separately on an earlier day--not on a later day. In regard to sequence, therefore, the neutrality proposals came first! Therefore, it appears to us that all of this arises from the development of other troubles afterwards.

My delegation waited to see how the ingenious suggestion of Mr. MacDonald would work. Apparently it has not found favour with everybody. It is, of course, one way of overcoming the difficulty. So far as we are concerned, if everybody is pleased to accept it we would have no objection at all. But the condition is everybody should

be pleased to do so. That condition is not fulfilled.

It was our intention, therefore, to make proposals in which some other way of compromise was to be found, and to propose to the Conference at some time--unless other agreements were reached between the great Powers themselves, who have a more or less conclusive voice here, Powers whom I shall not mention by name out of selfrespect to ourselves--that the Conference agree that the international aspects of the Laotian question, namely, the neutrality of Laos and the terms of reference of the International Commission for Supervision and Control, are closely interrelated; and, therefore, that no part of them shall be finally determined in isolation or to the exclusion of the others.

That is to say, if the Conference did come to an agreement on neutrality it should not be possible for those who did not want to come to agreement on other matters to say that the neutrality agreement was final. The others cannot say "You are agreed to neutrality; you are finally committed to that".

Furthermore, such parts as agreed will be binding on the participants of the Conference only when an overall agreement is reached.

We were intending on that basis--and without prejudice to the consideration of other matters--the question of equipment and so on--to make a proposal of this kind. The Conference should consider the terms of reference of supervision and control in the order in which they are prepared. The Russians have presented one set; and the Americans and the French have presented another. Both these proposals, however, have more or less followed the same format, so far as the issues are concerned.

At the present time we don't intend to put our proposal formally. We throw it out as a possible course to follow, that is to say, we submit it for consideration informally. Unless, as I have said, those whose views and agreements between whom, are more conclusive in respect of the Conference, can come to an agreement (which we hope they may; they sometimes do), then we might have to consider introducing a proposition of this kind before the Conference tomorrow.

Arising out of all I have said and under instructions from my Government, we are today putting forward what we think could be a declaration of neutrality.

We circulate this as a draft declaration, and assume that the Declaration by the Government of Laos has been made. It

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must be some assurance to those who entertain, no doubt legitimate, fears that this would be rushed through and that the other aspects would not be decided on, because if the formative part is such that

our declaration is a response to a declaration made by the Laotian Government, it goes without saying that the Laotian Government must come into existence. It has not, though all signs indicate that the formation of a Government of that kind cannot be too far off.

Therefore we suggest a declaration of this character:

"The Governments of the Union of Burma, Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, India, the People's Republic of Poland, the Republic of Viet-Nam, Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America"--the order of the States is not mine--

"(1) Take note of the Declaration by the Government of Laos dated..... ." (This is put down here because we are quite certain ourselves that the declaration will be forthcoming).

"(2) Solemnly declare that they recognize and respect the independence and neutrality of Laos, in accordance with the will and desires of the Government of Laos. In particular, they undertake to refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of Laos, and will not be parties to any act to impair directly or indirectly the sovereignty, independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of that State. They undertake not to attach political conditions to any assistance that they may offer or which Laos may seek and not to involve Laos in any military alliances or other alliances incompatible with her neutrality. They undertake not to introduce any foreign troops or military personnel in any form or arms into Laos or to establish in Laos military bases or strong points, or in any way to violate or threaten the peace or neutrality of that country.

"(3) Undertake in the event of a threat of violation or of violation of the sovereignty, independence or neutrality of Laos, to enter into consultations with the Government of Laos and amongst themselves for the purpose of maintaining the independence, sovereignty and neutrality of Laos."

"(4) Appeal to all other States to recognize and respect unequivocally the independence and neutrality of Laos and to refrain from any action that might violate such independence and neutrality.

"(5) State that in order to assist in insuring observance of these undertakings they are signing the Protocol of the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961."(1).

I now pass on this draft to the proper Conference authorities. There is however one explanation that is required here. That is that, under the 1954 Agreement, France has a special position in regard to the military personnel and equipment and things of that character. It is also understood that a new state of Laos would want equipment and personnel for its own defensive purposes.

So far as the position of France is concerned, we are intending to put that into the general document which we shall submit to the Conference tomorrow. I am only dealing with this one matter today. It will be quite clear, from what we said in the course of submission of the observations of my Government on this question earlier in our proceedings, that this problem divides itself into three aspects, out of which we accepted the aspect in regard to personnel, equipment and training. We expressed our views at that time, and we propose to incorporate them in the working paper which we intend to submit tomorrow.

Mr. Chairman, without further elaboration of this, I would like to submit to this Conference that all the delegates here, and more so the principal delegates of the more important countries of the world, are committed, and not only committed to the neutrality of Laos, but committed in coming to this Conference, to consider the external aspect of this question. The most important is the neutrality and sovereignty of that country. We have proceeded from that point of view. What is more, it is only logical that the functioning of the Commission and the helicopters and what not--whatever colour they are painted--are merely consequential to this. If we are going to get lost in the trees and not see the wood, we shall not get anywhere near our goal.

I would also like to point out that consideration of a declaration of this kind, and not getting stymied one way or another, would assist the process.

There is reason to believe that, in spite of the fact that the three Princes themselves have not

(1) The text of the above Draft Declaration was subsequently circulated as LAOS/DOC/23.

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yet been able to meet on Laotian territory, their representatives have been meeting and the progress they have made is not inconsiderable.

The constitutional procedures, how a national government can emerge and so on, also seem to be receiving consideration, and in some detail, showing a great deal of common sense and a practical approach. While it obviously would not be for us, as a Conference, to go into these internal question, we are interested and concerned in as far as they bear upon our consideration of problems and because the emergence of a national Government is vital. Since our desire is to assist Laos in setting its problem, it is my submission, Sir, that by further delaying this matter we will not be helping the progress which is being made in spite of all the difficulties, in spite of the fact there are three main parties there, we have been at war, in spite of the fact that that country has been torn for 20 or 25 years

and matters are still unsettled. With great respect, my delegation submits this declaration on neutrality, independence and sovereignty of Laos; notifies you, Mr. Co-Chairman, and your successor for tomorrow, that the Government of India will tomorrow submit, as a working paper, its draft proposals on the main substance of the question. We wish to see it regarded as a working paper because we do not want to add to the difficulties that already exist. These proposals have become polarized. We have our own suggestions to make in this matter and we have to take care to see that they are sufficiently flexible for details to emerge in relation to the establishment of a national Government, because the functional aspect of the Commission must largely depend on the emergence of that national Government.

Mr. Chairman, I submit this declaration and also notify you that tomorrow morning, with your permission, we would like to submit our main statement of substance. While personal considerations should not come into our deliberations here, I would like to say I have to leave tomorrow, and therefore I request you to permit me to do so.

LAOS SWITZERLAND INDIA USA MALI CHINA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC FRANCE RUSSIA  
BURMA CAMBODIA CANADA POLAND THAILAND

**Date :** Jul 13, 1961

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Following is the text of the statement Shri Krishna Menon made on Jul 14, 1961

In speaking yesterday when submitting the document on neutrality in the name of my Government, I referred to the fact--in criticism of all of ourselves, including my own Government--that we have not made as much progress in this room and in this Conference as had been made on this problem elsewhere.

In the course of our observations this morning, we will submit in detail, and up to date, what we consider this progress to be, and what its effect should be upon our deliberations and what the effect of the lack of progress here would be on progress elsewhere.

Yesterday, in submitting the document on the question of neutrality, I pointed out that we were not introducing any new idea; we were not differing from any member around this table or in this Conference. It was set out by us, with chapter and verse, so to say, that practically all delegations that had spoken, mainly the principal

ones, had started our deliberations on the basis of neutrality, on the one hand and, on the other, that we were primarily concerned with the international aspects of the Laotian question.

We may have to return to this again before we close.

Mr. Chairman, we intend today to submit our proposals in regard to the substance of the question. In order to emphasize the fact that the document should retain flexibility in view of the changes that must necessarily take place in regard to its final determination and depending upon the formation of a national government in Laos, I used the word "working paper".

I gathered from the wisdom of your administrative officials afterwards that if we called it a "working paper", technically it might not become a "Conference document", although, I confess, I am not able to understand this. We shall, therefore, submit this as a "Conference paper". Whatever you call it, it would be our proposal for setting out the position in regard to neutrality, and, arising from that, all that should follow; taken in relation to the 1954 Agreement.

It is entirely for the Conference to regard it one way or another, provided it is understood that it could retain the quality of flexibility and that its purpose is not to add to the differences or the confusion that has already arisen from the existence of two documents. We intervene with this proposal because we feel that a way has to be found whereby the Conference will agree as a whole on minimum proposals for what is necessary in the practical circumstances, especially now that two months have elapsed since the convening of the Conference.

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At the same time, I said yesterday that the procedural--I won't call it a "deadlock"--the procedural stalemate, on account of the question of the priorities in the discussion, either in regard to the neutrality aspects or any other aspects, should be resolved; and we still hope we can do so.

Partly because I myself have to leave the Conference today, and also because we are putting in our suggestions on the basis that they may be withdrawn if there is any other solution. I would like to place before the Conference for consideration our proposal for breaking the procedural deadlock:

"(1) The Conference agrees that the international aspects of the Laotian question, namely, the neutrality of Laos, and the terms of reference of the International Commission for Supervision and Control, are closely interrelated and, therefore, that no part of them shall be finally determined in isolation or exclusion from the others. Furthermore, such parts will become binding on the participants of the Conference only when overall agreement is

reached.

"(2) On the above basis, and without prejudice to the consideration of other matters within its competence (e.g., questions of equipment, etc.), the Conference decides to consider neutrality and the terms of reference of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in the order that they are presented in the proposals."

I would like to repeat that my delegation will withdraw this draft in the event that it is no longer necessary.

We will now proceed to submit to you the protocols, or the bases of the protocols, that are to be added to or become part of the 1954 Agreement as results that ensue from this Conference. (See LAOS/DOC/24).

While the copies are being circulated, I may mention that these are set out in the form of Articles which have relation to the various Articles of the 1954 Agreement.

The first paragraph of the draft is by way of preamble. It says:

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Preamble

"Having regard to the declarations on the neutrality of Laos (meanin also the declaration that will come from the Laotian Government) date Jul 11, 1961 (and then it sets out the names of the governments)."

In this, there is a small difference compared with the neutrality document.

In the neutrality document that we submitted yesterday, the name of Laos does not appear because the format there is that Laos makes a declaration, and we respond to it.

In the present case, the Conference's declaration binds the Kingdom of Laos, as it does all of us. Therefore, in setting out the names of the countries, Laos is included in its proper alphabetical order.

This takes us to the text beginning with Article 1.

Article 1 corresponds to Article 24 in chapter VI of the 1954 Agreement.

I would say here, as a prefatory remark, that this instrument of 1954 was drawn up in the context--as I said before, on 13 June--in the context of the hostilities between two non-Laotian parties, and, therefore, a large number of its clauses are related to the Joint Commission and its functioning. Those who will remember the discussions at that time, and who recall what has happened since, will also remember that the whole basis of this Joint Commission here, as in other international contexts of similar character, has been that the responsibility for the execution of any agreement on the cessation of hostilities must mainly depend upon the parties to the hostilities. This is not a theoretical view. There is no other way of terminating hostilities unless a supervisory or a third force, which is far more powerful than the two others and which is able to keep them down by sheer physical force, goes to the spot.

Therefore, the Joint Commission, which is one of the instruments set out in the 1954 Agreement, was devised both here and in a similar context in Korea--in the same way. The responsibilities must lie with them because the power to stop fighting rests with them. The people who are fighting must stop doing so. That has been the theory, the basis of such agreements even in the past--and the only practical one.

Article 1 of the present draft corresponds to Article 24 of the 1954 Agreement, which

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read as follows:

"Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties."

We say in the present draft:

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## Article 1

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"Responsibility for the execution of the ceasefire agreement shall rest with the parties to hostilities in Laos and, after the establishment of a national Government of Laos, with that Government."

The reason for this modification is that the 1954 Agreement provides for a machinery of a "Joint Committee", and now there is no Joint Committee because the parties are Laotian parties. And the national government there, therefore, in effect, takes the place of that.

Article 2, as submitted by us, reads:

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## Article 2

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"The International Commission for Supervision and Control, consisting of Canada, India and Poland, with the representative of India as Chairman, established by the Geneva Agreement of 1954, shall supervise and control the execution of the cease-fire agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of this Agreement" (of the current agreement.)

Now this is virtually the same as Article 25 of the 1954 Agreement, except that it does not refer to the headquarters of the commission, nor does it refer to Article 3.

The reference to Article 3 in the paper before you arises from the new circumstances that exist and, to a certain extent, is set out in the subsequent Articles in the 1954 Agreement itself.

Now, we come to Article 3, which is more of the body of the proposals. Article 3, Mr. Chairman, roughly corresponds to Articles 26 and 27 of the 1954 Agreement. The present draft reads:

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### Article 3

"The International Commission for Supervision and Control, on receiving information or reports from the Government of Laos or from such other authorities as may be designated for the purpose, or at its own initiative and in agreement with the Government of Laos, will investigate by visiting and inspecting or in other ways as appropriate such difficulties in regard to the maintenance of the cease-fire as may arise. In making such visits, the Commission or its teams may be accompanied by personnel deputed by the government of Laos, or designated authorities, and will be afforded the facilities needed to carry out its visits and inspections expeditiously and effectively. The Government of Laos will grant to the Commission the following facilities:

"(1) Full and complete protection including, if required, the placing of protective forces at their disposal.

"(2) Agreed privileges and immunities required for the performance of their duties."

We should explain that Article 3, while it does correspond to Articles 26 and 27 of the 1954 Agreement, is definitely drafted not only in words but in terms which take into account the present situation. As I said, the Joint Commission is no longer necessary and does not now exist. Again, as we said, we are dealing now with issues partly in the context of a civil war, and not the termination of a colonial war and other things that followed. We have, therefore, placed the responsibility very largely on a national government which, presumably, will have the support of all the three main Laotian parties.

We also take into account the fact that it is not possible for any mission to function in the territory except with the co-operation of the government of that territory. At the same time, if you will read the draft through, you will find we have left a great deal of flexibility in regard to Laotian authorities, (e.g.) we have said that authorities may either be designated by this Conference, in agreement with the Laotian Government, or the Laotian Government itself may designate certain authorities for this purpose. This flexibility has been left so that, in the light of the events that

will take place in the next week or so, we will be able to fill in the details.

Later in the document, we come to full and complete protection for the Commission, including the placing of protection forces at their disposal. The responsibility for the safety of the Commission must rest with the Laotian Government. We have had, in the past, unfortunate experiences, particularly in the Republic of Viet-Nam, in regard to the safety of the Commission. It is not possible for an individual government or the joint

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forces of this Commission to provide this protection. It is the responsibility of the Government whose concern it is really to maintain neutrality and to safeguard which the Commission is assigned.

Referring to (2), "required in the performance of their duties", this in our opinion would include the facilities to go and to come, the facilities for travelling and all that. This, at the present moment, is left comparatively flexible because we believe, at this stage and before the national government is formed, we cannot lay down, as had been laid down in the 1954 agreement, whether or where the fixed teams should be and where the stationary or local teams should be.

It would be rather putting the cart before the horse if we follow the 1954 practice now, because, as I said, of the existence of a national government following upon a civil war--a war which we are helping to try to end. Our endeavour is to terminate the civil war and see a state of peace in Laos.

Therefore, I would say that Article 3 and sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) exhibit this flexibility; so does the previous body of the paragraph.

We now come to Article 4. This is in relation to the withdrawal of troops of foreign forces. We believe that no country can be really neutral if, at the same time, there are foreign armies of occupation. We also believe that the existence of foreign armies of occupation, except as agreed by a sovereign country, is inconsistent with the maintenance of national sovereignty.

My Government--I don't say the Conference--my Government goes further in this matter and says that an Agreement made with a country where foreign intervention is not ended and at a time when a country is not fully free is a "constrictive" violation of its sovereignty. If I may digress for a moment, that is the reason why, in the peace treaty with Japan, it was not possible for India to sign along with some other countries. We made our own separate agreement because, at that time, Japan had not become independent and any treaty conceding rights or territory by a country still under foreign control would not be right.

Article 4 in the present draft is in relation to Article 27(a) of the 1954 Agreement and, in effect, it would delete Article 25.

In relation to Article 28 of the 1954 Agreement, that would not exist any more, and the particular provision about the withdrawal of troops is in 27(a), which says "control the withdrawal of foreign forces, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and see that frontiers are respected."

What we have said in our draft Article 4 is: "All foreign military and para-military units and military and para-military personnel and auxiliaries shall be withdrawn from Laos immediately and in any case, such withdrawals shall be completed within...days of the entry into force of this Agreement. Withdrawal shall take place along routes and through points to be agreed and indicated by the parties to hostilities in Laos or the Government of Laos, after its formation, to the International Commission for Supervision and Control. The International Commission for Supervision and Control shall supervise and control these withdrawals."

We now come to withdrawal, referring to Article 6, sub-paragraph (1), of the Agreement -- turning to Article 6, we find it says here, in Chapter II: "With effect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the introduction into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Laotian territory is prohibited."

If, on the one hand, foreign troops were withdrawn and on the other re-introduced, as has happened in another part of the world recently in respect of another country, that would be defeating the purpose of this agreement!

Paragraph 3 of our draft states: "The introduction or re-introduction of such similar military personnel is contrary to this agreement. The International Commission for Supervision and Control shall exercise diligence to assist in ensuring the observation of this prohibition, establishing such machinery as may be necessary for this purpose, in agreement with the Government of Laos, and in accordance with this agreement."

Then we come to Article 5 which has relation to a matter to which I referred yesterday, when presenting our document on neutrality. I pointed out, Mr. Chairman, at that time, that there are certain special circumstances in the relationship between the Laotian Kingdom and the Republic of France, arising partly from history and partly from the 1954 Agreement, and finally from the requirement of Laos for her own safety, in respect of facilities for military protection and for defensive military strength. Therefore we have, in Article 5, made an exception to the general rule of non-entry of military goods and personnel which we think thus meets the case.

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On 13 June, when I submitted the observations of the Government of

India on this point, we said that we considered giving assistance in this way as having three aspects; the aspect of providing personnel and equipment; the second, the aspect of maintaining bases for that purpose; and the third, the right or otherwise to delegate such capacity.

That is to say, we have not set out a general proposition which does not exclude the special consideration as between France and Laos.

The French are supposed to have a base there; they have personnel and equipment and, latterly, they passed on their obligations to some other country.

There were these three aspects.

We were convinced that in practical circumstances any kind of logical or abstract approach to the problem that no country should have been permitted to do so was not possible in the context of Laos, because the Laotians themselves wanted the assistance.

And we believe--we may be wrong--that all parties in Laos at present, the three principal parties in Laos, consider that such assistance, such agreement with the French Government and the national government is necessary. Therefore, we have said in.

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Article 5

"The retention of French personnel for the purposes of military training of the Laotian security force as provided in the Geneva Agreements, 1954, may be mutually agreed between the Governments of France and Laos.

"It shall not be open to the French Government to transfer or delegate its functions or powers to any other Government or authority excepting the Government of Laos, or to recruit any personnel other than French or Laotian in respect of these arrangements."

Unless this sub-paragraph is agreed to, it defeats the purpose of neutrality altogether, because it would mean introducing into the

territory of Laos other personnel, other elements which would infringe the balance, which would upset the balance, that is created by the this arrangement.

We repeat what we said before: Subject whatever the Laotian Government may decide in the context of this agreement--which we hope will get through--and the general conception of sovereignty and neutrality, it is up to Laos to provide the facilities that are required on the terms of their own contracts with other people.

Now, Article 6.

I should have said that this has a reference to Article 6, (a) and (b); Article 6 of the main agreement, and sections A and B of the French final declaration.

So if you turn and look at the final declaration of the Laotian Government it says, "The Royal Government of Laos is resolved never to pursue, etc. ..."

The French statement says: "The Government of the French Republic declares that it will withdraw its troops from the territory of Laos, at the request of the Government concerned, over a period fixed by agreement between the parties, except in cases, whereby in agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain, etc."

It is in the context of these clauses of the final declaration that I want to say this on behalf of my government: that this articles should be read along with the text of the declaration by the French Government. It is not possible for this Conference by any decision to alter a unilateral declaration made by the French Government; that has since been accepted by all concerned and is now part of an international treaty.

Therefore, this particular clause, to which I have made reference, should be read in the context of that.

The reply, in the same way, on the position of neutrality and so on, is in the declaration of the Laotian Government.

Then we come to Article 6.

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Article 6

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"The Government of Laos having themselves declared their neutrality, it follows that its preservation and the consequent exclusion of outside interference in their internal affairs is their concern, interest and obligation.

"The International Commission for Supervision and Control shall assist in the preservation of the neutrality of Laos, establishing such machinery as may be necessary in agreement with the

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Government of Laos and in accordance with this agreement."

This has relation to the Declaration of the Government of Laos in 1954, and also to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the final declaration of the Conference.

I will not read this paragraph of the Declaration of the Royal Laotian Government, which I presume will also form the basis of a present declaration by Laos--that the Government of Laos will not join in any agreement with other States to participate in a military alliance, etc., and declare their neutrality.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the final declaration of the Conference are important:

"4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities (in Viet-Nam) prohibiting the introduction (into Viet Nam) of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos."

In paragraph 4, what is applicable today is the last sentence, which I have just read.

Paragraph 5 says:

"5....."The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations

or, in the case of Laos, with the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers."

Article 6 has to be read in the context of all the paragraphs of the 1954 Agreement.

It will now be clear to the Conference why we said at the very beginning that the 1954 Agreement cannot be abrogated. If you abrogate that, then we have to have another treaty de novo. By our draft Protocol the 1954 treaty only gets overplayed--or eclipsed, substituted, whatever you like to call it--only in cases as in regard to the Joint Committee provisions do, the earlier provisions become factually deleted as they no longer apply to factual conditions.

Article 7 of the Indian text says:

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Article 7

"The introduction into Laos of Arms and war material generally, except as required for the defence and security forces of Laos, is contrary to this Agreement. It shall be the duty of the International Commission for Supervision and Control to exercise vigilance to assist in preventing any attempts at unauthorised or illegitimate entry into Laos of arms or other war material, and shall have machinery for this purpose as provided in Article 4 of this Agreement."

This, again, corresponds to Article 27(c) of the Geneva Agreements. Article 27(c) sets out the responsibilities of the International Commission, and says:

"(c) Supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Laos, the implementation of the provisions regulating the introduction into Laos of military personnel and war materials".

With this difference: that here it definitely provides for these

airfields, frontiers, and so on, under the conditions prevailing at that time. But, under present conditions, we have said there should be "machinery" established in co-operation with the Laotian Government, to protect what is their own concern, viz. Laotian neutrality. Machinery shall be so provided; we have referred to this in Article 4 of our text.

Then we come to Article 8. I do not want to avoid the difficulties in connection with this. We say here:

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Article 8

"The International Commission for Supervision and Control shall decide major questions by agreement among its members."

If the Conference will address itself to this problem, without partisanship and also in the light of past history, it will--we hope--come to the conclusion that a statement of this kind is all that is necessary to meet all points of view.

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It is not necessary for this Conference to go into the question of absolute unanimities and absolute majority decisions everywhere. Because, first of all, it is a matter of common knowledge that there will be certain questions that must be decided by unanimity, and certain other questions that need not be. That is common everywhere.

If you look at the previous Agreement, Articles 34 and 35, you note that Article 34 refers to the matters that are to be decided by a majority vote, with a decisive vote by the Chairman. As I said in my first statement here, such situations have arisen only twice or thrice or so in the whole history of the functioning of the Laotian Commission.

The more important part is Article 35, where the points on which unanimity is required has been laid down, and you will find that the two Articles cover practically all the important matters, that is to say, there must be unanimity on questions concerning violations and

threats of violations that might lead to hostilities and, in particular, refused by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan. On the withdrawal of foreign forces, the violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces, the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

We also believe, Mr. Chairman, that under the present conditions, the request for supervision will come from the national government, that is to say, the moment there is a violation either known to them or spoken about to them by members of the Commission or other responsible sources, then that government will ask the Commission to intervene, because the Commission is there to assist Laos in the retention of her neutrality.

The only reason for the existence of the Commission in Laos is in this regard. The question of its having to decide by unanimity or otherwise would not necessarily or always arise, because the Laotian government will complain about neutrality being violated and, if such complaints are made, then the Commission will have to operate.

Therefore today this question is not in the same context as before but, at the same time, in view of the controversy that prevails, not only here but on this question generally, we have left in flexible form all major questions to be settled by agreement, and I have no doubt whatsoever that, when the national government is formed, and there is one unified delegation here, it will be part of the concern of that delegation to see that we agree to some arrangement of this character, and I would therefore ask for both sides--and I hope this will not be misunderstood--to exercise restraint in this matter. This follows the previous pattern and it also takes into account the changes that will come about.

Article 9 reads:

"The International Commission for Supervision and Control will report to the Co-Chairmen as and when necessary. It will, in any case, send reports whenever it investigates an incident or take other important or major steps in pursuance of this Agreement. The Co-Chairman will circulate the reports of the Commission to members of this Conference."

In this connection, I want to re-state that my Government is not willing to accept either the exact provisions or the basis of the French proposals, that there should be a standing supervision Commission of this Conference. That would be a violation of the sovereignty of Laos. It would not be in keeping with anything we proposed and, what is more, we think it would only lead to friction and we feel that the wounds of civil war should be bound up.

The next is merely a simplification of Article 36 of the 1954 text, where specifically it has been laid down that the minority and majority of the report must be related to the report of the Chairman.

That is ordinary common procedure and when the agreement arises from this Conference, and the Co-Chairmen know it to exist, they should be informed.

Then we come to Article 10 which reads:

"The International Commission for Supervision and Control shall function in close co-operation with the Government of Laos, which shall extend to it the necessary facilities and assistance for the implementation of this Agreement and consistent with it."

I have already spoken about the basis of this because, as I said a while ago, conditions today are different and the absence of the joint Commission, for which there are so many provisions in the 1954 Agreement, and which has now become redundant, calls for some substitution in simplified form. As we said, the Commission has to function closely with the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission should reserve the part that has to be shifted to the Government of Laos but retain the implementation of the agreement consistent with it.

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Then we come to Article 11 reading:

"The International Commission for Supervision and Control shall act in co-operation with the International Commissions in Cambodia and Viet Nam, in accordance with the Geneva Agreements of 1954."

That refers to Article 38 of the 1954 Agreement and, since we have held that this agreement does not warrant abrogation, in any case the agreements of Cambodia and Viet-Nam cannot be abrogated by this Conference and would remain. Therefore it is a re-statement of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement.

Article 12 reads:

"The Co-Chairmen shall, after the expiration of three years, or earlier if so requested by the Government of Laos, report to the members of this Conference on the question of the termination or substantial modification of the operations of the International Commission for Supervision and Control."

The Conference may remember that yesterday, when we submitted our Draft Declaration on neutrality, we said there was a difference between the declaration of neutrality and other provisions, because the declaration of neutrality is designed to last for ever, for an indefinite period, but the others are provisions for machinery which are to last as long as necessary.

In Article 39 of the previous agreement the attenuation or throwing out of the Commission was contemplated. This had to be achieved by unanimous agreement. Whatever might have been the final arrangement

in 1958 on such an issue, it was practically a unilateral decision to elbow out the Commission in 1958. We think this was largely responsible for the unfortunate situation which followed and the basis for the present conditions and also for the discussion within the Commission itself. There was then no real agreement on this matter. Article 39 which, in effect, provides for revision of the Commission's position, is redrafted here in more explicit terms, to state that in three years or earlier, this matter may be reviewed. Some of the terms in the 1954 agreement are now not applicable. They have become redundant and, therefore, the provision for the Kingdom of Laos functioning as a sovereign State and the existence of a national government is provided for.

Article 13 is a new formulation but not a new idea. It follows from the others. Article 13 says that personnel required by the International Commission for Supervision and Control shall consist exclusively of the nationals of Canada, India and Poland or Laos as appropriate.

That is to say if, for the maintenance of these functions of the Commission, or for anything else arising from this Agreement, other nationals are to be introduced, the balance of the agreement would be upset and there would be reasonable complaint from all sides. Therefore we have said that it should be the nationals of these countries and the only change that can take place is in regard to the nationals of Laos assisting the Commission by agreement.

But this is in connexion with the international Commission for Supervision and Control--it does not affect the previous paragraph in regard to French assistance.

Then we come to Article 14, which forms part of the controversy that has been raging here, in regard to the property such as helicopters. We have said here "The administrative control of personnel and equipment at the disposal of the International Commission for Supervision and Control for the purposes of the discharge of its functions in accordance with this Agreement vests, to the extent necessary for such purposes, in the Commission."

This is done so that the Commission does not become a Department of the Laotian Government. It works in close co-operation with the Government but should have the necessary independence to perform its functions.

That still does not solve the problem as to who should provide the equipment. Our own view is that, having regard to the fact that all sides have offered to do so, and the national government would make all these sides into one, this problem will probably solve itself, especially in the views we submit in regard to other problems I am going to place before the Conference in a moment. The administration must, however, remain in the hands of the Commission.

I would like to say to our Laotian colleagues that this is in no way

a violation of the dignity of the Laotian Government. The International Commission in its context, will be able to control its own movements.

And the last and final paragraph, which is certainly of importance to us:

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LAOS SWITZERLAND USA CAMBODIA CANADA INDIA POLAND

**Date :** Jul 11, 1961

## Volume No

1995

GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS

"Article 15

"The expenses of the Commission and its services shall be borne by the members of the Conference on the basis of the principles governing contributions towards the expenses of the United Nations."

This is taken from Article 21 of the previous Agreement. But, so far as we are concerned, if there is any objection to mentioning the name of the United Nations in this connexion, we are quite prepared to accept any other basis. It is purely an actuarial--or whatever you call it--a statistical basis for the purpose of convenience.

This in essence is what we have submitted.

I am sorry, this seems already to have created some controversy. All I said was that the levying of contributions in terms of the basis which obtains in the United Nations, which has been worked out over a long period, and which was suggested in the 1954 Agreement, is a workable basis. But if it creates any difficulties to mention the United Nations here, my Government does not press this. This is something we can lay down on an ad hoc basis if you so wish. We would have no objection to that. It might be argued that certain governments do not pay their contribution to the United Nations, even if they agree to it. That is another matter altogether.

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I did not intend this matter to be a matter for hilarity, but there it is. You know you cannot laugh away money; you know someone has to pay--even parties who do not at present have representatives of the United Nations have to pay for this exercise.

I will now refer to another set of matters. I would particularly request the members of the Conference who are heads of delegations and, more particularly, the heads of the more powerful countries, to bear with me. Sitting here with all the deadlocks and stalemates and trying to resolve them, speaking about such procedural devices as taking up one subject on Monday, and something else on Tuesday, etc. and reaching no solution even on such small or smaller matters, we may lose sight of the fact that a substantial advance has been made in Laos itself.

We have been at pains to put together such information as we are able to gather, both by communication with our own Government and otherwise; all the material we have as far as we can speak about-- something we may not because they are still in the process of discussion. It presents a hopeful picture.

The latest phase of the Ban Namone meetings is in the atmosphere of cordiality among the Laotian parties.

This is a fact we should all take into account. We are informed from our own sources that these meetings have helped to heal the psychological breaches brought about by the civil war. If I may say so, that is evident even in this room. I have not heard any complaint from the delegate on the extreme right that he has suffered any encroachment from the delegate on the extreme left, nor vice versa. This is my first point.

The second is that the meeting of the parties at Ban Namone, which it may be noted is in Pathet Lao-held territory was accepted by the parties on the initiative of the Commission. This makes two points clear: (1) that Laos is still one, in spite of all the civil war; and (2) that the parties at that time were in as nearly good psychological relations as they are in today. There has been no suggestion that the Commission should accompany the Vientiane Delegation there for its protection. The Commission has however attended some of these meetings, but there is some dispute as to whether they should make it a rule or not. But our information is that the special invitations have worked more or less satisfactorily.

Now there are four welcome matters which may be more or less grouped together. These appear, in the main, in the letters to the Chairmen on 15 May: the agreement on procedure, the exchange of documents on a cease-fire (there have been complaints about threats in regard to the Padong incidents), exchange of documents, and the general understanding on the agenda. There has also been an agreement, Sir, that political and military matters should be considered simultaneously. They represent substantial advance in a country which, as I have repeatedly said, has been torn by war for over twenty years; and, what is more, has been in the grip of civil war for the last so many years.

Then we come to more recent developments in Laos; there is a general understanding on the formation of a coalition government, the need to

send a united delegation to Geneva and, also, an agreement on political programmes, both external and internal, and on neutrality. These are also borne out by the Zurich communique which is before you.

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And in the Zurich communique the first paragraph opens:

LAOS SWITZERLAND USA

**Date :** Jul 11, 1961

## Volume No

1995

GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS

"I. Political Programme

"The Kingdom of Laos is resolved to follow the path of peace and neutrality in conformity with the interests and aspirations of the Laotian people and with the Geneva Agreements of 1954, in order to build a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos. A provisional Government of National Union will be formed, which will give effect to this policy of peace and neutrality, by carrying out the following political programme:"

Then there are clauses on "Domestic Policy" which I shall not read out.

Then there is a paragraph on "Foreign Policy", where it says it will "Resolutely.....apply the five principles of peaceful co-existence in foreign relations....."; and "Not.....join in any alliance or military coalition..."; and "Not... allow any foreign interference in the internal affairs of Laos..."; and will not accept anything but "direct and unconditional aid from all countries that wish to help Laos build up an independent and autonomous national economy on the basis of respect for Laotian sovereignty"; and will "respect the treaties and agreements signed in conformity with the interests of the Laotian people and of the policy of peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in particular the Geneva Agreements of 1954, and (to)abrogate all treaties and agreements which are contrary to those principles".

The main provision is the agreement on a coalition government.

The Zurich negotiations have been welcomed and, also the

understanding that the Princes will meet again as soon as possible to carry out the Zurich agreements. We understand that the representations of the three Princes are now in negotiation on various matters and there has been no backsliding on the desire to reach agreement on these questions.

Having said this, I think it is as well to set out the fact that these are what now represents the development of more wholesome relations and the lessening of friction between the Laotian parties. At the same time, we should say that there have been also improvements in the degree of relationship between the Commission and the parties.

In regard to the four or five matters that I have already mentioned here, that is, the co-operation seen at the meetings at Ban Namone, the co-operation with regard to the formal documents, the acceptance of the Commission's suggestion that political and military talks should proceed simultaneously, the meeting of the three Princes, and the exchanging of messages between them--in all this co-operation between the Commission and the parties has been a marked feature.

When we discuss these matters, therefore, and speak about the functions of the Commission and of all the conflicts that may arise, we should take into account that even without an agreement into at present, without any final decisions and without getting the necessary direction from this Conference, there has been, in fact, co-operative working as between parties. The Laotian parties have generously given the Commission lodging and other facilities; they have not said, "We don't want you here. You fend for yourself." There, the parties have suggested to the Commission that renewed cease-fire orders should be issued on the Padong incident. The parties have also promised the Commission the means of transport; and investigations are agreed upon. The parties are feeling free to discuss with the Commission, or any of their friends, ideas on these problems.

We now come to the question of transport, which has vexed this Commission--in our submission--far more than is warranted by the circumstances. But still it has. This question may be divided into two parts: There is the transport that is required for the normal functioning of the Commission, that is for them to move about. And, secondly, there is the transport that is required for what may be the investigatory functions of the Commission.

With regard to the normal functioning of the Commission, our information is that there has been very generous support in this way from the Vientiane Government there and also token support from the other sides. Our information is that with regard to the first part of the transport problem there are not really very serious difficulties. With regard to the second part of the problem, this is still under discussion, and there is every reason to think that it will be resolved in in one form or another.

The Commission has set out its requirements in the communication to the Co-Chairmen, I understand, and those requirements are not of the dimensions that have been discussed in this room.

Since offers are still outstanding from these parties which go far in excess of what is required,

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no practical problem need rise in this connexion. I hope it will be possible for our distinguished friends from Canada to assist the solution of this problem in Laos itself.

I have no doubt that if this matter had not been raised to this high level of controversy here, it would have been settled by the Commissioners themselves on the spot.

I have set out here now, briefly, the gains made and the progress on the spot itself. And so far as that side of it is concerned, we proceed from these gains to what we hope will be a meeting of the Princes in some place at the end of this month, as soon as Prince Souvanna Phouma--who, I am sorry to say, still in hospital--is able to return to this country. Like a patriotic citizen, with comparative disregard of his own personal health, he told me yesterday that he is going home next week, and, if necessary, would come back for health reasons afterwards.

Negotiations will thus take place and we must look forward, not so much with optimism as with confidence, to the emergence of a national government. I have no doubt that if the moral support of this Conference is in that direction, this process will be speeded up. With regard to the various proposals for establishing machinery among the parties themselves for a more effective cease-fire, that is a problem under study with the Commission in co-operation with the parties.

I have now submitted our draft proposals and I hope that they will receive the full consideration of the Conference. In submitting them, we have not presumed to prescribe a panacea. We have not put forward a document that is not amenable to change. We believe ourselves that any further precision in this matter, at this stage, will lead to more difficulties.

At the same time, it is not a vague document. It sets down the principles on which we can function and make progress. Once a national government emerges, of course it will have its teething problems. There will be differences between members of the government just as there are differences between members of governments in other countries and in international conferences, and sometimes even publicity at other places, as I have seen at the United Nations in the case of certain countries.

That may be so. That sort of thing happens. I hope there will be

differences, otherwise that means that there is a kind of autocratic system. My Government is convinced that Laos has no future except as a neutral country, thus not becoming an arsenal or a battleground of one side or the other. The only way to remain neutral is for them to remain united; a government, whether of one character or another, can only be a government that represents the neutral position, tied to this one formula, this one concept of retaining sovereignty, seeking to prevent foreign intervention and not being involved in civil war.

We submit this proposal at this stage of the Conference. We have fully considered the two other proposals before us and we have not said they have no merit. If the Conference, in its wisdom, finds one or the other of those documents acceptable or finds some other between them, no side will be more pleased than the Government of India. We want to point out that the Government of India at no time subscribed to any policy that requires the implementation of these provisions by the use of force or outside the context of the agreement of the Laotian government. We have said, from the very beginning, that we will not be a party to the guarantee of neutrality by force of arms. We believe that the Commission should stop by force anybody from coming into Laos. We believe that a policeman should use only such force as is necessary and is available to him and under approved conditions and rules.

Having said that, I once again submit this document in the hope that differences arising in the document will be smoothed out. We have not tried to put this together and to say "A plague on both your houses" in regard to the other two proposals. We have drafted this, having taken into full account these two other documents and, even more, taking into account the conditions in Laos and the essential condition that she has got to remain a sovereign, independent and neutral country. Her neutrality is the concern of the rest of the world as well because, while it is a condition of the survival of Laos, it is equally a pre-requisite to a world without conflict which might be precipitated in that area. No country in Asia, particularly a small country, has any hope of survival in dignity and independence, except by maintaining its non-alignment with the contending parties in the world. Here we refer to no other extraneous matter. It is not necessary for this purpose.

Therefore I submit the document to you, Sir, in all humility, hoping that it will make some contribution to the solution of the problems before us and to help to resolve the question now before us. Let us be ready to go forward and

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continue the work that this Conference was called to do in a spirit of reconciliation, respect for the integrity and dignity of nations, small as well as large, and with determination and faith that in the pursuit of peace we shall find the way to achieve it.

LAOS SWITZERLAND USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CANADA INDIA

**Date :** Jul 11, 1961

## Volume No

1995

MOROCCO

Protocol between India and Morocco Signed

Trade talks between the four-member delegation from the Kingdom of Morocco and Indian officials concluded in New Delhi on Jul 19, 1961 and a protocol was signed bringing the Trade Agreement between the two countries provisionally into force from 1 August 1961. The Trade Agreement was negotiated in September last year at Rabat.

The protocol was signed by Mr. A. Lamrani, leader of the Moroccan delegation and head of the Economic Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while Shri B. N. Adarkar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, signed on behalf of India.

The revised arrangements provide for exchange of goods on a larger scale than previously envisaged but on a balanced basis. Morocco is likely to offer a substantial outlet for Indian green tea. Non-traditional items like diesel engines as well as engineering and electrical equipment are also likely to be exported from India. Indian imports from Morocco consist mainly of rock phosphates, lead and cork.

During 1960, India exported to Morocco goods worth Rs. 48 lakhs. Imports from Morocco amounted to Rs. 52 lakhs.

MOROCCO INDIA USA

**Date :** Jul 19, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PAKISTAN

Indo-Pakistan Agreement on Transfer of Bank Accounts and Safe Deposits

Agreement has been reached between India and Pakistan on the detailed procedure for the transfer of bank accounts of evacuees and the collection of the contents of lockers and safe deposits.

This was announced in New Delhi on Jul 10, 1961 in a joint communique issued on the conclusion of the two-day meeting of the Implementation Committees set up under the Movable Property and the Banking Agreements.

The Rehabilitation Ministers of India and Pakistan had agreed earlier at Calcutta that Pakistan Government would issue notification exempting all displaced Indian banks from the operation of the Evacuee Property Law and to declare them as non-evacuee concerns.

The Indian delegation to the Implementation Committee meeting was led by the Union Rehabilitation Secretary Shri Dharma Vira and the Pakistan delegation by Shri M.H. Sufi, Rehabilitation Secretary, Pakistan.

Following is the text of the joint communique:-

Further meetings of the Implementation Committees set up under the Movable Property and Banking Agreements were held at New Delhi on July 7 and 8, 1961.

In pursuance of the decision taken by the Rehabilitation Ministers of Pakistan and India at Calcutta, the mechanics for transfer of bank accounts of evacuees together with funds from the en-bloc areas were worked out. All the accounts along with the funds will be transferred on September 30, 1961. Regarding non-en-bloc areas, it was agreed that verified lists of accounts will be exchanged and the procedure for payment will be examined further.

It was also agreed that facilities for the realization of the assets of the Indian displaced banks in Pakistan would be provided in accordance with the provisions of the agreements already arrived at between the two countries.

A detailed procedure was also drawn up for the collection of the contents of lockers and safe deposits at Lahore and Delhi and their handing

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over to the diplomatic representative of the other country.

It was decided that the lists of lockers in which the two countries are interested and of third party claims against lockers and safe deposits received upto November 30, 1955, would be exchanged at Lahore on August 1, 1961. The contents of lockers and safe deposits will be brought to Lahore and Delhi by the end of August 1961. Simultaneously, the Joint Committee consisting of the representatives

of the two countries would examine and decide the third party claims against the lockers and safe deposits. The contents of lockers and safe deposits collected at Lahore and Delhi would be handed over to the diplomatic representative of the other country on September 30, 1961.

India agreed to release securities worth about Rs. 9 Lakhs belonging to the local bodies in Pakistan and lying with the D A.G., P&T, Calcutta. They also agreed to release the accumulated dividends or interest on the shares and securities of Pakistani nationals, lying with the banks in India.

There were further exchanges of cheques for sale proceeds of movable property and of securities and payment authorities in respect of court deposits.

PAKISTAN INDIA USA

**Date :** Jul 10, 1961

## Volume No

1995

POLAND

### Indo-Polish Agreement on Construction of Port Silo

An agreement was signed in New Delhi on Jul 21, 1961 between the Government of India and the Polish organisation CEKOP, under which the latter will prepare a project report for the construction of a 50,000-ton port silo either in Bombay or Madras. The report will be submitted to the Government of India within three months.

Shri H. Lal, Director General of Food, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, signed the agreement on behalf of India, and Mr. S. Komorowski on behalf of CEKOP.

In May 1960, a credit agreement was concluded with Poland, one of the items being the construction of a silo for the bulk storage of foodgrains. Subsequently, a technical team from Poland visited this country to collect data for the preparation of a project report.

India already has two silos, or grain elevators one at Hapur in Uttar Pradesh and the other, recently completed, in Calcutta. Each of these is of 10,000-ton capacity, but it is intended to augment the capacity of the Calcutta silo to about 20,000 tons. Both silos were constructed with aid received from the U.S. Technical Co-operation Mission.

Silos are modern devices for the scientific and prolonged storage of foodgrains and form an important element in the building up of India's 4 million-ton food reserve.

POLAND INDIA USA

**Date :** Jul 21, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNITED KINGDOM

Communique on Indo-U.K. Talks on E.C.M.

Shri Morarji Desai, the Minister of Finance, Shri K. C. Reddy, Minister of Commerce and Industry, and other Indian Ministers held discussions on 12th, 13th and Jul 14, 1961 with the British Minister of Aviation, the Rt. Hon. Peter Thorneycroft, about the issues involved in any negotiation by the British Government to join the European Economic Community. Mr. Thorneycroft had also a brief discussion on the main policy matters arising out of this question with the Prime Minister of India on 13 July.

Mr. Thorneycroft explained that although the British Government had reached no decision, they were concerned about the economic division of Europe which was emerging; and they were, therefore, examining carefully the problems that would arise if they decided to join. He drew attention to the economic consequences of continued division and to the importance of maintaining an expanding European economy,

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both as a market for the products of developing countries and as a source of investment funds for them. On the other hand, acceptance of a common tariff would inevitably give rise to the question how far the traditional facilities of duty-free entry into the United Kingdom and the system of preferences could be maintained in favour of India and other Commonwealth countries.

It was recognised that the question whether Britain should enter into negotiations with a view to acceding to the Treaty of Rome was primarily a matter for Britain; and the British Government alone could take a decision on it. Indian Ministers suggested that the accession of the U. K. to the Treaty of Rome might weaken existing Commonwealth links and injure the economies of the developing countries of the Commonwealth in particular. They drew attention to

the importance of avoiding further differences and complications in areas outside Europe.

Indian Ministers and officials emphasized the serious damage which was likely to be caused to India's export trade if the United Kingdom were to join the Community without securing agreement on special measures necessary adequately to safeguard it. They pointed out that the principal exports of India as well as of many other developing countries were subjected to high tariffs, internal taxes and quantitative restrictions of a discriminatory character in some of the countries of the EEC, while these products were being admitted duty-free and without restrictions to the United Kingdom. If the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community without suitable provisions for the future trade with the Commonwealth with special emphasis on certain types of products which come from the developing countries, India and other developing Commonwealth countries would find it extremely difficult to maintain and expand their export trade. This is a matter of vital concern for developing countries like India since the expansion of their export trade provides the external resources for their economic development.

It was common ground that the concession which India was receiving from the U. K. as well as other countries could only be repaid through an expansion of India's exports.

The Ministers examined in detail the export which might be affected and the wider commercial policy implications of any change in the present position. They attached great importance to the maintenance and expansion of international Commonwealth Trade.

Mr. Thorneycroft assured the Indian Ministers that the Interests of India as they had been explained to him would be kept fully in mind in any negotiations for entry into the European Economic Community. If negotiations were embarked upon, the British Government would keep in the closest touch with the Government of India in all matters affecting their interests.

The Ministers agreed that arrangements should be made for such consultations and for further discussion between the two Governments before the British Government took any decision to join the Community.

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UNITED KINGDOM INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ITALY

**Date :** Jul 14, 1961

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HUNGARY INDIA TUNISIA GERMANY NORWAY USA

**Date :** Aug 01, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

#### Finance Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha

The Finance Minister, Shri Morarji Desai made a statement in the Lok Sabha on Aug 11, 1961 on the decision on the United Kingdom to negotiate for entry into the European Common Market and the likely effects on India's trade.

Following is the text of his statement:

Mr. Speaker, Sir,

With your permission, I should like to make a brief statement on the possible effects on India's exports of the U. K. joining the Common Market.

As Hon'ble Members doubtless know, soon after the signing of the Rome Treaty for the formation of the European Common Market, the United Kingdom, as well as a number of other European countries, began exploring the possibility of joining the new European Economic Community set up thereunder. As no mutually acceptable basis of such association could be found, seven European countries, including the U. K. formed separately what is known as European Free Trade Area.

At the meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers last year, we were informed that the United Kingdom Government considered that this division of Europe into two economic blocs was not desirable and having regard to the realities of Britain's economic position, the U. K. should make another determined effort to join the European Economic Community. The United Kingdom Government assured us that

this being a matter of major concern to Commonwealth countries affecting their trade with the U. K., Commonwealth Governments will be kept fully informed throughout and there will be consultations at appropriate stages. Recently, Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, the United Kingdom Minister of Aviation, was in this country to have consultations with the Government of India on the subjects. I place on the table of the House a copy of the Press Communique issued on the subject at the end of these talks. Since then a statement has been made in the British Parliament by the Prime Minister of the U. K., indicating that the British Government has decided to open negotiations with a view to join the European Economic Community.

Our stand throughout has been that whether the U. K. should join the European Community is a matter on which the ultimate decision must rest with the Government of the United Kingdom. We have, however, made no secret of our concern over the possible set-back to our export trade. Although we have a much larger trade with the U. K. than with the Common Market countries, our trade with the U. K. is nearly in balance, while we run a heavy adverse balance in our trade with the Common Market countries. This is mainly because our exports to the Common Market countries are subject to various restrictions which do not apply in the U. K.

It is a matter of utmost importance to us to increase our exports to Europe. I need hardly emphasize the importance to our planned development of securing a sizeable increase in our exports. In so far as this trade has suffered because we have ourselves not paid adequate attention to marketing our products in Europe, it is for us to intensify our efforts to seek new contacts and to establish new markets. But our efforts to increase our exports to the Common Market countries cannot succeed without a substantial liberalisation of their tariff and commercial policies.

In our trade with the United Kingdom, we have enjoyed three main advantages. Firstly, as members of the Commonwealth, we have throughout had duty-free entry for almost all our products. Secondly, as members of the sterling area, our exports have been free from quantitative restrictions in the U. K. market. Thirdly, a number of our products enjoy preferential tariffs in the U. K., partly by virtue of the Trade Agreement between India and the U. K. and partly on account of the fact that as Commonwealth products are duty-free, the imposition of any tariffs in the U. K. on imports from non-Commonwealth countries results in a preferential position for all Commonwealth countries.

In the Common Market countries, on the other hand, our principal exports, with few exceptions, are subject to fairly high tariffs as well as other taxes. Even a commodity like tea, which is not produced in Western Europe, is subject to such impositions. In addition, there are quantitative restrictions, often of a discriminatory character, on our manufactured goods, such as cotton textiles, jute fabrics, vegetable oils and coir matting.

The result of the U. K. joining the Common Market will be that the same tariffs and the same commercial policies will eventually become applicable, both in the U. K. and in other countries of the Common Market. The kind of effect this will have on our export trade will depend upon the kind of tariffs and the kind of commercial policies which are ultimately evolved. It is not possible for me, therefore, at this stage, to attempt any kind of an assessment of the effects of the U. K. joining the Common Market on our export earnings.

The only thing which can be said with certainty is that, if the U. K. joins the Common Market, all our preferences in the U. K. market will disappear and, instead in so far as our products will pay an import duty while similar goods from the Common Market or its Associated Territories will be imported duty-free, there will be a reverse preference operating against our exports. Before commenting on this specific problem, I should like to state our general attitude towards preferences. To put it briefly, our attitude in the matter is in consonance with the principles embodied in the GATT to which we subscribed after our Independence, and to which the U. K., the Common Market countries, the EFTA countries, the Commonwealth countries, as well as many other countries in Asia and North and South America belong. The GATT is against any new preferences being created. The GATT has recognised that in order not to disturb patterns of trade established through decades of preferential treatment, the preferential concessions in operation prior to the coming into force of the GATT should be allowed to continue. Finally, the principle has been accepted in the GATT that if preferences are reduced, countries which benefit from the reduction in preferences should offer tariff concessions.

It is against this background of internationally accepted principles to which we subscribe that we have to review the matter. We would greatly regret the termination of the preferential arrangements between India and the U. K. which have led to an expansion of trade in both directions, specially as, through one device or another, new preferential arrangements seem to be growing in the world. But, we would acquiesce in it if we are compensated by a substantial liberalisation of import policies in the Common Market as a whole, provided suitable transitional arrangements are made so that the benefits of preferential treatment disappear only in slow, gradual stages. This is necessary if our trade, specially in items like cotton textiles, is not to be disrupted with consequent damage to our export earning and disturbance of international trade in such products. I am happy to say that the U. K. delegation fully agreed with our view on this point. As a long-term measure, we would view the disappearance of preferences in the U. K. market as a challenge to our industries to adjust themselves to face competition provided such competition is on equal terms and our exports do not encounter unreasonable restrictions.

I would emphasise the point about competition being on equal terms.

It is our considered view that the less developed countries of the world should not rely on preferential treatment in industrialised countries as a basis for the development of their industries and exports. Such dependence can undermine the political independence of the countries concerned. What is necessary is that all industrialised countries should give access on specially favourable but non-discriminatory basis to their markets to products, whether they are raw materials like metallic ores and rubber or beverages like tea, coffee and cocoa or simple processed goods like tanned hides and skin, vegetable oils and grey textiles which the developing countries produce economically.

As I have said earlier, no assessment of the effects of the U. K.'s joining the Common Market can be made without knowing on what terms the U. K. will accede and what would be the resultant tariffs and commercial policies of the European Common Market. In accordance with GATT principles, when U. K. joins the Common Market, the common tariffs will have to be re-adjusted. There should be, therefore, a general lowering of common market tariffs having regard to the fact that such a large volume of U. K.'s imports of products in which we are interested went duty free. Secondly, we shall expect that all quantitative restrictions affecting our exports will be abolished. These are contrary to the GATT, since the Common Market countries are no longer in balance of payment difficulties.

The United Kingdom Government is fully sympathetic to these ideas. We propose to impress these points on the Common Market countries also. They are helping developing countries with loans. We shall emphasise the importance of trade in reducing the dependence on aid.

We cannot, of course, predict what the ultimate response will be. International trade today is at the cross roads. We can either move in the direction of more liberal trading policies calculated to achieve a balanced exchange of

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goods and services between the developing countries and the industrialised countries on a fair, non-discriminatory basis; or, we can go in the direction of groupings, regional and of other kinds. While I have indicated the kind of solution which we ourselves would welcome, we shall always have to be ready to review our policies including our commitments under the GATT in the light of the developments that take place.

INDIA ITALY USA RUSSIA

**Date :** Aug 11, 1961

**Volume No**

Vice-President's Independence Day Message

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Following is the full text of the Vice-President Dr. Radhakrishnan's message to the nation and Indian nationals abroad on the occasion of the Fourteenth anniversary of India's independence:

Friends,

It gives me great pleasure to greet our countrymen and all Indian nationals who are living abroad on this fourteenth anniversary of our Independence. I assume that they have been following the trends and developments in the country.

For some days past, we were greatly concerned about the sudden illness of our President and I am happy to convey to you our great relief, in which I have no doubt you all share, at his rapid recovery, though it may take some time for him to regain his normal health. We all wish him well.

During the last year, we achieved a great deal in the modernisation of our country, though much remains to be done. The Third Five Year Plan has just been published. It takes account of our achievements and failures in the last ten years in the different fields of agriculture, industry, education, health and housing and sets forth the measures to be adopted to realise our social and economic objectives of larger employment and better opportunities for all.

Our country is growing better in many ways. Millions of our people are getting out of their ruts, out of their sheltered lives. There is an aspiration everywhere to improve the conditions of the lowly and the least fortunate. There is a yearning for greater understanding and goodwill among the people in the country. Yet there is a sense of disappointment. The old contempt and fears, the barriers of caste and community still divide us. They are undermining our democratic system which is based on the four principles of national unity, social justice, secularism which means respect for all faiths, and peaceful social changes. The social revolution now in progress has unleashed not unexpectedly destructive forces. These are the pains of the birth of the new order. Stability can be achieved only by carrying out the directives laid down in the Constitution. Some of the social institutions which we uphold embody the principle of inequality. We invent empty excuses for our ineptitude in fighting social evils and breaking man's tyranny over man. All human beings, whatever be their caste or community, race or religion, have a right to respect and friendship. Great patience and self-restraint are necessary if we are to weld together the different communities into a single whole.

To make a new India, we need not only industrial progress and political maturity, but a renewal of faith in the future of our country. We must courageously scrap old loyalties which are out of date and build new institutions which are suited to modern conditions. Life is a constant adaptation to change. When different people meet together it should not be the mere gathering of a crowd. There must be some bond of relationship if we are not to knock against one another. We must organise our emotions in terms of national unity. We cannot have national integration without national discipline, without a national ethos. Decency in public life should be maintained. We need the dedicated effort of all our citizens. It is my earnest hope that all those who live abroad and see how other countries are making progress will do their utmost to break down the old loyalties of caste, community, language and religion and help to build a truly democratic state.

If we are divided in mind we will be hesitant in action. Through panchayats, through schools and colleges, through the Press and the radio, through taluq boards and district councils we should help our people to understand the scope and significance of our present venture in which all our nationals are participants. A nation is bound by memories and hopes for its future.

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We have historical memories and national aspirations. Let us integrate the two and march forward to the goal of a civilised democratic Welfare State.

INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Aug 11, 1961

## Volume No

1995

HUNGARY

Prime Minister's Speech at Banquet in honour of Mr. Munnich

Speaking at a State Banquet in honour of his Excellency Mr. Ferenc Munnich, Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government at Rashtrapati Bhawan on Aug 24, 1961 the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies; Ladies and Gentlemen: We welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister and your Madam and your party to our country.

We are sorry that your visit is short and confined only to the city of Delhi. This city is no doubt both ancient and modern and represents to some extent both the past and the present of India and may even give you a glimpse of the future but India is by no means just Delhi and perhaps the city of Delhi gives you a very very small glimpse of what is happening in India today.

Twenty three years ago, I happened to visit Hungary, a long time ago. I intended going there, just to Budapest for two or three days but it so happened that I had to stay there for more than three weeks because my daughter who was with me fell ill and we had to remain there. Although it is a long time ago, I still have a vivid recollection of the beautiful city of Budapest and surrounding countryside which with its avenues of poplars reminded me greatly of the valley of Kashmir. Ever since then much has happened. There have been great wars and revolutions and your country and your city suffered greatly from that war. I am told that in spite of that great damage and suffering, the city of Budapest has become again as beautiful or more beautiful than it was.

Apart from the great wars and revolutions that had taken place in the past many years, your country also underwent an experience which was to you and to many others a very painful one when there was internal trouble and conflict. Inevitably, even people outside Hungary were distressed at what was happening and because not only is war bad but civil conflict, sometimes creates even more bitterness than actual war. I earnestly trust that the bitterness of that conflict, internal conflict, is past now and that all the people there live in harmony and peace.

Here, in India, we have had our own type of conflicts which were largely peaceful, even our struggle for independence was a peaceful one. Subsequently we had a taste of that bitter fruit of civil conflict in a different way, and it is only slowly that we have lived it down. We are now busy not to think of the past so much but of the future. And we are trying to build this ancient country of our India and new India, with its root in the past no doubt, but looking forward nevertheless to the future. But all our attempts at building the future and all the attempts of other countries of building the future may be destroyed and end in nothing if unfortunately war descends upon the world. Today again, as 20 years ago in Europe there is the smell of war although war has not come. Again one begins to hear to some extent the sound of marching feet and the drums of war. We earnestly hope that this crisis will pass and that the great leaders of big countries will try to resolve it by negotiation, by sitting down and trying to solve problems instead of allowing this to drift to a colossal conflict. We have been devoted to the cause of peace. In spite of our many other failings and apart from that devotion, we realise that only in real peace can we and other countries progress. I earnestly hope therefore that this danger and scare of war will pass and countries will realise that war is not something that anyone can play with today. It is too dangerous, too destructive. So I trust that as the crisis passes, we shall all

devote ourselves to cooperative effort, to take advantage of the great new forces that have arisen, that science has given us, use them for purposes of peaceful construction and to enhance the happiness of our people and the people of the world.

I hope, Mr. Prime Minister, that your brief visit to our old and new city of Delhi will be a pleasant one and that you will carry away pleasant and friendly memories of our country.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to drink to the health of the Prime Minister of the Hungarian people's Republic and Madam Munnich.

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HUNGARY INDIA USA ANGUILLA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Aug 24, 1961

## Volume No

1995

HUNGARY

Joint Communique

Following is the text of the Joint Communique by the Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, H. E. Dr. Ferenc Munnich, and the Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:

On the invitation of the Government of India, His Excellency Dr. Ferenc Munnich, Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, accompanied by his wife and high-ranking officials of the Hungarian Government, paid a visit to India from 24th to Aug 27, 1961.

During this brief visit the Prime Minister of Hungary and the Prime Minister of India had friendly exchange of views on matters of mutual interest and on the current international situation, among others on the question of the German Peace Treaty, on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons and on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Prime Ministers agreed that energetic measures should be taken to end colonialism and racial discrimination and to assist undeveloped areas in their economic and social progress in freedom and independence.

The Prime Ministers expressed their satisfaction at the growing co-

operation between their two countries in economic and cultural matters. They noted that a cultural Agreement will be signed between their two countries in the near future.

The Prime Ministers expressed their pleasure at the opportunity provided by the visit of the Prime Minister of Hungary to India to have this friendly exchange of views on various matters of common interest. They were confident that the visit will serve to strengthen the friendly relations existing between their two countries.

The Prime Minister of Hungary invited the Prime Minister of India to pay a visit to Hungary at a time convenient for him. The Prime Minister of India accepted the invitation with pleasure.

HUNGARY INDIA USA

**Date :** Aug 27, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri C.S. Jha's Statement in General Assembly on Tunisia

Shri C.S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative in the United Nations, made the following statement in the special session of the General Assembly on Aug 21, 1961 on the situation in Tunisia:

May I first of all convey, through you, the sincere felicitation of my delegation on the unanimous election of President Boland as President of this very important Special Session. Mr. Boland's excellent stewardship of his difficult assignment as President of the fifteenth session, made his unanimous election a completely natural and a spontaneous matter. We are very happy to see him again preside over the functions of this Assembly.

The matter for consideration by this Special Session of the General Assembly is the "Consideration of the grave situation in Tunisia obtaining since 19 July 1961." The fact that as many as forty-seven countries jointly or simultaneously asked for this Special Session and that the necessary majority for holding it was swiftly obtained is itself a measure of the great concern felt throughout the world over the situation in Tunisia.

It is not necessary for me here to describe at any great length the serious situation that has developed in Tunisia. This has been done in the excellent statement of Ambassador Slim of Tunisia. The

situation has already caused great damage to international relations, particularly between France and Tunisia and several other countries, which undoubtedly poses a threat to international peace and security. The matter was thoroughly discussed in the Security Council on 21, 22, 28 July, and 29 July 1961. The proceedings of the Council have, no doubt, been earnestly studied by all Members of the United Nations. Indeed, this Special Session is a consequence of the failure of the Security Council to take necessary action apart from an interim resolution calling for a cease-fire and return of all forces to their original positions, and to resolve the situation in which, as rightly observed by the representative of the United States in the Security Council on 21 July, "the lives of many individuals and perhaps the destinies of more than one

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nation lie at stake."

What are briefly the facts of the situation that is now before the General Assembly? Until 1956, Tunisia was under French colonial rule. In that year, after many years of suffering and of valiant struggle, the people of Tunisia achieved their independence. On 20 March 1956, France signed a protocol with Tunisia recognizing its independence and the full exercise of its sovereignty in all spheres. The protocol categorically stated, among other things:

"It follows that:

"(a) The Treaty concluded between France and Tunisia on 12th May 1881 may no longer govern Franco-Tunisian relations:

"(b) Any provisions of the conventions of 3rd June 1955 which may be incompatible with the new status of Tunisia as an independent sovereign State shall be modified or revoked."

This meant that a new era had dawned for Tunisia. The yoke of colonial subjugation was lifted for ever; and anything incompatible with Tunisia's sovereignty and independence had no longer any validity. The key provision in the protocol was the formal recognition by France of the independence of Tunisia, and that could mean nothing less than the full exercise of sovereignty by Tunisia over its entire territory. The admission of Tunisia to the United Nations, which followed soon after, was further confirmation of the recognition by the international community of the full sovereignty and independence of Tunisia; and, as everyone knows, ever since its admission into the United Nations, Tunisia has been functioning as a Member, equal in right and status with every other Member, loyal and faithful to the Charter of the United Nations.

To my delegation it is clear that the status of Tunisia as a sovereign independent State and its membership of the international community give it a position no whit inferior to that of any other Member of the United Nations--a position which does not admit of any

infracton of its sovereignty except in accordance with its own free will and judgment. It so happened that on the date that Tunisia attained its independence, there remained on Tunisian territory contingents of French forces including the so-called base of Bizerta: but the incidental presence of French forces did not and could not detract from the sovereignty and freedom of Tunisia, which were not only formally recognized by France, but accepted by the entire international community. The position that I have stated is further reinforced and confirmed by the fact that Tunisia has at no time accepted or acquiesced in the presence of French forces on its soil. There was no acceptance of the right of France to maintain forces on Tunisian territory at the time of Tunisian independence; and the history of Tunisia since then and the happenings there, some of which like the bombing by the French of the village of Sakiet-sidi-Yousouf in 1958, have engaged the attention of the United Nations, have shown clearly that Tunisia has at all times rejected the presence of French forces on its territory. It has indeed made repeated attempts to secure the evacuation of French forces from its soil in negotiation with the French Government, but, as stated by President Bourguiba in his letter to President de Gaulle of 6 July 1961:

"More than five years after it regained its internal and external sovereignty on 20 March 1956, Tunisia remains unable to exercise that sovereignty over the whole of its territory--a situation contrary to the wishes of its people and its Government which have been clearly and publicly expressed at every opportunity, which have been duly communicated to the French Government through the diplomatic channel, and which I made known to you on 27 February 1961.

"Despite these repeated requests, France has thus far refused to agree in principle, or to give serious consideration to the evacuation of its forces from the Bizerta base and our southern territories".

On 19 July, following demonstrations by Tunisians, French armed forces including military aircraft went into action and, as is known to everyone, many lives were lost as a result of these operations, which included French aerial bombing of defenceless Tunisian civilians. The Security Council urgently considered the matter on 21 July and 22 July and, fully aware of the gravity of the situation, adopted an interim resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces to their original positions. The Security Council, in the same resolution, also decided to continue the debate, but was unable to take any further decisions on the substantive aspects of the case presented to the Council by the Government of Tunisia.

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My delegation does not wish to go into the details of the very unfortunate happenings in Bizerta, and other parts of Tunisia. We do not think any useful purpose will be served by undertaking a meticulous analysis of the causes of the development of the present dangerous situation in Tunisia; nor do we think it would be

profitable to enter into any condemnatory tirades. We think that the Tunisian question raises profound issues which deserve prompt and serious consideration by this Assembly. Whatever may have been the origin of the presence of French forces on Tunisian soil, the plain fact today is that the Tunisian Government and people are irrevocably opposed to the continuance of these forces on Tunisian territory. They have indicated in unmistakable terms that they regard the continued presence of French forces as an impediment to the exercise of sovereign rights by the Tunisian Government. That being so, the continued presence of French forces in Tunisia must be regarded as an infringement of the sovereignty of Tunisia. It is impossible to conceive that any foreign Power could have the right of and insist upon maintaining its forces on the territory of another sovereign State without the latter's agreement or leave and consent. In the case of Tunisia, it seems to us that at no time did it agree to the presence of French forces. The representative of France in the Security Council on 21 July stated that the Juridical foundation of the French military base of Bizerta was a result of the June 1958 agreement between France and Tunisia, which took place at the time of the evacuation of the French forces from Tunisia. We have studied the agreement of 17 June 1958, which is reproduced in Security Council document S/4869. We do not consider that this can be interpreted in any sense to mean a cession of Tunisia's sovereign rights in Bizerta or as an agreement for the continued indefinite maintenance of the Bizerta base. That agreement has meaning and can be understood only within the cadre of Tunisia's full and unfettered sovereignty and independence. The French Government itself stated in its letter of 17 June "That they did not intend to maintain any armed forces on Tunisian territory other than those which may be stationed there by virtue of agreements negotiated between the two States". French forces other than those in Bizerta were to be withdrawn immediately. As regards Bizerta itself, negotiations were to be undertaken between the two Governments not for the relinquishment of Tunisia's sovereignty over Bizerta, but for the establishment of "a provisional arrangement for the maintenance of the strategic base of Bizerta until circumstances allowed of the conclusion of a final agreement on this matter". It is common knowledge that no agreement has been reached regarding Bizerta between the French and Tunisian Governments: indeed there have been no negotiations. Thus, no agreements have been reached with regard to the Bizerta base and, in the face of the declared opposition of the Tunisian Government and people, France can have no manner of right in Bizerta and the continuance of French forces in Bizerta has no legal or moral foundation.

The item before the Assembly has many aspects of great importance not only concerning the freedom of peoples but also pertaining to the attainment of conditions of international harmony and stability and reduction of world tensions, without which international peace and security become threatened. In general, the presence of a foreign military base or forces in any country, whatever may be the intention, and even if these are in pursuance of carefully drawn up agreements between Governments, are a source of frictions and tensions. We do not question the right of States to enter into agreements permitting the presence of foreign troops and bases on their soil, but my Government has over the years resolutely pointed out the dangers--and international tensions resulting therefrom.

It is not without significance that the last few years, which have seen the emergence of the concept of foreign military bases, wherever they may be, as a factor in international relations and an instrument of diplomacy have also witnessed the increase of international tensions, until today the world lives under a pall of apprehension and fear of an impending catastrophe.

As I have already stated, there can be no justification for the continued presence of French forces in the face of the clear and unequivocal stand of the Tunisian Government and people. The only question is of the orderly evacuation of such forces through peaceful negotiations. It is imperative that such negotiations be undertaken immediately, so that the situation in Tunisia, which is already grave and dangerous and which not only involves relations between France and Tunisia but is a source of deep concern throughout Asia and Africa, should not be further aggravated. It is our earnest hope and wish that negotiations take place between France and Tunisia with a view to arriving at agreed arrangements for the orderly evacuation of French forces. Such arrangements could of course take account of logistic and other problems of adjustment and consider the necessary

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modalities and timetable for the evacuation of French Forces. The Government of Tunisia has already indicated its intention to enter into negotiations for this purpose. Its attitude, in fact, has been very reasonable at all times. We hope that the Government of France, realizing the dangers of any aggravation of the Tunisian situation, particularly in the larger context of the present world situation, will show willingness to enter into such negotiations. The world today is already full of grave dangers arising from situations elsewhere. It would be the path of wisdom not to add to the already present grave anxieties and fears. The solution of the Tunisian situation will be a step towards the alleviation of tensions, and it is our belief that a peaceful solution of this situation will have beneficial effect on other situations which trouble the world today.

The first step in our view must be the full implementation of the Security Council resolution S/4882 of 22 July 1961. This was an interim resolution and called for the return of all forces to their original positions. The Government of Tunisia has complied with the Security Council's resolution. It is a matter of regret that, while the French forces have complied with the cease-fire order, they have not yet withdrawn to their original positions. The regret is the deeper, since France is not only a great Power and as such bears a special responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, but also because of our respect for the traditions of French liberalism. France has shown statesmanship in granting independence to many countries formerly under French colonial rule whose representatives are happily with us now in the United Nations. We hope that France will realize the wisdom of friendly compliance with the wishes of the Tunisian Government and

people and withdraw its forces from Tunisia. The forcible continued presence of such forces could only be regarded as a relic of colonial domination.

My delegation has co-sponsored a draft resolution, document A/L351. This resolution is free from acrimony or condemnation, as we did not feel that any useful purpose would be served by entering into expressions of such a nature. It is a reasonable resolution and states the minimum that is necessary as a recommendation from the General Assembly for bringing about a peaceful solution of the grave situation that prevails in Tunisia. There can be no compromise about the principle, which, I submit, derives from the fundamental purpose of the Charter of the United Nations, that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a State without the latter's consent and agreement is not permissible, and that such presence violates the sovereignty of that country. The United Nations, cannot escape the responsibility for a clear enunciation of this principle, which is the basis of the draft resolution. The responsibility is the greater because the Tunisian situation involves the forcible presence of armed forces of a great Power on the territory of a relatively small country which has appealed to the United Nations; and, even while we are discussing this matter, sporadic incidents are occurring in Tunisia, with serious danger of recurrence of armed conflict. It is necessary that the full weight of world public opinion should be brought to bear upon France through a suitable expression by the General Assembly. We trust that the draft resolution will commend itself to the Assembly and will be adopted unanimously.

INDIA TUNISIA USA FRANCE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Aug 21, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha initiating Debate on Foreign Affairs

Initiating the debate on Foreign Affairs in the Lok Sabha on August Aug 16, 1961 the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I beg to move:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

Sir, we have this discussion almost in every session and normally

speaking, the discussion may be divided into two parts--one the narration of the world's ills, the various ills that the world suffers from and which do not seem to lessen but tend to increase, and, secondly, some of our own problems in regard to foreign countries.

Now, although our own problems naturally affect us and interest us, the major problems are, nevertheless, the world's problems, because if

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something goes wrong in the world it affect us.

At the present moment the world is facing rather a serious situation. For the last few years there has been a great deal of talk of disarmament, of lessening tension in the world and all that. All this talk has, unfortunately, led in the present months, to further armament instead of disarmament. Now there is a greater degree of armament and a very definite drift towards an international conflict on a big scale.

USA INDIA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Germany

Immediately, of the many issues, the world's biggest problem relates to Germany and to the city of Berlin. These matters, relating to Germany--West Germany, East Germany, West Berlin and East Berlin--are dependent on a large number of agreements, protocols and the like ever since. I think, 1942 they started up to later in 1945, 1947 and 1948 and so on--and I do not propose to go into all these articles and protocols. Indeed, normally speaking, a decision on them should be made by the principal parties concerned, and we have no direct business to interfere or to express our own opinion. I have, therefore, refrained from expressing any opinion about the legal issues involved, but when a matter threatens to engulf the world in war then it is everybody's interest that this should be avoided. So I have mentioned it, though I do not propose to go into any detail with regard to it.

Now, there are two or three matters, however, that stand out. Recently, in the last two or three days, something has been done which has increased tension. What the legal implications of that are, it is rather a difficult matter--how far one can stop or ingress from one part of Berlin to another or from one part of Germany to the other. But there are two or three things. The first is, I think, whether one likes it or not, as a geographical fact there are two States existing now in Germany: one is West Germany or the Federal Government of Germany, and the other is East Germany. It is desirable I think it would be a normal development, for the two States to come together. Now, how they can come together is not clear to me, until and unless these tremendous tensions are resolved somehow and the fears and suspicions that afflict some of the great powers are lessened, because they can either be brought together by a process of war-and one tries to avoid that because that will destroy not only them but others too or by some agreement. That agreement can only come when these tensions are less and the fears of each party are also much less. I do not myself understand how the geographical fact of two States is going to, well, cease to exist by any other process except by agreement or war. There is no other way out of it. Now, these States not only stand by themselves but one of them, namely, the Federal Government, that is West Germany, is a very important member of the NATO alliance.

East Germany is a member of the Warsaw alliance. So there are not only two States, but States having separate alliances with groups of countries.

Now, at the present moment, one issue which has arisen, and which should, I hope, be cleared up, is the question of the relationship of West Berlin to West Germany and the access to West Berlin from parts of West Germany. I should have thought that it is an admitted matter that the fullest facilities for access to West Berlin should be given. I believe, it has been recognised--naturally Western Germany and western powers want that--fully by Mr. Khrushchev too. If that is a fact, everybody agrees then that at least one major cause of tension and friction will disappear, whatever other developments may take place, and I believe it is this fear that not now but step by step a situation might arise when this access to West Berlin will be stopped or hindered that gives rise to so many fears and, therefore, even some other steps which may not be objectionable are objected to. But that could be made clear, that whatever else happens this access to West Berlin will remain. It is rather presumptuous of me or anyone to suggest anything to the great powers who are involved in this but, nevertheless, because the situation is so dangerous one has to say something and can not remain quiet about it. Thus far, in spite of the fact that West Germany and East Germany are opposed to each other, are members of opposing alliances and, in a sense, do not almost recognise each other, the fact is, and quite inevitably, there have been many contacts between them. Large numbers of workers go from West Germany to East Germany: having been going in the past, and large numbers of people from East Germany go to West Germany, work for the day and go back. That has been happening till recently. I am

not sure if it is happening now, for the last two days or not, but I gather that in spite of the closure of the frontier, still there is a fair amount of movement between the two and people go. A son of a friend of mine, who is in West Germany, telephoned yesterday because his father was rather anxious about him, and said 'Don't worry, we are still moving about from West Germany to East Germany.' In fact, he told me that he was speaking from East Germany though

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he was living in the western part. So, he came to East Germany from the western part and telephoned, and there is a reason for it from his point of view; because, the telephone costs are cheaper from East Germany to Delhi. So, these contacts by man, trade, commerce, etc. go on.

If it is our objective that the two Germanys should come together and there should be a unified Germany, I should have thought that the process would be to help these contacts so that there are more and more contacts and ultimately, it becomes easier to unify them. But, of course, the real difficulty is behind these two Germanys are two opposing forces, two alliances, two blocs and until that is removed, the tension between the two is lessened, they are not allowed to come together, although they may trade with each other they may commerce with each other and have other contacts. I would have suggested with respect that these contacts should be increased, and that will be a step towards the ultimate unification of Germany, if that is to come about. That cannot come about, I do submit, without some process of getting closer to each other. The only other result would be either continuing tension, as at present, or war, which, I believe, most people wish to avoid.

There is on one side undoubtedly fear of, let us say, Soviet Power and the peculiar position of Berlin in the heart of East Germany. On the other side, let us always remember, there is still a continuing fear in the minds of Eastern Europe, not only in the Soviet Union but even in other countries, of the revival of the German militarism. It is a fear which has some basis in history, including the two major wars when all that area has been invaded by Germany. I hope this process will not occur again, but there it is and we have to realise it. It is not a one-sided fear; it is a two-sided fear and you cannot solve any problems when they are wrapped up in this fear.

GERMANY USA POLAND

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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Disarmament

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One obvious way, if not to solve the problem, to lessen the fears is to have disarmament on a very considerable scale. Immediately, many of these fears would lessen, and that is why we have attached so much importance to disarmament: not only because in itself it is good, but because it will lessen these fears which afflict the world. Thus, united Germany, however desirable that may be, it cannot possibly come about without removing these tensions.

I just mentioned disarmament which seems almost a far-off dream. We thought it was coming within grasp but today something is happening which is the reverse of it. Fortunately, the ban on nuclear tests, or suspension of them, still continues. But, after having come very near to an agreement, something happened and the agreement is as far off as ever. I should have thought that the very least is that each country should declare, each major power should declare that it will not use nuclear weapons. Well if the other party uses it, there is danger; I admit that. But that is the least.

On this question of disarmament and nuclear weapons, specially the question of nuclear weapons, at the present moment only a few countries possess them. There are only three countries which possess them or three countries which possess them rather fully, and they are the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Now France has also entered this ring. But it is obvious that in the course of a few years, may be two, three or four years more, many more countries are likely to have them and if there is no check on their production and manufacture now then it will become impossible at a later stage to put any check on them, if many countries have them. At present, perhaps these three or four countries might agree. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that these countries should try to arrive at a settlement in regard to these nuclear tests and, of course, in regard to general disarmament.

USA GERMANY FRANCE RUSSIA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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One question which has been very much in the news and which I should mention is Laos. In a sense, some progress has been made in regard to the Laotian situation. But progress has been slow, and I can very well understand people who are dealing with it, either in Geneva or in Laos itself, often feeling rather frustrated. Still, there has been some progress. And the progress has really come because of some agreements arrived at between the three princes. The three princes are supposed to represent three groups, three tendencies. But having come to that agreement there in Zurich, I think the princes have parted company and the agreement cannot be given full effect to, although talks are going on, for the formation of a national government in Laos itself. In the meanwhile, in Geneva, where a conference is being held, they discussed these matters, waiting for some decision by the princes or by the Laotian people. Therefore, the first question in regard to Laos is the formation of a national government. It is admitted all round that Laos should be a neutral State, as it is called,

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and should not be aligned to any military bloc and that foreign armies should be removed from Laotian territory. That is admitted, but how is it to be done in black and white is being discussed in Geneva.

Now, there is some argument also about the role of the International Commission. On the one side, it is said that the International Commission should be a powerful body which can act when it chooses and how it chooses. On the other side, it is said the powers of the International Commission should be reduced so that it cannot function easily. Our own attitude in regard to this matter is that the International Commission can perform a very important and useful service in Laos.

But it can only do so with the goodwill of the Government and the people there. It cannot be some kind of a super-Government coming over and functioning over the head of the Laotian Government. That would be a very definite diminution of the sovereignty of the Laotian Government and it will not create smooth relations. It must stand there on its own right, the right given by the 14-nation conference being held there including the Government of Laos and it should have a fair measure of freedom to investigate into charges made and to go anywhere. But it must function ultimately, naturally, under the Laotian Government and with its goodwill. There should be no great difficulty about that if there is that goodwill.

LAOS SWITZERLAND USA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Congo

Now I come to Africa. Africa is a country which has in the last year or more come very much on the international scene and has offered tremendous problems in the Congo etc. In the Congo it is still rather difficult to see clearly what is happening, but broadly speaking there has been an improvement in the situation in the Congo and it appears that some kind of an agreement has been arrived at between the Government at Leopoldville and the Government at Stanleyville that is of Mr. Gizenga's. The person who is standing out rather is Mr. Tshombe of Katanga. I hope that the decisions of the Parliament that has been held recently will hold and will be given effect to and the solidarity of the Congo will remain.

CONGO USA FALKLAND ISLANDS

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Algeria

But in Africa there is the old question of Algeria. Repeated attempt at negotiations have not brought any fruitful result yet. One can only hope that these will be resumed and out of them will come decisions confirming the independence of Algeria. Unfortunately for Algeria, the Sahara Desert is producing oil. Oil is always a troublesome thing, something that leads to cupidity and conflict. Normally one should say obviously that the Sahara Desert should be a part of Algeria or, maybe, a part of Tunis. Whatever it is, that is creating a good deal of trouble. I feel that the normal course should be followed and Algeria should include these areas. Anyhow, as the House knows, we have supported Algeria completely throughout this period.

One question has certainly arisen, that is, the recognition of the Provisional Government of Algeria. Many friends, Hon. Members opposite and on this side too, have felt that we should recognise the Provisional Government of Algeria. It may be that we have taken a rather legalistic view because normally speaking one does not recognise a government which does not function on the soil, except in wartime when this is being done, that is, emigre government. So, while we were completely in favour of Algeria's independence and the success of their nationalist struggle, we did hesitate to recognise this Government. In fact, however, although de jure recognition was not given to it, de facto recognition to some extent has taken place. We have met the Ministers of this Provisional Government and in a few days time, in a fortnight or so, as I shall presently inform the House, I am going to Belgrade to attend a conference of certain non-aligned countries and the Provisional Government of Algeria is also represented there. So we function together de facto. It is not a matter of high principle although some principles and practices of international law are involved in it. Nevertheless, it is not a matter of high principle and it is for us to consider afresh whether we should recognise the Provisional Government of Algeria or not and, if so, when we should do so. We thought that our non-formal recognition, that is, de jure recognition, would probably help us in some ways in dealing with this problem, in helping it and in helping them to find a solution. But if that is not so and other circumstances arise, we shall consider the question then of formally recognising the Provisional Government of Algeria.

ALGERIA USA TUNISIA YUGOSLAVIA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Angola

In Africa, however, the part of Africa which is more before the public eye than any other today is Angola. The Portuguese territory there, according to all the information that we have got, which is not very much because the whole place is a closed

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place where hardly anybody can enter. But whatever information we have got has indicated that something very horrible has been

happening in Angola. Although, as the House knows, we have not been very favourably inclined towards Portugal during the last many years, what is happening in Angola has been so horrible that whoever has heard of it, whether in this country or in any other country, his reaction has been one of extreme anger for there are some things which ought to be ruled out. But under the Portuguese rule there nothing is ruled out. These massacres have taken place on a big scale and yet the people of Angola have been struggling not without some success. It is not an easy matter for the Portuguese Government to suppress the Angolan people now though it may be a long business. Of course there is Mozambique and other Portuguese territories which may also be drawn into this conflict.

One aspect of these Portuguese colonies, more especially Angola now and Goa a little time ago, is the indirect help, or rather encouragement-sometimes help too in addition to encouragement--that it has received from the fact that it is a NATO country. That is a very important fact which I have no doubt has made a difference to the Portuguese also. But so bad has been the Portuguese activities in Angola recently that many countries, even NATO countries that encouraged Portugal or helped it, have had to desist and express their displeasure. The House may know that even the United States of America voted against Portugal in the United Nations on this issue. One NATO country, Norway, has openly and publicly said that they will not assist directly or indirectly in anything that Portugal does. The fact is that Portugal is supplied with arms by big Powers which, undoubtedly, I believe are being used in Angola against the people. But it is not arms so much that I am thinking of but of the passive support that Portugal has got because of its being a NATO country or because it is said to be, as in the case of the United Kingdom, their oldest ally. Well, because it is their oldest ally everything that it does has to be encouraged, however evil it may be, does not necessarily follow.

It has been a very painful thing for many countries including ours to see how in the last few months in various ways the British Government has shown sympathy for Portugal, and even though latterly they have expressed a certain mild disapproval--very mild--of some of its activities, their close relationship continues. But, I might say that I am not in favour of the N.A.T.O. or Warsaw Pact or C.E.N.T.O. or whatever it is. Apart from that general opinion, I should like to say something about N.A.T.O and it is this. Whatever virtues or good points N.A.T.O. may have, N.A.T.O. suffers very greatly in public estimation in every country because Portugal is a member of the N.A.T.O. It is manifest, if N.A.T.O. stands to fight for the free countries of the world and Portugal is one of the upholders of freedom. God help those who want that type of freedom.

The Angola matter is not a legal matter. It is not just a N.A.T.O. matter to be considered in the purview of the four corners of the N.A.T.O. It is a world matter. It is going to bring grief, of course, to Portugal. But, I fear, the credit of those who support Portugal will not go far if they go on supporting Portugal and its activities

in Angola.

An Hon'ble Member opposite said something about Kenya, Rhodesia, etc. Kenya and Rhodesia deserve attention. We are greatly interested in what is happening there and what should happen. There is no comparison between Kenya and Rhodesia and Angola. Let us see things in the proper perspective. In Kenya, I am glad to know that Mr. Kenyatta has been released after nine years in prison, after this tremendously long period, and we hope his release will lead to unity in the popular forces in Kenya and that unity will lead to freedom and independence in Kenya. In Rhodesia, in the Central African Federation as it is called, there has been a confusing and a very unsatisfactory position. The mere fact that the National movement there has been quite unable to agree to some of the recent proposals of the U. K. Government shows that the situation is unsatisfactory. Southern Rhodesia, I am afraid, is affected far too much by closeness of the South African Union. Northern Rhodesia is more distant and seems to pull in a different direction. But, it is clear, whether you take Nyasaland or other parts of the Federation, this federation as it is, is not likely to continue. It is opposed by the Africans. You cannot long impose it upon reluctant masses of the population there.

ANGOLA USA PORTUGAL MOZAMBIQUE NORWAY POLAND KENYA FRANCE SOUTH AFRICA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Pakistan

I come to certain things affecting us more closely, certain statements of the President of Pakistan. I am reluctant to say much about them except this that I was surprised and grieved at some of the statements. Not that I expect him to say things that I like or which we may approve of. But, the whole context of some of these statements, the way they were said and the way that India was made the subject of his

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attacks in foreign countries, did seem to me very peculiar and undesirable. It is not normally done, more especially by Heads of States. That is why I was greatly surprised. It showed a mental approach which I thought was deplorable. The mental approach was just hatred of India dislike that India should make any progress and

generally a basic policy that did not think so much positively of Pakistan, but rather negatively of what should happen to India. I have said previously that although much has been said about Kashmir in Pakistan--President Ayub Khan has said that if the Kashmir question is settled according to his liking, then all would be well-- I am absolutely convinced, convinced more than ever that it does not matter what happens to Kashmir,--I know what will happen to Kashmir; that is a different matter--this question of India and Pakistan is not dependent on Kashmir, but has deeper roots, unfortunately, in the minds of the rulers of Pakistan. If the Kashmir question was removed from the scene today, even then, Pakistan authorities--I say authorities; I do not think the people are concerned in this--would still fiercely attack India, because their whole policy is based on anti-India, on dislike of India, on envy of India, India making progress and they remaining where they have been and probably going backwards. This is the basic policy and it is difficult to deal with it. One can judge our policies and their policies. We here in India, whether newspapers or whether the people of Parliament, we do not go about talking about Pakistan all the time. We may occasionally refer to it. We do not curse Pakistan. We want friendship with Pakistan, with the people there. We want the progress of Pakistan. We do not refer to Pakistan or any other issue; while in Pakistan, the major subject for debate is always India, dislike and hatred of India. This is extraordinary. They have developed a complex. Instead of looking after their own progress--Pakistan's progress--which we would welcome, they think their progress consists somehow of denigrating India. It is very difficult for us to deal with this kind of complex, this kind of mind.

If you analyse it, you will see how it has come there. The whole origin of Pakistan was not based on a positive concept. It was based on the concept of hatred. Anti-India feeling. The brave people of Pakistan who had fought for Independence shoulder to shoulder with us, suddenly found themselves ruled by people who had taken no part in the Independence struggle. They had taken part against Independence. People who had supported the British rule then became the rulers of Pakistan. They had no roots in the Independence movement. They had opposed it. Socially speaking, they belonged to certain classes--very good classes no doubt, but there it is--big landlord class and the like in Pakistan. I have no objection to that. I am merely analysing it socially. So that, there was enormous difference between what took place in India and what took place in Pakistan although both had the same roots in the Independence struggle. Nobody can ever forget the tremendous part played in the Independence struggle by the people of Pakistan as it is today. We were all together then. People in the North West Frontier Province, people of Punjab as a whole including Pakistan Punjab, people of Sind played a brave part. But, to our misfortune, may be partly it was our fault--I am not prepared to say it was not--this religious or semi-religious or communal outlook developed in various parts of India and everywhere. I think it was partly our fault; I am not prepared to blame the people of Pakistan completely, because there was communalism in parts of India and there were reactions. However, that

developed and that led ultimately to the partition of India and that became a dominant feature in Pakistan governing the minds of the people. There was no positive approach. Hon. Members here may agree or disagree with the policy that we have been following in India. But, there has been a policy. Before we came to the Government, we had some kind of a policy, an economic policy, agrarian policy, policy in regard to landlordism and the like. And so, as soon as Independence came, we were full of these changes that we wished to bring about. And the record of the past twelve years is an attempt to bring about these changes in India, the Five Year Plans and the rest, and that attempt continues because it is a tremendous job. Regardless of any differences, in regard to the actual policies pursued, the fact is that our minds were full of these changes to be brought about in various departments of life here, and that continues on an ever bigger scale.

In Pakistan, there was no such background. The only background was hatred of India, dislike of India and fear of India. Why fear? They need not have feared India, because India could not attack them, both because our whole background is against it, and because we were full, not of Pakistan, not of anything else, but of our economic planning, our Five Year Plans and the rest; we were full of them; we were not thinking of any trouble for Pakistan; we wanted peace to develop our country, and we hoped that they would develop theirs. But they had no such thing to fill their minds. The only thing there was hatred of India, fear of India, fear because they themselves

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imagined that since they thought of India, we probably think of them which we did not, so, this is the background; let us remember, let us be clear about it.

Kashmir comes in, which is important, of course; Kashmir comes in, and comes in wrongly, of course, because in Kashmir, they are the guilty parties, as this House knows very well. But leave out these deeper considerations of guilt and lack of guilt. There are some obvious things. One is, and there is no doubt about it, that people from Pakistan or through Pakistan came to Kashmir, invaded Kashmir and committed arson, rape and every kind of crime. There was peace there. They say--and I say so; I am saying that this fact cannot be challenged--that they came to support some kind of a freedom movement in Kashmir. Well, there was some trouble in the Poonch area, some trouble there in the Maharaja's time, I mean; there was some trouble there. But there had not been the least bit of trouble in the Kashmir Valley, and they came to the Kashmir Valley, and committed all this arson and everything in Muzaffarabad, against not Hindus so much--Hindus were only a few--but against the Muslims of these places; and Kashmir reacted in a particular way.

Apart from that, ever since then, for some years, there was this trouble going on, and Security Council, and all that, and there was a certain sense of uncertainty in Kashmir which made it difficult for

reforms to come in for several years. Originally, right from the beginning, we had thought of the Constituent Assembly in Kashmir. We stopped that, 'we' meaning the people, the people there stopped it, of course, certainly, with our consent. I am not referring to legal matters, Kashmir's accession to India etc. We all know that. Of course, Kashmir legally acceded to India, legally, practically and in every way, acceded to India. That is there, and that is a matter which has been accepted by the commissions that the United Nations sent here. So, we postponed this for a while. But when this matter went on dragging along, it was decided by the then Kashmir Government, in consultation with us, that they cannot stop progress. So, they had their Constituent Assembly, an elected Constituent Assembly, and the first act that it did was one of a radical land reform. It was one of the first parts of India to give effect to this radical land reform, and it went. I am glad to say, a little further than many of our States have done. However, there it was. It started functioning on a constructive reform basis, and there is much else since then.

After that, there have been two elections and they framed their constitution, and after that, there have been two general elections, and the third is coming soon, when our general election takes place.

Repeatedly, the people of Kashmir or of that part of it which has not been aggressively occupied by the Pakistan forces have had occasion to vote in elections and in everything else, and they have been carrying on, and there is no doubt that in spite of all difficulties, Kashmir has made very considerable progress. In education, it has made remarkable progress, because they started from almost scratch. In other matters too, such as power development, and some small industries and some middling industries, it is making progress. Just look at the two pictures, the Kashmir which is making progress and that bit of Kashmir which is under Pakistan occupation, which is flat, doing nothing, doing practically nothing except singing songs of hatred; it is quite amazing; the difference, of course, is quite amazing. When people in Pakistan talk about plebiscite etc. in Kashmir, it does rather surprise one that a country which has given up the whole business of elections should advise another Power to have plebiscite and elections.

So, I have ventured to take the time of the House a little in probing back as to why it is so: it is because Pakistan has always got tied up in this way, mentally tied up in this way. I do not think that the people of Pakistan are so mentally tied up, though it is true that in the name of religion, it is always possible, whether in Pakistan or in India to rouse evil passions. I admit that, but broadly speaking, the people of Pakistan are free of this, but the governing authorities have got tied up in this way. And the result is that Pakistan has not yet developed roots, national roots. You cannot have a national root based on just hatred of India. It must be positive. That is the difficulty that we have to deal with. We want Pakistan to have roots, to develop roots, to prosper, to go ahead, to co-operate with us, and we shall co-operate with them because that is a normal

thing for two countries, any two adjoining neighbouring countries to do, more especially with a country like Pakistan which has been really part of us,--I am saying even now; because there are so many contacts, human contacts, apart from geography, cultural and historical contacts, but somehow, all this is almost wasted because of this approach.

We went pretty far in the Canal Waters Agreement. I think that it may justly be said that it was a generous agreement on our part. We

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profited by it too; that is why we have agreed to it, but it was generous to Pakistan; the burdens we took, and with a view to bring about that agreement, other countries took also heavy burdens; Pakistan profited greatly by it. As soon as that was over, some good happened; otherwise too, some frontier agreement took place, which was a good thing, but soon after, a loud outcry was raised again about Kashmir.

PAKISTAN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC USA INDIA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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1995

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Farakka Barage

Now, there is another matter which has not become a loud outcry yet, but we never know; it is beginning. That is in regard to certain rivers in East Bengal, or in East Pakistan, and West Bengal. The House knows very well about the Farakka Barrage scheme, which, essentially, apart from other things, is meant for the vital purpose of protection for the port of Calcutta. It is a most urgent matter, and unless we take it up, the whole of Calcutta may just gradually become useless; and where will the city of Calcutta be, if the port of Calcutta goes that way? It is a matter of the greatest importance. Therefore, we have been dealing with it for some time, investigating this and that, and to some extent, not hurrying this process because of Pakistan; we were waiting for our plans to be ready. When they became ready, we informed them about it.

When I was in England earlier this year for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, President Ayub Khan mentioned to me about Eastern Bengal rivers, and he said 'You are building something, and

we intend to do something. Let us do it in such a way as to benefit each other, and anyhow, not to come in each other's way, and let us decide this at ministerial level, at a Ministers' meeting., I said, 'Certainly; we are always prepared to co-operate with you, we shall gladly do this'. Then we had agreed to a Ministers level meeting; But obviously a meeting at the Ministers level can only be fruitful if facts are gathered together and we know exactly what the facts are. So the engineers--Pakistan engineers and Indian engineers met. They have met thus far on three occasions. In fact, they had met previously too, but they have met twice since the beginning of this year, and they are going to meet again. They have been exchanging these facts and figures, which are very complicated, of course. I hope that after the next meeting, which is going to take place fairly soon, both parties would be in possession of these facts. Then the time will come, if it is considered necessary for Ministers on both sides to meet and discuss, that is, not to allow matters to be dealt with by officials who cannot decide things.

But I see a kind of propaganda gradually beginning in Pakistan and to some extent in other countries by Pakistan's representatives to the effect that we are trying to do something by the Farakka Barrage to do enormous injury to the people of East Pakistan, and millions will die and this and that. It is a most extraordinary thing. As a matter of fact, even then our approach to the Farakka Barrage is that we do not wish in any way to harm the interests of East Pakistan in this, and we shall try to adhere to that to the best of our ability. We are certainly prepared to talk to them about the whole area or about other schemes that they may have and we may have on the basis of the information gathered.

PAKISTAN USA INDIA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Nepal

Now, I come to Nepal. There is one simple matter about Nepal about which I should like to inform the House, because people forget, and even the Nepalese seem to forget about. I am told that even the King of Nepal was rather surprised when he learnt of the measure of help we had given to Nepal and are giving today. He did not know apparently. Why, I do not know. So far, India has spent about Rs. 11 crores in aid to Nepal. In our Third Five Year Plan, provision has

been made for Rs. 18 crores to be spent in Nepal. This is apart from the Kosi irrigation and power project which is being built by us, estimated to cost Rs. 44.7 crores and the Gandak project which will cost us Rs. 50.5 crores. 1250 Nepalese have been trained in India in a variety of subjects. Our annual intake of Nepalese trainees in India is between 200-300. We have 187 Indian technical personnel helping in Nepal. These are just some odd figures. We have continued this help, and we have made no difference to it even though some changes took place in Nepal, as the House well knows, which were not very much to our liking. We did not allow that to affect the help we were giving to Nepal.

NEPAL USA INDIA LATVIA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

India-China Border

Now, I should like to say something about our border troubles with Tibet-China and refer specially to something that has apparently not been understood or approved of by some Hon. Members, that is, the visit of the Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry to Peking on his way back from Mongolia. He went to Mongolia to participate in the 40th anniversary of the freedom of Mongolia. 40 years

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ago the Mongolians obtained their freedom from Chinese rule. That was what they were celebrating. Mongolia, although very far from us, has brought old memories and has become progressively a little closer to us in thinking because we have found out now--I confess I did not myself know about it long ago, but in the last few years I have found it out--that Mongolia had many many contacts with India in ancient times. In fact, they derived so many things from us. They have produced so many of our old manuscripts which we have not got, and so on and so forth. They were particularly anxious that we should participate in their 40th anniversary celebrations, and we gladly did so. Our Secretary-General went there. The closest route to go to Mongolia is via China. The other route is--though longer, sometimes it takes a little less time--is via Moscow. He went via Moscow, spent some days there and then we decided that he should return via China--it was closer, while he was in China--there was nothing casual about

it--we asked him, not only as a matter of courtesy, to call on the Chinese President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, but if necessity arose, to talk to them about our border. There was nothing casual about it. It was the right thing to do. Talking does not mean negotiating anything. He had no power to negotiate, nor could he do so. But we did want to.

He went to find out what their reactions were to the Reports-- Official Reports--that had been published, because this House would remember that the Report has been published, containing the report of our officials and the report of the Chinese officials, which, in our opinion, proves almost to the hilt the case that India has put forward. These reports were published, they were placed before this House and discussed here. In China, they were not published at all; they have not yet been published and so nobody knows about these reports except some officials who may have seen them. In fact, they rather expressed their objection or resentment at our having published them before they did so or without their consent. What had happened was that we did not ask for their consent, but we had told them just a few days before that in a few days, three or four days' time, we would be placing these reports before our Parliament, and that meant publication. We did inform them; we had not waited for their consent, nor was it necessary.

It is rather difficult for the present Chinese Government to understand parliamentary procedures or what is due to the public. Anyhow, they have not published these reports, and these still remain in their secret archives or wherever they may be.

Now, under the original agreement arrived at between Premier Chou-en-lai and me when he came here, when we appointed these official commissions to confer with each other, it was decided that after these reports had been prepared, the two Governments should consider them and, may be, discuss them. It was not clearly specified, but the whole idea was that these should be considered, may be separately, may be jointly. Separately, we have considered these fully. I take it that they have considered them too officially, although these have not been published. The question did arise, and does arise, that on the basis of these reports and facts brought out, the two Governments may consider them, how and in what form, I am not clear.

So it seemed to me that it would be a good thing if our Secretary-General could, in the course of talks, just find out what their reactions to these reports were, and report to us. These were his instructions and that is what he did. He met them and discussed these matters at some length. But I am afraid the talks he had with these high Chinese authorities were not productive of much good in so far as we are concerned in this matter, and it was a repetition, as usual; in some small matters here and there, there was some slight variation, but basically it was a repetition. So the position in regard to this border situation remains more or less, what it was. That is, it is static, nothing much is happening. So far I know there has been no further aggression anywhere, nor has there been, except

in one or two places like Long Ju, any going back by the Chinese. Meanwhile we have been strengthening our position there by building roads, transport etc.

I do submit to the House that in spite of our strong feelings over this matter of border incursions and their occupying our territory, we cannot easily rush into war. If it is necessary ultimately, it is a different matter and we must prepare for it. That would be rather adventurist, which we cannot do, especially in the world as it is today on the verge, maybe, of war etc. We must take all these factors into consideration. The main thing is that we must firmly hold to our position, our opinions, our views, and try to get them realise may be it will take some time, but that is better than going into any adventurist action now.

CHINA INDIA MONGOLIA USA RUSSIA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

U.S. Arms Aid To Pakistan

One thing I should like to clear. I refer to the great concern and even excitement about the arms aid given to Pakistan by the United States

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Government. Some Hon. Members opposite wanted me to say that this is an unfriendly act of the United States Government. To begin with, I should like to say something that is pretty obvious, that is that the United States Governmental policy has been particularly friendly to India in the last few months even before that, but in the last few months especially. It is true that their giving this arms aid to Pakistan has caused us very much concern. I have no doubt in my mind that what the United States Government has said they mean, that is to say that they have not done so to embarrass India or to put India in any danger, but the real difficulty is not that we do not accept what the United States says--and they say, they are tied to it by their past commitments, they have to do it and all that, I accept all that--but having accepted it, it is still a matter of grave concern to us, because, as has been made perfectly clear, no commitment of the United States Government is likely to come in the way of the Pakistan Government, if they want to use those arms against somebody. They

used it against the tribal areas in Afghanistan the other day. That was not within the terms of the commitment made to the United States Government. There it is, they used it. Of course, they said they were protecting their borders or territory. Therefore, this concern does continue, and we have to continually think how to meet this new situation that has arisen.

PAKISTAN USA INDIA AFGHANISTAN

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Mongolia

I mentioned Mongolia. I should like to say that it has been a very serious lack that a country like Mongolia should not be taken into the United Nations. What is more surprising is--I speak, of course, from general knowledge, not from any specific knowledge, I may not be 100 per cent correct--that the United States Government lately, some little time ago, approved or desired to have Mongolia in the United Nations, but the Formosa Government vetoed it. I am not talking of a formal veto. They did have a formal veto some two or three years ago in the Security Council. This is not a formal veto, but they threatened to veto it, and therefore this question has been dropped. It is a most extraordinary state of affairs that the Formosan Government, which is a very peculiar Government in the sense that it is called the Government of China, a Government which has not got a square yard of China under its control and still is called the Government of China, is now coming in the way of another country, Mongolia, coming into the United Nations.

MONGOLIA USA CHINA

**Date :** Aug 16, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Lastly, I would just say a few words about this Belgrade conference, where I hope to go in about two weeks time from today. This conference was proposed--of course, there were discussions for months and months about some conference to be held; there were proposals by various countries, specially by Yugoslavia, Indonesia and the UAR, but they did not take shape. This time we got these invitations from the President of the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. There was some correspondence as to the purpose of the conference, and those who should attend it. It is called a conference of non-aligned countries. What is the definition of non-aligned, which countries are non-aligned? Some countries are not, obviously, non-aligned, some are rather doubtful. All this took place. Ultimately, a Preparatory Committee was held in Cairo, and they laid down certain tests of the countries to be invited. After that, some Ambassadors met to apply those tests. In the application of these tests, there was some difference of opinion between our approach and the approach of some other countries present there. Some of our proposals were accepted, some were not, because it had been laid down that there should be unanimous acceptance, so that even one country could oppose; and one or two countries did oppose and therefore they were not accepted. As a matter of fact, lately it has been proposed that some countries that we had proposed and which had been rejected there, should be invited and naturally we are in favour of that because we had proposed them earlier. This proposal has come from some other countries.

This conference is going to meet there, and we have made it perfectly clear, and it has been accepted all round, that we do not want to say or do anything which might lead to a third force or a third bloc. Why? Because we think that if we form a third bloc, we would, in effect, be supporting this idea of blocs. When we are non-aligned with the major blocs, it follows that we should not be aligned amongst ourselves. It is one thing to co-operate together, and we do co-operate in the United Nations, because we have common outlooks, but it is quite another thing to be aligned in a political or military way, and so we have made it clear that we propose to remain unaligned. We cannot get tied up with other countries in a sense so that we cannot follow our own policy because some majority decides in favour of another policy. Anyhow, that has been broadly accepted by this conference.

As to the subjects, it has been laid down, generally speaking, that internal matters, disputes between two countries, will not be considered, but broad matters like world peace, disarmament, the

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removal of colonialism, the removal of racialism, and such like general matters which affect us very greatly will be considered. That is the present position. For the rest, the agenda etc., will be

discussed there when we meet.

I have ventured to refer to most of the matters which perhaps are in the minds of Hon. Members.

YUGOSLAVIA USA INDONESIA EGYPT

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Goa

About Goa? I will just say one or two sentences about Goa. This matter was brought up today in connection with some torture or murder. We had not yet come to know all the facts, We shall find them out. But it is true that the position in Goa is to be reviewed from time to time and also the action that we should take in regard to it. I think that the policy that we have adopted during the last seven or eight years has been the right policy and what is more, it has yielded results--not in the sense that Goa has come to us--but--in gradually convincing of our right policy to many other countries and because of various reasons the general opinion in favour of Portugal has now almost disappeared. We should consider this policy carefully as to what we should do. Our difficulty has been a moral one and a practical one--moral one in the sense that we say that we will not go to war unless we are attacked. Should we try to solve this problem by war? Secondly, there is the practical difficulty because going to war with Portugal--Goa may be a small matter but it means war with Portugal--may mean war with other countries too if not war, a complicated situation.....(Interruptions.)

I am merely pointing out the logic of certain argument. It may not happen. The situation has changed somewhat now. I admit, that. But anyhow, taking military measures against which we have ourselves raised our voice all the time--that is the question. So, that has been the basis and I think our doing so has been justified--not by Goa coming over to us of course not--but in the world's opinion, our stock, if I may use that word, has gone up because we stick to certain basic policies and not function just in anger or in an adventurous way. But, as I said, we shall have to consider again and again, in the near future, how far we should vary the policies we have thus far pursued.

USA PORTUGAL CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Reply to Lok Sabha Debate on Foreign Affairs

Replying to the debate on Foreign Affairs in the Lok Sabha, on Aug 17, 1961,  
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Sir, my task in replying to this debate has been considerably lightened by the many speeches delivered by Hon. Members yesterday who, even though differing in some emphasis or in some minor matter, demonstrated a very large agreement with the basic policies that we have been pursuing. There was only one exception to this of a lone Member belonging to a rather lone party which disagrees with everything that we do, domestic or foreign. For the moment I do not suppose it is necessary for me to meet the points he raised in this House which were one of disapproval of what we do. But, if I may say so with respect, I found a certain appreciation in the speeches delivered here of the fact that we have to consider these matters not in an isolated manner, but in the longer context of world affairs today. Foreign affairs, after all, deal with world affairs. Some of them may be of greater importance to us than to the rest of the world, but anything that is important for the world must necessarily be important to us. A subject like war and peace, for instance, is obviously of the greatest importance to every country and to us. It is well to remember that because it is in that context that we have to consider our own problems and to adopt our policy, I should only, therefore, refer to two or three matters in regard to which, perhaps, I can give some information to the House.

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Hon. Member Shri Vajpayee said that our relations with the newly independent countries of Africa were not good, and that we should develop them. I do not think he is correct in making that assumption. Our relations with these various countries in Africa are good, they were good, but it is obvious that you cannot treat, one should not try to treat these independent countries of Africa as, if I may say so, just countries which take the lead from this country or that country, whether it is a great Power or whether it is India or any other country. They are full of a feeling of awakening, of growth, of strength, of trying to make themselves heard and to do something. Africa is full of a new life, which, sometimes, may lead to some action which may not be approved of by others, by members of this House or by me, but the main thing is that Africa is a continent which is full of vitality and vigour today. That is the main thing we must welcome, not some

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minor thing that they may do which we may not like. It is quite wrong to imagine that friendship with other countries means directions which we may give them or presume to give them. We presume to give no directions to any country in that sense. There is certainly friendly consultation, sometimes friendly advice if it is needed, and an attempt to co-operate without anything binding us.

In regard to specific African countries, it is true that our representation there has been very limited in the past. There were very few independent countries. I am not talking about the United Arab Republic and North Africa which might be called Arab Africa, where we have had some representation, fairly good representation. Coming to the rest of Africa, we have had representation in Ghana and Nigeria. Now we propose, and we are taking steps, to have an Ambassador in Senegal, and his domain of activity will extend to the countries of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Niger. Our Ambassador in the Congo will presently represent us in Chad, Central African Republic and Gabon. Our High Commissioner in Ghana will, in future, represent us at Sierra Leone, Mali, Guinea and Liberia. Our High Commissioner in Nigeria will represent us in the Cameroons, Togoland and Dahomey, and our representative in Mauritius will represent us in Somalia. Thus, in a sense, we shall cover nearly all the new States of Africa. We are quite alive to the very great importance of Africa, and these new countries, and so far as we are concerned, we shall develop close contacts with them, we shall try to. Where necessary, where desired and so far as we are capable, we shall give them help. We are even asked for help, chiefly technical help. We are, in fact, even now giving it to a number of these countries.

INDIA USA GHANA NIGER NIGERIA SENEGAL CHAD CONGO GABON GUINEA LIBERIA MALI  
SIERRA LEONE CAMEROON MAURITIUS SOMALIA

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South-East Asia

Then again, I think Shri Nath Pai said something about a vacuum developing in South-East Asia. It has become rather customary to talk of such vacuums. I confess I do not understand the use of this word, but great powers sometimes talk of vacuum of course because they have been pushed out and therefore there is vacuum and they speak of filling a vacuum because they are not there and they think that somebody else may fill it up. I do not understand the business of vacuum. Each country functions and it may get into difficulties or not but there is no vacuum. There may be trouble if you like and there may be conflict in the country but there is no question of a vacuum to be filled by another country. It is a wrong approach. Anyhow, we are not out to fill any vacuums in other countries. Naturally, we want to have the closest friendly relations and, therefore, our relations in South-East Asia are good and friendly. Sometimes, in some matters we may not agree. Burma was specially mentioned by the Hon. Member. I think in regard to Burma our relations have been extra-ordinarily good throughout these many years and they are good. Nothing has happened. I think the inference drawn is that they cannot be very good because Burma has had concluded some kind of a frontier treaty with China and therefore its relation must be bad with us. That is not a justifiable impressions. If Burma, taking everything into consideration, comes to a treaty with China about her borders, it is upto Burma to do it. We cannot go and tell Burma that because we are in conflict in regard to our borders with China, they must not have a treaty. That would not be a proper attitude for us nor is it justifiable. The meaning is that in a developing situation there are all kinds of new problems arising and it is not right for us to expect that every country or many countries will keep in step with us or fall in line with us in regard to every problem that arises. There have been some petty things in regard to Burma, money being sent from India to Burma or from Burma to India--some minor matters which have arisen purely through misunderstanding. But, there is no major issue between Burma and us.

USA BURMA CHINA INDIA

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## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### U. S. Aid to Pakistan

About the U. S. aid to Pakistan and to us, President Ayub Khan has made some statements which were not, I think, correct. First of all, he made some statements about our getting military aid from the United States. He mentioned hundreds of tanks and missiles and what not. I was really surprised and I was wholly unaware of this fact. So, I enquired into it and I found that in the course of the last ten years, sometime in 1952 or 1953, we purchased something from the United States. I think we purchased some tanks in 1954-55, as we purchase such equipment from other countries; we purchase them from where we can get them at the best price. There has been of course no element of aid in the military equipment that we have got from other countries at any time and in fact in recent years we have purchased less from the United States, the major reasons being that their prices are much more than those in other countries and naturally we prefer a market where we get things somewhat cheaper.

Then there is a statement made by President Ayub Khan and it has often been repeated on behalf of Pakistan: you do not get military aid but you get aid for civil purposes thereby releasing

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your resources for military purposes. That too is a very wrong argument because what aid that we get from any country abroad, normally speaking, is for particular purpose and if not one purpose, a group of purposes according to our planning; it is all tied up. Now, if we get some money, let us say, from United States or from U.K. or U.S.S.R. wherever it may be, we get it mostly for the foreign exchange element or for the capital goods that come in. In fact, that aid does not release any of our domestic resources and in fact we have to spend domestic resources to make good that aid for a project. I think I have made it clear. If we do not get that foreign aid, we may not have that project: that is a different matter and unfortunately for us we will have to go without that project. But foreign aid does not lead to any release of our domestic resources for military or like purposes, because any project that we undertake means expenditure of domestic money and foreign exchange. Therefore, every project that we take up is a drain on our domestic resources; it does not release the domestic resources. In case that foreign aid did not come, it may be that we may have to give up one or two or

three or five projects. That is a different matter. But by its coming we do not get release for military purposes. The military purposes remain naturally a burden on us which we have to shoulder completely with such capacity as we have.

In this connection, may I draw the attention of the House to a news item? In this morning's newspaper there is a statement reported to have been made by Mr. Chester Bowles, Under Secretary of State, who was recently in India. He is reported to have said that the United States was committed to the defence of both India and Pakistan if attacked by the other. He was asked about his statement during his Indian tour that the United States would help India if India was attacked by Pakistan. He said, the report goes on, he had only repeated "the offer made by Mr. Eisenhower then President, made in a letter to Mr. Nehru in 1954. Of course, we do the same for Pakistan; we are committed both ways..." Now, whatever commitments the U.S. Government has with Pakistan is a different matter. The alliances and treaties, the SEATO and the CENTO, etc. have separate agreements with Pakistan. There is no reference to the word 'committed'. They may be committed in their own minds. But there is no question of any commitment by any country to us in regard to aid of this type because, as the House will know, immediately we were committed in this way or anybody else was committed, it means our becoming not wholly unaligned. We begin to be aligned in one way; it must have that effect. As a matter of fact, this matter was not discussed at all,--what Mr. Chester Bowles has said. They may feel probably some kind of a moral issue, because they are helping Pakistan and because possibly they feel that doing this has not been wholly right on the moral plane or on the practical plane and therefore, for themselves, they want to balance that by saying that 'we are committed to India if India is attacked by Pakistan'. There has been no mention, no talk and no commitment so far as we are concerned.

An Hon. Member: He said that U. S. was committed to help India and to balance it he has said in Washington that U. S. would help both India and Pakistan.

The Prime Minister: I have not quite understood what the Hon. Member is saying, but it does not matter. I wanted, both in the interest of the United States as well as of India, to make this matter perfectly clear. But, as a matter of fact, he refers to what President Eisenhower had said in 1954. President Eisenhower had not quite said this. What he had said was this; when we protested to him about the military aid being given to Pakistan, his reply to me was, then, that he would offer military aid to India. He said "we are prepared to do the same to you", to which I had ventured to point out that if the military aid to Pakistan was or might be injurious to India,--about which we had protested--offering something to us would not be very much in keeping with our dignity or theirs, our accepting it or their offering it. I had pointed out this to him.

An Hon. Member: Have they not assured you that the equipment supplied to Pakistan shall not be used against India.

The Prime Minister: Yes, of course they have always said it; they have said it again. That is a different matter. This is a matter between Pakistan and United States, under what condition they give it. That is true. But what I am at present interested in saying is-- lest there be a misapprehension of what Mr. Chester Bowles has said, no doubt meaning quite well to India, but not perhaps realising that it might be interpreted in a way which is not basically true--there is no question of any commitment to us about that. As for some countries in South-East Asia, the House may remember that they were at one time referred to as under the protection of SEATO. SEATO is not only protecting its own countries but is spreading its umbrella to some other countries, which are not members of the SEATO. We are not under anybody's protection or anybody's clients in this respect. That should be made perfectly clear.

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Goa

In this connection, I might also refer to another piece of news that occurs in this morning's newspapers and that is, that the Government of Portugal has sent a note to the Government of India protesting against the Bill recently passed in respect of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. I have not read their protest note which has just come in. But I need not at present read it. Anyhow, they express in this note, as I understand, their intention to exert their right of passage through Indian Union territory to Dadra and Nagar Haveli. We shall of course deal with that note in the normal course. But I want to make it perfectly clear that no one is going to be allowed to pass through Indian territory sent by the Portuguese Government or any other Government. That should be made perfectly clear. If anybody seeks to do that, that person or group will be ejected with great speed from the Indian territory.

I had made this clear previously but I should like to do so again. Shri Braj Raj Singh again asked, "Why does not the Government agree to our nationals going to Goa to liberate it?" Well, how do our nationals go there? Either they go there in a Satyagraha fashion,

unarmed, and offer themselves to be shot or imprisoned, or they go with some kind of arms such as they may possess. It is clear that if they go in an unarmed way, as we have seen, they will be shot down ruthlessly by the Portuguese, because however feeble their army may be, it is easy to shoot down an unarmed people. And then that creates a certain situation for this House to consider, for the Government of India, our army to consider. We should be prepared for the consequences of that. Are we then prepared to send immediately the army.--those people are to be followed by the army--and if so, why not send the army previously, and why allow the people to be shot down and then go there? Or else, the other thing is that people should go there, either in small groups of individuals, with arms, to do petty acts of violence or violent struggle there. I am not going into the moral plane. A person or a group may be justified in doing that, but again, I do not think that is a practical proposition for odd individuals or small groups to do that. It will entangle us without producing results otherwise. We have to be clear on this. The question of Goa, as far as I can see, can only be dealt with either on a completely peaceful basis or on a full armed basis. A time may come when you decide to deal with it on the armed basis. We will do so then. But this kind of petty violence by groups and imagining that the people going there without arms, the citizens going there to liberate it, is not a practical proposition if you like it, apart from anything else that is involved in it.

But, as I said yesterday, I think it was in the other House, if I am asked at the present moment to give any kind of assurance that we shall not use armed forces in regard to Goa, I am not in a position to give it. I do not know what we may do at any time, but we cannot at present in regard to the development of events everywhere, rule out the question of using armed forces in regard to Goa.

INDIA PORTUGAL USA

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Tunisia

I am sorry I am rather going from subject to subject. As the House knows, in Tunisia, there has recently been a very deplorable and distressing incident, the bombing and other action taken by the French Government at Bizerta. Peculiarly painful this has been, and this shows how sometimes even Governments which have broadly acted in

a way to get rid of their colonies, how they hold on to that mentality. That brutal mentality comes back, the mentality of treating other countries as if they are a subject race, to be sat upon, to be shot down and bombed. Here is the French base in Tunisia. Obviously, from any point of view, even from the military point of view, a base in a foreign country can only be useful with the goodwill of the people of that country. It cannot be otherwise. For a little while it may be used against them, but broadly speaking, no base is of any use if the people of that country want to create trouble against that base. To imagine that by shooting and bombing Tunisians they can preserve the base at Bizerta seems to me really quite an extraordinary way of considering such problems. As a matter of fact, even the French have recognised that the base of Bizerta will have to go. So, it was only a question really of facing it,-- whatever it may be--going quickly or a little slowly and in spreading it out. Anyhow, it was a matter for decision with the Tunisian Government, and as everyone knows, the Tunisian Government, the head of that Government, has gone out of his way to be friendly with the western countries. In spite of that, he was given this treatment presumably to teach him a lesson. And yet, these countries do not realise that the lesson is certainly understood particularly in a way they did not expect.

Then we see the Secretary-General of the United Nations comes to Tunisia and wants to go to France to discuss this matter with the French

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Government and President De Gaulle, and he is told that nobody is going to see him if he goes there. It is a very extraordinary treatment given to the representative of the United Nations. It is one thing to agree or not agree to the proposition. But it is a discourteous treatment given to the representative of after all the only one world organisation of this kind which we have got. It does seem very extraordinary, almost a deliberate attempt to break up that organisation, to weaken it and to make it count for nothing. Therefore, this Bizerta incident has become a very serious matter. It is obvious that so far as we are concerned, anyhow we would be supporting the complete freedom of Tunisia and the removal of foreign bases. That has been our policy throughout. It continues to be that, but in the particular event as it has occurred, we feel it even more strongly that these bases should go.

Talking about the United Nations, I may refer to the South African Government, which has prevented a Commission of the United Nations from entering South-West Africa. This kind of not merely discourteous treatment, but aggressively hostile treatment to the United Nations Commission--they were carrying out a resolution passed, I forget, by the Security Council, I think, is regrettable. And, still more regrettable has been the fact that in this refusal of the South African Government to allow it to pass, the Government of the United Kingdom have passively acquiesced, almost actively I would say. It is

very extraordinary--the way great powers are beginning to treat the United Nations.

Several Hon. Members said that in connection with Pakistan; we should not continue appeasing Pakistan; we should not go in for appeasement, as we did in the Canal Waters Treaty or in regard to Berubari. I do not understand what appeasement means; in this context the word is thrown about. If we entered into the Canal Waters Treaty, it was because it was to our advantage. We were not throwing away anything; it was to our advantage. I would like Hon. Members who want to study this matter regarding the Canal Waters Treaty to take some trouble to go into it and see whether it was to our advantage or not. We are not distributing largesse to other countries.

An Hon. Member: On a previous occasion, you said you made a generous gesture in that regard. How is it to be reconciled with this?

The Prime Minister: I know surely; a generous gesture might also be to our advantage.

An Hon. Member: It was pointed out that it was for the benefit of Pakistan also.

The Prime Minister: Of course; when two parties have a deal, there must be an element of benefit to both, unless it is an enforced or compulsory deal. Take Berubari. I think we have done few things which are more advantageous to India than the Berubari matter. (Interruptions). It is no good looking at Berubari by itself. Even looking at it by itself, there was a chance of our losing the whole of Berubari, instead of certainly having half. But it is not a question of looking at it by itself. This was the part of a large deal, with territories being exchanged both in East Bengal, East Pakistan, West Bengal and on the western side here and we gained much more.

Suppose even if Berubari was not justified itself, as it was I think, one must consider the large territories that we get in other places. One must balance it and look at the whole picture. Anybody who looks at it realises that. Of course, it is easy enough to start an agitation saying we are giving up this without exactly knowing what our rights were and what possibilities were there for our claiming it. But if one considers how far this was balanced by other things that we gained, I have no doubt that it is definitely an advantageous settlement. So, I do not know what exactly appeasement means.

An Hon. Member: Appeasement can be big, can be small or can be anything.

The Prime Minister: I do not quite know whether it is small or big, but when one uses the word 'appeasement', it presumably means some action taken by fear or whatever it may be. But, of course, any action taken under some coercion or fear is bad, whatever it is. But if you want to have peace instead of trouble and settle something,

that is normally a good thing beneficial to a country. If you do it under pressure, under the coercion of another State or fear, well, of course, it is a bad thing. Undoubtedly it is bad.

But this kind of mentality that we must always take up a rigid attitude and try not to compromise, not to come to terms about these matters is, I submit, an exceedingly wrong attitude, which no country, however big it may be, ought to take at any time. It is an attitude really of a small country afraid of others and showing its strength by the strong language one uses. It is not the attitude of strength, but it is the attitude of weakness, which weakness is translated into strong language and strong gestures. Strong language and strong gestures may or

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extremely the other party adopts the same brave gestures and uses the same strong language as we see, let us say, in these big issues today like the German issue or the Berlin issue--the kind of language that is gradually being used, the language of cold war, etc. It does not depict that they are strong nations. Nevertheless, that language is used not because of strength, but the fear of the other. We must be strong and we must not give in on any wrong issue; that is a different matter.

Some Hon. Members still object to the Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry stopping at Peking and meeting--I do not think he met the President--the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister there. It passes my comprehension how that can be objected to unless behind that is some intention of giving up something that is vital to us or of subordinating our interests through fear or otherwise. That is a different matter. But it is the normal thing and the proper thing, in fact, something that was necessary and that has justified itself. It was on the way and he had to go to Peking. There was no way. He could, of course come back via Moscow by a long distance.

An Hon. Member: On previous occasion, the Hon. Prime Minister was pleased to say that there can be no friendly relations unless the territory is vacated. Still, why should there be gestures like our Secretary-General stopping at Peking?

The Prime Minister: That is a perfectly correct statement, which I repeat now. (Interruptions). So long as two countries have any kind of diplomatic relations, so long as they are not either at war, when they have no relations except fighting each other or on the verge of war when they break off relations, let us say like South Africa and us--we have no relations, although we are not at war; we have no friendly relations; we have no relations--so long as a country has diplomatic relations, it is carrying on relations. It has to talk, it has to send notes, etc. All these are relations. They may not be of a very friendly character. They are relations and diplomatically speaking, they have to be courteous relations. At least that is the

whole training in democracy, but in these days of cold war, it is forgotten.

What I mean is this. I want this matter to be carefully considered. It is one thing to have an opinion, a strong opinion, to hold it and even if necessary fight for it; it is completely another thing to cut off talking with another country. We have to talk, always talk, till we give up talking and fight; there is no middle course left in it.

I think it is because these are not developed, mature countries, functioning and developed in a mature way. It is one thing to hold to a policy, to hold on to something, but to shut all doors of talks means that you can never deal with the problem except on the field of war. It is obvious, if you rule out every other possible approach. There are, of course, in the ordinary course, pressures exercised in various ways. The Chinese attitude did exercise pressures on us because they sit on our territory. Our attitude in response to that, if I may say so, has exercised a very great deal of pressure on the Chinese because it has affected their prestige all over Asia, in Africa and everywhere. It is not a small pressure that we have exercised in this way.

So we have to take all these things into consideration. As I found that our Secretary-General had to go via Peking and had to spend necessarily a day at least there, deliberately--it was not by chance I told him to go there. He has been the previous Ambassador there. He knows these people. In the ordinary course he had to call on them, just a formal courtesy call. If he goes for a formal courtesy call it depends upon how his talk with them proceeds. He could talk about other matters. When he was going he asked me whether he could talk about other matters. I said, "It depends on circumstances. If they talk, of course, you can talk." We cannot say, no, we won't talk. And, he had to talk, and obviously the talk was more of exploration of minds and things like that than anything else. That type of exploration always goes on between representatives of States or heads of States and others.

TUNISIA USA FRANCE SOUTH AFRICA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PAKISTAN INDIA  
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Mongolia and U.N.

The fact is that, as I was pointing out yesterday, there is next to unanimity in getting Mongolia in. We want every country to be in. There are 99 nations in the United Nations. There are, I believe, just a very few left out. I see no reason why Mongolia should be left out, and we have tried for that. We can only try by talking about it, there is no other way. Now, at the present moment, every country, I think with one exception, wants Mongolia there. The one exception is the Formosa Government, the Kuomintang Government in Formosa. It is quite astonishing. Even the United States agreed and wanted to bring in Mongolia, when the Formosian Government wanted to use its veto. I was trying to point out an extra-ordinary situation that was created.

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MONGOLIA USA

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Pakistan

Again, I think Shri Mahanty said that we should have no piecemeal treaty with Pakistan like canal waters and Berubari. We are always to have piecemeal treaty, not with Pakistan but with any country. We cannot wait for the settlement of every possible dispute. If a settlement in one matter is useful to us, we have it. We settled, let us say, our border issues with Pakistan. It is good. The border is not completely settled yet; some trouble occurs. But it is not that daily there is trouble which necessitated our reference to it almost every day in this House. Broadly speaking, the Indo-Pakistan border is a peaceful border now. That is an advantage to us and to them. Berubari is also part of the border; so also canal waters. That can settle everything. As I said yesterday, now they are raising and making much of the eastern rivers in East Pakistan and West Bengal. Suppose a matter can be easily settled, we will settle it. We would not wait here till every trace of conflict or bitterness between India and Pakistan is over and then settle the whole thing together. That is not really dealing with the facts of life.

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East Germany

One thing more, Sir. Shri Dange laid stress on his desire that we should recognise the East German Government. Now, I admit that there is a good deal of logic in that argument. The fact of the matter is, as I said on the previous day, that we have been continuing to recognise the West German Government even before it became the West German Government. It is a war-time continuation. So it has continued. Of course, otherwise too we might have to recognise it, but it is a continuing thing. Now, since the East German Government came in there has been talk of conflict, talk of two Germanys uniting or something else happening, and we have felt, therefore, that if we took that step it may rather come in the way of this developing situation rather than help it. We have trade relations with East German Government. De facto we recognise it. They have got a Consul here and we are dealing with them in many ways; this is not that we boycott them.

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Congo

Shri Dange also criticised our role in the Congo and said that it was not consistent. He referred to our army people looking on when Mr. Lumumba was murdered. Well, that is not quite correct. They were not looking on. They were not there when he was murdered.

How can our army start petty actions of its own when things happen which they do not like? It is a disciplined army. The function as they are told to function. The whole policy of the U.N. Army in the

Congo had been fixed in another way. It is a different matter, but it had to function under the orders, under the broad directions of the United Nations authorities. I made it clear previously that many things were done, specially in the early days, on behalf of the United Nations in the Congo which I think were wrong and which led to a worsening of the situation. It may even be said that that led step by step, not directly but indirectly, to this unfortunate killing of Mr. Lumumba. One may say that. But to accuse us of being inconsistent in our policy there, is not correct. So long as we are there, we must function as a disciplined group under the United Nations. If we do not approve of that, we would withdraw our troops. We cannot function as an independent group there. fortunately, after all this trouble in the Congo, there is some hope now of a measure of unity, solidarity and some kind of democratic progress there.

Shri Nath Pai said something with which. I agree, and that is our right to buy arms in any country. We pay for them and get them from wherever we can, if that suits us and if the prices are favourable. If they are suitable, we will buy there. Of course, there is no inhibition about that in our minds.

I do not wish to take any more time of the House. I am grateful to the Hon. Members for their approach to this question, and I would beg of them again to look at this picture of international affairs in the broadest sense. We cannot get lost in our petty likes and dislikes when these big things are happening which may make a vast difference to the whole world.

CONGO USA

**Date** : Aug 17, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Statment in Rajya Sabha initiating Debate on Foreign Affairs

Initiating the debate on Foreign Affairs in Rajya Sabha on Aug 22, 1961 the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Mr. Deputy Chairman, I beg to move--

That the present international situation and the policy of the Government in relation thereto be

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taken into consideration.

A discussion on the international situation usually means making a list of the trouble spots of the world which are affecting or disturbing world peace. Secondly, it means our own trouble spots, India's, as affecting India especially.

USA INDIA

**Date :** Aug 22, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Germany

Now undoubtedly the major trouble spot or area of the world today which has a very intimate relation to the possibility of war or the continuance of peace is Central Europe or the question of Germany or, in a more limited sense, the question of West Berlin and East Germany. All this indicates how sixteen years after the last big war ended the consequences of that war are pursuing us still. After a while, these consequences took a different form. The allies of the war changed sides or parted company and new groupings took place and now we find that the allies of that time are the bitter opponents today in the cold war. Now one could go into these numerous declarations, protocols and other ways in which nations deal with each other, which various countries, more especially the great powers concerned, have agreed to in the course of the last fifteen years or so, more than fifteen years--in fact, the story begins in 1942 and subsequently. One can examine them in a legal sense and come to some legal decisions, although everyone knows that these matters are not usually decided on purely legal grounds when there are big political and other consequences involved. Nevertheless one can go into the question and one can go into the question of the allegations which each party makes of the other party having broken some covenant or some protocol, and one accusing the other of having done so unilaterally or otherwise. But the major fact is this that as a result of these various engagements and protocols two States were created--whether temporarily or permanently is another matter--West Germany and East Germany, and in the heart of East Germany there was the great city of Berlin, which itself was divided up into two parts, West Berlin and East Berlin, West Berlin being not a part of West Germany but very much attached to it in various ways. There was this West Berlin therefore in the heart of East Germany but in effect

attached psychologically and in various ways--even economic--to the Federal Government of West Germany. Now, it was not a very good way of carrying on things even temporarily; it has created difficulties. Now West Berlin has become a very prosperous city following the economic and social policies of West Germany. East Berlin is of course a part of East Germany and follows different social and economic policies. Now this kind of close association of a great city--nearly one half of it with one side and other half with the other side, that itself is likely to give rise to conflict when that great city is itself surrounded by another area, and with all kinds, of protocols governing in the matter of how to reach it, the whole situation is full of difficulty and conflict. Now it is not for me--I do not certainly claim to advise and say what should be done in this very complicated situation. But one thing I do venture to say and that is that a situation like this, or any situation, which might lead even to war, cannot be dealt with--well--by threats to each other, or military movements and preparations for war, but primarily by the leaders meeting and trying to find some way out. I do not myself see in all the tangle of declarations and rather threatening attitudes any particular problem which is incapable of solution at the present moment--not the final solution--I am not thinking in terms of a final solution but rather of a temporary solution leading step by step, possibly to other solutions. There is the problem of German unification. Normally one would think that the unification of Germany is desirable. The people of Germany--if not all, most of them--no doubt would like that unity. But the fact that led to the creation of two German States, that fact still remains, and unless something happens to remove that necessity, it is unlikely that unification will take place. No party, so far as I know, is opposed to German unity, completely. But each party wants German unity on its own terms, which are totally unacceptable to the other party. The result is that, in effect, you do not get German unity. And in fact German unity can only come through a peaceful process, when the two parts get together, or the big countries behind them get together and create conditions, an atmosphere where this thing can work. The way to prevent German unity is to carry on the cold war in its intensest form, because that very thing frightens each party not to agree to unity, which might be against their own interests, so that the present policies are being pursued, and this policy of intense cold war not only comes in the way of solution of any of the problems, but it particularly comes in the way of German unification which possibly, I imagine, most Germans desire--one can understand that. So how are we to meet this situation? It is clear that at the present moment there are two countries, and two Governments, the Federal Republic of West Germany and the Democratic Republic of East Germany. There they are; they are a fact of geography. One may not like this, or may not like that, but there they are, and to ignore the existence of one of them or either of

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them is just to shut your eyes to facts, and therefore one must proceed on this basis that there are these two Germanys at the

present moment functioning as separate countries--and one may say--not only as two separate countries but each Germany allied to a separate group of nations, to separate blocs, one to the N. A. T. O. group, the other to the Warsaw Pact group. Therefore, in order to solve this problem the two groups have to come to an agreement more or less, or approach an agreement. Many years ago, there was talk of a possible coming together and suggestions were made which, I thought, were of considerable importance and may form the basis for these two Germanys becoming an area of--what is called--disengagement, an area where there are no nuclear weapons, an area where, if they are not completely disarmed, they are at least largely disarmed and so on, which, in effect, meant that they both came out of the military blocs on either side. Now of course there were difficulties in the way of that, they are still there and they are even greater today. But we must be clear in our minds that all these problems can be solved by peaceful methods or else there is war; there is no third way. The third way may be just prolonging the present agony, carrying it on the verge of neither peace nor war. That of course is not a very satisfactory way, because you always live on the brink, and a false step or something may make you topple over. Now if one wants to avoid war, then the only other way is to pursue peaceful methods, and by peaceful methods I do not mean that either party gives up its position, but that they must deal with it in the normal manner, whether it is through diplomatic channels or through a discussion of these matters. The immediately present crisis has arisen because of the Soviet Union saying that they would have a separate treaty with East Germany in regard to Berlin, etc. Now normally one would think that some kind of treaty is desirable after sixteen years, sixteen years after the War ended, but I recognise that a treaty which does not bring into its fold the other countries--well--does not really end that odd situation. Now one major fact that is said repeatedly on the part of West Germany, West Berlin, or of the Western countries is that West Berlin must continue to exist in full freedom and to maintain its own structure--social, economic and other--and its full contacts with West Germany. I believe that the Soviet Government has declared repeatedly that the present contacts of West Berlin with West Germany will be maintained, will continue completely, and there will be no obstruction or limitation on them. Now, that should remove at least one major barrier to talks on this subject, and whatever guarantees for this purpose may be considered necessary might be afforded through talks or diplomatically.

Sir, I would personally think that, if the unification of Germany is desired, the only way to bring it about peacefully, though perhaps gradually, is to increase the various contacts between East and West Germany, trade contacts and the rest. In fact, there are a good number. People do not realise how many contacts there have been between East and West Germany throughout these years. So, an atmosphere would be created which would make further steps to bring them together easier. As it is, the very reverse is being done. An atmosphere of mutual fear is created with the result that no party is going to agree to a single step which it thinks might come in its way

in case there is conflict, which it thinks might affect its prestige.

Now, it is a fact that while on the one side the tremendous power of the Soviet Union rather frightens some Western countries, on the other side there is no doubt at all that all the East European countries are frightened of German militarism rising up again. They have had two painful experiences of wars, all these Eastern countries, Western also, but more especially Eastern, and they do not want to take the risk of this happening. And this is I think, a governing factor in the situation. If that fear was removed, the situation would be quite different. And step by step, as Germany gets more and more armed, this fear increases. If by any chance Western Germany gets nuclear weapons--I believe they even now have some kind of nuclear weapons, nuclear heads, I think--then the result would immediately be that the East German Army also might be provided with these nuclear heads, and so you come nearer and nearer to an eruption.

I say, Sir, it is not for me or for any of us to offer an advice in such matters, nor is it a very, I think, right position for us or for any country merely blindly because of our likes and dislikes to take up sides in this matter. That has not been our attitude. But in spite of the present method of increasing armed forces in Berlin, armies marching, giving the sound of armed feet all over, almost hearing the trumpets of war, an attempt should be made by responsible people from each side to meet and discuss these matters because there seems to me adequate ground for discussion. It is not that their position is so antagonistic that there can be no common ground though it may be antagonistic in the final sense but not in the present. And ultimately, I believe, the only real solution of these problem is disarmament. At least that will take one a good long way. That is

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all that I venture to say about this major problem of the present day because all other problems sink into almost insignificance when we face the problem of war and peace in the world, and it is that war and peace that is hanging in the balance today in Central Europe and they will affect the whole world immediately. All our problems, whether they are our internal developmental problems or our troubles with foreign countries, will immediately be affected by this and they become secondary and of little significance before that major event which may upset the whole world.

I might say here about Germany that as a result of the war certain new frontiers were accepted. Anyhow they came into being. They are referred as the Oder and Neisse Frontier which affects Poland and other countries. Now, there is not the slightest chance in the world of these frontiers being changed except by victory in a major war. That is obvious. You cannot rule out all that has happened as a consequence of the last war. Therefore, one has to accept those frontiers and accept them clearly. All these Eastern countries are affected by them. The State of Poland is affected if the frontiers

are changed and any kind of talk of changing those frontiers, or even hinting at the possibility of a change, makes the situation much worse. That is the major part of the issue I wished to refer.

For the rest I merely wish to say something about the situation in Africa. In Africa the main trouble spots are the Congo, Algeria, Tunisia, Bizerta; etc. And there is also Angola. These are the major spots. There are others too. Of course, there is South-West Africa and there is the Union of South Africa's continuing policy of apartheid and they are trying to affect other parts of Africa with it.

GERMANY USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC POLAND ALGERIA CONGO ANGOLA TUNISIA SOUTH AFRICA

**Date :** Aug 22, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Angola

For instance, in Angola it is said that the South African Government is lending its help to some extent to the Portuguese authorities. Also there is a sense of fellow-feeling, I believe, to some extent between the South African Government and the Central African Federation or rather the white governing elements there. So you see in Africa this tremendous upsurge being met by the old vested interests in the shape of some governments and chiefly white settlers try-to stop the march of the Africans forward, and as we have seen, in the Congo a very difficult situation is being created. The most painful thing, of course, today in a sense, perhaps in the whole world is what is happening in Angola and the way the Portuguese Government is dealing with the situation there with primitive savagery and barbarity. Many accounts do not come but some accounts do come, accounts chiefly of missionaries. Reading them it is a little difficult to remain calm and peaceful because it is a record of absolute primitive barbarity. It is shocking in the extreme that such things can occur. All one can hope is that the people of Angola will be able to meet this, as I believe they are meeting it and meeting it with a measure of success.

The terrible part of it is that the Portuguese authorities, apart from committing large scale genocide, are particularly interested in liquidating, killing, if you like, every educated African they can find in Angola. In a population of many millions there are not many

but tens of thousands of educated people--I am not talking of very high class education but moderately educated--so that the Angolans may not have any leadership left. That is the idea. It is a ghastly thing and it does little credit to other nations, especially the big nations, that such a thing should occur and they cannot check it or stop it. There is the United Nations, there are the other great countries and there is Portugal still sitting in the Councils of the NATO group of nations. Only one member of the NATO--I think it is Norway--has had the courage to say publicly that they will have nothing to do with Portugal in the shape of any help and that it should not be in the NATO. Of course we cannot expect that other countries will send armies to Angola to fight the Portuguese but the least that any country can do is to express its strong disapproval of what is happening there and to desist from even indirectly helping the Portuguese Government in this nefarious business. I am afraid some countries have not done so and I regret to say that the United Kingdom is one of those countries which indirectly have associated themselves with the portuguese, and, if not directly approved of what is happening, apparently have made it clear that they can survive without much damage to their own esteem. I think it is very unfortunate that any civilised country in the wide world should take up an attitude or take up a very legalistic attitude in regard to what is happening in Angola.

ANGOLA SOUTH AFRICA USA CONGO PORTUGAL NORWAY

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Algeria

In regard to Algeria, we have repeatedly hoped for or looked for some settlement between the Algerian Nationalist Movement and the French Government. They seemed to have come near it and yet again drifted away. There

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can be no doubt, nobody can doubt, not even the authorities in France, that Algeria is bound to be free and the continuation of this struggle merely means needless suffering all round. In Tunisia, what happened in Bizerta also indicates how even a vanishing imperialism strikes back and strikes back very roughly and very cruelly. Altogether the atmosphere of the world is so full of violence that it

is becoming increasingly difficult to consider problems in a peaceful, quite and logical way. So much in regard to foreign problems.

ALGERIA FRANCE TUNISIA

**Date :** Aug 22, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Belgrade Conferance

As the House knows, in about a week's time, I am going to attend a Conference at Belgrade, a Conference of countries that are described as nonaligned. I hope that this Conference will be able to throw its weight such as it has, on the side of peace in Europe because one of the main questions to be considered is the question of war and peace at present as well as the other questions like anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism and the like. Also I hope that it will do some good. It is not merely a question of denouncing things. It is very easy to denounce things and condemn them. It is much more difficult to take some steps which help to improve a situation and I hope that some such steps may be taken by them and that we shall not merely talk in terms of denunciation of what we dislike. Even here in our country and in the Parliament we have every right to express our opinions forcefully but we have always to think as to what steps or what word will help peace and what will merely aggravate a difficult situation.

YUGOSLAVIA USA

**Date :** Aug 22, 1961

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Goa

In India we have our three problems now which are our companions all the time. They are the two border problems, if you like the Pakistan border and the Tibet-China border with India and there is Goa. Of course they are entirely different problems, specially the Goa problem. I believe that conditions are ripening even in regard to Goa for an advance being made. It is difficult for me to say anything definite because I am not sure myself as to what might be done but in the whole context of things, what is happening to the Portuguese colonies abroad and to Portugal itself because in regard to Portugal one must remember that it is not a question of their introducing some special type of Government in their colonies--of course they have introduced it--but in Portugal itself, the method of Government is tyrannical and there is no freedom or civil liberty for even the Portuguese. What is happening there today will produce new situation in Goa requiring a new approach and we are watching them carefully.

INDIA PAKISTAN CHINA USA PORTUGAL CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Aug 22, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Kashmir

In regard to Pakistan, we have had recently quite a good deal of speeches and declarations from responsible people in Pakistan in regard to India, in regard to Kashmir and these speeches and declarations have rather pained me--no doubt it must have pained others too--more especially in the context in which they came. I do not wish to enter into any argument here or at any other time. So far as the question of Kashmir is concerned, our position has been perfectly clear and it remains clear and if anyone in Pakistan thinks that complaining to other countries or trying to rouse other countries or attempting to bully our people will force us into some kind of decision, if they think so, then they have totally misunderstood what India stands for and how India reacts to these tactics.

Our position in Kashmir is completely clear. Apart from all the 10 or 12 years of history, the basic facts remain, that Kashmir was invaded by raiders coming through Pakistan and that the Pakistani army followed them, that Kashmir joined legally the Indian Union. These are basic facts. When the U. N. Commission came here, they had accepted these facts. There is no doubt about it. Having accepted

them, they made certain proposals. Even in these proposals, which we accepted, the first step was that Pakistan should withdraw from the Kashmir territory. They have never done so in the least. So I cannot understand how anyone in Pakistan, least of all responsible leaders, can go on harping back on this issue. We have shown the greatest tolerance, the greatest patience, because according to us, the whole of Kashmir must be freed of any illegal control as part of it is under Pakistani control. That is our right.

But we have also said that we are not going to take any military measures to push out the Pakistan Army or the controlling apparatus from that area. It is our right and we are prepared to consider that when the time comes, in a peaceful way. That is going pretty far, as the House will appreciate, when we say that we are not going to take any military steps in that area which is occupied by Pakistan. That, as I said, is a policy which exhibits a great deal of patience and tolerance on our side. As for talk of plebiscite, etc., we have had repeated general

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elections there. We have a kind of responsible government going on there. We have development plans functioning and changing the face of Kashmir. And on the other side which they have occupied, there is backwardness everywhere. Not only in that part, but in the whole of Pakistan, there is no question of any elections or anything of that type. For them to recommend a process in Kashmir which they have themselves discarded completely does seem to me rather odd. Anyhow, that is the position and we are not going to be pushed out or harried by this kind of tactics that some people are employing in Pakistan.

PAKISTAN INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Aug 22, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Sino-Indian Border.

So far as the Indo-China--not Indochina, that is confusing, because there are countries in Indochina,--I mean so far as the Sino-Indian border is concerned, or the Tibet-Indian border, there is not very much to report. Ever since the official examination of facts was conducted by our officials and the Chinese Government officials and those big volumes come out, it appears to us, and I should imagine,

to any impartial reader, that the Chinese case had little substance, while our case was established beyond any possibility of doubt. We felt that this having been done, it was a step forward certainly and it should affect Chinese thinking in this matter, because we are not thinking, as far as possible, to try to settle this question by a war, and a very difficult war, in the high Himalayas. Apart from our aversion to war and apart from the world situation which would be affected by any such thing, we wanted to settle this, even if it took time, by peaceful methods without, of course, giving up our own rights, our own position. The official documents that came out very largely supported what we had said and established our case, and I thought that the Chinese Government would be affected by this and might change their attitude. It is difficult for me to say whether they are affected or not. Externally they are not. But I cannot conceive of their having read this and not having felt that their position was a weak one.

When recently our Secretary-General in the External Affairs Ministry went to represent us in Mongolia at the fortieth anniversary of their freedom, a freedom, I might remind the House, which they obtained from China forty years ago, I asked our Secretary-General--it was a normal thing to do--to pass through Peking when coming back to India. He could have come back through Moscow, but he went through Moscow, which is a longer way and this is a shorter way through Peking. And it was right not only that he should pay courtesy visits to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, not merely courtesy visits, but frankly discuss the situation. It is not a question of negotiation or anything but discussion, because we do not want merely the thing to be jammed. That is not to our advantage. It may be to the advantage of the Chinese Government that we do not discuss and they do not discuss, because they are sitting on our territory, but it is not to our advantage. So we decided that when he was there, he should discuss this matter and point out more especially what the official report had brought out. This was done. They had long discussions. Nobody expects these discussion to result in any firm conclusions. It was, if I may say so, an attempt to find out by us--and maybe by them--that was at the back of their own mind, as happens in diplomatic talks, not so much merely the thing that we put in a document, but what is behind it. That we wanted to find out, what the effect of these official reports was. But as I said, it is difficult for me to judge because in these matters the phrases used are seldom very clear and no commitments are made.

But I think these talks had some advantage in the sense that our position which has been clearly stated, of course in our documents, was nevertheless again fully and clearly stated by our Secretary-General to them, lest they should be under any mis-apprehension on the subject. There the matter is and I am not quite clear at the present moment and I cannot say definitely what the next step in this matter may be. But as I said, as regards these talks etc., I do not want the door to be closed for them, because it is not to our advantage. In what way this matter may be considered in the future, at the diplomatic level whatever it is--that of course, to some

extent, goes on--is to be decided.

But I should like this House to remember that in dealing with this very serious and very important matter, namely, our border with China we are not dealing merely with a present difficulty. We are dealing with the future. It may affect generations to come. Therefore, we have to move with wisdom and with strength, and not merely in a huff, to take a step which might rebound upon us. Nor indeed, whatever happens, should we weaken in our resolve to face all the consequences of this. It is not necessary for me to say, as the House knows it, that everyone, nearly all groups and individuals in India, have strong feelings about this matter.

Some others have not these strong feelings,

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and I want to say quite frankly to some Hon. Members opposite that this is a subject which does not admit of equivocation, in other matters whatever that might be. I find that even in this party or group which has had its doubts about the situation, they speak sometimes with two voices. I am not blaming all of them but the fact is that there has been in the past, and sometimes it does take place even now, a kind of propaganda or justification of China on our border, a kind of propaganda pointing out that this is just a game of some people in India in order to win the elections or in order to affect the elections.

Well, Sir, this started about two or three years ago, and how did we look long ahead, two or three years ahead, about the elections coming and create all this? Here is the simple precise statement in the officials report which states the position as to what has happened, and for people to go about criticising the Indian case--I do not mind criticism on a logical basis but bringing in this game of elections or something else and justifying what China has done--is an attitude, whatever it may be meant to achieve, which is certainly an anti-national attitude and there should be no equivocation about this matter. There must be the clearest statement as to where we stand about it because unfortunately these things do not affect the people of India much but they produce some wrong impression on the other side and that comes in the way of any proper approach to this problem.

For the present, Sir, I should like to confine myself to these remarks. There are many other subjects, of course, and I think it is better for Hon. Members to have more time. Then, in regard to any other subject, I shall gladly say something in my reply.

INDIA CHINA USA MONGOLIA RUSSIA

**Date :** Aug 22, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Reply to Rajya Sabha Debate on Foreign Affairs

Replying to the debate on Foreign Affairs in the Rajya Sabha on Aug 23, 1961, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Sir, I am grateful to Hon. Members for what I presume to call their general approval of the broad policies that we have been pursuing. There are some matters that were raised, to which I shall endeavour to give a reply.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Germany

In regard to the very serious situation that has arisen in Berlin or in Central Europe, I ventured to say yesterday that it was not for us to make proposals, definite proposals. It is a matter concerning the great powers and the only thing we would suggest strongly is that they should get together and deal with it, instead of moving about troops and issuing rather manifold statements on the situation.

Apart from the rights and wrongs of the matter, the consequences of conflict are so terrible that no responsible statesman or anyone else can go towards that conflict without making every effort to avoid it. Personally I think that in this particular instance of Berlin, looking at it even from the point of view of the two major contestants, it does not necessarily follow that there should be a conflict. There are ways and means probably which can avoid this I do hope that it will be taken advantage of, but the point is that this should be removed from the plane of troop movements and military preparations to the council chamber or to a meeting of representatives of the great powers concerned.

Now I would repeat some of the factors that are known. Much of this trouble at the present moment has arisen because of a fear in regard to the inhabitants of West Berlin whether they would be cut off from West Germany and whether the four powers or the three powers, namely the United States, the United Kingdom and France would be prevented from having access to West Berlin. In regard to this I can very well understand that a great city like West Berlin with a population, I think, of 2 1/2 million, apart from East Berlin, and following a certain social and economic structure to which they are addicted should be afraid of any change coming in the way of their lives and any break in the contacts they have had with West Germany.

It is true that their position, their isolated position, in the heart of East Germany is very unusual and odd. Nevertheless it has been made clear by Mr. Khrushchev that no interference will take place in their ways of living and their social and economic structure, and that the fullest assurances and guarantees will be given so that they may maintain their rights of way or passage with West Germany. If that is so, at any rate one of the major fears of West Berlin or the Western powers would now lose its substance. At any rate there is enough matter to be discussed on the council table and decisions arrived at to safeguard the freedom of West Berlin and the freedom of its contacts with West Germany.

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But there is one matter I should like to mention, and that is that the whole atmosphere has been vitiated in the last many years by certain uncertainty in regard to frontiers. About Berlin it is odd enough. About the other frontiers which are called the Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland, which is a frontier arising from the war, it has not been accepted by some countries notably West Germany, and this involves a large population. In Poland alone it involves, I believe, a population of 8 million; that is, when the frontier was changed, it involved a population of 8 million, and it would create a tremendous upset to all these people because many people have come and settled down there. Anyhow if anything is certain, it is this that any attempt to change that frontier will lead to war. I am surprised therefore that this matter should be left vague and in the air often with ideas thrown about that it should be changed. I cannot say whether this is a definite and firm policy of any country, but even leaving it vague is a dangerous thing, because that puts the whole question of West Germany and East Germany on a dangerous level. This is a thing which cannot possibly be done anyway by war, and war is not going to do it, and war will bring complete destruction to East Germany and West Germany and other countries. Therefore, I cannot understand why the permanence of these frontiers is not plainly accepted. Possibly it may be that some countries think that it could be used as a bargaining counter for other gains, I do not know. But it would not help if these matters are not clarified. In any case it is clear that there are in fact two countries at present. West Germany, the Federal Government, and East Germany, the German

Democratic Republic, each connected by land and otherwise with various power blocs. It is no good avoiding to see this, and in any talks one must accept facts.

Now I presume that there is a strong feeling among the German people in favour of unity, and that seems to be a natural feeling. Perhaps some time in the future that may come about, but it will never come about by war or by constant attempts at war or by cold war, because that very atmosphere that a cold war creates is against their coming together, because each major bloc is afraid of that happening if it happens in a way disadvantageous to that. One question was raised I think, by the Hon. Member, Dr. Kunzru, about the rights of people going from East Berlin to West Berlin. I have tried to look into this matter, and it is rather difficult to give a very precise answer, a legal answer, because there are so many charge and counter-charges, and so many changes have taken place. But the position as I understand it is this:

The Protocol of 12th September 1944 laid down that the occupation zones of Germany would be allotted to each of the occupying Powers (France was added to the occupying powers later). Berlin area was, however, regarded as special and this was to be under joint occupation of all the four Powers including France. Paragraph 5 of the protocol lays down that the Greater Berlin area was to be jointly administered.

After the Berlin blockade, however, the new arrangements that came into force were defined in the communique of the Council of Foreign Ministers of June 20, 1949. Paragraph 3 of this communique refers to the present administrative division of Germany and of Berlin and the need for consideration of questions of common interest relating to the administration of the four sectors in Berlin with a view to normalising, so far as possible, the life of the City by the Council of the four Foreign Ministers. Since this admission of the administrative division of Berlin, as distinguished from the joint administration of the greater Berlin area referred to in the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, makes a material change in the 1944 arrangements agreed to by the Four Powers, the Soviet and East German authorities could very well argue that they have the right to regulate and control the movement from the East Berlin area to the West Berlin area as the administration of Berlin has never been joint since 1949.

An Hon. Member: There was an agreement on the 4th May 1949 that movement between East and west Germany should be free, and this was confirmed later in June 1949 to which the Prime Minister has referred.

The Prime Minister: I have just referred to the communique of June 30, 1949 which, far from confirming the previous thing, rather upset it by giving up the joint Berlin arrangement and admitted these four separate areas.

The Hon. Member: The administration was given up but not free movement.

The Prime Minister: It is not a question of giving up. The point is what rights each party had. There has been this movement, in fact I should imagine that about fifty thousand workers went from one side to the other for their daily work. This has been happening all the time. The point is whether legally or by an agreement or protocol something had been decided upon which has been broken. The administration of Berlin from 1945 to 1948, the Berlin blockade of

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1948 and 1949 and the arrangements arrived at the end of the blockade further diluted the rights of Western Powers in Berlin particularly regarding the right of access.

The blockade was lifted by the agreement of the four powers on 4th May, 1949 which asked the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four Powers to consider questions relating to Germany and arising out of the situation in Berlin. This Council of Foreign Ministers stated in the final communique of 20th June, 1949 that "the movement of persons and goods and communications between the Eastern zone and the Western zones and Berlin and also in regard to transit, the occupation authorities each in its own zone will have an obligation to take the measures necessary to ensure the normal functioning and utilisation of rail, water, and road transport for such movement of persons and goods and such communications by posts, telephone and telegraph." This is the June 1949 Communique. The Foreign Ministers also acknowledged "the present administrative divisions" of Berlin and called upon the occupation authorities "to consult together" on quadripartite basis. This meant the continuance of freedom of movement between East and West Berlin in spite of the administrative divisions. The Council of Foreign Ministers did not invoke any right of access but merely mentioned "obligation" on the part of the occupation authorities to take the necessary measures, "each in its own zone".

On 12th May, 1949, an occupation statute was promulgated in the three Western zones of Germany. Although this came into operation only on the 21st September, 1949, when the West German Republic was recognised by the Western Powers, a similar statute on West Berlin was made immediately effective on the 14th May, 1949. The German Democratic Republic was promulgated by the Soviet Union on 2nd October, 1949, 12 days after the recognition of the West German Republic by the three Western Powers and article 2 of the Constitution mentioned Berlin as the capital of the German Democratic Republic.

By the end of 1949, the division of Germany had been formulated by the establishment of the separate states--West Germany and East Germany--and the division of Berlin was as firm as the division of Germany. By the statutes promulgated, West Berlin was part of West

Germany and East Berlin became the capital of East Germany. Both sides, however, kept up the pretence regarding the status of Berlin by stating that the law and treaties of the two Germany will not apply to the respective areas of Berlin unless they were reenacted by the legislature of East Berlin or West Berlin, as the case may be. Both in West Germany and in East Germany the occupation regime was terminated though the legal status of occupation continued. In Berlin, however both the occupation status and the occupation regime were kept up though with material modifications.

In 1954 the Western Powers decided to recognise the sovereignty of West Berlin and to invite her to join the NATO along with Western Germany. On October 22nd, 1954, the NATO Council suggested itself with the Tripartite guarantee of Berlin which thus became the responsibility of the North Atlantic Treaty System. Similar developments took place in East Berlin and East Germany. The Treaty of 20th September, 1955 vested the East German Republic with sovereignty and transferred to it the control over boundaries of Greater Berlin and all the lines of communication with the Federal Republic. The transit of personnel and freight to the three Western Power, however, continued, despite the treaty, to be handled not by the East German Republic but by the Soviet Union "for the time being".

Since then the Soviet Union denounced on 27th November, 1958, the two protocols of 1944 with a view to terminating in Berlin the occupation regime which had long since disappeared in West Germany and East Germany.

Hon. Members will see that all kind of changes were taking place during these last twelve years after the 1948 arrangement or protocol. A very major change has been that on the one side, West Germany has become a member of the NATO group of nations and East Germany has become a member of the Warsaw Pact, associating with the other bloc, and all these separating movements have been taking place and they are both admitted by some countries on each side as sovereign States West Germany and East Germany And this had a powerful effect on West Berlin and East Berlin. It may be that I cannot deal with this matter in strict law but the facts are that both have been functioning separately but with a great deal of contact and communication going on to and fro, admittedly each part governing this movement. As sovereign States, normally they have the right to control movements across their borders. Whether it is justifiable or not, it is another matter. However, these are the facts. Both these sides, of course, accuse the other of breaking the old agreements.

I may further state that legally the presence of Western Powers in the City of Berlin is based not on the Potsdam Agreement but on the Protocol

of 12th September, 1944. The right of access to Berlin of the Western Powers is, however, on a different footing. It is not inherent in the right to occupy Berlin. The Hague Court held in the Goa case that such right of access are not automatic in the case of an enclave nor is the right of access of Western Powers of the same validity in law as the right of occupation. It has not been stipulated specifically in any four-Power agreement. This right was secured by the Western Powers by a verbal agreement in June, 1945, not as a right but as a concession from the Soviet authorities.

Well, it is no good my developing legal arguments. But the point is that the issue there from the legal point of view is a confusing one. From the practical point of view, it is still more confused. But the major fact is that whether it is West Germany of East Germany or East or West Berlin, they represent different sovereign authorities and that has created difficulties. If these sovereign authorities cooperate, well and good; if they do not there is trouble, and we are having that trouble now.

Then, Sir, Mr. Bhupesh Gupta laid great stress on the supply of arms by the United States to Pakistan and on President Ayub Khan's various statements. Also he laid great stress on our recognition of the East German Government. While I am dealing with Germany, I shall deal with that. Our recognition of the West German Government, as I have often stated, is really a continuation of our war time association with the Western allies. We had a military mission there, that is the British Government of India had a military mission there. That continued after we became independent and that automatically converted itself into a diplomatic mission afterwards. For some time our Ambassador or representative had to be General and we had to put even our civilian officers in Military uniform and call them Generals though probably they had nothing to do with the army either. So, that developed in this way. So, it was a continuation. Now, on the eastern side there was no such continuity, no such background, and right from the beginning, there was this hope that some arrangement would be arrived at to bringing the two Germanys together and we avoided therefore taking any action which might come in the way of that to some extent, and we practised that. As time went on, we developed trade relations with East Germany, fairly good trade relations. They have got a trade representative in India, in Delhi, and in effect, practically we deal with them as an independent country which we recognise. But we have got no diplomatic contacts with them for the reasons I have mentioned.

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Then with Mr. Bhupesh Gupta's comments on the arms aid to Pakistan--well--partly I would agree with them, because we have felt great concern. But I would repeat what I said elsewhere and I do not think Mr. Bhupesh Gupta is justified in drawing certain inferences in regard to the United States. I am quite clear in my mind that in spite of this aid being given to Pakistan--which we deplore, because it creates difficulties for us--the fact is that the present Government of the United States is not only friendly to us but more friendly than any Government in the last ten years or so. But then, partly they have had to honour past commitments--past inheritance they cannot get rid of it, just as any country cannot wholly get rid of its past--and partly for whatever it is due to. It is not for me to judge of their motives or their desires, but one fact, I think, is quite clear and that is, that they are friendly to India, more so than before, and that their aid given to Pakistan certainly was not given with a view to embarrassing India, or to put India in a difficulty although, whatever their motive may have been, surely, the consequence of it is there for us to face. That is true. I think it is desirable therefore that we should see these things in proper perspective and not lose that perspective. Now, as a result of this aid, as Dr. Kunzru pointed out certain consequences flow, and we may have to face them and do whatever is possible for us to meet this tense situation. However, apart from the concern which it has naturally aroused in us and the vigilance that it should cause, I do not think we need be seriously alarmed. There are one or two aspects of course which might prove alarming, and one of them--I regret to say it--is that there is always the possibility and danger of complete irresponsibility on the part of Pakistan. We see leading personalities in Pakistan laying great stress on friendly relations with India and on the impossibility of war between Pakistan and India. We agree. And the next day, or the next week or the next month they say something which is completely the opposite of it. And there it is. I am sorry to say it is irritating to read that and note this policy of creating tensions. In general, what might be called a bullying policy. It cannot bully us, and it has, in fact, always been the policy with some countries. Now, if one country tries to bully another country, unless that other country is extraordinarily weak, the other country does not submit to bullying, but the reaction is the opposite one. It is not a wise policy for any country to try and bully another, big or small, much less a country like India which, whatever our failings may be, we do not like, and we do not submit to bullying from any quart.t

But it has been the painful experience during these past few months to see this attitude on the Pakistan side, and all that I can say about it is that it may be chiefly perhaps the result of--I dislike using the word--their disappointment, and envy at the progress of India comparely to our neighbouring country. Now it is true that we are bent on progress. All our Five Year Plans and everything are bent for that, as in every country it should be. There is no doubt that it is so in Pakistan or ought to be. We wish it well. And with progress inevitably comes greater strength, even greater military strength, not directly in the sense of more men, bigger arms, etc., but in the sense that modern wars are fought on the industrial front as much as on any other front, and therefore the importance even of developing your defence strength is far more today on the industrial front than on any other. Of course, in a moment of crisis one has to get what one can from any country, whether it is aeroplanes, whether it is tanks or anything else, but it is far better to have, if I may say so with all respect, to have second class weapons produced in your own country, on which you can rely, than on first class weapons coming from another country, which normally may not function if a screw or something is worn out or lost and when you want the spare parts you can not get them, or the other country may not supply them. Therefore the essence of defence today is the development of the industrial background of the country, that including, of course, the production of weapons, etc., and what has happened in the last few years, to a very considerable extent a very creditable extent, is the growth not only of the wide industrial background of the country, but more especially, the background of defence science and defence industry which have progressed very well. You will remember that before independence practically everything came from London or some other place. The country depended entirely, for her defence material, on the United Kingdom except for some very small armaments which the ordnance factories produced because of pressure of war; before the last War we had nothing; now we have built up very great establishments of defence apparatus and, what is even more important, a very fine defence science section. Of course defence means today science really. You talk about air-to-air missiles, air-to-ground missiless or ground-to-air missiles. What is that? It is science. It is all very well for us to go and buy something from the United Kingdom or the United States or the Soviet Union. We may use it for a little while, but really it does not do much good unless you grow into it, unless the nation makes it itself, and I may inform this House that for the last few months and even years it is our defence scientists-not by getting something from outside-it is our defence scientists that have been experimenting-and with success-in regard to these missiles from air to air. We are not a great power; we do not produce them in abundance. But the point is that we are reaching that stage through our own trained scientists, technicians, etc., which is of high importance, is far more important than buying some aircrafts or some missiles from abroad, which may or may not function at the time of need. So we have concentrated on the training of high class personnel, in science, in technology, etc., The mere fact that we produced a supersonic fighter at Bangalore is evidence of the high degree of skill and ability existing in our air force-both scientific

and technical. It is true that we have been helped by a noted German designer, Dr. Tank. But the fact remains that one man cannot do it all. It is all our young men who have done it. So this is the advance we are making apart from the other general Industrial advance that strengthens our nation, lays a foundation for future strength and progress and well-being. That is the main thing. There is always a choice to be made by a country. What are we to do? Are we to go on increasing our basic defence capacity, capacity of this basic industry and basic well-being and basic science, or are we to spend our resources in buying a number of latest type of weapons or aircraft from some country which may give us some satisfaction for the present but which two, three or four years hence may be no good at all? They wear out and we have not learnt much from them except to fly them to some extent.

Now, are we to think of the present danger to this extent that we injure our progress towards greater strength and greater sufficiency? One has to balance these things. Sometimes the present danger is so great that you sacrifice everything to prevent that danger taking that shape. But generally speaking, one must not be blown off one's feet by these alarms. One must keep ready and vigilant and concentrate on building from down up. That is what we have been doing with great success.

Our Army is changing I may say, and it has changed from an army of the old British type. Able as it was, I do not doubt its ability, but broadly speaking, not a scientific or technical army, but an army of brass hats. They were good brass hats. No doubt there they were. This is a major change. It is becoming a modern Army now, in the sense it is not a dependent army on whitehall or some place purchasing weapons, and that is an important factor in the growth of a nation.

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I am sorry, I have said this, really it is in connection with President Ayub Khan's complaint that we are making progress. Now, are we to stop our progress because by our progressing faster than Pakistan we become stronger and, therefore a danger to Pakistan? It is a queer argument. President Ayub Khan's argument is that we are getting stonger and, therefore, we are becoming a menace not only to Pakistan but to Burma, to Sikkim, to Nepal and Bhutan and every place round about. I hope that all these countries, with whom we have very friendly relations, are not afraid of our strength. Even today, as it is in terms of military or industrial strength we are stronger than many of our neighbours. There is no comparison between our strength and the strength of Sikkim or Bhutan or even Nepal. There is no question. But that does not mean that we are opposed to Nepal or Nepal need be afraid of us and all that. But, to a military mind nothing else apparently is clear except this military approach and balancing of guns and aircraft, etc.. That is an unfortunate thing. Apparently, Pakistan is governed very much by the military mind. It does not see the larger consequences of things.

There is another thing. President Ayub Khan precisely said that he was very much concerned with the possibility of the United States giving us military aid, that is to say, supplying us arms and aircraft free, a thing which was highly unlikely because we do not take such things. It was many years ago, I forget perhaps in 1954-55 when once we protested, at the time of President Eisenhower against this military aid being given to Pakistan. He was good enough to reply that we could have it too. Well, I pointed out to him, with respect, that our policy was opposed to this and while his giving military aid to Pakistan was injurious to us and added to our burdens, offering aid to us did not fit in with our conceptions of dignity and anyhow we could not possibly accept it. There is no question of taking this kind of aid. We are not going to do it, from any country.

We have in the course of the last few years purchased some aircraft and other things from the United States, generally in the earlier stage of the fifties, not later so much, because it so happens that good supplies from the United States are far more expensive than from the United Kingdom or France or certainly the Soviet Union. And there is no reason why we should not buy provided we get the right thing from the cheapest market. Even there our tendency now is whenever we buy anything we think of making it ourselves. So, we try to come to terms with that country to build up that factory and produce it here so that we will be self-sufficient.

President Ayub Khan actually gave the figure that we had bought-I forget the figure 400 tanks from the United States as military aid and so many other things. It was completely wrong, without any basis, we had bought some tanks about eight years ago from them. So, what he wants to do, I do not quite know, with this approach of fear, apprehension and dislike of India. As far as I can judge--nobody can look into the distant future--India is not going to be an aggressive country in a military sense. As a matter of fact, I should say that if we can survive--we meaning the world, not India--another fifteen or twenty years possibly much less I would say, then no country can be an aggressive country because of these modern developments, hydrogen bombs, this, that and the other. You cannot be aggressive when it means a complete suicide. Possibly even ten years is a good enough limit for that, I would say. If we survive, if the world survives, if it does, it means it comes to some understanding, some arrangements, and this cold war, ends, disarmament takes place for disarmament is the essence of this situation or else we blow ourselves up. To think in terms of this old world mentality, continuing of power blocs and threats and wars continuing now or in the future is out of date for any thinking person. That is my view of the world, much more so about India. It would be madness on the part of India and against our whole grain of thinking to indulge in aggression. We have no ambitions in regard to territory except to recover what is ours, except to gain one bit of territory which is still not ours and which is geographic, that is, Goa. That certainly will complete our political revolution. Outside that we have no ambitions anywhere. We do not wish to interfere with any country. We wish to co-operate.

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Belgrade Conference

Mr. Bhupesh Gupta made a suggestion that a number of M. Ps should go with me to Belgrade. I do not know if he thinks he is going to be... But I would point out to him that on the United Nations Conferences, to some extent, one has a number of people, but in this very limited Conference we have to take a very limited number of people who are more or less selected officially chosen. Thirtyone countries are going to be represented at Belgrade, many of them Presidents, some Kings and many Prime Ministers, humbler variety. And I am sure to tax the Yugoslav Government somewhat, to put all these people up and looking after them, would be difficult. In fact they have hinted at that. So far as India is concerned, although sometimes, Hon. Members may think that we are extravagant

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but they will be surprised when they compare how we function in other countries and how other countries function, how we travel, how many people go with us in our delegations and how other countries, many of the Asian countries too--I am not talking about the U. S. A. and England as they are bigger countries but other countries--go with specially chartered huge liners, full of people, crowds of them and crowds of not people doing the work of the Conference but retainers and people looking after each other and all that. It is an extraordinary situation. In fact when we go to some place, that leads to some comment in the local press too, not very creditable to the other Government in the sense that they pointed out this - "The Prime Minister of India comes simply. Why do we have such pomp and circumstance when we move?" Of course we do not want it. It is against our grain to do in that way and we cannot afford these things.

I think Mr. D. P. Singh of the Praja Socialist Party said something about Nepal, made some self-contradictory remarks and he said that we should help Nepal but we should not help the present order. How we are to distinguish this, I do not know. Did you not say?

The Hon. Member: I did not say that we should not help the present order. I said that we should help the present order.

The Prime Minister: All right I am sorry that I misunderstood what he said, I would even give you the facts that we are helping Nepal quite considerably and the fact that there has been a change in Nepal has not affected our help in the slightest.

I speak from memory but I think we have helped them to the tune of Rs. 13 crores and in the next five years, a much bigger sum it will be. I have got the figures but I need not trouble the House with them and we intend to continue doing that. Naturally, we have certain views about systems of Government and structures of society but we do not push them on others.

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Secretary-General's visit to China

Pandit Kunzru spoke with great warmth about the visit of our Secretary-General to Peking. I confess that I have been wholly unable to understand this viewpoint. It is one thing to agree or disagree but my misfortune is that I just cannot understand it at all how the things we did could, from any point of view, I say, be disapproved of or considered wrong. It was, I think, the right thing and so far as I am concerned, I will do it hundred times. I do not understand how a thing which is the normal thing should be considered a national humiliation. Really we think on different lines. I regret, it is my misfortune that I should do so. Again I think Mr. Jaswant Singh also expressed strong disapproval. It is said that our Ambassador should have conveyed our messages. This is something which shows, if I may say so with all respect, a complete lack of understanding of how countries function, how diplomats function, how Ambassadors function, how Special Envoys function. Of course the Ambassador has been there and he has been one of our best Ambassadors. He has done very good work and if the Secretary-General went, he also went. He was there with the Secretary-General all the time. He went with him. Mr. Jaswant Singh has got some sources of information which are not very correct.

The Hon. Member: I saw only in the papers. I wanted to know whether

they were correct or not.

The Prime Minister: May be, that shows how wrong the papers are. If that is so, I do not know which paper it was.

The Hon. Member: The Current.

The Prime Minister: I am sorry that the Hon. Member derives his information and education from such papers. That is all I can say but he said that the Secretary-General had been advised by the China Division of our Ministry not to go there. Now that is of course a very odd statement. The China Division is in charge of a Deputy Secretary and I have no idea of what private conversation he might have had with the Deputy Secretary but it is quite extraordinary to imagine that the Deputy Secretary is going to advise the Secretary-General in regard to such matters. Of course the question arose, as the House knows, like this. There was no question of the Secretary-General going to China or anywhere. He was to go to Mongolia. The question arose how was he to go to Mongolia. The normal route was via Peking, but we found that by trying to go via Peking, although it was a shorter route and less expensive route too, he had to change several times and it took a little longer. So we decided that he should go via Moscow. It was simpler. As it happened, it did not prove to be simple because of the weather. He was held up in all manner of places. He decided that he should go that way and come back by the shorter route, via Peking. He was forced to stop at Peking at least for a day or perhaps two days. There was no connecting aircraft. Then it obviously followed

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that if he was spending a day or two at Peking, is he to call on the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister because, remember, he had been an Ambassador there for three years and knew them very well? It is obvious that he should call on them as a matter of courtesy. It is wrong to say or imagine, because I used the word 'courtesy' previously, that he went all the way to Peking to call on them as a matter of courtesy but he had to go through Peking and it inevitably followed that he should call on them as a matter of courtesy. If he called on them, it was natural and right for him to talk to them, not merely about the weather but about other matters like our conflicts on our borders. Talking to them did not mean that he was offering anything to them or that he was showing any weakness. It was a sign of weakness to run away from a subject and be afraid to talk about it. That is what might be called pardahnashin politics. We cannot carry on in this way, afraid of being seen lest our virtue might not be assailed. Surely our virtue should be made of stronger stuff than this terrible fear of violation. So he had to take this step. It follows step by step. I would go a step further and say that it was his business to talk about these matters. Diplomacy does not consist of Ambassadors going up to the Foreign Minister of the other country and delivering ultimatums or reading out: "This is what our Government says." If that is diplomacy, it does not require any high

class man to do it. Any third-rate man can read out a message. Diplomacy consists of many things, among them being, trying to get at the back of the mind of the other party, influencing the back of the mind of the other Government and you can never do it by threats or ultimatums as I said in another connection. No country, not even the smallest country, is moved by threats nowadays, unless it is so weak that it surrenders. Then it is a different matter. It is always a friendly approach and a cooperative approach even though you may thoroughly disagree, even though the two cases may be entirely opposed to each other. That is the way it is done. It is done in a variety of ways. Today take even the two countries like the U. S. A and the Soviet Union, entirely opposed to each other--cold war and all that--yet their representatives go in addition to the Ambassador, apart from the Ambassador and they are constantly going. Mr. Stevenson may go and have talks. The Vice-President went and others go not as a matter of courtesy. I am sorry, I said the Vice-President. I do not think he went. I got mixed up. The previous Vice-President went. But even lately very eminent people are constantly going to and fro, in spite of this almost pre-war atmosphere. That is the way nations behave and that is the way nations stick to whatever they consider as important and vital to their interest. They do not give in. They do not surrender. They always explore the other Government's mind, etc. to see what the other party might be thinking, or what he might intend doing or not intend doing, all that kind of thing. This is the very texture of diplomacy and the relationship of one country with another. To imagine that in our relations with other countries we should always bluster and shout and issue threats, that is not good breeding in normal society, much less in international society. It is unfortunate that in the last twenty, thirty years, especially ever since the coming of Mr. Mussolini and later Mr. Hitler, this attitude of bluster has come into world politics much more than previously. Now, of course, many countries indulge in it. But I do think, apart from its innate futility, it is harmful and for any two great countries like India and China, however much opposed they might be, for them either to indulge in bluster at each other or remain silent and, shall I say, be reluctant even to look at each other, that would lead you no-where.

Of course, we feel in this matter and it is a very serious matter. But as I said previously last year in the other House, or may be here, this matter. this border conflict. of China taking possession of our territory, important as it is, this question of territory, has something behind it that is of far greater importance, that is, the future relations, contacts, enmities, hostilities, call it what you like, of two of the biggest countries in Asia. It may govern the future of both these countries of Asia. For some reason or the other they are now in terms of a measure of hostility. The facts are such and we cannot give in or surrender in any way and I think it is quite essential that this should be made clear to China and to others. But we should always look upon this not as a present evil but as a continuing evil, a continuing conflict which might govern generations, because as far as I can see--I want to be quite frank to the House--whatever the results of this immediate issue might be,

there are basic issues which will always create tension--by always I mean in the foreseeable future--between India and China, and we have to prepare for it, prepare a great deal for meeting that situation, meanwhile hold that situation and hold it the way we can.

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Shri Rajeshwar Dayal

One or two more things, Sir, and I shall finish. Mr. Jaswant Singh said that Shri Rajeshwar Dayal's coming away from the Congo

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is humiliating to India. That, so far as I know, is not the view of any person or any country in the wide world, except of Mr. Jaswant Singh.

The Hon. Member: There are many with me in that view, I am afraid, Sir.

The Prime Minister: Many people?

An Hon. Member: That is the opinion of "The Current."

The Prime Minister: I don't know if the Hon. Member got it from "The Current." But the fact of the matter is that whatever has been done on behalf of India, Shri Rajeshwar Dayal was not there as India's representative. He was an Indian lent to the United Nations and he represented the United Nations and carried out the wishes of the United Nations and of the Secretary-General. He was not carrying out our policy. But naturally, being an able man, his influence on these policies was, to some extent, felt. He could not lay down those policies. However, I am not discussing the Congo here. What I am saying is that so far as Shri Rajeshwar Dayal is concerned, he left his mark, wherever he worked, as very able person and he is respected in the U.N. and in the Congo in spite of many people criticising him when he was there, and he came away with great dignity and there was no question of any humiliation of anybody. It was on his own desire that he came away ultimately.

An Hon. Member: The fact that other powers withdrew their men there goes to the credit of Shri Rajeshwar Dayal.

The Prime Minister: No, that is different. Shri Rajeshwar Dayal was representing the Secretary-General and the United Nations. The other people Hon. Member refers to were Consuls or Consuls-General of other countries like the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. Now, it is well known and no secret, that the Consuls-General of the United Kingdom and of the U.S.A. did not approve of Shri Rajeshwar Dayal's activities there and constantly came in his way, in fact, in the way of the United Nations there. It is most deplorable that two great countries should come in the way of the representative of the United Nations there. And ultimately, I suppose, this fact was realised by the countries concerned and they withdrew them. As it happens, both these gentlemen were fairly wellknown to us in India. One of them used to be in the Indian Civil Service and we knew him very well and had no high opinion of him. The other person also was here in various capacities and did not create a very great impression here. They were withdrawn by their own countries.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Africa

There is one thing more I want to refer to. I referred to Africa yesterday, to Angola etc. This morning I got a telegram from a wellknown leader in Central Africa and the Central African Federation in Northern Rhodesia--Mr. Kaunda. He is among that group, the youngish group of eminent leaders that Africa is throwing up, like Mr. Nyrere, who is a very fine man, fine because he gives a restrained but powerful lead to Tanganyika, Mr. Kaunda is the national president of what is called the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia. I am reading this telegram. Naturally I cannot vouch exactly for what is stated in it. It says:

"Killing of Africans and total uprooting of villages in Northern Luapula Province of Northern Rhodesia by so-called security forces continues. Implore you in the name of God and humanity intervene by raising this matter at U. N. Emergency session discussing Bizerta and also directly with Mr. Macmillan."

With regard to Northern Rhodesia, the House perhaps knows that there has been a great tug of war going on about the constitutional reforms there.

At one time it appeared that these reforms would go fairly far but then ultimately what was produced was not considered good enough by the African leaders, among them Mr. Kaunda, and there has been trouble since then. I am told there was trouble and there was some arson and violence. Mr. Kaunda, I might mention, is, according to his speeches and statements, always laying stress on non-violent methods but the Government did not take advantage of this and instead sent large number of troops, flew them in, who are adopting very repressive measures.

ANGOLA USA

**Date** : Aug 23, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Clarification of Prime Minister's Statement on Berlin Issue

The Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following statement in the Rajya Sabha on Aug 28, 1961, clarifying his earlier statement in the House on the Berlin issue:

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... I referred previously here in this House to the situation that has arisen in the world at large, to the Berlin issue and the rest. I am not going to speak about them; but I want to clarify one or two matters in that connection which have led apparently to some misunderstanding chiefly abroad, not so much here.

In discussing the German or the Berlin issue which is exciting people's minds so much, I have repeatedly laid stress on an approach being made to these matters through peaceful negotiations by the big countries especially concerned. It is exceedingly difficult--nor I think very proper--for all of us or for me to put forward suggestions as to what other countries should do. Sometimes of course we have to put forward our broad ideas but the essential thing that I have pleaded for is this that these big countries should get together--their Heads--and try to find a way out of this present tangle. The greater the delay in doing so the greater the perils that we have to face because the technique of this cold war has become--it may be an

odd way of describing it by me--more and more heated but there it is. One sees daily statements, speeches thrown at each other, threats thrown at each other and powerful resolves made to dig in and not budge from a particular position. This kind of thing is alright sometimes but if it is persisted in, it leads to dangerous consequences. So I venture to say the sooner the people get together the better because I do not think--I firmly do not think--that any country is thinking in terms of a war but conditions may be produced when national honour just pushes each country in a particular direction.

Now I was discussing this. On the last occasion I spoke here I spoke about the question of Berlin and I said that so far as West Berlin was concerned one thing should be accepted without reservation and that is, the access to West Berlin from West Germany should be full and should continue as heretofore, because here is a city although half a city. still it is a city of 2 1/2 million people--West Berlin. They have these contacts and one can hardly conceive of those contacts and access being interfered with without the gravest consequence. Therefore, it is essential that it should be agreed and guaranteed that those contacts with West Berlin and East and West Germany should continue and even if other changes occur, that thing will remain. I have laid stress on that repeatedly and I have pointed out that even Mr. Khrushchev has admitted that. Therefore, this is a solid ground to talk about and to make it quite clear so that no subsequent change may be able to affect this. If that was done very clearly and definitely, some of this heat in the cold war would go.

Then there was a question--the Hon. Dr. Kunzru put it to me--about the contacts between East and West Berlin, and what was the legal aspect about that.

The Hon. Member: If I may say, I did not refer to the legal aspect. I referred to an agreement that was concluded between the powers concerned and I was wanting to know whether it was still valid or not.

The Prime Minister: That is legal, is it not? Or constitutional, call it what you like; it does not matter. These things may be looked upon as the law governing it or whatever it is. I went into this matter--or tried to--with the help of our Historical Section and they produced all manner of agreements, protocols, covenants and the like from 1944 onwards. It was highly confusing; but the confusing part was not these protocols and all that but that things were happening in between. For instance, originally the defeated Germany was divided up into three parts and later into four under the four big powers--the Soviet sector, the American sector, the British sector and the French sector--and the city of Berlin was treated separately under the ultimate control of the four powers. We began with this and the agreements about this. Then what happens is, the three Western sectors combine together and become the Republic of West Germany. It is a big step. Then the Republic of West Germany becomes a member of the NATO group of powers. This is another step. So there is

difference between what it was in 1945 and what it became a few years later. Similarly, the Soviet sector becomes the Democratic Republic of Eastern Germany and the second step is, it becomes a member of the Warsaw Pact. All these changes are taking place all the time which inevitably limit the force of some of the older pacts and covenants. It is therefore very difficult to justify fully anything purely legal. That is why I said on last occasion something about there being no strong legal basis at present in regard to East and West Berlin. I am not talking about East and West Germany; that I have disposed of. But because of these changes that have occurred, each party accuses the other of having taken some step which it should not have done, and therefore of having broken the previous agreement or covenant or protocol. The net result of the deliberations of the Foreign Ministers in 1949 in respect of East and West Berlin which called upon the occupation authorities to consult together on a quadripartite basis was the continuance of

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freedom of movement between East and West Berlin in spite of the administrative division. Since then even till recently about 50,000 East Berlin workers used to go daily to West Berlin--I am not talking about emigration; that is a separate thing--and come back. I do not know the exact figure but the figures I have here vary from 5,000 to 15,000 workers who went from West Berlin to East Berlin daily and went back. All that was natural. Here is a huge city; it is not very easy, not very advantageous to divide it into two entirely separate units and cut up the city's life. But gradually this process of separation went on because of this cold war till now, ten days ago--whatever the period was--when for the moment at least a terrific barrier has been put up between East and West Berlin preventing people from going in and out. I hope it is a temporary barrier because it is quite absurd to have a great city like this with a kind of a Great Wall of China dividing it into two. I repeat that whatever the legal implications may be--because there are two views and it may be that under strict law it may be justified, that barrier being put up--from every other point of view it is a harmful thing for a city's life to be cut up in this way and from the human point of view particularly it causes tremendous misery. Also of course Berlin continued to be a kind of symbol of the future unity of Germany whenever it might come about but this kind of thing goes against that trend. I mentioned about workers going across but apart from workers there is so much else which is common. The under ground railway which was run, I think, by the East German authorities went all over West Berlin.

Looking at this picture, the German picture, now it seems to me that in spite of basic differences in their outlook, in their approach--the Soviet group on the one side and the Western countries on the other--there are so many points in common between them. At any rate they agree that it should be easy, at any rate at least it is not very difficult to find some common basis for agreement at the present moment if they set about it. The agreement must, in their approach

take into account human considerations, and not stick too much to legal niceties or whatever some covenant contained in the 40s. The whole background has changed factually and it does seem very odd that these barriers should be put in the way of movement and cause infinite misery to large numbers of people. That is all I wish to say about that matter.

GERMANY USA POLAND CHINA

**Date :** Aug 28, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INTEGRATION OF DADRA AND NAGAR HAVELI

#### Prime Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution dealing with the integration into the Indian Union of the territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following speech in the Lok Sabha on Aug 14, 1961 Sir, I beg to move:

"That the Bill further to amend the Constitution of India, be taken into consideration."

I have to propose a very small amendment to the Constitution, but small as it is, a particularly significant one, and I hope and believe that it is the forerunner of other amendments of this kind..... The amendment, as the House knows, deals with the integration into the Indian Union of the territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. May I point out with respect that the word is ??? and not ??? as is often said? It is the ordinary Hindi word ???

The history of this little enclave is known to all Members; I am quite sure that Hon. Members are aware of how a number of courageous persons of Nagar Haveli and Dadra many years ago drove out the Portuguese garrison or police or whatever it was, the officials there, and established a free territory. Of course we were in complete sympathy with them, and they were in sympathy with us.

But as a matter of fact as was shown in the recent case in the Hague Court, this was an act of those people and not of the Government of India. Having established a free territory, we had no intention of allowing the Portuguese to come through Indian territory and to try to suppress the people of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. So they remained free.

Thereafter the Portuguese Government took this case to the International Court of Justice at the Hague claiming the right of passage to these territories. This case was argued and it lasted

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for several years. In fact, it was lasting all this time, we could not take some steps which we might otherwise have taken in regard to these territories or even in regard to Goa. Ultimately the case was decided and although the decision was not hundred per cent as we would have liked it to be--the majority decision, I mean--that decision made it quite clear that the basic attitude we had taken up was correct in regard to these. And it followed from that that we could go ahead and incorporate these territories into the Indian Union, which had been the repeated desire of the people of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. There was the Varishta Panchayat there which had passed a resolution to this effect.

So sometime after the Hague Court decision, we gave further thought to this matter and came to the conclusion that we should give effect to that request of the panchayat there. That request was repeated recently unanimously and as a consequence of that, we have brought forward this Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Bill, and a connected Bill which has been placed before this House in regard to the representation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli in this House.

We have treated them as Union Territories deliberately because we do not want to split them up or put them in either the State of Gujarat or the State of Maharashtra. First of all, we are giving effect to the wishes of the people there in that matter. In effect, the whole procedure that we are adopting is to give effect to their wishes, and their wishes were that we should treat them as a unit. I do not know about the distant future, but for the time being, in the near future, they will continue to be treated as Union Territories. Therefore, for any Hon. Member to ask us to split them up would be against their wishes, and I think it would not be right at all to do that.

Then there are suggestions in some of the proposed amendments that we should have added Goa, Daman and Diu etc. These amendments represent the laudable wishes and ambitions of some Hon. Members, but they do not represent the facts. We are dealing with certain facts which happened in Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Obviously that situation is different from the situation of Goa, Daman and Diu, because these places are still under the occupation of the Portuguese Government, and for us to declare them now would not be in consonance with facts. As it is, we say that from the 11th August this territory will form part of the Indian Union. But that is not so in respect of the other territories on the 11th August, because they do not form part of the Indian Union. It is our wish and our desire, which I have no doubt, will but fulfilled, that these territories including especially Goa should come into the Indian Union. But as I just said, the coming in of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, is a happy augury and a presage of the future.

INDIA USA

**Date :** Aug 14, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INTEGRATION OF DADRA AND NAGAR HAVELI

#### Situation In Angola

I do not think I need say much about this matter, but as we are dealing with this small relic of the old Portuguese Empire, it is well to remember the odd fact today that the Portuguese Empire is the biggest empire, possibly the worst too--but the biggest also--that exists today in this age of the liquidation of imperialism and colonialism. It is an odd fact that when great and more powerful empires have given way very largely the Portuguese Empire should continue. It is, of course, in a bad way today and in its major territories in Africa in Angola, the situation has been peculiarly horrible and painful, and probably even the past records of imperialist domination will not give us an example of what is happening now in Angola. I have no doubt in my mind that in Angola, and certainly, I think, also in other Portuguese dominions like Mozambique etc. the Portuguese Empire is doomed.

Unfortunately, we do not get many facts about the Angola situation because nobody is allowed to go there. Some little time ago, probably some English Methodist missionaries who were working there came out and they gave a ghastly picture of what they had seen. This was the first time that facts from reliable authorities came out. Even so, very little is known yet, but what is known is enough to condemn to the Portuguese authorities there and the Portuguese Government completely. I do not think it is going to be possible for the Portuguese Government to continue there for long, and all our sympathies--the sympathies of this House and of our people in this country--necessarily go out to the people of Angola.

ANGOLA USA MOZAMBIQUE

**Date :** Aug 14, 1961

## Volume No

INTEGRATION OF DADRA AND NAGAR HAVELI

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Goa

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I need not say much about Goa. It would be absurd for me to say that the freedom of Goa should depend on what happened in Africa. That would be wrong and not very creditable to us, that we should depend on other events in other continents for Goa to be free and to join the Indian Union. But the fact is that it is not a question of dependence, that in these matters one has to consider the entire picture because one thing affects another, and there is no doubt that the

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situation that has arisen in Africa has a certain connection with and effect on the situation in Goa. Whatever happens in Goa will ultimately be, of course, because of the people of Goa or the Government of India, these are the two authorities that function that can function, and each will no doubt in its own way take action when the time is ripe for it or considered ready for it.

So this Bill I am presenting to this House for its consideration is a simple one which I have no doubt every Member of the House will accept as it is, because we cannot add other places to it. It has no meaning, it is not factually correct. We cannot be putting in things which are absolutely, on the face of them, incorrect just to express our wishes. We may express them in some other form if you like but not in this Bill amending the Constitution. Our Constitution cannot be treated in this casual and light way as to put in our wishes for the future in it.

I submit therefore that on this occasion because it represents for the first time, the form--legal and constitutional--of the removal of a part of the Portuguese Empire in India, we should accept it, of course as it is and as a sign of the shadow of the future to come.

I believe that the members of the Varishta Panchayat of Dadra and Nagar Haveli have themselves come here, have been here for the last few days, to be present on what to them and to us is a historic occasion.

I should like to point out how well, during the last few years they have been functioning there as the governing authority of a free territory. They have no doubt advised by our Administrator, conducted the affairs of this territory. The place has been improved very greatly, I am told, in education and in other ways. Over and above that they have collected a large surplus of, I think, Rs. 18 lakhs. It is a large sum. It will go into the Consolidated Fund of India,

but that and more is going to be spent for the improvement and advancement of the people of these territories.

USA INDIA

**Date :** Aug 14, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INTEGRATION OF DADRA AND NAGAR HAVELI

#### Prime Minister's Statement in Rajya Sabha

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following statement in the Rajya Sabha on Aug 16, 1961, on the Bills seeking integration of Dadra and Nagar Haveli with the Indian Union:

Mr. Deputy Chairman, it was not my privilege, Sir, to introduce this measure before this House. My colleague, the Law Minister, was good enough to undertake that responsibility. I was engaged in the other House, but I should like to be associated with the consideration of this measure in this House even though this is rather a formal matter. There is no dispute about this measure and everyone who has spoken here has expressed his or her pleasure at it, and so there is nothing really for me to reply insofar as this measure is concerned.

But some other matter, I am told, have been raised. For instance, why has this been delayed so long, for seven years? And the question of Goa, I am told, has been raised and in that connection an Hon. Member referred to economic sanctions against Portugal. Now these may be important and interesting topics, but they really have no relation to this particular amendment of the Constitution.

Now the answer to the question of seven years' delay is chiefly the fact that the Hague Court considered this for many many years, and I do not myself see how it would have been desirable for us, while they were considering it, to take this action. It might well have had repercussions in the minds of the Hague Court Judges as a result of which their final advice or judgment might not have been very much to our liking. That would have produced difficulties for us. The Hague Court does not function this way, I mean they cannot send arms to enforce their will. Nevertheless it is there; it expresses the will of the international community in the sense of settling problems by methods of law and order, It seems to me that for us to have ignored the Hague Court and to have started doing something here while it was considering it would have been a great discourtesy, and apart from the great discourtesy it might have involved us in all manner of

complications in the United Nations or elsewhere. It is not always the best course to cut across the normal methods of doing things in our desire to have a speedy result. Sometimes an expected speedy result fails us and it takes us even more than the normal time to achieve the end in view. I have no doubt therefore that it was right for us to wait till the Hague Court had decided the issue and to wait for a little time, even after that, to observe the consequences of that decision.

Another point was raised, I understand, as

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for the future of this Bill. Some Hon. Member expressed the hope that too many of the members of our very efficient services even should not go in and take charge of this area and thought that it would be better for it to be left to the people there. Broadly I agree with that, and in fact that is what we have done for the last many years. We have helped them with advice and when they asked us to give them a good administrator, then only we found out some one who would help them and sent him. Apart from that we have not interfered in their rather simple system of administration. They have done fairly well. So it is not our desire to interfere much or at all in fact except insofar as they require but advice or help.

Now I come to the principal question which has been raised here and in the other House--about Goa. I can very well understand the sense of almost frustration in regard to Goa, which many of us feel and which I myself am experiencing often enough. It may be so, but it is rather difficult to judge as to what might have happened if we had acted somewhat differently. Nevertheless the more I think of it--and I am, for the moment, talking about the past--the more I am convinced that, on the whole, the policy we have adopted has been the right one. Of course it is conceivable that almost immediately after or contemporaneously with our gaining Swaraj some step might have been taken for Goa. It was a possibility at that time, a possibility that might not have produced at that time the same results which would otherwise have later. But at that time the House will remember the problem we had to face. Immediately after independence partition came and along with it the upheavals in North India, in Pakistan, here on this side of the border, right up to Delhi and even beyond. It was a very bad ordeal for all of us, and we were not thinking of any other thing. We could not. Well, we survived that ordeal, and then we thought it a reasonable presumption that it would be easy to solve the problem of the French possessions and the Portuguese possessions here by agreement. It never struck us that these countries would be--well--so difficult to deal with. The French ultimately--after a good deal of argument--did agree, and it was possible for the transfer to take place peacefully, although even now--as the House knows--the de jure transfer has not taken place, and always we are told that they are prepared to do so. But there are their difficulties--other difficulties--not in connection with this. It is true of course that during the last many years French has had to face any number of

difficulties and crisis, and it is unfortunate that we have had to suffer for that to some extent. Now we thought that we would be able to settle the question of Goa by argument. Even then we gave priority to the French possessions because we thought that it was more easy to deal with the French Government than the Portuguese Government--which it was indeed. But then we found that it was not only more difficult to deal with the Portuguese Government but also it was not possible to deal with them at all. As perhaps Hon. Members may remember, the first response we got from them to an official note in regard to Goa was that they produced a Papal Bull of the 15th century on which they based their right not only to Goa but to large parts of the world. Though large parts of the world have clipped from them, Goa has remained and to that they propose to hold on to the plea of the Papal Bull. It is very difficult to argue with persons of any country which bases its right in this way. Since then we, in the early days, opened diplomatic relations, sent a Minister to Lisbon in order to deal with this question. As this did not succeed, we withdrew, the Minister, closed our Mission there and have had no diplomatic relations since then.

As for the other matter, the problem then became, either we should take steps, that is military steps, or, as some people think, to encourage popular steps against the Portuguese Government. By popular steps I am not referring to anything that might happen within Goa but that people from outside come and march in. Now, anything that happens within Goa would have been, well, in the normal order of things. People in a country wish to change their Government, and they do it, but for others to go from outside created difficulties. The first difficulty was that it could be said, as it was said, that the people of Goa did not want any change at all and it had been imposed upon them by people coming from other parts. Secondly, people going from India, that is, unarmed people, would, as things were, inevitably be shot down. Now, if we allowed our people to go there to be shot down, in large numbers, which the Portuguese would certainly have done without the least compunction then we had to face a difficult choice. Either we put up with it and did nothing, which was a very painful choice, or we sent our Army behind them. Therefore, ultimately the question became of sending our army and not merely leaving it to unarmed people to go there. And till we were ready to send our Army in this way, it was not right for us to create a situation which demanded the sending of our Army. This is the basic logic.

Now, as regards the sending of our Army there, everyone knows, including Dr. Salazar, that the Portuguese Army could not resist our Army

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for more than a few hours, may be a day or two or whatever it may be. But it was not a military question. It was a political question with consequences not only on our policy but in other ways too. That would have meant war with Portugal. Now, Portugal may be, in the military

sense, a relatively easy country to deal with. Nevertheless, it is another country and for us, after all that we said repeatedly, again and again, not about Goa I mean, but about our general policy, to start a war, however small the war may be, would have been fundamentally opposed to all that we had said, and the weight which we have in the councils of the world would have been much less. Also we might have got entangled in many ways. We must not isolate this from the other world problems. Nevertheless, Portugal has been actively or passively supported by some great powers, as we know, in the United Nations and elsewhere. Naturally, there has been a tendency for that support to be withdrawn. In fact, Portugal today has not got many friends left in the world. But there was this support and it was just possible that a difficult situation might have arisen. In the United Nations we might have been condemned as aggressors, technically speaking and other problems would have faced us.

An Hon. Member: How? They would have to pass some resolution there. It would go to the Security Council and the veto is there. Then they have to go to the United Nations General Assembly. Do you think they could have passed a resolution?

The Prime Minister: I cannot say. Certainly they may have or they may not have done so. But that all depends. The point was that it was something that we opposed to all that we had been telling the world, the world which often has been at the brink of war. Even a little spark is a dangerous thing, and for us to light that spark was not in conformity with the whole trend of our policy, and it might even have involved us in considerable difficulties.

One minor matter I may remind the House about not directly in this connection but still we have to remember all this. The House may know that for some odd reasons the Pakistan Government has been very friendly to Portugal. Probably the sole reason is that anybody who is against India, the Pakistan Government embraces it and thinks that it can take advantage of that position. So, anyhow we thought it undesirable both on grounds of policy, basic or principal policy, and practical considerations to take military steps to drive out Portugal from Goa.

Also we felt that whatever might be done from outside, the initiative must come from the people of Goa, not from outside. So, years have passed and it has been a painful experience to hear what has happened in Goa, to put up with it without being able to do something about it. I do not know but, now looking back, we would have acted otherwise. It is always difficult to say. On the whole, I think we acted rightly. I am not justifying it, but still that is my impression. And this policy that we pursued, a policy of very considerable patience, has created a considerable impression all over the world in our favour vis-a-vis Portugal. And now, not because of India or Goa so much but more so because of what is happening in Angola. Portugal is in bad odour almost the world over. It is a misfortune that even now some countries support it actively or

passively. And I believe the fact that Portugal has been a member of the N.A.T.O. alliance has certainly given certain power to Portugal, certain strength to Portugal to function as it has done lately. The House may remember that even the United States of America, which previously rather sided with Portugal, and Mr. Dulles, the previous Secretary of State there, said something which was deeply resented in India, have voted against Portugal in the United Nations. I regret that the United Kingdom has not seen the light yet and still thinks of its oldest friend, oldest ally as well as N.A.T.O. ally. The fact of the matter is--and I think every country should realise it--that Portugal's association with N.A.T.O. brings disgrace to N.A.T.O. and not any strength, and the longer this continues and the N.A.T.O. powers, for reasons to which they attach values, keep Portugal there, they weaken this alliance. I am not in favour of N.A.T.O. or Warsaw Pact or C.E.N.T.O. or S.E.A.T.O. I am not saying this from the point of principles but I am merely saying that as it is, NATO today is weakened in the minds of vast numbers of people because of Portugal's association with it. That is the position in regard to Goa but I am prepared to say that in this changing world with what is happening now both outside India, in Africa, in Angola and what is happening in India and in Goa, this question cannot be considered as a closed one about what steps we should take in regard to Goa. We shall have to give a good deal of thought to it from time to time as to whether we should vary our previous policy and, if so, in what way. That is all I can say at present.

These were, so far as I know, all the subject matters raised but I have wanted to associate myself with this discussion here because, although this is a simple Bill--it is a Bill which no doubt

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will be passed unanimously and with acclaim here--nevertheless, it has importance and significance and, therefore, I wanted to be associated with this somewhat historic moment in our Parliament when this little piece of territory--its littleness does not count--is coming back to the arms of Mother India.

Later requesting the House to pass the Bill, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru said:

The Hon. Member who has just been speaking referred to various possible courses of action in regard to Goa. He said that there were other alternatives; one need not march an army; one need not send people to be shot down. Then he referred presumably to people going furtively and secretly with guns that they may obtain.....

If they do not go furtively and secretly they will be shot down; it is obvious. Odd individuals do not go openly to face an army, even a Portuguese army. A State army, however weak it may be, is infinitely stronger, from the point of view of arms, than a few odd individuals with shot guns in their hands which really means that people should go there secretly and organise, let us say, some kind of a guerilla

warfare. Now, I am not touching on the morals of this question. But practically speaking I am opposed--may be my upbringing is such--to any kind of sabotage activities and the like. I am entirely opposed to that. I have no moral objection to people with guns fighting for freedom but then I have to consider that from the practical point of view of how far it is likely to produce results. It is a conceivable thing if that had been done. But as things are, what happens is not that people do this. People go there in order to produce a situation which will compel the Government to send armies. Now, I am not prepared to be pressed into action until I think that the time is ready for that action. Therefore I have objected to this kind of thing. I am asked, 'permit us to go there unarmed'. All that, if I may say so with all respect, is not quite straightforward because they do not expect to do anything except to force us to follow them with guns. And as I have just hinted a time may come when we may even decide to send our armies and when that time comes it will be an open effort of ours and not a secret or furtive one.

INDIA USA PORTUGAL PAKISTAN ANGOLA POLAND

**Date** : Aug 16, 1961

## Volume No

1995

NORWAY

### Instruments of Ratification of Cultural Agreement Exchanged

The Instruments of Ratification of the Cultural Agreement between India and Norway were exchanged in New Delhi on Aug 08, 1961 Professor M.S. Thacker, Secretary in the Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs and H.E. Mr. Hans Olav Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Royal Norwegian Government in New Delhi exchanged the instruments on behalf of their respective Governments.

The Cultural Agreement between India and Norway was signed in Oslo (Norway) on April 19, 1961. In accordance with Article 7 of the Agreement, it comes into force from today.

The Agreement, which consists of 7 articles, aims at promoting and developing closer cultural relations and understanding between the two countries. Under the Agreement, the two Governments will encourage the exchange of representatives and delegations in the fields of education, science, technology, culture and arts; reciprocal visits of professors and research workers and exchange of cultural, scientific, technical and educational material and

equipment, translation and exchange of books, periodicals and other scientific, cultural and technical publications.

The Agreement also envisages training of employees and other nationals of one Government in cultural, scientific, technical and industrial institutions run by the other Government.

The Agreement will remain in force for a period of five years unless either Contracting Party gives notice of termination not less than six months before the expiry of such period, it shall remain in force thereafter until the expiry of six months from the date on which either Contracting Party has given notice of termination.

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NORWAY INDIA USA

**Date :** Aug 08, 1961

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YUGOSLAVIA USA FRANCE INDIA GERMANY

**Date :** Sep 01, 1961

## Volume No

1995

#### BELGRADE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS

Prime Minister's Speech at Plenary Session

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following speech  
at the Plenary Session of the Conference of Non-aligned Nations in

Belgrade on Sep 02, 1961

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished delegates:

Standing here before this distinguished assembly I feel moved. I think of past decades and I see many faces of old comrades and friends who devoted most of their life to the struggle for freedom and many of them succeeded and many of them have passed away. I see younger faces, too, representing their peoples, Heads of newly free countries and I see this great movement of freedom from colonial domination led by many of the distinguished delegates here going forward and meeting with success, indeed proving that in so far as any historical perspective is concerned the era of classic colonialism is gone and is dead, though of course it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet; but essentially it is over.

I think it was a happy and wise thought of the sponsors of this Conference to have convened it and it has turned out to be even a happier thought because of subsequent developments. I am glad that we are meeting here in this pleasant and friendly city of Belgrade and more specially under the auspices of the Government and especially, the leader, President Tito, of this Government and its people.

I said that it has become an even more important thing that we meet today; it would have been important in any event but it has become more important because of the development of the last two or three months when strange things have happened in the world and have suddenly drawn our attention to the abyss stretching out before us and below us. I think that the attention that this Conference has attracted in the world it would have attracted anyhow; but that attention is much more today because we meet at this particular crisis in human destiny.

People all over the world are vastly interested to know what we think about this crisis, where our thoughts or actions are going to lead us, what advice we give, What pressures we may exercise in solving this crisis. It is well to remember this because today every thing: what we have contended against and what we are continuing to struggle against--imperialism, colonialism, racialism and the rest--things which are very important and to which reference has been made repeatedly here, all these things are somewhat over-shadowed by this crisis. For, if war comes all else for the moment goes. Therefore, it becomes inevitable for us to pay attention to and not only to pay attention to but to make sure that the dominant note of our thinking and action, and what we say and put down, is this crisis that confronts humanity. People expect us to do this. Even the Great Powers also watch us and listen to us and are watching for what we shall do, and I am quite sure that vast numbers of individuals in every country are thinking of this even more than of normal subjects that rightly occupy our attention.

We call ourselves the Conference of Non-aligned countries. Now the word non-aligned may be differently interpreted, but basically it was

used and coined almost with the meaning: non-aligned with the great power blocs of the world. Non-aligned has a negative meaning, but if you give it a positive connotation it means nations which object to this lining-up for war purposes, military blocs, military alliances and the like. Therefore we keep away from this and we want to throw our weight such as it is, in favour of peace. In effect, therefore, when there is a crisis involving the possibility of war, the very fact that we are unaligned should stir us to action, should stir us to thought, should stir us to feel that now more than ever it is up to us to do whatever we can to prevent such a calamity coming down upon us. So from every point of view and from the point of view of our inception and being as modern nations, this problem is dominantly before us. I lay stress on this because, since we are engaged with many other difficult problems which face us as a whole, which face us as individual countries--for all of us have problems--it is a little dangerous with this particular crisis that we might really repeat, I say so with all respect, all other problems we have before us and put this major problem in the background. That I think would be little short of a tragedy because we would have failed in our purpose, we would have failed to meet the demands made by humanity on us today when it is facing this crisis. And they will say: "Yes what they say is good, we agree. Now, does it save us now, today, from the crisis that is the immediate problem? If this does not save us and war comes what good will their long speeches and declarations have done?" That will be the answer of humanity.

I, therefore, submit that we must look at

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things in the proper perspective today. First things must come first and nothing is more important or has more priority than this world situation of war and peace. Everything else, however vital to us--and other things are vital to us--has a secondary place. If in this crisis something we do, some action of ours or some words of ours help to some extent to resolve the problem, to remove the fear of war, then we have justified ourselves and strengthened ourselves in order to meet all other problems that face us. On the other hand, if we cannot face this matter straightforwardly and clearly in our own minds then somehow we fail mankind in this crisis, we give no lead. Of course we stand for anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism and all that. All our lives, of most of us present here, have been spent in that and we shall continue the struggle: nevertheless, the point arises at this particular crisis as to what we are going to do. Pass long resolutions and make brave declaration? That is easy enough; we have done it before and we can do it today too; but what else can we do to meet the crisis because the problem of war and peace has intimate relation to all those other matters we stand for. It is war or fear of war that has led to cold war. It is cold war which has resulted and is resulting in old imperialism and colonialism hanging on wherever these exist because to them it is advantageous.

So what I wish, with all respect, to place before this Assembly, is this: That we must take first things first and the first thing today is this fear of war because ever since the last war there have been many ups and downs, many crisis many dangerous situations, that have come up. We have got over them somehow or other but the present situation is, by far, the most dangerous that has arisen in the last fifteen years or so since the last war ended.

It has become commonplace for people in every country to refer to the dangers of modern nuclear warfare. Although we talk about it, I am not so sure that even those who talk about it, fully and emotionally, realise what this means. We talk about destruction of civilization, destruction of humanity, destruction of human race, if nuclear war comes. Well, if this is so something much more is required, some greater effort, some greater attempt on our part to do what we can to avoid it. I know that the key to the situation does not lie in the hands of this Conference or in those of other Congresses or Conferences. The key to the situation today lies essentially in the hands of the two great powers--the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I think that this Conference or rather countries that are represented in this Conference are not so helpless that they can look on while the world is destroyed and war is declared, I think we can make a difference--possibly we can, I cannot guarantee it--and if so, we should try our utmost to do it and not talk about other subjects even though they are important subjects, while the world goes to its doom.

That thing I would beg this Assembly to remember. I would beg that in whatever declaration it may make, this should be put foremost and topmost and perhaps be isolated to show that it is the main thing, that the other things may be very important but they are secondary. If this is done it will undoubtedly create a far greater impression than would a mere record of various other problems that face us, although they are very important problems. I do not deny this and we should act accordingly but there is a time and place to press any subject and today the time and the place and the occasion are here to take up this question of war and peace and make it our own and show to the world that we stand for peace and that, so far as we can, we shall fight for it--not fight in the sense of guns, but struggle for it in the ways open to us.

I would like to lay Stress on this right at the beginning of the few words that I wish to say to this Assembly because while, on the one hand, I see the power of nations assembled here, which is not military power, which is not economic power, but which, nevertheless, is power, call it moral force, call it what you will--it does make a difference obviously what we in our combined wisdom feel and think and what we are prepared to do; on the other hand a fear creeps in upon my mind that we may not be able to get out of the rut of meeting together, passing long resolutions and making brave declarations and then going home, allowing the world to drift to disaster. That itself will be a tragedy when so much is expected by our people, people whom we represent here and indeed by so many people outside in other

countries who may not be represented here but who are looking up to us.

It is a strange thing that some few years ago six seven or eight if you like--this business of non-alignment was a rare phenomenon. Few countries, here and there, asked about it and other countries rather made fun of it or at any rate did not take it seriously, "Non-alignment? What is this? You must be on this side or that side", that was the argument. Well, that argument is dead today; nobody dare say that, because the whole course of history of the last few years has shown a growing opinion spread of this

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conception of non-alignment. Why is that so? Because it was in tune with the course of events; it was in tune with the thinking of the vast numbers of people whether the country concerned was non-aligned or not; it was in tune with it because they hungered passionately for peace and did not like this massing up of vast armies and nuclear bombs on either side. Therefore, their minds turned to those countries who refused to line up with these people.

Maybe some of us did not approach this question with blank minds, this question of war and peace and whatever lies behind this cold war. We had our opinions, we had our inclinations but essentially we were against this business of cold war and all that it implied and the massing up of weapons and bombs etc. We talked, everybody talked and still talks, about disarmament. As my friend and colleague President Nkrumah has said, disarmament is the most vital thing. I entirely agree with him. The fact is that while we have talked about disarmament the world has gone on arming more and more.

What does all this mean? There is something wrong, some gap between our thinking and the action the world takes. The basic fact is that the world which has talked of disarmament month after month, year after year, has been arming more and more and it has arrived almost at the final stage when either it disarms or it bursts. There is no choice left today, and in this field of manoeuvring the choice is getting more and more limited. When each party digs in its toes to particular positions, when each great country, even smaller countries, feels its national honour is involved, it is difficult to move them. When big countries feel that their national honour is involved they risk war, whatever the consequences. That is what we are getting to. It is possible when these rigid attitudes are taken that an indication from this Conference and all those whom it represents--they are many and they count in great parts of the world--a positive indication might have some slight effect on these great protagonists who, with their nuclear bombs threaten each other and incidentally threaten all of us, because, it is now known very well that the effects of war will not be confined to those great powers or their lives but that other countries which are not in the war will also suffer. Presumably, if war comes, countries represented here will not rush into the war, they will remain apart. But what good

will it do them to remain apart when they will suffer from it and when the whole world will suffer?

Therefore, we have arrived at a position today where there is no choice. Well, to say there is no choice between war and peace sounds rather fatuous. I put it this way; There is no choice left between an attempt for negotiations for peace or war. If people refuse to negotiate, they must inevitably go to war. There is no choice. They must negotiate and I am amazed and surprised that rigid, proud attitudes are taken up by great countries, all being too high and mighty to negotiate for peace. I submit with all humility to them and to others that this is not the right attitude because it is not their pride only that is involved in it but the future of the human race.

I cannot--and I rather doubt if even this Assembly can go into these matters and suggest: "You must negotiate on these lines" or, "You must come to terms on these lines". I do not think that is possible for us or suitable. We may have our ideas, and when the time comes we may even say so, but our indicating: "These are the lines for your settlement for negotiation", instead of helping may hinder, because we are dealing with proud nations and they may react wrongly. Therefore we cannot really lay down any terms on which they should negotiate. But it is our duty and function to say that they must negotiate and any party that does not do so does tremendous injury to the human race.

I am not talking about basic agreements between rival ideas, rival ideologies and rival attempts to increase the power of the nation. I do not think that by one stroke you can solve all these problems or that anybody can. But at the present juncture one has to see how to lessen these tensions, how at least to remove some of the obstructions to peace, how at least to prevent war coming. If that is done, then other steps will naturally follow.

I believe firmly that the only possible way, ultimately, to solve these problems or many of them is by complete disarmament. Yet it would be absurd for me to say, "In the next week or month decide on complete disarmament" because it is not a practicable proposition. Today the situation is such that their fears from each other are leading them towards greater armaments all the time, whether, you look at one side or the other. Therefore, although I consider disarmament an absolute necessity for the peace of the world in the future--I think that without disarmament these difficulties, fears and conflicts will continue--nevertheless, one cannot expect suddenly because this Conference wants it, disarmament to appear on the scene in full panoply. We should lay stress on disarmament of course, but for the

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present moment the only thing that we can do is to lay stress on the fact of negotiations with a view to getting over these present fears and dangers. If that is done, the next and third step follows and may

be taken.

I would venture to say that it is not for us even to lay down what should be done in regard to Germany or Berlin which are immediate causes of this present tension. There are some things that seem to me obvious. For instance--others have referred to it too--it seems to me obvious that certain facts of life should be recognised. The facts of life are, first, that there are two independent entities, powers, countries: The Government of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) and the Government of East Germany (German Democratic People's Republic). That is a fact of life. It is not a matter of my or anyone else liking or disliking it. It is a fact that has to be recognized. If you ignore the facts of life and the facts of contemporary politics that means that you are ignoring something which will lead you to wrong results.

The second thing (I am expressing my own opinion for the moment) is that as things are, we find this great city of Berlin divided by what might be called an international frontier. It is a very awkward situation, but there it is. But anyhow West Berlin is very closely allied to Western Germany, to Western countries and they have had these routes of access to them, and I am glad that Mr. Khrushchev himself has indicated that that access will not be limited; it will be open to them as it is now. Now, if that is made perfectly clear and guaranteed by all concerned I should imagine that one of the major fears and major causes of conflict will be removed.

I am merely putting this forward to indicate how some of the big things that are troubling the people are capable of solution without solving the entire problem. If some things are understood and agreed to definitely, immediately the fear of war in the near future disappears. Other things can be considered later. So I venture to say that the most important thing for the world today is for these great powers directly concerned to meet together and negotiate with a will to peace and not to stand too much on their respective prestige and I think that if this Conference throws its weight on that, as I am sure it must be prepared to do, it will be a positive step which we take to help.

Take again the United Nations. As far as I remember, when the United Nations was formed, one of its early Articles said it was formed to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. That was the main purpose of the United Nations--to save humanity from the scourge of war. Here is a situation arising which threatens war very definitely. What will the United Nations do about it? I remember I was in Geneva in 1938, in the summer or autumn, and the old League of Nations was meeting there when the whole of Europe was tense with the fear of war. War came a year later, but even in 1938 it was tense because Hitler was marching this way and that way all over Europe. He went to Czechoslovakia and held it and he went to some other place, advancing all the time. There was this fear of war lying all over Europe but the League of Nations in Geneva was discussing at that time, I think, opium traffic. Very important undoubtedly, but

something else was more important than opium traffic and that was war. War came a year later. It was postponed only: it came in 1939.

Now I do not want the United Nations to function as the League of Nations did. I do not think it will, but I merely mention this. What can the United Nations do? The whole framework of the United Nations ever since it was formed fifteen years ago was the recognition of the balance of power in the world. That is why they had certain permanent members in the Security Council vetoing etc.--all that business. Now, of course, the world has changed since then considerably and there are many more members and this requires a change in the structure etc. of the United Nations. That is true. Nevertheless, the United Nations cannot easily ignore the balance of power in the world. It has to keep that in view. Anyhow the point is that it is the duty of the United Nations to consider this matter and try its utmost to solve it.

The United Nations meets from time to time for special causes, special discussions. I would have suggested, if it was not meeting as it is, I think, in about two weeks' time (or less), its meeting quickly to consider these matters. I am not suggesting the United Nations should sit down and consider Germany, Berlin, and all that. No. I say it should meet to consider the situation which might lead to war and take such steps in its united wisdom as it can. Fortunately it is meeting. I should say one of the earliest things it should do is to deal with this problem. All other problems are secondary: It should postpone them or put them lower down on its agenda.

Now, I feel strongly that this matter requires our urgent attention and urgent attention of every government and every organization in the

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world. Since it so happens by accident--or, that circumstances have so dealt with us--that we in this Conference are meeting at this time of the grave crisis, we should seize hold of it insofar as we can. I recognize that we cannot issue mandates I think we are an important Conference, I think we represent countries which, individually and certainly jointly, represent something important and valuable in the world and our voice counts to some extent. That is true.

At the same time we must not over-estimate our own importance. After all, we do not control the strings of the world, not only in a military sense but in other senses also. If our mandate ran it would be easy enough--we would issue a mandate. But we know that our mandate does not run all over the place. So we must realize that. We must realize both our actual and our potential strength that we have and also the lack of strength that we have. Both have to be considered together, then we should decide what to do.

So I am venturing to suggest not any specific course of action but

rather a mental outlook that should govern us in approaching this problem: that we should think of this as the most vital and important problem of the day and everything else as being secondary, however important it is. We can deal with other things more effectively and more strongly after we have dealt with this. Otherwise no other problem remains: they are submerged in the terrible disaster of war.

That is the main point I should like to place before this Assembly.

Now, Sir, may I add here that this danger of war comes nearer and nearer, has been enhanced and has become nearer to us perhaps by the recent decision of the Soviet Government to start nuclear tests. I am not in a position and I suppose no one else here is in a position to know all the facts which underlie these decisions--military considerations, political, non-political considerations, whatever they may be--but one thing I know: That this decision makes the situation much more dangerous. That is obvious to me, therefore, I regret it deeply because it may well lead to the other countries also starting this and then, apart from the danger inherent in nuclear tests--that is, radioactive substances falling and all that--all this brings us to the very verge and precipice of war. That is what I deeply regret. It has become even more urgent that this process of negotiation should begin without any delay, without thinking of who is going to ask whom first. The person who asks first will deserve credit, not the person who shrinks from asking others.

I should just like to refer briefly, I hope to some of our other problems. Many of the countries represented here have only recently become free or independent. They have tremendous problems and above all the problem of making good and to advance their own people economically, socially etc. because we must recognize that most of these countries are under-developed--nearly all. We must recognize that they are socially and economically backward countries and it is not an easy matter to get rid of this inheritance of backwardness and under-development. It requires clear thinking. It requires action. It requires a tremendous amount of hard work and all of us have to face that. I think that it is right and proper that other countries, affluent countries, rich countries, should help in this process. They should do it. They have to some extent done it. I think they should do more of it but whatever they may do, the ultimate burden will lie on the people of our own countries. If it did not, if by some miracle or somebody else's help we stood up, well, we would fall down again. When you stand up you do not stand long when you do not have strength. Ultimately the burden is on us. So it is no good expecting others to do all of our work.

Therefore, this great problem face each one of our countries and in facing it we have to think of this modern world which has not only changed greatly but which is changing from day to day: this world of atomic energy and jet and space travel, new forces being let loose and the tremendous value and importance of science today. We have to think of that. We cannot just imitate some body else and put a little machine here, a machine there and think we are making progress. We

have to catch up with the modern world and with science and technology keeping our own values intact, I hope.

All these problems can overwhelm us. Why I am venturing to refer to obvious things is that really in considering our other problems we may keep these basic things in view.

There are other countries, some represented here, others whom we know very well which are struggling for their freedom from the grasp of colonialism or imperialism which will not go. There is Algeria, which has paid a fantastic price in human life and suffering in its struggle for freedom and-yet which has not so far succeeded in achieving it. Naturally everyone present here is

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wholly desirous of Algeria becoming independent and I earnestly hope that this will be so.

There is Tunisia with its recent extraordinary experience and I am referring particularly to Bizerta, Why Bizerta? Because Bizerta is a foreign base and the very idea of a foreign base in a country seems quite extraordinary to me. It is bad enough to have bases anyway, but that a country should put its foreign base in another country seems quite extraordinary to me. How can that be tolerated by anybody? I do not understand how anyone can provide for a base in a country which opposes that base, purely from a practical point of view.

There are these problems of Africa, the Congo, and may I say, I am glad to learn that possibly by tomorrow we shall have here in this Assembly the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime minister of the Congo Republic, Mr. Adoula and Mr. Gizenga. There is Angola; the horror of Angola! I do not know how many of the delegates present here have had occasion to read the detailed accounts of what has happened in Angola, because Angola has been a closed book.

But something is happening in Angola--not only in Angola but round about--which really was a kind of horror which one hardly associates with the modern world--massacres, genocide and so on. Of course, our minds go out and we want not only to sympathise, we want to do what we can to put an end to this. Yet we cannot do very much as a rule although sometimes we may do a little. All these problems face us.

Then there is the situation in East Africa where conditions are better, of course and to some extent some countries have been promised independence such as Tanganyika, I believe, by December and other countries I hope also. There is the situation in Central Africa--the Rhodesias--where the picture is not good; there is trouble, And further south in South Africa you have the supreme symbol of racial arrogance racial discrimination, apartheid and all that which is an intolerable position to be accepted by any of us. And this is imposed upon South-West Africa in challenge to the United Nations' decisions. So all these problems crowd upon Us and we have

to face them of course.

For the moment, however, I would repeat that whatever we may do about other problems--and we should do whatever we can--the problem dominating the issue today is that of this danger of war. The danger of war depends on many factors but essentially on two major countries, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. It will do us no good, I think, if we start condemning this country or that country. It is not a very easy thing to do anyhow; it complicates the set of circumstances. But apart from being easy or difficult; if we are to be peacemakers, and if we want to help in the cause of peace, it does not help to start by condemnations. We want to win over and to influence and induce them to follow the path of peace, and if we denounce countries then we cannot influence them whatever else we can do. We cannot win them over. Times demand, therefore, that we should approach these countries and other countries in a friendly way, in a way to win them over and not merely to denounce them and irritate them and make it even more difficult for them to follow the path we indicate to them.

Let us look at this world today, it is a strange world perhaps the most fundamental fact of the world being the coming out of these new mighty forces. I am referring to atomic energy, space travel and all that which is the basic factor of the modern world. We have to think in terms of that and not get lost in terms of a world which is past and in slogans that no longer apply. But this is the world that we live in. When power of a new kind comes all your imperialism and all your old style colonialism will vanish and will go. I have no doubt. And yet this new power may well dominate us and dominate certainly the under-developed, backward countries because the sin of backwardness has to pay the penalty by somebody pushing you about.

We cannot afford to be backward; therefore we have to build in our own countries societies of free men, societies where freedom is real--because I think freedom is essential, that freedom will give us strength prosperous societies where the standards of living are rising. These are for us essential, basic problems to be thought out in terms of today, in terms of the modern world, space travel, jet travel atomic energy, not in terms of long ago. When you think in these terms war becomes even a greater folly and anachronism--than ever. If we cannot prevent war then for the moment all our other problems are sunk, we cannot deal with them. But if we can prevent war we can go ahead in our other problems, help to liberate the parts of the world under colonial and other imperial rule and more especially build up our own free societies, prosperous societies, welfare states in our respective countries because that is to be our positive work. Merely getting angry with some other country achieves nothing although one does get angry and cannot help it. It is the

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Positive constructive work we do that gives us strength to make our countries free. That is the positive work we have to do. But we

cannot do any of this unless there is no war. If war comes all is doomed.

Therefore, I venture to submit to this Assembly that we must lay the greatest stress on this major danger of today. Not only is it incumbent on us but if we do this we shall be in line with the thinking of millions and millions people. Strength comes ultimately from being in line with popular thinking. The fact that we are non-aligned has received strength from the fact that millions of people are not aligned, they do not want war, that is why we get indirect strength from this. Today this is the problem of practically the entire population of the world. Let us put ourselves in line with it and deal with it as well as we can, realising fully, of course, that our capacity is limited. We must not imagine that we can order about great countries, or as small countries do as we like. Our capacity is limited, but we have a certain capacity, a certain strength, call it what you like, moral strength or other strength. Let us use it properly, rightly, without force but with courtesy and with a friendly approach so that we may influence those who have the power of war and peace in their hands and thus try, if not to prevent war for all time, at any rate, to push it away so that in the meantime the world may learn better the use of cooperation. Then ultimately the world may put an end to war itself.

I will repeat: that I think that essentially we can never succeed unless there is disarmament on the biggest scale. Therefore, disarmament is a vital matter but even that is rather out of reach today because, how can we talk of disarmament when we are told that we are going to have nuclear tests today and tomorrow and when we are told that all these great countries are becoming more and more heavily armed?

I have ventured to express some of the ideas in my mind. I have not dealt with various items on the agenda because I feel that the first item overshadows all else. Others should be dealt with no doubt and, I hope, that when this matter comes up and some kind of a resolution or declaration or statement is being issued attention will be paid to this question of world peace being put not only foremost but so that it catches every person's attention and so that it does not get lost in a morass of detail and thus lose all significance and importance.

YUGOSLAVIA USA GERMANY SWITZERLAND NORWAY SLOVAKIA ALGERIA TUNISIA CONGO  
ANGOLA SOUTH AFRICA

**Date :** Sep 02, 1961

**Volume No**

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1995

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Danger of War and Appeal for Peace

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The following is the text of the statement on the danger of war and an appeal for peace as read and approved at the final session of the 25-nation conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade on Sep 06, 1961

This Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned countries is deeply concerned that even apart from already existing tension the grave and critical situation, which, as never before, threatens the world with the imminent and ominous prospect of conflict would almost certainly later develop into a world War. In this age of nuclear weapons and the accumulation of the power of mass destruction, such conflict and war would inevitably lead to devastation on a scale hitherto unknown, if not to world annihilation.

This Conference considers that this calamity must be avoided, and it is therefore urgent and imperative that the parties concerned, and more particularly the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., should immediately Suspend their recent war preparations and approaches, take no steps that would aggravate or contribute to further deteriorations in the situation, and resume negotiation for a peaceful settlement of any outstanding differences between them with due regard to the principles of the United Nations Charter and continue negotiating until both they and the rest of the world achieve total disarmament and enduring peace.

While decisions leading to war or peace at present rest with these great powers, the consequences affect the entire world. All nations and peoples have, therefore, an abiding concern and interest that the approaches and actions of the great power should be such as to enable mankind to move forward to peace and prosperity and not to the doom of extinction. In the certain knowledge that they seek peace, this Conference appeals to the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to make most immediate and direct approaches to each other to avert the imminent conflict and establish peace.

This Conference expresses the earnest hope that all nations not represented here, conscious of the extreme gravity of the situation will make a

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similar to the leaders of the Powers concerned thereby proclaiming and promoting the desire and determination of all mankind to see the achievement of lasting peace and security for all nations.

YUGOSLAVIA USA

**Date** : Sep 06, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### BELGRADE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS

#### Belgrade Declaration

At the conclusion of the Conference of Non-aligned nations, the Head of State or Government of these non-aligned countries made the following Declaration on Sep 06, 1961

The Conference of Heads of State or Government of the following non-aligned countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and of the following countries represented by observers: Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador was held in Belgrade from September 1 to 6, 1961, for the purpose of exchanging views on international problems with a view to contributing more effectively to world peace and security and peaceful co-operation among peoples.

The Heads of State or Government of the aforementioned countries have met at a moment when international events have taken a turn for the worst and when world peace is seriously threatened. Deeply concerned for the future of peace, voicing the aspirations of the vast majority of people of the world, aware that, in our time no people and no government can or should abandon its responsibilities in regard to the safeguarding of world peace, the participating countries--having examined in detail, in an atmosphere of equality, sincerity and mutual confidence, the current state of international relations and trends prevailing in the present-day world--make the following declaration:

The Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries noting that there are crisis that lead towards a world conflict in the transition from an old order based on domination to a new order based on cooperation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity; considering that the dynamic processes and forms of social change often result in or represent a conflict between the old established and the new emerging nationalist forces; considering that a lasting peace can be achieved only if this confrontation leads to a world where the domination of colonialism-imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations is radically eliminated:

And recognizing the fact

That acute emergencies threatening world peace now exist in this period of conflict in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America and big power rivalry likely to result in world conflagration cannot be excluded; that to eradicate basically the source of conflict is to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept and practice a policy of peaceful co-existence in the world;

That guided by these principles the period of transition and conflict can lay a firm foundation of cooperation and brotherhood between nations, state the following:

War has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than today. On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy in international relations.

Imperialism is weakening. Colonial empires and other forms of foreign oppression of peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America are gradually disappearing from the stage of history. Great successes have been achieved in the struggle of many peoples for national independence and equality. In the same way, the peoples of Latin America are continuing to make an increasingly effective contribution to the improvement of international relations. Great social changes in the world are further promoting such a development. All this not only accelerates the end of the epoch of foreign oppression of peoples, by makes peaceful cooperation among people, passed on the principles of independence and equal rights, an essential condition for their freedom and progress.

Tremendous progress has been achieved in the development of science, techniques and in the means of economic development.

Prompted by such developments in the world, the vast majority of people are becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that war between peoples constitutes not only an anachronism but also a crime against humanity. This awareness of peoples is becoming a great moral force, capable of exercising a vital influence on the development

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of international relations.

Relying on this and on the will of their peoples, the Governments of countries participating in the Conference resolutely reject the view that war, including the "cold war", is inevitable, as this view reflects a sense both of helplessness and hopelessness and is contrary to the progress of the world. They affirm their unwavering faith that the international community is able to organize its life without resorting to means which actually belong to a past epoch of human history.

However, the existing military blocs, which are growing into more and more powerful military, economic and political groupings, which by the logic and nature of their mutual relations, necessarily provoke periodical aggravations of international relations.

The cold war and the constant and acute danger of its being transformed into actual war have become a part of the situation prevailing in international relations.

For all these reasons, the Heads of State and Representatives of Government of non-aligned countries wish, in this way, to draw the attention of the world community to the existing situation and to the necessity that all peoples should exert efforts to find a sure road towards the stabilization of peace.

The present-day world is characterized by the existence of different social systems. The participating countries do not consider that these differences constitute an insurmountable obstacle for the stabilization of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference in the internal development of other peoples and nations are ruled out.

All peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and potentialities.

Furthermore, any attempt at imposing upon peoples one social or political system or another by force and from outside is a direct threat to world peace. The participating countries consider that under such conditions the principles of peaceful co-existence are the only alternative to the "cold war" and to a possible general nuclear catastrophe. Therefore, these principles--which include the right of peoples to self-determination, to independence and to the free determination of the forms and methods of economic, social and cultural development--must be the only basis of all international relations.

Active international cooperation in the fields of material and cultural exchanges among peoples is an essential means for the strengthening confidence in the possibility of peaceful co-existence among States with different social systems.

The participants in the Conference emphasize, in this connexion, that the policy of coexistence amounts to an active effort towards the elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national oppression, guaranteeing, at the same time, to every people their independent development.

Aware that ideological differences are necessarily a part of the growth of the human society, the participating countries consider that peoples and Governments shall refrain from any use of ideologies for the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure, or imposing

their will.

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries participating in the Conference are not making concrete proposals for the solution of all international disputes, and particularly disputes between the two blocs. They wish, above all, to draw attention to those acute problems of our time which must be solved rapidly, so that they should not lead to irreparable consequences.

In this respect, they particularly emphasize the need for a great sense of responsibility and realism when undertaking the solution of various problems resulting from differences in social systems.

The non-aligned countries represented at this Conference do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc. They sincerely desire to cooperate with any Government which seeks to contribute to the strengthening of confidence and peace in the world. The non-aligned countries wish to proceed in this manner all the more so as they are aware that peace and stability in the world depend, to a considerable extent, on the mutual relations of the Great Powers;

Aware of this, the participants in the Conference consider it a matter of principle that the Great Powers take more determined action for the solving of various problems by means of negotiations, displaying at the same time the necessary constructive approach and readiness for reaching solutions which will be mutually acceptable and useful for world peace.

The participants in the Conference consider

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that, under present conditions, the existence and the activities of non-aligned countries in the interests of peace are one of the more important factors for safeguarding world peace.

The participants in the Conference consider it essential that the non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues.

They consider that the further extension of the non-committed area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs, and intensification of cold war policies. The non-aligned countries provide encouragement and support to all peoples fighting for their independence and equality. The participants in the Conference are convinced that the emergence of newly-liberated countries will further assist in narrowing of the area of bloc antagonisms and thus encourage all tendencies aimed at strengthening peace and promoting peaceful cooperation among independent and equal nations.

1. The participants in the Conference solemnly re-affirm their

support to the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", adopted at the 15th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and recommend the immediate unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and resolved to make a concerted effort to put an end to all types of new colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations.

2. The participants in the Conference demand that an immediate stop be put to armed action and repressive measures of any kind directed against dependent peoples to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and that the integrity of their national territory should be respected. Any aid given by any country to a colonial power in such suppression is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

The participating countries respecting scrupulously the territorial integrity of all states oppose by all means any aims of annexation by other nations.

3. The participating countries consider the struggle of the people of Algeria for freedom, self-determination and independence, and for the integrity of its national territory including the Sahara, to be just and necessary and are therefore, determined to extend to the people of Algeria all the possible support and aid. The Heads of State or Government are particularly gratified that Algeria is represented at this Conference by its rightful representative, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Algeria.

4. The participating countries draw attention with great concern to the developments in Angola and to the intolerable measures of repression taken by the Portuguese colonial authorities against the people of Angola and demand that an immediate end should be put to any further shedding of blood of the Angolan people, and the people of Angola should be assisted by all peace-loving countries, particularly member-states of the United Nations, to establish their free and independent state without delay.

5. The participants in the Conference demand the immediate termination of all colonial occupation and the restoration of the territorial integrity to the rightful people in countries in which it has been violated in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the withdrawal of foreign forces from their national soil.

6. The participating countries demand the immediate evacuation of French armed forces from the whole of the Tunisian territory in accordance with the legitimate right of Tunisia to the exercise of its full national sovereignty.

7. The participating countries demand that the tragic events in the Congo must not be repeated and they feel that it is the duty of the world community to continue to do everything in its power in order to erase the consequences and to prevent any further foreign

intervention in this young Africa state, and enable the Congo to embark freely upon the road of its independent development based on respect for its sovereignty, unity and its territorial integrity.

8. The participants in the Conference resolutely condemn the policy of apartheid practised by the Union of South Africa and demand the immediate abandonment of this policy. They further state that the policy of discrimination anywhere in the world constitutes a grave violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of

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Human Rights.

9. The participating countries declare solemnly the absolute respect of the rights of ethnic or religious minorities to be protected in particular against crimes of genocide or any other violation of their fundamental human rights.

10. The participants in the Conference condemn the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.

11. The participating countries consider the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, particularly against their express will, a gross violation of the sovereignty of such States. They declare their full support to countries who are endeavouring to secure the vacation of these bases. They call upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously their abolition as a contribution to world peace.

12. They also acknowledge that the North American military base at Guantanamo, Cuba, to the permanence of which the Government and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, affects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country.

13. The participants in the Conference reaffirm their conviction that:

(a) All nations have the right of unity, self-determination, and independence by virtue of which right they can determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance.

(b) All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

The participating countries believe that the right of Cuba as that of any other nation to freely choose their political and social systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and possibilities should be respected.

14. The participating countries express their determination that no intimidation, interference or intervention should be brought to bear in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, including their right to pursue constructive and independent policies for the attainment and preservation of their sovereignty.

15. The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

16. The Heads of State or Government point out that general and complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes of internal security; and the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories.

17. The participating countries call upon all States in general, and States exploring outer space at present in particular, to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They express the hope that the international community will, through collective action, establish an international agency with a view to promote and coordinate the human actions in the field of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

18. The participants in the Conference urge the Great Powers to sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used for the peaceful economic and social development of all mankind. The participating countries also consider that:

(a) The non-aligned nations should be

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represented at all future world conferences on disarmament;

(b) All discussions on disarmament Should be held under the auspices of the United Nations;

(c) General and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control, the teams of which should include members of non-aligned nations.

19. The participants in the Conference consider it essential that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by all countries.

20. The participants in the Conference recommend that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to discussion of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament.

21. The participants in the Conference consider that efforts should be made to remove imbalance inherited from economic colonialism and imperialism. They consider it necessary to close, through accelerated economic, industrial and agricultural development, the ever-widening gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced countries and the many economically less-developed countries. The participants in the Conference recommend the immediate establishment and operation of a United Nations Capital Development Fund. They further agree to demand just terms of trade for the economically less-developed countries and, in particular, constructive efforts to eliminate the excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade and the restrictive measures and practices which adversely affect the trade and revenues of the newly-developing countries. In general they demand that the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution be applied in all fields of economic development to hasten the achievement of international social justice.

22. The participating countries invite all the countries in the course of development to cooperate effectively in the economic and commercial fields so as to face the policies of pressure in the economic sphere, as well as the harmful results which may be created by the economic blocs of the industrial countries. They invite all the countries concerned to consider to convene, as soon as possible, an international conference to discuss their common problems and to reach an agreement on the ways and means of repelling all damage which may hinder their development; and to discuss and agree upon the most effective measures to ensure the realization of their economic and social development.

23. The countries participating in the conference declare that the recipient countries must be free to determine the use of the economic and technical assistance which they receive, and to draw up their own plans and assign priorities in accordance with their needs.

24. The participating countries consider it essential that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, through the revision of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council in order to bring the composition and work of these two most important organs of the General Assembly into harmony with the needs of the Organisation and with the expanded membership of the United Nations.

25. The unity of the world organisation and the assuring of the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the United Nations bearing in mind equitable regional distribution.

26. Those of the countries participating in the Conference who recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China recommend that the General Assembly in its forthcoming Session should accept the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of that country in the United Nations.

27. The countries participating in the Conference consider that the German problem is not merely, a regional problem but liable to exercise

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a decisive influence on the course of developments in future international relations.

Concerned at the developments which have led to the present acute aggravation of the situation in regard to Germany and Berlin, the participating countries call upon all parties concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin, in accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of State or Government on September 5, 1961.

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries resolve that this Declaration should be forwarded to the United Nations and brought to the attention of all the Member States of the World Organisation. The present Declaration will be also forwarded to all the other States.

YUGOSLAVIA USA AFGHANISTAN ALGERIA BURMA CAMBODIA CONGO CUBA CYPRUS  
ETHIOPIA GHANA GUINEA INDIA INDONESIA IRAQ LEBANON MALI MOROCCO NEPAL SAUDI  
ARABIA SOMALIA SUDAN TUNISIA YEMEN BOLIVIA BRAZIL ECUADOR ANGOLA SOUTH AFRICA  
RUSSIA CHINA GERMANY

**Date** : Sep 06, 1961

# Volume No

1995

## BELGRADE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS

### Letters to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Khrushchev

The following is the text of letter of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries addressed to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Khrushchev:

We, the Heads of States and Governments of our respective countries attending the Conference of Non-aligned Countries held at Belgrade from September Sep 01, 1961, venture to address Your Excellency on a subject of vital and immediate importance to all of us and to the world as a whole. We do so not only on our own behalf, but at the unanimous desire of the Conference and of our peoples.

We are distressed and deeply concerned at the deterioration in the international situation and the prospect of war which now threatens humanity. Your Excellency has often pointed to the terrible nature of modern war and the use of nuclear weapons, which may well destroy humanity, and has pleaded for the maintenance of world peace.

Yet we are at the brink of this very danger that menaces the world and humanity. We are fully aware that Your Excellency is anxious as any of us to avoid this dreadful development which will not only end the hopes that we all have cherished for the advancement of our peoples but is a challenge to human survival. We are certain that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to avert such a calamity.

Having regard, however, to the gravity of the crisis that menaces the world and the urgent need to avert the developments that may precipitate it, we take the liberty of urging on the Great Powers concerned that negotiations should be resumed and pursued so that the danger of war might be removed from the world and mankind adopts ways of peace. In particular, we earnestly request for direct negotiations between Your Excellency and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who represent the two most powerful nations today and in whose hands lies the key to peace or war. We feel convinced that devoted as both of you are to world peace, your efforts through persistent negotiations will lead to a way out of the present impasse and enable the world and humanity to work and live for prosperity and peace.

We feel sure that Your Excellency will appreciate that this letter is written because of our love of peace and our horror of war and the compelling desire that a way out must be found before mankind is

faced with a terrible disaster.

YUGOSLAVIA USA

**Date :** Sep 01, 1961

## Volume No

1995

FRANCE

Indo-French Oil Agreement Signed

An agreement between the Oil & Natural Gas Commission, Government of India, and the French Petroleum Institute, a French Government undertaking, for carrying out the petroleum exploration in the Jaisalmer area in Rajasthan State, was signed in New Delhi on Sep 12, 1961

Shri J. Dayal, Member (Finance), O.N.G.C., signed on behalf of the Commission and Mr. R. Navarre, President of the French Petroleum Institute, on behalf of that organisation. Shri K. D. Malaviya, Union Minister for Mines & Oil, was also present.

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Under the agreement the Oil & Natural Gas Commission and the French Petroleum Institute will form an Indian-French Collaboration Team for carrying out the exploration, in which the entire risk will be borne by the O.N.G.C, The French Petroleum Institute will function as technical advisers and assistants to the Indian Technical Commission. They have also agreed to train personnel at their headquarters in Paris.

The foreign exchange expenditure involved in this exploration work is estimated to be about Rs. 4 crores and will be met out of a credit which the French Government have agreed to provide.

FRANCE INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Sep 12, 1961

## Volume No

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Prime Minister's Message condoling Mr. Hammarskjold's Death

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The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru issued the following statement on Sep 18, 1961 condoling the death of the U.N. Secretary-General Mr. Dag Hammarskjold:

I have learnt with deep grief of the tragic death of Mr. Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations. Whether this was due to accident or some kind of sabotage, I do not know. Conditions in the Congo are such that anything is possible.

Mr. Hammarskjold was a great international Civil Servant and he occupied for many years his high office with distinction and ability. He was often criticised, and we have sometimes criticised him also, but we did not doubt his loyal service to the United Nations and to the cause of peace.

It is a special tragedy that he should have died in the Congo which was suddenly flared up again in the news. After long consideration, Mr. Hammarskjold decided to give effect to the UN resolutions on the Congo. These resolutions were based on the unity and integrity of the Congo and on the removal of foreign mercenaries. We were glad that he had at last taken this action. It has been a great surprise to us that some countries have opposed this action. It appears that the fighting in Katanga against the UN forces is organised and led by European mercenaries. In effect, they have declared war against the United Nations, and those who support them support this war against the U.N. The Rhodesian Government must particularly bear responsibility for the attitude it has taken up in this matter.

This is leading to a situation of extreme gravity. For the United Nations, under pressure from some countries, to withdraw from the position it has taken up in regard to Katanga would be a very serious blow to the UN and to the Congo. People in India and, I am sure, in many other countries, would react strongly against any such step.

INDIA CONGO USA

**Date :** Sep 18, 1961

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**Volume No**

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Shri Krishna Menon's tribute to Mr. Hammarskjold

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Shri Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement in the General Assembly on Sep 20, 1961 paying a tribute to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold:

I come to the rostrum on this sad occasion to pay a tribute on behalf of the Government and the people of India to a great world statesman, a distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations and a friend of all of us. I am quite certain that, apart from all the official matters to which we may have referred, there is not any one among us who has not, over the last four or five years, had the opportunity to come into close contact with Dag Hammarskjold and to have the benefit of discussions with him of the kind which have left an impression upon all of us.

We cannot, however, regard this as merely an occasion of personal loss, because men, once they are born, know that they will die some time. This is a great political event. It is an accident; it is a great international tragedy; if it is anything else it will become an international crime. It is the desire of my Government and people that there should be a complete investigation of this matter when the occasion arises, and as soon as it is possible, so that the world will be assured that those who travel around functioning on behalf of the United Nations shall be free from hostile

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action by those from whom it is not expected.

My country is very shocked by this event, but we hope that the void that has been left by the sudden departure of the Secretary-General will not leave us stunned in such a way as not to perform our duties. In a sense it is a test for the United Nations because there are no provisions laid down, but since we are here as leaders of the nations of the world it is our duty to find a way out.

To Dag Hammarskjold himself--for his great devotion to the cause of United Nations and for the friendliness which he brought to bear among the nations of the Organizations--we pay our tribute. To the people of Sweden, who have now sacrificed the second of their great citizens to the cause of international peace, our hearts go out, and I am quite sure that the Assembly will want to remember the colleagues of Dag Hammarskjold, the other servants of the United Nations, who perished with him in the same catastrophe, and I wish to convey our sympathy to their families on this occasion.

With regard to the Congo itself, the best tribute we can pay to the Secretary-General is to see that the Security Council resolutions are implemented. Just half an hour ago has come the news of a ceasefire in Katanga. That may be the beginning, or perhaps the completion, of

the implementation of the resolution of the United Nations and a movement from struggle to peace.

For all these reasons we should do well to remember the service rendered by the late Secretary-General in this connexion, often under criticism, and it is not to be wondered at that any person who is dynamic and who has a policy and ideas to put forward should some time incur hostility and criticism. Neither that person nor the critic, therefore, is to be regarded as being doomed to condemnation for all times. That is part of the incidence of public life, as such, and Dag Hammarskjold took it in that way. All representatives will remember that when last year, while we were at the United Nations, there were demands for his resignation he said, very courageously, that it was very easy to resign but much more difficult to stay on. He said that if it was the desire of the smaller nations in the Assembly that he should resign he would do so but, on the contrary that if it was not their desire that he should resign he would stay.

Mr. Hammarskjold brought the importance of the United Nations to bear in Africa more than in any other part of the world. Perhaps those who have been here for six or seven years will realize that until about three years ago Africa was spoken of only in passing. It was only in 1957-1958, I believe, that, in the Secretary-General's report, Africa was fully projected as an important part of United Nations activities--not merely in the sense of receiving milk from UNICEF or antibiotics from WHO, but as part of the problem of restoring the imbalance of the world in which the present African position emerged. To Africa, more than anything else, his later years were devoted, and to Africa we look for the correction of these imbalances which will help to restore peace and harmony in the world.

To the late Secretary-General, therefore, we pay our tribute, and as far as we are concerned we should like to assure this Assembly that, to the best of our ability and to the best of the ability of our Government and our people, we shall devote ourselves to the fulfilment of the purposes of the Charter and the resolutions passed by the United Nations--more particularly with regard to the Congo, to Africa and to other matters.

INDIA USA SWEDEN CONGO

**Date** : Sep 20, 1961

**Volume No**

1995

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Shri Morarji Desai, Finance Minister of India, made the following speech at the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund in Vienna on Sep 20, 1961

We are meeting at the end of a year which has been a considerable ferment of ideas in the field of international monetary cooperation. Never before have so many plans and schemes been put forward for the reform of our institution. And I think I am right in saying that behind all the debate and discussion that has gone on in recent months lies the desire to consolidate the gains of the past decade and to evolve a pattern of international cooperation which could respond to the quick change of pace to which we are all being subjected.

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The pace of change in international affairs now-a-days is such that within three short years after the New Delhi meeting we are required once again to consider ways and means of augmenting the resources of the Fund. The advent of convertibility in large parts of the world, while symbolizing the growing economic strength of many Fund members, has facilitated large and frequent movements of capital which at times have proved somewhat burdensome to one country or the other. Perhaps the best evidence of the quickly changing international economic scene is provided by the fact that within only a few months after the preparation of the Annual Report of the Executive Directors, the Fund has been called upon to provide accommodation to as many as 15 countries, involving a total amount of more than \$ 2.5 billion, the fact that transactions of this magnitude, including an important transaction with my own country, have been put through so smoothly and expeditiously is, I think, an index of the flexibility and understanding with which the Fund has approached its growing tasks.

It is equally clear from the excellent Report of the Executive Directors and from the illuminating address of Mr. Jacobsson that the Fund has not been merely a passive spectator in the debates about new initiatives and new policies to which I referred a moment ago. It has pressed forward with its tasks steadily and courageously. A rational policy in regard to the currencies to be drawn from the Fund to which my distinguished friend the Governor from the United Kingdom referred last year has already become an established practice. It is only proper that the Fund should make a well-balanced use of its holdings of various currencies and that the currencies to be drawn at any given time should be largely those of the members that are currently gaining reserves. At the same time, experience has shown that this criterion need not conflict with the needs of the members or with their traditional ties with particular financial centers.

We welcome also the decision of the Executive Directors that the use of the Fund's resources for financing capital transfers is both

appropriate and authorized by the Articles of Agreement. We consider it self-evident as well as prudent that in assessing the need of a member, the Fund should look at the balance of payments as a whole and not at some particular aspects only. What is important is the pursuit by members of policies and objectives which are consistent with the purposes of the Fund and a reasonable assurance of prospective improvement in the payments position of the member so that the revolving nature of the Fund's resources could be preserved. But where these conditions obtain, there is no need or justification for drawing distinctions between the different causes of a member's difficulty, be they related to capital transfers of the process of development or some purely seasonal or cyclical factors.

There is another area in which the Fund has made considerable headway in the last year. I am referring to the sound beginning that has been made with Article VIII consultations. Speaking on this subject last year, I had occasion to urge that consultations with Article VIII countries should not be confined to matters within the strict jurisdiction of the Fund, but should embrace broader aspects of international economic cooperation such as those relating to trade and aid. One of the most urgent tasks facing the international community today is that of persuading the economically advanced countries to pursue a truly liberal policy towards the exports of the developing nations so that in time trade can take the place of aid. And the Fund, by its Articles of Agreement, is required to keep the broader aspects of international economic cooperation in view. I am happy to say that such experience as we have had with Article VIII consultations so far gives every assurance that, in the future as in the past, the Fund's consultations with all members will be imbued with the spirit of free and frank discussion of problems of common concern.

While the Fund has thus shown that it is constantly on the lookout for new initiatives and a new orientation of its policies, I am sure that no one in this room would contend that we have exhausted the scope for further action. The Report of the Directors and Mr. Jacobsson's statement have drawn attention to the discussions that have already taken place on the replenishment of the Fund's resources by borrowing. It is our earnest hope that these discussions will be brought to a speedy and forward-looking conclusion--and may I emphasize the fact that the outcome should be truly international rather than regional or exclusive in character. Given the unsettled state of international affairs, no one can discount the possibility of an unusual concentration of requests for accommodation from the Fund. It would be only prudent to arm ourselves in advance for any likely combination of claims on the Fund. While the Fund's holdings of gold are naturally meant for use when circumstances warrant; it is our earnest belief that frequent and large use of gold by the Fund would not be appropriate. It is for this reason that we attach special significance to the technique of borrowing national currencies as a normal means of supplementing the Fund's resources.

While I am still on the general plane of Fund policy, I might refer to some matters concerning the policy regarding the use of the Fund's resources. As the Report of the Directors points out, the policies the Fund has followed in this regard for some time have enabled it to conduct its operations with flexibility and dispatch. Nevertheless there are a few matters to which further thought needs to be given. The first relates to the so-called gold tranche drawings which are virtually automatic. Unfortunately, the gold tranche as now defined does not bear the same relationship to a member's quota in every case so that the degree of automatic accommodation provided to different members is not the same. It is our view that a member's need cannot be judged by the size of its gold contribution, which is determined by many historical considerations. A rational approach which has no overtones of the means test would be to treat all drawings up to 25 per cent of the quota on par. Beyond this, drawings up to the second 25 per cent of the quota should also be readily permitted as long as a member is making reasonable efforts on its own behalf.

In short, and without introducing too many fine distinctions, a member should have early access to the Fund up to half its quota as long as it is making a reasonable effort. In practice, perhaps, we have come very close to this position, but a formal statement along the lines I have suggested, in subsequent Annual Reports may serve better to assure members that their drawing rights on the Fund are truly an extension of their own reserves.

My second point relates to the differences in treatment that at present exist between drawings and stand-by arrangements. From a common sense point of view, a member who says, I will draw within a certain amount if I need it, is asking for less than a member who actually draws a similar amount. Nevertheless, it would appear that a stand-by arrangement is perhaps treated less favourably than a drawing. Thus amounts drawn under a stand-by are generally to be repaid within three years, whereas drawings are repayable within three to five years. I think this is an area in which the Directors and the Management could perhaps give a closer look at the existing practice.

I have dwelt at some length on broader aspects of Fund Policy as I feel the time is now ripe for building further on the sound foundations which have already been laid. We are very fortunate indeed that our esteemed Managing Director, Mr. Jacobsson, will continue to be at the helm of affairs for the next two years or so; and I have no doubt that under his wise leadership, the Executive Directors and the staff would seize every initiative for enlarging the usefulness of our institution.

Turning to events in India, you are Well aware that for more than a decade now we have made the development of our economy the centerpiece of all our policies. We have just launched our third Five Year Plan. And while this is not the occasion to detail the gains of the past and the tasks for the future, I should like to say that as

we try and tackle our formidable problems, We are much encouraged by the understanding and assistance we have been receiving from so many friendly quarters. The access to the Fund's resources such as we so readily obtained last July is of great and timely help to us. But given the assistance we have received, there is a great deal that will turn on our own efforts and endeavours.

The stresses and strains in the Indian economy to which I referred last year still remain and we have been operating on a very slender margin as far as our foreign exchange reserves are concerned. However, we have made considerable progress in augmenting internal resources and we shall pursue this task steadily to meet our growing needs. In stepping up domestic savings and mobilizing resources for development, budgetary policies have a most important role. The tax net is being extended and even essentials of consumption are being taxed. In the field of credit policies, the Reserve Bank of India is employing a variety of monetary instruments flexibly. It is our hope that as the foreign assistance already promised begins to be disbursed, it should be possible for us to carry on with the task of development while fulfilling all our obligations.

In the ultimate analysis, however, we would need to make every effort to increase our exports rapidly. In this respect, there is now much greater awareness in India and we give the highest priority to export promotion. Much, of course, would depend on our own efforts to increase production, improve its quality and keep our prices competitive by general monetary and fiscal soundness as well as by the utmost regard for efficiency. But, as I have already indicated, we would also need the cooperation of other countries, if our genuine efforts are not to be frustrated by restrictions on our nascent exports. In this, as in other matters, we shall look forward to the enlightened leadership of this institution and its members.

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INDIA AUSTRIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date** : Sep 20, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Finance Minister's Address to Board of Governors.

The Finance Minister, Shri Morarji Desai made the following statement at the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International

Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in Vienna on Sep 19, 1961

I would wish to associate my Government, my delegation and myself with the deep sense of loss recorded by this Assembly this morning in the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjold. He was indeed a man dedicated to his task; outstanding among his many virtues was his transparent honesty of purpose and immense courage; and he died, as he lived, in the great cause of humanity and peace.

We are used to a good record of performance the Bank which it has kept up during the year. But this year's sessions have a special significance in that we have before us the first report of IDA. The Bank has made some 27 loans to India aggregating over \$600 million. The IDA, which I am happy to say, works under the same able direction and management as the Bank, has also commenced operations on a significant scale by extending credits totalling more than \$100 million. The two institutions are supplementary and complimentary, and I am sure that while the IDA will profit greatly from the experience and expertise of the Bank, I believe also that the pattern of lending and the terms of IDA operation as they are emerging are pointers to the direction of further advance by the Bank itself.

Ever since the completion of the postwar reconstruction phase of its work, the Bank has been concentrating attention on problems of economic development. The contribution it has made towards the solution of these problems, both through financial assistance and technical advice, has been impressive and has evoked well-deserved praise. I am happy to say that the Bank has been in close touch throughout with the problems and progress of development in my country and the same is true, I am sure, of other developing countries as well. Soon after the last annual meeting in Washington, the Bank has sent out a team of experts to study our third Five Year Plan. The team produced a well-studied and ably presented document, and since then experts in different fields from the Bank have been visiting India with the object of assisting in the selection of projects for Bank and IDA assistance. The Bank has also played a crucial role in the consortium meetings that it has convened to assist India's Plans and I must take this opportunity to say now we in India appreciate the leadership and expertise provided in this connection by the President of the Bank, Mr. Black, by Sir William Iliff and Mr. Burke Knapp and by their associates.

Our experience in this regard is, I am sure, not unique. My fellow Governors would undoubtedly endorse the statement in the Annual Report of the Bank that "the activities of the Bank were part of a broadening stream of financial and technical assistance to the less developed countries" and that "further progress was made with other international initiatives to increase the flow of development funds and to coordinate efforts to assist economic development."

There is today far greater recognition than ever before of the urgency of well-balanced and rapid economic development and the responsibilities and obligations of industrially advanced countries

in this context; this is evidenced, if evidence be needed, by the very constructive and closely reasoned speech we heard this morning from our colleague, the Governor for the United States. I need hardly stress the point that the major brunt and primary responsibility of the tasks of development, in terms of the formulation of programs, their execution and their financing must fall on the developing countries themselves. This is axiomatic. But, the need and scope for international cooperation in this field are very vast and every effort has to be made to strengthen and enlarge this cooperation in the interests of stable and expanding world prosperity.

Mr. Black, our premier diplomat of economic development has, in his thought-provoking address to us this morning, referred to a very important aspect of this cooperation; with the economic recovery of the world since the war and with the rapid growth of industrialized countries made possible by technological advances, conventional capital as such has become more easily available. At the same time, in developing countries which have to catch up with arrears of growth, the need for new and foreign capital has outstripped the growth of debt financing capacity construed in an orthodox sense. We are glad to see that there is an awakening to this problem in aid-giving countries and hope that loans on terms far less onerous than the

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conventional will before long become the rule rather than the exception in international credits.

It would take me too far afield if I were to expound this theme of how to strengthen and enlarge the flow of capital from the more developed to the less developed countries. You, Mr. Chairman, have already dealt with this matter admirably in your opening address. But, while I am on this subject, I should like to mention a point or two regarding the further lines of advance by the Bank and the I. D. A. I might perhaps take the latter first. The I. D. A. has been designed to fill a gap in international finance which the IBRD or the other existing institutions could not fill. It takes up what are cryptically but not quite happily called nonbankable projects. IDA credits are free of interest and are repayable over a much longer period than the Bank allows. These credits have many other helpful features, on which I need not dwell at the present moment. The IDA, as I said earlier, has made a good beginning, but no one could possibly fail to note that the resources at its disposal are much too inadequate in relation to needs. I think it is clear that these resources will need to be substantially enlarged, and the ways and means of doing so explored before long if this new institution is to be enabled to prove equal to the tasks it has to undertake. This point has been raised by Mr. Black this morning and I am sure that Governors convened here will give due thought to it.

This brings me to another observation and this one relates to the International Bank. I have spoken already of the wise role the Bank

has played in assisting development and I should add that the Bank will inevitably be called upon in the coming years to play an even more vital and onerous part. With all the progress that has been made, the under-developed world, as you Mr. Chairman pointed out yesterday, is still on the threshold, some parts of it only barely and insecurely so, and it will, for several years, to come, need more both be way of finance and of technical know-how. It is, I think important in this context to stress the truly international character of the Bank. A number of new agencies have recently been set up by the industrialised countries with a view to coordinating their aid effort. Such institutions, while useful and important, are by their very nature limited in terms of structure as well as functions. The International Bank has both in intent and in operation progressed on a wider basis, and it is not, if I may say so, by some odd chance or by any considerations of economy in words that it has come to be known as the World Bank. It follows from this--and this is the point I wish to emphasise--namely, that the Bank has to strive, consciously and deliberately to ensure that it gets on its thinking the full impact of the needs and experience of all countries, especially of those that are in the early stages of development.

The Board of Executive Directors, I know has this aspect of the Bank's work and role constantly in view. There is, all the same, need for strengthening the representation of the less developed countries at the higher staff levels in the Bank. The less developed countries, it has been recognized, are short of technical personnel and they have to draw into their own service all the personnel they have and more. I realize that the Bank's effort to secure more adequate geographical representation on its staff, especially at high policy-making or policy-assessment levels is being inhibited by the paucity of personnel that the less developed countries can make available. Nevertheless, I think it is important that this should remain the direction of our effort, and I believe that the less developed countries should try and make the right type of personnel available for employment in the Bank on a basis, if necessary of limited assignment periods rather than in terms of a permanent transfer of services, to work with the Bank and bring the results of their experience and knowledge to bear on the Bank's thinking.

I need hardly dilate on the tasks before the Bank and IDA. The President, Mr. Black, has in his address this morning done this task splendidly and with his usual imaginative and yet practical idealism. The operations of the Bank require a combination of sound banking practice with forward-looking idealism which is necessary to promote development. Basically the objectives of the Bank and the IDA are the same and it would be surprising if the Bank, with its growing resources and experience, does not find it possible, and indeed necessary to adopt some of the techniques of its offspring. The scope as well as the terms of the Bank's operations have evolved in relation to its accepted objectives and they will, I am sure, be adapted further to the needs of the situation in the light of experience.

I should like at this stage to say a brief word on the problems of my country. We have completed two Five Year Plans and we have launched this year our third Plan. We envisage an investment programme which while modest in relation to our needs is, I believe, capable of taking the economy significantly forward towards its goal of reasonable standard of life for our people within

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a foreseeable future. Inevitably it would entail the fullest mobilisation of domestic resources. The Plan has a substantial foreign exchange component, and the general import needs of the economy are rising as development proceeds. There is thus need for securing an adequate flow of external capital into the country. I am happy that a large number of industrialised countries represented here have already promised assistance for the first two years of the Plan, and I am glad to find that there is increasing recognition of the need to provide finance on a basis that would assure the right timing and sufficient advance on plans as well as to provide terms of repayment that do not burden the short-term balance of payment unduly. In this context, may I express my thanks to the President of the Bank and Governors of these countries here for the cooperation and assistance they have extended. I will not enter into a discussion, fashionable among experts as to the concept of the take-off and how near India is to it. But it does seem to me that the gains of the past few years have been considerable, even if not spectacular, and every consideration, economic as well as social, points to the need for an acceleration of the pace of advance. I have every hope that given the requisite effort on our own part--and we do not propose to stint in this regard and continued goodwill and cooperation from friendly countries abroad, we shall succeed.

Before I conclude, may I take this opportunity of expressing, on behalf of the Government of India and on my own, our cordial thanks to the President and Government of the Republic of Austria for their warm hospitality. The President of the Republic has given us an inaugural address full of sagacity and wisdom. In the few days that I have been here I have been deeply impressed by the charms of Vienna and the friendliness of its people. These conferences we hold outside Washington once every three years make, I am sure, a valuable contribution to our understanding and appreciation of the problems facing the various member countries that form this distinguished international fraternity.

Finally I wish to join you in your expression of welcome to our new members, including our good neighbour, Nepal. I wish also to record our appreciation of the excellent work done by Mr. Garner both on the Bank and on the IFC. His mantle is to fall on Mr. Rosen, the Executive Vice President, and I extend to him my good wishes.

AUSTRIA USA INDIA NEPAL

**Date :** Sep 19, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Prime Minister's Speech at Kremlin Banquet

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru paid a visit to the U.S.S.R. from Sep 06, 1961. On the 6th September, a State Banquet was held in his honour in the Kremlin Palace in Moscow.

Speaking on the occasion, Prime Minister Nehru said:

I am happy to be in Moscow again and to have the opportunity to see your Great Country. I have come here as a student to see and to learn. Questions of Peace & War fill our minds. In India we have been brought up from our earliest years in the ways of peace. Therefore we feel concerned about the problems of peace perhaps more than any other country does. If I may say so, with due respect to all countries, going to war will be the utmost folly in the present age. When there is so much to be done in every country and when so many avenues remain unexplored, it would be illogical, unreasonable and foolish to start destruction. That is why we are earnestly and passionately pursuing the cause of peace. I know, Mr. Prime Minister, that you are devoted to the cause of peace and are working for it. I sincerely hope that your efforts and the efforts of others will enable the world to move towards the ways of construction instead of destruction.

Relations between our two countries have been friendly. We are grateful for all the help you have given us. However, what we value more than material help is your friendly association with us. I hope and look forward to the continuous growth of friendship between our two countries and cooperation in good deeds. Thank you for your welcome and kind words and I hope you will continue to guide your country for a long time to come.

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USA RUSSIA INDIA

**Date** : Sep 06, 1961

Volume No

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1995

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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Welcome Speech by Mr. Khrushchev

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Welcoming Prime Minister Nehru, Mr. Khrushchev said.

Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister,

Esteemed gentlemen,

Dear comrades:

It is a great pleasure to welcome once again today our distinguished guest Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of the friendly Republic of India, and also the members of his party.

We hope, Mr. Prime Minister, that your visit to the Soviet Union will be another step along the road of further strengthening the friendly Soviet-Indian relations, which rest on the principles of peaceful co-existence.

We highly appreciate the peaceful policy of your country and the efforts of your government towards improving the international situation, settling the problem of general and complete disarmament and liquidating the disgraceful colonial system.

The Soviet people are engaged in peaceful creative endeavour. All our people direct all their efforts towards fulfilling the great plans of building communism in our country. If the situation in the world depended only on us and the other peace-loving countries, there would be no threat of war.

But there still are forces which cannot understand or do not want to understand that the use of force in relations between states must be discarded in our nuclear age. Now life has placed into the foreground the question of a German peace treaty. It is time, high time, to put an end to the vestiges of World War II. We urge the governments of all countries that took part in the war against Nazi Germany to meet at an international conference for the conclusion of a German peace treaty. On this basis the question of normalizing the situation in West Berlin would also be solved. Our proposals on these problems in no way infringe the interests of the Western powers. The peoples need peace. But peace does not come by itself, it can be achieved only by joint, active efforts of all peoples and governments including the governments of the neutral countries. In the issue of peace or war, the peoples cannot remain indifferent and hope that the wish for peace alone will eliminate the threat of war.

Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister, we sincerely desire that the relations between our countries should continue to be an example of friendly

cooperation between States.

May I propose a toast to the health of our esteemed guest, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, and wish him good health for many years, to the success of the Indian people along the road of their further independent national development.

To the friendship and co-operation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and India;

To our joint efforts in the struggle against the forces of war, for the strengthening of peace on earth.

USA INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC GERMANY MALI

**Date** : Sep 06, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Prime Minister's Speech at Soviet-Indian Friendship Rally

Prime Minister Nehru made the following speech at the Soviet-Indian Friendship Rally in Moscow on Sep 09, 1961

Mr. Chairman,

Mr. Prime Minister Khrushchev,

Dear friends:

I am deeply grateful to all those who have spoken words of friendly welcome at this meeting. Indeed, ever since I reached Moscow two days ago, I have had evidence of welcome and friendship from every quarter here--from the respected Head and other Members of the Soviet Government and from the people of this great capital city. It is always a pleasure to me to come to the Soviet Union. It enables me to see for myself the progress in many fields that is being made here in the building up of a new society and the advance of science. The friendly atmosphere that surrounds me here heartens me.

Ever since I came here six years ago, many notable advances have been made by the Soviet Union. It has shown remarkable achievements in the new domain of space travel. Here in this beautiful city of Moscow I find great changes and large numbers of new houses that have been built in recent years. The city has grown and become even more

attractive and pleasing than it was previously.

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During these years, Indo-Soviet contacts and cooperation have grown considerably and our trade has grown greatly, so have our cultural associations. Hundreds of Indian students have come here for study and technical training. With Soviet aid many great plants have been built and are now being built in India and hundreds of Soviet technicians have helped us in India in this work which we consider very important. We have specially welcomed the cooperation of Soviet scientists and technicians in many of our important activities. I am deeply grateful to the Government of the Soviet Union for this help that they have given and are giving. We are engrossed in the work of building up a new India and raising the standards of our people and making life worth living for all of them. With this end in view we have just completed our Second Five Year Plan and have begun the Third Plan. We hope that by the end of that Plan we shall laid the firm foundations of industrial and agricultural growth.

While my mind is naturally full of the problems of my own country, I must confess that today I am troubled in my mind and spirit at the world situation which has deteriorated during the last few months, and there is now even an apprehension of war. War is bad anyhow, but in these days of dreadful nuclear weapons it is terrible to contemplate. All the leaders of the world have pointed this out and have said that peace is an inescapable necessity. In the Soviet Union, stress has been laid on peace more than perhaps in any other country. The Soviet Union has also stood for disarmament, total and complete, under effective international control, so as to put an end, once for all, to the dread prospect of war.

We in India have been especially devoted to peace. We have been conditioned for many years by our great leader Mahatma Gandhi who taught us the way of peace even in our struggle against British imperialism and brought us freedom through peaceful methods. We have many failings in India, and we do not pretend to be better in any way than any other people. But we have always stood for peace. Indeed, our dreams for a future new India will be shattered if war descends upon this distracted world.

Because of this training and conditioning that we have had, the present international situation is a matter of the deepest concern to us. We realise that the key to war and peace does not lie on our hands. And we can do little to make a difference to this ominous situation. But what little we can do for peace, we want to do, and we plead with these great powers who have this key to war and peace in their hands, among whom the Soviet Union is today outstanding, to remove this dreadful prospect of war and lead the world to peace.

I have come to Moscow from Belgrade, where a conference of 25 non-aligned countries was held. At the unanimous request of that conference, the President of Ghana and I have brought a message to

Chairman Khrushchev expressing their great concern at the dangerous international situation. A similar message has been sent to President Kennedy of the United States of America. In this message the members of this Conference have pleaded for urgent negotiations between these two great powers especially to endeavour to solve some of the important present problems or, at any rate, to lessen the tension and thus create an atmosphere for fruitful negotiations. That message has come from the leaders of 25 countries spread out over several continents, and I believe it represents the heart-felt wishes of millions of people all over the world.

In this message they have not given their own views about the particular international problems that face us today. It is their belief that every effort should be made to solve these problems by agreement, and their conviction that only negotiations can lead to fruitful results. There appears to us to be no way other than that of negotiation to deal with these grave matters. If once the present tensions are reduced and the near prospect of war no longer frightens humanity, then the way opens out for a consideration of basic problems like that of full disarmament. I am convinced that unless complete disarmament is aimed at and achieved, there will be no peace in this world. Fear will fill the minds of men everywhere, and fear is not a good companion; it leads to hatred and violence and to destruction. When the advancement of science has brought the building up of a new world within our reach, free from conflict and hatred and violence and bringing prosperity to all, it would be the deepest tragedy that mankind could not grasp this opportunity and revert to the ways of destruction. The present is the last chance for humanity to take. A wrong step now might well end any future for humanity.

We seek peace, but peace can only come through peaceful methods, or else we live in an atmosphere of fear and hatred and revenge.

We are told by eminent scientists and those who know, that war today cannot lead to the victory of any nation or party; it can only lead to a common defeat for all or even almost to an utter

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annihilation of the human race. If that is so, then other methods must be tried for the solution of national and international problems.

A great teacher of our people who lived 2500 years ago, the Buddha, once said that the greatest victory is one in which nobody is defeated and all can share in that victory. Such a victory cannot come through conflict and destruction on a large scale. I would, therefore, in all humility, plead for the methods of peace and negotiation to be employed in solving our problems. For many years now, the cry of peace has gone up from hundreds of millions of people in every country who look up to the leaders of nations. To give effect to the cry of their hearts, we have to listen to that passionate appeal and not betray it. National prestige is important,

but a prestige that hopes to establish peace through war today is based on neither reason nor logic, for war will not add to the prestige of anyone. National security is also an important consideration, but common destruction cannot add to security.

The advancement of nuclear science has brought a message of hope to the world, as also threat of doom. It is for the world to choose which way it prefers and it is for the great leaders to give the right lead. Nuclear bombs, ever since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have demonstrated the way of utter destruction. Ever since then, so-called progress has been made in making the possibility of such destruction infinitely greater, and because of radio activity terrible consequences might flow to future generations. That is why we have viewed with great concern the nuclear tests that have taken place in the past and have pleaded for their discontinuance. Whatever the military justification of these tests, they expose the whole human race to peril. Problems affecting millions of human beings have to be considered from the human point of view also.

Today, both logic and reason as well as human considerations point to the way of peace, and I plead with all sincerity and in all humility for this way to be adopted and to govern the thinking and activities of the leaders of nations. The Soviet Union has stood for peace and disarmament. It has been engaged in the mighty task of building up a new society. It has achieved great success already and looks forward to even greater success in the future. That success in constructive activity is the real victory which harms no one and brings greater happiness to millions of people. I earnestly hope that the lead for peace that the Soviet Union has given in the past years will be continued and yield fruitful results for all the countries.

I express my gratitude again to Chairman Khrushchev and the members of the Soviet Government as well as the people of this great country for their generous hospitality, their friendliness and the affection they have showered upon me. I trust that the relations of the people of India and the people of the Soviet Union will ever grow closer and more friendly.

INDIA RUSSIA USA YUGOSLAVIA GHANA JAPAN

**Date :** Sep 09, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Nehru-Khrushchev Joint Communiqué

At the conclusion of Prime Minister Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union, an official Communique was issued in Moscow on Sep 11, 1961

The following is the text of the Communique:

On the invitation of the Soviet Government, the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, visited the Soviet Union from the 6th September to the 11th September, 1961. During his visit Prime Minister Nehru had full and friendly talks with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N.S. Khrushchev. He also called on the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., L.I. Brezhnev.

From the Soviet side A.M. Kosigyn, Vice-President, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., A.A. Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. and other officials of the Soviet Government took part in the talks. Prime Minister Nehru was assisted by R.K. Nehru, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, S. Dutt, Ambassador of India in the U.S.S.R., and V.H. Coelho, Joint Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

During his stay in the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Nehru visited the exhibition of economic achievement of the U.S.S.R. and a new district of the house-building projects and other projects. He also acquainted himself with the achievements of the Soviet People in the fields of economics, culture and science.

Prime Minister Nehru was welcomed at a Soviet-Indian Friendship mass meeting in the Kremlin where speeches were made by him and by Chairman Khrushchev. On his way back to India, Prime Minister Nehru visited the City of Tashkent where he met the leaders of the Uzbek Soviet

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Socialist Republic. The visit of Prime Minister Nehru provided an occasion for a vivid demonstration of the cordial friendship between the Soviet and the Indian peoples; the Soviet people have shown their sincere feelings towards the people of India and their ardent desire to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries. The Indian people fully reciprocated these sentiments.

During their talks, Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Nehru exchanged views on the further progress of Soviet-Indian relations and on important international problems. They reaffirmed that the two Governments consider the securing of stable peace as their primary task. This task is all the more important at present in view of the dangerous turn in international relations.

Chairman Khrushchev explained the Government's point of view in regard to a German peace treaty. He pointed out that although 16 years have elapsed since the termination of World War II, the

remnants of war are still being preserved in the Central Europe. He also referred to the dangers of renewal in Western Germany of militarism and revanchism and the demand of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for nuclear weapons.

Chairman Khrushchev stated his views on normalising the situation in West Berlin on the basis of a peace treaty. In this connection he stated that the Soviet Union is anxious to solve the problem in agreement with all the parties concerned, taking full account of the peaceful interest of the German people. He informed Prime Minister Nehru that the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into negotiations with the Western Powers with a view to the early conclusion of a German peace treaty.

Chairman Khrushchev also informed Prime Minister Nehru of the Soviet Government's proposals in regard to the status of West Berlin as a demilitarised free city with international guarantee of the status and the ensuring of the freedom of communications between West Berlin and the outside world. He pointed out that the status of West Berlin as a demilitarised free city would contribute to the solution of the problem of West Berlin within the framework of a German peace treaty.

Prime Minister Nehru noted the views expressed by Chairman Khrushchev. While agreeing with the Chairman that the facts on the existence of the German States at present could not be ignored, and that any attempt to change the frontiers will have dangerous-consequences, he stressed the imperative need for finding a peaceful solution of the German problem by negotiations among all the parties concerned.

Chairman Khrushchev then stated the Soviet Government's view on disarmament and nuclear tests. He explained that weapons of unprecedented destructive power have been developed and international tension had reached a dangerously acute stage. He expressed the view that, in these circumstances, the implementation of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control is now more than ever a pressing necessity. He expressed the hope that the coming 16th Session of the United Nations General Assembly will adopt a clear and effective resolution on disarmament.

Chairman Khrushchev explained the motives and reasons which led the Soviet Government to decide to resume experimental nuclear weapon explosions. He pointed out that the Soviet Union was compelled to adopt this course in self-defence as the Western Powers had stepped up the arms race thereby aggravating the international situation. He also pointed out that the Soviet Union was always in favour of banning nuclear weapons and nuclear tests and had done everything possible to achieve a solution of this problem. However, the effort of the Soviet Union in the Three Powers Conference in Geneva to achieve the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear tests had not yielded results due to the negative attitude of the Western Powers. He also drew attention to the fact that the Western Powers had not accepted the Soviet proposal for dealing with a ban on

atomic explosions in a general agreement on total and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In his view, under present conditions this is the only possible way to reach an early agreement on the banning of experimental explosions of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

Chairman Khrushchev also stated that the intensified military preparations of the Western Powers and their direct threat to the Soviet Union had forced the Soviet Government to take a decision to increase somewhat their defence expenditure and to retain temporarily in service defence personnel who had completed their active service period established by law. The Soviet Government had, however, stressed that the aim of the Soviet Government in taking these measures was by no means to pursue a policy of arms race and that the Soviet Government and people had a great desire to proceed with the execution of measures for general and complete disarmament

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under strict international control if the Western Powers would agree to a disarmament treaty on these basis. In this connection he expressed his appreciation of the important contribution made by India and many other countries for the solution of the disarmament problem.

Prime Minister Nehru agreed with Chairman Khrushchev that general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control is the most important question facing the world today. He drew attention to the fact that the United Nations General Assembly had already passed positive resolutions to this effect. The Government and the people of India have always been opposed to tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

Prime Minister Nehru informed Chairman Khrushchev of the results of the conference of non-aligned countries which was recently held in Belgrade. Chairman Khrushchev agreed that colonialism in all its forms and manifestations and, in particular, the actions of the Portuguese colonial authorities in Angola and elsewhere should be resolutely condemned. He also declared that he deeply appreciated and sympathised with the desire of the Indian people to liberate immediately Goa, Daman and Diu from Portuguese colonialism. Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Nehru expressed their full sympathy with the people of Algeria who were fighting for their self-determination and for the recognition of their territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Nehru also agreed that the policy of racial discrimination and apartheid pursued by the Government of South Africa was a grave violation of the rights of man and fundamental liberties.

Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Nehru recognised that, in the present international situation the most important guarantee for the

preservation and strengthening of peace lies in a determined effort to solve peacefully all problems which are creating among the nations.

Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Nehru noted with satisfaction that friendly relations and cooperation between the Soviet Union and India are developing successfully in the interest of the peoples of both countries. They noted with particular satisfaction the considerable progress which has been made in Soviet-Indian economic and technical cooperation. After the signing in 1961 of the new Soviet-Indian agreement on economic questions, favourable prerequisites have been established for a further development of economic and technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and India. Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Nehru noted the desirability of further expansion of cultural exchanges between the two countries within the framework of the agreement on cultural, scientific and technical cooperation concluded in February, 1960. They reaffirmed that the exchange of visits and the maintenance of contacts between India and the U. S. S. R. played an important role in bringing the two countries closer and in establishing better understanding between them. They agreed to maintain and develop such contacts in the future.

Chairman Khrushchev expressed his firm belief that the present visit of Prime Minister Nehru of India to the Soviet Union is a new and important landmark in strengthening understanding, cooperation, friendship between the U.S.S.R. and India.

USA RUSSIA INDIA UZBEKISTAN GERMANY MALI SWITZERLAND YUGOSLAVIA ANGOLA  
ALGERIA SOUTH AFRICA

**Date** : Sep 11, 1961

## Volume No

1995

WEST GERMANY

Indo-German Loan Agreement Signed

An agreement for a credit of DM 170 million (Rs. 20.24 crores) from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Government of India was signed in Bonn on Sep 14, 1961 as further assistance from West Germany for the Third Five Year Plan. The Agreement was signed by Dr. Rudolf Lahr, West German Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Shri P.A. Menon, Ambassador of India in Bonn.

The entire credit is untied and the bulk of the amount will be paid into the Government of India account in the next few days. The rate of interest is 3 per cent per annum and the credit is repayable in 20 years including a period of 7 years during which no repayments are required to be made.

This amount is part of the German assistance totalling DM 1700 million (Rs. 202.38 crores)

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indicated by West Germany at the last meeting of the Consortium of Governments and Institutions interested in development assistance to India.

Together with the sum of D.M. 330 million for which credit agreements were signed in April this year, the total assistance received from West Germany this year comes to D. M. 500 million (Rs. 59.52 crores).

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GERMANY INDIA

**Date :** Sep 14, 1961

**October**

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GERMANY INDIA USA POLAND

**Date :** Oct 28, 1961

# Volume No

1995

CEYLON

Indo-Ceylonese Trade Agreement Signed

The following joint Communique was issued in New Delhi on Oct 28, 1961 after

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A Trade Delegation from Ceylon led by the Hon'ble Mr. T.B. Illangaratne, Minister of Trade, Commerce, Food and Shipping, Government of Ceylon, arrived in New Delhi on the 15th October 1961 for negotiating a Trade Agreement between the Governments of India and Ceylon.

As a result of these negotiations, a Trade Agreement was signed today by the Hon'ble Mr. T.B. Illangaratne on behalf of Ceylon and by the Hon'ble Shri K.C. Reddy on behalf of India. The Agreement, which comes into force with immediate effect, will remain in force until it is modified or terminated by either contracting party on giving 3 months' notice to the other party.

The two Governments have undertaken on the basis of mutual advantage to maintain as far as is practicable the traditional pattern of trade hitherto existing and to explore all possibilities, through consultations from time to time, of expanding trade and of trading in new goods. They have further undertaken to give full consideration to the suggestion made by either party for facilitating the export and import of specific commodities. The Agreement is expected to alleviate the difficulties currently encountered with regard to the exports of coconut oil, copra and rubber from Ceylon to India and the exports of dried fish, bidis, jaggery, tamarind and handloom textiles from India to Ceylon.

The discussions were conducted in the traditional spirit of friendship and co-operation, which has all along existed between the two countries.

GERMANY INDIA USA POLAND

**Date :** Oct 28, 1961

## Volume No

1995

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Indo-German Air Agreement Signed

Negotiations between the air delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of India commenced in New Delhi on Oct 09, 1961 and concluded on October 17, 1961. The German delegation was led by Mr. W. Kreipe, Director General of Civil Aviation, and the Indian delegation by Shri K.M. Raha, Director General of Civil Aviation. The negotiations were conducted in a cordial atmosphere.

The two delegations initialled the text of an Air Services Agreement between the two countries which will now be submitted to the respective Governments for signature and ratification. Under the terms of the Agreement negotiated between the two delegations, both Air India International and Lufthansa (the German Airline) will each be entitled to operate air services through Germany and India respectively.

GERMANY INDIA

**Date :** Oct 09, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### Vice-President's Message on U.N. Day

The Vice-President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, in a message broadcast on Oct 23, 1961 over the All India Radio on the eve of the U.N. Day celebrations, said: I am happy to say a few words on this United Nations Day. We in this country believe in the fundamental principles, though we are not unaware of the weaknesses of the Organisation.

Events in the Congo where we lost a great international civil servant and statesman, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, indicate how distant still is the goal; but we trust in the power of the human spirit. The cause the United Nations has to defend includes the whole of mankind and the rights of all nations to develop their possibilities and fulfil their aspirations without being restricted by others. The way to human society is through national societies.

In this age we can preserve our nation only if we are open to a universal perspective. It is

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clear that we should learn to get on with the other nations of the world if we are to survive. We must get rid of our future. If we persist in our struggles for political power and economic superiority the civilisation which we have slowly and laboriously built up across the centuries cannot avoid disastrous dissolution. The dangers ahead of us are great and time is running short.

The family of nations should wake up to the sheer compulsion of its

unity. The world is destined to be drawn together in a covenant of law and peace. This is not a mere dream of the prophets but a rational necessity recognised by the leaders of nations. The United Nations has to become the conscience and imagination of mankind. The United Nations and its allied organisations have been working slowly and steadily for the development of human solidarity. We wish them all well in the future.

INDIA CONGO USA

**Date** : Oct 23, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### Shri Krishna Menon's Speech in the General Assembly Debate

Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following speech in the general debate of the U.N. General Assembly on Oct 04, 1961

Though rather late in the proceedings, my delegation yields to none in the congratulations it would like to offer to you Sir, on your election to the presidency of this august Assembly. Even if your election had stood alone it would have been a matter for congratulation by itself. However, we should like to express our appreciation of the fact that you have been unanimously elected to your office and I hope that this great unanimity shown in your election and the understanding shown by your possible rival will be emulated in other fields so that we shall have more unanimous decisions in this Assembly. I should like to take this opportunity of saying also that it is not only a tribute to your personal qualities of which we are well aware—for although you are a comparative newcomer to the United Nations you have become acquainted with the delegations and the work of this Organization—but also a tribute to your country, especially at the present time.

We should like, further, to express our appreciation of the services rendered by your predecessor in a rather difficult year which ended tragically. My delegation has already expressed its sentiments with regard to the tragedy that overtook the Secretary-General and his colleagues in the disastrous journey they undertook over Africa. I should like, however, to take this opportunity of saying that my delegation, along with a number of others, has requested you, through the General Committee or by such other procedures as may be necessary, to act in order that the question of an international

investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and members of the party accompanying him may be inscribed on the agenda of this Organization. Since this matter is likely to come up in another place and in other ways it is not my desire to go into it now, but my Government takes a very serious view of this question. Irrespective of what may come out of the inquiry, it would be tragic if those who go out on United Nations missions and come to ends of this kind in circumstances of this character were not to become the concern of the Assembly in a very serious way. Therefore, as I say, we have gone to the length, along with other delegations, of asking to have this inscribed as an additional item on the agenda. Since it is now several days since your attention was drawn to this we hope that it will come up very soon.

Owing to the change in the procedure it has not been possible for us to take an earlier opportunity to congratulate the one hundredth Member of this Assembly, Sierra Leone. This country, with an area of some 28,000 square miles and a population of 2.5 million, comes into the picture of modern history with the advent of the Portuguese in the continent of Africa in order to capture slaves to be sold elsewhere in the world. For 200 years slavery went on. Ultimately Sierra Leone came into existence in the shape of Freetown--strangely enough, not as a colony in the beginning but in order that liberated slaves might find somewhere to go. But, as history would have it, this Freetown soon came under the commercial organization of an exploiting company and subsequently passed under colonial rule, reminding one of what Abraham Lincoln once said:

"The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd as his liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the same act as the destroyer of liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly the sheep and the world are not agreed upon a definition of the word

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'liberty'; and precisely the same difference prevails today among us human creatures, even in the North, and all professing to love liberty".

It was soon after Freetown was founded--and it is also interesting that Freetown came into existence soon after the American revolution and just before the French revolution, that is to say while, in other parts of the world, the liberty of men was being proclaimed and republics, were being founded--another town also came into being in Africa in this way. But it did not follow the course of the later history of Liberia. It became a Crown colony, but over a period of 100 years, by gradual processes, it attained its present situation where its rulers and the colonials, in the same way as in our history in the last stages, came to an agreement to part company in friendship as independent States. Soon after, as in other countries, King Nambina ceded twenty square miles of land to Captain Taylor, on behalf of the free community of settlers, in exchange for rum,

muskets and an embroidered waistcoat. Soon afterwards the inhabitants rebelled against the Company's misrule; the rebellion was put down, but it had the result, as in the case of India and Warren Hastings and others, of attracting domestic attention in England, as it was then, to misrule and the character of the administration.

In 1807 the British Parliament made the slave trade illegal and the new colony was used as a base of operations. From 1924 onwards institutions came into existence and by slow processes, over thirty or forty years, it has at last today become an independent and self-governing dominion of the British Commonwealth with freedom to choose its own form of government today, tomorrow and any day it likes. We are glad to think that its latter stages have followed the course of events in our own country rather than that of violence.

On 27 April Sierra Leone became independent, and on the same day the Republic of India recognized it as an independent State and established diplomatic relations with it.

I should like, however, to draw attention to what the Prime Minister said in this Assembly. Sir Milton Margai said:

"When, in future, both within and without the United Nations, we"-- that is, the Sierra Leone--"persistently championed the cause of a speedy and final end to every variety of colonial rule everywhere in the world, we wish the fact to be remembered that we do not speak out of bitterness, but out of conviction which we ourselves now enjoy is a right which all men everywhere must enjoy. We wish, further, to make it clear that we reserve the right to express ourselves fully and independently on all issues."

No one could have put this better, because very often those of us who are ex-colonized perhaps speak with more feeling than some others in the cause of colonial independence; it is often likely to be regarded as past bitterness expressing itself. We believe it is not possible for this world to remain half free and half slave. It is not possible, for the things we believe in, either to restore the economic imbalances or to establish peace, co-existence and co-operation in this world, or indeed to restore the dignity of human beings so long as there are subject peoples.

And that takes us to the problem of colonies as such. We have in this Assembly made considerable advances in this direction in the last year or two. It has now resolved in the Assembly that the whole regime of colonialism must come to an end, while no date with the calendar has been fixed, it is the spirit and the intention of that resolution that it shall come to an end quickly. And while we refer to this matter, it is only fair and right that we take both the welcome factors as well as the others in this way. In a short time Tanganyika, a Mandated Territory originally, afterwards a Trusteeship Territory which only a few years ago it was thought would take fifty years before it attained its independence, will apply for admission as an independent State to the United Nations. It may well be that

before we disperse, we would have added the one hundred and first State to the United Nations.

In the Caribbean there is British Guiana which has passed through some troublesome periods of recent history and which is also about to attain its independence. The Caribbean Islands are likely to take the same position. So in the whole of what was formerly the British Empire, there seems to be the process of--I would not call it disintegration--the resolving of the Empire into its proper component parts taking its place. We hope this process will speed up in East Africa and elsewhere.

My Government would also like to welcome without reservation the statement made by the

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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the United Kingdom, when he informed the Assembly that although they had no obligation under the Charter to submit political information in regard to Non-Self-Governing Territories, the United Kingdom intended to do so. But it is true that it will be only for a short period because all these territories, in their process of historical progress at the present time, will in less than twelve months have become independent.

We are equally concerned about the fact that this independence should be real and should not be, as in the case of another part of Africa, independence for the few and not for the many. Therefore, when there are large populations, as in the Central Federation or that part of Africa, if in the name of independence a large number of people are consigned to the rule of a majority which believes in a racial doctrine and a form of government which this Assembly has disapproved so many times and condemned in no uncertain terms, then we cannot welcome that as independence. It is particularly so when these territories, though they are not Members of the United Nations, are members of what may be called a solar system, that is to say, all the various specialized agencies and so on.

We also look forward to the time when the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi will become an independent territory, and we hope it will not pass through the travail of the Congo, that there will be no rear guard action fought in order to regain a Trust Territory into an Empire; that Australian New Guinea will similarly become independent; and that the many, many territories in Africa and elsewhere, about fifty in number, will in a short period of time have gained the status of independence.

We ourselves have not put down a date by the calendar, but we go by the spirit of last year's resolution that it was not mere empty words that the United Nations having decided on the end of colonialism, will now see to its implementation, that there will be machinery set up and that Article 73 now acquires a new meaning; and therefore when the Republic of Portugal refuses to obey the Mandate of the United

Nations to submit information, a new situation arises. Article 73 has to be read along with the new decisions of the United Nations and we are entitled to obtain information with regard to Portugal from whatever sources available to the United Nations.

The three main slices of the colonial empires that remain are that of France with its ten and a half million people and some four million square miles, mainly in the territory of Algeria, where over period of eight years sanguinary war has been going on in which a very considerable part of the French Air Force and French Navy is engaged, and according to where you get your figures, the casualties have been from 200,000 to 700,000. Equally, there seems to be no reconciliation of the points of view between the Algerian people who demand their birthright of independence, recognized by the United Nations not only in its Charter, but by subsequent resolutions. Whatever attempts at negotiation have so far failed, my country stands foursquare with the Algerian people in their demand for full and complete independence.

Portugal is the largest empire today--the oldest ally of the United Kingdom--a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Portugal owns 1.3 million square miles in the world, the greater part of it in Africa, with small enclaves on the Indian continent, in the Pacific Ocean, south and east in Timor and Macao. We are not here to make any special pleading on behalf of the particular part of these territories, but Portuguese colonialism does not even have the characteristic of nineteenth century or twentieth century colonial rule, but is characterized by cruelty and repression which has resulted in some--according to the authoritative estimates--over 130,000 refugees fleeing into the Congo.

The Assembly knows that conditions in the Congo are not such that anybody would like to go there as if going to a sanatorium, but the conditions obviously in Angola are far worse and therefore they are driven into these areas, and they are going on at the rate of 10,000 a month or so; these are not reports by political parties but by the international Red Cross which is taking care of these people. They are mainly children driven from Angolan homes where men and women are forced into modern slavery of forced labour. The view that is taken by the Portuguese Empire in this connexion is something that is inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

On 5 February of this year, there were enormous casualties arising from the attack on the population by the ruling Power; that neither the police nor the army recovered themselves from the troubles given by the Africans in resistance to oppression, and with armed settlers they invaded African quarters, beating up and shooting Africans indiscriminately.

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An eye-witness who left Luanda on 6 February told of a count of forty-nine African corpses, hundreds wounded and hundreds more in prison. The massacre continued.

Picking up the story on 24 February, the magazine Time reported that a Luanda cabdriver had:

"told reporters that he saw five trucks loaded with corpses driven out to a mass burial in the bush

"While tanks and armoured cars patrolled the streets at night and Portuguese gunboats and planes combed the coastline, a doctor said wearily, 'I don't know how much more of this I can stand. Every night we deal with men dreadfully cut up and wounded.'" (Time, 24 February 1961, page 22)

Another eyewitness said the following:

"On 29 July, on our way back, we passed through this village again. Three hours after we left the village that day, it was completely wiped out. Some other Journalists later visited this village and said that they had seen evidence of napalm bombs"--

these atrocious methods are shocking enough when used by nations in wars against other nations, but they are even more shocking when used by nations against their own peoples.

We could go on recounting the stories of atrocities. Africans are pulled out of their homes at night and shot dead for no reason except that they are Angolans or other Africans living in their own territories.

What is the Portuguese theory about this? I think that we must understand this particular aspect of the question when we discuss Article 73. The following is a memorandum which was written by the Portuguese Government to the Secretary-General of the League, of Nations in 1923:

"In new countries, and particularly in the African colonies, the regulation of labour is an important consideration...Forced labour is a form of slavery, and therefore measures should be taken to prevent it. Moreover, the European races which bring civilization to the natives need their assistance to attain their aims: the work of the colonist must combine with that of the aborigines. It is not reasonable that the colonization and development of uncivilized countries"--

the question is: who is uncivilized?--

"with the advantages which accrue to the natives therefrom, should be the result of the colonists' work and organization alone, without any assistance on the part of the native. Why should the negro be the only person in this world to be exempt from work? If he works of his own free will, he should be aided and protected by the law. If he does not, he must be induced to work by persuasion and by gentle and kindly methods. But if even these means prove ineffective, we have to

resort to the methods which civilized communities adopt against those members who desire to live on the results of others' labour--that is to say; vagabondage and idleness have to be punished.

"In African countries the principal industries now being established are the exploitation of the sub-soil and agriculture. Both of these industries require abundant manual labour. But colonists and authorities are interested in the industrial development of the country. If, therefore, manual labour is scarce, if a charter of labour has not been duly established, and if, for this reason, the development of the country is impeded, abuses are bound to occur, and, in spite of all laws and regulations, the natives will be the first to suffer.

"While individual liberty should be respected and the principles of justice and equality for all should be upheld, we have some reason to ask whether certain philanthropic ideas are not sometimes, as applied to the negro races of Africa, likely to produce an effect contrary to that intended. If we are to avoid forcing an evolution which in so-called civilized countries has taken centuries, we must see that tropical Africa does not come to full civilization without passing through a number of intermediate stages.

"To desire to convert the native of the bush, with his customs, habits and manner of life, into a man with all the rights and duties of a European is to provoke a situation which may cause bitter disillusionment. The negro has to be civilized by his labour and must be made to co-operate by this labour in the process of civilizing himself and developing tropical Africa. Kindly and humane methods must be used to induce him to co-operate, but that co-operation must also be a means of modifying his mental outlook.

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Such an undertaking requires great moderation, prudence and forethought-It is not an easy task, and it is a task which should be dealt with not only from the point of view of the treatment of the negro, but also of the manner in which he responds to it."

I repeat: that was a memorandum from the Portuguese Government to the League of Nations in 1923. About forty years have passed, but the position is much the same. When a commission was appointed by the United Nations--a commission on which a countryman of mine sat--it met with the same reaction.

Of course, there are some enlightened administrators in Portugal, also. One of them--Captain Henrique Galvao--said the following when, as a senior inspector of colonies, he reported to the Salazar Government in 1947:

"In some ways the situation (in Angola) is worse than simple slavery. Under slavery, after all, the native is bought as an animal: his owner prefers him to remain as fit as a horse or an ox. Yet here the

native is not bought--he is hired from the State, although he is called a free man. And his employer cares little if he sickens or dies, once he is working, because when he sickens or dies his employer will simply ask for another."

Africans have to carry out two kinds of forced labour. First, there is work for the Government. Under this heading, there are the following categories:

(a) Work on the Chefe de Posto's (District Officer's) garden. This is an official garden, but the vegetables and crops are grown partly for his personal use and partly sold for profit. Every man, woman and child over fourteen years of age and less has to work for fourteen days on the "Granja". Workers get no pay and have to provide their own tools.

(b) Road work. Again, every man, woman and child has to work--even cripples and old people--to get the work done. The Administration has moved villagers in close to the roads to make it convenient to use them for roadwork and also to control them for forced labour. There is no pay for this work and the Government gives no tools or rations. People are called out for this work as required. It is never known when it is finished.

(c) The Government uses forced labour on the harbour works at Luanda and on barrages on rivers for irrigation of the lands for Portuguese settlers. It also uses them on Government building schemes. An eye witness has said that he remembers seeing them working on a Government housing scheme for Portuguese civil servants.

Secondly, there is work for private enterprises. There is not a great deal of difference between contract and voluntary work. A man may volunteer to avoid a contract that he is afraid of. Sometimes the volunteers are worse off than the "contratados" because they can be more easily cheated by their employers over wages and time of employment, which may be extended after the agreed term is finished or may be renewed for another full period without the workers' consent.

For a year's forced labour a man is unlikely to get more than \$14 by the time the native tax has been taken off and the other deductions which the Chefe de Posto imposes. When the District Commissioner is paying off a gang of forced labourers, the traders are called and they bring wine and goods for sale so that the worker shall not get away with this money.

It is almost impossible to think that such things can happen in modern times.

We now have a situation in Angola where we have actually moved away from the question of repression of Africans and their rebellion against such repression: we now have a situation which affects the peace and security of the world. The United Nations must now take up

the situation not only from the point of view of the atrocities being committed in a colonial empire, but also from the point of view of the effect on Africa as a whole and on the world. In the name of law and order, weapons of war are being used to suppress populations. Some of these weapons of war are made available to the colonial Powers--whether it be France or Portugal--because of their alliances with other nations. That is to say, countries that are against colonial rule, that certainly would not adopt these tactics, find themselves in a vicarious way in the company of countries that are suppressing populations, using not merely the time-honoured methods of war, but modern methods of war.

In Africa, there has been no progress with regard to South West Africa. It is not my intention to deal with this matter here, because it is a separate item on the agenda of the Fourth Committee. South Africa continues to apply the policy

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of racial discrimination known as apartheid in spite of repeated appeals and condemnations by this Assembly, appeals and condemnations voiced year after year.

In the continent of Asia we have a spot of trouble in Indo-China. A conference on this subject is going on in Geneva. It is not my intention to deal with this subject in detail, although other people have referred to it. One hopes that the meeting of the Princes in Zurich, the desire of the Laotian parties to come together, and the view of the great Powers and others concerned in the Laotian conference--at least as publicly expressed--that Laos should remain a neutral country will lead to the emergence of a government of national unity in such a way as to bring peace to this war-torn country, this country that has not known peace for the last twenty-five years.

She fought the Japanese in the great war, then the French colonialists, then they have fought among themselves, and now goes on in this way. For the last twenty-five years war has continued in that territory.

Every speaker from this rostrum has referred to the problem of Berlin. It is not my intention to go into the details of this question because the parties mainly concerned are apparently, according to newspaper reports, in the course of private discussions and it is not our desire to say anything that may in any way come in the way of an agreement of some kind. Perhaps before the end of my observations I may have something more to say.

Now we come to one of the most important problems, that of the Congo. In the Congo, the war still drags on after eighteen months, but in the last few months there has been progress. The appeal made in this Assembly time after time during the course of the last session, for the convening of Parliament and for the emergence of a Government

that would have, after the death of Lumumba, some responsibility from Parliament seems to have at last eventuated. Today there is a government of unity and we are glad that countries of the eastern and western blocs today have embassies established in Leopoldville, so that there is gradually a movement under the new Prime Minister towards matters of that kind.

The United Nations Policy of integrity, independence, the maintenance of law and order and of economic assistance, which had been reiterated, is solidly pursued and my Government will give whatever assistance is possible in this direction provided it is used for those purposes. There have, however, been very considerable difficulties. The Government of India, at the request of the United Nations has placed at the disposal of the United Nations considerable personnel for the purposes of the maintenance of integrity, independence and law and order, and for the facilitation of economic assistance. This Assembly has, time after time, asked for the withdrawal of those non-Congolese who are not there by permission of the Congolese Government, or through the United Nations Organization, but this position still continues. In spite of eighteen months of repeated pressure from various quarters, there is still trouble going on in this way, and the troubles of the last few days have largely arisen from the operation of mercenaries who are assisting in the disintegration of the Congo.

In this connexion, I would not be doing my duty if I did not say something with regard to the operations of the Indian troops in this area. Unfortunately, there have been misstatements in regard to the performance of United Nations personnel. It is not my obligation to speak about all the others. Similar statements have been made about Irish troops, for no reason whatsoever. I regret that the first of these came out in the United Kingdom newspapers, though I would like to say at once that officially the Government of the United Kingdom not only has not condoned any of those reports but, what is more, has informed my Prime Minister that it does not share the views that have been stated.

What has actually happened, however, is that in this territory there have been operations against the United Nations forces by those who ought to know better. On 15 September, Sir Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, called upon free countries of the world without delay to demand a cease-fire in Katanga to restore the Tshombe Government. There is no objection to anybody demanding a cease-fire anywhere, because we do not want to see any fighting, but to operate against the United Nations policy there--this, by someone who no doubt in due course aspires to come here--is another matter. And here, if one may say so, the United Kingdom is entirely responsible for the defence and external policies of the Rhodestian dominion. He also said the fighting was bound to get worse.

On 15 September the French Government spokesman charged that the United Nations had exceeded its mandate and possibly violated the Charter by intervening with force in Katanga, Considering that the

operations of the forces for which we have some responsibility were ordered

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by the United Nations, at the request of the Congolese Government and Parliament, this does not correspond with the facts. I think the best comment on this comes from a New York newspaper which says:

"The sudden entry into the picture of Sir Roy Welensky, leader of the white settlers in the neighbouring Rhodesian Federation, is a reminder that even before the Congo became independent, African leaders were warning the U.N. of a Rhodesian plot to annex Katanga. It is inconceivable that Welensky will try by armed forces to prevent unification of the Congo. If he does, what has up to now been the crisis of the Congo may well turn into the crisis of Rhodesia."

It says at a later date:

"The current bloody struggle in Katanga, the first time a U.N. force has been involved in fighting, is not, as reports to the Security Council make clear, a result of a U.N. effort to end Katanga's secession by force...

"This is basically a struggle between the U.N. and a group of freebooters and adventurers--including French ultras exiled from their own country because of participation in the thwarted military rebellion in Algeria.

"For months now the U.N. has been engaged in patient, persistent, efforts to fulfil repeated General Assembly and Security Council directives that foreign mercenaries be evacuated from Katanga. Despite all its pleadings there were still some 500 left less than a month ago. They were the backbone of Katanga's resistance to national unity."

African nationalist leaders have supported the action of the United Nations in the whole of that region.

Then we come to certain matters to which I must draw attention There have been charges of Indian troops firing on Red Cross vehicles. I would like to say here, with completely checked information, that this is entirely false. General Mckeown told a Press conference "Indian troops are well led, best disciplined, and conducted themselves well." He said that the Indian troops had the hardest job in having to take radio and post office installations and came under heavy fire and sniping. But they were restrained. He denied that Gurkha troops fired at a Red Cross van. The General said that the Red Cross van was mounted with a bazooka by Belgian paratroopers. A Red Cross van does not become a Red Cross van because a cross is painted on it. It fired on and killed the Irish crew of the United Nations armoured car.

General Mckeown referred to the allegations of a British correspondent that Gurkha troops had inflicted heavy casualties on the other side during the capture of the radio station. "I do not accept any charge against them", he said,

Then we come to more recent matters in this connexion. During the recent fighting in Elizabethville a Red Cross ambulance car carried a bazooka and fired on soldiers in the same incident. Here is another one: on several occasions European civilians travelling in cars carrying Red Cross flags have been seen to carry machine guns. An Italian Red Cross medical team who were working for the United Nations were arrested in Elizabethville by Katangese soldiers under their European officers. This Italian Red Cross team was giving aid and succour to both the Katangese and United Nations troops. The Italian Red Cross hospital which was supporting the United Nations troops was constantly Under fire and had to be evacuated. At Albertville Indian soldiers captured two Belgians in civilian clothes manning a gun. They were later identified as doctors. A gentleman in priestly garb--I do not like to say a "priest"--was apprehended in the United Nations Italian military hospital in Albertville under suspicious circumstances. When searched a bayonet and hand grenade were found concealed in his robes. By early September half the mercenaries had been removed by the United Nations. Consuls concerned in Elizabethville gave the United Nations assurances that they would help in removing others. The Belgian Consul undertook to repatriate sixty-odd who had taken shelter in his consulate building. When fighting broke out, it was these who led elements of the Katanga gendarmerie. These Belgian army officers are members of the regular metropolitan army. Rhodesia has permitted the full use of its territory in support of Tshombe. It has helped with technicians, and has permitted passage of arms and ammunition.

I think I would like to stop there, because otherwise it will take too long at this late hour. I want to point out that this is a United Nations operation and, that being so, whoever is ordered by the United Nations to go in there ceases to be a national of his country for that purpose and

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is entitled to the protection of the United Nations The symbol of the Red Cross being used as a cover for these purpose is more than can be accepted as an excuse in this way. There has been no question of Indian troops firing on Red Cross officials--but where the Red Cross has been used by others in this way.

I now come to a more important aspect of the items we are to consider. The first of these which disturbs my Government lately, is the resumption of nuclear tests. We are a country that is nominally known as uncommitted. We do not take our instructions from either of the war blocs. Nor do we, in spite of differences that may arise in regard to either of them, always fail to express our opinions in this matter. With regard to these nuclear tests, it is necessary, however,

not to take this thing at a particular stage but to look at the thing as a whole.

It was first brought here by the Government of India in 1954. and from 1954 it incurred the opposition to the United Kingdom. When first India brought the idea that nuclear tests ought to be suspended, it was opposed by the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom for three reasons. First of all, said Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, it is not disarmament and therefore it need not be discussed. Secondly, it was said by the permanent representative at that time that the fall-out was negligible: there is always radiation from your wristwatch, and therefore it does not matter whether there is more radiation. Therefore there was no radiation. That was the second reason that it was not to be considered. Thirdly in the second or third year, when these things were wearing down, it was said that it was not detectable: in other words, you could explode an atom bomb in your pocket. That was the idea. For those three reasons, it was opposed.

Ultimately, after four years, there was a conference in Geneva, and the United States and the Soviet Union together came to an agreement, which had been discussed here also, that perhaps the technical parts of this could be investigated. Ultimately, the conference took place, and just before that, in 1958, the USSR stopped explosions--in March of 1958--and the United Kingdom and the United States stopped in September. And until September of this year, so far as we know, there have been no explosions except by France, which proclaimed what is called atomic isolation. In other words, they claim the liberty to bomb in the Sahara, which is African territory.

In the course of these negotiations in Geneva there were attempts--of course, we are not a party to them, we can only obtain them from such published information as is available--to break into the general ban. Our submission was that nuclear explosions, in whatever form they may take place, are bad, and that they ought to be stopped - - and completely stopped. The reasons are twofold. One is the effects of radiation, and the other is that nobody explodes these bombs just for amusement: it is only preparation for nuclear war. So for one reason or the other, it should be stopped.

Then, at that time, there came a dent in the idea of the general blanket prohibition, when the Western side proposed that underground explosions might be permitted, and there seems to have been disagreement about it. Since this will come up in the First Committee, I will not go into details about it. It was also said that it was difficult to detect these explosions.

Ultimately, in March of 1959, the British Prime Minister went to Moscow and proposed to the USSR that they might establish a principle which would permit underground blasts below a prescribed level.

My Government thinks that it was a great mistake to have gone away from the idea of blanket prohibition and to say that there may be good explosions and bad explosions. We are familiar with this

argument in the Assembly. I remember that, two or three years ago, it was between the "clean" bomb and the "dirty" bomb. Which was the clean bomb, I do not know--but there it is. Now, it is the nice explosions and the not so nice explosions.

Anyway, in May of 1959, the United States agreed to study some proposals in regard to inspection quotas, and so on.

To make a long story short, this year there came the renewal of explosions by the Soviet Union. My Government, without reservation, regrets this and regards it as a setback to peace. The moment it was confirmed, we made no reservations in this matter--because we think, on the one hand what is the purpose of this? It is not only a question of more radiation or less radiation, whether radiation is harmful or not so harmful, because, according to some United States scientists, even if there was a nuclear war, in the first year only 2 million people would die, and it would become 160 million in one hundred years. So there are different calculations. These Government scientists are like the bishops of the eighteenth century: they always have the opinions of their Governments. And therefore we need not

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pay much attention to it.

Our position with regard to the renewal of explosions by the Soviet Union is that it is highly regrettable. We have heard all the explanations; we are prepared even to consider the fact that they might have known that somebody else was preparing. But equally we think that anyone else who explodes a bomb because the Soviet Union did is also wrong in doing so. Our position is a 100 per cent position: no explosions under any circumstances, because the explosions are merely preparations for nuclear war, irrespective of the question of radiation as such.

Therefore, we have brought to the Assembly an item which differs from the one put down by the United States in regard to the treaty. The treaty and such things may come afterwards, but there should be a stopping of these explosions if we are to move towards disarmament or even towards the lowering of tensions.

We have been told in one case that it is because of all the troubles in regard to Berlin and general activity on behalf of NATO, the proposals of the West to give nuclear arms to West Germany, and so on. All this may be true. We are not one of the great Powers, we are not among the great killers of the world--we are minor killers--so we do not take responsibility for this. But, irrespective of the fact whether the nuclear power of the United States and its allies would increase or not, our answer to that is--what I think is the best thing is to quote Mr. Khrushchev on this.

It has been said that the fact of this test taking place now--said

the Secretary of State the other day--means that there must have been preparation for test in this way beforehand. That appears to apply to both sides, because it so happens that with the system that prevails in the Western world, all these things are published, and, in the Congressional inquiries in regard to underground test explosions, it is pointed out that it takes two or three years to make one of these big holes, it costs so much money--the question whether they radiate anything or not, I do not know.

Dr. Panofsky made the following remarks to Senator Hubert Humphrey:

"Firstly, the length of time has been estimated to be between two to four years to make a hole for 70 kilotons.

"Senator HUMPHREY: Two to four years?

"Dr. PANOFSKY: Right.

"Now let me make one other remark. We keep focussing our attention on salt. Now there is nothing magic about salt. The reason one talks about salt is because that is the medium in which engineers believe it would be the easiest to make such a big hole. It is not the properties of salt which make the muffling better, but it is just the fact that salt appears to be the most economical way of producing such a hole.

"Senator HUMPHREY: It would take two to four years, in other words, in the salt area--

"Dr. PANOFSKY: Yes.

"Senator HUMPHREY: And if you happen to run into something a little more difficult than salt, it would take longer.

"Dr. PANOFSKY: It would take longer and cost more.

"Senator HUMPHREY: Where do the salt areas of the world predominate?

"Dr. PANOFSKY: Everywhere. We know the Russians have large solution-mining operations and they are therefore familiar with the technique. Actually the question of natural occurring holes is not so critical because the natural occurring holes we know about are small. They are only useful for concealing explosions of 1 kiloton or so, which are difficult to identify anyhow.

"No really thorough engineering studies have been made which give reliable cost figures, but just as rough guidance, several hundred thousand dollars per kiloton for the hole is the kind of figure which the engineers discuss. This means that for 50 kilotons you might end up with figures in the general order of \$10 to \$30 million. These were figures which were produced by a rather brief study of the Atomic Energy Commission."

This is taken from the hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate.

Now statements have been made in the Soviet Union--and I am not going to read out the explanation given--that the need arose against their will because of the situation with regard to Germany or because of threats against the Soviet Union. We have been told here time after time--and I shall point out and give the figures when we come to talk about disarmament--that there are enough atom bombs in the world to blow up

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the world several times over. Then what is the point of having more of them? We have not been able to understand this even from a purely practical point of view.

Therefore, my country stands entirely without reservation in condemnation of the renewal of the tests, whether they be by one party, by two parties or by three parties. The French always keep out and make it difficult to draw any kind of tight cording in this matter.

Then there is the proposal made with regard to the abandonment of tests underwater and in the air. to which the Russians reply: "Yes, you are quite prepared to do that, but it is the other one we want." Then we come back to the same position, that whether it be underground, or overground, with the amount of material available it is quite obvious that there are all sorts of diabolical weapons from every part which can be fired from one place or the other, and that there is only one way of dealing with the atomic weapon, and that is to do away with it. There cannot be any kind of half-way house

From 1945 to 1958, the United States has been responsible for 169 explosions, the Soviet Union for 55 explosions, the United Kingdom for 21 explosions and France for 4 explosions, making a total of 249. Of course they are of different sizes. The total yield is estimated to be 170 megatons, which is equal to 170 million tons of TNT. Therefore today, so far as nuclear testing is concerned, we are in a much worse position with the renewal of tests by the Soviet Union, a few tests by the United States and the continuation of tests by France, than we were in 1959.

We hope that the efforts which were made by the Geneva Conference and which nearly came to a successful conclusion can perhaps be renewed. We may quote back on the one hand to Mr. Khrushchev and, on the other hand, to Mr. Stevenson, what they said recently. In January 1960, Mr. Khrushchev told the world:

"Should any of the States in the present-day conditions resume nuclear-weapons tests, it is not difficult to imagine the consequences of this act. Other States possessing the same weapons would be forced to take the same road. An impulse would be given to

resume nuclear-arms testing...under any conditions and unlimited by anything...Should any side violate the obligations to which it has committed itself, the instigators of such violations will cover themselves with shame and they will be condemned by the people of the world."

Mr. Stevenson, a few days before that, said the following:

"The recent proposal by some of our leaders that the United States resume underground nuclear tests, just when the first break in the arms deadlock seems possible, shocked me. I can think of few better ways to chill the prospects, deface our peaceful image, and underscore the Communist propaganda that they are the peacemakers and we the warmongers.

"We should extend our test suspension so long as negotiations continue in good faith and Russia maintains a similar suspension. I am confident that some, at least, of the Russian leaders are anxious to halt testing and development of nuclear weapons before the danger becomes even more uncontrollable. The good faith of the negotiations is, of course, decisive, because indefinite suspension amounts to a test ban without inspection.

"There are those who say that disarmament is impossible until political settlements have been reached and confidence restored. I disagree. I believe the nuclear arms race with weapons of mass destruction is a new element and in itself a cause of tension. Fear will not vanish until the arms race is arrested."

It is quite true that there are reservations in the statements, but they both show an attitude of mind which, if I may say with respect, coincides with the views we have expressed, namely that there cannot be a half-way house in this matter. Either there are nuclear explosions or there are not nuclear explosions. It is not sufficient if somebody says that the radiation is greater in Minnesota than somewhere else. It makes no difference to the world as such, because apart from the radiation there is an increase of the nuclear arms race, and that concerns us even more than anything else.

With regard to disarmament, our Prime Minister recently expressed his views and the ruling party in India yesterday passed a resolution with reservations expressing appreciation of the agreement or whatever you would like to call it resulting from the exchange between the Soviet

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Union and the United States.

The Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, speaking here the other day, referred to the communique of the Commonwealth Conference. I wish he had not, because it is my duty to say that while we have subscribed to that communique, my Prime Minister has made it clear

beyond any doubt that my country stands by the sixteen-Power draft resolution that has been submitted to the Assembly and is still under discussion. We are glad to think that the joint communique issued by the two countries in very large measure adopts the substance and the phraseology of the draft resolution. But there are some very significant omissions and significant additions to which I shall briefly refer today. My delegation will no doubt take this up in the First Committee if it comes there for discussion and if the discussions are not taking place among the great Powers. We have felt that the only way to get anything worthwhile done in the United Nations on one issue or another is for the United States and the Soviet Union to come to an agreement. We have found this to be true, and from 1952 onwards we have made the appeal each year that unless the United States and the Soviet Union come to an agreement, we are not likely to move forward. We stand unreservedly on that position. It is quite true that we are equal in status, but as the late Lord Balfour said, we are equal in status, but our equality of status does not extend to the equality of function. It is in the hands of the powerful nations that the peace of the world rests. Therefore, we hope that this agreement will come about. However, I am sorry to say that already annotations have come out in the way of two statements, one by the United States and one by the Soviet Union, which already show the difficulties involved when we embark on a question like that of full and complete disarmament.

This is the policy which has been put forward in the sixteen-Power draft resolution. By full and complete disarmaments we mean full and complete disarmament. I shall come to that in a moment. We, as smaller people in the world, look at the whole of this discussion on disarmament from 1945 onwards. There is no doubt that there has been a considerable amount of debate. At one time it looked as though we would go further and further. But as my Prime Minister said at Belgrade the other day, looking at the world we see more and more arms.

On 25 July, the President of the United States asked for an additional grant of \$3,247 million of appropriations for the armed forces. To fill out present army divisions and to make more men available for prompt deployment, he requested an increase in the army's total authorised strength from 875,000 to approximately 1 million men.

He requested an increase of 29,000 and 63,000 men respectively in the Navy and Air Force. These are all Published figures so there is no harm in repeating them.

Then we go on to the other side. We read in The New York Times of 5 September from Warsaw:

"Marian Spychalski, Defence Minister, disclosed today that other Soviet-bloc countries, as well as the Soviet Union and Poland, had taken steps 'conducive to the strengthening of defence readiness'".

Defence readiness is what it is called politely. The article continues:

"General Spychalski, addressing a graduation ceremony of the Czarniecki officers' academy at Poznan, reported in general terms that a military alert had been ordered within the Soviet bloc."

Again this is taking into consideration the necessity of strengthening defence. That is to say, in 1955, 1956 and 1958 the Soviet Union claims their armed forces had been reduced by 2,140,000 men. On 15 January 1960, a decision was taken on a further reduction of the numerical strength of our armed forces (the Soviet Union) by 1,200,000 men. Then it goes on to say that they will fulfil this decision to the last if there is an intensification of war preparations in the NATO member States, threatening the security of the socialist countries.

We are not concerned with the reasoning in this matter but with the facts. The fact is that in 1960, instead of a cutback of 1,200,000 men, they remain. The statement continues:

"Taking into consideration the necessity of strengthening the defence potential of the Soviet Union in these conditions, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR found it necessary temporarily to retain in the armed forces of the USSR soldiers, sailors, sergeants, sergeant majors and petty officers of the appropriate arms of the service and

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qualifications, who have completed their term of military service established by law and are subject to transfer to the reserve, to the amount necessary for securing the combat readiness of the Soviet Army in case of any possible provocations by the aggressive quarters of the Western Powers."

Thus, irrespective of the reasons, the facts are that on both sides armaments expenditures in money goes on more and more and more. A summation of national defence spending for arms, armaments and personnel shows that the world is spending \$14 million an hour for arms and armies. All this may not concern the great Powers so much, but I think that the normal peoples of the world, if they know more and more what they are doing in these directions, less and less will use the legalisms and all the arguments, all the "pros" and "cons", all the finding fault one way or another.

This is \$40 a year for every man, woman and child on earth, That is very much more than the per capita income of the African population of the Congo. At least 15 million men are members of the various national armies, and a total of 75 million men are engaged in tasks directly or indirectly connected with making war. Not included in these totals are an uncounted number of scientists whose research is more or less directly aimed at producing weapons or at improving

existing weapons.

Of the total arms expenditure, the United States and the Soviet Union together account for 73 per cent, \$88 billion a year. The United States has the largest armaments expenditure of any nation--\$46 billion a year. This is 55 per cent of the total Federal budget. However, it has been estimated that the Soviets spend as much as \$42 billion a year for military expenses, among which would be expenditures titled "Heavy Construction", "Education" and "Scientific Experiments". The Soviets claim to be spending only \$10.2 billion a year for arms and armed forces.

Ending the arms race absolutely would enable doubling the incomes of 1.2 billion people who now make less than \$100 a year. Or it would enable adequate housing to be provided for 240 million families which are now inadequately housed.

Thus while there has been all this talk of cutting down on arms, if you take the year 1950, as regards expenditures on arms of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR, you will see that the expenditure on military budgets in France has gone up from 1.55 to 3.2; in this particular case largely because of colonial wars. The United Kingdom has gone from 2.38 to 4.2. The United States has gone from 14.6 to 46. The USSR has gone from 20.72 to 24.0. I suppose that is because of different calculations. Anyway, in every country there has been an increase in military expenditures.

We explain the military expenditures in our country as irrelevant for this purpose because they do not come into this particular arms race. However, as a matter of interest it has decreased in the last three years from .613 to .510, so in a small way one makes whatever contribution one can. I do not intend reading out all of these figures because, even though they are very important, this would not be welcome perhaps at this time of the evening.

With regard to the disarmament position, in 1946, directives were given by the United Nations and then we came to a period of deadlock. Again in 1952 directives were formulated. Last year, my delegation, in common with fifteen others, tried to persuade the Assembly to accept the giving of directives to the people who were engaged in disarmament negotiations. For the first time there was an attempt on both sides not to kill those resolutions but to have them considered. They have been discussed now for a long time and certainly there is the advantage that there has been an agreement put out between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the goals of disarmament. And here may I say this. There are two ways of looking at a goal; one is a goal of something you try to reach; but if you look at a goal from the point of view of a goalkeeper, to prevent the other fellow from getting there, then the word "goal" has a different meaning. That is the difficulty in using this word because "goal" means that if all difficulties are overcome they will get there.

So far as the goal of negotiations is concerned both countries, as in

the draft resolution before the Assembly, have agreed to accept full and complete disarmament, which indeed was accepted even two years ago.

However, as far as our draft resolution, the sixteen-power draft resolution, is concerned, there is a paragraph in it which enjoins and urges countries to refrain from actions likely to aggravate international tensions. This has been taken out and has been substituted by reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace.

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Now we go on to the other side with regard to the maintenance of international forces. Until there is international law in the world and until the one-world principle has been agreed upon, we are not, as Lord Home tried to persuade this Assembly, ready to accept the doctrine of the balance of power. It is not possible for small countries to accept the idea that the great Powers would have armed forces which would be placed at the disposal of the international authority. In the draft resolution, as it is put out and in the Agreed Principles, both of them contemplate such a force, but in the other case there is a proposal for a police force. But in this agreement a few national contingents, constituting the international force, would exclude the possibility of their being used for purposes inconsistent with the Charter, including such use in the interest of one group or another. That was the trouble. The international forces had to be used at various times and unanimity could not be obtained in the Assembly, not necessarily from one bloc or the other but even from other countries.

Another important difference between these agreed principles in the draft resolution is in regard to nuclear stockpiles. The draft resolution relates to the elimination of nuclear stockpiles and means of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

This is what the agreed principles between the Soviet Union and the United States talk about the elimination of nuclear stockpiles. It is not said that once eliminated you cannot replace them. However, the resolution offered the prohibition of these means of war, and this has been the position of the United Nations since 1952 when we accepted the prohibition resolution. In that sense, unless it is merely a verbal change, it is something on which we will have something to say afterwards,

Then we come to one of the main controversies on which there was a possibility of reaching an agreement in 1960, and that is with regard to what was called partial disarmament and complete disarmament. We are one of those countries who, on the one hand, think that it is not possible in today's world to reach any agreement on disarmament without controls, without inspections and without everything else agreed to. But, equally, we have always stated that any form of disarmament, however well intentioned or desirable, will take time,

whether it takes one minute or one year or ten years; it will take time. But in this sixteen-Power resolution it is clear that the first part of it is not supposed to be a sort of probationary period or trial experiment, to see how it works--that is, if everybody behaves properly, to go on to the next step. It seeks to commit the world as a whole to disarmament.

There has been discussion about this, and that part is still left in ambiguity.

I have dealt with the main aspects, with this exception. According to the agreed principles, the international inspecting officers would have unrestricted access, without veto, to all places necessary for the purpose of verification. This is a great advance as compared with the resolution which we submitted, and we welcome it--unrestricted access to all places, without veto. It would work out if there was agreement on full and complete disarmament.

The agreed principles omit altogether the provisions contained in the sixteen-Power draft resolution which relate to the exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes. No doubt that is a very simple matter, because there are only two countries concerned.

There was also a provision in the draft resolution with regard to surprise attacks. It was stated that all countries shall refrain from all forms of surprise attack and preparation for the same. This has also been eliminated in these agreed principles.

I have now dealt with most of these matters. All that now remains is an aspect or two with regard to the drift towards war. Now, we are not ourselves directly concerned in the Berlin dispute, in a narrow sense. It is not before the United Nations. We have not sought to bring it before the United Nations because we think that if the great Powers concerned could bring about a settlement--and we hope they will--from all that has been heard that would be the best thing one could think of.

However, in respect of what has been said about the imminence of a nuclear war and the preparations for same--the resumption of test explosions, etc.--while we may not be the contributors to either peace or war, we have the great advantage of being the common victims of it, and therefore from the victims' point of view we think we have some reason to say something about these matters.

I do not propose to read from the pages and pages I have here that relate to various types of weapons. For the first time we have been able to get the particulars on Russian weapons, which were recently published, and on American

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weapons. Surface to surface, air to air ground to air, from water to air--all over the place, beautiful names with a very destructive

capacity. And on top of it also the use of moon for this purpose. This is purely a lunatic effort.

There was a society in the eighteenth century which met on a day wherein there was a full moon. The reason was that various people wanted to get back to their homes which were thirty and forty miles away. They were called the "lunar society". They were the beginning of the scientists of the world.

Now I have here a letter in respect of testimony which was submitted to the House Armed Services Committee which says that the United States Air Force intends to establish a missile base on the moon. There is nothing lunatic about this. It is considered that the warhead would be fired from the moon to the earth without an enormous expenditure of energy since the moon has no atmosphere and little gravity.

The letter goes on to say that General Putt testified that the moon would provide a base of retaliation of considerable advantage over earthbound nations. Sounds rather mystic, does it not? He pointed out that an attack upon the moon by the USSR would have to be launched a day or two before an attack upon the terrestrial United States if the United States was to be unable to retaliate from the moon. Such a preliminary attack upon the moon, he considered, would warn Americans of their danger. If, on the other hand, the Russians did not demolish the United States lunar installations, it would be possible from these installations to destroy Russia, although the terrestrial United States had been obliterated--a good prospect.

His testimony was reinforced by Richard E. Horner--the letter goes on--Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, who saw in the establishment of lunar bases an opportunity of breaking through the nuclear stalemate.

My friend, Mr. Arthur Dean, has arrived here too early.

The letter further states that it is curious, and typical of militarist mentality everywhere, that both these two eminent gentlemen seemed at first loath to admit the possibility of Russia also installing missile stations on the moon. It is obvious that what one side can do the other also can do, and the only result of such plans, if they are carried out, must be warfare on the moon. General Putt, it is true, did in the end, acknowledge that what the United States can do in the moon Russia can also do, but the moral which he drew was that the United States must also occupy Mars and Venus which, apparently, he considered to be beyond the reach of the Soviets.

I do not know why.

The letter further states that all this curious speculation received much less publicity than might have been expected and that the writer should not have known of it but for the fact that it was reported

"I.F. Stone's Weekly" of 20 October 1958.

I have seen no account of similar plans of the Soviet Union, but I must find out for myself.

This is a letter from Bertrand Russell before he went to prison.

I shall now dwell on a matter which has engaged the attention of the Assembly very recently, and that is the situation which has been created by the sudden death of the Secretary-General. I have been asked by my Government to make our position entirely dear. We desire a United Nations that will function strongly. Last year when Mr. Khrushchev put forward the proposal of a tripartite Secretariat, my Prime Minister spoke in opposition at that time to it, and our position with regard to the troika is the same. I used the word "troika", because it has been properly used.

In other words, we do not believe in an executive which provides for the functioning of three heads that would cancel out each other. Therefore, we are against a Secretariat which possesses these three heads.

We are also against what the Americans call an arrangement which contains a built-in veto. Of course, "veto" is a word which has been used by the newspapers. We are against any kind of arrangement whereby forward movement would become impossible. At the same time, however, we believe there is some element of merit in this collective idea, because mistakes of various kinds have been made in the past. There is no reason at all why, through the ingenuity of the statesmen who are gathered here, a solution of this character could not be brought about.

We think that it is possible to find a solution. In the statement put out by the Soviet Union, it would appear, so far as we understand it, that it has come away from the idea of the veto. It has

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also moved towards the idea of having one person--of course with certain modifications, and so on.

We are not at present putting forward any proposals--because we do not want it to be thought that we are in any way hindering any bilateral agreement in regard to these proposals--but I, should like representatives--particularly those with strong views, to look at the history of this matter. This idea of more than one Secretary-General is nothing new. In 1946 the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations submitted a report to the United Nations, and what is more, it was accepted--its proposals have never been carried out. At that time it was said:

"11. the Secretary-General should be authorised to appoint Assistant Secretaries-General and such other officials and employees as are

required--The Assistant Secretaries-General should have responsibility, etc." (Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, Chapter 8, page 82) Later on it is pointed out that:

"8. there should always be one Assistant Secretary-General amongst those referred to in Recommendation 11 below, designated by the Secretary-General to deputise for him when he is absent or unable to perform his functions." (Ibid., page 81)

Looking back, after the event, it would seem that if this recommendation had been followed we could have avoided our present difficulty. What I am trying to point out is that this idea of having more than one person carrying responsibilities, in whatever form, is nothing new.

In 1952 Mr. Trygve Lie submitted to the General Assembly his report on reorganization. In that report we find the following:

"The Secretary-General believes that many advantages would result from the introduction of a simplified scheme in which three Deputy Secretaries-General would replace the present Assistant Secretaries-General and more responsibility for day-to-day administration would be delegated to the Principal Directors. The main features of the plan would be:

"(a) To enable the Secretary-General to devote his entire energies to the most important problems of policy and programme formulation by freeing him from questions of day-to-day operation, administration and co-ordination.

"(b) To provide the Secretary-General with a small group of deputies of the highest competence and prestige to collaborate with him. Although these persons should each be responsible for the functioning of a part of the Secretariat so as to ensure that their policy considerations would be rooted in realities, their main duty would be the development and over-all co-ordination of policies and programmes.

"(c) To delegate through the Deputy Secretaries-General to the next supervisory level--the maximum responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the several areas of the Secretariat." (Official Records, document A/2214, page 3).

I have no desire to go into a great many details nor into Mr. Hammarskjold's report because it was intended for him to argue it, and since he is not here, it is not necessary. The same idea is carried through with different modifications.

So the idea of having a collective factor is nothing new. While we are against any kind of arrangement which divides the world in three, while We are against any arrangement which provides for a built-in veto, we think that it is impossible for this Organization to function except by agreement between the great Powers. That is the

basis on which the United Nations was founded. The United States was the main delegation responsible for the veto at San Francisco; no more powerful speeches could have been made than those by Senator Connolly at that time--for some time the Russians did not seem to have been anxious about it in those days. Therefore, we think that the private talks being carried on by these great countries with minor and smaller people as well as between themselves have probably moved them nearer.

There is no reason why, in our submission, with a degree of the understanding of the position of the large number of nations in this Assembly, many of which would not want to be driven into the position of subscribing to a railroaded draft resolution--because we have seen resolutions

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in this Assembly adopted by fifty-five votes to five and nothing happened after--a solution could not be reached. Especially when the chief executive of one of the Charter organs may have to be appointed such appointment must carry with it both moral and other consent of practically the entire body of people, and not become an issue wherein we merely count votes and get somewhere.

Therefore, we would be willing to support any agreement that is reached between the main contending parties, irrespective of our own minor desires in this matter. We think that it should be possible for them to come to an agreement on some individual, and for that individual to appoint five or six deputies, according to geographical or other considerations. If it is felt that the Charter is more conformed with if the appointments are made by the Secretary-General himself, these things can be easily provided for. We believe, therefore, that if a common individual can be agreed upon and that individual can go on immediately to accept the position and, in general pour oil on the troubled waters, then we shall be able to proceed.

As a Government, we are a little concerned about the fact that an arrangement of this character must come through the Security Council--and for this reason. The Government of India has today 7,000 personnel in the Congo. For the first time, the armed forces of India have gone beyond their shores with lethal weapons. It is true that they went to Korea, to Gaza to Lebanon and elsewhere, but today they are in the Congo as a fighting force at the demand of the United Nations. Increasing demands are made upon us each day and, what is more, we have responsibilities to our people and our Parliament in regard to this performance. The whole of the Congo action emanates from the Security Council's functions, and it would be a bad day if things of this kind were to be decided by a majority vote in the Assembly and not by the Security Council. We are not a member of the Security Council, but we are a Member of this Organization and, therefore, if the Secretary-General is merely a creature of the General Assembly by a majority vote or a unanimous vote and,

therefore, not related as a Charter organ to the Security Council, it would put the Security Council outside the competence of the whole thing. This is a serious matter. I have tried speaking privately about it, but with no results.

I think that it is necessary for me to say, on behalf of the Government of India, that we would support any arrangement on which there is comparative agreement between the great Powers, an agreement which would enable things to function. We think that it is possible to do so because the Soviet Union has moved away from the troika position and a built-in veto; it said in its statement of 1 October that it was not asking for veto. Therefore, I hope that, in the next few days, it will be possible to come to some agreement. It will depend on the two sides being able to have confidence not only in each other, but in the kind of person who would come in, a person who would not be pushed one way or the other. Any person who is likely to be not totally objective and have the courage to say so would find himself in difficulty.

Given this background, we do not see any difficulty about these other functionary and collective factors being brought in on the basis of geographical considerations--five or six as the case may be by agreement--if the countries behind them do not try to condition those officials.

For its part, whether it be in the Congo or in the Secretariat, the Government of India has never given an instruction to any Indian personnel, either here or in the field of operations. Once they are handed over they are international civil servants, and we have scrupulously respected that position. Even with regard to the Congo operations my Government collected all its information from other sources and not from anybody within the United Nations, because there were Indian officials in charge and we did not want to embarrass them.

That would be our position. Therefore, I make this suggestion that it may be possible for the representatives of the great Powers to come together on this basis and to be able to earn the gratitude of large numbers of people, especially people like ourselves who do not want to be divided in this manner and who would like to see a unanimous decision somehow or other taking place.

I am quite certain that whatever decision we take, it will not be in conformity with the Charter because the authors of the Charter--in their great anxiety to say something in a few pages, or whatever it may have been--did not make any provision for this purpose. Perhaps they thought that Secretaries-General would not die. That is also possible. But, anyway, there is no precedent for this. It has been said that there are precedents. I do not want to argue that. If the time comes when it is necessary we will argue, but there are no precedents so that whatever arrangements were made would not be on all fours in terms of

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the letter of the Charter. Certainly they should be in the spirit of the Charter in the sense that the Security Council and the Assembly must be able to subscribe to them.

The man must be able to work instead of having One party or the other be suspicious of him so that he will be unable to go forward in other ways: We hope that any further progress between the great Powers with regard to the issue of war and peace agitating the world--which is really disturbing people far more than anything else--will be helped by any movement towards that end.

We are a country with very little capacity to influence decisions, either by force of arms, by economic power or even by the power of persuasion. Even when a proposition has been put forward it usually takes six or seven years for the United States to look at it--and for other people perhaps the same time. We find that very often the approach is the same in this matter. We have made this appeal in this way in the hope that, in the next few days, having come so far--that is, the idea of a veto having gone away and the idea of one man not being admitted at all but the idea of one man plus having come into being--we shall, with a degree of give and take, find that it will be possible; especially if in the intervening period we can have five or six, or whatever number is required for the purpose, to go on with the duties as they are at present.

The world is exercised about the situation in Berlin, but not because people understand why a city should be divided like this. So far as we are concerned when any country makes peace with anybody we shall not say "No". If the Americans want to make peace with East Germany we shall not object to it, and if the Russians want to make peace with East Germany we shall not object to that. In spite of such instructions as I have I have refrained from going into any detail in this matter because the situation changes from day to day, and for other people to make observations on details of this kind would not be of any assistance. But it would be a bad thing for people to be told, as they are constantly told in the lobbies of this Assembly, that the world is getting accustomed to the idea of a nuclear war, so let the other side take care. Each side says, "Let the other side take care"--not that it itself should take care.

So I conclude with two quotations. Normally one goes back to history, somewhere else, because living people should not be quoted since they may change their opinions next day. I remember a gentleman with whom I was discussing a particular article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I quoted him, and at the end of it he said, "I have changed my opinion since I wrote that". So there is always that danger. However; Mr. Khrushchev said when he visited us here:

"The Peoples are thirsting for peace; they want to live without fear for their future, without fear of losing those who are dear to them in the conflagration of a new war.

"For centuries, the peoples have dreamed of putting an end to the destructive methods waging war...

"We say sincerely to all countries: As against the slogan 'Let us arm!', still enjoys currency in some places, we advance the slogan 'Let us disarm completely' Let us compete as to who builds more homes, schools and hospitals for the people and produces more bread, milk, meat, clothing, and other consumer goods; let us not compete as to who has more hydrogen bombs and rockets." (A/PV. 799. paras 45,46 and 96)

And President Kennedy, speaking to us the other day said:

"Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to, mankind. ... "Let us call a truce to terror. Let us invoke the blessings of peace. And, as we build an international capacity to keep peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war..."

The President went on to say,

"Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us." (A/PV. 1013, pages II, 12 and 16)

I do not think that I could conclude these few observations of mine on a better note than this. I submit them to the Assembly for its consideration.

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INDIA USA SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CONGO AUSTRALIA GUINEA  
PORTUGAL FRANCE ALGERIA ANGOLA GABON OMAN LATVIA CHINA SWITZERLAND LAOS  
JAPAN GERMANY RUSSIA YUGOSLAVIA POLAND KOREA LEBANON

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INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri Krishna Menon's Statements in Political Committee on Suspension of Nuclear Tests

Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the

United Nations, made the following statement in the Political Committee on Oct 20, 1961 on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests:

If it had been possible I would have liked to intervene in this debate at a later stage, after hearing the representative of the Soviet Union who, I understand, is going to speak on the subject matter of this question, following upon Mr. Stevenson yesterday. After the decision of the Assembly, which we continue to regret, we are now having a joint discussion on the two items and therefore, having regard to the vote and the relative capacity of delegations to weigh with the Committee, the second item becomes more important. Unfortunately, I am not able to do this. However, I have before me the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union at various times--ten or eleven times--and those of the United States, more particularly that of the Chairman of the United States delegation yesterday.

I think that is a good point at which to begin because I find myself in complete agreement with certain parts of it; but unfortunately, these statements are like the curate's egg--good in parts. I am quite prepared to follow this argument. Yesterday Mr. Stevenson said:

"There is still time to halt this drift towards the further refinement and multiplication of these weapons. Perhaps this will be the last clear chance to reverse this tragic trend, for if testing is stopped..."

Mark these words:

"for if testing is stopped the terrible pace of technological progress will be decisively retarded.

"A ban on tests,..."

It does not say, "A treaty on tests..."

"A ban on tests, of course, is only the first step, and the control and destruction of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is the ultimate goal..."

Apart from taking away the word 'ultimate' I would agree with every word of it: that is to say, a ban on tests is what we want, and that is the purpose of my delegation's intervention. It has been made, ear on so many occasions.

I should therefore like the Committee to have before its mind's eye what our objectives are in this matter--that is to say, not the long-term objectives in a world context but in the context of this debate. What are we trying to do here? Is it possible for this Committee to sit down and conclude a treaty within the time and with the expertise at its disposal? Or will it speed the conclusion of a treaty by refusing to pronounce itself on the necessity of the stopping of

these explosions?

At a later stage, the United States delegation, with characteristic optimism--very, very commendable--has said that the negotiating committee which apparently must do the work, a negotiating committee of these three countries, should report back to the Assembly in March of 1962. So we are supposed to be resigned to the fact that between now, mid-October 1961, and the beginning of April 1962--during these five months or so--there should be no attempt to put a brake on tests. That is, if tests go on at the present rate--and I will develop the argument as I proceed--there will be a five-month period in which children can play. That is what it comes to--a five-month period in which there is not only no control but even no appeal of the world to halt. That is the position.

I have no doubt that the Committee will vote according to the instructions of the various Governments and various other considerations. But it is the duty of my Government to make sure, however long it takes, that we place before you such material as we consider relevant to this problem, so that it should not be said, as Mr. Stevenson said yesterday, that this opportunity is lost. Particularly when we hear from both sides, more particularly from the Soviet side, that they are in a state of preparation to explode bigger bombs, is it necessary for the public opinion of the world to go out from here, whatever may be its consequences.

Our own approach to this problem is not as it has been presented or understood by certain members of the Committee, particularly some of my colleagues from Latin America who have spoken. We are not against any binding obligation--and I want to say here categorically, without any reservation whatsoever, that, if our attitude is so presented, it is a misrepresentation of the position of India. What is more, it is not only a

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misrepresentation of our position today; it is a misrepresentation of the position we have had for a number of years.

What we are saying is not that there should be uncontrolled suspension forever. What we are saying is that these things must stop. Just because there is going to be a treaty, which has taken three years to negotiate and which will take further time, are we to allow no expression of opinion to go out, no attempt to be made, along the lines I have read out from the United States speech of yesterday, to have a halt to these things? That is our position, Therefore, to have a juxta position--treaty or no treaty, uncontrolled ban or controlled ban--this is not, if I may say so with great respect, intellectually an honest position to present. It is a total misrepresentation of the opinion of my country in regard to disarmament, in regard to anything at all--just because we ask that these horrible things must stop, both on account of the time and our desire not to disturb feelings--not referring even to published

documents on these questions which show the enormity of the catastrophes we are likely to face.

The issue is presented, as I said, as though, on the one hand, we want uncontrolled suspension depending only on the goodwill of the people concerned, and, on the other hand, that what is being sought on one side is difficult for the other. We are here as the victims and as the victims we cry out. That is all there is to it.

Furthermore, it is also thought that this matter concerns only the two great Powers, or the three great Powers, as the case may be. Now that is not the position, because so long as there are other countries either exploding bombs or capable of doing so, there will be no agreement. In such an event each side will suspect that the allies or friends of one side or the other will be used as an alibi for themselves. Therefore, in our submission, any binding international agreement would have to be of a character which is open for signature to every Member of the United Nations, even if they are not making bombs today. After all, there are countries today which are capable of making bombs today but which were not capable of making them last year. Therefore, it should be of a character that does not leave any loopholes.

Equally, we think that any agreement of that character is merely a prelude to the total prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. That being so, no classification of explosions can be excluded, because while they may appear small in relation to something else, their consequences are the same. As will be seen in our revised draft resolution (A/C. 1/L. 283/Rev. 1), we think the two things go together: "to refrain from further test explosions pending the establishment of internationally binding obligations". The form of those obligations is a matter to be decided upon. But it goes without saying that no internationally binding obligations can ever come about except by the hard and difficult process of negotiation, the pressures of world public opinion and the exposure of unreasonableness at the particular time.

It is also necessary that all the facts with regard to this question should be available to the United Nations. Since the meetings of the Ten-Power Conference on Disarmament, the meetings on surprise attacks and the nuclear test ban negotiations, the "Disarmament Commission" has practically become a name, a label--it consists of all of us. At least last year it served the post-office function of submitting the report, but even that has gone out. Therefore, the Assembly is completely out of this business. I should like at this stage, therefore, to refer to the position of the Assembly in regard to the whole of this matter.

From 1946 onwards the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted resolutions in regard to the total prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. Here I think it is only fair to say that objection has come in one year from one side and in another year from another side. Nevertheless, that has been the central policy of the General

Assembly in its resolution 41 (I) of the first session, resolution 191 (III) of the third session, resolution 290 (IV) of the fourth session, resolution 380 (V) of the fifth session--all these resolutions without equivocation call for the total prohibition of weapons of mass destruction--resolution 502 (VI) of the sixth session resolution 704(VII) of the seventh session resolution 715 (VIII) of the eighth session. At its ninth session in 1954, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which definitely and categorically requested the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. In 1956, while it did not go into this matter in specific terms, it recalled the previous resolutions. So there has been no going back on this question. Any view which says that in the interests of national security or in the interests of protecting somebody else it is necessary to prepare weapons of mass destruction, is contrary to the decisions Of the General Assembly.

In 1958 the General Assembly urged that the States that had tested nuclear weapons--there

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were three countries at that time--should undertake negotiations and should make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests under effective international control. At the fourteenth session the General Assembly urged the States concerned to continue the present voluntary discontinuance of nuclear tests and expressed the hope that the States would undertake further effort to reach an early agreement relating to the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

Now in all humility I ask whether we are going to go back on the General Assembly resolution of the fourteenth session which requests the voluntary discontinuance of nuclear tests and expresses the hope that States will continue to observe that discontinuance? Are we going to say that we shall not repeat the request for the voluntary discontinuance of the suspension or the attempts to reach agreement?

At the fifteenth session last year we took note of the progress made at Geneva. As I said on the last occasion, that has no organizational or constitutional relation to the document that is now circulated, because this document is dated April 1961. In resolutions 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV), the Assembly took note of the progress made in the Geneva negotiations and urged the States concerned to make every effort to reach agreement as soon as possible. Those of you who were present here will remember that we took it from both sides that there were certain points of agreement and disagreement but that it was likely that agreement would be reached. We did not at that time go into the contents of the points of agreement or disagreement. Now as we examine the contents of these points, we find that the disagreement was far wider than we had thought and that the contents of agreement was more general. The two Assembly resolutions also urged the States concerned to continue their present voluntary suspension of nuclear testing.

Now I would like to ask my colleagues who spoke with great eloquence on the last occasion when we asked for these two items to be treated separately, and the United States delegation and the Soviet Union delegation repeated their attitudes with regard to the draft resolution submitted by us--do they want this draft resolution? The two resolutions urge the States concerned to continue their present voluntary suspension of testing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. It is quite true that a violation of them has occurred on both sides, first by the Russians and afterwards by the Americans, but the fact that there was a violation of something good is not an argument for abandoning it.

So far as the suspension, or what they call a "standstill" agreement, is concerned, my Government has placed this matter before you from 1954 onwards. I do not say this in any sense of criticism bitterness, but from the very beginning the United Kingdom delegation has put all its strength in the opposition to suspension. As I pointed out, at first we were told that this is not disarmament and that therefore there was no point in discussing it here. Then we were told orally and simultaneously that there was really no danger, that it was all alarmist, that the radiation effects were small. There may have been some justification for it at that time because the explosions were fewer in number in 1954. They said that "the radiation effects are small, there is natural radiation anyway, so why not have a little more." We were also told that detection was impossible. I have no doubt that these arguments still continue. One year it is adopted by one side, and the other year it is adopted by the other side, as I will point out in a moment.

I will not go into these papers which cover the whole history of the matter. Thus, the great Powers concerned in this matter, after the discussions in the Assembly for two or three years, did nothing about them. The Assembly insisted on the consideration of these matters and passed a resolution calling upon the Disarmament Commission to consider them in an appropriate manner. Even then it lay there a long time. On 16 March 1955 we again reminded the Secretary-General of the direction by the Assembly that the view of all States, including India, which are not members of the Commission, be further considered by the Disarmament Commission in accordance with such procedural arrangements the Commission would find it possible to make. I find this hard to believe, but the Disarmament Commission found it difficult to find a procedure to listen to anybody else for a long time. Then we were asked to go there.

At the tenth session of the General Assembly we again submitted draft resolutions. At that time the opposition came from the same quarters. Ultimately there were compromises or various amendments, and Mr. Anthony Nutting, the representative of the United Kingdom, who was an expert on this matter, said on 9 December 1955;

"Operative paragraph 2 has been expanded to meet the chief points of the Indian draft resolution. Along with the proposals of the Prime

Minister of

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France and the Prime minister of the United Kingdom it now includes the two proposals of the Government of India for negotiations looking towards a suspension of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons and an armaments truce. It includes provision that these joint proposals of the Government of India should be added to those which the Sub-Committee is to take account of in its further work. It places them on an equal footing with the proposals of the Prime Minister of France and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom" (A/C. I/PV.809, page 38-40).

By that time the Assembly had gotten into the position of regarding the suspension of nuclear weapons tests as an extremely important matter for the survival of humanity, because it could then no longer be considered as disarmament or anything else. An enormous amount of literature had appeared on the effects of radiation; we had discussions here on the effects of radiation; we had discussions here on the effects of restiation. Even though they had not reached the present dimensions, there had been more and more explosions and therefore public opinion had had this effect. But still nothing very much happened. Ultimately the Disarmament Commission, which had heard the various views, did not do very much or did little about it, and we came back here again to the Assembly.

The Assembly at its eleventh session adopted a unanimous resolution on disarmament which was sponsored by India and other Powers. Afterwards the specific protest on examination was defeated by a certain number of abstentions and a proposal by Canada, Japan and Norway for the registration of nuclear test explosions was given priority of place.

To come to the end of all this history, the Assembly definitely asked the States concerned to seek a solution for the remaining questions so that the conclusion of an agreement could be achieved at an early date, and asked them to continue the voluntary suspension. Thus our position on this matter has remained constant and it will continue to do so. We will stop asking for suspension only when the situation is such that it is beyond any discussion or if a treaty is signed or by disarmament or if, whatever it may be, we find it no longer necessary.

I should like to say at this stage that a large number of new countries that have joined the United Nations from Asia and Africa, and those who are not committed to the power blocs have always stood by this position. These resolution have been co-sponsored by large numbers of countries and even in the recent debates this was quite clear. I think it was the representative of Senegal who said that when they came here they looked to the United Nations for guidance and help in these matters of moral concern and now they find themselves at the other end. This is rather a sad state of affairs.

If I were to go through all the papers I have, I would find myself in difficulty.

The Soviet Union takes the position that suspension cannot be a matter of a separate treaty. I presume it takes the position that no even a voluntary suspension is desired but that it must be part of disarmament. So we look back into the history of this again. But if I were to take you through the whole of this history, we should be here all afternoon. But what happens? Here on 14 October 1958, Commander Noble, the representative of the United Kingdom tells us this:

"Now the Soviet Union objects to our desire to link the continued suspension, and final cessation, of tests with real disarmament. They want the test problem settled finally in isolation from anything else; they want us to agree now to renounce all nuclear weapons tests for ever, whether or not there is ever any real disarmament or agreement on a controlled organization.

"I believe that most of us here recognize that the suspension or cessation of nuclear weapons tests is not in itself disarmament, in the sense of a real reduction of armaments; on the contrary, it will leave a number of Powers to go on to amassing nuclear weapons as much as they please. In itself, therefore, it can do little to assure greater peace and security. The suspension of tests may, however, be valuable and may contribute to peace and security because it may increase confidence and may help to bring about real disarmament." (A/C. 1/PV. 948. page 31)

Mr. Noble continued:

"We cannot commit ourselves now to the final and permanent cessation of nuclear weapons tests without any real assurance of real disarmament, because we cannot be sure whether in those

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circumstances peace and security could be maintained." (A/C. 1/PV.948, page 33-35)

That was a position of one side at that time, that is, that there cannot be abandonment of tests without disarmament. They wanted the two things linked. He also said on another occasion:

"The United Kingdom suggested that the Sub-Committee should explore the possibilities of an agreement on the limitation of nuclear test explosions, either as part of a disarmament plan or separately. While the United Kingdom preferred to have the limitation and prohibition of such tests included in a comprehensive disarmament agreement, it was ready, in the absence of a disarmament agreement, to consider the possibility of limiting tests in consultation with the Governments concerned. Great public anxiety had been caused by scientific reports."

This, you may remember, was established when the Scientific Committee itself was a matter of controversy. Ultimately its existence has enlightened the world a great deal. Mr. Noble said that the Sub-Committee should study the problem concerned.

One year one side puts forward a proposal. It is finally opposed. The next year it is taken up the other way. This goes on in this jigsaw puzzle. It is what they call gamesmanship. That is, each proposal looks very good, but there is some devil in it somewhere the other fellow cannot take, and then he turns around and says he is responsible for rejecting it.

There again you know it is the commonplace in this Committee, or at least in certain parts of it, to try and cast doubts on an argument by saying either "the Americans agree with it or the Russians agree with it, but on account of the cold war each one is a poisonous embrace for the other people."

Let us see what is stated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which I believe is a highly respectable organization.:

"Among the nuclear Powers themselves the initiative in seeking a test ban agreement came from the USSR."

I do not say this; and I do not care where it came from. I only regret that, having made that initiative, they have gone away from it and committed what is a great disappointment to humanity and a reversal of the whole process.

"Discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests was included in its 10 May 1955 proposals before the Disarmament Sub-Committee as one of the first measures in a disarmament programme. Later, on 27 March 1956, the USSR called for a test cessation forthwith.

"Independently there came into the agreement other problems of disarmament. Premier Bulganin, in his extensive correspondence with President Eisenhower during 1956, continued to press for an independent agreement."

This is what Mr. Bulganin said:

"I should like also to direct your attention, Mr. President, to so important and pressing a problem, one which is part of the atomic problem, as the continued tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. It is a known fact that the discontinuation of such tests does not of itself require any international control agreements, for the present state of science and engineering makes it possible to detect any explosion of any atomic or hydrogen bomb wherever it may be set off.

"In our opinion, this situation makes it possible to separate the problem of ending tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons from the general problem of disarmament and to solve it independently even now without tying an agreement on this subject..." and so on.

Now I am only quoting. These are not my opinions.

Then came the discussions here. The representative of the United States, Mr. Cabot Lodge, said that public opinion in the world was so exercised over this matter that, irrespective of our own individual opinions, we must do something about it. I cannot remember how one delegation or another voted, but anyway the resolutions on which agreement had been reached were the result of that situation. I say that for two reasons: first of all, to be objective

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in this matter and, secondly, that we may not forget that, however much the opposition may be and however much some of our friends, from whom one would have expected a different reaction, might not regard moral foundations of themselves as important or as conclusive, we have to keep on hammering at them. Otherwise between now and 1 April there is a long period of time, and I will show you what can happen in a moment.

That takes us to Geneva, and I will go through this very rapidly, because we wanted to avoid referring to this in this phase of the debate. I am not saying, "We told you so." However, by tying these two items together you have compelled us to go into this. We did not want to go into this. All we want to say is, "Suspend these explosions and go on to come to an agreement quickly." That is all this Assembly can say, because we do not have the time or the expertise; nor can a hundred people reach quicker agreement than three people. However, the Assembly in its wisdom has decided that we must consider these together. I accept that, and therefore we will go into it. If you find this rather wearying, I can only say that I am not a primary culprit.

On 1 December 1958, as has already been pointed out, the Russians offered a draft treaty for an immediate and unconditional ban on tests. I am not saying this to show who was there first. In the consideration of the draft resolutions submitted we have to take into account that we cannot as an Assembly disregard the fact that there is no agreed text by anybody. What we have is a draft by the United Kingdom and the United States which they are asking the other people to accept. I have no doubt it is a good draft, if the other side accepts. But all treaties necessarily must be matters for negotiation. If the other side is unreasonable, it must be persuaded. If the other side is likely to submit to other pressures, then normally those pressures are applied, but certainly we have the right to make an appeal.

Soon afterwards the United States offered a working paper. That was a healthy state of affairs. That is to say, there was one paper from one side and another paper from another side. Since I was not at Geneva, I cannot say which one was not taken as the basis for discussion. Possibly the United States paper was taken as the basis

for discussion, because that is what has happened here. Anyway, what happened in the first place was that there were two of these. Mr. Tsarapkin and Mr. Dean, who, as you know, were such good friends, went on talking about this, with the British intervening in this matter whenever they had anything to offer. They reached agreement on four articles providing for the prohibition of tests, the establishment of a control organization, which would include a commission, a detection and identification system, a single administrator and a conference of parties to the treaty. That was the time when we all felt optimistic. We thought we were very nearly getting there. It was also agreed that the commission would consist of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and four other States chosen by the conference. It all looked too good to be true.

However, then came the second phase when the government scientists entered--the Rand research people--and there was an enormous amount of literature published at that time pressing the United States Government not to give in on testing. This is not the occasion to look at it, but if you read the literature on the subject it may answer a few questions. It was at this time that the government scientists entered. From January 1959 to March 1959 the Nevada tests took place, and the position that was commonly held in Geneva by both sides that all tests should come under the ban underwent revision, because the back-room boys advised--perhaps they were right but, as you know, government scientists usually have a different view from other scientists--that identification of underground tests was more difficult than was previously believed. I think it was common talk at Geneva that some miscalculation had been made in the mathematics or something of that character. Consequently, in October 1958 it was stated by the Western side that identification of underground tests was more difficult than previously believed, thus casting doubts on the reliability of the proposed monitoring system. If new knowledge came to people's attention, that must be taken into account and examined.

It was at that stage that there entered the factor to which I referred the other day, which is a vicious factor in this whole business, when the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom visited Moscow--I believe it was about March 1960--when it was sought to make a dent in this general ban on tests, when it was put to the Russians, "Let us have an extension in regard to underground tests." You may remember all the argument about the clean bomb and the dirty bomb, about how clean the clean bomb was, how it only killed a certain number of people and so on;

By that time, the Soviet Union had

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take a more rigid and difficult and, if I may so, what looks like an inconsiderate attitude, on this matter. That is to say, they kept on saying that we must have a total test ban--which is the position they

are now taking in regard to the offer made by the United Kingdom and the United States in regard to the total banning of all atmospheric and underwater tests.

But at that time, the United Kingdom and the United States made a further advance. They dropped the demand that this should be linked to the general question of disarmament--I suppose they were preparing the way for the Russians to take over. But they insisted that an effective inspection system must remain. Then there was considerable discussion in regard to staff and so on.

That takes us to the third phase of the discussions, where the Russians opposed the proposal to limit the ban to atmospheric and underwater tests--that is to say, the proposal made after the new, most regrettable and catastrophic resumption of tests by the Soviet Union in September--made by the United Kingdom and the United States to the Soviet Union to impose, even without control, a ban on atmospheric and underwater tests.

The Soviet Union said that it would accept a gradual system of inspection and control if the West would agree to abolish foreign bases and withdraw their troops from foreign soil. So, gradually, the Russians brought in the disarmament issue which had been banned by the others.

Then there are various details with regard to inspection. As usual, the Russians demanded unanimity in the control commission, and then made concessions in which they said that they would agree to inspection if it were made with the consent of the country concerned. On this point the position of the United States is noted in the Congressional Records of 1960. Senator Humphrey, Chairman of the Commission, said:

"Since the Soviets reluctantly accepted the principle of on-site inspection, they have to trim it down, they have to circumscribe it. They feel compelled to limit it to a point where its effectiveness or its usefulness is sorely affected. Isn't that about it?"

Dr. Romney replied:

"Yes."

Then said Senator Humphrey:

"Why didn't you recommend the inclusion of unmanned stations, Dr. Fisk or Dr. Panofsky, or did you? The Berkner report said that you could improve detection by increasing the number of manned control posts or by adding unmanned posts. Did you make any such recommendation to this second conference?"

And Dr. Fisk replied:

"Not explicitly, Mr. Chairman."

This is not so complicated as it may appear, because the argument between the Russians and the United States is that the Soviet Union suspects that inspection conceals espionage. The Western side thinks that any objection to the perfection of inspection would mean an attempt to escape it. This goes on all the time. Therefore, it was said by the scientists at that time that it is possible to have unmanned inspection--that is, inspection by remote control. Therefore, Senator Humphrey asks:

"Did you make any such recommendation to the second conference, Dr. Fisk?" and the answer was:

"Not explicitly, Mr. Chairman?"

So we are entitled to look into this question of whether everything possible had been done; and, naturally, there are two opposing sides. "by implication," he said, and referred to parts of the Berkner report. They knew well what they were referring to when they said: "by implication!". They know very well that an efficient system, whether manned or unmanned, depends on the number of stations and the number of instruments. At any rate, there was another important factor.

Then the Senator finally asks:

"And your failure to bring it up is no indication, and should not be taken as an indication, that you do not consider the unmanned station concept worthy of study?"

This is an important factor in the United Kingdom--United States paper before us. Dr. Fisk answers:

"No, by no means.

"This seems to me something that ought to be looked into very thoroughly and carefully. All we can do is to appeal to these parties to come together in speedy agreements."

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Now I shall proceed to the forth phase. This is a rather important one because, at that Conference, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, who was the first to oppose this whole idea of suspension when we proposed it in the Assembly, proposed joint underground tests on which to base the control system. This is not an unusual thing. There is the experience, shall we say, of countries not within military alliances, which, when they make protests about military aid to other countries, are told: "We will give it to you also." Mr. Selwyn Lloyd proposed underground tests on a military base control system. The idea was that these underground tests were for the purposes of the advancement of scientific knowledge, or whatever it was. Technical conferences

failed to agree on detection of underground tests.

The Soviet Union agreed to accept the United States plan for a limited test ban, provided the West agreed on a moratorium on small-scale underground tests. At that time we expressed our disagreement, both to the Russians and to the West, in regard to the acceptance of underground tests, at the Assembly and before, because we thought that this was vitiating the whole thing.

Then President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan agreed to join the Soviet Union in such moratorium, provided the Soviet Union accepted international inspection and control. That is where it came in. But this was towards the middle of July 1960.

In May 1950 President Eisenhower announced what is known as the Vela project for a series of nuclear and non-nuclear blasts. That upset the whole of this arrangement, and the Soviet Union objected to the unilateral plan for Vela, because underlying it was the idea of the United Kingdom proposal of joint tests, which presumably was on behalf of the West. That is where a counter-factor comes in to it. The United States attempted to assure the Soviet Union that Vela was no military goal. The Soviet Union insisted on the right to examine the devices if the United States conducted nuclear tests without Soviet accord--that is to say the idea of breaking the so-called moratorium. This is not a word which we use; it goes back to 1960. That is, one party or the other tries to break it, and the other person says: "if you do, we will do the same."

That takes us to the fifth phase, from July 1960 to August 1960. The United States accepted the principle of a fixed quota of on-site inspections. That is one of the principal difficulties--the number of inspections that should take place. As I said, the Russians are very allergic to this idea because they keep on objecting to more inspections. Ultimately, there is agreement on the quota. The parties agree that a control system should be fully operational six years after it is effective. Therefore, there is considerable agreement on that.

That takes us to the last phase, from March to August 1961. During that period the President of France proclaimed what has been called "atomic isolation". He does not come into these discussions. There were atomic explosions conducted by the Republic--as I said, in the territory of the Africans, in the Sahara. Four explosions took place, and, for a country with the resources of France, in comparison with those of the United States or the Soviet Union or the United Kingdom, that was quite a number of tests. They may have been small tests, but they were conducted in Africa--a fact against which this Assembly also passed resolutions.

On 15 May this year the Soviet Union declared that it would resume nuclear testing unless the United Kingdom and the United States induced France to give up its testing programme. My Government cannot say, although the United States and the United Kingdom are military

allies of France, either that they have that power or that it is part of their practice to use such compulsion, but the fact does remain that one of their allies was outside the bargain. So even if the other three parties came to an agreement, France could still continue testing, especially since its testing was taking place in Africa and public opinion would not, perhaps, be exercised in the same way. In Africa it is possible to do more things without exercising public opinion because of that region's comparatively under-developed character. That is less so now, but it was the position.

At that time President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev met in Vienna, and Mr. Khrushchev made it clear that there could be no neutralist administrator for the control of test. Inspection in the absence of total disarmament, he said, would be a subterfuge for espionage.

This, or at least part of it, is, I must say, taken from newspaper reports. The conversations were private. In a memorandum handed to President Kennedy, Mr. Khrushchev suggested that if an agreement on a test ban could not be reached speedily then this matter should be taken

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up as a part of general and complete disarmament. That is where the trouble started.

After the Vienna conversations, when the two great statesmen met and could not come to an agreement, the Soviet Union said, "Now let this become part of disarmament". That was opposed by the United States because, by that time, the "troika" and various other factors--the whole armoury of instruments of the cold war--had come into existence and the Geneva Conference was floundering. On 29 August 1961 the Soviet Union announced that it was going to resume tests because of--on its showing--the military threat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the intransigence of the Western Powers and their menacing attitude concerning the German peace treaty, the continuation of tests by France, and the interests of Soviet security.

First of all, it is quite clear that this argument means that these tests are neither scientific nor innocent. They are military, and they are intended to advance military power on either side. The argument is there. They say, "Because something happened in Berlin there must be more tests--for the sake of security, and so on and so on".

The question has arisen how the Soviet Union could conduct these tests unless there had been preparation. From what I have read out to the Committee there is no doubt that there had been preparation for tests on both sides. In six weeks they conducted twenty tests of the megaton variety, and the United States had initiated project Vela.

At the risk of boring the Committee, I shall first read the Soviet

statement. I cannot find the American statement at the moment, but I will find it as I pursue this. It will be found that arguments advanced are identical, and I want to point out that I do not put this forward for rhetorical effect. The fact is that these two great Powers think alike on this question--in power terms. Mr. Khrushchev says:

"If every people, be it the people of a big or a small country, of one with highly developed industry or one only beginning to develop its economy, of a country which is a member of military blocs or States, or following a neutral policy, demanded in a full voice that the military machinery of States should be at last smashed and mankind be delivered from the danger of destructive nuclear war, that would have been achieved. Expressing the vital interests people and, as it is convinced, ests of all sincere champions of disarmament and peace, the Soviet Government addresses the peoples and the Governments of all the countries of the world with its appeal for increasing tenfold the efforts in order to practically implement the idea of general and complete disarmament and to forever eliminate the danger of nuclear weapons from the life of humanity. It reaffirms the readiness of the Soviet Union to sign at any time an agreement on general and complete disarmament...", and so on.

But he goes on to say that the renewal of these tests is intended for the purpose of ensuring the security of other peoples and their own. Mr. Stevenson said the same thing yesterday here.

In another part of this correspondence it is definitely stated--and they make no secret of the fact--that they believe that the renewal of these tests is in the interests of their security, in the interests of world peace and calculated to prevent the greater harm of nuclear war, for the protection of smaller peoples, and this, that and the other.

We had the same thing yesterday here. Yesterday, Mr. Setevenson, speaking to this Committee, said:

"... I must inform the Committee that the United States is obliged, in self-protection, to reserve the right to make preparations to test in the atmosphere as well as underground. But my Government stands ready to resume negotiations for a treaty tomorrow. We will devote all our energies...etc., etc." (A/C.I/PV. 1171, p, 3-5)

But he went on to say, in another place, that this would be done in the interests of security as well as in the interests of other nations.

So both sides say that they are renewing tests in order to protect us. All we can say is, "God save us from our protectors".

I have looked at this very carefully. I find that it is rather like ladies' fashions. If you wait long enough the old fashions come back. The argument that is rejected by one side this year is accepted by

the next, and it goes round and round in that way.

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Then we come to preparation. I have to take one after the other, but I want to tell the Committee that the order in which I take them has no relation whatsoever to who prepared first, who did not prepare, and so on, I want to get this out of the way before Ideal with as much current information as we have on the effects of radiation.

On 20 July 1959, more than two years ago, The New York Times published a report from Washington, dated 19 July 1959. which said:

"The Atomic Energy Commission is quietly preparing for immediate resumption of nuclear testing if the negotiations with the Soviet Union for a ban collapse."

And, as I have already read out to the Committee, other people said the same. So the idea of preparation, if any, goes back two and a half years almost.

Then we come to the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, and he predicted on 5 August 1959 that the United States would resume testing of atomic weapons after 31 October.

Now, it is quite true that in some of our countries, men in public positions--politicians as they are sometimes called--make statements, not necessarily governmental policy; but to the outside world, when a Chairman of a Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy comes forward and says so, it has the effect of whatever it has. And then it says:

"The United States would resume testing of atomic weapons on 31 October."

I am not prepared to say that this is a governmental statement. He says: "Other nations could be expected to follow suit." If "other nations" means the United States and the Soviet Union, then I think that the United Kingdom can be relieved of this business because they are one group; therefore, there is no necessity for them to do these tests. That means they must know that the Soviet Union is also preparing--unless they know of other countries. Then, it goes on to say:

"...no one should be surprised if testing within the atmosphere is continued on a limited scale."

Then, he concludes that particular statement by saying:

"Most important, I am not sure that the Government of either the United States or Russia"--this is not my statement, Senator Anderson says--"really wants to cease nuclear testing."

If I had said that, my friend, Mr. Belaunde, would attribute motives. But I do not say this. It is said by the Chairman of the Congressional Committee, a man with a responsible position who says that neither of them wants to stop testing. Is that the position? If that is the position, then what went on in the last week or so was not a procedural wrangle, as it was called; it was something worse; it was something in which the Assembly was not taken into confidence, If it is true I said "if".

The same Senator goes on to say:

"I would support the resumption as directed by the President of our underground test programme for final development of certain of our weapons before they go into production."

Therefore, let the Committee have no illusions about the scientific character of these tests: underground, overground, on upper ground, on the moon or anywhere else, because I read out to you the other day about plans for a destruction station, or a bombing station, whatever you call it, on the moon.

"These weapons, which currently are in a state of partial development"--The weapons are in a state of partial development, and we are told there is no preparation.

"and the details of which for obvious reasons I cannot discuss will decidedly improve our nuclear defence capability when fully developed. While such underground developmental tests would make it possible for us to get these weapons to production sooner, the tests would not result in any radioactive debris being injected into the atmosphere and hence would not result in any additional radioactive fall-out."

The main difference of the underground testing is not that it would not produce more destructive weapons, but that it would not have immediate radioactive fall-out effects.

But as against that, Dr. Corliss Lamont, author and philosopher said in a radio broadcast on 25 September 1961:

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"...the underground tests of the United States began after Moscow broke the three-year moratorium on testing were 'not as dangerous' as the Soviet explosions in the atmosphere, which produces radioactive fall-out. But they are dangerous just the same because of the possibility that sources of water supply may be contaminated by the contamination of rocks subject to explosion."

I am not quoting this authority, but there it is, the other view, so far as you want to know it.

I quote parts from an American Scientific Journal of September 1951:

"Pentagon officials have also expressed wishes to resume testing of some specific weapons; improves warheads for Atlas, Titan and ICBM's less bulky for given explosive energy than those tested before the moratorium--`bantam' A-bombs for battle use in limited wars"--

I do not know what a limited war is--

--Davy Crocke"--nice names--`bazooka' shells, about the size of a water melon"--they do not say about the size of a bomb, but about the size of a water melon--"more powerful atomic warheads for Polaris submarine missiles and the Minuteman ICBM; a neutron flux warhead, to `neutralize' enemy missiles; the neutron bomb; and fission-fusion bombs of a larger yield than have ever been tested". This is what the Pentagon wants.

"Proponents of resuming testing argue that the urgency of having up-to-date weapons counterbalances the propaganda advantage the Russians would gain if the United States resumes testing first."

May I read another of these American quotations before I go on to the Russian. This is by Thomas E. Murray who was a member of the Atomic Energy Commission for seven years, and later was a consultant to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of Congress. In a memorandum to the Joint Committee, Mr. Murray said in June 1959:

"The stopping of United States tests would be disastrous in the present state of our nuclear armament programmes."

He goes on to say:

"Limited nuclear weapons have always been the stepchild in our armament programme."

I must say this is a very well-nursed stepchild.

"Our programme in this range has hardly begun to move beyond the development stage; and in this stage, tests are absolutely necessary..."

He goes on to say:

"There is another alarming aspect to the matter...the results of...tests have been sufficient to raise grave questions about the effect of nuclear explosions in outer space on the operation of American weapons systems, communications system and early warning systems."

So that is what is coming now.

Mr. Murray continues:

"We must assume that the Soviet Union has conducted similar

experiments and may be in a position to exploit their effects to its own advantage in the event of war. Given the meagerness of our knowledge in this area, it is imperatively necessary that the United States should conduct further tests in outer space. Delay is dangerous."

It is not the test that are dangerous, but the delay in conducting them, that is dangerous. That is a different point of view from what we hold.

Mr. Murray also predicted that an agreement of the type now being considered in Geneva.

"would not necessarily put a stop to Soviet nuclear tests" because: "The Soviet Union could very easily evade the extremely limited capabilities of the proposed system of 'occasional' inspections."

So, this is the position. Naturally, there is more material published in this part of the world. I do not read Russian anyway. These are various translations that have come in of statements made. On 21 June 1961,

Mr. Khrushchev said:

"Quite a few devices which need

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practical testing have been developed in the Soviet Union. This testing, of course, will increase the fighting power of our armed forces and enable us to develop even better atomic and nuclear bombs and improve the technology of their manufacture. If in reply to the resumption of nuclear tests by the Western Powers we did not start testing our weapons, we would damage the defence potential of our country and of the entire socialist community."

Now, so far as the army of the Soviet Union and their preparations for it, in fact, the Soviet authorities have been at pains in the last two or three months to give considerable publicity to it. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to go on. In fact, at the end of my observations, I shall refer to the last of the statements made about this fifty megaton bomb.

I think that it is necessary to give this information, despite the fact that for four or five years the Committee has been hearing about and has become familiar with the effects of radiation. Of course, there has been no end to the propaganda used in an attempt to minimize what is going on, particularly in view of the fact--as Mr. Dean pointed out that the increase in radiation at present almost equals the radiation caused by all the explosions which took place in the past; and this must now be considered in the light of Mr. Stevenson's statement yesterday.

I shall again take the United States statements first.

Mr. Libby, a member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, has said:

"Fallout is the major danger in atomic and nuclear warfare. Cities can be washed off"--

I read this out so that we may be able to assess for ourselves the extent to which it is possible to protect people. It is not my business to discuss any national programmes; that would be interference in the internal affairs of others. But if Mr. Libby says that cities can be washed off, that is what he means.

There is a statement by the National Planning Association, which, I am assured, is a United States body of considerable reputation. It has been studying this subject for several years now, and I have been told by my American friends that it is regarded as very objective in its investigations. This is a statement which it has made regarding fallout casualties in nuclear warfare:

"The Federal Civil Defence Administration has computed the hypothetical fallout for an attack on the industrial complex and the air bases of the United States under typical weather conditions. In the exercise, about 250 nuclear or thermonuclear weapons having a combined yield of 2,500 megatons with damage zones ranging from three to five miles were dropped on cities, industrial projects and airfields throughout the United States. The following are some of the general conclusions which were drawn by the Federal Defence Administration:

"On the first day, 36 million dead, 57 million injured and 58 million uninjured. On the seventh day, 51 million dead, 42 million injured and 58 million uninjured"--

these, apparently, were people who were in shelters. The statement goes on:

"On the fourteenth day, 61 million dead and 31 million injured. On the sixtieth day, 72 million dead and 21 million injured.

"These numbers are based on 1950 population figures.

"It is assumed that 93 million people will be stricken, and among these, 36 million people will die on the first day. Others will be injured and will die on subsequent days. Those who died on the first day were presumably killed by the immediate effects of the bombs, mainly blast and thermal effects. The subsequent rise in fatalities among the injured group reflects the delayed effects of radiation damage"--

that is, these people gradually burned, as was the case with the people in Hiroshima--

"coupled in many cases with external injuries."

Another document states:

"Dr. Edward Condon, atomic scientist, predicted today"--

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that is, 29 March 1958--

"that many thousands of persons would die in agony because of poisons released by hydrogen bomb tests"--

here, I would note, the reference is not to a war, but to the hydrogen bomb tests.

"Mr. Condon, Head of the Washington University Physics Department and a controversial figure in the field of atomic science, said that deaths from bone cancer and leukemia would stem from tests that already had taken place"--

and that was in 1958; since then we have had large numbers of tests, including the present major ones.

Here is another statement, by the French Academy:

"More than 1 million persons will die and 1 1/4 million abnormal children will be born as a result of radioactive fallout from nuclear bombs already exploded, five prominent American, Japanese and French scientists said today"--

that is, 3 October 1959.

"About 140,000 abnormal children have already been born as a result of experimental nuclear tests."

We have been told not to worry because there are normal radiations around us anyway. But this is what we have to think about: 140,000 abnormal children have already been born as a result of experimental nuclear tests. The scientists, who included two Nobel Prize winners, made that statement in a memorandum submitted to the French Academy. The report was made at a time when several African countries had criticized French plans to conduct nuclear tests in the Sahara. The scientists said that elementary calculations showed that fallout from each superbomb caused the birth of 15,000 abnormal children. They gave more details, but I shall not go into them.

A New York Times report in 1958 stated that fallout from the latest two stratospheric nuclear explosions above Johnson Island would rain down on the entire world for the next 10 years. This was a statement by Mr. Libby, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. When asked whether he thought that the accumulated fallout from such bomb

testing would be injurious to people, Mr. Libby said that he did not think so. He contended that the advantages of tests to the free world were worth the increase in the fallout.

Another report states that human populations could recover from the effects of heavy radioactive fallout from thermonuclear bombs, but that that might take 500 to 900 years. Two University of Texas scientists reached that conclusion on the basis of their study of fruit flies; these scientists were Mr. Wilson S. Stone and Mrs. Florence D. Wilson. They said.

"For example, if a thermonuclear blast such as the one at Bikini on 1 March 1954 had exploded during the Crusades between 1000 A.D. and 1299 A.D., it would have taken until the present century for the genetic damage to be erased from the human population."

In other words, even one bomb of the Bikini type--that is to say, the type that existed before the present Soviet explosions--has genetic effects on the human race for over 1,000 years,

This is another report from The New York Times:

"For the first time the Atomic Energy Commission disclosed how much radio-active debris has been created since the first atomic weapons were exploded in 1945"--

that is the New Mexico explosions--

"and how much had been contributed by the Western Powers and the Soviet Union before the halt in testing last fall"--

in other words, before the moratorium. The report goes on:

"A table was supplied to the Subcommittee by Dr. Charles L. Dunham, Director of the Commission's Division of Biology and Medicine. It showed that since 1945 the three atomic Powers had exploded atomic and hydrogen bombs with a total fission yield of 91,460 kilotons"--

and if that is multiplied by 10,000, one gets so many millions; I think that Mr. Dean gave the figures the other day. The report continues:

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"Of this total, 65,900 kilotons were contributed by the United States and Britain, and 25,560 kilotons by the Soviet Union"--

and these were the previous figures; they are not the current figures.

"The Commission gave no breakdown for the United States and Britain, but it was obvious that most of the Western radioactive debris was created in United States tests.

"A kiloton is the equivalent of 1,000 tons of TNT. It is the fission process in atomic and thermonuclear bombs that is primarily responsible for creating the radioactive debris of atomic fallout, such as strontium-90 and cesium 137.....

"The rising level of radioactive debris created by both sides prompted an expression of considerable concern by Representative Chet Holifield, Democrat of California and Chairman of the Sub-Committee. He noted that the radioactive debris being created far exceeded the safety limit of 10,000 kilotons annually, which was recommended by scientists during the Sub-Committee's fallout hearings in 1957".

This is from another report in The New York Times:

"The explosion of fifty kilograms (110 pounds) yields an explosive energy equal to 1 million tons of TNT, or one megaton. Hence the term 'fission yield of one megaton' means the explosion and release into the atmosphere of fifty kilograms of fission products, radioactive elements of various types, such as Strontium-90 and Cesium-137, which constitute a hazard to health.

"Information developed at the hearings shows that the test programmes of all countries the United States, Britain and Russia--have released to date a fission yield of ninety to ninetytwo megatons. This corresponds to the explosion of 4,500 to 4,600 kilograms (9,000 to 10,120 pounds) of the fissionable elements".

I shall now pass over all the other American authorities and deal only with one of the latest. This is in regard to food:

"What should the average citizen do about the news that the Public Health Service is finding radioactive iodine in fresh food supplies at various points around the country? The answer from Surgeon General Luther Terry and from nuclear experts consulted ..... is: Present levels do not warrant undue public concern... The only food importantly involved is milk. The radioactive fallout on the surface of fresh fruits and vegetables is readily removed by washing them. But the cow eats unwashed grass and..."

I suppose we ought to train the cow to eat washed grass hereafter. The report continues:

"...it takes a whole lot of grass to make a quart of milk--so fallout products are naturally concentrated in milk. The first tests announced were for iodine-131 which is one of the easiest forms of fallout to test. Strontium-90 is also being checked, but has not been announced. The peak iodine levels in the six cities during the period between September 20 and 29 ranged from 140 micromicrocuries in a liter of milk in Tampa to 530 in New Orleans. A liter is slightly more than a quart...Iodine-131, a product of atomic fission which does not exist in nature, is worrisome because it has an affinity for the thyroid gland, and doctors say that excessive doses too long

continued can cause cancer or other damage to thyroid.

"Whether the high levels recorded last month continue depends entirely on whether nuclear testing continues. Iodine-131 has a half life of only eight days, meaning it loses half its radioactivity in that time..."

Unfortunately, cows eat grass before then:

"...half of the rest in the next eight days..." Then we come to the genetic effects:

"Female fertility has been found far more vulnerable to radiations than has long been believed."

This is not family planning propaganda: it refers to the effect of radiation:

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"...it was reported here today."

That was in Washington:

"The tests, which are with comparatively low exposures to radiation sources, were done on mice. But there is no reason to believe that the same sterilizing effects wouldn't occur in humans, said a biologist...of Oak Ridge, Tennessee."

"In problems of worldwide contamination, strontium-90 and cesium-137 are particularly important. Their halflives are 28 and 30 years respectively..."

This means that, after the explosion, the strontium and cesium effects last for thirty years, or at least, their half strength:

"...they do not die out in the long time required for distribution via the stratosphere. Strontium is similar to calcium and is therefore concentrated in the bones, where it can induce tumors. Cesium is similar to sodium and is mainly a genetic hazard."

Then we come to one of the most dangerous of the effects of the chemicals that come out. I refer to carbon-14--carbon is such an innocent thing, but not when it comes to this:

"C-14, while not a true fission product, is nevertheless about the most abundant radioisotope produced. While some fraction of it may come down as insoluble calcium carbonate and not cause any serious trouble for many years, if ever, the balance oxidizes to become CO<sub>2</sub> and enters the atmosphere. Part of it eventually enters the biosphere.

Carbon. 14 Problem

Approximate  
r/yr

Current background radiation      0.1--0.2

Normal C-14 dose                    0.0015"

That is very small:

"Possible increase due to tests      0.0008

Small war might add                0.01--0.1"

I do not think we need worry about what a large war might add. If there is a large war it does not matter very much:

"Currently we receive approximately 0.0015 r/yr from C-14. As a result of past tests the amount of C-14 in the atmosphere has probably increased by about 75 per cent, but most of this is in the stratosphere and currently out of harm's way. Some of this stratospheric material will eventually find its way into the troposphere and then into the food we eat."

This is what happened to the Japanese fishermen, and to the fish that were sold in Japan after the first Bikini explosions. The statement continues:

"It is quite possible that this process could result in additional radiation to the whole body, including the reproductive glands, of about .0008 r/yr. While .0008 r seems like a very small amount, if one multiplies it by 8,100 years, which is the average lifetime of C-14,..."

None of us may live for 8,100 years, but the race continues:

"...one gets about .7 r, which is an appreciable dose if one is trying to calculate the damage a genetic line will receive over the next 10,000 years. (Such a dose could, for example, cause about 1,000,000 serious defects) A war in the early 1960's might cause an increase in the amount of C-14 of at most one hundred times that produced by the tests, but probably it would be somewhat less. This could mean an additional .1 r/yr, or about a 67 per cent increase over the current background radiation.... A war in the more distant future could cause an increase over past tests by a factor of 1,000..."

This is the scientist's way of saying one thousand times:

"...but it also would probably be much less. A factor of 1,000 might result in an additional 1r/yr, which is 'small' compared to industrial levels...While this situation would be serious, it clearly would not prevent post-war reconstruction.

Unfortunately, as already mentioned,

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C-14 has an average life of about 10,000 years. A dose of 1r/yr for 10,000 years would mean in effect that the average background radiation for the population had been increased by close to a factor of five or ten....

While we could live with this problem, it would still be an immense toll to pay for the next five or ten thousand years."

There is some significance in my reading this extract. It is from a statement by Herman Kahn, one of the Rand boys. He is one of the foremost advocates of the suggestion that nuclear war is not so bad after all--a lot of people will live; also, one of the main advocates, I believe, of the continuance of these tests. I will go no further than to say that his scientific view is that we could live with a nuclear war.

Now we come to the Russian scientists. Whatever views we may hold on the various sides of this Committee, there is no doubt that the Soviet scientists are held in great respect by the rest of the world. Their achievements from October 4th, 1957 have staggered the world; so there cannot be any question of the value of these documents; and they are not very old. In fact, one of them, by our own Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiation, has been signed by Soviet representatives, along with others--about the effects of recent fallout. This comes from a Soviet publication:

"Soviet scientists are deeply concerned over the fact that to this day there is no international agreement on the unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Our scientific community has unequivocally called for a ban on nuclear weapons."

I think we should remember that: scientific opinion is against them, whatever country is involved:

"Our scientific community has unequivocally called for a ban on nuclear weapons."

I wish we could say the same thing of Herman Kahn, or Doctor Teller: "This is also the stand taken by such worldfamous scientists as Niels Bohr (Denmark), Linus Pauling (the United States of America), Heisenberg (Germany), Yukawa (Japan), Powell (Great Britain), the late Joliot-Curie (France) and many others.

Of course, some of these people have been called political names: I am not denying that. But that does not alter their scientific position.

Academician Kurchatov goes on to say:

"Tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons not only hold the world in the grip of constant anxiety as the portent of a possible future atomic war, but are (and in future will be still more) a hazard to the health of humanity. Calculations show that if tests are continued at the 1956-58 rate several million persons out of each future generation will contract hereditary diseases due to the fallout of the radio-active isotopes of strontium, cesium and carbon that are produced in nuclear explosions and that spread over the entire globe."

I think my delegation pointed out the other day that the average of explosions over these three years is five per month. But we have had twenty a month in the last month.

Then we have Academician Sakharov, Soviet scientist, who says:

"Thermonuclear warfare carries with it the potential danger of a lethal dosage of radiation being delivered to the whole of humanity. This danger is apparently absent in the case of nuclear weapons tests inasmuch as the present rate of the testing will never deliver to any single individual a dosage exceeding one roentgen. However, thousands of millions of people are being subjected to this radiation in addition to the natural background radiation and other noxious things, and in the case of carbon-14 this will continue over the course of hundreds of generations. The number of victims of additional radiation from nuclear tests is determined under these conditions by what is known as nonthreshold biological effects."

May I interpose here that one of the leading British scientists has said that there is no such thing as a biological non-threshold. That is one of the arguments going on between the Russians and the West in Geneva.

Academician Sakharov goes on:

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"The number of casualties is proportionate to the over-all dosage to mankind, irrespective of the dispersion of radiation to various groups of people and in time.

"The simplest non-threshold effect of radiation is that which it has on heredity. The material carrier of heredity is the gene--a special structure in the chromosomes of cellular nuclei. To bring about an irreversible alteration of a gene (the so-called gene mutation), one act of ionization is sufficient; for this reason, genetic changes can result from the very smallest doses of radiation with a probability that is directly proportional to the dose."

Then we have another quotation from Sakharov:

"Utilizing the data given by Leipunsky, we can assess the effect of bone damage due to strontium and the effect of external radiation due

to cesium at 0.5 of the effect of C14. For the sake of completeness, we shall give a brief review of the estimates. If testing is continued at the present rate, the amount of strontium-90 in bone will come to about 65 strontium units, which is a radiation dose of  $160 \times 10^{-3}$ ..... Thus, the total losses from a one-megaton explosion will come to 10,000 persons, while the total losses from all past nuclear explosions will amount to 500,000. This is a minimum estimate, since an account of the other radio-isotopes, other pathways of contamination and a fuller account of all non-threshold and threshold biological effects will produce an increase. One should not forget that total number of victims is already approaching one million and that each year of continued testing increases this number by 200,000 to 300,000 persons."

This was before these recent tests started, I believe--but, at any rate, that is the increase.

He goes on to say:

"The cessation of test explosions will preserve the lives of hundreds of thousands of people"--

this comes from the Russian side, and this is what I would like to submit to the Committee--

"and Will have a still greater indirect effect by helping to lessen international tension and to reduce the possibility of a nuclear war--the greatest danger of our age."

Then, we have a quotation from General Gavin, Chief of Army Research and Development in the United States. When testifying before a Senate Committee, he was asked:

"If we got into a nuclear war and our Strategic Air Force made an assault in force against Russia with nuclear weapons so that the weapons exploded in a way where the prevailing winds would carry them southeast over Russia, what would be the effect in the way of death?"

To this question, General Gavin replied:

"Current planning estimates run on the order of several hundred million deaths. That would be either way, depending on which way the wind blew. If the wind blew to the southeast they would be mostly in the USSR, although they would extend into the Japanese and perhaps down into the Philippine area. If the wind blew the other way they would extend well back into Western Europe."

So it all depends on the wind.

I have read out at great length these statements about the results of radiation. I know it is rather tiring to the Committee. But that is what you are asked to do: you are asked to discuss the details of a treaty. Now, if it is not possible to absorb material that goes with

it, how do we do the other business? We have a responsibility in this matter, and we will go all the way towards asking people to sign a treaty, but it is not possible for us to make a treaty here or to say "You shall make a treaty"--so and so--except in so far as we have already said it, because there are two views put forward, each one saying that "If you don't have a treaty"--

I hope the Chairman will forgive me--I know it is not the resolutions stage, but there has been no hard and fast rule in this Committee in regard to the presenting of resolutions, although you cannot take it for voting purposes--since I have to leave the country today, I have to submit it to you now:

"The General Assembly,

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"Recalling resolution 1577 (XV) of 20 December 1950, which urged the Powers concerned to continue the suspension of test explosions, and also resolution 1578 (XV),

"Further recalling resolution 1379 (XIV),

"Bearing in mind both the grave and continuing hazards of radiation resulting to humanity from test explosions as well as their adverse consequences to the prospects of world peace through heightening rather than lessening of international tensions.

"1. Expresses its deep concern and profound regret that test explosions have been resumed;

"2. Considers that such tests should stand totally prohibited;

"3. Earnestly urges the Powers concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the establishment of internationally binding obligations for their cessation and prohibition;

"4. Calls upon the Powers concerned to engage themselves with urgency and speed in the necessary efforts to establish such internationally binding obligations."

This is the submission that we make.

Now it has been said that an appeal for the cessation of tests either means nothing or it means that there is more or less a desire not to introduce any control or anything of that character. The main contention of this, which I believe was repeated in another way by Governor Stevenson, was that while a treaty would be binding internationally, a cessation would not be binding.

First of all, I want to say that a cessation is a first step, just as a treaty is a first step of disarmament. The other day Mr. Dean referred to the inaccuracies of my statement, but he has not pointed

out what those inaccuracies were. Article 22 of the draft treaty submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States of America reads as follows:

"Duration. This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, subject to the inherent right of a party to withdraw and to be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the treaty and its annexes, including those provisions for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system are not being fulfilled and observed."

That means that if one party says that another party is not observing these provisions, that party may renounce the treaty and withdraw. In this particular treaty it is understood that it is based upon the suspicion that the other party may not carry it out. As we have already said, we believe that this treaty is one which should be signed by every Member State of the United Nations. We have seen that since testing started on new Power has come into the explosion field; and there has been talk of others. All of these tests have been exploded over other people, therefore we all ought to be bound equally by a treaty of this character. The Pacific has been used as a testing ground--it is a world sea but it has been used for this purpose. The northern part of the Soviet Union has been used, and even though it is their own territory the atmosphere is contaminated and many countries are likely to be affected.

In submitting this draft resolution I want to state my difficulty with regard to the United States draft. According to the practices of the Assembly, while the person who submits a draft resolution has exercised, in the past, the liberty of submitting it and talking about it, he does not have the same liberty with regard to the other draft unless it is present. It may be that it will be revised, and therefore I do not want to be unfair in the sense of dealing with the United States draft resolution at the present time.

We would go all the way with anyone who was making an appeal for a treaty, but I definitely say that we cannot wait for this Committee to sit down and draft treaties before we make our appeal to the countries concerned to stop these explosions. The representative of Mexico or the representative of Peru has said that this is not the time for that. When a 50-megaton bomb is to be exploded and when Mr. Khrushchev says that he has a 100-megaton bomb but that it would probably break their window panes--if that was all it would break it would not be so bad--can it be said that this is not the time? Governor Stevenson said yesterday: "There is still time to halt this drift towards the further refinement and multiplication of these weapons. Perhaps this will be the last clear chance to reverse this tragic trend, for if testing is stopped the terrible pace of technological progress will be decisively retarded." (A/C, 1/PV. 1171, page 2)

My delegation has said time after time that the suspension of nuclear weapon tests is the reverse of nuclear armament. As I said the other

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day, it takes about seven years for these ideas to get down to certain quarters. If the banning of tests is the first step and the control and destruction of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is the ultimate goal--ultimate may mean something very remote. There are two ideas of a goal: one is something that you try to reach, and one is the goalkeeper's idea of a goal, namely to prevent anybody from reaching it. That is his job. He stands at the goal to prevent anybody from getting there.

Governor Stevenson went on to say at yesterday's meeting:

"Accordingly, I must inform the Committee that the United States is obliged, in self-protection to reserve the right to make preparations to test in the atmosphere as well as underground. But my Government stands ready to resume negotiations for a treaty tomorrow. We will devote all our energies..." (Ibid., page 3-5)

What do we have now? Twenty-four explosions have taken place plus a number by the United States. If the 50 megaton explosion occurs, it will be that much more. We have a promise from the United States that if the Russians stop they will stop. It is like the man who says there is not too much earth, there is too little water, so he puts some of the earth into the water and some of the water into the earth, and it goes on that way without end. It is a vicious circle.

Now we talk about preparations. There again I have read out this matter of preparations with regard to the Russians. Now let me read out something else. I shall read out to you a White House statement on the testing of nuclear weapons, which goes as far back as 26 October 1956:

"If your Government were to suspend research and preparation for tests--as well as the tests themselves--and resume such preparation only upon knowledge that another nation had actually exploded another H-bomb, we could find our present commanding lead in nuclear weapons erased or even reversed. For the preparation for such a test may require up to two years.

"If your Government were to suspend only its tests, while continuing precautionary research and preparation--if that were feasible--we could still suffer a serious military disadvantage, it requires a year or more to organize and effect such tests as those conducted at our proving ground in the Pacific Ocean."

The last paragraph refers to overground tests. Governor Stevenson tells us that they may go on with tests, but how can we accept this statement and that statement at the same time if it takes one year to prepare them?

Then we come to these underground tests. I think I read this

statement out at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, but it ought to go in the Committee's records. In this matter too it is sought more or less to imply that it would not hurt anyone. In a United States Senate inquiry, Senator Humphrey asked the following questions:

"Senator Humphrey: How long would it take?

"Dr. Panofsky: The length of time has been estimated to be between two to four years to make a hole for 70 kilotons.

"Senator Humphrey: Two to four years?

"Dr. Panofsky: Right.

"Now, let me make one other remark. We keep focussing our attention on salt. Now there is nothing magic about salt. The reason one talks about salt is because that is the medium in which engineers believe it would be the easiest to make such a big hole. It is not the properties of salt which make the muffling better, but it is just the fact that salt appears to be the most economical way of producing such a hole.

"Senator Humphrey: It would take two to four years, in other words, in the salt area--

"Dr. Panofsky: Yes.

"Senator Humphrey: And if you happen to run into something a little more difficult than salt, it would take longer.

"Dr. Panofsky: It would take longer and cost more.

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"Senator Humphrey: Where do the salt areas of the world predominate?

"Dr. Panofsky: Everywhere. We know the Russians have large solution-mining operations and they are therefore familiar with the technique. Actually the question of natural occurring holes is not so critical because the natural occurring holes we know about are small. They are only useful for concealing explosions of 1 kiloton or so, which are difficult to identify anyhow.

"No really thorough engineering studies have been made which give reliable cost figures, but just as rough guidance, several hundred thousand dollars per kiloton for the hole is the kind of figure which the engineers discuss.

"This means that for 50 kilotons you might end up with figures in the general order of 10 to 30 million.

"These were figures which were produced by a rather brief study of

the Atomic Energy Commission."

There is very much more material on this which gives something more than that. It is said in another place where the detection question comes up, if the concealed test cannot be detected by anti-nuclear devices, then what is the position? What is the engineer's answer? The answer is that:

`..... there is the purely engineering aspect of the problem--it would require colossal land removal to create a cavity sufficiently deep to cushion a nuclear explosion. For instance, a hole to cushion the explosion of a 100-kiloton bomb"--that is only one megaton--"would have to be deep enough to accommodate a dozen or so skyscrapers.

"The volume of work would be fantastic to dig a hole in hard rock deep enough to carry out a concealed explosion of 100-kiloton device, would involve the extraction of 25 million tons of rock and earth, or enough to fill 5 million trucks...it takes 21,000 American miners to extract 19.5 million tons of anthracite, or less than the amount needed to dig a 'big hole'."

Therefore, that cannot be done quietly at night.

There are public operations requiring a very long time and a great deal of expenditure. I must now read to the Committee the preparation made under Eisenhower's direction in regard to the Vela Project, only part of which is in operation. This is taken from the Christian Science Monitor by a writer named Neal Stanford writing in that magazine on 12 August 1961:

"Project Vela has been under way for some time. It includes three sub-projects--Vela Sierra, Vela Hotet and Vela Uniform. The first two of these are concerned with problems of detecting nuclear blast in space. The third, Vela Uniform, deals with the thorny problem of underground explosions. It is Vela Uniform that is at issue here.

"The Vela Uniform programme calls for 13 nuclear and 22 chemical experimental blasts to provide information both on how to detect nuclear testing and how such testing might be concealed by a designing aggressor.

"The nuclear phase of this programme has been held up on the hope the Soviets would resume realistic test-ban negotiations...

"Actually those ready to put the Vela Uniform nuclear tests into operation have the facilities, caves, tunnels, etc. ready for use. These include a quarter-mile-long tunnel out in New Mexico, a huge salt cavern in Mississippi, a variety of huge holes in the ground in Nevada.

"And there are explosives at hand for the detonations. Thus it would be only a matter of days, or weeks at the most, before this phase of

Vela Uniform would go into operation, once the President gave the signal.

"Sixty million dollars has been spent already setting up Vela, and another \$ 50,000,000 has been earmarked for these underground tests. But few informed people believe it will end there. The general expectation is that nearer \$ 200,000,000 eventually will go into Vela."

We are not concerned about the expenditure of the money; that is a matter for the country spending it. However, this project will take time and great preparation as these are not small devices for laboratory experiments. They are merely what is necessary for nuclear weapons intended for nuclear war.

There is another passage from Governor Stevenson's speech yesterday-- and I do not want to read more into it--where he refers to what secret

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science might reveal, in the attempt to stop these bombs which people who know about it will perhaps understand. It refers to more deadly weapons. More deadly weapons will perhaps provide safety for those that have them and destruction for the other fellow. That only makes the danger of war greater because there is less risk for the perpetrator. Unfortunately, from the time that humanity began to scratch each other's faces or our worthy ancestors the chimpanzees did it, we have always discounted our opponents; we have always thought, "two can play at this game", so that we have now come to the position where we appeal for unanimous support for this resolution. We hope that the United States--which has led the opposition to it and which repeated this yesterday--will recognize that we are not here on a party wicket of any kind; we are not here to score a point, we are not here to allocate responsibility. It is quite true that when I leave this room a certain crowd of journalists will turn around and ask me, "Why did you not abuse the Soviets?" That is the usual question. I do not want to use abusive language. At any rate, there has been no pulling of punches so far as our information goes. It is not in order for us to allocate blame. We have tried to place before this Committee the objective realities, irrespective of the irritation it may cause, knowing very well that both the Soviet Union and the United States know that this is a great political issue and that the people of the world have to know its consequences.

We are now at the stage when Mr. Khrushchev has announced a 50 megaton explosion. May I say that President Kennedy has made an appeal to him in one way or another. He has said, "Please do not explode it". Now if the President of the United States can say this, could not some of those others here, who think they should not say so also, say the same thing? Why should his appeals not be of a character which goes for the United Nations as a whole? As I said, we now have all that we have from these two speeches. The Soviet Union

says, "It is necessary for our protection, we have been provoked into it, we know what is going on and we are not going to be caught unawares, we are not going to be caught unprepared, we are here to protect our people as well". We heard the same thing from Governor Stevenson in another kind of phraseology. He said, "I want to tell you, we want to be frank with you, that we are going to have big explosions." I think Mr. Dean said the other day that if the Soviet Union completes this series of tests, then the United States would start and that when these close others will start. They are going to take it by turns like baby-sitters. So what we are concerned about is that we should be seized of the enormity--I do not want to use any word that may be offensive--of the situation. This is not a separate position where we try to say, "We voted with this camp and we voted with that camp." We have had ten or twelve years of this. We have seen this issue pushed from pillar to post, with each side saying today that it is disarmament and tomorrow that it is not. None of us will be able to count the losses. We have a moral responsibility, apart from anything else, not to be a party to a delaying action, a delaying action being something that this Committee cannot be party to. Do not tell me, but ask yourselves in your private minds: is it possible for you to sit down here and even lay down the restricted blueprints on a treaty to which there are two parties who never see eye to eye and who are allies only in war--and not in peace so far.

Therefore we say that a treaty must be concluded, and concluded as quickly as possible. If the Soviet Union says, "No, before that we will have disarmament", then good; nobody is stopping it. Then I suppose these treaty provisions will go into the disarmament provisions. At any rate what we say is that here and now, pending this treaty, there should be no further explosions. It may be that one is not sufficiently realistic, but I feel that there is no country in the world, no Government in the world, no statesman in the world today that is not responsive to the voice of world public opinion. Even such countries as the thirty or forty of us here that are not so powerful, either economically or militarily or in political experience, as our friends in Europe, North America or Latin America--even our voices carry, because they are human voices. Far more, we are more likely to be the victims of this in normal times, in the absence of nuclear war, than a great many others. The only country that sits around this table and that has had first-hand experience of an atomic bomb at the wrong end is an Asiatic country. Even after that suffering, the only countries that have been the victims in this way of food poisoning on a large scale have been the countries in that area. I am not saying this particularly to direct your attention to the geography of the world. However, all those things would disappear.

There is no protection against large-scale radiation. We hear a great deal about being shielded from it. You can shield yourself for twenty-four hours. I do not have time to give you all the details or the statistics about these methods of protection. For how long can one sit in a protective shield? For three days, three

years or thirty years? There is no protection against this. The challenge is not to us only. It is a challenge to human wisdom. It is a challenge to human responsibility, to own responsibility to succeeding generations.

We are told that these effects last for 8,000 years in some cases and for 1,000 years in other cases. If they had dropped atomic bombs to win the Crusades, the genetic effects would still be hers. I will not mention the name, but in one of the most advanced countries in the world today in normal times four per cent of the children born are deficient, and that will go up, even at the present rate of radiation, by one per cent a year. Are we going to allow the human race to go on in this way? What its psychological or other effects are, I have not gone into.

I thank the members of the Committee for their kind indulgence in listening to me time and putting up with the large number quotations I have read out because I am no scientist. According to some people, I am scientific ignoramus, which means a person who reads only some of it. At any rate I put before you the facts that are available. I submit that it is for the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation...which is an impartial committee and a committee consisting of different countries from both sides--to put forward to these contestants the kind of blueprint on which they can work.

You cannot get a treaty by delivering an ultimatum. You cannot get a treaty by saying, "This or nothing else." It may come from one side or the other. We are not against a treaty. Not only are we not against a treaty what we state here in the proposal we are making is "pending the establishment of internationally binding obligations"--which may be a treaty or anything else--and we urge them to do it with speed. We may not say that we should not make any effort, that we expect them to go back to where they were this time last year or a few months ago in order that these things may be done, because we want something better. As I say, it is a great human responsibility, an international responsibility. All our other talk will have no meaning whatsoever. It is a responsibility which we may not dare to cast aside because of some political or other inconvenience at one moment or another.

After all, there have been times when nations and individuals have been minorities of one. We believe that it is right and proper that our voice should be raised in order that the continuing hazards of radiations, the genetic effects and the continued contamination of the air, should be brought to an end. As has been stated, these effects can last for thousands of years, and the effects of fall-out may last for anything from ten to thirty years, because contaminated food may be consumed by cattle which in turn are consumed by large numbers of people. In this way a situation is created in the world which is irreversible. The essence of civilization is that we do not create circumstances which we cannot reverse. We should not do evil

which we cannot undo.

So at this stage I submit this draft resolution for your consideration.

Shri Krishna Menon made two more statements in the Political Committee on the same subject on October 16 and 17, 1961.

The following is the text the statement Shri Menon made on October 16, 1961:

I ask the indulgence of the Committee for intervening on the subject once again, particularly as we are on a relatively simple matter which could have been disposed of the first day were it not for the adjournment, and that matter is the question of priority.

I want to say that all that is being discussed is the priority between three items, that is, item 1, 4 and 5 on the Committee's agenda. In the submission of my delegation items 1 and 4 belong to one category and item 5 belongs to another category. Therefore, we have submitted to this Committee item 1 which is a simple item, an item which is very much an Assembly item and may be considered by us. It does not require a detailed discussion on the substance of this matter which has been before us for many years, which has been referred to the Committee on Atomic Radiation which produced voluminous reports, some very valuable reports. Therefore, I want to make it clear in the first instance that at the present moment we are not discussing anything else. I say that because the representative of the United States said during the course of his introduction that he had thrown out a suggestion that there might be joint discussion, and I said on the last occasion that is entirely another matter. It would procedurally be out of order to consider the grouping of items while we are deciding priorities. The question of whether we should discuss items together or separately or whether we should discuss them in the morning or in the afternoon comes after we have disposed of all the items or

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the Committee in its wisdom decides to dispose of a certain number and leave the others in abeyance. That has been the procedure in this Committee for as long as I have been here and this is now nearly ten years and I submit therefore, as I said before, to try to bring up this question of joint discussion at this stage is to draw a red herring because items 1 and 4 are in the same category; they are both cold war items. We want to keep this discussion out of the cold war context.

While we claim no monopoly in this matter, this idea of having these test explosions not take place expresses the widespread feelings of humanity irrespective of country, irrespective of political, religious or other convictions. And if this be the will of the peoples of the United Nations, I think that this is the least we can

say. Over and above that, the appeal or recommendation or whatever the form in which it has put forward within the competence of the Assembly, the Assembly can make a request, can make a recommendation, can make a call, according to whatever is decided to the Member States on practically any question.

As regards both the disarmament question and on item 4, we have referred these to special bodies, and in each of these cases the proper procedure would be to review the work of those special bodies after a disarmament commission has reported to us on this matter. That is the proper procedure. I know by long experience that the mere arguing of a case is not always entirely adequate for conditioning the decision of this committee or any other Committee in the United Nations, and therefore we have tried to put these arguments out. As I said, it is entirely within the competence of this Assembly and it should not take a very long time. Our proposal in regard to item 72 on the general agenda-it is item 5 here-is not an attempt to drive a wedge between the treaty problem and the disarmament problem. It is quite true that if we come to an agreement on disarmament, it would not be necessary either to discuss a treaty or the suspension; the whole thing goes together; that is to say, if we got an agreement on disarmament tomorrow morning these things may be possible at any rate if the United States and the Soviet Union came to an agreement on principles, though in less than twenty-four hours explanations of them were forthcoming, this may be possible.

Still it is possible that, in the conditions existing in the world, agreements may be reached on a nuclear standstill or something of that character. What I should like to submit to the Committee, therefore, is that the simple proposition that we have put forward does not come in the way of a treaty on disarmament. Every agreement for discussing this along with the disarmament issue equally applies to deciding on discussing it along with item 4. So far as we are concerned, there are two categories: in one category are the great Powers, and in the other are the small Powers. I would, therefore, without any bitterness on this matter, request my colleagues here to try to look at this question from this viewpoint: each day that passes-each minute, as we see it-radiation increases in the world and tension increases.

There is another factor to be considered: the item that we have put forward, in our humble submission, is an essential item, in the present circumstances, for the promotion of the other two. Does anyone think that a discussion of disarmament is made easier while there are explosions going on both sides and representations are being made as to how many are exploded, whether they cause radiation, whether they are clear or dirty, whether they are underground or above ground? So in order to promote either item on disarmament or a treaty the suspension of explosions is the first essential; just as in a war, if you want to get peace, if you want to get a cessation of the war itself, you silence the guns before you do anything else,

We are today in worse position than when the treaty came to grief. We

are told the treaty has done very well, that there is only a little gap left and, therefore, it can be easily achieved. I shall come to that in a moment. However, what has to be remembered is that before we came to this Assembly some time before there was a situation where there was no tension caused by explosions. Now, on the other hand, the situation has worsened because of the renewal of explosions. At least, therefore, we ought to go back to that status which prevailed before and at least put that right if we can.

I am not for a moment saying that even if this were voted upon by an overwhelming majority the great Powers would therefore listen to us. They may or may not; I do not know; that is up to them. But we are here largely to express the opinions of our Governments and what we understand to be the opinions of the peoples of the world. That is our function, especially in regard to this particular issue. However, whether we read the Soviet speech or Mr. Dean's speech, we find references made to the urgency of this problem at various times. So far as we are concerned, as the representatives of Senegal and Mali have

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said, we do not believe that our uncommitted nature means that we have no views on anything; at the same time, it also does not mean that we have to find equal criticism on both sides. But it so happens that these great Powers think alike, and therefore we have to put forward that problem.

We have just now heard the representative of Hungary speaking about the uselessness of having a suspension of tests and about its having no relevance to disarmament. I would refer my colleague, who I believe is a newcomer to this Committee, to the speeches made by a gentleman called Mr. Nutting, who represented the United Kingdom at the time, and by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd before him, who told this Assembly in very eloquent terms that the suspension of explosions had nothing to do with disarmament, that it was disarmament and, therefore, we should not discuss it. We were held in that way for five years. First we were told: "It is not disarmament. Therefore, let us not have it." Then we were told: "It is not possible to detect explosions, and therefore any agreement on that would be futile." Thirdly, we were told: "Radiation does not matter very much, because we will always have radiation." That was the argument at that time. Now the same argument is adopted on the Hungarian side. Really nobody says that it is disarmament. It could easily be argued that any step in disarmament is not disarmament. It could be argued that disarmament is not peace. A disarmed world might still not be at peace. There it is all a question of degree.

Let us look briefly at the Soviet views on this question. In 1960 Academician Kurchatov, speaking on the danger of nuclear tests, said the following. This is not my opinion but the opinion of a distinguished Soviet scientist:

"Calculations show that if tests are continued at the 1956-58 rate several million persons out of each future generation will contract hereditary diseases due to the fall-out of the radioactive isotopes of strontium, cesium and carbon that are produced in nuclear explosions and that spread over the entire globe."

What is said here is this: "...if tests are continued at the 1956-58 rate...". Between 1956 and 1958 the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom between them exploded at the rate of five bombs a month; but now in one month they have exploded twenty-three bombs, or whatever the figure is. So the explosions are four or five times greater in number. I am not saying that they will explode twenty-three every month. They may do. How should I know? They have said that they have plenty of these things. They seem to have the money and the resources, and they seem to have the fear or the hope that this is going to bring about peace, but we are entitled to hold another opinion. I should like to quote this opinion, which is not a political opinion but a scientific opinion. It simply states what is the effect of a certain physical fact in the world upon biological, genetic or other circumstances. That could not have changed since 1960 on account of political opinion. If five bombs a month could affect several million persons, obviously twenty-three bombs a month could affect more persons. I could quote you large numbers of opinions of this character. Another of these academicians, Mr. Lebedinsky, says:

"...Due to nuclear testing, changes have occurred in the environment of all living beings on earth. These changes have been registered everywhere and are, therefore, affecting the entire population of the world...The nuclear tests that have resulted in this situation are in conflict with the interests of humanity."

How can that be reconciled with statements to the effect: "Let us have disarmament"? As I said the other day, it is just like telling a hungry man: "Why have bread? Why don't you have cake?"

I do not want to read too many of these quotations, but I should just like to read another statement by this same scientist, Mr. Lebedinsky:

"We may rest assured that such a hypothetical case of continued testing over an indefinitely long period of time is impossible, inconceivable. But even disregarding this imagined calculation, it is necessary to assess the biological effects produced by the changes that have already occurred in our environment..."

"Attempts to justify nuclear bomb tests are doomed. True science, which serves the interests of the peoples, warns humanity of the imminent danger."

From there we move on to another great Power, the United States. Mr. Dean is a lawyer, as you all know, and a very distinguished one; and

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a lawyer is at his best when he argues a bad case. I am by profession a lawyer. He told us that he believed first priority should be given to a discussion on nuclear testing. My difficulty is that I agree with Mr. Dean's arguments almost entirely, but I do not agree with his conclusions. Let us give priority to the discussion of nuclear testing rather than fiddle about with troikas and various other things that have been discussed--however necessary they may be. Control of this is necessary even if, in the meantime, disarmament as a whole does not come up. No one has denied that. We were ourselves sponsors of a draft resolution last year asking for conclusion of a treaty, Mr. Dean went on--and I hope he will not accuse me of plagiarism because that is what I said:

"...nuclear testing is a subject on which this Assembly can take action here and now." (A/C. 1/PV. 1163, page 22)

That is exactly what I said. But a treaty has been relegated to these three great men--presumably of the three great Powers--who have been sitting for three years, and we are told that they have not been able to reach an agreement. Then how can it be decided in the First Committee of a hundred nations who are not charged with this matter? I am only referring to it in a perfunctory way; I am not going into the details.

Then goes on Mr. Dean:

"The ban on nuclear testing should be handled in a clear-cut way through separate actions on a priority basis by this Committee." (Ibid.)

That is all I am saying; it is what I said. When a lawyer argues a weak case he puts arguments to which people listen and then just states the conclusion and hammers the conclusion afterwards. That is an ordinary court practice.

Then, comes the United States criticism of our position. Mr. Dean said that he had supported us in our argument that there should be suspension of nuclear tests--obviously. No one argues that United States is for nuclear tests. It has not resumed tests but has followed the others, and it could not have resumed the tests unless it had been prepared for it. I pointed out the other day how long it takes to prepare these underground tests, and when the main debate comes, my delegation will give the facts which have been published by the United States Government in this regard.

So, preparations have been going on on both sides. But the United States representative went on to say that the two items might be considered together. The only reason why we discuss the items together is to save time, and we have not seen a great deal of urgency here to save time. I come to this Committee year after year at 10 o'clock in the morning and I find no speakers and then I go

home. What is more, almost anybody can get an adjournment motion through at six o'clock. Therefore, as far as time is concerned I say that if item 5 is handled in the way it should be and people do not wander all over the place--except that one cannot avoid referring to peace, or coexistence, or disarmament, or treaties, when talking of suspension of nuclear tests--it could be completed. As I have said, if you get suspension of nuclear tests, the remainder of the work becomes a little easier. It is easier to discuss a treaty in the context of people not calling each other names or making explosions. For example if Mr. Dean goes back to Geneva--which is the place where all these conferences take place where there is no agreement--and begins discussions, and on that morning there are a lot of explosions and radiation goes up in North America as a result--whether the Russians explode their bombs in Siberia or whatever they do, they do not tell me, but I imagine it is somewhere there--and the Canadian Government puts out the figures of increased radiation, then that is a bad day to get agreement altogether. Thus, while we are discussing the matter, my delegation itself will certainly refer to disarmament.

Disarmament is made easier if there are no more nuclear explosions in the world. Nuclear explosions, apart from the radiation consequences, are also a kind of reminder to the world that there is going to be a nuclear war.

Then we come nearer home, as we would say, nearer to our friends--that is, the British. The United Kingdom Government's position is the same as that of the United States except that it is expressed in a more confused way. The United Kingdom representative tells us that a draft treaty is in being. A draft treaty is no more in being than if you go to a stationer's shop and buy a form and say that a company registration is in being. If the British and the Americans, or the British and the Canadians, or the British alone, or the Americans alone, or the Russians alone, say that they are going to draft something, that is not a treaty. In the United States particularly I get papers each day about peace plans, about how to make the world good, including advice to read the Fourth Psalm or something of that kind. So there are lots of treaties in this way and, therefore, there is no draft treaty in being.

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There is no more a draft treaty in being than there is a draft resolution in being. There is a draft resolution in the sense that a delegation puts one forward. It is like the young man who says to a young woman: "I am willing to marry you", and she says "no", and then he goes out and says that there is 50 per cent agreement.

I have had the privilege of knowing Mr. Godber, representative of the United Kingdom, only very recently and we have been extremely friendly in conversation, and no countries can be closer than mine and the United Kingdom. Therefore, they know us well, with the result that they know our motives. Therefore, we shall go into the motives in this question. Mr. Godber said.

"To press for that to be done would seem to imply that the representative of India is afraid that if the two were discussed together his item would seem to be the less effective instrument." (A/C. 1/PV. 1164. page 48-50)

Lots of things have been said about the representative of India, but nobody has said that he is afraid of saying anything--so far. I would leave it like that. The reason why it is put forward is that if there was not this inference drawn, I am quite sure that this proposal to the atomic Power concerned--that is the United States, the Soviet Union and France--would have gone out; and great as they may be, and whatever their forms of government, whatever their various other complications, there is no Government, no people, no statesmen in the world today who is not in some degree amenable to world public opinion. It has been our experience here, as in this case, that it takes five or six or seven years before they adopt the argument.

The United Kingdom has come forward pressing for a treaty. The United Kingdom was the strongest opponent of a treaty on disarmament when it was put forward by the Indian Government. They said that if the United Nations Secretariat put forward some sort of blueprint of a disarmament treaty, then, instead of each one trying to put forward propositions that would be rejected by the other, we would be discussing them clause by clause. Mr. Nutting said that that would be putting the cart before the horse.

Then we went on for four years, during which suggestions were put forward in this committee of a concrete character, which were forgotten immediately after the Assembly, until we took procedural measures whereby they had to be referred to the Disarmament Commission and, by Constant reminders, after a period of three years and a commitment to the Assembly that they would be regarded in the same way as other suggestions, they were discussed. But it got no further.

There Mr. Lodge's statement from the summary record says that there is agreement on so many vital points of disarmament, but it is extremely difficult to draft any kind of legal instrument which would be reasonably complete or which would make any sense at all. You could read the whole text of the report, it could be set out, and you could discuss a treaty in this Committee. But what was suggested at that time was not that. What was suggested was that the United Nations Secretariat should draft something and that then we could take up the points one by one.

But that is not the position here. Here the position is that we are told that there is a draft treaty--drafted by one side--which would form the basis of discussion. I have no objection. If the Russians are willing to do so, so much the better. But now we come to certain matters of very serious importance, There are certain procedural considerations in this, and I want to say now that if there are procedural departures of a character that goes to the root of the

matter my delegation, at the risk of being regarded as being procedurally difficult, will have to raise these points.

As for this treaty matter, they are, as I have said, of the same category. We must first have the Disarmament Commission, or the Ten-Nation Committee, or this Committee of Three through the Disarmament Commission. It must be given to us. I would like to ask how many delegations have seen the proceedings of the Geneva conference. The proceedings of the Geneva conference exist in one copy in the Secretariat of the United Nations. Since we have been following this matter we are allowed to see it. There is no secrecy about it, but the proceedings are not circulated to governments. They are the proceedings of three years, and what is published is the so-called treaty, but not the whole of those proceedings. So, unless we study them, how shall we be able to apply our mind to it except by saying that there should be a treaty? But we said last year that there should be a treaty. We said also that there should be suspension of explosions, and we would not have brought this resolution here this year if there had not been a renewal of explosions.

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We have no objection to anyone's moving or giving serious consideration to the idea of treaties, but all we are saying is that these are two separate matters. Then we are told that this treaty is a simple matter, which again I raise not in order to argue the point in great detail but because it would mislead large numbers of people, particularly those who are not familiar with the background of this problem. Mr. Arthur Dean told us that the differences that existed between the two sides were so small, implying thereby I suppose--and I am quite prepared to withdraw this if I am wrong--that it is really a small matter and that we could easily settle it. But, first of all, in any serious discussion it is the last small difference that is much more difficult than all the other previous agreements that have been reached.

Now we have taken the trouble to look at these records, to which we have had access--and to which any one of the delegations here can have access, although there are one hundred Members to use one copy. Anyone who refers to the records will find, I believe, that there is agreement on eighteen points and disagreement on ten. These points, however, are points by courtesy to Mr. Dean, because each of these eighteen points means that some part of an idea is agreed to. The other is not agreed to. So it is up to you to make up your minds whether a point is agreed to or not. I am not for a moment minimizing it, but out of these eighteen points that are agreed to what are the agreement? That there should be discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests conducted directly or through other countries--general points of that kind; the establishment of an over-all control system--on which everybody is agreed; a four Power control system consisting of an administrator.....--the difficulty being when it comes to who should be the administrator, so that that point appears on the agreement list and on the disagreement list.

Thus, when one comes to study this one finds there is much divergence of opinion between the two sides. I hope it will be bridged, but if we are to wait until it is bridged, and if these explosions of larger and larger bombs are to take place, then where are we?

The United States representative tells us, "If we have merely suspension as before then we have no guarantee that it will be maintained". I submit that there are no guarantees in the present state of international law except moral guarantees or war. That is to say, either you impose them by force if you can--which we are here trying to avoid--or you depend upon the other Power's willingness. But I do not leave it there. What does this draft treaty referred to by the United Kingdom representative say? It says:

"Indefinite duration of the treaty"--that is what they want. indefinite prohibition--"with the right of a party to withdraw if the treaty and its annexes, including those setting up a control system and providing for its effective operation, are not being fulfilled."

That is to say that at any time any of these great countries can say. "You are not inspecting properly, so we are going out". So while I do not want to minimize the importance of this treaty--and I think it will be a good treaty when it is concluded because both parties want this agreement--what I am saying is that there is no more binding force in this than in any decision, or in any commitment, or in any sacrifice or in whatever it may be, not to carry on in this way. In other words, a treaty can be broken even in normal circumstances, but this treaty in fact provides for it. This treaty says:

".....the right of a party to withdraw if the treaty and its annexes, including those setting up a control system and providing for its effective operation, are not being fulfilled."

Therefore, it is not right for this Committee to feel that there is something very binding in a treaty. And before I leave this particular point may I say that what we are asking for is a situation where there are no more tests. A treaty is a kind of agreement, even if you take away this limitation which I read out. But first let us get the thing set before we start limiting it. And if we are to discuss this treaty then it is necessary that we should have all the facts before us.

For example, take the simple matter of finance to which I think all governments are very alert. The difference between the United States-United Kingdom proposal and the USSR proposal is this. They both want a veto--great Powers, you know, they both want a veto--and I think they are entitled to it. But the United States-United Kingdom people want a partial veto, a piecemeal veto, while the Russians want either to veto the whole budget or to agree to the whole budget. They say, "We veto the whole budget or agree to the whole budget, then you do what you like", according to the summaries that have been made. The other people say that the original parties could veto the total

budget or individual items. The

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USSR proposal is that the original parties could veto the total budget but not individual items, meaning thereby, that once there is agreement then the control commission is an autonomous body. I am not saying that one is better than the other. What I am saying is that both want a veto. Both want to hold the pursestrings, which is quite natural. Both want to get out of it, which is also understandable. There is no virtue or lack of virtue in these people - they are like all of us, only they are bigger Powers. That is one item.

The same thing applies to various other matters, and there are ten main items on which there is disagreement. Most of which could I believe, given goodwill, be resolved. The most difficult, of course, is the question of the machinery of control, which is now, as Committee knows, riddled by this idea of a three-man administration, vetoes, the number of check points and things of that character. We ourselves have reservations on this treaty because we would not be happy about any treaty that permitted any kind of explosion, whether it be underground, on the ground, on the moon, or wherever it was. They are all part of the same family, and it makes no difference.

That is our position. Therefore, I would like to submit at this stage that we should not get in the position in which the disarmament negotiation were about three, four or five years ago, and also last year when sixteen countries submitted to the General Assembly, as others did some years ago, that the Assembly should give directives in that way. The best I can do is to read from an American publication of the Carnegie Endowment. The Carnegie Endowment cannot be accused of any lack of objectivity and certainly not of bias towards the Russians. I am only arguing in analogy in this matter, and not about these explosions, but the way these negotiations are conducted. It says the following:

"In effect, disarmament negotiations themselves have become a weapon in the cold war. Speeches made in commission, committee, and plenary assembly have more often been designed to influence different segments of opinion than to reach an accommodation with the other nations represented at the conference table."

That is, humble people like ourselves. It goes on to say:

"Both East and West have become masters of the art of appealing directly to the peoples over the heads of their governments.

"Beginning with the proposals for international control of atomic energy, both sides have developed and refined the technique of utilizing the discussions for propaganda purposes. This might be described as the 'gamesmanship' of disarmament negotiations. A cardinal feature of this 'game' has been to reject the proposals of the other side without appearing to sabotage the discussions.

"Every plan offered by either side has contained a set of proposals calculated to have wide popular appeal. Every such set has included at least one feature that the other side could not possibly accept, thus forcing a rejection. Then the proposing side has been able to claim that the rejector is opposed to the idea of disarmament in toto. The objectionable feature may be thought of as the 'joker' in every series of proposals."]

This is not written by politicians but by people who analyse these matters.

Now the position is the same here. No one can oppose total and complete disarmament. Nobody wants to do so. No one wants to oppose the introduction of proper international controls, under proper instruments, in regard to treaties, and it is not as though one opposing them. But each of the two sides--and now in this case a third side--will put into that position. That is why we have come here asking merely at the present moment that item 5 on the agenda should be considered first and voted upon, and if, as the representative of the United Kingdom says, we are doing that out of fear, we shall reap the reward of fear. That is to say, like people who do fear we will run away.

Therefore, let the debate decide that matter and, so far as we are concerned, we think that this is entirely separate from the two other cold war items. If it is the desire of the Russians and the Americans to discuss these items, then those discussions can go on between them. They talk to each other and understand each other very much more than they understand us. or we understand them. But this is a public appeal from the United Nations Assembly, representing world public opinion, on a matter that is of vital importance. When radiation is going up in this way

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and when there are so many ticklish points in the world where a mishap of any kind can lead to great catastrophe, we therefore come forward with this proposal.

I submit that at the present moment, so far as we are concerned, only one matter is before us and that is the numbering of the items. When the numbering is completed, the time will then come to consider whether item 1 or 2, or 2 and 3, or 1, 2 and 3 should be discussed or otherwise. At that time each one will no doubt submit their proposals. But there should be no doubt in anybody's mind that the questions are similar because they are related to the same subject. They are all similar; they all relate to the subject of world peace. But they are entirely different. They come from entirely different stables. They are different orientations; the purposes are different. They spring from different apprehensions and different concerns and therefore there should be no feeling that we are pressing from a sectarian point of view, having vested interests in an item that is

put forward. We quite appreciate the fact that we are asking the indulgence of the Assembly in seeking priority for an item that was put in latter, for reasons that have already been submitted, which is the normal procedure in this place.

Finally, we have not received, except as was absolutely necessary with regard to this subject and only to the extent that the three main parties concerned have brought in the question of the treaty, the necessary reports from the Disarmament Commission, as required under last year's resolution, and where it stands and so on. Finally we would like to say that whatever we have said in regard to the United States and the Soviet Union or the United Kingdom equally applies to any other country that has either been exploding bombs or is capable of doing so, because one of the main difficulties in this matter has been this loophole through which an agreement is made impossible. Therefore, I submit that priority be given to item 5 on the agenda.

The following is the text of Shri Menon's statement on October 17, 1961:

In view of the amount of time that has been spent on this particular aspect of our debate, my delegation would not normally have intervened again either in right of reply or to make a second statement. Therefore, we have availed ourselves of our right to move our own amendment and deal with the amendments moved by the United States of America. Since then, much has been said and this discussion has developed into a major debate. However, it is not our intention to answer every statement that has been made, because that would take too long especially because the last one was totally inaccurate as far as I was concerned. But I was speaking in English and perhaps what I said was distorted. Therefore, for the convenience of the Committee and also for the purpose of brevity I would like to indicate that what I propose to do is to refer first of all to some observations made by the representative of United States yesterday which are in a different category from what he has said today. Then I shall deal with the very important statement made by the representative of Peru, which even if it were not important I could not have let go without an answer, and then I shall deal with the Soviet Union and finally with the United States of America unless some other matter comes up.

Yesterday, the representative of the United States referred to the inaccuracy of certain statements. I have no doubt that we all make inaccurate statements, I do not say that there cannot have been inaccuracies, but I have been trying to find out what these inaccuracies were. I have been listening today for that purpose, and since he misunderstood what I said at the time, namely that what the Assembly was seized of was not the so-called draft treaty-to which I shall return-new texts have come to light today, not with regard to the draft treaty but to the whole proceedings and the discussions that took place in Geneva. The United States has submitted the text of two notes between itself and the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union

has submitted nothing, so that all that the General Assembly is seized of in connexion with the entire proceedings in Geneva are two notes sent by the United States. There are two notes dated 23 June of this year and 26 July of this year and another one dated 3 June this year. The note of 3 June is the treaty and the other two are two notes sent by the United States. Presumably the United Kingdom would be in agreement also...or perhaps it would not, I do not know...but these notes have been circulated as United Nations documents on an important matter. There has been no such communication from the Soviet Union and none from the United Kingdom except its joint signature on the treaty.

I was referring to the fact that if we are going to enter into a discussion on the so-called conclusion of a treaty, there are only two possibilities. We may discuss this text of "x" number of articles and a large number of annexes and notes. The purpose of the item submitted by the Government of India is set out in the memorandum. I shall deal with that at a later stage. However,

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yesterday the representative of the United States referred to inaccuracies and also to the issue that the very fact that I referred to this treaty indicated that the items could not be discussed separately. Now I referred to this treaty only to point out the enormous amount of detail involved. Also, there was the circumstance which arose whether it is a draft treaty, that a treaty is not a resolution, that a treaty by definition is a concordat. I do not have to explain these words and therefore, it was only for that purpose I went into it. I did not try to analyse the treaty or to examine the substance of it.

I come now to the statement of the representative of Peru, who enjoys the respect of all members of this Committee. He is a past President of the General Assembly and a past Chairman of this Committee. First, I should like to deal with some of the substantial matters to which he referred.

He referred very rightly...and I believe he is the only one who has done us the honour to the heading of this item. We have been talking about item 4 and item 5 but we have not used any phraseology. Item 5 is, "Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal."

I have no recollection of my Government at any time having taken the position that a treaty is not required. What we are discussing is whether we should discuss this item and the treaty, if there should be one, at the same time. This should not be confused. That would be like trying to prove that a cat has got three tails: because no cat has got two tails and every cat has got one tail more than no cat, therefore every cat has got three tails. That is the kind of argument that is being used. Therefore, the treaty should be taken as specifying what we have before us, either in this book or in relation

to the Geneva proceedings. This is far too serious a matter to try to have it dismissed by lack of accurate interpretations by me or by anybody else. Therefore, when Mr. Belaunde refers to the obligations of States, we mean the obligations of States. I agree, there are obligations of various kinds. The representative of Greece has said that the state of international law is such that obligations of an international character are still moral obligations, because there is no way of enforcing them as members of the community. But if we are going to have a discussion of international law, let us go to the Sixth Committee and have it worked out in that way. Perhaps that will also come into this question.

Does a smaller obligation exclude a larger obligation? Did we ever say at any time that this should not be discussed? Any delegation has the right to have what it presents considered in the context in which it is presented. This attitude is what Mr. Arthur Dean calls a monopoly, of which he is more familiar than I.

Therefore, the obligation of States, Mr. Belaunde, is not such as to be avoided. I am very sorry that the great prestige which the representative of Peru enjoys in this Committee, and particularly with the Latin American countries, should be brought into play in presenting this matter in this way. This does not reflect on the opinion or the submission made by my delegation.

Secondly, now that the discussion has gone to this extent, I would like to refer to document A/4801/Add. 1. What does the Government of India say on page 3 of this document? "They consider it essential not only that the attempts to reach agreement on a treaty be resumed without delay but that, pending such result, the States principally concerned, as well as all other States, should undertake not to contemplate the unilateral resumption of tests."

I know that humanity functions in two terms: in terms of remembering and of forgetting. If we did not remember anything, life would be impossible; if we remembered everything, life would also be impossible. Politicians sometimes have convenient memories where they use a selective memory. In this statement on page 3, we have put forward this argument where we say that it is essential to reach agreement on a treaty.

What is more, can this Committee remember any statement made at any time either here or anywhere else on behalf of my Government where we have said that the United States item should not be considered or should be relegated to the bottom of the agenda or, as the representative of the United States has, I regret to say, stated today, that we were trying to seek some monopoly of consideration. In fact, all that we have asked for is that the order should be changed, that item 5 should be taken first and item 4 afterwards. We do not take the position that we should take item 5 first and then consider all things afterwards. That is not our position. And while I regard my colleague from Afghanistan with great respect and affection, I cannot in the present circumstances agree to his request for

priority, because that creates a new issue, an issue which would probably confuse the question by raising the thought that we want the United States item to be relegated

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further down on the agenda. That is not our view at all.

Our one purpose in this matter is to get as large a vote as possible on a single resolution, on which practically all or the overwhelming majority of members would agree. That is a different matter. I shall come to our draft resolution in a moment.

There again, I have the obligation to point out that this item, which was proposed by us in document A/4801 and is now item 4 on our agenda, was submitted to the Secretary-General on 17 July, certainly after the United States item was submitted, which was on 14 July. No responsible Government, no Member State here, would submit items just for the fun of submitting them. We already have seventy-two permanent items on the agenda, and we do not add to them. We submit items only because we think there is some purpose in it. In this particular case an item has been submitted by one of the parties involved not just anyone who did not know but by one of the parties involved--who had given thought to it and had been engaged in the discussions in Geneva. Therefore, when we submit this item after that, there must be a good reason for it. As I say, it is not merely an ill-thought-out position and it does not exclude the question of a treaty at all. What we seek to do is to obtain here as wide support as possible for something that will express the concern of the world and stop these tests.

There is a press report this afternoon that the Soviet Union has announced that it is going to explode another 50-megaton bomb and later on a 100-megaton bomb if necessary, and so on. I am not saying that we should be panicked or alarmed or dragooned or anything of that character, because we will not be here to be dragooned. But I think it is all the more reason why the brake of world public opinion should be applied to all countries. My Government does not want to enter into this dispute as to who prepared and who did not prepare. There is not the slightest doubt that the Soviet Union must have been preparing to explode these bombs. They have not denied it; they said they had been ready to explode them. If they could explode them without preparation, the danger would be even greater.

That applies with greater force to the United States position. If the United States position is that underground explosions do not require preparation, then I think they ought to be stopped this moment, because then there would be surprise explosions. But that is not the position. I happen to be one of those who pay attention to the proceedings of the legislature of the United States in connexion with these matters. I read them, and I have quoted them to you. What is more, when this discussion takes place, my delegation will put before you material that will stagger you--evidence given before the United

States Senate that each of these holes cost any thing from 30 to 50 million and required the removal of some 35 million tons of material, and also required from two to four years of work. May be that is a minor one, but surely it cannot be a little ant-hole that has been exploded. I am not prepared to deny the statement made by the United States delegation on this matter, because it represents its Government in its view. All I am saying is this. If an explosion can be carried out without preparation, it is dangerous; and, if they are preparing for it, then it is a breach of faith. In either case they are wrong. I would like to see how they get out of that.

Now we come back to my distinguished colleague from Peru. The representative of Peru is a good friend of mine and later on he will tell me how wrong I am and how far I am away from human conscience. The difficulty is that the torrent of his eloquence sends the rockets of his ideas so high up that their power becomes exhausted and then the words, or whatever is left of the rockets, fall according to their natural political gravitation. That is normal; it is the ordinary law of physics. There are only two forces in the world: gravitation and electromagnetism. Apparently even this great power does not belong to the field of electro-magnetism; it still remains in the field of earth's gravity. That gravity is conquered by the torrential eloquence of Mr. Belaunde. His rocket goes high up and then it burns itself out. Then what is left--which, if I were impolite, I would call debris, but I do not, because I have the highest respect for Mr. Belaunde and he is trying to fight a very hard case for his friends--comes down to the point where it naturally comes home, so to say, according to its natural political gravitation.

So, from the point of view of the substance of this matter, my Government does not stand against a treaty. In fact it asks for a treaty. The only issue before us is this. As we pointed out yesterday--of course we cannot claim the same attention as the United States, because it is a great Power and has many allies in the world, but we did not point this out yesterday--the average number of explosions in the three years from 1956 to 1958 was five per month, while this year, after the renewal of these explosions, it has risen to about twenty-three or twenty-four a

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month. We have the scientific facts, which have been provided by the government scientists and therefore must be right, indicating that so many tons of bombs have been exploded. All the more reason, therefore, why we should do something to stop this before we go into all the minutiae of the subject.

That takes me to the representative of the United Kingdom. I am not going to repeat anything I said yesterday, because yesterday is over. However, there is some misunderstanding on this matter. Now I hope I shall be able to clear up this misunderstanding. He attempted to present our attitude as though we wanted uncontrolled suspension. If

a doctor tries to bring down a man's high temperature, it does not mean that he does not want to cure his fever. What we suggested was that, even to bring about these things--whether it be disarmament or whether it be a treaty or anything else--the atmosphere of the kind experienced a while ago from the front benches of the three great Powers who always sit together has to be altered. The representative of the United Kingdom now tells us that we have mentioned the possibility of discussing items 1 and 2 together, 2 and 3 together or 1, 2 and 3 together. I simply cannot conceive of that as a positive, logical or mathematical possibility. That might be done by the Secretariat--not that they are as intelligent as I am, but they are certainly more sensible. However, the point that he has tried to make in this argument is that the Indian delegation was casting its ticket in favour of discussing this disarmament item. It is a favourite pastime here to say that somebody is too near the Soviet Union. That is, if you say, "It is now 6.40", or whatever it is, then you are wrong. We are not frightened of this. We are not frightened of agreeing or disagreeing with either the United States or the Soviet Union. There are consequences to individuals, and I take them; I have taken them for ten years. However, when the representative of the United States or of the United Kingdom points out that our suggestion involves taking it into the disarmament item, it is not correct. We never suggested anything of the kind. All I said was that to discuss this with one is in the same category as discussing it with the other. Our objection was not that there was something wrong with a treaty or something contaminating in a treaty or that there was something bad evil in the disarmament problem; our objection was that there were complex problems, as to time. They imported all sorts of other questions while here we were discussing a matter which to a certain extent has changed, even after the submission of our item, on account of the renewal of tests. Therefore, this presentation of it, while it may or may not be technically correct, does not represent our viewpoint. We did not suggest that it might also be taken up with the disarmament item. We are against taking it up with the disarmament item. We want the item to stand as it is. That is why it was suggested. That is not monopoly. It is entirely right for a country that has submitted an item before us to say, "No, we won't give way to you", and so on. I shall come to that priority question afterwards.

Then Mr. Godber has said that our procedural proposals--he has been polite enough to say that they are procedural proposals--have substantive implications. Now the cat is out of the bag. That is to say, therefore, that it is not a procedural argument if there are substantive implications. The substantive implications are that this thing which has not been agreed to in three years in Geneva has now been brought up here, and all we can do is either to say that we are in sympathy with the whole of the book, or to go through it chapter by chapter and sit here for another three years--but in this case it would be thirty years because there are a hundred of us. Having done that, I want to go further.

Though it is quite true that I am presenting these arguments alone, I

think that those concerned in this matter would be mistaken in thinking that we are waging a lone battle, because the whole world wants suspension of tests.

I should like the Committee to look at resolutions 1253 (XIII) and 1402 (XIV), because the representative of the United Kingdom has said that there was no decision by the Assembly that the matter should be sent to the Disarmament Commission, or here, or something of that kind. That is not the position. Records of talks have been coming to the library of the United Nations, as I said yesterday, and the library is used fully by all Members. Accounts were also given to the press reporters. Here, I want to go step by step. First of all, I want serious notice to be taken of the fact that the Assembly has no notice whatsoever that the Geneva Conference is over. We read the newspapers, but those who think they can accept anything printed in the newspapers as necessarily true should not be here because newspapers can only collect information given by certain parties. We have no official communication from anybody. The General Assembly has not been informed; the Security Council has not been informed; the Disarmament Commission has not been informed that the Geneva Conference of the three countries--the United Kingdom, the United

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States and the Soviet Union--has been concluded. In fact, I tell you that I do not know whether it is over or not; they had at least one meeting after the Soviet explosion. If the explosion terminated the Conference, I have seen no official communication about that body winding itself up. If it wound itself up, then it has an obligation to report to us; and that is why I am reading out these resolutions.

Resolution 1252 (XIII) says in the third preambular paragraph:

"Nothing that negotiations on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and on the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the report of the Conference of Experts began on 31 October 1958,". (Resolution 1252 (XIII))

Then the resolution says in paragraph 1 of the recommendations:

"Urges that in the negotiations between States that have tested nuclear weapons the parties make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control;". (Ibid.)

In the following year, at the fourteenth session, resolution 1402 (XIV) says the following:

"Expresses the hope that these States will intensify their efforts to reach such an agreement at an early date;". (Resolution 1402 (XIV), A) Part B of the same resolution says:

"Expresses further the hope that the States concerned will reach such

agreement at an early date;

"Appeals to the States concerned in the Geneva discussions to continue their present voluntary suspension of tests, and to other States to desist from such tests;". (Ibid., B)

So all these things are on record, and they have been referred to in subsequent resolutions. Therefore, we come to the resolution of the fifteenth session (1577 (XV)). In that resolution we recall resolutions 1252 (XIII) and 1402(XIV) and go on to request the parties concerned to report the results of their negotiations to the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly.

I have sat in this Committee, on this subject, for ten years. It is the accepted practice that these things go to the Disarmament Commission. In the early days the Disarmament Commission used to work on them; now all it does is to transmit the item--but at least it has an obligation to transmit it. There has been no transmission of these records. There is no evidence that the records have been received.

Resolution 1577 (XV) says further:

"Urges the States concerned to seek a solution for the few remaining questions, so that the conclusion of the agreement will be reached at an early date;". (Resolution 1577 (XV))

This refers to an agreement that must have been extent on 20 December or before--that is to say, in 1960. But the document before us (A/4772) is dated 3 June 1961, and it says:

"In accordance with General Assembly resolution 1578 (XV) which, inter alia, `requests the States concerned in the Geneva negotiations: (a) To keep the Disarmament Commission periodically informed of the progress of their negotiations, (b) To report the results of their negotiations to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly, we should be grateful if this letter and its enclosure could be circulated to all Members of the United Nations as a document of the General Assembly and of the disarmament Commission (A/4772).

But the important part of this document is the previous paragraph, which says:

"We have the honour, on instructions from Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and from the Government of the United States of America, to transmit the attached document, `Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests', which was submitted jointly by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States on 18 April 1961..." (Ibid.)

Therefore, this document is not the one referred to here. We were discussing in 1960 a document on which these two countries are alleged to have reached agreement on everything but two or three

points. Now we are given a new document dated 18 April 1961. Therefore, we are being asked simultaneously, on this urgent matter, to consider

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a document which, even for those most intimately connected with it, must require some consideration, I referred to some of the paragraphs yesterday and was told that it was inaccurate. But if that is so, if a person who makes a study of it finds it inaccurate, other people may find it even more so. This is not the document which was referred to in this. That is, we are being asked in item 4 to consider a treaty which was submitted, after a great deal of painstaking effort by the United Kingdom and the United States, to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General.

In fact, although I would not like to swear to this, there appears to be no evidence in this document that this particular test, dated 18 April 1961, had seen the light of day at this time. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary, and I should have read it out. "The United States, on 18 April 1961, at the 292nd meeting of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests"--that is to say, this document came into existence only at the 292nd meeting, and since they could not go on there it is passed on to us. But, as I say, we are not a body which is competent for this purpose, because these resolutions have not been rescinded. They require a two-thirds majority to be rescinded. We appointed these three people to go into this--or, rather, we took official notice of it in three successive years of resolutions, and we cannot just ignore them. If we want to ignore them we have to rescind them by a two-thirds majority.

Secondly, this relates to an entirely different set of circumstances. All the proceedings are upstairs in the library--I referred to them yesterday and I hope that some of the members of the Committee will refer to them also--and this is another document, unless I am wrong. As I read out, this was submitted at the 292nd meeting of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Obviously there was a draft before the 292nd meeting and there were proceedings before 292nd meeting. Even if, as I say, I am inaccurate, I think that sufficient doubts and sufficient difficulties have come in the way for us to appreciate that it is not possible for us to deal with this by a simple resolution. We are quite prepared to put more in it if necessary. We put it in, quite frankly, because we did not want another problem of priorities, and because it is quite well known that sometimes resolutions get in here at 9.25, at 9.29 and so on. So it has been put in in order that it might have its right for a place.

Now I come to the second part of the United States representative's speech where he talks, first of all, about this procedural "wrangle". I have gone to the trouble to find out what this word means. "Wrangle", according to the Oxford Dictionary, means a brawl--loud or vulgar or confused argument. It may be "a confused argument or altercation or quarrel". But between Mr. Dean and me there never is

any quarrel. It is very difficult to quarrel with him. I think it was Mr. Chesterton, who was as heavy as Mr. Dean is, who said, "I can neither fight nor run away; therefore, I smile". So, my delegation does not engage in any brawls. I will check with my Ambassador whether there have been any private brawls outside, and if there have I will apologize. There has been no angry language used, as far as I know, and therefore no wrangle has taken place.

These are procedural discussions, but, as the United Kingdom representative pointed out, although the form is procedural they have gone further into it because we are so deeply concerned about getting a decision with a large degree of support which would make a moral impact on the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France such as to stop these diabolical experiments in the world.

We may be sentimental, or naive, or whatever it is, but we do not think that there is any Government in the world--however powerful and whatever its form, whatever its constitution, whatever its capacity to send out stories that are not true in the newspapers every half hour or to control its Press or documents--that is not affected by public opinion. My professor of political science taught me once that public opinion is not necessarily of one kind. He said, "In Tsarist Russia there is public opinion which is autocracy tempered by assassination". "In England", he said, "there is oligarchy tempered by the fear of a general election". So there is public opinion of one kind or another, and I have not the slightest doubt that the very considerable advance made by the Soviet Union in connexion with the question of the temporary arrangements in relation to the Secretary-General is the result either of persuasion or of listening to other people--things of that character. Things change in the world, otherwise it is not worth surviving. Nuclear war is justified if there are no changes.

Therefore we say that our concern in this matter is not a vested interest or a monopoly, as Mr. Dean has chosen to call it. Mr. Dean then went on to refer to the "intransigence" of the Indian delegation. I said yesterday something about fifty-fifty, and it was unfortunately thrown back at Mr. Tsarapkin, whom I saw afterwards.

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But what is this compromise? First of all, what is Mr. Dean conceding, I should like to know? If there is a joint discussion, then that is what the United States delegation wanted from the very beginning--and I do not propose to make any reservations in making this statement as clear as possible. From the very beginning they wanted these things to be discussed together, while we regarded them as of a different character. But even if--let us assume--two subjects are discussed together, if there should be more than one resolution then, under the rules of procedure, the Chairman is obliged to put them separately.

So, there is no great favour done to anybody. You cannot have two

draft resolutions and say, "I have two proposals, put them together". You cannot do that, Mr. Chairman, with great respect. Therefore, that problem does not arise. Why joint discussion? Even if, on one item, there were two draft resolutions, both draft resolutions would have to be put separately. Therefore, the United States representative conceded nothing until yesterday. Yesterday he did make a concession, and what concession is contained in the amendment, which says, "Substitute the word 'listed' for the word 'discussed'." (A/C. 1/L. 284)

My delegation, according to Mr. Dean, does not reciprocate any sentiment, but, you know, it requires two sides. There must be a transmission apparatus and a reception apparatus always. "Substitute the word 'listed' for the word 'discussed' "--we at once accepted this amendment. There is no machinery in the United Nations for publishing the fact that we accepted it. We indicated to the United States delegation that we had accepted it. We have indicated to the Secretariat that we have accepted it. I believe it was mentioned--but anyway we accepted it.

The other one was a new draft resolution to which we moved an amendment. It is not my understanding, and I hope that it will never be my understanding, that compromise means surrender, that compromise means conformity. And if I can keep my friends only by saying "Yes" to everything, they will have to find somebody else.

Therefore, we have accepted this, but the other goes directly against what we have been asking for. There is no question of compromise then. There is no necessity for all these amendments. There is no necessity for anything. We can proceed to the discussion of these joint matters together.

I have been called "intransigent". Having been accused of inaccuracy, I again look at this dictionary, which even in America is regarded as a great authority I am told. For "intransigent"--and I hope Mr. Dean is not going to be offended--the first definition is not so bad. It says, "Uncompromising in politics".

I could say something about it, but I am not going to do so. But the next definition is "an uncompromising republican". Now Mr. Dean cannot say that he is an uncompromising republican. But I am an uncompromising republican. That is why on 26 January 1951 my country declared itself a republic by a unanimous vote of its Parliament. Therefore, I am an uncompromising republican and I cannot change a thing on that. I am now informed that Mr. Dean is an uncompromising republican. Anyway, that goes into domestic politics and I do not wish to interfere with it.

Therefore, if I may say so with great respect, rebukes will not take us anywhere. My delegation has stated its position fully and clearly and I am sorry to say that in most of these statements there has been an attempt to make it out as though we are putting out some milk and water solution, trying to run away from the idea of getting something

that is binding, trying to avoid discussion and, as was said by the representative of the United Kingdom, "afraid of the results" on the United States item.

That is not the position, and it is not only my statement on it. It is a statement that is contained in the memorandum (A/4801/Add. 1) submitted by the Government of India on 28 July 1961 where it asks for a treaty. But what we are saying is that pending a treaty there should be a stopping of explosions. This is not a new idea. We have asked this for a very long time. There have been objections, sometimes from the Soviet Union, sometimes from the United States.

Now we come to the Soviet argument. I did not say what Mr. Zorin seems to have heard. Of course, we live in this mechanical world and I suppose that mechanical things are as imperfect as human beings that make them. I certainly did not say that the disarmament item was a cold war item. I said that to bring this into the discussion, to join it up with the discussion, would make it become a cold war procedure. And I said that equally in respect to both sides, both items, the one proposed by the United States, and the other favoured by the USSR. We do not say that one is right or that the other one is wrong, but we try to see it as it exists.

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What I said was that with all the annotation, with all the glosses that have been put on the so-called joint statement of Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev, there could be no question--and we have heard it from the United States--of having any kind of development on this for months, and so on.

If there is going to be a disarmament treaty tomorrow, I am prepared to withdraw the item at this moment. If Mr. Dean speaking for the United States, and Mr. Zorin, are able to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that within twenty - four hours they will come to an agreement, we will lock them up and they will come to an agreement on a disarmament agreement. Then I am prepared to withdraw this item. But that is not the position. We have been discussing disarmament for ten years. I read out to the Committee yesterday, with the Carnegie Foundation stamp, the tactics of "gamesmanship" that has been followed--what Bertrand Russell has called "a game of chicken".

Each one puts forward a document that looks very good, but with a little thorn in it somewhere what the other fellow cannot accept. Therefore it is rejected and they blame the other fellow for it. That has been going on for a long time. Ultimately sixteen countries submitted a resolution last year which we thought was very nearly going to be accepted, until various other considerations which do not have very much to do with the Assembly itself prevailed. But the resolution is kept in being and, as I said the other day, we were glad to see that the greater part of it is incorporated in this joint document. Therefore, we say that if it is discussed jointly with the disarmament item, jointly with the United States item and jointly

with the Irish item, there would be all these things arising.. For example, if it were discussed jointly with the Irish item, this problem would arise: Nuclear bombs are bad, nuclear weapons are bad, and if they are going to be bad; why should it be confined only to some countries? We would not ask that question. There are countries in the world which today have the capacity to make them and which have asked the question in the past and will ask it again.

Therefore, our Irish colleagues have rightly kept that item separately from all this trouble. Nobody has asked the question of the Irish delegation why they do not bring that here as well and have it taken all together. But why is this special treatment meted out to something which is so urgent, so important and which reflects the sentiments and the concerns of the millions of people in the world and, what is more, as I said the first day, which is within the competence of the General Assembly? The Assembly is competent to express that concern to the four nuclear Powers which are at the present moment capable of making those explosions, and are making them, or will make them, or are prepared or unprepared for them. Some people can make them without preparation, according to the statements; some people with preparation, wherever it is.

Now it is within our competence to do that and that is why we have intervened once again, and we make no apology for the time taken in this matter. I am quite certain that if this item is given priority and not mixed up with anything else, it will not be necessary to go into megacycles and thresholds and exploding on the moon and various other places where the Soviets and Americans go for their honeymoon these days, or to other planets, and so on. We could discuss this merely in terms of terror that faces the world, merely in terms of sentiments of all humanity.

It is in that vein that I make the appeal, I would not say without hope, but with faith. I still hope that the representatives in this Assembly will vote not only for the priority of this item but also for it being discussed separately. So far as we are concerned, we have already stated that item 4 should be discussed immediately after item 5, and therefore we are not able, for that reason and for other reasons, to join in the priority request of my colleague from Afghanistan. We similarly are opposed to the proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union. Although they seem as logical as the other one, we would oppose this logic because we do not approve of its character for the same reason that we oppose the other one.

Therefore, we submit that our acceptance of the first amendment of the United States has been recorded and I hope that Mr. Dean, since it is late in the evening and he is really a forgiving man, perhaps will now think I am not so intransigent. I have accepted one of his amendments and he can accept mine, and then we can get on. Tomorrow morning we can start the debate. I submit this in all sincerity, with all the earnestness at my command and with all the unreserved position of the Government of India, which does not want to detract from this position. We have given it very careful consideration. If

anything comes here from any delegation, and all the more from the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union--which are very closely connected to us in many ways, and which in this particular matter have so much

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concern--we do not brush it aside. We have looked at it from every point of view. Let it not be said about that as was said by a great English philosopher of the eighteenth century, the great Halifax "Ignorance leadeth a man into a party; shame prevents him from leaving it".

Do not let us be in that position. Do not let us take positions because we belong to this camp or because we belong to that camp. This is the camp of humanity. We are in the position where ninety-five megatons have been exploded, according to Mr. Dean, in a short time, and what is more, we have a promise from Mr. Dean that is not going to stop. We also have the promise from Mr. Khrushchev that he is producing them like sausages, and so on.

They had the power, we do not doubt it. Therefore, the only thing that can stop them--they cannot be stopped by other nuclear bombs, for one thing it only multiplies the evil, and nobody wants that anyway--the force of public opinion, not of a sanctionary character, not of a character which would bring any consequences upon them, but by the nature of civilized nations, of the character of Member States, or of our history in this quest.

Finally, may I say, so far as my delegation is concerned, the history of this matter has been such that every time a proposal has been made--from the very beginning when we wanted a suspension, there has been opposition. It has taken a long time. Normally speaking it takes seven years for an idea to get down to general acceptance. But unfortunately, we do not have seven years; we do not have seven months; probably we do not have seven days. Therefore, I appeal, Mr. Chairman, if I may say, with your permission, to all my colleagues, irrespective of their loyalties in this particular matter, that our recommendation should go forth. We have not said in this resolution anything that should militate against the idea of controls or anything of that character. It says at the end--I will leave out the preamble because I do not want to take any more of your time--it is not the resolution stage, I can only refer to it for the purpose of explanation:

"Expresses its deep concern and profound regret that test explosions have been resumed;" (A/C. 1/L. 283)

Now, is that not the unanimous opinion this Committee--that they have been resumed?

"Earnestly urges the Powers concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of the necessary agreements..."

(Ibid) Therefore, it means that this is past. Then we must do whatever we can to urge for the conclusion of the necessary agreements. It will be clear to us that whether it was April 1960 or September 1960 or previously, we will be able to study them with regard to the tests or general and complete disarmament.

Now, the representative from Greece made some intervention in regard to what I thought was that we were making some reservation about the binding character of international obligations. We did nothing of the kind. All I said was that in the draft treaty that is before you, there is a provision for people to contract out, that is to say, they stay in as long as they want to:

"This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the Treaty and its Annexes, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed."  
(GEN/DNT/110, Article 22, page 39)

All of you will recognize that in all these words in the last three lines there are so many problems involved that one or the other party can say, "We are not satisfied." Therefore, it is only goodwill, it is only unanimity, it is only confidence in each other, it is only the fact that explosions are not taking place and that preparations for them are not in being, that will bring them about. Therefore, while I would not say that a voluntary suspension is the same as a treaty of this character, I would certainly join issue when someone says, that there is nothing in a voluntary suspension, because you can suspend it today and break it up tomorrow. After all, it lasted for a considerable time and we are in this position today because there has been a violation of it. I have no doubt at all that the wisdom of the United States and of the Soviet Union will find a way of responding to the call of world public opinion.

INDIA USA SWITZERLAND RUSSIA FRANCE CANADA JAPAN NORWAY SENEGAL CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AUSTRIA GERMANY UNITED KINGDOM MEXICO MALDIVES DENMARK PERU MALI HUNGARY OMAN TOTO GREECE AFGHANISTAN

**Date :** Oct 20, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri C.S. Jha's Statement in General Assembly on the Death of Mr. Hammarskjold

Shri C.S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made the following

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statement in the General Assembly on Oct 26, 1961 on the tenation draft resolution for an international investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and members of the party accompanying him:

In the early hours of the morning of 18 September there was enacted a grave international tragedy. The aircraft carrying Day Hammarskjold, our Secretary-General, and members of his party, which were destined for Ndola, a town on the frontier between the Congo and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, failed to reach its destination and it was subsequently reported to have crashed causing the death of the Secretary-General and members of his party. The sole surviving member, a security guard, ultimately also died.

This news shocked and stunned the whole world. A tragedy of this magnitude would in any case have been taken to heart by the international community. But the tragedy was particularly deep and profound because it meant the loss of the executive head and chief administrative officer of the United Nations and of his very valuable and trusted colleagues who were engaged in a mission of peace. Mr. Hammarskjold and his party were trying to stop the difficult situation that had arisen in Katanga in which United Nations troops have been involved with the mercenaries and parts of the local gendarmarie.

The mission was motivated by the highest ideals of humidity and of peace. Mr. Hammarskjold and his trusted collaborators died in the cause of peace and in the cause of the United Nations.

As a matter of fact, the death of Mr. Hammarskjold was typical of the man; he died in harness, he died as he lived: in the cause of peace and dedication to the United Nations. Many tributes have been paid to Mr. Hammarskjold by statesmen of the world, by Parliaments, and by public opinion all over the world. This is not the time to repeat them here. My Government has paid the highest tributes to Mr. Hammarskjold and to the members of the United Nations who were lost in this mission of peace. A great servant of humanity, an international civil servant was lost to the world. In the death of Mr. Wieschhoff, Mr. Fabry and others who were outstanding international civil servants, the international Organization lost some of its most valuable workers who had struggled for many years in the cause of the United Nations. The martyrdom of Mr. Hammarskjold and of his trusted collaborators, we feel sure, will strengthen the roots and the sources of the United Nations and give it a strength and durability despite the temporary difficulties that that tragedy has created for the United Nations.

A tragedy of this nature is bound to deeply affect world public

opinion and the international community. This means that there is a certain international responsibility with regard to the ascertainment of the causes and circumstances of this tragedy. Since the concern is so deeply widespread in international character, we feel that there must be an international investigation. There is a responsibility for international investigation into this awful tragedy. We also feel that this responsibility properly belongs to the United Nations whose chief administrative officer Mr. Hammarskjold was, and for whose mission of peace he and others lost their lives. We, therefore, feel--and that is why we have co-sponsored this draft resolution (A/L. 356/Rev.1) with other Member States--that the United Nations must discharge its responsibility for an international investigation into all the circumstances of this great tragedy. This is a proper function of our Organization, and it is a function which we should undertake.

These are the motivations behind this draft resolution which is before the General Assembly. I should like to make it clear that this draft resolution has not been submitted in any spirit of conflict or contradiction with inquiries of a national nature that have been undertaken or may be undertaken with regard to this tragedy. The draft resolution itself in the fourth paragraph of its preamble notes that inquiries have been or are being conducted by Governments or parties concerned into the accident which caused the death of Mr. Hammarskjold and members of his party. We also feel that this international investigation has to be in the largest framework. It has to take into account all the circumstances preceding and related to the tragedy. It is necessary that the investigation should be on the broadest possible basis so that lessons should be drawn from it, so that there should be no repetition of these tragedies: and so that the United Nations might be fully prepared in the event of responsibilities of this nature coming to it to afford the maximum protection to its officials and others engaged in the implementation of its resolutions. We feel that far from there being any conflict, it is quite possible that there may be harmonization of mutual assistance between the international investigation, which is contemplated in this draft' resolution, and the various inquiries that may be going on or are being conducted at the present

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moment into the accident.

In operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution there have been detailed some of the circumstances to which particular attention might be given by the commission of investigation which this Assembly is requested to appoint in accordance with the terms of its draft resolution.

In operative paragraph 4 there is a blank. It is our view, which I hope will be shared by the other sponsors of the draft resolution, that the time given to the Commission should be three months from the date of its appointment.

Operative paragraph 5 states:

"Requests all Governments and parties concerned and the appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations to extend their full co-operation and assistance to the said Commission in making this investigation;"

This paragraph is very succinctly worded, but it is our hope and belief that all Governments--and I underline the word "all"--whether they are Members of the United Nations or not must render to this Commission every possible assistance and facilities of every kind. We would like to see a complete and unreserved co-operation by all Governments into this investigation.

There is one other point touched by the resolution, which in our view is also of great importance. We feel that it will be admitted by everyone that the United Nations owes it to its devoted civil servants to see that their families and dependants are not left stranded and are suitably remunerated or compensated in the event of tragedies overtaking their international civil servants in fulfilling missions of peace or otherwise implementing missions of the United Nations. That is why we have operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, which says:

"Decides to consider, in the appropriate Committee during the current session, the question of offering suitable remuneration to the families of the victims of this grave tragedy."

It is our hope that the Fifth Committee, after the adoption of this resolution, which we hope will receive unanimous support, will engage itself without delay in the consideration of operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution.

I would not wish to take more time of the General Assembly. This is a simple draft resolution. I have tried to explain its motivations. I would again emphasize that there is no conflict between any other inquiry that might be going on, but we feel that there is a great international responsibility on the United Nations which this body must discharge, a responsibility which I might say is really elementary and which follows necessarily from the fact that great responsibilities are coming to the United Nations by virtue of resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, and that the officials of the United Nations have to undertake missions of grave responsibility and often of grave risks.

My delegation hopes that this draft resolution will quickly receive the unanimous support of the General Assembly.

INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CONGO USA

**Date :** Oct 26, 1961

# Volume No

1995

## INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri B. N. Chakravarty's Statements in Political Committee on suspension of Nuclear tests

Shri B.N. Chakravarty, Indian High Commissioner in Canada, and Member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Political Committee on Oct 24, 1961 on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

I crave your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, and that of the Committee in intervening once again in this debate in further elucidation of my delegation's position with regard to the item under discussion.

On 20 October we submitted a revision of our draft resolution in document A/C.1/L. 283/ Rev. 1. During the brief recess in our debate we had given further thought to the text of this revised draft and, as we found it not to be entirely satisfactory, we have ventured to submit a further slight revision of that draft resolution the text of which is now before the Committee in document A/C. 1/L. 283/Rev. 2.

In the first revision we had used the expression "internationally binding obligations" in one or two places. On reflection, we feel that, with respect to the suspension or voluntary cessation of tests, internationally binding obligations already exist in the form of several resolutions adopted by the Assembly with an overwhelming majority of votes. These resolutions are referred to in the text of our draft resolution. What

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we are dealing with now is the breach of these obligations flowing from the General Assembly resolutions, first by one atomic Power and then by another.

It will be seen that this revised draft has been co-sponsored with us by Ghana, Nepal and the United Arab Republic. I am glad to inform the Committee that Ethiopia has also joined us in submitting this draft resolution for the Committee's consideration and approval.

I should like to take this opportunity of making a brief observation on the numerous comments made by the representative of the United States yesterday concerning the statement made by my delegation.

Mr. Dean referred to the so-called inaccuracies in our statement.

What we said is a matter of record and it was very largely based on authentic documentation available in this country, as well as in the Soviet Union. Mr. Dean may not agree with our point of view or with our interpretation, but that is a different matter. At a later stage we may perhaps get a further opportunity to refer to this matter. There are, however, one or two things on which I wish to comment briefly right away.

Mr. Dean said:

"The main fallacy, which I personally regret very much, is Mr. Menon's attempt to equate the United States, which observed the moratorium and did not prepare for testing, with the Soviet Union, which broke the moratorium and did prepare for nuclear weapons testing." (A/C. 1/PV. 1174, page 17)

This statement, to say the least, is a misinterpretation of what the chairman of my delegation had said. We have made no attempt to equate one country with another. All we have attempted is to present the facts as they appear to us. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union had prepared for the current series of tests. The fact that, soon after, the United States resumed underground tests would seem to indicate that preparations for underground testing had been under way for some time--unless, of course, it is urged that underground testing can be resumed without any preparation. If that is so, I submit, the situation is most dangerous.

Mr. Dean also said that Project VELA was being carried out with the entire consent of the Soviet Government. We are not aware of any such consent, and perhaps the representative of the Soviet Union might throw some light on this matter. All that we know from the records of the proceedings of the Geneva discussions is that there was agreement at one time that some underground tests might be carried out under the joint supervision and control of the negotiating Powers. But when preparations actually got under way for the conduct of these tests, the United States did not agree to the Soviet Union taking part in the control and supervision of the nuclear part of this series of tests.

Again, we have it on the authority of what has appeared in the newspapers in this country that several of these tests are intended for the refinement of weapons. If either the reports of the Geneva discussion or the published statements in this country are inaccurate it is for the appropriate authorities to correct them. Our submission is that all these events represent a drift towards an uninhibited nuclear arms race which might well lead us to disaster. Our desire is to stop that drift.

The Soviet Union has announced the intention of exploding a fifty-megaton device. The representative of the United States of America said on 19 October:

"Unless something is done quickly the Soviet testing will necessarily

result in further testing by my country, and perhaps by others."  
(A/C.1/PV.1171, p. 2)

And he added:

"...unless a treaty can be signed, and signed promptly, the United States has no choice but to prepare and to take the action necessary to protect its own security and that of the world community." (Ibid., p. 3-5)

It is this frightful contest that our draft resolution seeks immediately to bring to a halt.

I have already briefly indicated why we are opposed to a request by the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution submitted in document A/C.1/L.288 on 20 October 1961 that priority should be given to their proposal over our draft resolution, which was tabled earlier, which is also an emergency draft resolution and which, in our humble submission, is much more comprehensive and goes to the roots of the great problem we are dealing with. We adhere to

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that position and we are constrained to oppose that request for priority. This Committee and the General Assembly have in the past expressed themselves unequivocally against all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. The subject matter of the eight-Power draft resolution is one particular test contemplated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Admittedly, the contemplated explosion is of unprecedented size and poses fallout and other dangers of a special magnitude. But by limiting an appeal to this particular test this Committee and the Assembly will be inadvertently sanctioning or condoning tests of smaller magnitude below the fifty-megaton range. In so doing the Assembly will be going back on its previous resolutions, and that is a situation which my delegation cannot view with equanimity.

It was precisely because of our desire to prevent a further pollution of the atmosphere that India had proposed a draft resolution appealing for immediate suspension of all tests. Again, it was because we did not want any delay in the adoption of our draft resolution that we not only sought priority for this item but also pressed for a separate discussion. The United States of America and the United Kingdom would not have any moratorium without a proper treaty, and the USSR would not have any moratorium except as a part of general and complete disarmament. After prolonged discussions the Committee decided to give the Indian item first priority, but only on condition that it would be discussed jointly with the United States-United Kingdom item listed as item 4 in document A/C.1/844. We deplore the delay that has already taken place because of the decision to have a joint discussion. A simultaneous discussion of the two items has naturally led to long arguments back and forth. If the Indian draft resolution is passed immediately we may even now achieve

the objective of the eight-Power draft resolution and more.

We are no less alarmed at the prospects of the explosion of a fifty-megaton device, and we are opposed to it as we are to all nuclear tests. As my Prime Minister has repeatedly made clear, we are opposed to any nuclear tests, however exploded, above or under ground, under water or in outer space, and no matter by whom. Our deep concern and regret at the resumption of tests by the USSR were expressed in no uncertain terms by my Prime Minister at Belgrade and in Moscow itself. This very morning I have seen a Reuter message from which it appears that my Prime Minister, only last night, had appealed for the big Powers to end their nuclear tests, and he was very much upset to find from the newspapers the regrettable news that a terrible bomb has been exploded.

For all these reasons we have been pressing for an urgent consideration of our item. Everybody agrees that there has already been an enormous increase in radioactivity, and this is an actual danger which is increasing every day as a result of the currently continuing tests. We want to stop this, but we are being repeatedly told that our draft resolution would be ineffective. The representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom made it quite clear during the discussion that they could never agree to a suspension of nuclear tests without a treaty under effective international control. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has emphasized that it is not prepared to consider suspension of nuclear tests except as part of a treaty on general and complete disarmament covering the point. Neither side was, therefore, in favour of an immediate adoption of our draft resolution urging the nuclear Powers to refrain from further test explosions, even as a preliminary step pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements with regard to tests or general and complete disarmament. France, regrettably, has preferred to stand in atomic isolation and did not consider itself in any way bound to observe the voluntary moratorium.

The views of the nuclear Powers have thus been made abundantly clear. So where do we, the non-nuclear Powers, stand? Why should we not discharge our moral responsibility by expressing world opinion against nuclear tests in clear, unequivocal terms by appealing to the nuclear Powers to stop all tests immediately pending the conclusion of a treaty under effective international control, as desired by the United States and the United Kingdom, and pending general and complete disarmament as desired by the USSR? We fully realize that we can only appeal, and that unless the nuclear Powers themselves agree there is no way of preventing them from conducting these tests. That, however, is no reason why we should not try to see if the nuclear Powers respond to this appeal or not. We still like to believe that the nuclear Powers cannot be entirely insensitive to an appeal to this august body which reflects public opinion of the entire world. Indeed, the very opposition of our draft resolution by all the nuclear Powers seems to indicate that no one would willingly ignore such appeals.

It has been argued--and it was again reiterated by Mr. Dean yesterday--that the Indian draft resolution is ineffective as it asks for an

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uncontrolled moratorium. Any assertion that India wants only an uncontrolled moratorium is to say the least, an unfair presentation of our case. As will be clearly seen from our draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev. 2) we do not say that that is all we want. In the operative paragraphs the draft resolution states the following:

"Earnestly urges the Powers concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to tests or general and complete disarmament;

"Calls upon the Powers concerned to engage themselves with urgency and speed in the necessary efforts to conclude such agreements expeditiously."

This will make it clear--as we have repeatedly stated on many previous occasions--that we are not opposed to a treaty for effective international control or to general and complete disarmament. We do not and cannot, however, accept the proposition that suspension of nuclear tests must await the conclusion of a treaty. We feel that these latter objections, eminently desirable as they are, will take some time to achieve. If, on the other hand, the optimism of the representative of the United States is justified and there is no reason why a nuclear test ban treaty with effective controls cannot be signed within thirty days, why should there be so much objection to a moratorium for this short period?

In accordance with the operative paragraphs of our draft resolution, the Powers concerned may resume negotiations with a view to conclude a treaty urgently. Tests, at least the bigger ones, cannot, fortunately, be conducted surreptitiously, though preparation for tests can be made surreptitiously. Since such preparations take a long time no great risk could be involved in moratorium if a treaty with proper controls can follow it in thirty days. We do believe that a moratorium will create a climate more favourable towards the conclusion of the necessary agreements for the purpose in view.

If this Committee still feels that an appeal for an immediate suspension of all tests is not likely to be heeded by the nuclear Powers, I would respectfully request the Committee to carefully consider if there is any good reason to believe that an appeal not to explode a 50-megaton device is more likely to be listened to. Assuming for argument's sake that the USSR does agree not to explode a 50-megaton device but explodes instead a 49-megaton device or several 20, 30 or 44-megaton devices, should that satisfy us? The resulting pollution of the atmosphere would be just as great or may

be even greater.

We cannot, therefore, be satisfied with anything less than a complete suspension of all kinds of nuclear tests. That alone will stop further intensification of atomic hazards. Also, it may not be possible to check with absolute accuracy whether a particular test explosion is of the order of 50 megaton or 49. The difficulty of accurate checks may give rise to further unnecessary controversies, one party claiming that the tests explosion was less than 50 megatons and another challenging the statement. If there is a stoppage of all tests, no matter of what magnitude, no such controversy is likely to arise. The fact that there has been an explosion in some part of the world can be detected with a fair degree of accuracy. The detection of any explosion would show who is insensitive to this general appeal.

In a speech on 20 October, the representative of Cyprus gave the impression as if the only point for consideration is the degree of imminence as between the declared intention of the USSR to explode a 50-megaton device and that of the United States to reserve the right to resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere. I submit that the question is not merely what is more imminent, but also how to stop the tests which are currently being conducted', the atmospheric ones by the USSR and the underground ones by the United States of America.

Unless the current series of tests are immediately discontinued, atomic hazards will go on increasing. Are we to stop only the imminent potential danger and do nothing about the actual continuing danger? An appeal to only one Power, and that in respect of only one particular type of explosion, is a very limited appeal indeed. A resolution of this nature' if adopted, is likely to give the impression that this world body is condoning the smaller test explosions--any number of them. That certainly cannot be the intention. Our objection is not merely that the appeal is only to one nuclear Power, but that it is directed only against a particular type of explosion, leaving all nuclear Powers completely free to conduct any kind of test explosions below the 50-megaton range. We want to make it absolutely clear that we remain firm in our opposition--complete and unequivocal--to all kinds of tests, small or large, at all times and under all circumstances.

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I should like to conclude by appealing to my fellow representatives here once again not to act in a way which would express our fear or disapproval of only one kind of atomic weapons or tests and which might be construed as our tacit consent to an arms race in atomic weapons of another calibre or size. Let us unanimously declare here and now that we are totally opposed to all kinds of tests in all environments at any time or place. For, they are all conducted for one purpose, the development of new and more destructive weapons.

I would, therefore, earnestly urge this Committee once again to adopt

our draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2) without any further delay. It would be extremely unfortunate if the Committee does not find it possible to grant priority to our draft resolution which is more comprehensive than the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288/Rev. 1) with a limited and unilateral appeal.

Lest there should be any misunderstanding, let me, however, make it clear that the acceptance by the eight co-sponsors of our amendment removes some of the objections we had to their draft resolution. I might add that while we insist on priority for our draft resolution, the appeal therein begin more effective and universal, we would raise no objection to the eight-Power draft resolution in its revised form. So far as we are concerned, this draft resolution can be voted upon today, at this meeting, which may be prolonged as necessary, immediately after and along with our own draft resolution.

Following is the text of the statement Shri Chakravarty made on October 27, 1961:

The day before yesterday, I was happy to note that the United States and United Kingdom delegations voted for the eight-Power draft resolution appealing to the Soviet Union not to carry out the 50-megaton test. One of their main objections to our draft resolution had been that mere appeals are not likely to be heeded and that a General Assembly resolution urging suspension of tests is likely to be disregarded by the Soviet Union whenever it suits the Soviet Union to do so. The vote by the United States and United Kingdom delegations in support of this appeal naturally led me to think that they might now have changed their views on the utility of a mere appeal. After the appeal which we made the day before yesterday to the Soviet Union in respect of only 50-megaton tests, would it not be completely illogical still to persist in the erroneous belief that an appeal by this world body to all nuclear Powers to suspend immediately all nuclear tests, whatever their nature and size, is not likely to succeed?

Any proposal to delay the adoption of our appeal means that an appeal made to the Soviet Union alone is more likely to succeed, even though it violated the General Assembly resolutions urging the suspension of all tests. Are we to understand that other nuclear Powers would be more insensitive to our appeals, just as France has disregarded all such appeals, including the one specially directed to it in resolution 1379 (XIV)? Or is it the suggestion that the conscience of the world is roused only by the harmful effects of a 50-megaton test, and not by other tests of a smaller magnitude?

The United States representative has charged us with having equated a 50-kiloton underground test with a 50-megaton test in the atmosphere. I should like to say that if equation means that we are equally opposed to both, we certainly plead guilty. Our draft resolution is not directed merely against the 50-kiloton underground test by the United States: it is also directed against the currently continuing tests conducted by the Soviet Union. We have also been charged with

not having criticized the Soviet Union as much as we have criticized the United States of America. But may I point out that, had our draft resolution not been blocked by tying it up with a joint debate on the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution, it could have been adopted a long time ago--perhaps, indeed, some weeks ago.

If the Committee had promptly adopted our resolution, for which we have been pressing from the very beginning of the session, it would have prevented the Soviet Union from conducting most of the present series of tests; that is, of course, assuming that the USSR would be amenable to world appeal, as we have always urged, and which is now also apparently hoped for by the United States and the United Kingdom. How would it have affected the United States? Our resolution would only have prevented them from conducting the fifty-kiloton underground tests, against the USSR conducting what is now believed to be upto thirty megaton range tests. Mr. Chairman, I ask you if this indicates our partiality for the Soviet Union? Our resolution, if passed promptly, would have been more embarrassing for the USSR. Not knowing enough about nuclear testing we cannot be quite sure, but we are told that a few tests are not of much use unless the whole series is completed, ff that is correct, the United

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States and United Kingdom should have supported our request for adoption of our resolution on an emergency basis. If the USSR disregarded the appeal, the United States and United Kingdom would have been on perhaps a stronger ground in justifying the resumption of tests, even though we might have continued to beg of them not to resume tests. Instead, they have chosen to take every possible step to prevent or delay our resolution being adopted. We can understand the Soviet Union opposing our resolution, as it has indeed done, since the adoption of that resolution would have been most embarrassing for them. We cannot, however, understand the reason for so much opposition to our resolution being adopted by the United States and United Kingdom. The opposition to immediate consideration of our proposal can only mean that other tests do not matter, even though the cumulative effects of so many tests may be much more serious than even a fifty-megaton test.

The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that they had had to take special measures to avoid the deleterious effect on milk supply. May I ask, is it because of the intended fifty-megaton explosion, or because of the currently continuing tests, that the milk is poisoned? It is, therefore, logical for the United Kingdom to join us in our appeal to all nuclear States to stop any kind of test. The possibility that an appeal may be disregarded did not stand in the way of their supporting the eight-Power resolution. May I earnestly appeal that this consideration should not deter them from agreeing to urgent consideration of our item either.

The Parliament of Norway has been more consistent. They have not referred to the fifty megaton test at all. I would seek your

permission Sir, to quote from the statement which has been circulated to us:

"The decision of the Government of the Soviet Union to resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere has created a profound disappointment and caused serious apprehensions about what the future might hold. Continued tests with nuclear weapons will elicit deep anxiety and indignation..."

It continues:

"The Parliament of Norway, therefore, considers it a right and a duty to protect and warn against further violations of universal ethics, which condemn nuclear weapons tests". (A/C.1/849)

Now what is after all our resolution? What does it propose? I crave your indulgence to quote the operative paragraphs:

"Expresses its deep concern and profound regret that test explosions have been resumed;"

Can there be any objection to that?

"Earnestly urges the Powers concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to tests or general and complete disarmament;"

Can there be any objection to that either?

"Calls upon the Powers concerned to engage themselves with urgency and speed in the necessary efforts, to conclude such agreements expeditiously." (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2)

May I submit that we have had enough discussion on this subject. No further discussion of this simple and straightforward resolution is needed. To oppose the immediate adoption of our resolution would perhaps give some basis for the charge, made by certain delegates the day before yesterday, that this appeal was made only as a political move.

INDIA USA CANADA GHANA NEPAL ETHIOPIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SWITZERLAND  
RUSSIA YUGOSLAVIA FRANCE PERU CYPRUS NORWAY

**Date :** Oct 24, 1961

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Vice-President's Welcome Speech at State Banquet

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Speaking at the banquet given in honour of the President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Aleksander Zawadzki, at Rashtrapati Bhawan on Oct 11, 1961, the Vice-President, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, said:

Mr. President, Your Excellencies, Ladies and

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Gentlemen, I extend to you, Mr. President, a very hearty welcome on behalf of the Government and the people of this country. In the latter category I include myself.

The Prime Minister visited your country in 1955; I was there in 1956, and we had a very friendly enthusiastic reception at your hands. We remember these things with great gratitude. I hope that in the few days you are here you will see something of the work which we are doing. Your country in the last war suffered great losses in property, in human life, but with great determination, enterprise and skill you are rebuilding your nation. We are also doing the same thing and trying to tackle our problems, problems which face underdeveloped people.

As you mentioned this evening, both our countries are interested in the maintenance of peace. But when you look at the world around, you are sometimes disheartened. The resumption of nuclear tests by the great powers which know that in war the use of nuclear weapons will be annihilation; even in peace they will have harmful effects and lead to a slow decay of the quality of the human race--many people who are frightened by these things feel benumbed sometimes and do not wish to express themselves openly their opposition to these things. We comfort ourselves by saying that things have been like this all these days, will continue to be so and there is nothing which human beings can do. This belief in human impotence is an illusion. If human beings had not exerted their will, their courage, their imagination, we would still be living in the prehistoric times like savages living in caves.

We have made tremendous progress and it is possible for human beings, if they only assert themselves, to bring about a change in human relations. We can darken the future or illumine the future. What we do depends on ourselves, on the way in which we are able to resist the forces which sometimes threaten to stifle us. All human progress has been a succession of battles against fatality, and conquests for freedom. That is very necessary even today. We should now assert ourselves and say that what the great powers are doing is something which is injurious to themselves and to the human race.

You referred this evening to the policy which this country has adopted, the policy of peaceful co-existence. Peaceful co-existence means respect for all nations. We must give dignity to every nation in the world. We should not delude ourselves into the thought that we are ardent leaders of mankind, that we are educators of the human race and that all people should adopt what we believe. That kind of satisfied virtue will not take us far in the present situation. Having suffered yourself in the last war, I have no doubt that you are as anxious as any other people in this world to do everything possible to bring some sanity and humanity into international relations. In this great effort you may rest assured that you will have our whole-hearted co-operation and support.

May I now ask you to raise your glasses to the health of His Excellency the President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic?

POLAND USA

**Date** : Oct 11, 1961

## Volume No

1995

POLAND

Polish President's Reply

Replying to the speech of the Vice-President, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Aleksander Zawadzki, Said:

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Indian Friends, I would first of all thank Your Excellency the President for the kind and hospitable reception which has been accorded to me and to those accompanying me on the Indian soil.

I understand that by this cordial reception you would like to express your sentiments, the sentiments of the Indian people towards the people of Poland.

It is our deep and sincere intention that our present visit to India will continue still further to strengthening of the already existing ties of friendship between our two countries and our two nations.

As we already said this afternoon, there were already exchanges of visits between leading statesmen of our countries. We have had the honour of playing host to Prime Minister Nehru and to you, Your

Excellency.

On such occasions during such meetings, as is generally the practice, both sides are exchanging opinions and informations on their achievements on their shortcomings and they are also informing each other about the problems which are facing their respective countries. And of course besides exchanging views and opinions on

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bilateral problems and problems of mutual interest, mutual relations, it is also a necessity under the present conditions to exchange opinions on some international issues and questions.

We could say that both our countries know something about the respective ways along which we move forward towards development, think out something about the shortcomings, about the successes and about the difficulties. And I also think that both our Governments are informed and acquainted about their respective attitudes on problems which are of interest to all nations.

One of such problems which is facing today all countries and all nations is the question of preservation of peace and the question of maintenance of peace.

We should really have a look and see what forces are gaining preponderance today in the world, those forces who are striving to stabilise and strengthen peace or those forces who are ready rather to unleash another World War.

Are those forces gaining the upper hand which would like to push back the wheels of history and to stop mankind on its road to progress or those forces which go forward and which look into the future, into a better and prosperous future for all mankind?

That is, I think, why we should be vigilant and why we should keep a watch, why we should try to prevent further development of those forces which would like to turn the humanity from the road of progress, which would like to halt the wheels of history and to stop our development.

On the occasion of your visits to Poland, Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, we had already the opportunity of telling you what is the most pressing problem for the Polish people.

We think that the main problem for all nations is the question of general and complete disarmament, the successful implementation of which could safeguard peace all over the world.

Along side this general and complete disarmament we seek the complete cessation of all nuclear tests.

An attempt to separate those two problems, as the practice has shown,

has not given positive results.

You, Sir, in your statement mentioned the activities of great powers. In our country, basing upon the present state of international state, we distinguish various kinds of great powers. There are among them the imperialist powers aiming at maintenance or restoration of the old colonial system. And there are socialists and peaceful great powers among them.

The Soviet Union has recently resumed nuclear tests. We of Poland, the nation which is striving for peace, have approved of this decision of the Soviet Union.

As we have read in the official Soviet communique, this decision by the Soviet Government was taken with heavy heart and it is equally with a heavy heart that we have supported and concurred in this.

Now please allow me to explain this attitude of ours.

You mentioned in your speech that we of Poland, we suffered heavy damages and casualties during this last War. I will add that those victims numbered about six millions, including millions of children and women. And those millions died at the hands of Nazis. And the attention of the whole Polish people is nowadays concentrated upon the present trend of developments in Western Germany.

We see that they are rebuilding themselves with the help of imperialist great Powers and they are equipping themselves with missiles and official representatives of the German Federal Government demand nuclear weapons.

They put forward revisionist, militarist and revanchist claims and they demand the change of frontiers of Germany including the change of Polish frontier, the change of the Oder Neisse Line, the change of the frontiers of Czechoslovakia and other neighbours. Basing on our own experience you might easily guess why they need nuclear weapons and what would be the use they would make of them.

In this far-off Europe where we are situated in the Central Europe we are faced with the German problem. As you know, as a result of the Nazi defeat following the Second World War there was established two German States. We see the solution of the German problem in the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German States. And if one of those countries, namely, the German Federal Republic will refuse to sign a treaty and if the signing of the treaty would be refused by the Western Powers, we go on with the signing of a peace treaty with the German Democratic

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Republic. It is on the basis of this treaty that we see the solution of West Berlin as a free and demilitarised city.

I would not like to go into detail now, but I would tell you what was the situation in West Berlin and what threat this city presented to peace. Anyhow, the situation which we were facing in West Berlin was the situation dangerous to peace.

The solution of the German problem including the final recognition of the German frontier, the Oder Neisse Line, the solution of the question of West Berlin will safeguard world peace and will allow us to prevent another world conflagration.

We would like to convince as great a number of our friends all over the world as possible. We are a people who have suffered such terrible destruction and casualties. Therefore we would like to convince our friends about the real situation.

And when we speak about big Powers, when the proposal with regard to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany was put forward and also the proposal on the settlement of West Berlin question as a free city, the Western Powers mobilise their troops and get into manoeuvres and troop movements, and they openly increase their garrisons in West Berlin which of course tend to aggravate the situation still further.

And consequently we who form the camp of Socialist States were forced to take certain measures which would prevent the danger which has been created by the Western action.

As you all know, alongside with our steps we continued our selfless and tireless efforts in order to establish and maintain contacts with our counterparts to conduct negotiations, to look for ways of agreement, to look for peaceful solutions by negotiations of all those problems on which hinge the fate of not only Europe but of the world as a whole.

It seems to me that we can state with satisfaction today that certain results have already been achieved along this road. But this is by no means sufficient and our further efforts and our further action is needed. Well, I have put these problems in the way I did.

Now let me say that India counts as one of the great non-aligned countries but at the same time non-passive. The proof of it is that we have had the statements made by Prime Minister Nehru on a number of problems which are of particular interest to Us, and we are deeply grateful for these statements that you made on those problems, Mr. Prime Minister.

We are striving for strengthening the forces of peace and reducing international tensions. We also see the understanding shown for our people who were terribly afflicted during the last War. We also see in this the realistic appraisal of the situation in the present world.

We would like that in this consistent and untiring fight for struggle

for peace our numbers and our ranks should constitute the greatest number so that we might all look for proper and just solutions of the problems confronting us and save the mankind from all possible disaster.

We can of course state that we have certain achievements, but we cannot say that we have sufficient safeguards that the future development of events will be only towards peace and we must not think that there are no forces which are incapable of any action or initiative.

To end my few remarks I would like to say that we of Poland evaluate positively our cordial relations with India, that we wish for a further and all round development of those relations between our two countries and we would like to see this co-operation in all fields, economic, cultural and other fields. We wish to develop this co-operation both in our bilateral relations and in the various international forums. We would also like the further strengthening of our mutual understanding and the similarities of our attitudes on a number of problems. I am afraid that I do not have time really to present to you all those problems which have been mentioned. Still I think even within the shortest possible time which is available to us we should have the opportunity to refer to those problems once again.

We would like to have good understanding of all the problems and develop our mutual relations, because we see the great role played by India not only in Asia, not only among the so-called non-aligned countries but also in the world as such. We see the great role of India in the shaping of international policies, in solving international problems. And I think it will be correct to say that both Vice-President Radhakrishnan and Prime Minister Nehru have not been in Poland for a long time. Five or six years have elapsed since their visits, which is a long span of time. In five or six years a number of things have happened. Many new things have happened and many developments have taken place in our country, in Poland. Also we find that the German problem has arisen. So many new developments

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have taken place since then. So, we have to take all those things into consideration.

And now, may I be allowed to raise this toast to the health of the President of India?

POLAND INDIA USA GERMANY NORWAY SLOVAKIA

**Date :** Oct 11, 1961

**Volume No**

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1995

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POLAND

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Joint Communiqué

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At the conclusion of the Polish President's four-day visit to India, an official communiqué was issued in New Delhi on Oct 14, 1961

The following is the full text of the communiqué:

On the invitation of the Government of India, the President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, Aleksander Zawadzki, accompanied by Julian Tokarski, Deputy Prime Minister, Mariam Nazkowski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mrs. Alicja Musialowa, Member of the Council of State, as well as by a group of advisers, paid a visit to India from October 11 to 14, 1961.

During his stay the President had a friendly exchange of views with Vice-President Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, on the current international situation and on questions of mutual interest to both countries.

The President and the Prime Minister of India agreed that, in the present difficult situation which involves the danger of war, every country should direct its efforts to the easing of international tension to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. They welcomed in this connection the recent exploratory talks between the representatives of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. They expressed the hope that ways and means of arriving at a negotiated peaceful settlement on the questions in regard to Germany and West Berlin will be found on the basis of existing practical realities.

The President expressed the satisfaction of the Polish people at the statement of the Prime Minister of India on the question of recognition of the Polish Oder-Neisse frontier.

The President and the Prime Minister of India exchanged views on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. They expressed the hope that the informal discussions now going on and the discussions in the current session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on various proposals, including the Polish proposal for an atom-free zone in Central Europe, would result in further constructive steps towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament. The President voiced the position of the Polish Government that the question of nuclear tests should be part of general and complete disarmament. The Prime Minister, however, was of the opinion that nuclear tests should not be conducted.

The President and the Prime Minister of India agreed that immediate measures should be taken to end colonialism and racial discrimination

and to assist under-developed areas in their economic and social progress in freedom and independence.

The President and the Prime Minister of India exchanged views on the progress being made at the Geneva Conference on Laos and on the negotiations between the Princes in Laos and expressed the hope that the Laotian problem will be settled on the basis of a neutral, united and independent Laos.

The President and the Prime Minister of India expressed their deep satisfaction at the increasing understanding and friendship between Poland and India at the development of cooperation in the economic and cultural fields between the two countries. They further expressed their gratification at the friendly exchange of views that took place between them on questions of interest to both countries. They are confident that the visit of the President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic will further strengthen the friendly relations that exist between the two countries.

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POLAND INDIA USA GERMANY LAOS SWITZERLAND

**Date :** Oct 14, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Protocol extending Trade Agreement Signed

An official U.A.R. Delegation of six members led by H.E. Mr. H.K. Hamdi, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy & Treasury, Cairo, which arrived in India on Sep 27, 1961 held discussions with the Government of India to review the trade between the two countries regulated by a Trade Agreement which has been in force since July 8, 1953.

As a result of the discussions a fresh Protocol further extending the Trade Agreement was signed in New Delhi on October 18, 1961 by the two Governments. The Protocol provides for both the Governments to endeavour to attain an increased level of trade between the two countries on a balanced basis, the payments for all current transactions being in convertible currency unless otherwise agreed to between the two Governments. The schedules attached to the existing Agreement have been replaced by new schedules covering a wider range of commodities available for import and export.

In the Protocol provision has also been made for the two Governments to accord facilities for holding of exhibitions, fairs, etc.

EGYPT INDIA USA

**Date :** Sep 27, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Indo-U.S. Loan Agreement Signed

The Governments of India and the United States on Oct 26, 1961, signed an agreement covering an American loan of 820 million (Rs. 9.5 crores) to India for the import of nonferrous metals.

The agreement was signed by Shri L.K. Jha, Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, and Mr. John Kenneth Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador.

The loan will be channelled through the U.S. Development Loan Fund. Like all other credits by the Development Loan Fund to India, it is repayable in rupees.

The loan will help in making full use of the additional industrial capacities created in India in recent years and will be utilised in the United States for procurement of aluminium, copper and zinc. Much of the metal will be processed into final form at plants in India. Resulting products will be used mainly on projects in the fields of power, transportation and communication.

The non-ferrous metals to be procured are needed to meet objectives in the first year of the Third Five Year Plan. The major part of the imports will be used in the fabrication of electrical equipment, such as, transformers, motors, generators, switchgear and overhead lines for Railway electrification and also in the manufacture of machinery components for chemical, sugar, tea, paper, automobile and storage battery industries.

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USA INDIA RUSSIA

**Date :** Oct 26, 1961

## November

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HUNGARY USA INDIA CONGO SOUTH AFRICA PORTUGAL PAKISTAN JAPAN CHINA POLAND  
EGYPT

**Date :** Nov 01, 1961

## Volume No

1995

HUNGARY

### Agreement on peaceful uses of Atomic Energy

India and Hungary have agreed to collaborate in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. In letters exchanged between Dr. H.J. Bhabha, Chairman, Indian Atomic Energy Commission, and Mr. Antal Apro, Chairman, Hungarian National Atomic Energy Commission, it has been agreed that the two countries will:

- (1) exchange information concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy, except information of a secret nature or information obtained from, or developed in collaboration with a third party;
- (2) arrange for the visit of scientists as may be mutually agreed from time to time;
- (3) arrange for the sale or lease of materials and equipment as may be mutually agreed from time to time;
- (4) cooperate with each other in the implementation of such joint projects as may be mutually agreed from time to time; and
- (5) offer two fellowships each on a reciprocal basis for the training or visits of scientists in subjects as may be mutually agreed.

This agreement will be in force for a period of five years in the first instance, and may be renewed from time to time for such period as the two parties mutually agree.

The proposal for such an agreement was first mooted when Dr. Bhabha and Shri P.N. Thapar Member for Finance and Administration, Atomic

Energy Commission, visited Hungary in May, 1959, in response to an invitation from the Vice-President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Later, two Hungarian metallurgists visited the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay in order to see the plant and process for making atomically pure Uranium.

HUNGARY USA INDIA

**Date :** Nov 01, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### Prime Minister's Address to the General Assembly

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Nov 10, 1961

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished delegates:

It is a little over a year now since I had the honour of addressing this great Assembly. In the course of this year much has happened and this Organisation, which represents the world community, has faced many crisis and among these crisis has been the tragic death of the late Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold who, during the many years of his high office, shaped to some extent the working of this Assembly and enlarged its functions. I would like to pay my tribute and my homage to the memory of Mr. Hammarskjold. To you, Sir, who occupy now this high seat of the Secretary-General, I offer my warm welcome and regard and greetings. And I can assure you that we, in common with others, not only welcome you here but offer you our full co-operation, for you represent the United Nations, to which all of us must offer co-operation.

These last years of difficulty and crisis have brought out more than ever before the importance of this organisation. Indeed, one wonders what the world would be like if the United Nations ceased to be or did not function. Therefore, it is of the highest importance that this great organization should not only function but should function with effectiveness and with the support of the countries represented here. I hope that under your guidance, Mr. Secretary-General, the United Nations will advance from strength to strength and will serve the cause of the peace of the world and the cause of removing the remnants of foreign domination from various parts of this world.

The General Assembly and the Security Council took many steps in the

last year or more in regard to these matters and thereby somewhat

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They must represent all the members of this United Nations in this great body. But I do think that it is better for those countries--a few of them--to deal with this problem rather than for a larger body to deal with it to begin with. I feel rather strongly on this question although we in India are not situated in the major theatres of a possible war--probably not. Nevertheless, I feel that everything that man has striven for in the past thousands of years is at stake today. As strongly as I feel about these colonial matters, about the freedom of colonial countries and others, I do think that the major question and the biggest question today is this question of war and peace and disarmament. There is no conflict between those.

In fact, the whole atmosphere of the world will change if disarmament comes in and these present problems go towards solution. How then are we to do it? I do not know. The president was good enough to refer to the wisdom of the East or to my wisdom. It was kind of him to make that reference to me, but I possess no greater wisdom than each one of us here. Only perhaps in some matters, some of us may feel a little more, some of us who have experienced many ups and downs in their lives may think more deeply about them. But it is wisdom that we want, it is the common wisdom that should come to everyone. It is no mystery. In the problems before us there are no mysteries. They are obvious problems, and the fear of war is obvious. The fear that grips mankind is obvious. How can we go on dealing with the secondary questions of the world, discussing them, etc., when this basic problem deludes us? As a part of this question of disarmament there is the particular question today of nuclear tests. The General Assembly passed a resolution recently about them. It was, I think, a great misfortune that after a period of abstinence from nuclear tests there was a resumption. There can be no doubt that that turned the attention of the world in a wrong direction, apart from the harm it might do. Immediately the idea of a possible war became more prevalent. Immediately it became more difficult to have treaties for ending nuclear tests because while treaties are essential, are necessary for this, when the whole atmosphere becomes one of fear and apprehension, it becomes more difficult to get a treaty. I do think, and I would beg the countries, concerned to realize, that they are doing a grave disservice to the world, to their countries even by not putting an end to this business of nuclear tests and putting an end to it by treaty as rapidly as possible.

The Assembly has passed a resolution in favour of some kind of moratorium. No one imagines that a voluntary moratorium is going to solve this question. There must be stricter controls by treaty and otherwise. But while that should be aimed at and worked for and achieved as rapidly as possible, one should not leave the door open, while you discuss it, for these nuclear tests to go on. Arguments may be raised that one party or one country gets an advantage over the other and these arguments may have substance. Yet my own reaction to

these nuclear tests is a very strong one. I think they are basically evil. They encourage evil. Therefore, the sooner this evil is dealt with the better.

I cannot suggest any rapid or magic ways of dealing with the problems of the world. But I find that perhaps the worse difficulty we have to face is something you cannot grip, An atmosphere, the imponderables of life, how people are suddenly filled with fear, passion and hatred. How can we deal with them? We live in this world of conflicts and yet the world goes on, undoubtedly because of the co-operation of nations and individuals. The essential thing about this world is co-operation, and even today, between countries which are opposed to each other in the political or other fields, there is a vast amount of co-operation. Little is known, or little is said about this co-operation that is going on, but a great deal is said about every point of conflict, and so the world is full of this idea that the conflicts go on and we live on the verge of disaster. Perhaps it would be a truer picture if the co-operating elements in the world today were put forward and we were made to think that the world depends on co-operation and not on conflict.

A proposal has been made by various people to the effect that more attention should be directed to these co-operative ventures, especially for peace and in the interest of peace, so that more positive thinking may take place on this subject and people should realize that this co-operation is already taking place and it can be extended. Some years ago it was resolved to have an international geophysical year. That was a specific subject, but it has been suggested that perhaps this Assembly might resolve to call upon all countries of the world to devote a year, not to speeches about peace -- I do not think that is much good -- but to the furtherance of co-operative activities in any field--political, cultural and whatever field there may be, and there are thousands of fields. That perhaps would direct some of our energy and some of our thinking to this idea of co-operation which would create an atmosphere for solving the problems

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more easily. That by itself will not solve any problems but it will lessen this destruction and conflict which now affect the world. I make this suggestion to you not in any detail but broadly, so that this assembly might consider it and, if it is worthwhile, perhaps appoint a committee to consider it further and make suggestions as to how this might perhaps be done. As you will have noticed, the words are amusing and can easily be called hackneyed phrases and hackneyed thinking. There is nothing new or wonderful about them. There is nothing new or wonderful about the truths of the world, and the truth is that violence and hatred are bad--bad for individuals and bad for everybody. The great men of the world have been those who have fought hatred and violence and not those who have encouraged it. Even in some supposedly worthwhile cause, and we have arrived at the stage where this, I feel, has to be checked. It really requires a new way

of thinking, a new development of humanity. Possibly we are going through that process and possibly this very crisis will wake up the mind of man and direct it to this new way of thinking. The old way of thinking has landed us in this disastrous situation, even though, as I said, the world has made tremendous progress in many ways, progress which manifestly can cure the material ills of the world. But what shall it profit the world if it conquers the material ills and then commits suicide because it has not controlled its own mind? Therefore, we have to undertake this vast task of encouraging this new thinking, this new approach, the approach of co-operation, and not on a mere ideological basis but on the practical basis of sheer survival in this world. I would beg the Assembly to consider this from this larger point of view and not from the point of view of profit or loss to this nation or that nation, because the choice before us is not profit or loss but of survival or loss to everybody.

I realize that all this sounds very vague and amorphous and does not indicate anything very special. What are we to do? There are these problems of Germany and Berlin and South East Asia. Undoubtedly, there are those problems and there are the problems of Africa. Even if I had some detailed ideas about these subjects, this is no occasion for me to put them forward. But I do think that the problems of Germany and Berlin, difficult as they are and involving something more than national conflicts--they involve large numbers of human beings, and to me the human aspect of such problems is always important--difficult as they are, they are capable of solution, if they are approached with the attention to solve them honourably and without attempting to bring discredit or dishonour to any party.

With regard to Indo-China, you will remember the Geneva Conference which was held five or six years ago. That conference came to certain conclusions and appointed some international commissions. The main conclusions were that those countries should be kept out of the power conflicts, that they should be helped, that they should not be entangled in these major conflicts, because it was clear then that if they were so entangled they would perish, whatever the other result of the conflict. To some extent those commissions functioned satisfactorily and prevented this. Later some of those commissions were not allowed to function as they should have done, and I think that much of the difficulty has arisen because they were not allowed to function. It is not an easy question, but I think that even these questions can be solved primarily on the basis of applying the Geneva Conference policy, which was agreed by everyone, and allowing the commissions to function.

It has been very gracious of you, Mr. President, to invite me to address this great Assembly. I feel rather humble before it. I am no man of wisdom. I am only a person who has dabbled in public affairs for nearly half a century and learned something from them, and mostly what I have learned is how wise men often behave in a very foolish manner. And that thought makes me often doubt my own wisdom, or whatever you wish to call it. I question myself: "Am I right?" I have doubts about many things, but I have no doubt at all about some

things, because I have been conditioned in that way. I have grown up in that way during long years of guidance from my old leader, Mahatma Gandhi, that hatred and violence are essentially bad and evil, and anything that promotes hatred, therefore, is bad. One cannot solve questions by trying to destroy the other party but by trying to win him over. You may not always win him over 100 per cent, but there is no other way. Now, apart from theory, apart from idealism, the practical approach to the problem is such that the choice offered to the world is: co-operate or perish. The choice is of peaceful co-existence or no existence at all. There is no doubt about it.

Therefore, I venture to suggest to this Assembly that these questions should be looked upon from this broader point of view and with the urgency that they demand. I am quite sure that the great nations and the small nations of the world feel that way, but somehow irritations come,

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difficulties come. And that prevents progress being made.

But I do believe that the time is ripe for progress to be made in that direction and these great countries should seize this opportunity and proceed with it, not thinking too much about who makes the first move in this direction, because the person who makes the first move will do the right thing, will be respected, and it will not be considered that the first move or the second move comes from weakness. Countries are strong today. A strong country does not become a weak country by taking the first move. Everybody knows a country's strength.

I am grateful to you, Sir, for the opportunity that has been given to me to address this great Assembly. Again I would repeat that the future of the world depends so much on the continuance of the United Nations. Without it, perhaps that future itself would end.

INDIA USA GERMANY CHINA SWITZERLAND

**Date** : Nov 10, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri Krishna Menon's Statement in the Security Council Debate on Congo

Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the

United Nation, made the following statement in the Security Council debate on Congo on Nov 17, 1961

My delegation is grateful to the President and the other members of the Security Council for allowing us to participate in these proceedings, in accordance with rule 38 of the Council's rules of procedure.

This is the first occasion on which my delegation has attended the Security Council in the presence of the acting Secretary-General. I hope, therefore, that it will not be thought that I am taking too much time if I offer our congratulations to him and say that, as in the past, the Government of India will give all the assistance that is possible to give and that it is within that Government's power to give to the Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate of the United Nations regarding the Congo and regarding other matters.

At these meetings it is inevitable that part of the proceedings should be spent on matters having the nature of an inquest, on references to statements made in the past and on comments about how situations have changed. My Government therefore feels that it is necessary for us to get back to the beginning of this business. After all, Mr. Spaak--and I think the representative of France also--raised some doubts about the position of the United Nations in the Congo, especially in view of current events; therefore, as I have said, we must go somewhat back in the history of this affair.

I think that we should refer first of all to the cablegram of 13 July 1960 that came to the United Nations. We read there:

"The Government of the Republic of the Congo requests urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance"

there were no reservations. Further on we read:

"We accuse the Belgian Government of having carefully prepared the secession of Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country. The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace."  
(Official Records of the Security Council Fifteenth Year. Supplement for July, August and September 1960, Document S/4382, page 11)

I have not seen in any of the resolutions which have been adopted any repudiation of that position. It is quite true that with developing events we have taken different times. But, if the United Nations is in the Congo and if some of our countries are involved there at the behest of the United Nations, it is basically because of that position--namely, that the Government of the Republic of the Congo asked for military assistance. There have been intervening periods of conflict of authority inside the country. But the United Nations resolutions, in regard to which our country has taken a very active part, have repeatedly called for the settlement of the problems on

the basis of the Fundamental Law of the country and the decisions of Parliament. Hence, whatever intermediate difficulties may have arisen, the present Government of the Congo is the legal successor of the Government of the Congo at that time; it was accepted as such by Mr. Hammarskjöld.

We are there because military assistance was asked for. We are there mainly for four purposes. Those purposes are the maintenance of the integrity and the political independence of the Congo to assist the Congo Government to maintain law order; to prevent the occurrence of civil war, and to secure the withdrawal and evacuation of foreign

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military and para-military personnel. I think that it would help, perhaps if I prefaced these observations by expressing, on behalf of my Government, and on my own behalf, the fact that we are prepared in all good faith, and without reservation, to accept what Mr. Spook has to say in respect of his own policy and the orientation of the present policy of the Belgian Government. We did not question it, but that does not wipe out history. Mr. Spaak and I live in countries with parliamentary systems of Government, and we cannot say that one Government steps in one place, and then another chapter is opened. We welcome the new chapter, however, and also the actions that may follow from it.

In this connexion, it is as well for us to recall the position when the Secretary-General's representative in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal, first sent in his report to him, and it was being discussed. It was the subject of not only much heated controversy but a great deal of condemnation from some of the countries who today accept as a fact that there has been intervention.

Then, for the first time, the United Nations came forward and said, "There is considerable intervention, though the intervention comes from advisers, from military people, from others who are supposed to be following more peaceful occupations in Belgium." References were made to schoolmasters, and so on, at that time; and the Council will remember the Assembly debates. The report was being condemned both by the newspapers and some of the great Powers who are with us today. Now it is accepted that these people were there, and no one can deny that the whole of the difficulties in the Congo have arisen from foreign intervention. That is not to say that the United Nations resolution is not heeded by the present Belgian Government, or that it is not making the best efforts possible, or has not got its limitations--with which we shall, if necessary, deal later.

There are 100-odd Members of the United Nations, and all of us do not come to the Security Council. If my Government seeks to be represented here on these occasions it is apart from the general commitments that any country has in assisting the carrying out of United Nations resolutions. The Government of the India has entered into very considerable military commitments. The Foreign Minister of

Belgium made reference to inept military operations--to which I shall refer in a moment. We have come here partly because we have responsibilities to our Parliament and our people in regard to this heavy commitment in the Congo, which was not undertaken lightly, and to which I shall refer again later in the course of my observations.

Having received this letter from the then President and Prime Minister of the Congo on 12 July 1960, what did the Security Council do? As far as I remember, there were no votes against this. It decided to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps--there was no limitation--it was left to the discretion of the Secretary-General:

"...in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts Congolese Government, with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks." (S/4387)

Therefore, the task is to keep the independence of the Congo, to prevent secession. It appears that this resolution, in regard to giving military assistance until the Congolese Army is able to take over, still remains. There have been large numbers of resolutions passed since--I understand that the President wishes, if possible, to conclude the proceedings this afternoon, so I will try to make this as brief as I can--so that no explanation or gloss of any kind is required to explain away the presence of military troops in the Congo itself.

To the mind of our Government, the real issue today may appear on the surface to be the presence of mercenaries. It is quite true that without outside assistance, either in the way of personnel or equipment, it would not be possible for Katanga to offer not only opposition to the Central Government of the Congo, but to wage war on the United Nations. This is the issue--to wage war on the United Nations. It would not be possible for them to do so. If it were possible for any body of Congolese persons or gendarmerie to do that kind of thing, then it should be possible for the Central Government's Congolose troops also to do it. They are deficient in practical terms, in the assistance that, Katange gets from outside. There has been no suggestion that these things have not gone into this place The Council will remember that in the very many debates that we had in the Assembly, the late Secretary General repeatedly said, "There have been promises..." I have myself read out five or six of these statements. "On each day the Belgian Government promised to withdraw so

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In fact, it is the other way around. Propaganda is not sufficient among United Nations supporters. While this represents another surrender on the part of the United Nations, a campaign against the United Nations by radio has been instituted in a highly derogatory fashion. At this point I shall not read the other provisions.

However, we would like the Secretary-General since apparently this truce was being carried out under Security Council resolutions, to tell us the extent to which it accords with the general purposes of the United Nations if, in fact, while they are free to inspect our positions, we cannot inspect theirs. While it is true that the radio stations were apparently captured by United Nations troops if the Katangese are free to use them hostile to the United Nations, how are we to maintain the present truce position?

Mr. Spaak refers to the question of conciliation. My country and Government is very much interested in the general approach to this problem. We think that no matter how difficult the situation is, there should be attempts at conciliation. However, conciliation cannot be had on the basis of the surrendering by one party to the other.

The resolution of the General Assembly of 17 April called upon all Congolese authorities concerned to desist from attempting any military solution to their problems and to resolve them by peaceful means. If that is not an appeal to conciliation, I do not know what is.

By a resolution the Assembly appointed a mission of conciliation. This Commission consisted of seven members who were designated by the President of the Assembly. They were to assist the Congolese leaders in achieving reconciliation and in ending the political crisis.

This Commission went to the Congo last year and submitted its report in March 1961. The following extracts from this report are relevant.

The Commission said that the present crisis will not be solved unless Parliament is reconvened without delay. The reconvening of Parliament. I must say, is not a military solution; it is a conciliatory solution; and fortunately Parliament has been convened.

The report of the Commission also recommended that political personalities who were detained by the Republic of the Congo should be released and that a general amnesty should be granted immediately following the establishment of a government of national unity, it was not the Commission's intention that a general amnesty should extend to those who committed capital offences.

I may be mistaken, and if I am, the Foreign Minister of the Congo will perhaps correct me, but I believe it is a matter of common knowledge that many of these political personalities at this stage or at other stages were released and that Mr. Tshombe himself was permitted to return by the Congolese Government.

The Commission found among many leaders belonging to the pro-Lumumba and pro-Kasavubu groups a general willingness to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis. That was irrespective of political considerations on the Leopoldville side.

They were all anxious, irrespective of what had happened, to reach a peaceful solution. The report stated that a small number of other leaders seemed reluctant to accept the Commission's conciliation efforts. It also said that Tshombe and Kalonji declined to receive the Commission. These are the people to whom we are supposed to give conciliation. Tshombe and Kalonji refused to receive the Commission's officials because they said that no special problem was submitted for their consideration. This can only be interpreted as meaning that they relied upon a military solution. Therefore, my Government in general principles echoes the sentiments of Mr. Spaak in desiring to seek conciliation but not at the expense of the sovereignty of the Congo and not under the condition that the Katangese shall be free to wage war on United Nations troops, not on the condition that the people who are in the Congo who are not of African origin shall use the sign of the Red cross in shooting down our troops. Indian personnel have been shot down by weapons hidden in Red Cross vehicles. Unfortunately it has been blazoned out of the world that the troops have fired on these Red Cross vehicles, which is not at all true. In fact, they were not Red Cross vehicles; they carried bazookas. Even then we did not fire them.

I have here many extracts which show that these personnel have been either smuggling or carrying arms, persons either in priestly garb or under Red Cross cover, using their positions in order to smuggle arms or to carry out military action against United Nations troops.

The Foreign Minister of Belgium, who commands a great deal of respect from all of us here, a former President of the United Nations General Assembly, one of the founders and one of the people who assisted at the formulation of the Charter, talked to us a great deal, about

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the telegram that had come from Mr. Tshombe. In fact, the telegraph office, asked our Government representatives if we were willing to

receive a telegramme that had been sent. This means that even the Post Office thought that it would not be proper for us to receive it. Anyway, we said, "You can get a public carrier and deliver it." We would not receive a telegram as a communication from Tshombe as a Government because he is merely a provincial authority. As somebody asked yesterday, what business does he have to a Foreign Minister and so on? One does not know.

If the demand in regard to conciliation is that we should treat the provincial authorities in Katanga as well as the Government of the Republic as equals, that would be a violation of the United Nations position as well as disregard of the authority of the Congolese Government.

We have no desire to drag out this discussion at great length. Not being members of the Security Council, it is not for us either to support or to oppose resolutions. I should in all earnestness like to submit, and I hope what I say will not fall on deaf ears from the right quarters, that we hope that this meeting of the Security Council will not end without a decision and direction to the United Nations authorities, in order to take into account the fact that countries like ours have placed our resources at their disposal not in order to play around, not in order that their armies shall be submitted to indignities and humiliation but to carry out their purposes.

The Secretary-General has said of this resolution that he should have the authority to carry out what it requires. That is why, while we have no right to express either support or otherwise of the resolution, I suppose, we express the hope that what has been put forward by the three members of the Security Council will meet with unanimous approval. In fact, perhaps, it does not go as far as some people think it ought to go. But at any rate there is nothing in it which goes beyond resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

Having said all this, we have certain matters on which we should like to have information from the Secretariat. We have just heard from the Foreign Minister about the inept military operations. We should like to feel that in operations like these, in which there is a connexion between the thirty-eighth floor and the field, they are sufficiently organic, sufficiently active and sufficiently effective.

I have also heard the question raised in some places that these are not enough forces in the Congo. There are 16,000 troops in the country, 6,000 belonging to my country, and others belonging to people. It is impossible in any situation to spread our troops in every village, to man every yard of a 2,000 mile frontier. No war can be waged in that way. That being so, the combined national armies of some of our countries would have to go to the Congo for that purpose. What is more, they are not there as an army of conquest, they are there for preventive operations.

We should like to submit that since there is prima facie evidence--

and some people think conclusive evidence--of the transit of arms across the frontiers, these frontiers have to be protected, if necessary, by military force. No one suggests that these 2000 miles can be protected inch by inch, but we understand that there are only a few main roads coming into the territory across the border. It is not sufficient merely for us to appeal to other countries not to provide arms because we have been told that some Governments are not in a position to do so.

In that connexion, if the representative of France would not misunderstand me, may I say that we have dealings with the Government of France in the purchase of military aircraft. We have never sought nor have we been able to find anywhere in France any private authority that can sell a military airplane. So far as we know, it has to come in any country through Governments or with their sanction. We have also been told by such intelligence and such information as we have that the Government of France has not sold any airplanes to any parties in the Congo. Yet those airplanes have been sold to somebody. So far as we know, even what is called the Union Miniere is not manufacturing airplanes yet: perhaps they will if they are allowed to go on at this rate.

So these airplanes came from somewhere. Otherwise, if the Government of France knows of some method whereby airplanes can be produced without manufacture I should like to know of it; it would save a lot of foreign exchange. So these airplanes--at least some of them--came from France; others came from Germany. They have been piloted not by Congolese pilots because, to the best of my knowledge, at the present moment there are no fighter pilots in the Congo, and they have been provided by the people.

I would agree with the Foreign Minister of Belgium when he said that it is sometimes impossible for a Government to keep in close contact

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with the activities of all its nationals. In that case I would say: let the protection of that Government be withdrawn from these people and these people should become subject to the domestic law of that country. There is a responsibility on the part of that Government to the Congolese Government to arrest them, to punish them and to do whatever is necessary under their laws. In any case, if it is a question of their not being amenable to domestic law, to the municipal law of the home country, now that it has been proclaimed, it should be possible for the United Nations to take whatever action it can take against those who wage war against the United Nations. There has been military action against the United Nations troops. Is any further evidence required as regards what action we should take? Therefore the first thing that we should like to suggest is that in the question of the mercenaries they must be out of the way. From early last year--I think it was when the Dayal report came in--the United Nations has been passing repeated resolutions to get these people out. Each time the late Secretary-General has said, "Yes, we

have got this letter, we have sent this one, this has not happened, we have sent this letter again". Gradually some of them have gone out. But the fact that some of them have gone out does not mean that some others do not come in. It is like some of these people who are fanatics at tree planting. At the end of the year, the public figures are 2 million trees being planted, but they do not tell us how many trees were destroyed by lack of care or by being eaten by animals. So at the end of the fall, according to the figures there are millions of trees in the forest but there are not any because they have been destroyed. In the same way these people are being sent out, it is true, but they go out by one road and come back by another. Or else they go out by one road and come back by airplane. If that is the case, what is the use of sending them out? Therefore, this prevention is not the business at the present time either of the Belgian Government or of any other Government, be it Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government or whatever Government may be involved. I hope we will not call on the Belgian, United Kingdom and Rhodesian Governments to guard the frontiers of the Congo. That would be rather a dangerous experiment, and they are not asking for it. But I think that from this side it is possible for us to protect this. If 15,000 troops cannot protect these frontiers, then there must be something wrong with the troops or something wrong with the people who lead them, and I refuse to believe there is anything wrong.

If more assistance is required, my country may not be able to furnish any more or it may be--I do not know. We have placed at your disposal these land troops, and others have supplied air forces as they have been asked for. It would be a great pity to increase the size of the forces as though there were a major war operation. Nobody is waging war against the Congo or anything of that character. We are only trying a police action in order to deal with a tribal or with a provincial rebellion. If the provincial rebellion requires more than this, it is only because the provincial rebellion has ceased to be a provincial rebellion and become--not now but in the first instance--a return of the empire by the back door. That is what happened in the beginning--a return of the empire by the back door, with the assistance of all others.

Before I leave this Katanga position, I would like the Secretariat to tell us what were the circumstances that led to the sudden falling off of the Katanga action. What Governments were involved in the pressures that were put upon the United Nations at that time? Was it right to lead the troops, at great risk to themselves, to take positions and then in the middle to call it off, unless there were some political advantages or the enemy had surrendered? We have today in hospitals in the Congo Indian troops who have been shot in the chest. After all, while they are troops placed at the disposal of the United Nations, they are still part of the Indian Army, and I say with all sense of responsibility that it is our information that not one of these shots had been fired by an African. These men were not allowed to use their machine guns or other weapons, when they were being fired at when the post office was being held. They were trying to persuade these people not to carry on militant action, and they

were shot in consequence.

This is neither war nor peace. We are quite prepared to send our troops, as in the Gaza Strip, for peaceful action anywhere, but we cannot have the situation in which the troops of an army of a civilized Government are thrown into a context of buccaneer law, where they cannot look after themselves and you will not look after them yourself. This is a situation that is very difficult to accept. We shall continue to give all the assistance we can give. I do not speak in this way because we have probably a disproportionate number of people there; this applies to all others who are there.

The presence of the aircraft has to be accounted for, because we have it from the representative of France that no such aircraft have been supplied to anybody in the Congo, and I accept that. I am also prepared to believe

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that they are not at present part of the Belgian Air Force. I do not say they are from the air force of any other country. We should like to know how these aircraft, made in France or in Germany, found their way to the Congo. Are there authorities in the Congo who are in a position to obtain them so easily, when other Governments find it very difficult to get the weapons and equipment they want? Therefore there is a blank to be filled up in this way, which is of great importance. The Secretary-General, I hope, will note that they have now asked for air support. If they have asked for air support, then we must know what the situation on the other side is. Is this air support for waging air war or is it for cover for your land troops? If it is a question of there being an air force on the other side, then we have to measure our own strength in the same way. It is a situation that is rather different from the one that existed some time ago.

I have already referred to the attempts at conciliation that have been made, but it is not the view of my Government that there can be any settlement with the Government of Katanga on the basis that it is another parallel Government which shares the authority of the Congolese Republic. If that were so, the Security Council must reverse its resolutions and obtain the support of the Congolese Government for that position.

The Foreign Minister of Belgium--quite unwittingly, I think -- used the phrase yesterday "the white man hunt". I am sure he will not misunderstand me from the way I have expressed myself up to now. I confess I regret this, because you will notice that in the newspapers there is nothing but "a white man hunt" in the headlines. There is no question of a white man hunt, especially when the United Nations troops have been operating against anybody who has been operating against them. It so happens that the white man stands out in a country which is not his, and therefore he is thrown into relief. I hope this will not be taken as a kind of racial War against anybody.

May I with great respect say that the one authority and the one person who can contribute a great deal to conciliation is the country of Belgium, on the one hand, and its Foreign Minister, on the other, because, if there is neither moral nor material support from Belgium for these men who have been waging war against the United Nations and have been defying its resolutions and making mockery of its operations, that would to a certain extent reverse the positions that have been held in the past.

On 2 August 1961 both Houses of Parliament passed a unanimous vote of confidence in the Government of Prime Minister Adoula. In its resolution of 2 August the House of Representatives declared:

"The new Government of national unity shall be the legal successor of the first central Government of the Republic of the Congo." (S/4913).

In a letter to Mr. Hammarskjöld the Prime Minister said:

"...My Government is the only government with which the United Nations should deal. It is my confident hope that all assistance thus provided by the United Nations...will be rendered exclusively to the central Government of the Republic of the Congo." (S/4923, p. 1).

To this the Secretary-General replied:

"... I have no hesitation in confirming to you that the United Nations will, in response to the decisions of Parliament, deal with your Government as being the central Government of the Republic of the Congo. I agree thus that whatever aid and support the United Nations is in a position to give to the Congo...should be rendered exclusively to your Government." (S/4923, p.3)

Referring to the secession of Katanga--and I say this because it is not only the people from outside who may be regarded as not being so concerned about the feelings and not so cognizant of the feelings inside the Congo--refers to the sentiments expressed by the Prime Minister in regard to the Katanga secession, says this:

"...The secession of Katanga did great harm to the country. That was what divided us and deprived the State of a large part of the budgetary resources which belong to it."--I think the representative of the United Kingdom referred to this yesterday--"For the past year we have tried all peaceful means of reaching an agreement with Elisabethville, but without success.

"...At Coquilhatville...President Tshombe aroused the indignation of the Congolese people...for the last time he was trusted and released...The Congolese people wished to safeguard the heritage of 30 June 1960 and neither Tshombe,

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his Ministers, the Union Minière or the Belgians who were behind the

secession of Katanga can prevent the Congolese people from regaining their heritage."

This is the position of the Congolese people also. These aggressive actions, according to the Prime Minister, are exclusively attributable to non-Congolese officers and mercenaries who are commanding and serving in the Elisabethville armed forces. Technically there is no difference in regard to these so-called mercenaries between the countries from which they come and the majority of the United Nations. It is a question of operating it.

From here, may I say, we all referred--every member of the Council and all those others who spoke--to the dastardly murder and the cruelties inflicted on those thirteen Italian airmen. My Government does not yield to anybody in its expression of abhorrence at these actions, but what we have to remember is this. These actions have taken place in the past and may well continue in the future until we clean up the Congo situation. That is to say, if there are armies that are not trained, if they are incited to mutiny by one side or the other and if their hatred is conditioned by propaganda, then these things are likely to happen. Therefore, if what we want is the termination of this state of affairs, then we all must assist in the restoration of civilized government in the Congo.

It is not only in a part of Africa, but in other parts of the world, that human beings, otherwise civilized, are behaving in a most savage way. I do not exclude my own country. In certain conditions of excitement, frenzy and fanaticism all sorts of cruelty take place. This is not to minimize this abhorrent act. But our position now should be that this situation of African killing African and calling on other people for support must stop. In the present situation, whatever might have been the rightness or wrongness of the view a year and a half ago, we have gone there as the United Nations, with military aid, to assist the Government of the Congo, first, to maintain its integrity, to sustain its independence, to obtain the evacuation of foreign personnel, to assist in the cessation of the civil war, and also to assist it to train its own troops and to give technical assistance. All these factors should be as operative now as before--and it seems a long time since these operations were undertaken.

My country was not the first to send troops to the Congo because we had, not doubts but inhibitions about sending armed forces outside. So the first thousand or eight hundred people who went out of India were those who were employed in transport, commissariat, field ambulance and other duties, thus assisting in the United Nations operation even as we did in Korea some years ago. Afterwards came very frantic appeals--rather insistent--from the United Nations for armed support and at that time, irrespective of our own difficulties, we placed at the disposal of the United Nations competent troops with all the ancillary forces required in full measure. Thus, we went in at that time with competent troops when the United Nations required it most, and I believe that the presence of these troops, and of the

others making up the 15,000, may have been largely responsible for at least retaining the Congo position as it is and not making it go completely to pieces.

We have been here I do not know how many times concerning the same problems and, thanks to the initiative of Ethiopia. and the Sudan, the ??? of the Security Council who are the committed to any of the contending so-called "war blocs" in the world have submitted a draft resolution. This draft resolution simply asks for the implementation of the purposes of the United Nations Charter. I should like to submit that it is only fair, if nothing else, that the new Secretary-General should have the full authority and support of the United Nations in trying to bring this matter to an end so that, not foreign mercenaries in this case, but foreign troops can go home. And I say that for whatever purposes troops are in a country, after a time they will not be liked very much. It is not right that even United Nations troops should be in the Congo longer than required, and no country, no Government, more than ours desires this situation to come to an end.

The constructive suggestions which we have made are that force, if necessary, is to be used in order to terminate the war against the United Nations, because the prestige of the United Nations--not in a false sense, but the continuance of its authority, of its capability to develop the progress of Africa and to prevent an international catastrophe arising from this--is dependent on our success in the Congo. This is one of the main reasons, as my Prime Minister told Parliament, why we, in spite of all our difficulties, responded to the appeal of the late Secretary-General on behalf of the United Nations.

Secondly, it is necessary, apart from the appeals made to those from whom arms may proceed, either with the consent or connivance,

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or even against the wishes of the Government, that this should be stopped at the frontiers by proper control and inspection--which is being done in other places--and part of the duties of the Congolese regular forces and of the United Nations authority should be directed in that way. There should be no quarter, there should be no going away from any idea of relaxing our views in regard to the retention of mercenaries.

The Foreign Minister said yesterday that the United Nations had agreed to the retention of twelve military officers. This is the first time we have heard about it. I know of no mention of this in the Advisory Committee or anywhere else that the United Nations had agreed to the retention of some of the foreign officers in the Congo for purposes other than assistance to the United Nations. I find it difficult to believe that the evacuation of Belgians, in the event of any violent outburst, could not be done by the United Nations itself. Are twelve Belgian officers required to deal with such a situation and, if they are required, should they be military officers? So far

as I know from my own side, the first shots against the Indian troops were fired from the Belgian Consulate. If Mr. Spaak says that is not so, I am prepared for the moment to accept, but these are our military reports. After all, an army has to know where the shots come from, I suppose, So they were fired from the Belgian Consulate, This was long before.

I am not bringing up this past history in order to show that things have not changed. For myself, I am prepared to accept the statement of the Foreign Minister that his Government and himself are doing all they can to reverse the situation. But this has been a very bad situation and drastic action is required. Any kind of even what may appear legitimate defence of Tshombe or explanation of the slowness of action rather gives the impression that there still is moral support forthcoming. There must be a complete and total reversal as far as that is concerned if we are going to get anywhere.

I hope that this Council will not adjourn without giving very clear directives to the Secretary-General in pursuance of the decisions already reached, so that the forces in the Congo can function fully, effectively and for the purposes for which they were sent, and can go home as early as possible.

I should like to assure the Secretary-General once again that the resources of our Government, to the extent that it is possible, will be placed at his disposal in the discharge of the responsibilities which the United Nations has undertaken.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC USA CONGO INDIA BELGIUM FRANCE RUSSIA GERMANY KOREA  
ETHIOPIA SUDAN

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INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri Krishna Menon's Statement in Political Committee on Disarmament

Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Political Committee on Nov 20, 1961 on the question of disarmament.

For fifteen years now the United Nations has been discussing the problem of disarmament. It so happens in history that such discussions reach a certain peak and then arrive at a state of stalemate, and then some new hopes arise. After these discussions had

led nowhere, in 1954 a sub-committee was appointed and the Assembly as a whole, and indeed the world, thought that there was a new departure which would, by private negotiations bring about the settlement that was required.

In 1959, by resolution 1378, the fourteenth General Assembly of the United Nations accepted general and complete disarmament as the objective and culmination of our disarmament efforts. Since that period there have been discussions here with regard to its achievement.

Last year, that is in 1960, my delegation along with eleven others submitted a draft resolution the basis of which was that we had come to the stage when this Assembly ought to give some directives to the great Powers concerned or to the Disarmament Committee, as the case may be, to produce the principles on which negotiations could proceed. It so happened that neither that resolution nor a large number of other resolutions which shared the same aspects were brought to the point of voting.

Then, we met here last March in resumed session. The situation then was that the United States, having elected a new Government which was committed to the position of general and complete disarmament, suggested that perhaps a little time should elapse for them to consider the whole problem. It is from that point that this new chapter opens.

From March onward the world and the United Nations looked to direct negotiations between the two countries in order to achieve some agreement. Today we are in the happy

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position that almost for the first time there is not only an agreement on a resolution but a joint statement between the United States and the Soviet Union accepting general and complete disarmament as the purpose of disarmament negotiations and also the principles on which they are to be based.

My delegation, which has taken a considerable amount of the Assembly's time at previous sessions both in discussing principles as well as modalities, does not intend to do so on this occasion. The reason is that, as we said during the discussion on the proposal for a treaty in regard to nuclear explosions, we did not think it was possible in the Committee to formulate anything more than principles or directives. On the one hand, what we have to say in this regard is set out in the twelve Power resolution of last year that is contained in document A/C. 1/L.259. On the other hand, we already have the statement on these agreed principles which has been submitted to this Assembly in document A/4879. My Government desires to express its appreciation in regard to the emergency treatment given this document.

As has been stated by both the United States and the Soviet Union, no one is naive enough to think that a declaration of these principles or an agreed basis is disarmament. However, it is certainly a healthy beginning. During all the prolonged negotiations and discussions which have taken place during the past fifteen years this position was not reached. While armaments have increased, it has been the added vitiating factor at the present time on account of the renewal of explosions in violation of a moratorium understanding. And in spite of the fact that in the face of these agreed principles the speeches which we have heard from the main nuclear Powers have been couched in a language to which we have become accustomed, we have every reason to believe that we are at a higher level of negotiation. In other words, in 1954, when the Committee was established, we had moved to the position that the giving of certain directives was necessary. The Assembly gave those directives, and the negotiations proceeded along those lines for several years.

We have now come to a further higher position, where there is the acceptance of general and complete disarmament and, secondly, that war is no longer to be the instrument for settling international problems.

The Government of India, expressing itself through my delegation, has repeatedly pointed out that disarmament is but a-step to something more important: namely the outlawing of war. That is incorporated in this agreement.

It also says here that disarmament is to be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; that is to say, that something is to be substituted for arms, if arms are taken away, in order to maintain what arms are supposed to be doing: to keep the peace.

While we do not claim that these agreed principles merely paraphrase the document I referred to, A/C.1/L.259, so far as we are concerned it includes practically all the items set forth in the twelve-Power resolution submitted on 15 November 1960. At that time the two Powers mainly concerned did not oppose the resolution, and it still remains with the Assembly.

We are happy to think that in this agreed statement which is before us most of those things are incorporated. We have moved out to the position where we think of a world without arms, a world in which the stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction have been eliminated, including their methods of delivery--a world in which training establishments, defence ministers and things of that kind are abolished.

We suggested at that time that it should also be agreed that at no stage of the disarmament negotiations should any one group of Powers be put in a better position than another. I will not go into an analysis of these agreed principles, except to read into the record the fact that the Government of India welcomes this agreement.

For one thing, any agreement between these two Powers comes as a relief to the world and is welcome as a step towards progress. Secondly, they are in agreement on basic principles none of which are merely words that are strung together, because their content is of far-reaching importance. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have since issued statements which do not contradict this but put interpretations on their implementation which require further elaboration from each side. It is common ground, I believe, between the two parties that in order to implement these principles negotiating machinery is necessary.

Although I do not say this will remain so, there is no agreement yet between these two nations as to what that negotiating should be. I believe that is the problem before us at the present time.

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Again I should like to repeat that we do not think that any amount of discussion in this Committee is going to take us further than these agreed principles. Further, we have the fear that greater and greater discussion on these matters might likely result in the taking up of positions and the arranging of groups of States on one side or the other, or on a third, as the case may be, without making any further progress in regard to the implementation of these principles. Therefore, we think that our function now is to try and find a way to aid the emergence of this negotiating machinery.

It might look as though that although these principles have been agreed to, agreement on the negotiating machinery will prove a stumbling block. But this has happened before. When we adjourned in March there was no agreement between the two great nuclear Powers. Now they seem to have reached agreement on this matter up to this point.

My delegation does not regard bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union as something that derogates from the authority of the United Nations because the boundaries of the United Nations are not merely the organizational limits of this Organization but also its purposes. If they are achieved in some other forum, and if more particularly they spring from resolutions and decisions made here, we do not regret it.

Our history on this matter is not a recent one. As early as the seventh session of this Assembly, my delegation submitted to this Committee that:

"...any solution (for the disarmament problem) depended essentially on agreement between the United States and the USSR, the States which had the most powerful armaments....

"The task was, essentially, to bring about agreement among the major Powers. The United Nations was based on the conception of the

latter's exceptional responsibilities and powers. It was their duty to the entire world to reach agreement". (A/C.1/SR.581, page 497)

That position has been continued session after session I will not read all the extracts that relate to them, but at the following session, the Government of India instructed the delegation to say that:

"the responsibility really lies upon the shoulders of the great Powers. There can be no real settlement of world problems except by agreement between the great Powers (the Soviet Union and the United States) which alone have the material strength and in whose hands largely lies the power of decision. Hence, we should like to submit to the Assembly, at the appropriate moment, that it is necessary for the Heads of these States--or whoever speaks for them at the highest level--to meet together in the context of an informal gathering, the kind of gatherings that made possible the emergence of this very body". (A/PV.620, page 32)

The body we referred to was the United Nations. We were referring at that time to the meetings at Teheran and at other places. It was on the basis of this that we supported the emergence of the Five-Power Committee.

Then at the tenth session my delegation expressed the view:

"that, on the one hand, disarmament is a matter for all nations, great or small, in whatever continent they may be and in whatever climate, and that, on the other hand, it is impossible to bring about agreement on disarmament unless the great Powers--and now we say, principally the United States of America and the Soviet Union--come to an agreement." (4/PV.559, page 482)

In 1956 we expressed the same view as follows:

"We believe that the main parties to disarmament are the United States and the Soviet Union, and, therefore, it is the view of our Government in this, as in other matters, that direct negotiations between these two countries, without prejudice to their membership either of the United Nations or of the Disarmament Commission, without any deals behind anybody's back--which will not happen anyway--are desirable". (DC/ PV.58. page 39-40)

At the eleventh session, expressing the same view, we said:

"We should all welcome it if the United States and the Soviet Union, which are the countries mainly concerned

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in this matter, could come to some agreement by diplomatic negotiations and as a result of the common realization--which we are convinced exists--that the present situation can lead to catastrophic

world tragedies". (A/PV. 611, pages 571-572)

In 1957 we said the following:

"There is only one way we shall get disarmament, and that is when what President Eisenhower has called the atomic colossi agree. Unless the Americans and the Russians come to some agreement, and unless they are prepared to save the world from atomic destruction, there is no hope of our reaching any disarmament." (A/C.1/PV.873, page 11)

In 1959--that was after we had accepted the doctrine of general and complete disarmament--there were doubts and concern in the Committee that perhaps the negotiations were being taken out of the body as a whole. The Government of India supported the emergence of the Ten-Power Committee even though it was not one of the ten Powers. We said then:

"This Ten-Power Committee is nothing new. It is merely an expression of the diplomatic capacities and diplomatic facilities existing in people and is in no way opposed to the purposes of this Organization. But we think that if we agree, as we have, and wish this Ten Power Committee well, then we must leave it to make its own procedures and arrange its own composition...". (Meeting of the First Committee, 2 November 1959)

That is the record of the Government of India in regard to direct negotiations. I have read all this out in order that people should not feel that they are tired of this discussion, that there is an ad hoc solution at the present time. There are the realities of the situation: that is, there two great atomic Powers have to come to agreement.

This year we approach this problem in the background of certain new factors. One is the emergence of the agreement which came as a surprise to some people--no doubt an agreeable surprise--but direct negotiations did produce an agreement on principles which was set out in somewhat great detail and the acceptance of various particulars which have a great bearing upon the Implementation of them. For reasons which I have already set out, we do not think that the discussion of the details of the substance of the matter at this stage will make any additional contribution. We will not go into them. Therefore, my delegation has submitted a draft resolution which is contained in document A/C.1/L.299 which I shall read out to the Committee.

Mr. Krishna Menon read the draft resolution contained in document A / C. 1/ L.299.

We have put this draft resolution forward in all seriousness and sincerity because we do not think that we shall make any progress on these agreed principles unless these two great Powers are able to agree on this particular matter. As was pointed out by the representative of the United Kingdom this morning, we already have

proposals on both sides which reveal the differences of approach they have. It is not the desire of my delegation to examine this in great detail except to say that we would accept anything as welcome if these two agreed because, after all, if their agreement comes in, then there is some hope of progress. At the same time we have said that the composition of that body should be such that they and the rest of the world would regard it as satisfactory. We must certainly hope--we have no reason to doubt--that these two great countries and their allies, whom they will no doubt consult, will consider that as a necessary condition.

In the proposals that have been put forward, the Ten-Power committee has been rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. If it was only a solemn rejection, we perhaps might have asked them to reconsider it. But for the last years or more, the capacities of the Ten-Power negotiations have been exhausted. Therefore, one side has said, "that will not do," and, as must be clear from what I have already said, one of the essential qualities of any committee or any body is that it has the agreement of both sides which must negotiate.

Then there is the proposal made by the United States of America about the addition of three chairmen to this ten-nation committee. We ourselves have no objection to this particular proposal. But as presently advised, my Government is not likely to agree to the nomination of individuals as distinct from their countries. We are dealing here with vast political issues and not with legalistic issues or questions of terminology or of giving an award as between two parties as though we might ask the judges of the International Court of Justice or somebody to decide on some interpretation. Since they are political issues which

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must be backed by political power and political experience and, furthermore, since the other countries of the world, whether they be uncommitted or committed, cannot be excluded ultimately from this, it would not, so far as I have been presently advised, meet with the approval of our people and our Government. I believe the same to be true of many of my colleagues with whom I have had the privilege of working: That any body or group of this character which is composed of all individuals, however distinguished, would not carry the public opinion of their own countries necessarily or even of the world. I have no doubt that there are such eminent men in the world, but this is not a place where eminent men themselves have been able to bring about results because today we are living in circumstances where world public opinion as expressed and as set out in the Charter is the most important element.

There are other proposals that have been put forward. We do not want to go into the differences of quality between them. Any of those, if they are agreed to, would meet with our approval. We would, however, like to say that the so called uncommitted countries are not a bloc, and the essence of non-alignment is that non-aligned countries should

be free to be non-aligned with each other; otherwise they lose their independence. Non-alignment arises from the fact or the belief that bloc politics and the grouping of Powers and this ganging up in this way and dividing the world into armed groups or ideological groups is not likely to bring about world co-operation. Therefore, the addition of a third bloc will not be a solution.

Proposals on both sides contain the addition of countries of that character, but the balance has to be maintained in regard to both the geographical conditions of the world and the political outlook that will be brought to bear. So the position of my Government is that the next step that should be taken in this Committee, while some debate would certainly go on, is such that we would say very little to introduce elements of controversy into this situation. Unfortunately, from the three nuclear Powers who have spoken we have heard a great deal about the race for peace the race for arms and so on. Our experience, unfortunately, is that the usual invectives have figured in all these speeches. We are not a school of morality; we are not educating people as to the right way of delivery of public speeches; but we are concerned about the matter in the sense that more vituperation and more polemics, as was pointed out by the United Kingdom this morning are not likely to get us any further. While it would be very wrong to shut down debate on this subject prematurely, it appears to us that the businesslike way of dealing with this would be for the United States and the Soviet Union to get together, as they have been doing for the past few months, and solve this problem of finding agreed principles and get down to some agreement on a negotiating body. The negotiating body is necessary, because the ten-Power Committee which was the negotiating body has not been able to get any further.

There is a proposal also that we should meet in the Disarmament Commission as a committee of the whole. Since the Disarmament Committee is composed of 103 nations now, we may not get very much further unless there is some elaboration of these principles in terms of implementation. Hence the draft resolution that my Government desires to submit to this Assembly, then we may now proceed, that we may now go on to request these two great countries to come to agreement--these countries which each have the largest amount of destructive power at their disposal and equally the considerable influence that arises from their military, economic and other positions. Since we are not in this group of Powers, either in the sense of belonging to the armed blocs or in the sense of economic or military importance, it should not be thought that we are escaping our responsibilities. Our responsibilities only begin when the negotiating body gets down to the implementing processes, and then it would be possible for all of us, through the countries represented on this negotiating Committee and later the Disarmament Commission itself, to be able to talk about them.

Reference has also been made this morning by the representative of Yugoslavia to the possible convening of a special session of the General Assembly or of the Disarmament Commission or of a world

disarmament conference. The Government of India is in agreement with this in so far as that was the opinion that emerged out of the discussions between the non-aligned countries when they recently met in Belgrade. But all these decisions are conditioned by the events that happen at the time. Therefore we remain flexible in regard to this. We would support such a proposal, but it appears to us that even that proposal would have to be part of the discussions of this negotiating body whatever it may be.

Therefore the important matter before us is this. Having been faced with the very welcome situation of an agreement on principles which roughly correspond, in our submission the directives set out in this document to which I have referred, with one or two exceptions--about which

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we can argue, if it is still thought necessary, When the time comes--the next step is the creation of this implementing body. Otherwise our speeches would merely be expressions of views which do not lead to any particular results.

It has also to be considered that we proceed from now in the context of certain other decisions that we have made. That is, this Assembly itself has passed resolutions asking, on the one hand, for the suspension of preparations for nuclear war--that is, test explosions--pending the conclusion of treaties, and it has also asked that Africa be declared a nuclear-free zone and that explosions be not carried out in that area. If the Assembly little by little subscribes to these steps by overwhelming majority votes--I am sorry to say, not by unanimous votes--these are indications of the progress we have made in this field. So, while there is considerable tension, which may be in regard to various localities in the world--and I do not want even to cite names or in regard to the vituperation and the emphasis of differences, there is also on the positive side the fact that we have passed certain resolutions and come to certain decisions and we have also the position that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on principles.

For these reasons we submit this to the Committee, deliberately refraining from going into details or the merits of this question or our own views with regard to the working out of these positions, except to say that we consider that there should be no departure from the doctrine of full and complete disarmament as a preliminary to the outlawing of war. Secondly, war has been found not only expensive--that is a very small matter--war has become, shall we say, useless. When all nations are engaged in war, it has not even the results we normally expect from war. I wished to quote from the speeches made in the past few days, first by Mr. Zorin, afterwards by Mr. Stevenson and yesterday, I believe, by the representative of the United Kingdom, all of whom in different language say that war is no longer, in the context of modern technology and modern developments, possible, nor has it any purpose whatsoever. Perhaps it would be as

well to look at them. Mr. Zorin, speaking to us on the first day, said:

"The revolution in military technology which has occurred during the past few years has stripped of their effective basis any disarmament programmes other than a programme of general and complete disarmament." (A/C.1/PV. 1195, pages 8-10)

An American philosopher, writing 100 years ago, began his statement on war by saying: "War is the gory nerve of nations; it gives them courage..." and so on—even as Mussolini used to say. Having said that, he went on in the next paragraph: "When that situation is reached when in war entire nations are involved and nations are to be exterminated, then war becomes futile." His forecast seems to have been prophetic. That is the position today. We have reached such a situation. Even if a small war were started somewhere, this small war might become bigger and bigger nuclear weapons be used. While we are not prepared to speculate whether or not any people would be left alive or whether or not bacteria would survive, civilization as we know it today would not be able to survive. What is more, the long-term consequences of nuclear war are such that there would be very little in the way of victors and vanquished.

On the same day, the representative of the United States, speaking in this Committee said:

"...war in the future would differ fundamentally from war in the past as we have known it—not in degree but in kind." That is the most important thing. "It is this which seems so difficult to grasp. Thermonuclear war cannot serve anyone's national interest any longer, no matter how moral or immoral that interest may be, no matter how just or how unjust, no matter how noble or ignoble, regardless of the nation's ideology, its faith or its social system." (A/C.1/PV.1195, page 47)

It is very difficult in the face of this to do anything less or to fail to do anything to ease the sense of urgency in any way with regard to the steps we must take to outlaw war altogether and bring about total and complete disarmament. As we submitted to the General Assembly last year, the kind of idea of the limitation of armaments, even to the extent of allowing national contingents for the purpose of international policing, has to be thought of from the point of view that if nations are armed down even to the level of 1870 or 1470, as the case may be, and we still retain war as an instrument for the settling of disputes, then in six months time all the weapons that have been abandoned will come back, because all the technology and all the people and all the hatreds and the passions will return in the world. It will be only a question of time when all these abandoned weapons will be used, little by little, and we are again where we started.

The representative of the United Kingdom.

speaking to us this morning, said the same thing He said:

"My whole desire, my instinct and my overwhelming inclination is that we should get away from these polemical declarations"--of course this appears in the last page; the polemical declarations appeared in the previous pages--"and at the earliest possible moment establish a practical, workmanlike negotiating body, that we should address ourselves with urgency and determination to the task before us and with genuine goodwill and understanding on both sides, seek to produce a draft upon which we can agree among ourselves and which we can submit with confidence to the Assembly. If we can do this, we can give new encouragement to the whole world. We can replace anxiety by hope and we can give a new impetus to the United Nations itself."  
(A/C.1/PV. 1197, page 32)

The United Nations has to its credit, in spite of all the vicissitudes through which we are passing, many achievements, even in the particular session. We seem to have overcome the difficulty about filling the vacancy created by the unfortunate death of the late Secretary-General. We have, in spite of what would have been considered impossible two or three years ago, made considerable advances in the liquidation of the colonial empire and in the expansion of the freedom of mankind as such. We have also adopted, as I pointed out a while ago, several resolutions restricting the scope of nuclear warfare; and in other Committees, where constructive measures were considered, there are various positive suggestions in regard to world co-operation. Only this morning the General Committee, in its wisdom, very kindly accepted a submission made by the Government of India for the inclusion of an item for the inauguration of a "United Nations Co-operation Year" in 1963 and requesting the President to nominate a preparatory committee. At least that is our suggestion which will go before the plenary meeting in a short time.

Therefore, looking at this picture, both the positive and negative sides of it, we have every reason to be hopeful that the same spirit, the same compulsions--I will not say the spirit perhaps, but the same compulsions--which resulted in the agreement between these two great countries, in spite of all the vituperation, even in spite of the unwarranted breach of the moratorium some time ago and the threat of continuing explosions in the world, in spite of all that and in spite of the repressions that go on in the world, and in spite of the position we are in, shall we say, in the Congo, in Algeria or in all these places, have resulted in progress and there is every hope that in this method of direct negotiation by those who are most immediately concerned and who must speak with that degree of responsibility without turning to other people, there probably lies the solution.

Once more I would like to say that my Government has been of this view for a very long time, and I want to repeat that it is in no

sense an escape from our own responsibilities. It is an acceptance in humility of the realities of this world. We are dealing with a problem of power. We are dealing today with the problem of the infinite capacity of destruction, and the destruction of that power. It is only those who arm that can effectively lay them down. We can appeal to them, we can argue, we can show the wisdom of it and so on, but obviously these arms have been amassed by the parties concerned for what we must assume are the desire to preserve their own security and for other good reasons. Therefore, they are the only people who can lay their arms down and the agreement between them is the vital part of any movement forward. In fact we may say, by definition almost, that the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is the key to the opening up of a new chapter.

The Government of India, therefore, wishes to submit to the Assembly its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.299), that these two countries now be asked by the Assembly to get together, to submit both the composition and the modalities of this negotiating body to implement the purposes which they have agreed upon between themselves and which have been universally welcomed not only by the United Nations but by the entire world, and which, for most unsophisticated people presents not only a ray but a considerable amount of hope and expectation.

INDIA USA PERU RUSSIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC YUGOSLAVIA ALGERIA CONGO

**Date :** Nov 20, 1961

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### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri Krishna Menon's Statement on the granting of independence to Colonial Countries

Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made a statement in the General Assembly on Nov 20, 1961 on the peoples.

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The following is the text of his statement:

Mr. President, my delegation asked to speak primarily for the purpose of introducing a draft resolution regarding West Irian (A/L.367). Since you have granted us your kind permission, we have been able to arrange with the delegation Of Indonesia to take its place at this meeting, and in order to save the time of the Assembly, we thought it

best to deal with the subject--on which we would have intervened, in any case, as regards this resolution.

I should like--if I may be permitted--to express our own view with regard to this general debate on colonialism. We have moved so far forward that some of the speeches we make may, perhaps, look a little redundant.

The decision to terminate colonial rule was taken by this Assembly at its last session; and many speeches were also made at the resumed session. A great many speeches were made on the conditions of colonial countries and on the dangers of not putting an end to them. Now in these buildings to day, whether we take the Fourth Committee, this Assembly, or some of the other Committees, at every turn, this problem comes up; and like disarmament--while not quite like disarmament, to a lesser degree, perhaps--though we have been talking for many years about disarming, we seem to build up arms. In the case of the colonies, no new colony has come into existence, but the rear-guard action is being fought; and, unfortunately, in regard to some people, empires seem to die so hard.

But let me state the position of my Government. We no longer regard the termination of colonialism a matter of agitation or demand by the ex-colonial countries or the present colonial countries. It has now become a matter for the United Nations, because they adopted this resolution practically unanimously (1514) (XV), and, what is more, called upon them to terminate their rule. So, it is no longer a question of yielding to agitation on one side or even going into the merits of the problem. We have taken a decision on this. All that is required is for those people who are still in possession of power authority--whatever the legalities or modalities may be--to surrender, and we will thereby be able to save the time of the Assembly--what is more, prevent new Congos from developing, or new Angolas, new Algerias, etc., and what is more, see the end of the old Algerias, the old Congos and the old Angolas.

Now we have before us this General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which--considering the gravity of this subject--except for its preamble, is brief, and it points out that the subjection of any people to alien subjugation or domination constitutes a denial of human rights.

But there is nothing in this draft resolution not already found in the Charter. The difficulty in human affairs in the world is not that there are not enough laws, ethical codes and so on, but that people do not obey them.

At the same time, it would be wrong for us to think that great advances have not been made. I do not know but these ex-colonials seem to monopolize the Chair of this meeting, whether it be in the person of the President or in the person of the Vice-President who now occupies the Chair. We heard from this rostrum only a few years ago--five, six, seven years ago--their countries demand their

independence, and not only have they become independent territories but their representatives preside over the destinies of the great Organization. These are matters which we may sometimes forget, but if all Member States remember them then they would see the greater enormity of their offence in continuing colonial rule; because once the incubus of empire is released, there is released into the world not only the liberty of those people but also their vast energies, the removal of their frustrations and the extension of the area of liberty in this world as well.

In regard to resolution 1514 (XV) we have now passed from the stage of demands, justifications, or even of complaint, to the point of implementing it. That is to say, our purpose is now to carry out the decisions of the Assembly--and when I say "our purpose" I mean not only colonials and ex-colonials, but the entire Assembly must now be involved in the more practical task of dismantling the empires so that the territories will be returned to their respective peoples, under conditions in which their freedom can be enlarged and implemented. Thus will be corrected some of the imbalances that exist, since this world cannot exist half free and half slave, even as countries cannot do so.

I address myself now to the draft resolution now before the Assembly, document A/L.366. I have no desire to discuss it paragraph by paragraph, but I shall deal with some of its operative parts.

We regret it is necessary to introduce this draft resolution. My country, both here and as a member of the Trusteeship Council for four or six years as the case may be, has always been, in principle, against setting a date by the

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calendar. It is not because we are afraid that colonies will be liberated too fast but because we think setting a date by the calendar exempts ruling Powers from the responsibility of moving along in time with the context of events: And I remember very well how a few years ago when the question of Tanganyika came up there were members in the Trusteeship Council who wanted its independence realized in ten years; the ruling country at that time thought it would be fifty years. But in a few days Tanganyika will become an independent territory and no doubt will soon become a Member State of this Organization.

With regard to the very country of the President of this Assembly, at one time the escape from liberation was to argue that it was not a colony--I will come to that in a moment when I shall deal with our friends in Portugal. They are not our pet diversion; they are problems as far as we are concerned and we must look at them.

Now, in the terms of the draft resolution, we are asked to solemnly reiterate and reaffirm. That does not require any support from anyone. But we go further and say that this draft resolution

represents a degree of compromise to a great number of people, so that there should be no one in this Assembly who does not vote for it.

Last year when resolution 1514 (XV) was passed, we called upon the colonial Powers to take immediate steps to implement it. That is to say, some steps had to be taken, irrespective of calendar dates, so that no colony would today be what it was then when that resolution was adopted. And to the extent that a metropolitan Power has not acted in this way, or a colonial country has not at least seen a degree of greater freedom than before, to that extent this resolution stands dishonoured by that Member State and that must be regarded as a blot on its record in this Assembly.

Therefore this year we have removed from that position to the position of implementing the decisions of the Assembly. The Assembly is master of its own procedure and once it has, practically unanimously, arrived at this decision it is right that it should, within its competence and the four corners of the Charter, establish the machinery for this purpose. Thus operative paragraph 3 of this draft resolution asks that a special committee of seventeen members be set up, to be nominated by the President of the current session of the General Assembly.

My delegation is particularly happy that this nomination is to be undertaken by the President of the Assembly, because it will take this matter away from the context of the cold war and all the arguments about problems of cartography, that is to say, whether in this map this belongs to Asia and that to Africa and so on. So the President in his wisdom and in the normal course of business here, in consultation with the various parties concerned, will exercise his judgment and appoint a committee of seventeen people, not for the purpose of inquiring whether these colonies are fit or unfit for liberation, but to implement liberation, that is, the process of unwinding these empires.

That committee will examine the application of the Declaration and make suggestions whereby it can be quickly put into effect. It is not suggested that this committee is either a new trusteeship council or a new super-State, or has vested in it some sort of condominium over these areas; the purpose of this committee will be merely implementary to try to put into operation the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV).

We unfortunately anticipate the fact that, in spite of unanimous decisions of the Assembly, there are countries--and fortunately very few of them--which do not co-operate with the Assembly in the implementation of its resolutions. For years this Assembly has been unable to obtain the co-operation of the party directly concerned in respect of resolutions adopted on racial discrimination and therefore, even as early as 1954 or 1955, we set up committees where inquiries were undertaken in other parts of the world.

All of you know that in the Fourth Committee, for the last two years, we have been struggling hard in order to persuade the Government of Portugal to perform its duties under the Charter; and for a long time even those we thought would know better had been under the impression that the submission of information on colonial territories was an act of grace. It is nothing of the kind; it is an obligation placed by the Charter on colonial countries that they must submit information, with certain limitations, in regard to their dependent territories. This is now accepted, and I am glad to think that, only a few hours ago, another resolution on the subject of Non-Self-Governing Territories also of a character intended to further the process of decolonization, was adopted, calling upon metropolitan countries to take steps to help the emergence of adequate indigenous civil servants and technical personnel independent territories to effectively implement Assembly resolutions (A/C.4/L.709).

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That particular point, although it has not yet come here, is a matter of great importance, especially when we look at it in the context of Congo. There is no greater condemnation of colonialism than what is taking place in the Congo--and I am not thinking so much of the return of the Belgians or the mercenaries or all about Tshombe, or anything of that kind. The very fact that a metropolitan country, after years of rule, leaves a territory in that state of anarchy where, after its withdrawal, civil war and outside intervention follow provides the worst picture of colonial rule that has come before this Assembly.

The other paragraphs of this draft resolution empowers this special committee to go outside the Headquarters of the United Nations. This does not mean that we are empowering this committee to negotiate with sovereign Governments in regard to their colonial territories. But in many cases it is not possible to obtain this information here, and in the case of one or two countries with which we have had experience they do not permit United Nations delegations to enter those places and therefore we must empower this committee to meet wherever it feels desirable in order to obtain the desired information and discharge its trust.

Other paragraphs are concerned with the more constructive part of asking the Trusteeship Council, the Committee on Information, the specialized agencies, etc. to work in their respective fields towards this end. I need hardly labour this point any more except to refer to those parts of the colonial empire which have not honoured this resolution and where they still seem to be living in conditions of many decades ago.

On this matter I repeatedly said here that we always recognize and pay tribute where we can for progress made. While the British Empire still has something like thirty or forty colonial areas and some 30 or 40 million people under its rule, this vast Empire on which it was said the sun never set and stretched over the seven seas and covered

all these continents, in that place the process of unwinding has taken place. We ourselves take some pride in thinking that we encouraged this process of unwinding. But still there are these territories, some of them like Tanganyika, and I hope that the territories of British East Africa, will soon join us as independent countries. I would like to express the hope that there will be no attempt made to take away with one hand what is given with the other, because any attempt to dilute the degree of national independence that is given, will kick back in a very bad way because the responsibility, in sense of the exercise of power, will have moved away with the metropolitan country and at the same time it will not have become planted in the colonial people themselves.

So there is this vast territory of the former British Empire still left, and in some cases--and I make no reservation in this matter--like that of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, we are awaiting with bated breath to see what is happening, because in the beginning of this century, under the impact of nineteenth century liberalism, the British Empire conferred what was called independence upon a minority of people in that land of the Union of South Africa, which is about 200 years behind modern, civilization in these matters, with the result that a small minority was given "independence" to oppress the others.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, geographically, politically, emotionally, and "morally" is contiguous to the Union. In the three territories of Swaziland, Bechuanaland, Basutoland which have geographical troubles, and in the Trust Territory--which ought to be the Trust Territory of South West Africa--are special problems. If they merely follow independence, without following the contents of it, we shall again condemn millions of people to a domination and a racialism of a small minority. That is why my country keeps vigilance over this matter. We have no desire to retard the progress of Rhodesia, or Rhodesia and Nyasaland. We have no desire to pronounce on the merits or otherwise of federation or non-federation. But we are concerned to see that the African and Asian populations and others who do not belong to the ruling race as such, do not become the helots of an empire and do not have the same kind of democracy that the Greeks had 2,000 years ago when the fortunes and the liberty of 300 people depended upon the suppression of 30,000. Therefore, while we shall keep vigilance on that, we shall not thereby subscribe to the perpetuation of empire. The United Kingdom has a responsibility to itself in this matter, and to its partners in the Commonwealth, to the good example it has set in the last few years by speeding up the process of liberation that in the name of liberation more people shall not be condemned to racial helotry.

We go on from there to the classic piece of the twentieth century empire, the empire of Portugal. This comparatively small country in Europe has--I believe I am right about my figures--somewhere about 1.3 million square miles of territory under its domination in Africa and in Asia and there live more people than in Portugal itself.

Now here is probably not merely a perpetuation of colonialism but an attempt on the one hand to lead this Assembly into the wrong ideas by saying this is part of Portugal. I would like you to examine this not merely from the point of view of verbal terminology. But when a country says that another person's territory is its own, then it not only does not take the position of the other metropolitan countries--shall we say Britain for example which always said "we own this territory, we hope some day they will be free"--that some day may be 500 years hence--but in the case of Portugal it means that not only for today but for all time they deny independence for the colonial peoples by saying that "you are not colonial peoples". That is their way of doing it: "you are not colonial peoples, you are part of Portugal", But if they are part of Portugal then they ought to have the civic rights and all the equalities that go with it.

So here is a Member of the United Nations that not only for today, not only for tomorrow, but for all time will deny the homeland of people to the people to whom it really belongs. And does anyone think, when the mighty British Empire thought it both politic, part of wisdom part of common sense and part of decency to abdicate her power in her great Indian Empire, does anyone think that the small territory in India which Portugal regards as Portugal is going to remain in subjection? Does he think that our desire not to foment warlike actions anywhere, nor to take direct action, nor to create more difficulties in the world than there are, is going to endure for long?--because peoples will not remain suppressed.

The other day speaking in the Fourth Committee, because the representative of Portugal had challenged some statements made by our Prime Minister, I had occasion to reiterate that we as a State have not abjured the use of force. There are large numbers of people in India who are pacifists, who will not use force. Gandhi's teachings are against force. But as a State we maintain an army, a navy and an airforce, and I hope a competent one. Therefore we have not abjured the use of force. We have signed the Charter, willing to place at the disposal of the United Nations the armed forces of our country. And therefore if aggression continues for ever, if our people are subjected to being shot in cold blood, if there is no civil liberty and if the peace and security of our land on the one hand and of the world as a whole is being endangered by the continuance of conflicts of our territory, no one has the right--not under the Charter of the United Nations--there is no law of morality, no law of political ethics, no law on international behaviour to prevent a sovereign land like ours seeking to complete the liberation of our entire country.

To us, as is often said in India, Goa is part of unfinished business. That is to say, there were three colonial Powers on our territory, one was Britain, the largest of all. We have dealt with them and that is all that really matters. Then came France, which had seven enclaves in our country and by patient negotiations we brought about a state where at any rate the de facto transfer of these territories,

small as they are, have taken place and I do not think that the de jure transfer can be very long.

We have for long tried to negotiate, maintained our missions in Lisbon, negotiated with these people. We have, even when they went to the World Court on some grounds which were not tenable, when they wanted to claim the right of way on our sovereign territory in order to suppress their colonials. We have always observed the Charter and the law of nations.

What I said the other day at the Fourth Committee, remains the policy of my Government. We shall not use force if we can avoid it. But when a time comes and aggression continues in such a way, when thousands and thousands of people are subjected to this situation, when our public opinion can brook it no more when their own brothers are being slaughtered, when it becomes also an arena of international intrigue, then, as a sovereign country, we retain our right to take whatever action we please, subject to the law of nations. That is all we said and that remains the position.

But having said that much even as an element of context, we do not rush in these matters because we believe that the use for force, whatever may be the justification, always has other consequences. But it is not possible for a sovereign nation adequately conditioned for its defences and for the maintenance of dignity and sovereignty to keep quite for long. This is in no sense the language of violence. It is not by the way of a notice to Portugal or anything in that character. But our people are impatient and our Government has been engaged in the last so many years in restraining that impatience and we cannot for long suppress impatience which is based upon very legitimate grounds and upon the desire to be free.

Now that covers some of the territories in Asia.

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In Africa there are Angola and Mozambique, and other territories where today cruelty of a character which was not known in imperial times for hundreds of years, is being practised. There are people who have been victims of the crime of murder, persons in large numbers driven away from their homes, together with their families. There are large numbers of refugees. A type of repression is practised that not only is not consistent with the Charter but also is not consistent with the conduct expected of Members of the United Nations. We have not brought this up previously in any forum except to draw the attention of other Member States--and of public opinion--to it, and I hope public opinion will take note of it as public opinion will be the most effective solvent for all the world's evils, as it has today moved to the position that this country has no friends in the maintenance of its empire. We are one of those people who desire to remain friendly with them; our people have been associated with Portuguese civilization, although through the channel of conquest, for three or four hundred years. There are people who speak the

language as in the case of Pondicherry; it is not our desire, in the context of the independence or the liberation of these areas, to wipe out what has been historically built up.

But, at the same time, the imperialism of Portugal is one of those things that makes a mockery of this resolution. Here is a comparatively small country. It is quite true--it has powerful allies. And again, without any offence to any one, any of the great Powers, we should like to say that the armed alliance of colonial countries with others cause us concern, because that might--as in the case of Algeria, where, we are told, nearly half of the French airforce and a considerable part of France's navy are deployed in the suppression of the Algerian people--cannot last for long. Many countries in the world have now recognized the Provisional Government of Algeria. Many others do not. It is only an exercise of discretion and patience. It will not be long before France will have to recognize that there are no two ways, today, in 1961, of dealing with colonial territories. Either one remains there and faces the consequences, or one leaves and conforms to the principles of the Charter. Consider, therefore, the French empire in Africa where, in addition to everything else, among other things there has been the use of those territories and that neighbourhood for the purpose of nuclear weapons experiments, much against the desires and without the consent of the African peoples.

So these are the unfinished parts of the colonial business; that is why twenty-eight speakers have spoken in this Assembly, during the last five or six meetings, and I think, in a sense, it is an economic use of our time. We have made these decisions and now we must go on. It says in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution now before you (A/L.366) that a special committee should be appointed. I have no doubt at all that the President will take these steps after the draft resolution has passed the Assembly.

Now, there are two other draft resolutions before us--one submitted by Nigeria (A/L.357) and the other by the Soviet Union (A/L.355). My delegation at an appropriate time, perhaps, will have something to say about it but while I am at this rostrum, I want to say here, without any reservation whatsoever, that the Government of India will not subscribe to operative paragraph 1 of the Nigerian draft resolution (A/L. 357), whatever else it may do, because that paragraph sets a target date of 1970. Well, we did not set a target date for Nigeria; and Nigeria set no target date for itself. For part of Africa to remain colonial till 1970 is long and, again, this date 1970 only refers to Africa. There are colonial territories in the Caribbean; there are colonial territories in Asia, Timor in the Pacific, Macao off the Chinese coast, and Goa on our own continent--all these other territories--and this draft resolution refers to a target date of 1970 only for Africa. So by no stretch of imagination will the Government of India subscribe to this calendar date. It is for the same reason that we do not want to subscribe to any calendar date. It is for the same reason that we do not want to subscribe to any calendar date. The end of 1962 may be too long for some people;

at any rate, it also creates a situation. If by the end of 1962 something does not happen, then this resolution becomes a mockery. Our position, therefore, is that independence must be immediate; we do not want to go by the calendar. And the only way of making it immediate is to take steps that will unwind the empire, not by gradual stages but we agree with the sentiments expressed in the desire for shortness of time.

The uncommitted nations which met at Belgrade discussed this at great length and then they all came to the conclusion that it was not in the interest of the liberation of colonies to set dates by the calendar, but to demand it by the pace of events. There is no reason why we should set 1962, because we have said that neither their qualifications nor examinations they should pass are the test of the liquidation of empire. The rulers have no right to be there and the peoples have a right to be free and that is all there is to it.

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As I have said, today in this Assembly are many representatives of countries that were colonies only two years ago, five years ago, eight years ago, or ten years ago, who are performing important tasks in the service of humanity.

This brings me to the next part, which is in regard to West Irian. Now West Irian is a subject on which this Assembly has a great deal of information, because year after year we have discussed it in great detail in the First Committee. I hope I will not be misunderstood when I say that the draft resolution submitted by the Netherlands--while we cannot accept it and the Indonesians have not accepted it since it goes contrary to large chunks of history--does, at any rate, represent a change. It means that the Netherlands are coming here saying they will honour--they will honour--their commitment to unwind their empire. Of course I do not suppose this applies to their Caribbean empire--but they will unwind their empire. But having said that, I am informed that in the last speech made on this subject by the Netherlands, they made it very clear that nothing was going to happen for a year. And so--while I have no desire to discuss the merits of it, the draft resolution we have submitted (A/L. 367) is of another character; it asks for this matter to be the subject of direct negotiation. It suggests that, in view of the history of this matter and the desire that must prevail in this Assembly among all concerned that, as far as possible--if it is at all possible--the changes must be peaceful; that further attempts should be made for bilateral negotiations, bilateral discussions, between the two main parties concerned.

Now, you may well ask what is our position in regard to the question. I would, therefore, without entering into the merits of it and without asking the Assembly to commit itself to it, try to place our reasons before the Assembly. Now, the basis of the present situation in West Irian is what is called the Linggadjati Agreement of 1950. Article 1 of this Agreement says that "the Kingdom of the Netherlands

unconditionally and irrevocably"--if those words mean anything, and I hope the Assembly will notice this--the Kingdom of the Netherlands, that is, the Dutch Government, "unconditionally and irrevocably transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and thereby recognizes said Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign State."

At the convention, Indonesian representatives supported that West Irian has always been part of Indonesia. Now I am told that the Netherlands delegation here has referred to our support of the proposition, submitted to the Fourth Committee, and afterwards adopted by the Assembly, in regard to the submission of information--and, if I may say so, either it is a misunderstanding or is likely to be a misrepresentation. I do not say so, is a misrepresentation by the Dutch, but that is the result. When the question of the submission of information in regard to West Irian came before the Fourth Committee, the Government of India reserved its position.

It said the submission of information is in regard to Territories which are dependent in actuality, irrespective of the question of sovereignty. If those territories are dependent, if their administration is in the hands of somebody, rightly or wrongly, as was the case of Tunisia and Morocco, where we argued that Tunisia and Morocco were not colonies but countries which had entered into an alliance with France many years ago and which, under the Treaty of Algeciras, were to retain their sovereignty, and we asked for their restoration of their independence. We simply asked for the return of territories that were factually dependent; and we made our reservation at that time, and our subscribing to the idea of their coming under Article 73 does not argue West Irian into a separate territory, which is a Dutch colony. West Irian, so far as the Government of India is concerned, is an integral part of Indonesia.

But, in all these matters, when great changes are taking place, we believe there is room for discussion and understanding. So, as the Netherlands has decided, according to its draft resolution, to withdraw from West Irian, then the question of to whom it should go should be a matter for discussion and common agreement. I should also like to say that we cannot agree to what has been set out in the Netherlands draft resolution, namely; that the United Nations should appoint a commission for Netherlands. New Guinea composed of so and so, because this means that the question of sovereignty--at worst, or at best, or whatever you like to call it--is under dispute. This particular paragraph prejudices that question. We are quite prepared, for the purpose of the sixteenth session of the Assembly, to leave this in abeyance and to allow Indonesia and the Netherlands to sit, under the aegis of the President of the Assembly, in order to find a way whereby this unwinding process can take place.

We should like to express our appreciation of the fact that the Netherlands Government has offered to spend a considerable amount on the

economic development of this territory. But no amount of economic aid can ever be a substitute for the freedom of people. It may be argued that the West Irians are entitled to self-determination; if that is so the Assembly would have to decide that, and whatever emerges in regard to the question of sovereignty, under your kind guidance, Mr. President, that would be of some value to the Assembly. But if the position is that every country has to come here and submit itself to that doctrine of self-determination, then I think every village, every state and every municipality would have to become independent territory.

The position of the Government of India is that West Irian is a colonial territory having been administered by the Netherlands, and under the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement whose sovereignty has been transferred. But I do not want to argue the merits of this at the present time because our desire is not to create any difficulties in regard to this. We firmly believe that, having regard to what has happened in the last five or six years, and the recognition of large numbers of Dutch people and of Indonesian people of their own interests, another period of direct negotiation, with such good offices as you can exercise, Mr. President, would lead to our finding a solution, which in the past was not possible.

Now, some people may ask: Is this not a process of evasion, are you not escaping something? Our answer to that would be: one year ago, two years ago, five years ago, no one would have thought that the imperial country of the Netherlands would come here and say that it is prepared to withdraw from that territory. But at the present moment, for their going they prescribe something in regard to the future of this territory. The answer of the Indonesians, as far as I understand it, is this: that they have no right to give this away because it is not theirs to give away.

Now, for the purpose of this particular session, we would submit that our draft resolution (A/L.367) might perhaps lead to a termination of imperial rule of the Netherlands in West Irian, thus enabling the people of West Irian to be joined with those of Indonesia; in fact, West Irian is very much like Goa, except of course that there are no Linggadjati Agreements in connexion with it. It is part of the continent of Indonesia and, as we have said here, having considered the question of West Irian in the context of this colonialism liquidation resolution and having regard to the history of the question--if we look back on its history--there has been no West Irian, there has only been Indonesia. There was no West Irian before the Linggadjati Agreement there was only Indonesia. This particular residency was kept back and so on. There can be no doubt that the Netherlands have another side to this question. Having regard to the history of this controversy, considering that it is an unresolved dispute--which is not under discussion--there is a dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands or, from our point of view, not a

dispute in regard to sovereignty but a dispute in regard to how these things ought to be adjusted.

"Having heard the statements of the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia"--if the Foreign Minister of Indonesia on behalf of his Government and people were able to accept the proposition put forward by the Netherlands, we would not be here to argue the finesse of constitutionality; but no Government in Indonesia can accept this position because the people of Indonesia are conscious of their situation in the matter. "Being concerned that the continuance of this dispute may result in a further worsening of relations between the two countries"--relations that have deteriorated over a long period of time--and "bearing in mind the desirability of restoring normal friendly relations between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia", which is very necessary, in our submission, for the stability of our part of the world--especially the large Indonesian archipelago which stretches out into the Pacific Ocean and on which certain positions were taken in the Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva last year and which were rather shattering for us--we believe "that a peaceful and agreed solution to this problem is essential".

Operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Indian draft resolution read:

"Urges the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands to engage themselves in further negotiations under the aegis of the President of the General Assembly with a view to finding a solution of the question in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;

"Requests the President to facilitate bilateral negotiations envisaged in paragraph I above under his auspices;

"Requests the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands to cooperate..." (A/L.367).

I submit that this is a resolution that seeks the way of peace rather than the way of conflict.

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Neither party stands to lose anything very much because it was not the intention of the Netherlands Government to do anything for a year anyway. It asked for a commission of inquiry by the United Nations, which would have begged the whole question of sovereignty, and I cannot see--except in the general purposes of the Charter--where the authority could be derived, because there is no trusteeship agreement in regard to it. And then again, today the administration is in the hands of one side and the inquiry going there would be conditioned by that situation.

For all those reasons we have submitted in good faith this very simple resolution, which simply asks that the process of bilateral

talking--which has gone on for a long time--with your kind assistance, Mr. President, may lead to a different situation because we are not where we were two or three years ago.

By the Netherlands Government accepting the resolution on the liquidation of colonialism and their public opinion being willing to see the termination of authority in that area, one of the main difficulties is removed. Then the other difficulty is that, even though Netherlands public opinion may have views with regard to who is sovereign and who is not. It is something that, under the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement and with your own assistance, Mr. President, to these parties to understand their respective positions, we will be able to find some solution.

Let it not be forgotten that in 1946 the position of Indonesia looked as though it might lead to a war of some kind; the Security Council intervened and an independent Indonesia emerged almost overnight. And today it is one of the countries in this Organization which is making an effective contribution to the implementation of the purposes of the Charter. We therefore suggest that the Assembly accept this resolution, which is offered in the context of peaceful solutions. We have put forward our own interpretation--the interpretation of the Government of India and its position--in regard to the sovereignty of Indonesia over all the Indonesian islands, some 3,000 of them in the archipelago. While we have referred to the interpretation of this treaty of 1950 which, in our view, has certain implications, we have not today asked for any decision in this matter. All these documents are here: the Linggadjati Agreement, the colonial resolution, all the discussions that have gone on thereafter. I feel quite certain that in view of the fact that bilateral negotiations have led to results in the past--we have had the recent instance of the United States and the Soviet Union submitting to the Assembly the general principles of a basis of disarmament as a result of bilateral negotiations.

Our country has always advocated, from this rostrum, that people who have differences face each other rather than run away from each other. We think it is better, in the present circumstances--not to introduce other elements--that such mediatory influence, such restraining influence or conciliatory influence as may be necessary, in the context of the argument could be supplied by the distinguished President of the General Assembly itself.

For all those reasons we submit, on the one hand, that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) has now reached the stage of implementation, and this Committee to be nominated by the President should be set up and should get the unanimous approval of this body.

With regard to the particular problem of West Irian, we have just submitted draft resolution A/L.367. and it is a peace offering. This is a situation in which we are interested because we would not like to see any friction and greater conflict taking place in that part of the world. South East Asia is sensitive for many reasons. It is a great archipelago, and we have every reason to think that, once this

problem is resolved, the contribution of the Netherlands to the development of these areas and the general implementation of the purposes of the United Nations would be far greater than otherwise. I submit this resolutions Sir.

INDIA USA INDONESIA CONGO ALGERIA ANGOLA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PORTUGAL SOUTH AFRICA SWAZILAND FRANCE MOZAMBIQUE NIGER NIGERIA YUGOSLAVIA THE NETHERLANDS MOROCCO TUNISIA GUINEA SWITZERLAND

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### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri Krishna Menon's Statement in Trusteeship Committee on Portuguese non-compliance with U. N. Charter

Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following speech in the Trusteeship Committee on Nov 13, 1961 intervening in the debate on the question of Portuguese non-compliance with its obligations under Chapter XI on the United Nations Charter:

Madam Chairman,

My delegation has paid its tribute to your election. Your election to this high office is

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indicative of the changes that are taking place in the world in regard to the colonial empire. As I come here to speak on this subject once again it is a great pleasure to see a representative of an African country guiding the deliberations of this body; there can be no longer any question of competence and incompetence of certain powers or peoples of the world to rule or to govern or to administer their own affairs their own way. I also want to express my deep sympathy for you on the passing away of a colleague of yours which must cause you great grief, and add to the traditional burdens you have to carry in coming here to guide our deliberations.

Madam, there is hardly any need for further speeches on this subject except for the fact that fundamental issues in regard to the competence of the Assembly's resolution of last year concerning Portuguese colonies and the current discussion of this subject have been raised. The trend of affairs in the world, the trend of discussion in this committee coming even from present and former

Metropolitan countries, with the exception, perhaps, of one or two, make it very clear that any argument for the purposes of persuasion is unnecessary. But at the same time Portugal having raised the question that we, on the one hand are practising some kind of discrimination, or, on the other interpreting the law by a process of tortuous construction, are certain things that have to be said for the record.

First of all, I want to say, Madam Chairman, we did not deal with this question of information or the basis on which information is to be given just this year or last year. In fact, the Assembly addressed itself to this matter long before Portugal became a Member of the United Nations. Even at that time, most countries here were ex-colonial countries, and they endeavoured to the best of their ability, mainly for the sake of the United Nations so that it should become a universal Organization, to offer their assistance in the process of decolonisation even though there were factors that prevented that mission. So no discrimination charges can be laid at our door. For example, these factors enumerated in Resolution 742(VIII) relating to the basis for the supply of information, they were not laid down because Portugal refused to give information in spite of the decisions of the United Nations nor because of the reason of the atrocities in Angola, Goa, Mozambique and all these places--these are merely the continuing processes of colonial repression: They arise from the nature of the Charter itself. I am surprised that even some of those who ought to know better keep on harping upon the theme that there is some element of voluntary self-humiliation involved in this matter.

Therefore, I refer to Article 73, Article 73 is an obligation. It does not say to colonial Powers: do as you like. "Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government, it says, recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount and accept as a sacred trust the obligations to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the wellbeing of the inhabitants of these territories and to this end:...to transmit regularly information...etc. etc." They undertake to do that.

Secondly, even without this categorical statement, if a country by its becoming a member of the United Nations accepts as a sacred trust the obligation to promote, etc. or recognises that the interests of the inhabitants are paramount, it thereby accepts accountability, and the accountability in this case is to the United Nations. Therefore, there is no question whatsoever that Article 73, especially as read with Article 74 on the one hand and Article 10 on the other, exempts any country from the obligations so undertaken.

The next argument that is advanced by Portugal and her friends is that this a matter of interpretation. Interpretation became necessary not because any of the other countries had refused to submit

information in the past but in order to restrict or rather to define the nature of information that may come and the factors involved in this.

Furthermore, Madam Chairman, reading through the speeches in this debate, I find, it is said, that two or three years ago when a similar request was proposed in a draft resolution to some countries, it was not accepted by the Assembly. That was so; and, therefore, it came year after year, and the third or fourth year, apparently by a very large majority, the Assembly decided that Portugal ought to submit information. Now we hear the argument that because once a resolution is defeated, and then it is the reversal of that position that there is some legality involved in it. This is a very strange argument. All that we can say is this: the Assembly, out of consideration for itself, and no doubt some of its members out of their susceptibility for Portugal had put this off year after year; and as each year went,

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partly by the fact that the will of Portugal remained unchanging and partly by the fact that there were developments in the world whereby colonialism was becoming more and more out of date like slavery, the opinions began to change. And you cannot argue against this progressive change in opinion. To argue that since in the 13th Assembly a draft resolution was not accepted, in the 14th Assembly it was not accepted, its acceptance in the 15th Assembly was wrong, is like arguing that since metropolitan countries declined to give colonial countries self-government 50 years ago, there is something wrong in giving it now.

Therefore, the decision of the United Nations is not a matter of interpretation. It has come after very careful consideration, The factors to determine the Non-Self-Governing status of a territory and the obligation to transmit information appended to Resolution 748 were formulated in the 8th Assembly. Last year, the Committee of Six countries--and these six countries included three who have in one form or another closer relations with Portugal on the one hand, and two of them definitely are metropolitan countries, even if you exclude the United States from that classification--again gave very careful thought to this whole matter. This Committee formulated 12 Principles which were carefully scrutinised by the last Assembly.

Now then, if you look at the formulation of these Principles in the annex to Resolution 1541 of the 15th Assembly, what does it say?

"The authors of the Charter of the United Nations had in mind that Chapter XI should be applicable to the territories which were then known to be of the colonial type," then meaning at the founding of the United Nations, not when Portugal came in. Therefore, this principle is applicable to all territories which were then known to be of the colonial type. The question then is: Are these territories all under Portugal whether in Africa or other places which are far

larger than Portugal's home territory, with population also larger than that of the home territory--are they colonial territories or not? I will come to that in a moment.

Then, you go further and Principle 4 in this annex states: Prima facie "there is an obligation"--there is no ambiguity in these words--Prima facie "there is an obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate". Now not even this definition of Africa being Portugal or Goa being Portugal or Sac Tome being Portugal can change the facts of geography. These territories happen to be in other continents; and it is Portugal's obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate "and distinct ethnically, and/or culturally from the country which is administering it". I do not think that this principal 4 as formulated by the Assembly after very careful consideration by the Committee of Six Members and careful discussion in this committee permits any ambiguity whatsoever. So, any idea that we are making obligatory what was permissive or was dependent upon what one party might wish or say that is not correct.

Then the next point made by the metropolitan country of Portugal is that these territories of 800,000 sq. miles or whatever it is, with 10 million or 12 million people, they are Portugal, that they are a part of the metropolitan territory and, therefore, are not colonies. Madam, a territory of this kind ceases to be a colony in three ways: either it emerges as an independent sovereign state, which none of them has done, or it votes for free association with the Metropolitan country, which it cannot do because the people are not free, or it must be integrated with or into an independent state--I am prepared to concede that Portugal is an independent state for this purpose and my Government does not want to go into the question of the form of her internal Government: that's largely her business and the business of the Portuguese people, and if that has international consequences those we can consider in another context. But the integration of the independent states, Madam, means that there must be similarity to begin with. Integration, which can be regarded as the attainment of self-government is well set out in another place in these Principles. There must be some degree of similarity: there must be complete equality and other rights and privileges, complete equality of people of the erstwhile non-self-governing territories and the erstwhile colonial power, neither is erstwhile in this case; both territories should have equal status and so on and so forth. In the light of all this it is our view that the Portuguese declaration that its African territories and other colonial territories are an integral part of Portugal is based upon this argument of integration. But let us look at, for example, Africa. And in Portuguese Africa there are probably 10,000 people, some say 30,000, but any way a small number of people who come under the class of assimilados. All the others are people of a different class of citizenship, if you can call it citizenship. In fact, their state is that of bondsmen who have no freedom in the normal sense and cannot be regarded as having this equal status. That is the present situation, but that doesn't stand alone. We can look back in history.

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How did these territories become associated with Portugal?

She is the earliest of the modern colonial countries, having colonized, conquered Angola in 1498, having imposed slavery on what is now the Congo in 1492, having conquered Mozambique in 1507--the oldest of the colonial empires, and she has no colonies of settlement. There is no case of Portuguese empire in history where people have gone to a virgin country and occupied, made it their homeland. They are the acquisitions of conquest and afterwards of exchanging barter with fellow colonialists of that type. That is to say, the boundaries of Portugal's colonies have been settled with the French and with the English and various other people at that time of the same feather and of the same flock. They all have classic characteristics of a colony of conquest. In these places themselves there were often warlike actions, and their biggest expansion came in, as elsewhere in Europe, on the fall of Constantinople when they moved eastward in search of spices, the European nations having learned the art of cooking. And, they went in search of spices all over the world, first in the East and later in Africa, and they captured the spice trade throughout after the fall of Constantinople at the end of the Crusading period. The route to India was discovered by Vasco de Gama in 1498, and he tried to establish an empire in that part of the world of which only the small territories of Goa and other areas now remain, having been beaten in the struggle for colonialism by rival powers, first by the French and then by the British.

Now, to control the spice trade the most valuable was the need of the Indian archipelago, which afterwards became Indonesia, Albuquerque, the ablest of the Portuguese commanders, came to the conclusion that the Portuguese needed a permanent fleet in the Indian Ocean. That does not look as though it was part of a free society. For this they required and secured a naval base with adequate facilities for furnishing and refitting ships, if there were sailors to replace the losses caused by climate and disease, which were the allies of the colonial people in the past. They needed naval fortresses commanding the clearing houses of the Indian Ocean. All the characteristic features of a colonial empire were there. Goa was selected by Albuquerque as a base in 1509 when he became Governor General in succession to Almeida. Goa, at the end of the 15th Century was under the control of the Moslem rulers of Bijapur. Being an island, it was vulnerable to attack by sea. In February 1510 it was attacked by Albuquerque, and in November of that year it was finally subdued and fortified. The stigma of Portuguese remains there to this day. That does not look as though it is integrated with Portugal. It is a colony of conquest.

Then we come to the territory, if you like, of Mozambique. In Mozambique from 1498 to 1891, though I won't go through the whole history of this, following the visit of Diaz, there were attacks,

battles, conquest and the erection of forts. There was ultimately the loss of Mombasa to the British, the separation of Mozambique from the other part of the empire Goa, and further occupation of further territory. In 1886 came the German-Portuguese Treaty, in 1891 the treaty with the United Kingdom to adjust boundaries and to consolidate conquered empires. They are all classic instances of colonial expansion of that period. The history of the territory now known as Portuguese Guinea offers another illustration of this process. Really, all of these are sheer examples of conquest and there is--while you can't unconquer except by granting of independence, there is no factor in history which shows that there was anything in the nature of settlement, or developing a virgin country, or anything of that kind.

Now we come to Angola. From 1559, when Diaz landed in Angola and founded an empire near what is now, I think, Luanda, the process of penetration and conquest went on for 40 or more years. European colonists were sent to Angola in 1597, that is 30 or 40 years after the first conquest. Then too there is a history of wars, with the Dutch and others who followed, and the boundaries of the State of Angola were settled partly with the Belgians who were already in the Congo, with France in 1886, with Germany in 1886, and the United Kingdom in 1891.

So, any arguments that these are non-colonial territories, and by some freak of geography or whatever it may be, they are extensions of the metropolitan area, does not hold good. Therefore, Article 74 and the factors established by the Eighth Assembly, and later by the Fifteenth Assembly as a result of the deliberations of the Committee of Six including the three principles that I have read out are applicable; and Articles 73 and 74 are as binding upon any Member of the United Nations as any other part of the argument.

My delegation submits, also, Madam, that the oft-repeated argument of Article 2 (7) of the Charter doesn't really require any refutation, because the Charter stands as a whole. Article 2 (7) was written in with the knowledge that articles 73 and 74 were there. Article 2 (7) was

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written in with the knowledge that Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of the Charter were there. One document has got to be taken all together. What is more, in Resolution 1541 of the Fifteenth Assembly, there is no doubt left in regard to Portuguese territories. I don't want to read the whole list of them, but if you read this resolution and read the first operative paragraphs, the Assembly takes care to set out seriatim every single Portuguese colony. It does not list Portugal here. It does not mention Portugal as it regards it as the metropolitan territory, but it deals with Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome, Macao and Goa etc.

Therefore, so far as the Assembly is concerned, so far as the Charter

is concerned, so far as the law of the United Nations is concerned, so far as the practice that obtains here is concerned, there is no argument, there is no justification whatsoever in pleading that Resolution 1541 does not apply, that what we are trying to do is to use the mass voting power, if you like, of the anti-colonialists and others, of all people who believe in the principles of the Charter in regard to this matter to discriminate against Portugal. As I said last year too the argument is that everybody, except Portugal, is out of step!

Furthermore, even if it were a matter of interpretation, my Delegation would submit that interpretation is law. All law is made up of statute, principles and natural law, and judicial interpretation. From the time of the Romans onward, whose law the Portuguese respect I presume, even Pretorian time, there has been judicial interpretation. Law, under the same statute, is today different from what it might have been 200 years ago. They interpreted it in the context of social circumstance. Madam Chairman, Portugal was not forced into the United Nations. She made an application to become a member. Her application after many years was admitted by the acceptance by the Security Council who made a recommendation that she may be admitted to membership, this was a voluntary act on her part. She came here with eyes open, with all the customs and the practice and the law that it takes, and therefore when she came into this house she knew how it was constructed and what are the forms of behaviour in this family, and you can't vote yourself out of that in that way.

While I would agree with some of those who spoke before that either the acceptance of a resolution or even the membership of the Organization, does not mean that you accept every detail or accept with every comma and full stop. The membership of the United Nations does mean the acceptance of the Charter and its basic principles and its articles. There cannot be any justification for saying at any time that either Article 73 or 74 is a matter of voluntary acceptance, and the proof of it is that out of the large number of members of the United Nations there is only one country that refuses to submit information. Furthermore, Madam Chairman, may I ask whether this refusal to submit information, which I hope will be a short-lived affair because there will soon be no colonies to submit information about, is it really to the benefit of anybody?

I have not the privilege of sitting through the proceedings of this Committee, but it is my business, at least, to acquaint myself with what is going on. As is common knowledge of this Committee the country that refuses to submit information or thinks it is wrong to submit information--does no good either to itself or to anyone else. The fact is that before this Committee maps, charts, refutations, and everything has also been brought, and if part information is coming, would it not be fair to this Committee, will it not be fair to Portugal itself, that they should be presented in a form that can be examined, that can, if necessary, be refuted by some people, cross-examined by others, and all that done in a proper way? That is, once

a country is a member of this Organization and the item is admitted, the discussion of that becomes inevitable, and as it is inevitable, it is far better that we should have the whole picture rather than allow some of us, maybe either misinformed and misguided, to make statements which Portugal cannot repudiate. I say, that I have no particular claims, either to plead or to advance, as some other people may have. It is in the interest of all concerned that this information should be made available.

We should also note the fact that a country like the United Kingdom, which has from the very beginning submitted information, this year voluntarily came forward before the Assembly and agreed to submit political information which she declined for so long. And while I have no desire to be ungracious about it, there is no doubt that practical men as they are, they realized that it is more useful from their point of view apart from anything else to submit rather than to withhold information. It was more in the fitness of things than that with all the developments going on, the Assembly should know what the political conditions are, that others should be informed that they are doing something or why they are not doing a particular thing.

So while the trend of development is towards submitting more and more information, how can

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a country come forward and say that, first of all, the Charter is wrong, your interpretation is wrong, the Committee of Six, out of which three were metropolitan countries bearing in mind the individual observation I made regarding the United States is wrong, the Assembly is wrong, how can that be regarded as tenable?

It is not the purpose of my Delegation at this stage to go into the detailed comments that we may have to make or castigations we may have to make in regard to the administration of Angola, or the terror that prevails in these areas except to point out that in Angola or in Goa, or whatever it may be, when terror prevails, all the more reason why we should know, all the more reason why Portugal itself should be concerned to either correct what she regards as mis-statements or exaggerations or put the thing in its proper perspective. It is only to that extent that my Delegation and I believe most of the others, agree with the distinguished delegate from the United Kingdom that this is not the place to deal with these matters relating to Angola, and we shall deal with them on another occasion.

Now this draft resolution has been criticised. Naturally, We are a community of 103 nations with different backgrounds, speaking different languages--which in itself tend to cast resolutions in different modes, and we are likely to look at them in different ways. But, as Sir Hugh Foot said a little while ago, we have to either subscribe to something or not subscribe to something in a matter of this kind, not by looking at every comma and every full stop. My colleague from Guinea tried to explain that the word "condemn" did

not mean what it said, and I don't mind; I have no hesitation in confessing that left to ourselves we can not insist about berth and section from our point of view in a general resolution sponsored by some 30 delegations. But when the distinguished delegate of Guinea, who has next door to his home land the sore living example of Portuguese Guinea, when he comes forward and says that there is no wholesale condemnation of the people with Government of Portugal involved, but of certain political, social, economic, and human circumstance that exists, that it is a particularly evil that is being disapproved, then, I should have thought, that was a very generous contribution towards the explanation of this resolution. We hope that this will be the last time that a resolution of this kind is passed; that the Government of Portugal will be willing to come forward, obtain and place before this Assembly what information it has--and the information it has would not be very much, because it is not given to the colonial empires of this kind. There is so much indirect rule. She can't bring all the labourers, contractors over here or even get the information that is required, but it would be possible for us to know that forced labor prevails, that there is a police state in these areas, there is no civil liberty of any kind, etc.

Now, I am not anticipating what this report will be, if it comes. But what I have stated, I stated deliberately, because the time has come, Madam Chairman, for the United Nations to accept the position that United Nations resolutions having been ignored, having been treated contemptuously by the power concerned in spite of the obligation that she has undertaken under the Charter in spite of the fact that she had expressed repeatedly in what appeared in 6, 7, 8 years, or probably more, a desire to become a member of this Organization, that if one side will not cooperate, then it is for us to perform our duty, and that duty cannot be of a character where we force the doors of these colonies open, even if we could. That is not the practice of the United Nations. We are entitled to obtain information, to try together in the proper way by asking the persons whom we may expect to be in possession of them. If they will not do that, then it is necessary that the World Assembly should keep itself informed. That is what happens everywhere, and I think the draft resolution contemplates that situation where without violence to the Charter, without violence to the sovereignty of nations, it is necessary that we should possess ourselves of these facts, so that the liquidation of colonialism may be speeded up, that some light or reason and truth will be turned upon this large iniquitous area of the world where prevails the state of affairs which is at least 500 years out-of-date. The conditions that obtain in the Portuguese colonial empire are as out-of date as slavery, and share all the characteristics of slavery at its worst period.

I would like here to quote what has been said by my colleague from the United States:

"All members of the United Nations have a responsibility to advance the principles laid down in the Charter and specifically, those of

articles 73 and 74. Member States are also committed to seek solutions through peaceful means as called for in the Charter, and a number of relevant resolutions, including General Assembly Resolution 1542. In the current debate over-riding a consideration"--and I subscribe to this--,"must be the welfare of the people of the territories under Portuguese administration"--That

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is laid down in Article 73. That is what they accepted when they came in.--"It would serve no useful purpose for the Government of Portugal to be led to believe that Portugal was singled out by the United Nations for destructive criticism; on the contrary, it should be given reasons to believe that all Member States are genuinely interested in helping to create conditions which would lead to self-determination."

That last part is important in view of the non-cooperation of Portugal. The only way that we can give reason to believe that Member States are genuinely interested is to trying by genuine methods, by bonafide methods to obtain information ourselves; and, therefore, we must look to those, who expressed this view, to give us their support.

It has also been argued that my Delegation had suggested that there was some legality in the Portuguese position. I referred to it, last year, as legal fiction. It is quite true, Madam Chairman, that perhaps, out of misplaced generosity, I referred to the Portuguese position as a legal fiction. With your permission, though you were not the Chairman last year, I am quite prepared to withdraw the word "legal." It is just a fiction and nothing else. I said that out of courtesy--legal fiction, the legal fiction of making colonial territories, the conquered territories of Africa and Asia part of Portugal by an amendment to their own constitution. That amendment does not do anybody any good, because the Committee on Factors of the Eighth Assembly and the Committee of Six of last year without doubt, explained to you that these criteria thus established are supposed to apply to the colonies as they existed in the days of in San Francisco, and the amendment of the Portuguese Constitution is a municipal act of a later day. It has no relation to us. These territories were colonies when the Charter was founded, and any kind of arbitrary alteration in their status thereafter does not in any way change that position. Over and above that, that itself was done, I suppose, out of fear that people may ask questions. If the amendment of the Constitution had taken place with the 100% expansion of civil liberty in the Portuguese empire, then integration as envisaged in the factors set out would have taken place, that is not the situation. That is not the situation at all.

References have also been made by the various speakers, and I believe it appears in the draft resolution also about the kind of action that should be taken by Member States in regard to the Portugal with respect to her non-cooperation with the United Nations. I would like

to submit the view of my country that this is not a vindictive act of any kind. There must be pressures exercised in various ways, and certainly from the United Kingdom (paragraph 8), the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom said: "We agree with the object of paragraph regarding support and assistance. We have certain obligations in the military field towards Portugal as a fellow member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are; of course, binding upon us,.....etc." I am glad to see the first part which says that the United Kingdom agrees that certain action short of sanctions may be taken in this way to express the disapproval of other countries in regard to Portuguese policy about a vast number of human beings. That's what it really comes to. But we are not able to subscribe to the idea that a military alliance can be utilised by a country directly, indirectly, either obviously overtly or covertly, for the purpose of expanding or maintaining colonial power. If we agree to that, our position in regard to France and her actions in Algeria, all these things would stand challenged, whatever our views may be with regard to military alliances--that is a thing by itself, and we are not commenting on that. If it is found that the military assistance given as a result of an alliance strengthens the recipient country in its colonial grip, then, whether you like it or not, the military alliance becomes an ally of colonialism. How can you escape that fact? It is no use saying, the assistance is given for a different purpose. I have repeatedly said in various committees: The gun that will fire only in one direction has not been made: much depends upon who is behind it.

So, if Portugal receives economic assistance, technical assistance, weapons or strategic weapons as a result of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and if it strengthens her colonial grip, then the people who give her assistance bear moral responsibility, if not political responsibility.

I have great respect for the present delegate of the United Kingdom, in the Fourth Committee and he knows more than anyone else from his experience of the last 5 or 10 years that no legal argument is going to stop people from obtaining their freedom in colonial territories, whether it be in Eurasia or whether it be in the West Indies or the Caribbean or anywhere else. They will all come into their own.

Two years ago, the then Secretary of State of the United States made express statements in

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regard to NATO, and Goa and my Government at that time drew the attention of the United States Government, and we thought that this matter was at an end. And we have thought that metropolitan countries who were so tied up in these military alliances, thereby indirectly aiding colonial powers, would think it wiser not to say anything about them. But, perhaps, we don't know what is wise for metropolitan countries. They are the authors of these things. My purpose in intervening in this debate is to re-enter in the record that there is

no discriminatory treatment. There is nothing that we ask for except compliance with what is made obligatory by the Charter. I think there is a confusion here between this chapter XI and the following chapter--Chapter XII. Chapter XII deals with trusteeship territories where also sacred trust is mentioned. There the Charter provides for former colonies being placed under trusteeship as a voluntary action, the colonial power and the United Nations there entering into an agreement, trusteeship agreement. But all that does not apply to this chapter. This chapter makes the supply of information, within the restrictions provided in it, mandatory.

Over and above all of this, they have to take into account that the United Nations is not a mausoleum; it is a dynamic Organization which must reflect with all instrumentations the great dynamic forces that play in the world. And it is too late in the day now, especially after what has happened in the continent of Africa lately, for anyone to say that there are certain parts of the world which can be shielded off from the effect of the forces of liberty and of the desire of human beings and of nations to be free of external authority. Since my distinguished colleague from Portugal is very correct and in restrained language has pointed out that my country, and I myself am a stickler for not waiving legal provisions. I were to plead "not guilty." We are not asking for legal provisions. I used the word "legal" fiction last time largely out of courtesy, and right now, with permission, I'll withdraw it and say the whole position is a fiction. There is nothing legal about it.

Furthermore, I think Portugal, in another context she went to the World Court against my country as the opposite party, in claiming he right to walk over our territory in order to enforce colonialism, one of the things she said was that the right to walk over this territory was a matter of interpretation, that interpretation having been accepted by the British, and various other people and since the matter was public knowledge, therefore it was law. In other words, it was like alliance of marriage in a Scottish Court Whose recognition by the public of the fact of union is law. And so Portugal herself has said that even interpretation generally recognized, is part of law. That must be accepted. This interpretation is recognized by 102 nations, or 101 nations--I am sorry, 101 nations--and therefore it is part of law. I don't see how they can get out of this. They can't get out of it by refusing to give information. The more they refuse, the more information we will have, I think. The only thing is it may sometimes be too much exaggerated.

And here is what one of the judges of the World Court, the World Court being an organ of the United Nations, has stated in this matter. Judge Quintana of Argentina, while holding that the Portuguese Government's claims in this connection, that in regard to the Indian case, should have been dismissed, made the following observations.

"To support the Portuguese claim in this case, which implies survival of the colonial system, without categorical and conclusive proof is

to fly in the face of the United Nations Charter.

As judge of its own law--the United Nations Charter--and judge of its own age--the age of national independence the International Court of Justice cannot turn its back upon the world as it is. "International law must adapt itself to political necessities", said the Permanent Court of Arbitration. That is the reason why the Charter made legal provision to cover the independence of non-self-governing territories."

Said the prevalent court of arbitration. That is the reason why the Charter made legal provision to cover the independence of non-self-governing territories.

That brings me to my last observation which I had not intended to make until I saw the Portuguese speeches of the last few days. Reference has been made by the distinguished delegate from Portugal--not the Foreign Minister whose presence we are trying to welcome here--references have been made to some observation made by my Prime Minister regarding the use of force in regard to Goa, which they call Portuguese India. I am glad to hear they call it India, even if Portuguese. Now all we have to do is to get Portugal out: Then it becomes India. Now my country has at no time--may be it will, I hope, in

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the future--has at no time abjured the use of force in international relations, because the world, unfortunately, is so constituted. A few days after our independence the armies of India, ill-prepared as they were, went out into battle in order to repel the first aggressor. There are others who today seek to occupy territory, and if necessary we shall use force against them today. Today there are the Armed Forces of India at the service of the United Nations in the Congo and in other areas. Now if it is good enough for us to use force at the behest of the United Nations, and if necessary, against the violation of our territory, then if Portugal thinks that colonialism is going to endure forever, and, what is more, if the example of Nagar Haveli and other enclaves in Eastern India has been lost upon the Portuguese empire, irrespective of Governments, no public opinion is going to sit back, with the armed might of a country whatever that be, to see part of it crushed under colonial rule forever. And we make no apology for saying that, while we have no intention of taking war-like action against a member of the United Nations, if circumstances should be of a character, if aggression should be perpetrated, we have not abjured the use of force, and we make no apologies for it. But we shall not do what Portugal is doing in Goa, namely, shooting innocent people in cold blood.

INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PORTUGAL ANGOLA MOZAMBIQUE CONGO  
INDONESIA PERU GUINEA FRANCE GERMANY SAO TOME E PRINCIPE OMAN SOUTH AFRICA  
ECUADOR ALGERIA ARGENTINA

**Date :** Nov 13, 1961

## Volume No

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### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri C.S. Jha's Statement on the granting of independence to Colonial Countries.

Shri C.S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made the following statement in the General Assembly on Nov 27, 1961 on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples:

We have had a long and sometimes exhausting debate on the item regarding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. We have reached the stage now of considering and voting on the draft resolutions that are before the Assembly and, with the President's permission, I should now like to state the attitude of my delegation with regard to these draft resolutions.

There are two draft resolutions, one of which was submitted by the Soviet Union (A/L. 355), the other by Nigeria (ALL. 357)--later, another one was submitted by Mexico (A/L. 3(9)), about which I shall speak a little later--which are referable not to any particular territory, but seek to push forward the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of the fifteenth session to colonial and dependent territories in general. These draft resolutions flowed naturally and logically from resolution 1514 (XV). But they incorporate some divergent ideas as to what has been generally described as the target date for independence.

The draft resolution submitted by the USSR, document A/L. 355, inter alia:

"Declares that the final and unconditional liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations must be implemented not later than the end of 1962".

The draft resolution introduced by the Foreign Minister of Nigeria (A/L. 357) refers specifically to dependent and colonial territories and peoples in Africa. Among other things, this draft resolution:

"Solemnly proclaims:

"That all colonial, dependent and Non-Self-Governing Territories and peoples in Africa shall attain independence by, before, and not later

than 1 December 1970".

The very fact that we have two divergent target dates, fairly widely removed from one another, and that these have been suggested by delegations whose solicitude for seeing the end of colonialism is fully established and recognized reveals the difficulties in trying to fix any target dates. The views of my Government with regard to the fixing of any such dates was clearly stated in the statement made by the Chairman of our delegation, Mr. Krishna Menon, on 20 November 1961:

"Our position..."--as he stated--"is that independence must be immediate; we do not want to go by the calendar."

The difficulty about fixing a target date--whether it is 1970 or 1962, or some intermediate date--is that any date is likely to be too long in some cases, and perhaps too short in others, to take the necessary steps for transfer of power, including consultation with the people, and so forth. Apart from this, the fixing of any target date by the Assembly presupposes a certain patronizing, paternal attitude and, to some extent, ignoring the

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views of the peoples concerned. For it is, after all, for the people of the territory to decide in what manner and when they will take over power from their colonial overlords. Even the fixing of a target date of 1952--and target dates have a habit of becoming fixed dates--may be too long for some countries which have been ripe for independence to which the advent of independence has been long overdue, and to which freedom has been persistently denied by the colonial Powers over the years.

We are, therefore, of the view that the best thing that the Assembly can do is to bring the whole weight of its opinion and influence on immediate steps being taken for the transfer of power to the peoples of the territories concerned in accordance with their freely expressed wishes, as laid down in resolution 1514 (XV).

It is significant in this connexion that the recent Belgrade Conference thought it wise not to set any target dates, but to demand freedom by the pace of events.

For all these reasons, we feel that the Assembly should not tie itself up or tie up the pace of events in colonial and dependent territories. The best thing we can do is to persist in demanding that immediate measures be taken by the colonial Powers for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) and to prod them relentlessly and ceaselessly. My delegation, therefore, while fully appreciating the sincerity behind the two draft resolutions, and while agreeing with practically everything else that has been said in these draft resolutions, will not be able to subscribe to the clauses seeking to fix target dates for independence.

A couple of days ago, a draft resolution was submitted by the delegation of Mexico (A/L. 369). My delegation, along with many other delegations, has very great respect for the delegation of Mexico because of the liberal views it has consistently taken, and because of the contribution it has made to the whole question of the freedom of dependent and colonial peoples. We feel, however, that the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution, document All. 369, seek to establish principles and procedures which properly should be the matter of very careful examination by the ad hoc committee, or the special committee, which both this draft resolution, and the Afro-Asian draft resolution--if I may use that expression--contained in document A/L.366, advocates.

In the draft resolution submitted by the Asian-African countries (A/L. 366) it was carefully and purposely left general; that is to say, in operative paragraph 4, it is stated that the special committee was:

"...to examine the application of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration, and to report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session".

Now, we felt, after very careful consideration over several weeks among the group of countries which constitutes a large part of this Assembly--if I may say so--that the best thing was to leave general initiative in the hands of this special committee, and not tie their hands by any definite mandate, or by telling them what exactly to do and what kind of recommendations to make to the assembly in pursuance of their general mandate.

There are also several other difficulties in the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Mexico (A/L. 369). For example, and I shall point out only one or two aspects; operative paragraph I (a) states that the committee will:

"...examine all cases of Non-Self-Governing Territories, both those under colonial rule and those administered by any Power under international trusteeship, in order to indicate which of them are already in a position to attain full independence immediately".

Now, this, to my delegation, seems rather too much to ask any committee to do. It should not be the function of any committee to lay down the law with regard to different territories, as to whether they are fit for independence, and when they will be fit for independence; we believe that that is a paternal kind of attitude. We feel that it is for the people of the territories, their political leaders, to arrange by discussion, by negotiationsometimes, even by armed struggle, and this has happened in the case of colonial countries--to arrange for the date and the manner of the transfer of power with their colonial overlords.

I think that the Assembly might get into very serious difficulties vis a vis the political leaders and political parties in dependent territories if it were to suggest dates or to express views as to whether a particular territory was or was not fit for independence.

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I do not wish to go further into the several clauses of the first, second and third paragraphs which when taken in isolation are, perhaps, not so objectionable--at any rate, in individual cases they may be the right solutions. But we do not think that these are the types of directives that should be given, at this stage at any rate, to the special committee whom we are entrusting with the examination of this whole question of the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). With great regret and with our great respect for the Mexican delegation, nevertheless we will not be able to support this draft resolution, and we hope that the Asian-African draft resolution, which has been prepared very carefully after a great deal of consideration and which has a very large sponsorship, will receive the approval of this Assembly.

We next come to the question of West Irian. Let me say, first of all, that we believe that, considering the importance of this question, its historical background, the fact that it involves a longstanding dispute between two Member States, the Netherlands and Indonesia, and that the Assembly in the past has considered this matter as a specific item on its agenda, we would have preferred it not to come to us incidentally, as it were, as part of the general question of implementation of the Declaration of the Assembly contained in resolution 1514 (XV). The matter is not as simple as that. We feel that the Assembly has to move with circumspection and caution in this matter, if only for the reason that it involves a serious dispute between two Member States and has aroused deep feelings in Indonesia, as indeed it has in the Netherlands and perhaps in many other countries.

West Irian--since the representative of the Netherlands was fairly harsh on our resolution and perhaps doubted our motives, too, I must go into this question a little more in detail than I would have wished to do and explain our position before this Assembly--was a part of the Netherlands East Indies, an entity that was distinctly recognized and recognizable, which had functioned as a unitary and integral territory for over 350 years. Following the end of the Second World War, a bitter war was fought against the colonial Power by the people of Indonesia and, through the good offices of the United Nations in bringing about a cessation of fighting and a settlement, Indonesia attained her independence. The instrument of the transfer of power was the Agreement of 1949, which was arrived at at a round-table conference. The very first article of the Agreement, entitled "Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty" says:

"The Kingdom of the Netherlands unconditionally and irrevocably

transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and thereby recognizes said Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign State." United Nations Treaty Series, volume 69 page 206)

The second clause of Article 1 is also important in this connexion. It says:

"The Republic of the United States of Indonesia accepts said sovereignty on the basis of the provisions of its Constitution which as a draft has been brought to the knowledge of the Kingdom of the Netherlands." (Ibid.)

Clause (f) of Article 2 lays down that with regard to

"...the residency of New Guinea" it is decided "that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands." (Ibid. page 208)

Subsequently, on 2 November 1949, it was agreed through an exchange of letters that the clause "status quo of the Residency of New Guinea shall be maintained" means through continuing under the Government of the Netherlands".

What are we to make of these basic documents and facts? We cannot simply ignore them. Article 1 (1) "unconditionally and irrevocably transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia"... that is the Netherlands East Indies. "The Republic of the United States of Indonesia accepts said sovereignty on the basis of the provisions of its Constitution"--which was a Constitution for the whole of the then Netherlands East Indies--"which as a draft has been brought to the knowledge of the Kingdom of the Netherlands". And within a year from the date of the transfer of complete sovereignty--again irrevocably and unconditionally transferred to the Republic--the question of the political status of New Guinea was to be determined through bilateral negotiations.

It is not our purpose here to adjudicate between the rival claims of the Netherlands and

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Indonesia in regard to sovereignty over West Irian. We are not competent to do so, nor, for that matter is the General Assembly. We believe that each of us is entitled to form our own opinion and judgement. It is the view of my delegation that what was transferred to Indonesia was complete sovereignty, without any subtraction or detraction from it, over the whole of the Netherlands East Indies without any conditions or reservations. Consequently, sovereignty over West Irian as an integral part of the Netherlands East Indies

passed to the United States of Indonesia. What did not go to the United States of Indonesia was the administration of West Irian, which remained with the Netherlands; and the question of political status--not sovereignty--of New Guinea was to be a matter of subsequent discussion and negotiations. Until some years ago, several times negotiations took place but without any result. It was, however, repeatedly reaffirmed that no change in the existing situation with regard to New Guinea was to be made unless specifically agreed to by the parties.

Now, the Netherlands does not agree with this view and considers that in the Agreement of 1949 Netherlands sovereignty over West Irian was held back pending further agreement. There are Members of the Assembly who probably share the view of the Netherlands. At the same time, there are many others who acknowledge and recognize Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian as we do, Taking the best or the worst view--as you please--no one can objectively deny that there is a longstanding unresolved dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia. It is this which lends great complexity to this question and calls for a wise and judicious handling of it in the General Assembly. If this is not done, we fear that the Assembly will be making itself a party to serious difficulties in that part of the world.

The question of sovereignty over West Irian would itself not have been of any great consequence from the Assembly's point of view if it was not fundamentally related to the proposals placed before us by the Netherlands delegation and to the 13-Power draft resolution, which my delegation finds to be only a mild variant of the Netherlands proposal.

Let us examine the Netherlands proposal first. Let me say, to begin with, that it deserves our serious consideration and that, in so far as it indicates, the desire of the Netherlands to relinquish administration over New Guinea, to unwind its Empire, it is to be welcomed and we appreciate it. There are, however, other elements in it which have to be examined carefully and meticulously. First, it proceeds from the assumption, stated clearly in the fifth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/L. 354/Rev. 1. that the Netherlands has sovereignty over West Irian. This, in our view is not so; and in any case the question of sovereignty is in serious dispute. The resolution then proceeds to get the approval, in principle, of the United Nations to United Nations administration through a United Nations development authority, to a plebiscite under United Nations auspices, and proposes the appointment of a commission to establish the conditions and details of implementation of these principles.

All this is to be done without the agreement or consent of Indonesia, whose claims in fact, are ignored altogether. We do not think that this is the right way to settle this long-standing dispute, which has defied solution for the last ten or eleven years and has bedeviled relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands and has aroused deep political passions in Indonesia, as, indeed, also in the Netherlands.

Even a solution which appears to be good has to be reached in the right way. The way in which a solution is reached in matters like this is just as important as the solution itself, and we fear that if the Assembly is rushed into taking any far-reaching decisions in this matter, without endeavouring to reach an agreed solution, it will have a disturbing effect in South-East Asia and, instead of avoiding, may contribute to further dissension and conflicts.

We do not believe that the taking over of West Irian under United Nations administration even temporarily, except by agreement of all the parties concerned, will be in accordance with the Charter. The United Nations Charter does not contemplate nor permit of administration of territories under the United Nations save and except under trusteeship. There is good reason for this because the United Nations was intended as a centre for harmonizing differences and was not intended to become a State or a super State. The framers of the Charter rightly did not wish the United Nations to take over trusteeship in conflict with Member States directly concerned which might bring the United Nations under fire from a State or from its nationalist public opinion. I take the liberty of drawing attention to these obvious aspects to emphasize that there can be no question of the United Nations taking over the responsibility for the administration of West Irian, even for an interim period, without the agreement of Indonesia which, in our view, has sovereignty over the territory in question, and also this cannot be done without a unanimous or near unanimous decision of the United Nations. Likewise, it could not be done without the consent of the Netherlands,

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which actually has administrative control over the territory at present. To do otherwise would be an infraction of the Charter and would bring the United Nations into serious conflict with Member States. The same observations apply to the resolution moved by thirteen countries (document A/L. 368). This resolution does not go into as much detail as the Netherlands resolution but it has the same pattern. It seeks acceptance by the Assembly of the principle of United Nations administration over West Irian and it tacitly assumes Netherlands sovereignty over West Irian; and in this connexion I would draw attention to paragraph 6 of the preamble of the thirteen-Power resolution.

In both these resolutions much has been said about the principle of self-determination. This is, of course, a principle mentioned in the Charter and the right of dependent peoples to self-determination has been reiterated in the General Assembly's resolution 1514 (XIV) to which Members of the Assembly have almost unanimously subscribed. The principle of self-determination, as expounded in the Charter, can only apply in the context of the basic concepts of the Charter, among which are sovereign equality of States and respect for the sovereignty of States. The Charter under Article 1, paragraph 2, itself makes the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples a means of developing friendly relations among nations.

Actually what the Charter says is this, the purposes of the United Nations are to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. And it is quite clear from the wording itself that self-determination of peoples is to be a means for the establishment of friendly relations among nations. We support the principle of self-determination but we cannot agree to the application of this principle in respect of territories and peoples of sovereign and independent States or as a means of settling disputes without the agreement of the States concerned in the dispute and under agreed conditions.

Here if I may digress a little, the representative of the Netherlands in his statement a short while ago from this rostrum strongly criticized our resolution on the grounds that it does not recognize the principle of self-determination and, in fact, he went on to say that it ignores and violates the principle of self-determination. Now, I should like to point out to him that these criticisms are indeed not valid: what does our resolution say? May I invite the attention of the Assembly to the draft resolution in document A/L. 367. There is not a single word in this resolution which can be construed as going against the principle of self-determination. On the contrary, if operative paragraph 1 is looked into, it says,

"Urges the Government of Indonesia and the Netherlands to engage themselves in further negotiations under the aegis of the President of the General Assembly with a view to finding a solution of this question in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter"

And isn't the principle of self-determination incorporated, as well as the principles of the United Nations Charter, in article 1. So how can anyone say that by quoting, that by citing the Charter, we are committing the unpardonable offence of omitting any mention of self-determination or violating the principle of self-determination. I am quite unable to understand that particular argument.

The representative of the Netherlands goes on to say further that our resolution treats the people as non-existent or lifeless. There is again nothing in the resolution that has been presented by India and co-sponsored by some other countries, nothing in that resolution which can be construed to mean that the people of West Irian are a lifeless people. This is a simple resolution, it asks for negotiations under the auspices of the President and that these negotiations find a solution in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

It is a simple resolution, but it is a wise resolution; it does not go into dangerous grounds, it doesn't try to push any particular solution or any particular resolution over the head of one or the other of the principal parties concerned. There is nothing in this resolution which can be construed as pre-judging any issue that may be raised during the negotiations: the issue of self-determination or

the issue of sovereignty, or of some other issue. And we have purposely made this resolution free from any pre-conditions or pre-judgment in order that the negotiations should be held in the best and most propitious circumstances.

The representative of the Netherlands referred to the statement of Mr. Khrishna Menon the other day from this rostrum and what that statement meant was that you cannot apply the principle of self-determination with regard to the peoples of a sovereign territory. The words used in the Charter are self-determination of peoples; and you cannot split up the peoples of any country. If you do that then what is there left? You have to have self-determination in every municipality, self-determination of every ethnic group, of linguistic groups, of religious groups and all that kind of thing. And, surely, nobody in this Assembly, no

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representative of any sovereign state can agree to any proposition which means a fractionation of his peoples into different peoples; the world has enough troubles of this sort as it is today. Are we going to push this principle of self-determination, however good it might be, to destroy the integrity of States and to affect the sovereignty of countries? It is in that context that he made that remark. We are not against the principle of self-determination when it is applied under the proper conditions, under the proper circumstances, under agreed conditions; but to push the principle of self-determinations in every dispute, the fractionation of the peoples of a country, peoples of a sovereign State, is, I think, something that the founders of the Charter never contemplated and something which, if we decide it and if we make that a precedent, we should all rue the day that we did it.

I have taken this much time to digress from my written statement because we do not want any kind of misunderstanding about our proposal. It is open to delegations to accept it or reject it. They are masters of their own wishes. But to say that this has a bad motivation or that it ignores or violates the Charter, or certain principles of the Charter, is, I submit, a criticism which is not justified in the least.

With regard to the 13-Power draft resolution, this resolution, while asking for negotiations, fixes a time limit of 31 March 1962 and seeks to commit the Assembly to the appointment of an inquiry committee in the event of no agreement being reached until that date. This, with all respect to the sponsors of the draft resolution who, as I have already said, have certainly approached this question with sincerity, seems to us a rather unrealistic approach. How can one expect a dispute which has remained unresolved for the past ten years to be settled in a matter of three months? It is hardly fair to the parties to pressure them in this fashion and to hold the threat of a United Nations inquiry commission or other action over their deliberations. In so far as the 13-Power draft resolution accepts the

principle of direct negotiations, it represents a very good step and an advance. Until such negotiations take place it is obvious that the parties have the best chance of success in conditions which do not prescribe a time limit or pre-or post-conditions and which permit the maximum flexibility of approach by both sides to the negotiations.

My delegation believes that the only line the United Nations can take is to get negotiations going between the parties and to assist them in this process. When two Member States are deadlocked in a long-standing dispute of this character, there is no substitute for negotiations. Any dictation by the United Nations would be pointless, unwise and against the spirit of the Charter. Indeed there is no instance, as far as I know, in which the United Nations has sought to settle a dispute between two Member States over the head of them. May I cite, in this connexion, the recent debates and the outcome of such debates in the Special Political Committee on the dispute between Austria and Italy on the treatment of the German-speaking minority in Bolzano. The Assembly in that case decided last year and the Special Political Committee has taken a decision this year not to press any particular solution or even lay down any particular method of negotiation or conciliation without the agreement of the parties.

It is for the reasons I have just stated that my delegation, much to our regret, will be obliged to oppose both the Netherlands and the 13-Power draft resolutions if they are put to the vote.

We have submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution (A/L. 367) co-sponsored by Bolivia, India and the United Arab Republic. It does not prejudice any issue--neither the issue of self-determination nor the possible future role of the United Nations in West Irian. We could do nothing better than to give such negotiations the best chance under the auspices of the President of the Assembly, in whom both parties to the dispute, and indeed others, have full confidence.

The impact of views by Members here will no doubt be felt by all concerned. We have referred to the very important statements of the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands in the preamble of our draft resolution. Now that is recorded here. Those statements, as well as the statements of the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, will have to be looked into during the negotiations. These are carefully noted in the preamble of the resolution--without, of course, expressing any opinion as to which should be accepted. It is not for us to do that.

As I said, the impact of these views, of the statements made here by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries and of the statements made by others, will all be felt during the negotiations by those concerned. It is only in these circumstances that we give the question of West Irian the best chance of an agreed solution with or without the participation of the United Nations, taking into account its various aspects and the views expressed in the course of these deliberations.

We hope that the resolution in document A/L. 367 will receive a large measure of support and that the other draft resolutions will not be pressed to a vote. The best thing that could be done is to keep them on the table, keep them as live proposals for consideration, at least for the time being. That is the way, in our opinion, in which the Assembly could best deal with this difficult and long-standing dispute between two Member States which has been the source of difficulty and trouble in that part of the world.

INDIA USA NIGER NIGERIA MEXICO YUGOSLAVIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC INDONESIA  
THE NETHERLANDS GUINEA AUSTRIA ITALY BOLIVIA

**Date :** Nov 27, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### Shri B. N. Chakravarty's Statement in Political Committee on Suspension of Nuclear Tests

Shri B.N. Chakravarty, Member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following Statement in the Political Committee on Nov 02, 1961 in the debate on the draft resolution, submitted by India along with five other Member Nations, for a complete cessation and complete prohibition of all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear tests:

Mr. Chairman,

I seek your permission to intervene in this debate on the draft resolution which was presented several days ago, by our delegation along with five others for this Committee's consideration. I have to do so because some of the interventions in the debate on this draft resolution call for a reply or an explanation of some parts of it.

In the course of our deliberations here it has been stated by some delegations that all that India is seeking is another uncontrolled or uninspected moratorium on nuclear tests. This is a complete misunderstanding of our stand on this question. We stand for a complete cessation, and complete prohibition of all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, in all environments and by all powers.

Let there be no mistake about it; our position is clear, categorical, uncompromising and unequivocal. This has been our position ever since the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; this has been our position more particularly since 1954, when at the

initiative of our Prime Minister and the Chairman of our Delegation, attempts were made by us to seek a clear expression of the General Assembly's views against nuclear weapons tests. It was a matter of regret to us that all these efforts failed during the first three or four years. No one was, therefore, happier than us when in October 1958, the nuclear powers, voluntarily agreed to suspend nuclear tests and to engage in negotiations to agree on the cessation or prohibition of tests. Since then the General Assembly has adopted as many as five resolutions calling upon all States to refrain from conducting nuclear tests.

For nearly three years the world was spared the evil effects of radioactive fallout. The talks at Geneva progressed, the prospects of peace brightened though France had in the meantime begun her test series in the Sahara and continued with it despite the General Assembly's special request directed to her. We were still hoping that a treaty would soon follow. Instead the moratorium was broken by the U.S.S.R. on 1 September 1961.

My Prime Minister deplored the resumption of tests by the Soviet Union both in Belgrade and in Moscow and there is little that I can add to it. We also regretted the resumption of underground tests by the U.S.A. started a few days later. Three days ago my Prime Minister commented on the explosion of a 50 megaton bomb by the U.S.S.R. as "highly regrettable and indefensible". In this matter we have not thus, taken sides with one party or another. It is, therefore, most unkind to suggest that we have been trying to explain, interpret or defend the point of view, the policy or the interest of one country or another.

We in India have a democratic form of government responsible to a Parliament which in turn represents the interests and the aspirations of over 430 million people, who are as much entitled to their own security as well as the health and well-being of their progeny as any other people in the world. The Government of India, which I have the honour to represent, is charged with the security and well-being of a substantial part of the entire population of the world. We are a comparatively under-developed country, and are struggling against poverty and disease and numerous other handicaps from which our people have suffered for decades. It is in the name of these 430 million people that we speak here. It is their interests that we must first and foremost bear in our minds. No representative of India, whether in this Committee or elsewhere, can take up a position just to please another State, however great or powerful.

On this question of tests our stand, in brief, is that all tests must stop whether they are underground, or under-water, in the atmosphere or in outer space. On this question we have made no

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compromise in the past, and we are not prepared to make any now, because it affects our people as much as the people of other

countries. After the full statements we have made pointing out published facts as have come to our notice from both sides, it is not reasonable for any one to say that we are not objective or that we are not gravely concerned about tests whoever conducts them. It is for this reason--our uncompromising opposition to all tests--that we voted in favour of the 8-Power resolution even though we protested against the priority given to that resolution over our resolution, which was equally urgent and much more comprehensive.

We are told that these tests are conducted for the security of this or that State or people. Mr. Chairman, may I submit that there are in numerous countries like mine, many millions of people like those of my country, who cannot even afford shelters from the inclemencies of weather far less shelters against fall-out hazards created by man, My delegation would like to urge that while great Powers admittedly have obligations to ensure the security of their countries and their people, it is equally their obligation, as leaders of the world community, to see that hazards to a great majority of helpless mankind are not created by their actions.

If we speak out against nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, we do so because there is only one purpose of these tests, namely, the sharpening of the tools of war. The situation in the world today is one of grave peril: one incident somewhere may result in a nuclear and thermo-nuclear holocaust in which no people, no country will be secure. In fact reliable scientific opinion supports our apprehension that increasing radio-active fall-out may soon make this planet of ours uninhabitable. We find it, therefore, extremely difficult to accept the argument that the conduct of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests advances or promotes security of mankind. Even without an actual nuclear war, the continuation of tests by one country or another indefinitely will jeopardise the lives and well-being of millions of people.

It is a matter of deep regret to my delegation that the Soviet Union has not only not responded to the Assembly's appeal of the other day not to conduct a 50-megaton test explosion but has exploded, instead, a super-bomb estimated to be the equivalent of 75 millions tons of TNT. We dread the consequences of the fall-out resulting from this gigantic explosion.

We have heard it said that since the Soviet Union has not heeded to one appeal, it is not likely to heed to yet another appeal. To those who say that I wish respectfully to put this question. What then are we to do? Should this Organization accept defeat and sit silently while tests go on uninterrupted? Or should we not make yet another appeal--an appeal to all nuclear powers not to engage in this nuclear arms race but to bring this frightening race to an end? Would our peoples expect us to sit silently here and witness this calamitous drift towards disaster? Or would they wish us to speak our minds out and to let the great powers know what we think and how we feel about this matter?

It has been stated that the simple suspension of tests is like a truce, which has already been violated; and that there is, therefore, no point in having another truce unless there is a proper treaty.

I ask you, Sir, can there be a treaty without the essential preliminary of a truce or cessation of hostilities? If a truce is broken, must one resume hostilities at once without trying to establish another truce pending a treaty? As has been stated so dearly by the distinguished representative of Canada "a series of tests conducted by one side brings about a subsequent series of tests conducted by the other--and this is the essence of and the most dangerous part of the arms race". We are in complete agreement with this view.

No arms race has ever led to stability or security, never has peace come out of preparations for war. Therefore, this perilous nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms race must be brought to an end if a nuclear and thermo-nuclear war is to be averted. That is why I must urge my colleagues here, all of us who represent countries from different corners of the globe, to join us in urging the great powers to stop tests immediately, to get back to the negotiating table, and work out, as expeditiously as possible, agreements and arrangements whereby the prospect of peace can be restored.

Doubts have been cast as to our views concerning inspection and control. Let me repeat once again, briefly but clearly that we too want a treaty or some other internationally binding agreement under effective international control. In resolutions 1252 (XIII), 1402 (XIV) and 1578 (XV) the Assembly urged the nuclear powers to reach agreement on the cessation of tests under appropriate international control. Some of these resolutions were submitted by us. We voted for all of them, these resolutions stand unrevoked. What reason is there, I ask, for any one to suggest that we are opposed to control or to inspection, or that we want a moratorium without either? But I

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submit, a system of inspection and control will have to form part of a treaty, which is to be negotiated by the great Powers and cannot be imposed either by this Committee or by the Assembly. Far less is the Assembly in a position to develop a system of control and inspection, and put it into effect unless the nuclear powers themselves agree. The details of control and inspection will have to be negotiated and agreed upon by them, others joining in later. It is our belief that an immediate suspension of tests would improve the climate, and facilitate the negotiations for a Treaty.

In a resolution of the kind we have ventured to submit for the Committee's consideration, there is no place for an expression of detailed views on a system of inspection and control, which can only be discussed during negotiations and agreed upon by the nuclear powers themselves.

On the other hand, we recognise--and here I speak for my delegation alone--the concern of some distinguished Latin-American delegations that the acceptance, in principle, of control provisions in a treaty or agreement should, once again, find expression in the resolution under discussion. We regard the amendment introduced by Bolivia, Brazil and five other States in document A/C. 1/L. 294 as a tangible expression of that concern. As I said, my Government have consistently held the view that nuclear test explosions should as soon as possible come under a ban in accordance with an international agreement reached between the powers concerned, which should, among other things, provide the appropriate safeguards designed to eliminate the possibility of clandestine explosions.

In so far as this amendment represents a reiteration of the general principle already stated in Resolution 1578 (XV), which is recalled in our draft, we can see no objection to it. I should, however, add that our draft resolution in document A/C. 1/L. 283/Rev. 2 had been prepared after a great deal of care, it is a balanced expression of the point of view that my delegation and many others in this Committee have expounded. We would, therefore, have preferred the amendment to come in as operative paragraph 4 and not as paragraph 3 in the resolution.

Doubts have also been expressed regarding the implications of the phrase "or general and complete disarmament" at the end of operative paragraph 2 of our draft resolution. It has been said that a treaty concerning general and complete disarmament may take years to negotiate, and, therefore, the net effect of our draft resolution, if adopted, would be a perpetual, uncontrolled and uninspected moratorium. Such an interpretation is completely out of tune with the whole tenor of our text. The resolution speaks of "the grave and continuing hazards of radiation" and the "adverse consequences to the prospects of world peace" resulting from these tests. It considers it urgent and imperative that no further tests should take place. It earnestly urges the powers concerned to refrain from further test explosion pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to tests or general and complete disarmament. It calls upon the powers concerned "to engage themselves with urgency and speed" to conclude such agreements expeditiously. I submit that the whole tenor of this resolution is one of emergency and of urgency. It is our fervent hope that this question of the cessation of tests will not get bogged down in interminable discussions. The intention of the sponsors is clearly brought out in the body of the draft resolution as a whole, e.g., that negotiations for the cessation or prohibition of tests, whether by way of a separate treaty or as a part of agreement concerning general and complete disarmament, should be attended to by the powers concerned as a matter of highest priority. Operative paragraph 2 of our resolution only means that we do not mind whether a treaty is reached separately or as part of general and complete disarmament, so long as this is done urgently and expeditiously and so long as there is a cessation of tests pending such an agreement. We do not think that the reading of any particular phrase out of context either of the paragraph or of

the resolution as a whole is fair or reasonable.

On this point, I cannot do better than to quote what the distinguished representative of Canada said in his statement on the 30th October, referring to the Soviet unwillingness to consider the question of nuclear tests ban treaty except in the context of disarmament discussions. I quote--"Canada would see no objection to having the cessation of nuclear tests discussed in the context of disarmament as the question of highest priority. However, my delegation believes that it is so urgent to reach a binding agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon testing that its consideration should not be delayed until negotiation begins on other disarmament measures or on the broad question of general and complete disarmament."

After the explanation we have given of the words "or general and complete disarmament" we do hope that operative paragraph 2, as it stands, and the text of the resolution as a whole, will receive overwhelming support particularly after the amendment that has now been introduced.

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Before concluding, I would like to say a few words concerning the amendment tabled by the distinguished representative of Afghanistan, in document A/C. 1/1. 289/Rev. 1. The purpose of this amendment is to insert in the body of the preamble of our draft resolution, the following paragraph:

"Deeply concerned over the circumstances that have led the nuclear powers to resume test explosions,".

I have great respect and admiration for my colleague, the distinguished representative of Afghanistan, and I listened to him the other day with the attention that his interventions in this Committee invariably deserve. But I must say with great regret--and I hope he will not take it amiss--that it is my feeling that this amendment will introduce a contentious matter in our resolution. We share his concern about the circumstances that have resulted in an augmentation of the nuclear arms race, but it is difficult to judge these circumstances. The hard fact is that tests have been resumed and our first objective is to stop them. However grave these circumstances may be, we do not see them as justifying the resumption of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. In our view these tests cannot be justified under any circumstances. We have it on the authority of the spokesmen of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America that either of these powers is in possession of nuclear and thermo-nuclear stockpiles large enough to destroy this world many times over. In that view there can be no necessity for continuing this terrifying race. And what is more, no circumstances would justify an act or acts on the part of one or another great power which constitute such a grave peril not only to the human beings of this generation but also to those yet to come. It is our earnest

hope, therefore, that my friend from Afghanistan will understand our position and would, perhaps, be willing to give our view a further consideration, and not to press his amendment to a vote. If, however, he is unable to do so, we shall be constrained to vote against it. In that event, I do hope he will not misunderstand our action as in any way detracting from our admiration or affection for him and his great country and people.

INDIA USA JAPAN SWITZERLAND FRANCE RUSSIA YUGOSLAVIA CANADA PERU BOLIVIA  
BRAZIL CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AFGHANISTAN

**Date :** Nov 02, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri B.N. Chakravarty's Statement in the General Assembly on Suspension of Nuclear Tests.

Shri B. N. Chakravarty, Member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement in the General Assembly on a draft resolution on suspension of nuclear tests.

Mr. President, I thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to say a few words.

In the report of the First Committee (A/4942/Add. 1) under discussion, there is a draft resolution for adoption by this Assembly. This resolution was originally submitted in the First Committee by my delegation together with five other delegations. Later, a number of representatives of the Latin American States moved an amendment to our draft resolution which was adopted by the Committee by a large majority. This amendment forms paragraph 3 of the draft resolution recommended now for consideration by the General Assembly.

A phrase "or general and complete disarmament" occurring at the end of operative paragraph 2 in the original submitted by us was deleted by a vote in the First Committee. While we would have liked to retain this phrase, we nevertheless feel that neither the insertion of paragraph 3 nor the deletion of this phrase, "or general and complete disarmament" from paragraph 2, alters the basic character of our original proposal. The main purpose of this proposal is that nuclear and thermonuclear tests which are now being conducted should be stopped immediately and that the atomic Powers should return to the negotiating table and speedily conclude a treaty providing for an appropriate system of international control and inspection.

As the Members of the General Assembly here know, this draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 72 in favour, 21 against, with 8 abstentions. That vote itself is indicative of the massive support behind our plea that, pending negotiations for the necessary agreements concerning the cessation and prohibition of atomic tests, no such tests should be conducted at any time under any environment by any Power. What is more important is the fact that these 72 positive votes in support of this draft resolution represent the great mass of public opinion in the world which is categorically and uncompromisingly opposed to test explosions. These test explosions cause not only fall-out hazards of unprecedented dimensions, but also result in an augmentation of the nuclear arms race. Such an arms race, far from leading to security or stability, brings us nearer to a

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cataclysmic nuclear holocaust. We have, therefore, no doubt that the draft resolution before the Assembly will receive an even larger vote than the one in the First Committee.

It is a matter of profound regret and concern to my delegation that the great Powers, the nuclear Powers--all of them--voted against this draft resolution in the First Committee. This opposition of the nuclear Powers to the steps proposed in the draft resolution now recommended by the First Committee is, I submit, not in keeping with their special responsibilities and obligations under the Charter of our Organization: to ensure the welfare and progress of humanity and to maintain and strengthen international peace.

The nuclear Powers are certainly aware of the prevailing sentiment among the masses of people all over the world that nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests are an evil and that the sooner our world is rid of that evil, the better for all concerned. Once again I appeal to them not to turn a deaf ear to the pleas of humanity that these tests be stopped forthwith. It is urgently necessary for these Powers to return to the negotiating table to conclude the requisite internationally binding agreements, providing for appropriate international control and inspection, to ban nuclear and thermonuclear tests of all kinds, in all environments and by all concerned, once and for all. It would help create a proper climate for these negotiations if the tests were to be immediately suspended. We therefore once again plead with the nuclear Powers in this Assembly to suspend these tests, return to the negotiations and complete the task which the Assembly entrusted to them.

In the course of the discussions on this question in the First Committee, as well as in one of the statements we heard just now, it has been suggested that this draft resolution seeks the resumption of an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium in preference to a treaty providing for international control and inspection. This, I submit, is certainly not the case. We have repeatedly stated that we are

strongly in favour of a treaty providing for a system of control and inspection. As may be seen from the document itself, it does not merely say that the tests should be stopped: it proceeds further and expresses confidence that:

"the States concerned will reach agreement as soon as possible on the cessation of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, under appropriate international control" (A/4942/Add. 1);

it proceeds further and calls upon:

"the Powers concerned to engage themselves with urgency and speed in the necessary efforts to conclude such agreements expeditiously". (Ibid.)

I submit that this draft resolution makes it quite clear that it is more than a request for a mere moratorium. Our position, however, is that pending the conclusion of such a treaty there must be a suspension of tests. The suspension of tests ought not to be tied up with the setting up of a system of control and inspection, as it may take some time to negotiate the details of such a system. As my Prime Minister said yesterday, if measures of inspection or control can be agreed upon and arranged with the consent of all concerned, we should welcome such inspection and control even during a moratorium. What we are opposed to is a nuclear arms race--and, what is worse, an uninhibited one at that. As I said in the First Committee, it is our belief that such an arms race cannot be justified on the grounds of the security of this or that people. The future of the world, the well-being of humanity as a whole are at stake.

No arms race in the past has brought either stability or security. Never has peace come out of preparations for war. We can ignore that fact of history only at our peril.

Before concluding, I should like once again to appeal to Members of this Assembly, especially those representing the nuclear Powers which, as leaders of the world community, hold in their hands the fate of all mankind, to lend their support to the draft resolution that has been recommended by the First Committee.

INDIA USA PERU

**Date** : Nov 02, 1961

**Volume No**

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri B.N. Chakravarty, Member, Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Political Committee on Nov 30, 1961 on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons:

The item that we have been discussing today is one in which my Government has taken a good

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deal of interest in the past. Although, during the last few years, this item has been brought to this Committee by the representative of Ireland, I recall that in 1956 the Chairman of my delegation, Mr. Krishna Menon, placed my Government's views before the Disarmament Commission. Among the issues to which he referred, he drew particular attention to this aspect of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. He said:

"Another aspect of this nuclear field is something that causes us all concern. I hope that it will be possible for the nuclear Powers to assure the world that there will be no trade in these weapons, that there will be no supply of them to other countries, from where they can go to still other countries so that they will be distributed generally. That is, with the transfer of atomic or nuclear or other weapons, a large number of countries would spread the danger of war; and when one country outside this group has the weapons, other people will try to get hold of them". (DC/PV. 58, paragraph 84)

The views of the Government of India and also several other proposals came up for consideration at the eleventh session of the General Assembly but unfortunately, the Disarmament Commission did not consider those proposals at that time. Since then, other proposals have been brought up, particularly during the last few years by the representative of Ireland.

We are thus very happy to support the Irish resolution although, in our view, the draft resolution does not go far enough or, at least, as far as we would like it to go. The important point, however, in this draft resolution is that it draws attention to this problem that has become, as I explained only yesterday in connexion with the Swedish resolution (A/CA.L 297), momentous because of the increasing capacity of a large number of countries to make nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. That is the main reason why we are happy to support this draft resolution (A/C.1/L298/Rev.1).

Our happiness has, however, been somewhat diluted by what has taken place in the debate so far. We were under the impression that this meant that some sort of separate agreement could be arrived at by the nuclear Powers to control the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution says:

"Calls on all States...at present possessing nuclear weapons to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions..."

I heard, however, this morning that the idea is that this should be taken as part of general and complete disarmament.

If this proposal is tied up with general and complete disarmament, we fear that the effect of this draft resolution will be very little indeed. It will take a long time before the disarmament treaty comes into being and, meanwhile, various countries will be free to develop their atomic resources and possibly manufacture nuclear bombs themselves.

The Foreign Minister of Ireland made this suggestion:

"Might I suggest to the nuclear Powers that one way of approaching the matter is to set up a small committee of their experts who would work confidentially to hammer out the necessary agreement for submission to their Government in the first instance; and that when the agreement is signed by the nuclear Powers, it should be submitted for the approval of the United Nations and the accession of the non-nuclear Powers." (A/C.1/PV.1208.page 48)

I got the impression, naturally, that his idea was that this matter should be taken up separately by the nuclear Powers without tying it up with the question of general and complete disarmament. It would then have been very valuable and would have been a step towards general and complete disarmament, which we all desire. It is somewhat unfortunate that the idea now seems to be that this should be taken up together with general and complete disarmament.

We have had the views of the Soviet Union in connexion with the nuclear test ban treaty, who insisted that there can be no nuclear test ban treaty except as a part of general and complete disarmament. If this Irish draft resolution also cannot be considered except as a part of general and complete disarmament, it is my opinion that we will not have made any progress whatsoever.

Another point I wish to mention is that there would be much more effective prevention of dissemination, if there were control of transfer of nuclear weapons and not only control of the transfer of control thereof.

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I wish to state--I may be wrong and I will be glad to get clarification if I am wrong--that what is asked for in the draft resolution are, as regards transfer of control, provision under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons: That would seem to indicate that so long as the country concerned retained some control, there is nothing to

prevent the physical transfer of the atomic weapons.

That, I think, makes the draft resolution somewhat ineffective. We have heard again, I do not know myself whether the facts stated are correct, that troops are likely to be trained in the use of such weapons, though the control will remain with the nuclear Powers concerned. Again I speak subject to correction, but if troops are trained in the use of such weapons, I do not know how long it will take a particular nation, if it is so interested, to take physical control of these weapons.

It has been suggested that national security demands that countries should have the occasion to demand some nuclear weapons for their national defence. It seems to us that the main use of nuclear weapons is that they act as a deterrent. As a deterrent, it is not necessary that more than a few countries should possess such weapons. For instance, if the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have these weapons as a deterrent, I think it is not necessary that the smaller countries need have physical possession of nuclear weapons as a preventive to war. They may only need them if they want or if there is actually a war, in which case, of course, they would like to have the nuclear weapons. If different countries can get possession of nuclear weapons, it will, on the contrary, make it necessary for many others to want to possess similar weapons. On the other hand, if nobody except the great Powers possesses these weapons, the chances of any other country wanting such weapons would be considerably reduced.

Before concluding I would like to make it clear that while we will support this draft resolution--however unsatisfactory it may be from our point of view--my delegation would not like our support to imply in any way that we have, by voting for this draft resolution, accepted the principles that seem to be implied in this draft resolution that we agree to the continued manufacture or retention of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear Powers. Our position on this question has remained unchanged. We have always believed and we still believe that there can be no effective disarmament unless the nuclear Powers decide to abolish nuclear weapons. The possession and manufacture of these weapons acts like a chain reaction and not only will the existing Powers have a nuclear arms race, but others may follow.

As I said yesterday, the possession of atomic weapons has become a matter of prestige or distinction and if there is no treaty soon enough to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons, we fear that there will be other countries who will soon become nuclear Powers and will join the "Nuclear Club". From that point of view we feel that it is an urgent matter, and a treaty, as suggested in this draft resolution' should be concluded as early as possible and certainly should not be treated as part of the general question of general and complete disarmament.

**Date :** Nov 30, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### Shri B.N. Chakravarty's Statement on Apartheid Policy in South Africa

Shri B.N. Chakravarty, Member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Special Political Committee on Nov 06, 1961 on the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policy of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

Mr. Chairman,

The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policy of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa has been debated in this Organization since 1952.

The discussion on this subject has been going on for ten years, but not only is there no change for the better but the situation is getting progressively worse. When the distinguished Foreign Minister of South Africa announced in the General Assembly his intention to appear before the Special Political Committee we started wondering if this decision signified some change in the past policy of the Government of South Africa of not participating in the debate and if there would now be some fruitful discussion. His opening statement on the 24th of October has set at rest any such speculation and has come as a disappointment.

He has again raised the plea that the subject matter under discussion is essentially within South

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Africa's domestic jurisdiction and that it is no concern either of the United Nations or of this Committee. This plea has consistently been rejected all these years by the General Assembly and its Committees. I should not, therefore, waste the time of this Committee by entering into a detailed discussion of this issue once again. It would be sufficient for me to refer to Oppenheim's International Law where it has been clearly stated:

"With regard to the protection of human rights and freedom, a prominent feature of the Charter, the prohibition of intervention

(with regard to matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States) does not preclude study, discussion, investigation and recommendation on the part of the various organs of the United Nations."

The United Nations having never had any doubts about its competence to examine the question of a breach of obligations as laid down in the Charter relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, cannot be charged with applying "double standard" because it failed to intervene in matters which in its view are indeed essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. In other words, while other States had succeeded in establishing such a plea South Africa has failed to do so.

In his opening statement the distinguished Foreign Minister has put the question "How many sponsors of the resolution are themselves guilty of discriminating practices and of denying to people in their respective countries the fundamental human rights set out in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter? How many of them have come to the court of the United Nations with 'clean hands'?" It is indeed gratifying to find that he considers this body as a court though he has been consistently disregarding the verdict of the court. Be that as it may, I would like to make it clear that no one, least of all we, have ever suggested that discrimination and racial evils are to be found in South Africa alone. There are not many countries in the world where discrimination of one form or another does not still exist. But there are no countries which loudly proclaim discrimination as a virtue. We all recognize it as evil, we are ashamed of its continuance, we try to get away from this evil, we fight against it and organize public opinion against it. If South Africa had taken the same attitude there would have been far less criticism even though the degree and scope of discrimination prevailing in South Africa is incomparably greater. While all other countries are making efforts with varying degrees of success to root out this evil, South Africa is the only country which practises racial discrimination as a State policy. South Africa comes in for criticism not only because of the enormity of the discrimination practised there but because racial discrimination is laid down as a policy of the State and is sanctioned by the laws of the land. It is urged that apartheid is the only sensible policy not only for South Africa but that this is the ideal for all other multiracial countries. Apartheid is sought to be justified with all kinds of arguments, even religious ones. While there is some progress in most countries towards elimination of discrimination and inequalities, progress in South Africa has been in the reverse direction. Far from taking a step forward, South Africa is taking progressively steps backward. Each year brings in new laws and regulations which are totally opposed to such concepts as human rights, fundamental freedoms and the dignity of the individual. The Charter lays down certain obligations which are ideals to aspire and strive for even though we may still fall short of it. If there had been no such evils there would have been no need to make these provisions. So long as these evils continue we must have the intention and the determination to work for these ideals and root out

these evils. It is this lack of intention far less determination, on the part of South Africa, to do away with these evils that we complain of.

Prime Minister Macmillan summed up the position clearly in his statement in the British Parliament after the last Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. I quote certain extracts from the statement.

"All kinds of discrimination--not only racial, but political, religious and cultural--in one form or another have been and are still practised, often as a survival of long traditions. But the fundamental difference between ours and the South African philosophy is that we are trying to escape from these inherited practices. We are trying, with varying degrees of success but always with a single purpose, to move away from this concept in any form. What shocked the Conference--meaning the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference--was that the policy of the present South African Government appeared to set up what we would regard as an unhappy practice, inherited from the past, perhaps, as a philosophy of action for the future. This philosophy seemed altogether remote from and, indeed, abhorrent to the ideals

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towards which mankind is struggling in this century,...

"It was not, therefore, because all of us are without sin that we felt so strongly. It was because this apartheid theory transposes what we regard as a wrong into a right. I do not question sincerity with which these views are held by many people in South Africa, or their very deep conviction that theirs is the right course in the interests of all races, but we in Britain have never been in doubt that this is a wrong course.....

Mr. Macmillan then said that had Dr. Verwoerd made any concession or given any ground for hope he still thought the Conference would have looked beyond the immediate difficulties to the possibilities of the future. "But the Prime Minister of South Africa, with an honesty which one must recognize, made it abundantly clear beyond all doubt that he would not think it right to relax in any form the extreme rigidity of his dogma, either now or in the future."

We speak in all humility because we ourselves are not yet completely free from social inequalities and our attitude has always been one of appeal to South Africa to join in the general attempt to eradicate this evil root and branch.

What is apartheid? Apartheid is a discriminatory law against a class. The disabilities arising from it are not due to any act of omission or commission by an individual but solely due to his being born into a particular community. No matter what you do you cannot get out of these disabilities. They apply to a person from his birth and continues till he is dead and buried. The Bantu Self-Government Act

is not to be confused with any real self-government. In theory homelands are to be set up for different ethnic groups which will gradually become self-governing at a pace to be determined by the White South African Government and the non-White South African has no say in the matter. The idea is to convert the present Native Reserves into "national homelands". These Reserves are, according to South African Government's own Tomlinson Commission Report, shockingly congested and are unable to sustain even the present population in the Reserves which is roughly about a third of the total African population. The total population of the Republic in 1960 was 15,841,000 of which Africans account for 10,807,892 the Whites 3,067,638 Coloureds 1,488,638 and Asians 477,414. With less than a fifth of the population, the Whites own more than four-fifths of the area of the Republic. If apartheid had been carried to its logical conclusion, by a complete separation of the races, by carving out a White South Africa on the population basis where there would be no Africans, the rest of South Africa being left to the non-Whites to develop according to their own genius, there might have been something to be said for it even though we ourselves would prefer a multiracial society. Apartheid does not go to that extent. It does not involve a partition on these lines. Total apartheid of this kind does not of course suit the White South African. He is not prepared to do any of the unskilled or manual work which is now done exclusively by the non-Whites. Without the Black African labour, industrial development of South Africa would come to a stop and South African economy would be ruined. Besides, how can the White South African continue to live his luxurious life if there are no cheap African servants to run his household or Indian and Coloured waiters to run his hotels? He cannot view with equanimity the prospect of living as other White people do in Europe and America where domestic servant is so expensive and scarce. Oh, no, it is unthinkable to have such an all-White South Africa where there would be no black man to do the menial work. The non-White is thus a necessary evil. They must, however, be content with their lot, and must not ask for political rights. They may be given some local autonomy--as much as the White South African may consider to be good for them--but they must remain under White administration and control. Apartheid contemplates a White South Africa and a non-White South Africa but the latter must be ruled by the former.

Apartheid does not thus contemplate any partition of the Republic into two separate sovereign States, each independent of the other. On the other hand, if apartheid is to mean separate and equal institutional provision for each racial group, it is just not capable of realisation within the foreseeable future. Purely on financial considerations, it is not possible to have separate schools, hospitals, transport facilities, townships, organs of local government and Parliamentary representation, etc. if these facilities are to be reasonably equal and equitable for the different races. The Government of South Africa claims to be contemplating separation on these lines but that Government is in fact spending most of its income on the Whites and only a small percentage is being spent for the non-White population which is more than four times the White

population. Apartheid with equal treatment for all is impracticable if only on financial consideration. The only

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possible solution of this complex problem would be to have a multiracial society providing a framework for interracial co-operation in which all discriminatory legislation would be repealed and equal opportunity would be given to all citizens. South Africa is not, however, prepared even to think on those lines. Any such suggestion would be a heresy.

People advocating a new deal for the coloured people are considered almost as traitors. According to Prime Minister Dr. Verwoerd, a programme of "small concessions" or "limited integration" in regard to the coloured would open the door to "Black domination" and "biological assimilation".

Sir De Villiers Graaff, speaking in the House of Assembly, was in favour of the Coloureds having Parliamentary representation. Dr. Verwoerd in his argument that such a step would open the flood gates to integration, said: "This will have to be extended to the Asiatics. The Coloureds will have to be allowed to serve on the controlling bodies of the United Party. If this is not so, then the whole policy is a bluff. This will mean that, in the Cape at least, the United Party will be completely overwhelmed and ruled by the Coloureds.

In a final statement to the electorate on the eve of the recent election Prime Minister Verwoerd said:

"Your choice is more sharply defined than at any previous election, namely between a White Republic with non-White neighbours and a multiracial fatherland with first a multiracial and later a Black Government.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of South Africa says that apartheid really means a policy of separate development for its non-White population. Let us examine how far this claim can be justified. In doing so we must realise the difficulties of assessing facts. Non-Whites are not welcome in South Africa. A few White priests and laymen who speak with sympathy are all dubbed as Communists. Quotations from their writings would probably be dismissed straightaway as unreliable evidence. I am, therefore, going to restrict myself to referring mainly to the laws that exist on the Statute Book. Their existence cannot be denied and the laws themselves will throw an illuminating flood of light on the conditions in South Africa.

The non-White in South Africa, of course has no franchise. Does he enjoy any of the human rights and freedoms? In implementation of the policy of apartheid, the South African Government enacted a series of legislation since 1948 all of which has had the effect of narrowing still further the field of civil liberties of the African and Asian

communities. The Population Registration Act requires every person over 16 years of age to carry his Identity Card giving a description of his person and the ethnic group to which he belongs. The Pass System is the keystone of the South African race policy. An amendment to the Urban Areas Act in 1952, as further amended in 1957, prohibits all Africans from being in towns at all for more than 72 hours except with permission of a Labour Bureau or of a designated Municipal Officer. Exceptions to these sweeping provisions are few and narrow. The Group Areas Act 1950, now consolidated as Act 77 of 1957, applies to all racial groups and drastically restricts the freedom of residence. Residence in certain specified areas is restricted to person of particular racial groups. The Act is administered with the harshest discrimination against the non-White groups. People are driven out of their established homes on grounds of race and, very often, this has also the effect of depriving a person of this customary livelihood.

The Departure from the Union Regulation Act 1955 penalizes a citizen who returns to South Africa if he had left it without Government permission. Although this measure was primarily aimed at non-Europeans, it has been used by the Government against its political opponents of all races.

The African people had already been effectively deprived of most of the property rights by 1948. The present Government's policy seems to be to destroy even the few rights that still remain. The Group Areas Act attacks the property rights of all races, although the non-European groups are naturally the hardest hit. They are uprooted not only from their homes but from their places of business also. The Act prohibits members of one group from acquiring property from members of another group in the controlled area without permit. This is particularly hard on the non-White groups since they own far less property per capita than the members of the White group.

The Native Building Workers Act 1951 as amended in 1955 prohibits the employment of Africans on skilled work in the building industry outside a "native area". The Industrial Conciliation Act 1956 as amended in 1959 empowers the Minister of Labour to reserve categories of work

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for particular racial groups, It also empowers him to lay down the proportion of workers of various racial groups Who may be employed in any industry or occupation. The whole of South African industry has thus been brought under control of the Minister of Labour who may fix any conditions that he may like. The Group Areas Act also places some restrictions on freedom of vocation and employment.

Another interference with vocational freedom is contained in the Motor Bureau Transportation Act 1930 empowering the Transportation Board to limit operators of taxi services to conveyance of passengers of only the racial group to which the driver of the taxi belongs.

This interference threatens coloured taxi drivers with ruin since the demand for their services from the coloured community alone is insufficient to enable them to operate economically.

The recent legislation permitting arbitrary arrest, detention and exile has left hardly any freedom of the person. Power has been taken by the executive practically to deny the right of habeas corpus. Under the Natives (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act 1956 an African threatened by an official with forcible removal from any land, building or area, however blatantly unlawful, is precluded from access to the courts for relief. His sole remedy is that of obtaining compensation after the wrong has been committed. In fact, this remedy is also often denied to him. Under the Native Administration Act an African can, without a hearing, be banished by the executive from his home and confined to some remote, inaccessible area, where he may not have any means of livelihood. If the dependents of the detainees are given any maintenance grants the amount again depends on the pigment of the skin of the detainee. The maximum grant per adult per month is £11. and 10 for the whites, £3 for the coloureds and Asians and £1 for the Africans in urban areas. No grants are made to African dependents in rural areas. The executive have full power to set up concentration camps and confine individuals therein indefinitely and without trial. (Native Administration Act). The Suppression of Communism Act 1950 and the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1953 also provide for similar power of banishment and indefinite confinement by executive order. Under an amendment to the Urban Areas Act of 1956 any urban local authority can banish any African to whom it objects, even if that is his permanent home.

Under the Public Safety Act 1953, the executive may declare in its discretion a state of emergency and may thereafter order summary detention of individual or without trial recourse to a Court.

The Criminal Code as amended in 1955 empowers the police to enter, without warrant, private premises, if they think that a meeting is being held there which is likely to endanger law and order, to search those premises and to interrogate the inmates. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1953 authorizes the opening of private correspondence on mere suspicion. The Group Areas Act authorizes wholesale invasion of family privacy by empowering inspectors to enter without warrant any home at any hour of the day or night, search the premises and interrogate the inmates.

Considerable inroads have been made, even on freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The "Church Clause" in the Native Laws Amendment Act 1957 authorizes the Minister to prohibit the attendance of Africans at Church in an urban area outside a particular location. In terms of "Extension of University Education Act 1959", non-White men and women are excluded from the established Universities. This makes a mockery of freedom of thought. The Act provides for the establishment of the University Colleges for African and other non-White students, but these are hardly capable of providing genuine University education comparable to what was previously available to

such students in mixed Universities. No trace of University autonomy and academic freedom is to be found in the Act. These University institutes are to be entirely controlled by the Minister. The teachers are to be permitted to teach the truth only in so far as it is palatable to the Government of the day. The University College effort Hare Transfer Act 1959 in effect destroys the autonomous University College of that name and substitutes a tribal institution for such African groups as the Minister may determine. The implications of the Bantu Education Act 1953 are similar in the field of primary and secondary education. A State monopoly of instruction of African children has been established with the avowed aim not of developing their minds but of conditioning them to acceptance of their allotted status in a caste society.

Freedom of speech and of the press have likewise been drastically reduced. Legislation creating offences committed by the spoken word is so vague in nature that it is almost impossible for anyone to know whether he is infringing the law or not. The Suppression of Communism Act penalizes any act calculated to further the aims of Communism whether or not the individual has

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any such intention. The words "aims of Communism" for this purpose, have an extremely broad interpretation. It includes not only the doctrine of Marxian Socialism but also any policy aimed at any change, political, economic, social or industrial.

By an abuse of the provisions of the Customs Act 1955 which prohibits the import of goods which are indecent, obscene, or objectionable on any other ground whatsoever, the present Government make a systematic practice of banning as "objectionable" any literature, including in some cases traditional classics and modern works of world famous authors, which may contain views contrary to their own political ideology.

The Suppression of Communism Act has naturally made deep inroads into the freedom of assembly and association. The executive may ban any gathering and prevent individuals from attending such gatherings. A recent amendment of the Group Areas Act prohibits association between members of different racial groups. The establishment of places of public entertainment and of clubs for members of more than one racial groups can be prohibited as also the partaking of refreshments together by members of different racial groups at any place, whether public or private. Freedom of association between fellow-workers of different racial groups has likewise been progressively restricted in trade unions and other occupational organisations. Mixed trade unions of Europeans and non-Europeans has been prohibited in the future under the Industrial Conciliation Act 1957. Existing mixed unions are compelled to have separate branches for Europeans and non-Europeans and they must hold separate meetings.

The progressive invasion of fundamental freedom of the non-European

communities is now menacing those of Europeans also, although in lesser degree. All the various acts referred to above restrict European liberties also in some degree. Even the liberal-minded European is now afraid to take part in any interfacial activities as he is not sure as to what is lawful and what is not. There have been grave inroads on the right of inter-racial association.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of South Africa, in his speech in the General Debate, has claimed "that quiet conditions prevail in South Africa in spite of strenuous efforts by subversive elements in London, New York, Accra, Cairo, acting in concert with the subversive elements in South Africa, to stir up trouble in the Republic. The activities of these organisations and of expatriate Bantu agitators has had little influence on the South African Bantu who prefers satisfactory social conditions and progress". This claim does not, however, seem to be borne out by the revolt against the Bantustan programme which began with the Pondos who inhabit the Eastern half of the Native Reserve in the Transkei--a 100,000 square mile hill country between Natal and Cape Province proper. They chased away the tribal authorities and set up their own administration at district and regional levels. The focus of hatred continues in nearly every instance to be the Chiefs themselves. Formerly they were the spokesmen of the tribes in relation to the Government. The Bantustan laws have made them overlords--an ironic commentary on the government policy of enabling the Africans to develop in their own way.

Nor is the claim supported by the Rand Daily Mail which on 1st February 1961 commented as follows: "At this stage no reasonable person expects the Bantustan experiment to run smoothly but what real news is allowed to come out of the Transkei, suggests that, even for an experiment, it is going very badly indeed." Troops are still stationed in Pondoland and at the end of last week there were new military movements with the object of rounding up still more Pondos. In fact, there is every indication that the Transkei is slipping out of control by the normal means of Government."

Expenditure on Bantu administration, education, and development of the reserves for 1951-52 came to 5.9% of the total expenditure; the corresponding figure for 1961-62 is 5.63%. Even with the additional Rand 10 million made available later to the South African Native Trust, the percentage comes to only 7.02% of the total estimated expenditure for the year. State expenditure on education, when worked out per child, is actually less now than it was in 1951-52. The percentage of African children that proceed beyond the lower standards is little higher than it was years ago and the matriculation passes have dropped from 40.3% to 17.9% since the Government took over control of Mission schools in 1953.

Mr F. Spencer Chapman, the British Headmaster of St. Andrews College, one of South Africa's leading private schools, has disclosed that he is resigning because South Africa was developing "on exactly parallel lines to Nazi Germany." He made this announcement in an interview published by Grocott's Daily Mail,

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June 27th. "The system of muzzling that was going on in South Africa--first the radio, next the press and in due course education--was an exact replica of Hitler's technique."

The separation of the races has gone to such absurd limits that even in the field of sports the Whites and non-Whites cannot meet. Non-White players are not allowed in cricket teams and African jockeys are not expected to ride when White jockeys are available. The Cape Times of 29th March 1961 reported that "the proposed multi-racial soccer match between Durban City and the Combined Team of Coloureds, Indians and Africans has been cancelled. Until such time as a national racial policy in regard to sport has been defined the National football League was not prepared to sanction multi-racial soccer."

It is amazing that attempts are being made to find authority in the Scriptures in support of apartheid. The question of the race problem was considered at the 34th General Synod of the Gereformeerde Kerk. Die Transvaler (Jan.28) reported that the conclusions include the following: The Bible and Christianity, although originating in the East in antiquity and disseminated through the West, particularly in modern times, were not Eastern or Western, but derived from God and were destined for the whole of mankind without distinction. It recognized the unity of mankind in creation and re-creation through the Pentecost miracle but rejected the false unity striving of humanity. God himself accomplished the division of humanity and diversities--i.e., in races, cultural circles, peoples, etc. and determined for all nations their vocation, times and dwelling places until the end. In South Africa Church mixing between Whites and non-Whites was not desirable.

Jesus Christ, unfortunately for the race conscious Afrikaner, was an Asian. Had he lived in these days and tried to migrate to South Africa, he would have been refused entry because of his Asian origin. The Rev. T.N.W. Bush, ex-Chaplain of St. Andrews School, Bloemfontein, has written a revealing article on the attitude of the Church towards apartheid in July-September 1961 issue of Africa South in Exile. I crave your indulgence, Sir, to quote some portions of this article. He says that there is apparently a curious and saddening contradiction in the Churches in South Africa. What is accepted as theologically indisputable appears to be dismissed as practically inexpedient, if not impossible. Christ's teachings remain but a piously held and beautiful philosophy. While a number of clergymen in the higher ranks, to their credit, are fighting for equality of all races in the eyes of God, the ground is cut under their feet by their own subordinates. While a motion was sponsored by the Bishop of Kimberly and Kurman for admission of non-White members to Churches in white residential areas, the instruction was disregarded and a threatening attitude developed towards the Bishop. Some threatened to join the Dutch Reformed or Methodist Church if the

Bishop's wishes were implemented. His own minister of the Parish, a Cambridge graduate, conditioned by many years of work in predominantly Afrikaner areas, found himself "in complete sympathy" with his White flock's attitude. Naturally, the proposal fell through. Later the Bishop resigned presumably because he realized the hopelessness of continuing the struggle on his own while most of his army is rapidly going over to the side of the enemy. One of the Archdeacons of the Church declared publicly that Joost de Blank had proved himself unfitted to occupy the Archbishop's chair and that Bishop Reeves would be doing the Church in South Africa a service if he stayed in England permanently. The whole sad story of Christian failure can be exemplified and summed up by the Anglican Church Counsellor of one of the Pretoria Parishes who went to his Rector and said "I am sorry Padre, but my wife and I have given the matter serious thought and have decided to transfer to the Methodist Church. Please do not take the matter personal in any way, but you must admit that it is embarrassing to be Anglicans these days, not to mention the business consequences. It has not been an easy decision to make after our long association with the Church. You will remember that my wife's grandfather was a Bishop in Scotland but what would happen to our children, Padre, if Scott, Reeves and Huddleston got their way?" One might ask what would have happened to the Christian Church if Jesus had abandoned the cause as this Counsellor did? The Christian South African has apparently forgotten, or he does not care, who it was who once said: "I was anhungred and ye gave me no meat...in prison, and ye visited me not. Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of the least of these, ye did it not to me". The Church Bishops who advocate anti-government action are seen as the challengers of white privileges. If they get their way, a levelling of material conditions between black and white is seen as a consequence, with an enormous sacrifice in living standards by the whites. Such clerical liberalism simply cannot be tolerated. Most laymen and a large proportion of the clergy, therefore, find acquiescence both safe and comfortable.

Mr. Chairman, I think I have said enough to show what separate development for the non-White

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means and how happy the Bantu must be under this policy of apartheid.

Apartheid is repugnant not only on abstract principles but because in its practical application it has caused untold misery to millions of people. This is a policy of calculated deprivation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and as such clearly contravenes the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. South Africa is a founder member of the United Nations and its revered leader Field Marshal Smuts, whose name is very much respected in the United Nations, was one of the architects of the Charter. South Africa cannot thus plead that she joined the U.N. without understanding the obligations of the Charter. It is, therefore, all the more regrettable that South Africa has been continuing to violate the Charter all these years and consistently disregarding the successive

resolutions of the General Assembly. Even the personal visit of the late Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, produced no result. He reported that although no immediate mutually acceptable solution of the problem of South Africa's racial policies emerged during the consultations between him and Dr. Verwoerd the talks nevertheless "served a most useful purpose", and that he would pursue his efforts during one or more future visits to South Africa "at an appropriate time".

History recounts many instances of sanguinary revolutions when people are repressed and are denied the democratic method of evolution. Despite ruthless killings, mass imprisonment and banishments Africans will continue to resist racial discrimination. As Lord Hailsham stated in the British Parliament: "What is wrong about apartheid is that while it preaches a separation that can never be achieved, it achieves a subordination of one community to another Which will never be accepted". The recent rapid emergence of independent African States will naturally encourage such resistance. Unless reforms are introduced and a beginning made right now, the danger is that the resistance may take violent lines. Already there is a tendency of African leadership passing from the hands of the moderate to those of extremists and an explosion may come any day--rebellion and massacre may follow. When will South Africa realise that she is being more and more isolated? The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chief Albert J. Lutuli for his fight against apartheid is a proof-if proof is needed--of how hateful apartheid is to the rest of the world. The first indication of official reaction came from a scathing attack on Chief Lutuli by the South African Broadcasting Corporation which is wholly owned and operated by the South African Government. When will South Africa understand that the suicidal racial policy must be changed if not on humanitarian considerations, at least in enlightened self-interest--for the sake of their very survival? What we are witnessing in Angola is bad enough--it would be much worse in South Africa once the African is goaded to violence. It is not South Africa alone but the whole world which is exposed to a dreadful future with all the dangers arising out of racial conflict and affront to human dignity. Hatred is mounting up and can only end in disaster unless there is an immediate change in policy.

The only silver lining in a dark cloud is that there are some White South Africans who still believe in human rights and fundamental freedoms and who are raising their voices, feeble though they may be, in support of racial harmony. The recent election of one member of the Progressive Party in the South African Parliament is also a hopeful sign. We must pay our homage and tribute to the few liberals--both priests and laymen--who despite difficulties are still continuing the struggle against injustice even at considerable personal risk to themselves. Let us hope. and pray that the saner counsel will prevail on the South African Government. We speak more in sorrow than in anger and we fervently hope that the appeal of the General Assembly will not once again go unheeded. It is our firm belief that no Government, not even that of South Africa, can go on indefinitely flouting world opinion as reflected in this

Organization. May we respectfully request all member States to keep in view the fact that the least that we in this Committee can do, is to stand solidly behind the people in South Africa who are carrying on their fight against this policy of apartheid which is so abhorrent to all of us. We hope that every member of this Committee without exception, will let South Africa know that the world unequivocally condemns the racial policy followed by that Government and calls upon that Government to take urgent steps to put a stop to this evil.

In conclusion, I would like to reserve rights of my delegation to speak on the resolutions on this subject at the appropriate time.

INDIA SOUTH AFRICA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC EGYPT GHANA UNITED KINGDOM  
GERMANY FRANCE ANGOLA

**Date :** Nov 06, 1961

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INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri J. N. Sahni's Statement on Portugal's non-compliance with U.N. Charter.

Shri J.N. Sahni, Member, Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement

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in the Trusteeship Committee on Nov 01, 1961 on the non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with chapter XI of the Charter and Resolution 1542 (XV) of the General Assembly:

Madam Chairman,

It is in the nature of anachronism that at a time when colonialism has practically entered its last phase, when colonial powers far from trying to justify colonial possessions are almost apologetic for having to hold on to some of these possessions, when the Assembly has accepted in principle the immediate liquidation of colonialism in every form, that we should be discussing today not as to how and when Portugal should vacate its colonial territories, but as to what steps would be taken to obtain from Portugal information about political, economic, social and educational conditions in these territories-- basic elementary obligation which every colonial power, owes to the United Nations under its Charter.

The irony of this anachronism only hightens and highlights the

gravity of Portugal's failure to fulfil its obligations. The gravity of this situation is further highlighted by the fact that Portugal alone--Portugal of all the colonial powers alone, refuses to discharge this obligation. Spain, which did not transmit information on its colonies till last year, now does so, with the other administering countries. The U.K. in fact seems to have moved a step further and has agreed even to furnish political information and there by implement more fully both in letter and in spirit its obligations under article 73 of the Charter.

This continued default on the part of Portugal is bad by itself, but it becomes worse when Portugal attempts to justify its refusal, that it alone among colonial powers has no such obligation, that its overseas possessions are in fact only provinces and are an integral part of metropolitan Portugal and are being developed as part of a multi-racial Portuguese family. The distinguished Representative of Portugal speaking in another place on this motion claimed immunity from this obligation of the Charter under the plea that the Assembly was not competent to ask information from Member Governments "in regard to the status of territories under their national sovereignty" and that whatever the situation may have been in the past, "now, in spite of the recent events in Angola, and in the normal process of the evolution of our society, the Statute has been terminated, and all inhabitants in those provinces have acquired full citizenship". He even expressed righteous indignation at the inscription of this item since according to him "this item would signify, in a sense, that the Organisation was trying to prevent the development of multi-racial states a shocking notion indeed, especially when one considers that multi-racial societies are the most constructive solution to the problem of bringing peace and harmony to the world". In the course of the speech, I will have something to say about the character of this multi-racial society, the manner in which it is being forced into shape and the methods which are being adopted under the very eyes of a civilized world to accomplish Portuguese designs. But just now I can only say that the righteous indignation of the distinguished Representative of Portugal brings to one's mind the picture of an outlaw holding up a victim in a seemingly affectionate embrace with a gun pointing close at the former's back while protesting to a vigilant policeman against his interference in an essential domestic affair.

Madam Chairman, the plea the distinguished delegate of Portugal has put forward is not a new one-it is of course not a new one so far as Portugal is concerned, because it has been advanced by Portugal ever since Portugal became a Member of the United Nations irrespective of the statutory changes referred to--but it is not a new one, Madam, even so as some of the other Administering Authorities are concerned who under the impact of changing times in the changing world have had second thoughts and not only decided to meet this obligation under the Charter, but have actually worked diligently to prepare so-called members of their "metropolitan family" for independence. It is open to any one even to quote the scriptures to justify any code of conduct, but such pleas can deceive no one in the year of grace 1961,

and certainly not the millions of people who have to bear the crushing weight of Portuguese colonialism. One is almost tempted to assume that Portugal is perhaps like the proverbial Rip Van Winkle slumbering away oblivious of the winds of change and unresponsive to the forces of progress of a new world. It is not without reason that the Prime Minister of India referring to this aspect said in a recent speech "while colonialism historically speaking was fading out, the odd thing was that the most backward country in Europe is Portugal, which was backward socially, politically, economically and in almost every other sense, represented the biggest colonial empire and continued to try to hold it". Just now, Madam Chairman, we are concerned with Portugal and if Portugal is the "last leg" of a fading colonialism then at least it is worth noting what that leg stands for and what it symbolizes.

While conscious of the anachronistic character of the present discussion and aware

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that even though enough has already been said in this Committee and in the Assembly regarding the imperative character of the obligation, I would like to repeat briefly again the nature, the scope and the character of this obligation, if only to bring home to Portugal how out of tune and out of step it is with the rest of the civilized world.

Madam Chairman, I do not have to read out the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter to this Committee. The obligations laid down in that chapter concerning the possessions of a colonial power are both specific and implied. They flow from the concept of the "Sacred Trust" under which these territories are supposed to be held. They are well understood in this Committee. These have been defined and interpreted by this Committee at least on three occasions and there should be no doubt as to their meaning and the scope of their applicability. In these interpretations the Administering members-- few in number--took equal part with the vast majority of non-administering members, and therefore special weight attaches to them. Apply to these so called integral parts of Portugal Resolution 742 (VIII), or the 12 principles enunciated by the Committee of six about a year ago, and their true colonial character becomes apparent. The history of our age has known nothing more farfetched or absurd than the plea that these territories in Africa and Asia, far away from Portugal, sharing nothing with Portugal but their wealth and that too through the use of force on the part of the latter are not colonies but integral parts of the metropolitan area on the basis of some statutes unilaterally adopted by the Government of Portugal. Such a plea is wholly inconsistent with and repugnant to the spirit and concept of a "free world"--I do not use this phrase in its hackneyed sense--enshrined in the Charter.

Madam Chairman, a perusal of Document A/AC 100-2 issued by the Secretariat which gives an account of the background to the drafting

of Chapter XI of the Charter of San Francisco will show to Members of this Committee as to what was the underlying concept and scope of Chapter XI. According to the framers of Chapter XI at San Francisco "it applies to all dependent peoples in all dependent territories" so that "henceforth there should be an international instrument under which the dependent territories would be administered in the interest of the indigenous people". The distinction--only in the letter by calling all these indigenous people "Portugese", their indigenous character is not altered. Their rights under the Charter cannot be curtailed nor by that token can Portugal default or find extenuation thereby. As was pointed out by my delegation on an earlier occasion, Madam Chairman, the English may have done many things to justify their hold on India, which they should not have done but they were certainly not what we call as "English-men". When a reference is made, Madam Chairman, to "indigenous people" let us be clear that the principle governing the application of Article 73 of the Charter embraces all dependent territories which are geographically separate from the metropolitan territory and whose people are racially, ethnically and culturally distinct from the people of the metropolitan country. There can be no objection to the establishment of a relationship politically or otherwise with the metropolitan area out of their free voluntary choice exercised as a free independent country after and only subject to their having attained independence. But to convert these overseas territories into subject provinces of the metropolitan area by a unilateral fiat of the governing authority neither alters their dependent character nor does it permit Portugal to absolve itself of its moral obligations to the United Nations or to the world at large.

The framers of Chapter XI of the Charter and of Article 73 left no loopholes for countries like Portugal. Even though it is too late in the day to their demanding the fulfilment of the obligations under Article 73 such a demand is important and vital since Article 73 is starting point of an obligation and a commitment which must in due time, and Madam, in the present tempo of world progress, in a very short time should lead to full-fledged independence of these territories. The Committee of six therefore after the fullest consideration came to the inevitable conclusion that this obligation under Article 73 definitely lies and the Assembly on its recommendation felt persuaded to pass a comprehensive Resolution A/RES 1542 (XV) requesting the Government of Portugal "to transmit to the Secretary-General information in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter on the conditions prevailing in the territory under its administration". These were separately enumerated as:

- (a) The Cape Verde Archipelago,
- (b) Guinea, called "Portuguese Guinea",
- (c) Sao Tome and Principe, and their dependencies,
- (d) Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda,

(e) Angola, including the enclave of Cabinda

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(f) Mozambique

(g) Goa and dependencies, called "the State of India"

(h) Macau and dependencies

(i) Timor and dependencies,

Even though a Member of the United Nations and having thus accepted all obligations under the Charter, and particularly under Article XI, as a power with colonial possessions Portugal continues to be recalcitrant, is unwilling to abide by the rules of conduct, has refused to respond to the almost unanimous request of the Assembly and has taken cover under a plea in conflict with accepted juridical principles and to moral obligations.

Before, however, Madam Chairman, we address ourselves to the problem thus created, I would like this Committee to take note also of the realities of the situation. While not stemming directly from this refusal on the part of Portugal, the condition in these territories and some of the tragic events that have occurred are in actual fact seriously endangering world peace, apart from influencing to their utmost detriment the lives of millions of people inhabiting the territories enumerated earlier.

Portugal, Madam Chairman, is by no means the only country, although it is the latest among colonial countries to spread the statutory net of metropolitan unity over its colonial possessions to avoid answerability for what it does to those colonial people--to the United Nations. Similar pleas have been put forward on different occasions by the United Kingdom, by the Netherlands and by France, but in due course good sense has prevailed. They have responded to the changing tempo of public opinion, to the spirit underlying the Charter and the responsibilities and obligations devolving upon them as Trustees of dependent people.

Portugal, however, has continued to take shelter behind a legal fiction. It became, therefore, necessary, to spell out once again most unequivocally, the obligations of member nations under chapter XI and Article 73 of the Charter and to reinforce the competence of the Assembly. In this respect the Committee of Six was appointed whose definite and clear conclusions were placed before the Assembly. On the basis of these conclusions and recommendations, Resolution 1542 was adopted by an overwhelming vote of the Assembly. This Resolution leaves no room for doubt as to what the obligations of Portugal are under the Charter and as a member of the United Nations, in respect of Chapter XI and Article 73.

Now, Madam Chairman, the competence of the Assembly to define territories regarding which a colonial government incurs obligations under Article 73 cannot be challenged and the Portuguese government, no matter what it has been saying in the past, has no excuse or justification, so long as it claims membership in the United Nations, now to deliberately default in this obligation.

In April this year the Security Council was seized of a complaint regarding the situation in Angola, one of the largest among the territories in Portuguese possession. A large volume of evidence was produced before the Security Council detailing some of the blood-curdling atrocities of which the people of Angola have been the victims at the hands of their Portuguese masters. Basing its decision on this evidence, the Security Council appointed a Special Committee of the Representatives of this Assembly to make an on-the-spot enquiry and submit their report and recommendations to the Assembly. This is not the time to discuss what happened to this Committee or its report. The important thing for us to note is that on the basis of material available to it the Security Council felt concerned about occurrences in Angola and appointed a Committee to investigate. Madam Chairman, before I proceed, allow me to make one thing very clear. We have no quarrel with the Portuguese people. In fact we sympathize with them, because one of the major evils of colonialism is that it hurts as much the colonized as the colonizer. While it brings suffering to the one it demoralizes the other. We along with the rest of the world get stories from various sources about brutality and oppression, about primitive conditions forced on the life of indigenous people, of dragooned labour, even of genocide. All that we have repeatedly asked is that in its own interests, in the interest of the people of these territories, above all in the compliance of its obligations under the Charter, Portugal should supply official authenticated information about social, economic and political conditions in these territories. I would like to place before this Committee some of the most recent reports from sources whose bona fides at least Portugal cannot challenge.

Referring to conditions in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea Mr. Benjamin Welles, the New York Times Correspondent in Madrid, who according to the paper "is currently on a roving assignment in Africa" wrote in the New York Times on March 19, 1961 as follows:-

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"Angola (the biggest and richest) covers 481,000 square miles has a 1,000 mile coast line and a population of 4,500,000. Tribal Africans governed in varying degree by 250,000 Portuguese whites, Malatos and blacks. It is the chief ornament in the Portuguese imperial diadem."

Diadems are only possessions, however precious they may be! The writer proceeds further and after describing how these 4,500,000 people are governed, indicated what they contribute "as equal citizens" to the imperial diadem in economic advantages and sweated labour. "With its sister province Mozambique", he observes "Angola

absorbs about 23% of Portugal's exports--captive markets that might not easily be replaced. Between them their exports of coffee, diamonds, sisal, mica and other minerals have long provided Portugal with the dollars she appropriates and distributes as she sees fit--seldom to the colonies' satisfaction". It is important to note how dollars are appropriated in this benevolent multi-racial dominion. This correspondent incidentally cannot call a spade other than a spade and for him, "colonies" are "colonies". Mr. Welles proceeds further and gives us some idea as to how not only the mineral and the land wealth of these territories is disposed of but also how human beings, so called equal members of this wonderful "family" are bartered away as wealth to help neighbouring colonies. "Both these territories", he says referring to Angola and Mozambique, also provide native labour for surrounding white-ruled areas, such as, the Union of South Africa, the Rhodesias and until recently the Belgian Congo".

Someone pompously claimed, Madam, the other day that Portugal was the first to abolish slavery. To alter a trite saying about the rose, give trading in human labour any name you wish "contratados" or "voluntarios" the system under which the indigenous people are sold to sweat for others is even worse than slavery. Here again, Madam Chairman, I do not wish to quote some of the harrowing and blood-curdling stories which reach us from different sources. I would however, again quote from an article published in an American paper, which I am sure the distinguished delegate of Portugal will agree is not hostile to Portugal--the Christian Science Monitor--By Mr. J. Jerome Smith on May 6, 1951. "This forced labour", writes Mr. Jerome Smith "is a much criticized but basic feature of Portugal's colonial policy in Angola and Mozambique." One historian specializing in Portuguese Africa according to Smith, has called it "a projection of slavery". Mr. Jerome Smith proceeds further, "it is widely held that a basic incentive which now drives large numbers of two million native Angolans out of subsistence agriculture and across the colony's borders is this reprehensive labour practice. Corporal punishment in these Portuguese colonies and higher wages offered across the borders add to the incentive. He proceeds further "over 3/4ths of the mining labour in Southern Rhodesia is foreign" largely from Mozambique and Nyasaland.....Under one treaty, the Union of South Africa recruits nearly 100,000 Africans from Mozambique alone" and, Madam Chairman, after having been sold out through recruiting agencies and treaties, what happens to the small earnings which these toiling slaves sometimes bring back by sweating and starving themselves. This is what Mr. J. Jerome Smith has to say "Besides spending their wages in Portuguese markets, they pay taxes, including an immigration tax. Taxes imposed on the Africans amount to half of the Colonial income in Angola". Mr. Jerome Smith concludes "It has been said that without the cheap labour from Portuguese Africa the Union of South Africa's gold mines could not compete in the world market with Australia or the United States. It is apparent that other mining industries bordering the Portugese colonies also count heavily on cheap labour. Turning now, Madam Chairman, to Education. In Angola, in 1956, and I apologise to this House that no later authentic figures are available to me. There are 245 educational

institutions for a population of 4,145,000. These had 16,114 pupils. Out of these only 3,000 were indigenous African children, a greater part of whom again were the children of "assimilated" public officials. John Gunther writing much earlier found only 68 African pupils in Secondary schools. Madam Chairman, one could go on quoting volumes of evidence from sources, which even the distinguished delegate from Portugal cannot but consider responsible, bona fide and authentic. This evidence could only give to this committee an idea of the primitive and backward conditions under which millions in Portuguese colonies are forced to live to sustain Portugal's economy and Portuguese prosperity. This year, Madam Chairman, for the first time, may be under provocations of an unwholesome character, we were assured of information and evidence to disprove most of the charges made against Portugal. Speaking in the Assembly Madam, Chairman, on behalf of Portugal, Mr. De Miranda, who for the purpose of record referred to himself "as a Goan" and concerned about the tranquillity "of my country in my homeland--Goa", characterized as "grossly misleading, utterly baseless and irresponsible statements made by the

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Representative of India" and said "I will demonstrate this point presently, and the evidence I shall place before the Assembly will be my justification for requesting its patient hearing for some minutes". Madam Chairman, we listened patiently to the distinguished Goan Representative of Portugal but probably the brief time he had on that occasion was taken up almost entirely by a flamboyant outburst and a reckless tirade against India. I will have to say something about this later.

As Shakespeare said even a toad has sometimes a jewel in its head and good can come out of evil. While I have no desire to comment on his fulminations against my country, although some of his intemperate statements, irresistibly recall to one's mind the under tones and the over tones of some of our own "sons of India" who during the worst days of our subjection, inveighed against patriots and trumpeted at international forums the beneficent glories of the British rule. But we would be glad to have that evidence placed before this Committee. We would be glad even to give Portugal the benefit of the doubt, if there is a doubt, because what we have been asking for, what we are asking even now is authentic information, substantiated evidence, official data to enable the world to draw its own conclusions.

We have been told of a Utopian multi-racial national community based on the principle of "all men as equal, whatever their race, creed and colour" as being descriptive of Portuguese policies in the territories in its possession. We would like to know the extent of equality in law, in the social fields of labour and education, in terms of electoral privileges, the franchise and the character of the electorates in fact in any other basis of equality familiar to civilized democratic people. I take it that the distinguished representative from Goa himself may be a member of some kind of a Council. We would appreciate knowing the constituency he represents,

the number of electors constituting such constituencies and the number of citizens living in that constituency. Years ago we also had Legislative Councils, in which most members represented only one constituency namely the Viceroy's House i.e. they were nominated by the Viceroy.

Several distinguished delegates have placed before the Assembly, before the Security Council this year a great volume of evidence of the nature of atrocities and the extent of havoc, misery and suffering inflicted by the Portuguese in Angola and other territories. But unfortunately there has been no abatement of terror. This is what "New York Post" published on May 26, 1961 from Reuters: "British Political Weeklies today estimated the number of Africans killed in Portuguese operations against rebels in Angola at 20 to 25 thousand." Left Wing "New Statesman" said "some 35 thousand virtually defenceless Africans have already been butchered by machine-guns and napalms, A writer in the Right Wing "Spectator" quoted the figure of 20,000 as the "most apparently trustworthy and by no means the largest of the figures that have slipped through the terror-struck censorship". The independent "Economist" said the killing of Africans had been "indiscriminate" and put the figure at thousands or tens of thousands.

All three weekly reviews published editorials or articles strongly Critical of Portugal and Antonia Salazar's regime.

The "New Statesman" said that now since the fighting in Algeria was at last ending Dr. Salazar is identified, not only in Africa but in Asia and Latin America as the enemy number one?

These three responsible weeklies are from a country which is embarrassing friendly to Portugal. It is they who think, that instead of being the creator and the builder of an Utopian multi-racial community, the dictatorial head of Portugal is being identified as enemy number one of the African people.

Madame Chairman, we would only be too happy if the Portuguese Government could produce evidence to show that this is a distorted picture, that these are not facts but fiction and while God is in his Heaven there is nothing wrong with the territories over which Dr. Salazar rules. Madam Chairman, I am sure, I have exhausted the patience of this Committee but the tale of woe, of suffering and of humiliation of those who live in Portuguese overseas territorial possessions is so depressing, so sad, even I may say so, so revolting to one's sense of humanity that one sometimes wonders how such primitive barbarism can coexist with a civilized society which has accepted the noble principles enshrined in the Charter and the great moral obligations of the Declaration of Human Rights.

Madam Chairman, I have not said anything about the continued Portuguese occupation of Goa which is almost like a fly seeking a permanent home on the trunk of an elephant. I have not said anything, because a great deal has been said in the Assembly, which should be

enough even for the deaf to listen and the blind to see. The conditions in Goa continue

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to be bad as everywhere else in Portuguese-controlled territories. Writing on May 21, 1961 the Correspondent of the New York Times observed "evidence within Goa, which is on the West Coast of India, indicates that many persons oppose suppressive Portuguese measures, but have neither the political fervour nor means to halt them". He writes further "the press is rigidly censored everywhere in the domain of Premier Antonia De Alvaria Salazar. Political activities, except by Dr. Salazar's National Union, is banned". He writes further "for the first time in nearly 50 years Goans have been commissioned in the Portuguese Army, although none ranks highly."

Madam Chairman, my country, ever since it has attained its freedom, has according to its limited resources supported every move to liquidate colonialism in the world, since we feel that this soul-searing system is repugnant to human dignity, is opposed to modern civilized concepts of a free human society, and is one of the greatest dangers to world peace. In the case of Goa, we feel a little more emotionally. We may be pardoned, Madam Chairman, if we are even rather intolerant and impatient about Portuguese occupation of Goa, whether it is as they say through the virtue of a papal bull or some kind of arrangement with a vanished system. We feel that there can be no coexistence between a free society, and colonial slavery. In the interest of our own security, in the interest of our own policy of non-alignment, but above all, and this is paramount, in the interests of Goanese people who are part of us, our very kith and kin, we cannot allow a colonial power to maintain a foothold on our soil. Our revolution was aimed against all three colonial powers, England, France and Portugal. Whatever our relationship may have been in the past, England and France went out with grace and dignity. We have been asking even during the days of our struggle that Portugal should do the same. Ever since our freedom, we have adopted all reasonable persuasive methods to make Portugal see the signs of the times. We are a patient people, my Government is a patient Government, and the Prime Minister of India is more patient than both. This is, Madam, what he said as lately as October 21, 1961 and I quote from a report from the "Statesman" of New Delhi "Mr. Nehru devoted considerable time to explaining India's policies on Goa....."and while saying" that India had never committed herself to ending Portuguese rule in Goa only through nonmilitary means, he, however, emphasized that it was still the Government's intention to settle this problem peacefully. In the ultimate analysis India's policy towards Goa had been conditioned not by her theoretical attachment to non-violence but for practical considerations. At the same time, he acknowledged how his country's non-violent approach had influenced her efforts in seeking peaceful end of Portuguese rule."

Madam Chairman, I have taken the liberty of quoting this latest statement of my Prime Minister partly to show how strongly we feel

about the continued presence of the Portuguese in control of Goa, and yet at the same time how patiently even tolerantly we are continuing to seek and may continue to seek the peaceful withdrawal of the Portuguese from our soil. But whatever the measure of our patience and our deep devotion to the methods whereby we were able to end British and French colonialism in India, the fact remains that the Portuguese will have to go, no matter what we and the Goanese have to do to attain this objective. Goa still is a part of our unfinished revolution.

While, Madam Chairman, we would await any gesture of co-operation towards enlightening this Committee regarding the state of affairs in the Portuguese colonies; this Committee has to take note of Portugal's continued default, and to recommend steps necessary for correcting this position. To come to the last position regarding this non-compliance, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December, 1960, spelt out once again and most clearly "the principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information called for under Article 73 of the Charter", regarding non-self-governing territories. And further, so that there should be no room for any kind of doubt, the Assembly in its resolution 1542 (XV) decided that in the light of the provision of Chapter XI of the Charter, the General Assembly resolution 742 (VIII) and the principles approved by the Assembly in resolution 1541 (XI) of 15 December 1960, the territories under the administration of Portugal listed thereunder are non-self-governing territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. The resolution specifically and categorically declared that "an obligation exists on the part of the Government of Portugal to transmit information under Chapter XI of the Charter, concerning these territories and that it should be discharged without further delay.

The Government of Portugal, Madam Chairman, in response to these resolutions and in terms of its obligations under the Charter, was required to transmit information accordingly, and was invited to participate as an Administering country in the work of the Committee of Information from

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Non-Self-Governing Territories.

These obligations, were reiterated in the course of the debates of the General Assembly in April 1961, and of the Security Council in March and June 1961. They were reiterated once again in the General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) and the Security Council resolution contained in document S/4835 dealing with the most recent and most flagrant instance of the Portuguese Government's continuous suppression of the rights of its colonial peoples, namely, their actions in Angola.

In spite of these repeated reaffirmations of its duties and

obligations as a member state, the Portuguese Government have continued to persist in their refusal to discharge their obligations. As has been stated by my Delegation in document A/4841, they have neither submitted any information, nor have they agreed to do so in the future. The Portuguese Government declined to attend the meeting in April or May of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories of which Portugal is an Administering Member. This Committee again, Madam Chairman, passed a resolution recalling once again the obligation of the Government of Portugal to transmit information and expressing regret that no information had been transmitted, and no representative from Portugal was present.

If this obstinate persistence in its perverse refusal to respond to these repeated demands from the Assembly, was merely a technical default, it might have been a strain on our patience, but would not be a cause of grave concern. It is not that information is not pouring out of these territories from different sources. I have already referred very briefly to the type of information and its character and its contents that has become available. I have advisedly relied on information from sections of the press which are not only responsible but whose bona fides cannot be challenged by the Portuguese Government. This information, leaves no doubt that large populations in these territories are not only being denied elementary human rights, like the right of free speech, the right of association, the right of choice of their means of livelihood etc. but are being kept in a state of ignorance and backwardness unthinkable in modern times. They are being crushed through a process of savage terrorism, which has no parallel even in the worst phases of colonial history. Apart from the diabolical crimes and atrocities that are being committed, there have been serious allegations of mass genocide in the name of peace and tranquility, and on the plea of bringing into existence a multi-racial society Peace and tranquility forsooth, Madam Chairman, and here again let me refer to what has been said by an American source as to the nature of this peace. The special correspondent of the Herald Tribune writing from Luanda, Angola, wrote as follows in May 1961: "Transfer over many years of all business profits to Portugal and the United States has left the country without any recuperative resources." He then observes: "In Luanda itself basking in almost Mediterranean sunshine, the rain of terror and lynching of Africans has at least been stopped." Proceeding further he observes "The northern countryside presents a scene of desolation. Villages and farms are gutted ruins. For hundreds of miles, as seen from the air, the only sign of life is an occasional rising smoke trail.....In the city itself, even in the African locations, there is scarcely an African to be seen. Between 30,000 and 50,000 people are now thought to have died." 50,000 people in a single continuous operation represent a big part of Angola's small African population. This is peace forsooth, Madam Chairman, the peace of the graveyard. It is because of these harrowing reports that world opinion must feel concerned and do something about bringing home to Portugal not only the gravity of its default, but also the grave dangers to world peace resulting from its actions. What we are dealing with is an explosive situation. It is a situation which

concerns the lives, the property and the very existence of millions of inhabitants living in territories with a combined area several times larger than Portugal itself. It is a situation which seriously endangers peace.

Madam Chairman, I should like to conclude by saying that while Portugal has failed to discharge her obligations, there are obligations on the part of the United Nations also--obligations towards the peoples of Portuguese colonies--in the discharge of which we must not hesitate, and we certainly cannot afford to fail. The United Nations on its part should examine information concerning Portuguese colonies, and formulate its own recommendations and observations for the advancement of peoples in those colonies, as in the case of the colonies of other administering members, and this we must do irrespective of whether or not Portugal transmits any information. If she does not transmit information, such information as is available from other sources must be collected and prepared by the Secretariat for appropriate examination. If it becomes necessary in the circumstances to which Portugal's refusal to co-operate with the United Nations has given rise, it would even be desirable to receive petitions

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from the inhabitants of these colonies, and to give them a hearing should they demand hearings, This is the least the United Nations can do at this stage, and while we regret that the United Nations should have to take recourse to these means, the responsibility for compelling recourse to them will be entirely and squarely on Portugal.

Normally, the affairs of all colonies should be the subject of examination by the Committee on Information. But here we have a situation in which a large number of colonial powers are extending their co-operation to the United Nations in the Committee on Information, and only Portugal remains out of that pale of co-operation. The case of Portuguese colonies should, therefore, have to be treated as a very special one because the means we have to adopt in the discharge of our obligations to the inhabitants of Portuguese colonies need not be applied to the Non-Self-Governing Territories of other administering members as they are voluntarily and willingly cooperating with us in the organs established by the Assembly in implementation of Chapter XI of the Charter. It might, therefore, be useful for the Committee to consider whether the most appropriate action on our part at this stage will not be to set up a special committee elected by the Assembly to receive and examine the information from Portuguese Non-Self-Governing Territories, in the way I have suggested above. It is on these lines that my delegation would wish to see the Committee make a recommendation to the Assembly by the Assembly Plenary. At the appropriate stage my delegation will itself extend its cooperation in the preparation and submission of a resolution on these lines.

INDIA PORTUGAL USA SPAIN UNITED KINGDOM ANGOLA PERU CAPE VERDE GUINEA SAO  
TOME E PRINCIPE MOZAMBIQUE FRANCE THE NETHERLANDS CONGO ITALY SOUTH AFRICA  
AUSTRALIA IRAN ALGERIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Nov 01, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### Shri J.N. Khosla's Statement on Racial Discrimination in Non-self- governing Territories

Shri J.N. Khosla, Member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following speech in the Trusteeship Committee on Nov 17, 1961 on racial discrimination in the Non-self-governing Territories:

Madam Chairman:

The problem of racial discrimination is of major concern to us all, for on its solution depends the future--political, economic, social and even spiritual--of mankind. If war is to be banished forever from the hearts of men, racial prejudice and all that it implies must be eradicated, and liberty, equality and social justice guaranteed to all, irrespective of caste, colour or creed. In spite of the long drawn out struggle, which has gone on with some success against this monster of prejudice, it still raises its ugly head in many regions and in many climates. This affront to human dignity and self-respect needs immediate and radical solution.

The report under discussion, today, Madam Chairman, covers only non-self-governing territories. While racial discrimination bedevils most of the colonial territories, my remarks will be confined to only some of these territories--mainly the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Kenya--in Africa where racial discrimination has not only caused untold misery and unhappiness, but still remains a vital barrier to human progress and in places causes serious conflict.

The situation is aggravated by the facts that racial relations in these territories are not merely race relations, they are relations between different economic groups with different levels of education, political power, incomes and sociological background. Racial prejudice permeates every feature of life. Colour of skin is associated with political status; it signifies standards of culture and living, and stages of refinement and etiquette.

Europeans came to Africa as conquerors and have, therefore, enjoyed

supremacy. Through racial discrimination, they have preserved their supremacy, and so called "racial prestige". Rigidity of racial barriers is as a rule found to be more intense in areas where the number of the Europeans is larger, as in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and also in Kenya, than where their number is smaller, as in Tanganyika and Uganda, where their dependence on the indigenous, population, for many services, is necessarily greater.

Experience shows that discrimination stems mainly from the desire:

- (1) to establish racial supremacy;
- (2) to dominate politically;
- (3) to exploit economically;

For proper understanding, Madam Chairman, of the problem of racial discrimination, it is essential to examine its political, economic and social ramifications, in some of these territories. I shall deal, in turn, briefly, with each one of these aspects.

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Political Domination.

The Europeans through constitutional, administrative and other methods have retained political control in their hands. "Liberty", "equality", and "fraternity" have no meaning for the Africans.

In Northern Rhodesia, the 80,000 whites, are opposed to yielding their present position of political domination to 2 1/2 million Africans. They have shown no desire either to understand the signs of the times, or their own long-term interests. Mr. Leonard Ingalls, special correspondent of the New York Times, writing from Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia on the 8th of August 1961, said that John Gaunt, a European leader, summarised the views of his community as follows:

"I am not prepared to live in a country under black government, with a black Prime Minister, black judges and black policemen, because I don't believe that they have the same high standards of integrity and behaviour that I am accustomed to. They may reach those standards in time but there is no sign of it today, as events in other countries have shown".

This kind of day-dreaming hardly needs a comment. It is surprising that even in the Year of Grace 1961, most of these European settlers are incapable of rising above their prejudices. They are, instead, making a great effort to increase their numbers by encouraging immigration. During the last ten years, they have doubled their population in Northern Rhodesia. But one can hardly imagine that immigration would be a practical proposition to convert themselves into a majority. Leonard Ingalls reports, that the attitude of some whites towards Africans in Northern Rhodesia is strongly influenced

by the presence of many white South African mine workers in the copper belt. They have brought their harsh racial opinions with them from South Africa and give them full voice at every opportunity.

It is gratifying to note, however, that some sections of the European community, in the territory, have shown realism and courage in facing the problem. Sir John Moffat, leader in Northern Rhodesia of the multi-racial Central African party, said:

"The Africans here are extraordinarily reasonable people, but they are getting impatient. After all this is a protectorate, not a British possession. It belongs to the Africans and if they want to govern it why shouldn't they?

Basically here, it is a white problem, not an African problem. We have a small white community that won't face the facts of life in Africa and the time we've got is too short to abolish the differences between the two. At the most we have five years to train the Africans for self-government."

The position of the African is even worse in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The imposition of the Federation was and still is primarily designed to entrench settlers into positions of political power ad infinitum. The Federal Franchise allowed the politically and economically powerful settlers to maintain their domination over Africans. It enabled them to determine, uninhibited, the number of Africans they wished to dole-off the Voters' Roll. This franchise divided citizens into three classes--the Ordinary, the Special and the Ungraded.

To qualify as a full voter, you need:

Income	Property	Education
£ 720 p.a.	£ 1500	nil
£ 480	£ 1000	8 years schooling
£ 300	£ 500	std 10.

To be a Special voter, i.e. one whose vote was one third of a full vote, one needs:

Income	Property	Education
£ 150 p.a.	£ 500	Literacy in English
£ 120 p.a.	Nil	Std. 8

When it is realised that the average wage of the African mine worker is the highest in Central Africa at £ 99 p.a. in the Copper Mines, compared to £ 1932 p.a. of his white counterpart, it will be seen that this highly qualitative franchise virtually renders every

European a voter on the basis of "One Man One Vote", while effectively excluding the average African from becoming even a special voter.

Besides, by making it obligatory for the African candidates to obtain certificates of candidature from two third of the chiefs in their constituencies, directly under the control of the District Commissioners, the politically minded

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among the few qualified Africans that there are, are left out.

Rev. Faith Raven, in his 'Central Africa' (1960), quotes an official Federal publication which boasts:

"The Government are firmly opposed to any reduction in (educational and financial) standards of qualifications required of voters for the election of the members of the Assembly, as they believe that only civilised and responsible people are qualified to hold the reins of of Government in the Federation."

Who is a "civilized and responsible" person? Rev. Raven answers:

"Europeans devise the test of 'civilization.' They also decide how many may pass it. For, African education policy is in the hands of European employers who also fix the wages the African will earn."

In the Federation and its component parts, there have never been any African Cabinet Ministers. The number of indigenous people even in the senior grade of the civil service has been insignificant: 983 Europeans to 50 Africans. (Vide report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1960, popularly called the Moncton Report) Despite legal guarantees to the contrary, Africans are barred from direct entry to Grade I services except as doctors, of whom, till 1959, only four had been recruited. It is not surprising therefore, that the Africans do not want the continuance of the Federation. Moncton Report (p. 75) emphasizes:

"Racial discrimination though diminishing, remains one of the more important forces working against federation. The reference to partnership in the preamble of the 1953 Constitution, leads Africans to believe that discrimination would quickly disappear. The fact that it did not, has resulted in growing suspicion and disillusionment."

Recently, œ500,000 was voted by the Federal Government to sell the idea of Federation to the very African who is opposed to it. The African, of course, was not consulted. He is as much a tax-payer as any other inhabitant in the Federation and, therefore, shares this expenditure, and yet he is denied direct representation in either the legislature or the government.

The proviso in the Federal Constitution that the said Constitution

would not be amended during the trial period of seven years has been tampered with, resulting in 'The Enlargement of the Federal Franchise Act' and in many other discriminatory Acts, such as, the Army Service (Conscription) Act. The African Affairs Board, which was described in 1953 as 'an impregnable safeguard for the African', is under a threat of removal by Sir Roy Welensky and his followers, who want to institute in its place a Senate composed of Chiefs, and others, who would be amenable to his influence.

In Nyasaland there has been some improvement in the situation with the introduction of the new constitution. Much remains still to be done. A larger measure of political power however, having been given to the Africans, the future progress should be more rapid than before. Even the Europeans in this Protectorate have begun to realise that the guarantees of their future lies in cooperation with the Africans, rather than in constitutional safeguards. Thus three months ago, in the elections held under the new Constitution, three out of eight seats reserved for the Europeans and other non-Africans, for which Africans are not eligible to vote were won by Malawai Congress party (Dr. Hasting Banda's party). (See the New York Times, August 17, 1961).

Turning to Kenya, until recently another problem territory, we find that the hopes for constitutional advance are now brightening. The Africans rightly believe that without political control, their national reconstruction and progress would be seriously retarded, and are insisting upon immediate grant of independence.

Madam Chairman, here we must emphasize that British professions in regard to racial discrimination, laudable though they are, are not fully translated into practice in their dependencies. Even a superficial observer could see that the United Kingdom Government's assertion that those fundamental rights and freedoms which are part of the British tradition are established and protected by the laws of the territories, is hardly justifiable. We all admire the great principles of law and justice and the traditions of freedom of thought and expression, which the British enjoy in their country. We also admire men like our British colleague Sir Hugh Foot in this committee, who have promoted the cause of freedom with a spirit of dedication and understanding. But Madam Chairman, we find a considerable divergence, in

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the British dependent territories, between professed policy and its application, in regard to human rights.

Economic Exploitation.

Economically too, these non-self-governing territories are dominated by the Europeans, who control the entire industrial and commercial activity in these territories and derive huge profits.

The African generally ekes out his existence mainly on subsistence economy, or by providing unskilled labour. The results are obvious. In Northern Rhodesia, thus, per capita income of the African rural worker is about £16 a year; that of the African industrial worker, £60 to 80. By contrast the European earns £1,000 to 12,000 plus many other perquisites denied to the African. The minimum wage of the African, in fact, is fixed by the Native Labour Board, and is intended only to cover a single man's needs.

Weakness of African Trade Unionism, and until recently the refusal of Europeans to admit Africans into their Unions, has handicapped the indigenous labour in collective bargaining. Even now, the Africans, admitted to the European Unions, often complain that they are virtually second-class members. Discrimination continues. To quote Rev. F. Raven again:

"The policy of 'equal pay for equal work' has not meant in practice that an African is free to earn the same wages as a European; on the contrary, just because some jobs must be paid at European rates, they are reserved for Europeans".

The best agricultural areas even have been reserved for a handful of Europeans who have only partially developed their extensive domains. The new land policy promises to ameliorate the position. But nothing short of a drastic measure would satisfy the legitimate demands of the Africans.

Social Supremacy.

Madam Chairman, now a word about discrimination in the social field. In some ways this type of discrimination raises the worst tensions and engenders deepest hatred and bitterness, for it affects day to day life and hurts most. Urbanisation has accentuated inter-racial cleavage. Racial segregation in Northern Rhodesia has condemned many an African worker to live in insanitary slums around European habitations enjoying all kinds of modern Conveniences at public expense. Even in these slums the African has no right to stay unless he has a job. His family can seldom come with him, and if it does come, he can hardly afford to keep them above a semi-starvation level.

Until recently, municipal laws required him to carry a night pass to avoid arrest; his entry to restaurants, cinemas, hotels, clubs and even public conveniences was barred, and he could be served only at the back of a shop. This is not all; even today there is hardly any contact between the European and African outside of the master servant-relationship. Even those few educated Africans who have entered the senior or medium grades of civil service, or have obtained some success in business or in their technical posts can only have formal or impersonal relations with the Europeans. Thus the main racial categories essentially remain closed to intercourse with each other. "Our relationships with the African stop at 4.40 p.m." is often heard from Europeans who live in their garden cities or hills,

as if they were in Kensington Gardens or Hampstead.

It is gratifying to note however, that a couple of months ago racial discrimination in Northern Rhodesia's tearooms, cafes, restaurants, hotel dining rooms and lounges, cinemas has been abolished by law which carries fairly stiff penalties.

"This law," said Sir Evelyn Home, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, "will have profound effect on race relations in this territory". Since then one of the main clubs has also been thrown open to Africans. We hope this movement will continue and legislation banning racial discrimination, will be effectively enforced.

In the federal capital traditions die hard. Europeans continue to regard themselves as a distinct social and racial category with characteristic appearance, values and modes of behaviour. Even the educated African cannot live in white areas. Mr. Savanhu, a Junior Minister, has not been permitted to transgress this rule. There can be no compromise with poor relations, who "may be asked to a meal, but never to stay". Obviously the African is free to live as he likes and according to his own tradition, but only behind bars. The Federation claims to having a multi-racial partnership; the existence of an overwhelming majority of the under privileged belies this claim.

In Nyasaland even the small European minority of 8,000 has tried to be exclusive and to preserve its privileged position. Mr. Cameron, young Scottish lawyer, who came to Nyasaland

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four years ago, in an interview, published in New York Times on the 6th of July, this year, said:

"I had heard of partnership and we came with an open mind expecting to mix and work with Africans....."

"Some of the books we read about Nyasaland said there was no colour bar here, which was not true. First we found that the Blantyre Club was for Europeans only. Then we discovered that schools were completely segregated. About £30,000 was spent for a municipal swimming pool just across the road from an African's school but they weren't allowed to use it".

"There was virtually no contact between Africans and Europeans outside office hours and that is certainly something I did not expect. But my employer told me social integration was not part of partnership."

Social discrimination has also given rise to serious strife and conflict in Kenya where policy of segregation in many fields still continues. An African, not in domestic service, cannot remain within a town for more than 48 hours without employment. Law controls his

movements. He can be arrested by a policeman without warrant, on a flimsy excuse.

I need hardly multiply examples. While some progress has been achieved, racial discrimination still remains one of the most irksome and degenerating aspect of life for the non-European in those territories. The heavy price that humanity has paid for racialism is incalculable but Madam Chairman, to give some idea of it, I would mention briefly the following points:

1) Racial discrimination has prevented full development and use of manpower to achieve optimum productivity. A nation based on racial preferences cannot successfully meet the challenge of the age in creating for itself a just and prosperous society. By denying the African the opportunity to train himself as a technician, or skilled worker or a manager, a vast potential of human and material resources remains untapped. Restrictive and monopolistic methods of the privileged few raise the cost of production. Not only the nation as a whole, the individual employer the worker as well as the consumer is put to a ???

2) Continued existence of a large mass of population at low standards of living seriously affects economic growth. Long term interest of the nation and even of the Europeans would inter alia postulate the expansion of consumers market among Africans, require curbing the migratory nature of African labour, removal of unfair conditions on the use of land by the African, and giving each individual a sense of unity of national aims.

3) Discrimination creates social problems solution of which is costly. The under-privileged inevitably suffer from malnutrition and are exposed to epidemics, for the prevention of which the state has to spend a lot on health services. By creating internal friction, racial discrimination undermines stability, encourages lawlessness and crime. Maintenance of law and order requires elaborate and costly security services. Thus in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the government, according to Philip Mason (see his "Year of Decision", p. 266) spent more on police than on African education.

4) We have witnessed that racial discrimination has given rise to international tensions and conflict. It hinders growth of friendly relations and cooperation among nations with obvious detriment to the cause of world peace and prosperity.

5) Segregation, and consequent isolation prevents understanding of cultures and all the advantages that come out of it. We have seen in Africa how the Europeans have completely ignored the past heritage of the indigenous population and have missed a great opportunity of taking advantage out of it. All pervasive colour prejudice accounts for the isolation of the white. It creates psychological barriers, perverts mentality and makes problem of social adjustment difficult. As Professor Arnold Rose, of the University of Minnesota in his excellent monograph "The Roots of Prejudice" points out:

"Recent researches have shown the correlation between prejudice and other kinds of rigidity and narrowness, at least in Western culture. While the cause is not clear, the connection is so strong that it may fairly be inferred that maintenance of prejudice will be accompanied by a closed mind towards anything new and an inability to accept and reciprocate fully any human relationship."

6) Racial discrimination causes frustration and unhappiness all round. Political consciousness becomes pronounced and tends to express itself in

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terms of race, because, this is related to daily experience. This in turn strengthens reaction and encourages violence and blood-shed, and even war. Talking of the Federation, Mr. Aiden Crawley, a former Under Secretary of State in U.K., warned "That type (i.e. white) minority racial rule is only going to strengthen fascist movements....."(Vide African Affairs, July 1961 p. 396). Racism is generating hatred and factionalism in Africa. It is vitiating the atmosphere and retarding national integration and a healthy growth of the people concerned. Sir Hume Foot expressed this magnificently when he said:

"Racialism, I have no doubt, is the greater danger of our age. No country and no people can be complacent in the face of this evil and this danger. It debases those who persecute and support it even more than those who suffer from it."

If head-on race collisions are to be avoided in these territories, the causes of racial antagonisms, must be eradicated; and every effort should be made to establish inter-racial relations on the basis of equality, mutual advantage and understanding. Experience shows that there are mainly two methods of fighting against racial discrimination: by legislation and educating public opinion.

Doubts have been expressed as to the desirability and even efficacy of legislative and administrative action in dealing with problems of racial discrimination. While recognising some of its handicaps, we must emphasise, that very little can be achieved without the help of legislation. At any rate legislative method does not require any justification. When racial discrimination threatens the very existence of the state itself, it cannot be treated as merely a sin, or an immoral practice which the State could legitimately leave to the conscience of the individual or to the ministrations of the preacher. It is a crime against the state and society and must be made punishable in law, deserving even severer retribution than ordinary crime. The first essential thing is to replace the colonial constitutions by democratic constitutions based on universal suffrage and assuring the unprivileged, full rights of citizenship. With the emergence of democratically elected assemblies, existing legislation affecting race relations which no longer corresponds to

cultural and social realities and which has become a focus of racial antagonism should be annulled. Equality of remuneration for work of equal economic value, equality of opportunity and treatment for all, must be guaranteed by the state. Thus racial discrimination, in all forms and manifestations must be made punishable by law. But that would not be enough unless legislation can be properly enforced. Vested interests often find methods of circumventing the law. As reported in one of the dependencies there are hardly any "European only" notices instead there are small discreet "Right of admission reserved" signs, which appear above the door of refreshment rooms, places of entertainment and pleasure.

Education as a method for the eradication of racial discrimination is no less important. Children of all hues should be brought up together in common understanding and friendship. They must be given a grounding in history--real history and not the one often produced by the colonial historians for specific purposes--which should inculcate in their minds respect for one another and for their common heritage and culture. It is unfortunate, that, in practically all the non-self-governing countries I have been dealing with today education still remains segregated. Nor is this all. Per capita expenses for education in these territories for the European child is 15 to 20 times higher than that for the non-European. I need not labour this point further.

The Administering Governments must launch a campaign of educating the public against racial discrimination which is often rooted in prejudice and ignorance. To the European settlers the Negro, for instance, still remains *Le Sauvage*. Even when he is liberal and means well, his attitude towards the Negro is paternal, rather than that of an equal. His approach is anthropological rather than sociological. The administering authorities, must, as an urgent task, publicise the significant contributions that the Negro and other African races have made towards modern art and music. They must also publicise the vital part independent African Nations are playing in international affairs, today.

Except for North Africa's great past as a cradle of civilisation, few of us know about the valuable contributions other parts of Africa made in the ages gone by. The common impression seems to be that the history of the Negro started with the colonial period. That this is not correct is well established by recent researches.

Several medieval Arab historians have left us picturesque accounts of the ancient Empires that flourished in West Africa. These Empires had enjoyed, since the beginning of their history, cultural and diplomatic relations with North Africa and with most of the Arab countries. Arab historians and geographers have furnished us with

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valuable, details based on the one hand, on eyewitness accounts--as in the case of El Bekri in the eleventh century, Idrissi in the

twelfth, Yakout in the thirteenth and Ibn Khaldoun and Al Omari in the fourteenth--and on the other on their own observations while travelling in these countries, as in the case of Ibn Haoukal in the tenth century, Ibn Batoutah in the fourteenth and Leon the African in the early sixteenth century. Leon, the African, was simply amazed to see the Sudanese town of Gao, about which he wrote "How wealthy it is! Trading is intense thereú Like Timbuktu, Gao is a center of finance and speculation. People deal in drafts drawn on Cairo, Fez, Venice and Genoa".

The Arab historian Ibn Khaldoun wrote in 1393 a remarkable chronicle on Ghana, which flourished remarkably well from the ninth to the eleventh century A.D. A Frenchwoman, Vera Cardot, in her famous *Belles pages de L'histoire-Africaine*, wrote "when they read the history of Ghana, many Europeans thought it was a legend and accused the chroniclers of embellishing reality. But in 1914, Bonnel de Mezieres (a French administrator) discovered the site of Ghana. He saw the traces of broadavenues, lined with houses whose wall were still standing about a yard above the level of the ground. Some of these walls seemed to have supported upper storeys. The traces of streets, squares and wells were evident from the stonework, which could still be seen. Bonnel de Mezieres found also the remains of a metallurgical workshop and, in a courtyard, traces of the use of indigo".

Djenne, now a small town in the Mali Republic, was a large university town around the year 800. In the *Tarikh es Soudan*, written around 1630, the Sudanese writer Abdherraman Sadi, speaking of Djenne, tells us "Any one who is driven from his homeland by poverty and misery and comes to live in this city, will find there, by the grace of God, such abundance and wealth, that he will forget his former fatherland".

And how to describe Timbuktu, the city of lights, of Mall whose university drew scholars and students from the entire Arab world? Alpenfels, a Swedish historian writes that at Timbuktu "when the great Negro scholar, Ahmed Baba (1556-1627), was arrested by soldiers of the Sultan El Mansour, he was worried lest he might die without having collected as many books as some of his friends, and his library contained 1600 volumes". Alpenfels concludes: "While this intellectual activity was taking place in Africa some of our Nordic ancestors were still worshipping before stone altars".

We must understand and appreciate these somewhat obscure pages of history.

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, I would on behalf of my delegation strongly urge the administering authorities, to remove by all means at their disposal the stigma of racial discrimination which has plagued their dependent peoples and outraged human dignity and self-respect since centuries past. My delegation strongly supports the resolution on racial discrimination before us. I thank you, Madam Chairman and my fellow delegates for patient hearing that has been

given to me.

INDIA USA PERU KENYA UGANDA ZAMBIA SOUTH AFRICA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC  
UNITED KINGDOM SUDAN EGYPT GHANA OMAN GERMANY MALI

**Date :** Nov 17, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri Moinul Haque Cbaudhury's Statement on problem of people of Indo-Pakistan Origin in South Africa

Shri Moinul Haque Chaudhury, Member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Special Political Committee on Nov 17, 1961 on the problem of people of Indo-Pakistan origin in the Republic of South Africa:

Mr. Chairman:

We are going to discuss once again the item inscribed in the agenda of the United Nations as 'The Problem of People of Indo-Pakistan Origin in the Republic of South Africa'. Since the year 1946 this subject had come before the Assembly time and again and it was debated in all the sessions of the Assembly except one. I am confident that the individual members who participated in these discussions in previous years are conversant with the basic facts relating to the subject. It is, therefore, not my intention to impose a detailed speech covering the entire ground of the whole case. Apart from referring to new developments, I would refer to only such facts which would give a connected account of the whole matter, particularly for the benefit of the new member states of the United Nations and those individual representatives who may be new to the subject, in this committee.

At the outset, I want to make it clear that my Government do not accept the position taken by the distinguished Foreign Minister of South Africa that the consideration of the question of the treatment of people of Indo-Pakistan origin in South

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Africa constitutes intervention in the domestic affairs of the Republic of South Africa. We have no desire to intervene in any country's domestic affairs. In fact, we made no such attempt in the past, consistent with our national policy. But we cannot accept the proposition that grave violations of human rights and fundamental

freedoms, which deeply move millions of people the world over and divide humanity into compartments, violation of the Charter of the United Nations could remain an internal or domestic matter. I need not waste the time of the Committee by entering into further details in support of this point. Suffice it to say that the General Assembly had rejected this objection repeatedly. Coming to the subject, I would like to say, all that the Government of India want is that the question should be resolved by peaceful negotiations in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. This matter first came up before the United Nations in 1946 and the Assembly at its first session adopted resolution No. 44 (1) which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having taken note of the application made by the Government of India regarding the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa, and having considered the matter,

"1. States that, because of that treatment, friendly relations between the two Member States have been impaired and, unless a satisfactory settlement is reached, these relations are likely to be further impaired;

"2. Is of the opinion that the treatment of Indians in the Union should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreement concluded between the two Governments and the relevant provisions of the Charter,

"3. Therefore requests the two Governments to report at the next session of the General Assembly the measures adopted to this effect."

Since then it has been debated, as I have mentioned earlier, by the General Assembly in all its sessions except the fourth; the only reason for not debating it in the fourth session was that negotiations were in progress at that time between the Governments of India and Pakistan on the one hand and the Government of the Union of South Africa on the other. Each year the policies of the Government of South Africa in this regard have been condemned by an ever-increasing number of nations, both in this august body and outside; I mean the world public opinion, at large. Resolution No. 1597 (XV) on the subject in the last session was carried by 78-0-2 votes. But, Mr. Chairman, with the deepest regret I am to say that all these have made no effect on the Government of the Republic of South Africa. They say that one may take a horse to water, but one cannot make him drink. I am afraid we have not even succeeded in taking the horse to water in this case; however, we shall keep on trying.

It is well-known that my Government is totally and completely opposed to the racial policies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. But then it is not the intention of my Government to claim a special treatment for the people of Indian origin in South Africa. In fact, the Government and the people of India do not isolate this question from the general treatment of the majority of the population

in the Republic of South Africa. While we do not want any special treatment, gain or advantage for the people of Indian origin in South Africa, we do assert that all the non-white population including the people of Indian origin should be treated in conformity with the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a matter of fact, we want equal treatment, equal rights and privileges for the entire population of South Africa whatever may be their origin, race or religion. Apart from the question of treatment in conformity with the Charter and declaration of Human Rights, the problem of the people of Indo-Pakistan origin in South Africa is also a matter of treaty obligation. I will have occasion to refer to it again in some detail.

In spite of the fact that my Government and my people deeply regret the policies pursued by the Government of South Africa, it is not our intention to put any heat or acrimony in this debate. As a matter of fact, we approach this matter with a considerable degree of sadness for, Mahatma Gandhi's name is associated with this issue. It is he who first protested against the treatment meted out to the Indian population in South Africa. He went there as a very young man in 1893, and although his initial intention was to stay there for a year or two, he did not return to India until 1914 being engrossed with this problem. It is therefore unlikely that the present Government of India or any representative of India would inject a spirit of vindictiveness, hatred or bitterness in tackling this problem.

There are at present about 500,000 persons

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of Indo-Pakistan origin in South Africa. Ninety per cent of these people were born in South Africa. Till the summer of 1961 the South African Government had been propagating that these half a million people were aliens and their rightful place was in the countries of their origin and that they should be repatriated. It has been the view of my Government and that of many other Governments that these people were the nationals and citizens of South Africa, as they had been living there for the last three or four generations, adopting that country as their homeland and as ninety per cent of them were born in South Africa itself. It has taken the South African Government several decades to give up its original idea of repatriating these suffering people from South Africa. A member of the South African Government has said on August 5th in Pietermaritzburg, "We have no choice but to acknowledge that they have become a permanent part of the population." This does not of course mean that the conditions of life and work have improved for these people.

The first batch of Indians went to South Africa in the year 1860. The history is this. In 1855 the Colonial Office, Cape of Good Hope, approached the then Government of India, seeking the latter's "permission to the immigration of labourers from that country into Natal." The Government of India turned down the request but were

approached again in 1858. On the 31st March 1858 the then Government of India decided and I quote, "After careful consideration of the subject, we have come to the conclusion that if the colony (meaning South Africa) agrees to the rules which we have considered sufficient in regard to other colonies, it will be unjust to it and to Indian labourers not to allow them to go to the colony if they can be prevailed upon by legitimate offers to do so." The Government of Natal then enacted law 14 of 1859 authorising the immigration of Indian labourers. The corresponding law of the Government of India was Act XXXIII of 1860 which permitted the emigration of Indians to Natal. Not only would the authorities in Natal pay for the transport of these Indians, but under law 14 it was also laid down that the Government of Natal should defray the cost of repatriation of those labourers who wished to return to India on the expiry of their five-year period of indenture. Later, the Natal Government was so anxious that the Indian labourers should settle down in the colony that it provided under section 51 of law 2, 1870, for free grants of land to the indenture-expired Indians if they commuted their right to a free return passage to India. Many Indians availed themselves of this law, and stayed on as labourers; some starting afresh as farmers or Some as traders. In 1874 the Government of Natal added new qualifications to the terms of the contract that the Indian immigrants were to serve five years instead of three, and that a labourer was not to return to India until he had resided in the colony for ten years. Another indication of the colony's anxiety that it should have a permanent Indian population in Natal was evident from the law which laid down that for every hundred men going a statutory number of women, namely, forty, should accompany them. These people went there because the South African Government needed labour for industrial and agricultural enterprises. The part played by these Indians in the prosperity of South Africa was the subject of a tribute in the Legislative Council in 1908 by Sir Liege Hulett, former Prime Minister of Natal, and I quote: "The condition of the colony before importation of Indian labour was one of gloom; it was one that then and there threatened to extinguish the vitality of the country and it was only by the Government assisting the importation of that labour that the country began at once to thrive. The cost had been turned into one of the most prosperous parts of South Africa.....Durban was absolutely built up by the Indian population". Referring to the ex-labourers who had settled in South Africa, Sir Hulett, the ex-Prime Minister of Natal, said, "The free Indians at present in the colony were an immense benefit, being largely engaged in agriculture pursuits."

India at that time was the responsibility internationally and otherwise of the British Government. The Secretary of State for Colonies of the United Kingdom Government in 1875 said, "Above all things we must confidently expect as an indispensable condition of the proposed agreement that the colonial laws and their administration will be such that Indian settlers who have completed the terms of services to which they have agreed, as the rate for the expense of bringing them to the colonies, will be free men in all respects, with privileges no way inferior to those of any other class

of Her Majesty's subjects resident in the colonies." This is a treaty obligation. It is an obligation which the British Government of the day pronounced; and we have always maintained right through these negotiations that the South African Government as the successor of the colonial government is bound by this treaty obligation to us, India and Pakistan, the successor Governments to the British Indian Government. Successive pronouncements of this nature have been made by the representatives of the British Government time and time again. For example, the Secretary of State for India had said in 1918 while rejecting the proposal of the Natal Government

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for legislation to prohibit the issue of license for trading to Asians: "It would be a matter of greatest difficulty to enumerate any conditions under which it would be possible to justify the interdiction of a particular class in the State from engaging in normal legitimate and necessary occupations; and it would be still harder to justify dispossessing them from their existing means of livelihood, however liberal might be the terms of compensation. But the imposition of such disabilities on a class which owes its presence in the Colony to the Colony's own necessities, and whose numbers have been augmented by the voluntary action and indeed the settled policy of successive Colonial Governments, over a period of 16 years since the advent of self-government, would appear on its merits to constitute a hardship of a specially grievous character".

Mr. Chairman, in fact the Government of Natal had specifically undertaken that once the immigrants had worked out their indentures, "they should be free to engage in any ordinary occupation and should not be subject to any discriminatory legislation."

Apart from this juridical aspect we are convinced, as I have already said, that the problem of Indians in South Africa is a part of the larger question of freedom and equality of peoples in South Africa. This problem is another offshoot of the hateful and deplorable policy of apartheid followed and preached by the Government of South Africa, which had been repeatedly condemned by the General Assembly. Only the other day this Committee had again pronounced its judgment disapproving the policy of the Government of the Republic of South Africa in this matter. Mahatma Gandhi started his non-violent campaign in the early years of the present century against this. His movement in South Africa was a partial success. While he did not succeed in freeing the non-white population from all discriminations he did vividly show to the world at large that even in the 20th century a man could be treated as an inferior, not entitled to equal treatment and as a beast of burden if he happened to have a particular kind of skin. Gandhiji's efforts however resulted in the signing of the famous Gandhi-Smuts Agreement of 1914. By this agreement it was hoped that a beginning had been made for the consideration of this problem in future years on the basis of friendly association. But the subsequent events and the attitude of the Government of South Africa belied the hopes. This matter was

raised by the British Government at successive imperial conferences and the Imperial Conference of 1921 passed a resolution recommending "that in the interest of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth it is desirable that the rights of such Indians to citizenship should be recognized." In 1926-27 there was a round-table conference between the representatives of the Government of India and those of the Government of the Union of South Africa. This conference resulted in the famous Capetown Agreement and the well-known "up-lift" clause of the Agreement which read as follows:

"The Union Government firmly believe in and adhere to the principle that it is the duty of every civilised Government to devise ways and means and to take all possible steps for the uplifting of every Section of their permanent population to the full extent of their capacity and opportunities; and accept the view that in the provision of education and other facilities the considerable number of Indians who remain part of the permanent population should not be allowed to lag behind other sections of the people."

But this agreement was not implemented and the South African Government continued unwaveringly in the pursuit of their disastrous policies of racial discrimination. Not only these people have no share in the Government of the country, of which they are the citizens, for they have no or very little political rights, during the last twenty years discriminatory laws have been passed in violation of all these agreements, and the culmination of this was in the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act-1946, popularly known as the "Ghetto Act." The Ghetto Act was followed by the Group Areas Act in 1950. This Act laid down that all land in the Union of South Africa would be divided and controlled by the Government for purposes of ownership and occupation by the different racial groups including people of Indian origin. This Act has now been implemented with a vengeance, with total disregard to the feelings and the legal and historical rights of the people of Indo-Pakistan origin in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, in various parts of South-Africa the Indians are being forcibly evicted now from their homes. In Maritzburg "some eightyone businesses were effected as compared with one European business, while about 379 acres of Indiaowned land was affected as opposed to less than five acres owned by Europeans." The most Reverend Archbishop Dennis Hurley on Wednesday, March 29, 1961, said, "The Group Areas Act did not make provision for direct killing but properly applied to deprive people of their livelihood, could

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crush them and hound them off property they and their forebears had occupied and developed." But a hopeful sign is that these policies of the Government of South Africa do not find support with many liberal minded Europeans. The Star (17th May 1961) commented that seventy-five Europeans including most of the businessmen of Potgietersrus signed a petition strongly opposing to moving of the Indian

shopkeepers.

Away from this northern Transvaal town. The petitioners said that implementation of the Group Areas Act in Potgietersrus would only result in depriving the Indian Community of their means of livelihood. I quote: "We believe sincerely that it was never the intention of the legislature to move long-established Indian business houses from their present position to areas where it is inconceivable to expect them to trade and earn any livelihood. Our relationship with the Indian Community has been one of complete harmony and the vast majority live decent and law-abiding lives among us. We have no fear of their ever being a danger to European, business or trade nor to our culture or religion." From this it is quite clear that no one in South Africa, is free in any sense of the term. Even when the whites and non-whites live in harmony and friendship, the Government of South Africa in its wisdom, which they call separate development, elect to drive a wedge between them. These examples can be multiplied ad infinitum. The Star (14th August 1961) commented that the Witwatersrand Central School Board refused to recommend for consideration as a private school the Witwatersrand Indian College. A resolution by Mr. Evan Cuyler, M.P.C., passed by five votes to three, said that the College should not be registered unless it was situated in an Indian residential area. What a pity! There was and is naturally great distress and human misery caused by all these atrocious and inhuman actions. The Government of South Africa in August this year established the new department of Community Development and Housing. The functions of the department were determined by the requirement prescribed by the Group Areas Act. This department was set up to fortify and carry out the invidious provisions of the Group Areas Act and not to ameliorate any of them.

On the first of August 1961 the South African Government announced the appointment of a Minister for Indian Affairs. Mr. Maree was appointed Minister for Indian Affairs. The reactions of the Indians and Africans to the creation of the Indian department were immediate and condemnatory. Mr. R.P. Pather, President of the Natal Indian Organization, said on August 12th, this year, in Durban that the declaration on the new department of Indian Affairs by the Minister, Mr. Maree, was an attempt "to unscramble a scrambled egg. It was this that the Indians opposed," Mr. Pather continued: "South Africa lives in paradoxes. In one breath the Minister makes a bold declaration that the Indian people form an integral part of the permanent population of South Africa. This declaration merely reiterates the obvious, for no people who have lived in the country for 100 years can be regarded as foreign."

"In another breath, he refers to the creation of special departments for Indian people. This means only that they are being regarded as a separate entity."

He continued, "I feel that the departmentalization of various racial groups is not in the best interests of the country, as each group will be treated as a separate entity...Formerly the India came under

the Ministry of the Interior and was allowed to approach any other Ministry without any qualms, but it would seem that henceforth the doors of the other Ministries will be closed to the Indians. I hope I am wrong in this assumption. Poverty unemployment, the restriction of avenues of employment and housing are grave issues which are confronting the leaders of the Indian people." It needs no comment that this kind of legislation will eventually lead to the entire Indian Community being reduced to the level of manual labourers, being uprooted from their hearths and homes and prevented from trading with other racial groups. If the South African Government really contemplated giving South Africa "a New Deal" the first thing that it could do was to abandon the Group Areas Act. Instead they are creating these new departments, only to carry out the provisions of the Group Areas Act in a more sinister form. In fact legislation of this nature means the unadulterated intensification of the racial policies of apartheid. Nobel prize winner, Albert J. Luthuli, formerly President of the banned African National Congress, when asked for his views on the appointment of a Minister for Indian Affairs said that the Indian people of South Africa should have nothing whatsoever to do with the newly established. Department and the proposed Asian Affairs Board, as these institutions were no more than segregatory intitutions, which could not be regarded as democratic. He described these institutions as completely "useless", for they did not give the Indian people the right to take part in the Parliamentary machinery of the country. In his own words, I quote, "These so-called boards have

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no link with Parliament. They form part of the Government's pattern to segregate each racial group of the country. They do not meet the needs of the people who are clamouring for full democratic rights."

The South African Indian Congress had this to say, "The Minister for Indian Affairs is a logical development under apartheid. We have now a Ministry for African Affairs and Colonial Affairs and Indian Affairs, but none yet for Jewish and Afrikaner and English Affairs. The ethnic, linguistic and racial division continue, and for each section there is a separate institution to control thousands of lives which would not be possible under multi-racialism, for then we would think as South Africans and there would be no need for departments for separate races but one Ministry for dealing with all internal problems." The statement further continues, "It is clear that the South African Indian Congress must reject this Ministry and refuse to cooperate with it. We cannot congratulate Mr. Maree, the Minister for Indian Affairs, who has been and still is an opponent of Indian development, who has maliciously repeated nationalist sentiments that the ultimate purpose of the Group Areas Act was to drive the Indians out of the Commercial and business fields. The Minister does not meet the needs of the Indian people, who have proclaimed that they want full democratic rights on a par with the Europeans." But no need has been paid to all these declarations of the Indians and the Africans, who after all, are the people most affected by those laws. The result

is that hundreds of Indian families have been forced out from areas which they have developed and enriched. Their business and trades have been lost and under the prevailing conditions, it would be next to impossible for them to earn a decent living. The Government is trying to congregate the Indians and Coloureds in clearly defined racial areas throughout the country. This means the up-rooting of their homes and business. Each day conditions go from bad to worse with no sign of redress from any quarter.

Mr. Chairman, the Indian residents of the Black River area Rondebosch have been frightfully hurt by the Group Areas Act. The case of Mr. H. Abraham is typical. After forty years of work and saving he is now becoming a victim of apartheid and the Group Areas Act. He has been asked to vacate his house and find for himself shelter in another area. Mrs. E. Abbas told the "Cape Times" that before her husband had built their modern home in Rosslyn Road, he went to the Group Areas Act Board to make sure that they did not have to move. The assurance was given and the house was built and they put everything they had into it and now they had been asked to clear out. One could go on multiplying these examples. The Natal Mercury of June 29, 1961 carried the news item about a leading member of the Indian Community and a well-known businessman, Mr. S. R. Naidu, who had been told by the Group Areas Board to move out of the premises, which he had occupied in the central business area for more than thirty-three years. It may be of interest to you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this Committee, that Mr. Naidu's offices are situated near the Supreme Court and yet there is no redress for Mr. Naidu and his likes in South Africa. I do not wish to trouble the Committee with further details of this kind. The Committee had heard enough of details about such inhuman treatment accorded to the non-white population in South Africa during the debate on apartheid in recent weeks in this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to recall the speech of Mr. MacMillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, which he made in South Africa in the spring of 1960. It has now become one of the celebrated utterances of the British Prime Minister. This is the speech in which he spoke of the "wind of change blowing in Africa." Change there has been, no doubt, in the entire continent of Africa; change for the better, heralding freedom and joy to millions. But there has been a different kind of change in South Africa for others; a change for the worse. A change which has meant putting the clock back. Of late the high priests of apartheid are going from one disastrous venture to another, unabated, making intolerable the lives of millions of human beings whose labour and toil they exploit to the maximum.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to recall the operative paragraph of resolution No. 1597 (XV) of 13 April 1961. In compliance with this resolution the Indian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom on instructions from the Government of India addressed a letter to the Republic of South Africa (Document A/4803/Add I). In the Government of India's communication, dated August 1, 1961, the Government of India once again expressed their readiness to enter into

negotiations with the Government of the Republic of South Africa in accordance with resolution 1597 (XV) of the General Assembly. In order to make it easier for the Union Government to participate in the discussions with the Government of India, my Government reiterated its desire "that such negotiations will be without prejudice to the position adopted by any of the parties concerned. in respect of the domestic jurisdiction of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations." ... "The

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Government of the Republic of South Africa would welcome the initiative now taken and accede to the request made in pursuance of the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations." I need not quote further and overburden the Committee. In spite of such a conciliatory attitude of my Government, the South African Government have again ignored this resolution, and no progress whatsoever has been made. My distinguished colleague from Pakistan will probably narrate as to how their efforts similarly failed. It is for the Committee to consider what further action should be taken in view of the continued disregard of the resolutions of the General Assembly by the Government of the Republic of South Africa. It is a pity that the Government of South Africa is not taking note of the writing on the wall; it seems they do not feel that their isolation has become almost total and complete. It is a matter of great regret and concern to my delegation that the South African Government continues to boycott the meetings of the Committee when this subject is discussed.

However, we shall not rest content until iniquity and racial discrimination have disappeared from South Africa. In this noble aim we have the mandate and the sympathy of the millions of people, not only in India, but of the world at large, and have the clear sanction of not only the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights but also of the General Assembly. Conditioned and brought up as we are in India, we cannot but hope that some day a silver lining would appear out of the dark cloud surrounding South Africa and that Mr. Louw and his Government will amend their policies so that everyone in South Africa is governed by the same laws and subjected to the same regulations regardless of the colour of his skin.

Before I conclude my speech, I would like to inform the Committee that as in previous years we do not ourselves propose to submit a resolution. We have left it to the other members of the Committee to do so. I would like to express the gratitude of my delegation to the member nations who have co-sponsored the resolution placed before the Committee, which we are sure will have greater support than ever before.

INDIA PAKISTAN SOUTH AFRICA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BELGIUM MALI

**Date :** Nov 17, 1961

# Volume No

1995

JAPAN

Prime Minister's Welcome Speech at Banquet in honour of Japanese Prime Minister

Speaking at a banquet given in honour of the Prime Minister of Japan His Excellency Mr. Hayato Ikeda, in New Delhi on Nov 20, 1961, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are happy to welcome today You, Mr. Prime Minister, Madam Ikeda and the Lady to my left, Miss Ikeda. We welcome you personally because of the distinguished office you hold and because it is our desire to have the closest and most friendly relations with the great country of which you are the Prime Minister. Our contacts with Japan go back to a very long period in history. In between, they were rather broken off but again we are reviving them and there is very much in common between our two countries so that if we cooperate, it can be to our mutual advantage. We are a developing country and your country, Mr. Prime Minister, is one which is considered among the developed countries, although, of course, there is no end to development of any country. in trade, commerce and other matters, I have no doubt that there is room for close cooperation. Also--and I attach importance to this in the wider sphere of international affairs--although we call ourselves as one of the unaligned countries and it would not be right to include Japan in the list, still, Japan, more than almost any country in the world, is now attached passionately to the idea of peace. In the last Great War, Japan had the first experience--first terrible experience--of the atomic bomb, an experience, if we are not careful, will have to be shared by many countries in the world and possibly in a much worse way. So that is the fate which awaits the world unless we definitely establish peace on firm foundations throughout the world. We have many problems to face in the world but the first and foremost is that of peace because, if war comes, all the other problems do not count. They go to pieces. In this matter, as I said Japan has been an ardent advocate of peace and we are also passionately attached to that objective and so, among other things, in this also, I trust that we shall be able to cooperate to the fullest extent. I have no doubt that people all over the world and if I may say so, Governments all over the world, want peace but somehow some tragic fate pursues us and while we desire peace, our fears and apprehensions

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often lead us into the opposite direction. I trust we will be able to stop this wrong and dangerous trend and use the great resources of science and technology for the betterment of humanity and not for its destruction. I welcome you again, Mr. Prime Minister, and hope that your visit will add not only to the closeness of our relations but to the greater cooperation of our two countries.

Some time back we had the privilege of welcoming Their Royal Highnesses, the Crown Prince and the Princess of Japan here. We were very happy with their visit here and if I may say so, by their charm' they created a great impression wherever they went in India and we well remember that visit of theirs which has left such pleasant memories.

May I ask Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, to drink to the health of His Excellency Mr. Ikeda, the Prime Minister of Japan, Madam Ikeda and Miss Ikeda.

JAPAN INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Nov 20, 1961

## Volume No

1995

JAPAN

Japanese Prime Minister's Reply

Replying to Prime Minister Nehru, the Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Hayato Ikeda said:

Your Excellency Mr. Prime Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am delighted to have this opportunity to visit this great country of India and I look forward with real pleasure to have friendly, personal talks with you, Mr. Prime Minister, and to see at first hand something of the phenomenal progress your country is making under your wise and inspiring leadership.

From the moment of our arrival I have keenly felt the friendly warmth of the reception your Government and people have extended to my party and to me. For this and for your gracious and generous references made just now to my country and to me personally, I want to express my very profound thanks. I am extremely grateful to you, Mr. Prime Minister, for holding this splendid dinner in our honour, and for doing so under the stress of great fatigue from which I realise you

must be suffering having just returned today from a long and arduous journey. I sincerely hope that you will speedily recover from the strain which I feel, you must be enduring, to accord us this honour this evening.

The visit to this country of the Crown Prince and Crown Princess of Japan to which you have just referred, in November last year, was an event of great significance in the relationship between our two countries. They were given a most heartwarming reception here, which Their Highnesses and the people of Japan will never forget, and on behalf of the people of Japan I want to express again to your Government and to your people our very sincere thanks.

The people of Japan feel a sense of high regard and admiration for India as they see this country making giant strides in advancing the economic well-being of the people.

Having successfully completed your First and Second Five-Year Plans, you are now resolutely carrying out your Third Five-Year Plan which assures to India another glorious step forward and a brighter future.

In Japan, we have been able to achieve great economic progress since the war as a result of the joint and prodigious efforts of our people and the assistance received from friendly countries. We are now engaged in a programme of economic growth by which we seek to double the national income within the coming ten years. Although that is our present goal, it has always been my belief that the prosperity of Japan as an Asian nation is not truly possible unless other Asian nations are also prosperous, especially India with her large population, vast area, her rich natural resources and her sound democratic institutions. Japan and India have much in common. As you, Mr. Prime Minister has just said, they have, I believe, a common destiny to fulfil in Asia, to walk hand in hand with each other and with other friendly countries towards general progress and prosperity.

From such a standpoint, my country wishes to cooperate with India in her economic development efforts to the fullest extent of our capacity. It is my strong feeling that destiny has thrust upon our peoples the high and noble task of working together to bring prosperity to Asia and to contribute to peace and stability in this region. I am sure, that you, Mr. Prime Minister, and other leaders of India, share this view. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a matter of deep regret that contrary to the hopes of mankind, the foul wind of war is blowing and worsening the international situation from day to day. By the intensification of the cold war, the world is in a critical stage: but peace we must maintain by all means. We must work fastidiously with dedication towards

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our common goal of achieving prosperity for Asia and we must not fail in our endeavour for peace. I have always entertained the highest

regard for you, Mr. Prime Minister, for your active role on the stage of international diplomacy and for the valuable contribution you are making to safeguard the peace of the world. Japan and India share similar ideals and similar goals. The national policies of our countries are founded on democratic concepts, on the principle of freedom and dignity of the individual. We share alike an ardent desire for world peace. This being so it is my earnest hope that our two countries will cooperate closely in all efforts to maintain the peace of the world.

In closing, I wish again to express our very profound thanks for the warm welcome and hospitality accorded us by the Government of India.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, will you be good enough to join me in drinking to the health of His Excellency Prime Minister Nehru and to a prosperous India.

JAPAN INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Nov 20, 1961

## Volume No

1995

JAPAN

Nehru-Ikeda Joint Communique

The following is the text of the Joint Communique issued in New Delhi on Nov 23, 1961, at the conclusion of the talks between the Prime Minister of Japan, His Excellency Mr. Hayato Ikeda, and the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:

The Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Hayato Ikeda, accompanied by Mrs. Ikeda, visited New Delhi from November 20 to November 23, 1961, at the invitation of the Government of India.

During his stay in New Delhi, Prime Minister Ikeda and Prime Minister of India had free and frank exchange of views on various problems of mutual interest, including the situation in South-east Asia, in a cordial and friendly atmosphere.

The Prime Ministers agreed that maintenance of world peace is a prerequisite not only for economic development and prosperity of their own countries and for the stability and economic prosperity of Asia but for the very survival of humanity and human civilization. They affirmed their common objectives of maintenance of world peace and international security and agreed to work for the achievement of

these objectives in every possible way. The Prime Minister of Japan took the opportunity in this connection to express his appreciation of the strenuous endeavours made by the Prime Minister of India in the cause of peace.

The Prime Ministers emphasised the urgent necessity for joint efforts to enhance the authority of the United Nations and to strengthen its functions as an instrument for international peace and justice.

The Prime Ministers expressed their deep concern over the effects on human beings of the radioactive fallouts resulting from the continued nuclear weapons tests and over the danger of the continuation of such tests leading to a nuclear war and total annihilation of mankind. They strongly appeal for the immediate suspension of nuclear weapons tests and for an early conclusion of an agreement of the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests under effective inspection and control.

The Prime Ministers affirmed the importance of the Powers concerned reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and supervision.

They agreed on the importance of mutually beneficial economic relationship between their two countries and discussed ways and means to achieve a better integration of that relationship. Prime Minister Ikeda extended his congratulations to Prime Minister Nehru for the successful completion of India's First and Second Five Year Plans and further expressed his sincere hope that the Third Five Year Plan would also be successfully implemented. Prime Minister Ikeda assured Prime Minister Nehru that Japan would be prepared to strengthen her economic and technical assistance to India within her capacity in future.

The Prime Ministers recalled the long tradition of cultural and spiritual ties which bind the peoples of Japan and India and agreed that under the cultural Agreement between Japan and India cultural, educational and scientific exchanges should be further promoted between the two countries.

The Prime Ministers expressed their satisfaction at the opportunity provided by this visit to deepen mutual understanding of their respective views on the world situation.

The Prime Ministers expressed the hope that the personal contact established during this visit would be maintained and continued by keeping in touch with each other in future.

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JAPAN USA INDIA

**Date** : Nov 13, 1961

# Volume No

1995

PAKISTAN

Law Minister's Reply to Lok Sabha Debate on Col. Bhattacharya

Replying to the debate in the Lok Sabha on Nov 29, 1961, on Col Bhattacharya's conviction by a Pakistan military tribunal, the Minister for Law, Shri A.K. Sen, said:

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, naturally, the Government is very glad that this House has taken such a lively interest in the affairs of a gallant officer, who, according to all reliable evidence,--and I am here saying according to all reliable evidence, deliberately because, I am not merely asserting the case of the Indian Government or of our people, but a case which, necessarily, follows from the evidence that has come up in this case, and that is,--that this officer, while engaged in the course of his duty, was ambushed, injured and forcibly carried away across the border. I have taken great care myself to read the arguments addressed by the Prosecutor in the case before the Military Tribunal as also the arguments which have been advanced by the defence council, in writing. I may here inform Hon. Members that according to apparently the procedure adopted by Military tribunals in Pakistan, the counsel are not allowed to address the tribunals. They are asked to state whatever they have to say in writing and file it in court.

That appeal cannot be taken away by the military tribunals. They have a procedure which entirely is quite different from ours and from the procedure recognised as proper in the rest of the civilised world, and that is, that the advocates or counsel engaged either for the prosecution or for the defence are not allowed to address the tribunal but are asked to state whatever they have to say in writing and file it in court. Further, the evidence adduced before the court was not supplied to the defence counsel. Though an application was made by him in the course of the hearing, a rule was shown from the Martial Law Regulations which said that after the sentence is confirmed the accused would have the right to have the proceedings of the evidence for the purpose of filing an appeal.

But from that rule, curiously enough, a decision was given by the Military tribunal that before the sentence was pronounced, the accused was not entitled to copies of the depositions--a proposition of law, which, I have no doubt, will shock the legal conscience of the rest of the world. But, nevertheless, under that handicap, the defence counsel had to work.

I must pay a great compliment to the Advocate of Col. Bhattacharya

who went from India to defend him, that he took great trouble to go through the records himself, not getting copies, to make such notes as he could make in his own hand for the purpose of conducting the defence. I might also say that, having seen his arguments and the great care and labour he took, I shall be failing in my duty if I did not pay my compliments to this able advocate who did his best and succeeded even in convincing the Military tribunal of this sort that the charge against Col. Bhattacharya under the Official Secrets Act of having collected some information prior to his apprehension was not proved. I shall, therefore, deem it very unfortunate that one Hon. Member, Shrimati Renuka Ray, thought it fit to give expression to a feeling which might do injustice to this able advocate. I know Dr. Pal myself. He is a reputed civil, international lawyer. No request, of course, was communicated either by his wife or any one else to engage Dr. Pal. Nor am I quite sure if Dr. Pal would have undertaken, being purely a civil, international lawyer, this case which was a pure criminal case as was made out before the Military tribunal.

Secondly, Col. Bhattacharya's own brother, who is a military officer, had seen the advocate, not only himself, but, he saw me several times. They were perfectly satisfied with the Advocate who was made available for defending the accused. I claim some knowledge of the criminal bar in Calcutta and I took the greatest care to send the best man available--Shri Ghatak. He is an outstanding criminal lawyer, and we had to send a lawyer who understood Bengali because all the evidence that was going to be adduced before the tribunal was in Bengali, witnesses being all from that border area of Bengal, for the prosecution. We took the utmost care to select the counsel for this purpose. In fact, we also briefed another counsel, a very senior counsel from Calcutta, Shri N.R. Das Gupta to advise Shri Ghatak from time to time, if necessary, as to how the defence should be conducted. It was also stipulated that if Shri Ghatak, however, thought that Shri Das Gupta's physical presence was necessary at Dacca they would also be made available, and the Deputy High Commissioner secured permission from the Pakistan Government for the appearance of both Shri Das Gupta and Shri Ghatak.

I shall also here touch upon a point which

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was raised by Shri Aurobindo Ghosal about the Government not appearing. I do not know if the Government can appear as such, even if it wanted to, in a criminal case in which a particular officer figures as the accused. I do not think that is possible. Only the accused can appear and all that the Government can do is to make available all the legal assistance that may be at its disposal. Further, in this case, we had accepted the highest legal advice of the country, namely, that of the Attorney-General, in maintaining the position that having regard to the fact that this officer was kidnapped illegally and by force, and that the Tribunal, therefore, had no jurisdiction or competence to try him, it would not be in

consonance with our legal stand if we appeared as a Government in any manner. But that is merely an academic question. The Government did its best to see that the best legal talent was made available for the defence of this officer and all the necessary funds were made available to Col. Bhattacharya's family for the purpose of paying the fees of the lawyers engaged. That was also done and the lawyers were engaged on the authority of Col. Bhattacharya's family. I think his own brother had signed the necessary warrant of attorney, authorising Mr. Ghatak and Mr. Das Gupta to appear for Col. Bhattacharya. And naturally Mr. Ghatak also had talks with Col. Bhattacharya himself and took instructions from him.

I must say here that from the very beginning, the whole matter proceeded with by the Pakistan Government in a manner which does not fit in with our concept of justice. I know that when I gave expression to this fact a lot was made in the course of trial by the Public Prosecutor himself before the court when he referred to my speech here during the Extradition Bill and said that I had characterised this trial as a barbarous trial. Well, I stick to all that I said on that occasion even today and I say so because the way in which the entire proceedings were conducted—from start to finish—if I may say so with the utmost of restraint—of language which it is difficult to maintain in such matters—and the proceedings and procedure followed, did not fit in with our concept of fundamental principles of justice as recognised in all civilised countries. I will give my reason for it since the Pakistan authorities, or the Public Prosecutor, thought that I had said something unfair touching on this trial.

The officer was arrested on the afternoon of the fourth of April. About the circumstances of his arrest, I shall mention a little later and I shall mention it with reference to the evidence produced by the prosecution itself. He was arrested on the 4th of April. It is said that that very afternoon a telephonic report was made by the officer who effected the capture, an officer by the name of Capt. Mumtaz Hussain of the Border Army, to his Brigadier. That telephonic conversation according to recognised concepts of justice should have been recorded. It was neither produced nor was any evidence given by the Brigadier as to what report was made. But curiously enough from the 4th April to 26th of April no investigation takes place, no first information report is made to any police authorities having jurisdiction. The first information report that is available is dated the 12th of May, a month and seven days after the incident. The Prosecutor himself before the Tribunal was forced to admit that it was most unusual. Well, it could not have been otherwise. And it appears further that the first information report was made after investigation was started on the 26th of April. Nobody has ever heard of such a thing that investigation precedes the filing of the first information report.

In contrast I may say that so far as this incident is concerned, the other officer who was with Col. Bhattacharya, Mr. Ghosh, made his first information report before the Bagda police station on the same

day. That is the law of this country, as it is the law everywhere else, according to civilised concepts of justice. A crime takes place and no investigation is started before a month and then the first information report is filed after the investigation has started. On those grounds alone no court of this country would have convicted an accused, On that alone, I make bold to say that if a Pakistani was caught charged with many things, that is the same charges, hauled up before our court and the court found that the investigation did not start until a month later and the first information report was filed only after the investigation was started, on that ground alone, the court would have acquitted the accused. I am glad that our courts do so and would do so because after all that is all that is to be expected in a free country where the rule of law prevails and nobody, whether he is an enemy or an alien or a citizen can be convicted in a court of law excepting on proper evidence and upon proper proof. That explains the point Mr. Gupta raised: that these people get lighter punishments in this country. Well, in this country the Government does not punish; it is for the courts to punish and if the courts award certain penalty, Government cannot say: award higher penalty.

An Hon'ble Member: It may change the law.

The Law Minister: That is a different matter--whether we should do it or not. It is for the

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Parliament to decide. But upto now whatever be the law, the penalty imposed by the law and the penalties judged by an Indian court, the Government has nothing to do in the matter, of convicting or punishing people. And I think this House will be the last to warrant any change in that system of justice. This House, like our courts, is a pillar of a great democracy in which justice is guaranteed to the enemies, to the aliens and to the citizens alike; and the Government does not punish, a Government only prosecutes. This being the very essence of our constitution and our way of life, we felt very shocked at the way, as I said, these proceedings were conducted and this gallant officer was brought to trial and ultimately convicted. And that is why not only Members here, but I also gave expression to views which might appear to be rather excessive or extreme, but nevertheless, we have no reason to regret.

Now, with these observations, may I come to the facts as disclosed by the evidence? I shall state the facts as disclosed by the prosecution evidence first and then leave it to the House to judge how far on that any man could be convicted of the charges on which this officer has been convicted.

The prosecution evidence says that Col. Bhattacharya, along with another officer, came near about four o'clock on the 4th of April well inside the Indian border. That is why I said that on the evidence of the prosecution evidence I leave it to the House to judge whether the prosecution proved the case, proved the case according to

our notions of justice. The evidence again is,--and that evidence is of no less a man than Captain Mumtaz Hussain, who was asked to lead the ambush party,--that these officers came and beckoned to the third accused who was a Pakistani national. According to this Pakistani officer, the Pakistani accused was inside the Pakistan border, and that on such beckoning they met at a particular place near a bamboo clump, when there was an altercation between the Pakistani accused and this officer, and the cry was raised by the Pakistani accused, as a result of which these armed constables and the Pakistani military officer--actually they were armed troops, they were not police, but they were real troops of the army, led by Captain Mumtaz Hussain, who was ordered to lay ambush, and to stage this ambush; mind you, the evidence is that they were ordered to ambush these officers, an extraordinary state of affairs, on the evidence of the Pakistani officer himself. They are asked by the Pakistani authorities to go and ambush this officer. And then, when this cry is raised, one of the Indian officers, Mr. Ghosh, made good his escape, and this other officer was trying to escape, when he was shot at and kept. Irrespective of any reference to the map, irrespective of any knowledge of that area, they just said at the time of the trial that Col. Bhattacharya when he was caught was inside the Pakistan border. A part from this tutored evidence that at the time of his capture, he was within the Pakistan border, all the probabilities are against such a case. A responsible Indian officer, if he was going to meet a Pakistani accused, would be the last to go inside the Pakistani border. That is commonsense. And he would never meet with incriminating documents--inside a foreign country. It is against commonsense. Secondly, the evidence of these people who said that when he was captured he was within Pakistani territory would be completely destroyed the moment it is remembered that these statements were made only on the 26th April, that is, 21 or 22 days after the incident. On the day of occurrence or soon thereafter, no statement is recorded; 21 days after that they remember where the border is. And one has to remember that this border only goes from pillar to pillar, and in between the pillars, there are no lines of demarcation; and it is on evidence that these officers followed the demarcation very well, and they stood at a spot, and according to the prosecution evidence itself, they beckoned to this Pakistani accused to go there. So, it is inconceivable that these ordinary witnesses who were parties to this ambush would know where the border is and 21 days after the incident, correctly say where the border is, with reference to maps and so on.

It is quite clear that this ambush was preplanned, and was carried out, irrespective of the sanctity of the India border, and there was a clear violation not only of our sovereignty, but a total disregard of our border rights. More than that, the person of Col. Bhattacharya was secured by force and illegally, as a result of which a claim for reparation, from the Indian Government arises, and also a claim for compensation, so far as Col. Bhattacharya is concerned, arises, and an immediate obligation on the part of Pakistan to return Col. Bhattacharya to the Indian Government.

Accordingly, on the 5th April, 1961, a protest note incorporating these demands was delivered verbally first, and later on confirmed in writing, our Deputy High Commissioner. The Chief Secretary said that he would be looking into the matter, and later on, we were informed that the External Affairs Ministry of Pakistan would be dealing with this matter directly. We were informed much latter, that is, after the investigation had started, that the Pakistan authorities had proved

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that the officer was engaged on a mission of securing secret information from Pakistani agents, and he was actually caught in the act of doing so, He was allowed an interview only at the end of April, I think, on the 28th April, after a lot of protestations. It was long afterwards, though our Deputy High Commissioner has been demanding an Interview immediately. And the Deputy High Commissioner was not allowed to interview him alone. He was always accompanied by officers, that is military officers, and he was asked only to talk to Col. Bhattacharya about his personal health and personal matters and nothing else.

About the 12th August, we were informed that Col. Bhattacharya would be tried formally on a charge amongst other things, of having contravened the Official Secrets Act of Pakistan in having obtained and in trying to obtain secret information concerning Pakistan army movements.

In the meantime--and this is very important--we had sent a very strong note in July. It is important for the Hon. Members to know of this, because much of the demand that has been made by Shri Indrajit Gupta and others as to how we should have conducted ourselves diplomatically and in what way we should have framed our demands would be met by what we had already done in this matter. May I read out exactly from the note which was handed over.

It reads thus:

The incontestable facts are that on 4th April, at about 10.00 hours in the village of Payra, in the district of 24-Parganas; West Bengal, Col. Bhattacharya and an officer of the West Bengal police were suddenly fired upon and attacked by a body of armed forces, six in number, who had come across the Indo-Pakistan border and laid in ambush in Indian territory."

Then we say that he received a bullet wound and was carried away by force. We say further:

"The Government of India regret that in order to escape their liability for the wrong committed against Indian Sovereignty and against the person of Col. Bhattacharya, the Government of Pakistan have found it necessary to put out a version that is completely at variance with the truth."

--this is, the truth, as I have described.

Then, we have said:

"The Govt. of India desire to protest emphatically against the conduct of the Government of Pakistan and point out that the Government of Pakistan has through its agents committed a most serious violation of India's sovereignty, and this was no ordinary trespass into Indian territory but a deliberate incursion by armed forces of Pakistan for the purpose of attacking an important Indian national and an officer of the Indian Army wounding him and taking him away from the territory of India, and the Government of Pakistan is obliged in international law to make full reparation; the Government of Pakistan is under a legal obligation to release and return Col. Bhattacharya to India, without any further delay and to punish these who were responsible for attacking and wounding him and carrying him away from Indian territory, to make other reparations for the wrong already committed against Indian sovereignty and to compensate Col. Bhattacharya for his wrongful detention and the injury suffered by him."

Then, we said that in the meantime, full liberty should be given to approach him and so on and so forth.

In reply, they say something. And we pointed out--and this is in answer to what an Hon. Member said--that this release was demanded--of course, this release comes strictly within the wording of the Indo-Pakistan border agreement--because we do not accept the contention that he had strayed into Pakistan at all.

But even assuming that the Pakistan case was correct, at the meet it would be a case where Col. Bhattacharya would have gone into Pakistan territory to meet this other man by inadvertence. The relevant clause with regard to that in the Indo-Pakistan border agreement referred to this aspect and says that in case of any inadvertent crossing of the border, the security forces shall immediately return the person concerned to the opposite commander at the officer level. Of course, it does not apply in this case. Our case is that he did not go into Pakistan territory at all. In any event, under such a circumstance the officer should be released and a joint investigation could be made. But they said that this was not a case at all of a border incident; this was a case where the man had come deliberately to indulge in espionage activity and he would be put on trial.

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That is the position.

It appears that Col. Bhattacharya wanted two lawyers when he was told that he would be tried. He was asked to nominate lawyers. Since he was asked to nominate lawyers only from Pakistan, he mentioned two names, that of Mr. Brohi and that of Mr. Hamidul Huq Chaudhuri. The

latter was a member of the Calcutta Bar and later on an important Minister in Pakistan before the Pakistan Constitution was overthrown by the military rule regime that is in power in Pakistan today. As you know, Mr. Brohi is a very reputed lawyer of Pakistan. He was formerly High Commissioner for Pakistan here.

The prayer was rejected and he was given a lawyer by name Nalini Kant Roy, who apparently is on the government panel for some legal work at Dacca. With all respect to this gentleman--I have no doubt that he made genuine efforts to do his best--I must say that 'doing best' is a relative term and it varies from person to person. Our experience has been that he was totally ignorant of what the case was all about or what his duties were until own lawyers arrived there. When we came to know of that, we made all arrangements for sending lawyers from India. At first, the right to have lawyers from India to defend him was not conceded. But I must say that giving expression to our indignation here by them in this House, particularly by myself, might have had a sobering effect. After I spoke very strongly about it. I remember on the next day the Indian advocate was allowed to go to Pakistan. I remember that the public prosecutor opposed Shri Ghatak appearing for him, an extraordinary thing in this country. The prosecutor never opposes any defence put forward by the accused. In fact, we welcome it. The prosecutor welcomes a good defence. The prosecutor is there to prosecute not to see that the man is convicted anyhow.

Anyway, fortunately this lawyer was allowed and he conducted the defence very ably indeed. I have no doubt that in his written argument he succeeded in totally demolishing the prosecution witnesses, because it was impossible for the prosecution witnesses to prove that after 21 days they remembered where the border was, where they captured him and so on and so forth.

Anyhow, the charges were five. I may read out the charges on which Col. Bhattacharya was prosecuted. The first was under section 3(1) clause C read with section 9 of the Official Secrets Act, which is the same as our Official Secrets Act. In that, it is said:

"He, for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of Pakistan, on 4th April 1961, at Surbanda Huda under the Maheshpur police station, district Jessore, attempted to obtain or collect secret documents or information relating to military establishment at Jessore cantonment from Rafiuddin Ahmed alias S. Sen alias Sukumar, which were calculated to be or might be or are intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy."

This charge is attempt to obtain information on the 4th April. The second one was a more important charge, under the official Secrets Act, same clause. In that:

"For any purpose prejudicial to the interest or security of Pakistan between September 1960 and 27th March 1961, obtained and collected secret documents and information relating to military establishments

at Jessore cantonment through Rafiuddin Ahmed and which were calculated to be or might be or are intended to be directly or indirectly, useful to an enemy".

As if we are an enemy! In any event, this charge was not proved even according to the tribunal. Therefore, the only charge on which he was convicted was of having attempted to obtain secret information on the 4th April, the date of his arrest, of having entered Pakistan illegally and of having carried a revolver, and therefore, coming under the Arms Act--more or less technical things, having regard to the circumstances under which he was there and was apprehended.

But curiously enough, the tribunal awarded a savage sentence of 8 years. We all know it. We all deplore it. As soon as it was brought to our knowledge, the External Affairs Ministry sent for the High Commissioner for Pakistan in Delhi and the shock that the whole country felt at the savage and inhuman sentence was conveyed to him.

The High Commissioner in Delhi was told in the interest of orderly relations between these two countries, Col. Bhattacharya must be immediately released and that the matter should not be dealt with as one only between an individual and the Pakistan Government, but as one involving two great countries having a common border. It was also stressed that the relationship between these two countries, India and Pakistan, was far more important than the issue of a particular

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officer or person. I can only assure the House that the utmost efforts have been made and pursued for the purpose, not only of getting the release of this officer because, as I said, it is not merely the issue of an officer which has really agitated this House and the whole country; it is a much wider issue, namely, the violation of the country's sovereignty; an injury on its sovereignty by reason of the fact that a party of armed soldiers trespassed into our country, laid an ambush deliberately and kidnapped an officer on duty. Certainly, our heart goes out in sympathy for this officer who, naturally, symbolises today the injury done to the whole nation. It is really an injury done through this officer to the whole nation, and, as I said, legally, therefore, our claim for reparation and compensation for this is a valid claim which has been properly made.

The Hon. Members should, no doubt, leave a good deal of things to be done by the Government without demanding a disclosure of everything that is being done or being pursued.

It will not only be necessary for securing the release of this officer, but also for achieving what we all want to achieve, that much of the things that are done should not be done publicly, because it excites passions in both countries, and lots of things which can be done possibly more easily become bogged if once in the process it has the effect of rousing passions everywhere. I can only assure this House, as the Prime Minister did, that no relaxation of efforts would

be made on the part of the Government until and unless this injury done not only to this individual officer but to the whole country is repaired completely, and I have no doubt that before long the hon. House, will have the good tidings that it has been so done. But for that, the hon. House naturally must give the utmost freedom and liberty, and possibly even the secrecy, to the Government to pursue its methods. I want to express the deep concern and sympathy of this House and the Government, and I have no doubt that in the circumstances in which this unfortunate officer is placed now, he will have the consolation at least at this thought and at this news that the entire House has expressed its unanimous sympathy and concern for his fate.

In the meantime, I think the House would be entitled to know what is being done for the family of Col. Bhattacharya. The family is being paid the full salary due to Col. Bhattacharya and all his allowances, and they are allowed to occupy Government quarters. He is treated as if he is still on active service.

As soon as the sentence was passed, the lawyer who defended Col. Bhattacharya had come there. He had gone to Dacca, he had seen Col. Bhattacharya himself. We had a conference here in which I took part myself, because I thought it was a case in which it should not be merely left to the Officers to do their duty, but that it would be better not only for the officer but for the whole country and this House if a Minister took a direct interest in these matters. I have taken care to convene these conferences in my own room myself, and we had prepared all the necessary papers for appeal. It took a good deal of research to find out who was the appellate authority under the martial law regulations, because the jurisdiction of courts is barred now under the martial law regulations. For some time the courts exercised some jurisdiction by trying to interfere in the decisions of the martial law courts on the ground that they had exceeded their jurisdiction, or that they had done a thing contrary to the purpose for which they had been constituted and things of that sort. Even that is now barred by a fresh ordinance, and today the position is that against martial law sentences there is no appeal to any court. It took a lot of time, and we had to carry out a bit of research to find out to whom the appeal must be addressed, and ultimately we came to the conclusion that everything converged to the same place, the President of Pakistan. That means, he was the repository of ultimate authority for everything. Therefore, we had decided ultimately to prefer an appeal on behalf of Col. Bhattacharya, as he must be the appellant.

For that purpose, an application was made by Col. Bhattacharya himself. After the sentence was pronounced, he was asked by the tribunal to apply for the records and the proceedings. A draft application was sent to him. Unfortunately the lawyer was not allowed to see him on the ground that he had seen him 14 days ago and that the jail regulations did not allow a visit within 14 days--an extraordinary thing in this country. A lawyer is allowed to interview his client always, and if a lawyer is debarred by a jail authority

from interviewing his client who is seeking to appeal to a court of law, the jailor would be guilty of contempt of court for having impeded the course of justice. He will be hauled up before the High Court any time if he prevents a lawyer from seeing his client for the purpose of preparing his defence or appeal. The High Court will haul up the jail authority and commit him for contempt for interfering with the course of justice.

Unfortunately, here they have imposed the jail regulation against a lawyer for defence as against ordinary visitors. Therefore, Col.

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Bhattacharya did not know what to do when he got the draft. He had made some changes, but he has applied for records and proceedings for the purpose of preferring an appeal, which, I have no doubt, will be preferred in due course.

Unfortunately, we do not know yet whether there has been a judgment or not. The sentence has been pronounced, but we do not know whether there has been a judgment or not, because no judgment was read out, and I understand it is not common for the martial law tribunals to write judgments. Only the sentence is pronounced. If there is no judgement, no ground of appeal can be possibly written, and we shall have only to say that everything was in error. Anyway; I have no doubt that we shall leave the matter in the most competent hands, and it will be done.

After all, this is a peculiar position. Whether the President moves by way of appeal or by way of diplomatic approaches, it is the same authority in this case. So, it will be difficult to say ultimately what is the process which has moved him.

In the meantime, the House will, no doubt, be anxious to know how this officer is being treated in jail. It has been ascertained, and our lawyer had also seen him recently in jail when he went to consult him for the purpose of preparing his appeal, that the order is to treat him as an "A" class prisoner.

I hope we have placed all the materials available before the House. I have also said, as far as possible, what we have tried to do apart from the formal defence in a court of law, which has certainly been done. This, I think, dispels any idea that the Government's approach has been only legalistic and not extra-legalistic. That is in answer to an Hon. Member's contention that my presence here shows that the Government has been thinking only in legalistic terms. I hope now that it is quite a confirmation of the contrary after I have given all the facts.

I think what the Prime Minister thought was that since the matter was so closely connected with the evidence, a criminal case and various other things, and since I had done this from the very start--not that the Prime Minister could not have done it much better, he would have

done it much better--possibly it would be better if he left it to me. There is no intention on his part to escape responsibility. I think it will be nice if some of us relieve him from time to time of some of these matters. (Interruption).

Let us hope and we firmly resolve that our efforts will be crowned with success. As I said, in this matter, the goodwill and the unanimous support of the House is a great asset. Let this House not think on divided lines on matters like this which are matters of national concern.

PAKISTAN USA INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC UNITED KINGDOM LATVIA

**Date :** Nov 29, 1961

## Volume No

1995

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Prime Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha on Chinese Activities in Ladakh

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on Nov 28, 1961 on Chinese activities in Ladakh:

As you have been pleased to fix, I think, the 4th of December for a discussion on this subject of our border, more especially in regard to the renewed activities and aggression of Chinese authorities there, I do not propose to say much. But, I should like to help hon. Members to know the facts as far as they are in my possession so that it might help them in the course of their discussion.

This white Paper that I am placing today contains a large number of letters, charges and counter-charges made by one Government or the other and the replies. That will give them some picture of the relations of the two Governments which are obviously very far from friendly. It consists of charges and counter-charges being made of this kind. In one of the letters sent more or less recently on the 31st of October, 1961. It is a long letter sent by our Ministry to the Embassy of China here--various matters are dealt with, various charges made by the Chinese Government against us are replied to and repudiated. Then this letter says: I shall read out a paragraph from it.

"Reports received in August-September 1961 show that the Chinese forces have spread even beyond the 1956 Chinese claim line in Ladakh to establish the following new posts, and that they have constructed

roads to link these posts with rear bases:--

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Post at E 78.12, No. 35.19--this is the location of the post--

Post at Nyagzu

Post at Dambuguru.

These fresh instances of violation of Indian territory by the Chinese establish conclusively that the Chinese are guilty of further aggression against India and their protestations to the contrary are only a cloak to cover up these renewed incursions and aggressive activities."

Thereafter, we rejected their note. I read out this brief reference because this particular matter has been before us now.

I should like to explain because there is much confusion on this issue. On the one hand, quite rightly and inevitably, there is a strong feeling in this House and in the country about these Chinese aggressive activities in Ladakh and elsewhere, a feeling that is obviously completely shared by the Government and by, I take it, almost everybody in India, and further that active and effective steps should be taken against these activities. What has happened? I wanted, first of all, to make that clear. In the course of the last two years--I am not referring to the period previous to the years as that has been fairly well discussed here and the facts are known--in the course of the last two years, we find that three Chinese posts have been established. I have myself used the word 'check-posts' for their posts or our posts. It is not a correct description. They are military posts; they are not check-posts. Check-posts are normal police posts. Whether they are our posts in these mountains or the Chinese, they are regular military posts. In course of the last two years, three posts have been established.

As a matter of fact, so far as we are aware they were established during the last summer, especially one important post to which I shall refer. Of these three military posts, two of them, one at Dambuguru and the other at Nyagzu in the Kongka La-Khurnak Fort sector of Ladakh, are practically on the international frontier between Tibet and Ladakh; I am talking about the real frontier, not where the Chinese have come in. They are actually on the international frontier. We are not quite certain whether they are a mile or two on this side or on that side, because it is rather difficult in these high mountain regions to be precise about the actual line.

An Hon. Member: Then, they must be on this side. If there is doubt, then they are obviously on this side.

The Prime Minister: Let us presume that. We have presumed that. But I

am merely saying that they are near the international frontier. And it is an objectionable thing, the Chinese having built them, not because they have included any particular area of territory there by coming a mile but because that is a sign of aggressive mentality behind it and aggressive activities. What I mean to say is that to consider or to think that, as has been said, a large area--I do not know how much, thousand or two thousand square miles--have been further occupied is not a correct statement. What is correct is that in so far as these two posts are concerned, they are, as I said, almost on the international frontier. And it is objectionable, because the mere erection of these posts even on the international frontier is an aggressive activity and not in keeping with the assurances given to us.

The third post is a more important one, that is, a post in the northern part of this Ladakh area. Presumably, this was put up during this last summer. It is very difficult to give exact dates, because we find out about the existence of these posts by reconnaissance. When a reconnaissance occurs, we see that it is not there; when it next occurs, it is there or it is being built, so that all we can say is that on a certain date, it was there, and on a certain date it was not there; and roughly, we can, therefore, say that it must have come into existence between those two dates.

Early in September, our reconnaissance took place and discovered this post, which is a post a little further to the west of their last post where it was.

This is towards the Karakoram range. As a matter of fact, we have built an important post, military post right near the Karakoram pass, which is a very important route of entry. Although now it is not used very much, it used to be a very important route from India to Sinkiang and Central Asia. We have built a very important post there at a place named Daulatbeg Oldi which is about ten miles from the Karakoram pass, and which is a post at about nearly 17,000 feet altitude. The Chinese post which they have built up is to the east of this, ten to twelve miles to the east of this. It is this one single post that is a little further away from the old frontier, from the frontier line, and must be put in a different category, as compared to the two other posts that I have said, which are more or less on the international border. We objected to these posts, of course, for reasons

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which I have stated. But to this post, our objection is greater because it has moved west two miles. But even that does not imply that the Chinese have taken possession of any large area. A post is just a post at that point, to the right, to the left, or to the east; they are not in possession; no body is in possession except any Armed Force that goes there for the time being. And as I have pointed out, we have got an important military post.

An Hon. Member: About how many soldiers are there in one post?

The Prime Minister: I cannot say how many people the Chinese have put there. Roughly speaking, about fifty is the outside limit on a post; it may be sixty or it may be forty, I cannot say, because every such post, so far as we are concerned, has to be fed, and everything has to be supplied, by air. Ever since these troubles became marked in our frontier regions, we have been trying to build rapidly roads, and in order to facilitate this process, we have taken it out of the normal channels and routine methods of building roads by the P.W.D.'s, which, however good they may be, are rather slow-working. And we have created a special division of the Army for building roads in these high mountains, with good engineers and the rest. They have done very good work, and proceeded more or less according to schedule. But it has been a tremendous task, in this sense that every little matchstick, every screw, and everything else has to be carried by air, even to build the road; every person whom we station there has to be supplied with everything he needs by air. So, it was for this purpose that we purchased a number of very good transport aircraft from various countries. It has been of help to us. And this process is continuing well. This was the base, because we have normally been thinking of preparing for such effective steps in a thorough way. We cannot take adventurist action which may land us in greater military or other difficulties.

It is not an easy matter to conduct a warfare in these regions, but it has to be done, and, therefore, we have to prepare for it, if necessary, and the base of that preparation is this system of roads that are being built rapidly, not only there, but over a large part of the border.

The hon. Member Shri Tyagi has rightly drawn attention to the fact that we should not help those who are opposed to us to get information which might help them; that is an obvious precaution that every-country takes.

They may know, much of this, as we know a good deal about their activities. Nevertheless, they do not know everything. It is no good helping them to know a little more than what they know. I acknowledge that my general tendency, more especially in the House, is to take hon. Members in to my confidence and say things which perhaps I ought not to say. From that point of view, I was, in fact, thinking of inviting some hon. Members, leaders of parties, to see me privately when I could talk to them with a map in front of me and try to explain these matters a little further, which I cannot do in the House.

An Hon. Member: Let us have a closed sitting of the House. A debate can be had in that way and let all the Members know.

The Speaker: He wants a Secret Session.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I am very sorry. A Secret Session or

public Session, these things cannot be discussed with hundreds of people present. Obviously, however secret it is, it only means that it does not go to newspapers. But otherwise, it becomes semi-public.

An Hon. Member: That is the general weakness of all parties.

The Prime Minister: That is not a weakness of ours. That is a well known fact everywhere. I was merely stating something that is terribly secret. The locations may be secret, but obviously not, we have been engaged to the best of our ability to strengthen our positions all along the borders. In fact, as I once said, we were engaged in doing this, to some extent right from 1950 on--wards. One error--if you like--we made in our judgement. The frontier was a tremendous frontier of 2,000 miles, and it is a very difficult frontier, in the sense that there is no means of communication sometimes for hundreds of miles on the frontier, because this was a dead frontier in the past.

The old British Government did not take much interest in it, and it remained so. But the moment we became independent, both because of that and because of the fact at that time the Chinese came into Tibet, we were alerted by this fact, although nothing had happened against us so much directly. But this frontier became a live frontier and we began taking military and other steps, 'other steps' meaning development of communications etc.

We concentrated rather on the North East Frontier Agency because we thought that that

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might be threatened more than any other place. The problem was so huge, involving 2,000 miles of mountainous frontier. In fact, we succeeded not only in bringing a large part of the North East Frontier Agency in a system of regular administration and communications but in establishing many posts there which have done good work and which have, in fact, prevented any incursion there.

References have often been made to Longju, which is a small village of a few huts only and which, according to us, lies in our territory just on this side of the border. According to the Chinese, it does not. We are even now within about four or five miles--that is, our posts are--from Longju. Of course, the four or five miles are not just straight going. It is mountainous territory and is very difficult going. We have been asked why we have not occupied Longju, although Longju has been vacated by the Chinese. Why they vacated it I do not know. They are four miles beyond on the other side. It is not a difficult matter, I suppose, for us to go four or five miles ahead and sit there. But it is of no particular importance.

An Hon. Member: Have they reoccupied Longju? On a former occasion, we were told that they vacated it because of certain epidemic there.

The Prime Minister: There was some story about epidemic. They left it. They have not, so far as we know, reoccupied. What their reason is, I do not know. But it is of no particular importance to them or to us.

Replying to another question the Prime Minister said: It is perfectly clear that Longju is of no military importance to either party. Of course, it is our territory. That is a different matter. It is an obvious fact. I am not telling anybody that. We can, and we may perhaps, occupy it, but if we occupy it, we must be prepared to do many other things too all along the border. When we want and when we are ready for it, we will do it. What I mean is that we have to see things in the large context and perspective, military strategy and the rest. We have to go by the advice given to us by our military chiefs and advisers, that it is not of great importance from that point of view. For instance, Ladakh or any other part is far more important.

So my point is that we hold the entire North East Frontier border well except this little village of Longju which, at the present moment, nobody holds. At one time, we had even suggested to the Chinese, before these various developments had taken place, that they should retire from Longju and it should be left unoccupied by either party. That was sometime ago. But we have every right to occupy it, if we so choose and if it is in keeping with our general military strategy. That was the point I was making. But it is not, from the military or other point of view, of extreme importance.

An Hon. Member: These are unfortunate remarks about Longju.

The Prime Minister: It may be unfortunate but I am trying to make a factual statement. That is my difficulty. If I have to be frank to the House, I hope this House will never compel me to speak lies to this House because they consider that lies are good for this country. We may delude ourselves with a lie. We do not delude the opposite party by our lies because they know the facts as well as we do, and perhaps more.

That is what I ventured to say. We are taking even from 1950 onwards steps to protect our borders, trying to build roads etc. We attached importance to the NEFA border for various reasons and we have succeeded in protecting it adequately. We are now building up a system of roads right up to the border.

In the other parts, specially the Ladakh part, difficulties were greater--far greater--for us to build roads. Take, for instance, even a single road, which leads from Srinagar to Leh. Leh is a very important part of the Kashmir State. Even the building of that road had caused great difficulties to us. It is now completed. That is one of the big things we have done, and that helps us to move material and men into Ladakh.

So we have been building these roads and building bases at suitable

places for our armed forces. Out of the bases go forward posts etc. The whole thing is being built up in an organised way, paying special attention to the logistic demands of the situation because the whole thing depends on that. Napoleon or someone else once said that an army moves on its stomach. That is true, not only stomach but other supplies and all that.

We are a modern army. We are not just an adventurist group going in and taking undue risks in doing it, undue risks for our soldiers and others. Therefore, we have been proceeding step by step, building up our strength in these areas, and we have gone a good distance in doing that.

I was talking about the last two years. That is where, keeping in mind what Shri Tyagi has

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said, it is not proper for me to mention places of our posts etc., the military posts we have set up. But we have set up more than half a dozen new posts, important posts, in various parts of the Ladakh border. I have mentioned one already, an important one which is right near the Karakoram Pass a very important one.

An hon. Member asked what is the strength of each post, and I said that normally it is 40 or 50 men. But I should like the House to remember that behind these 40 or 50 men is a huge apparatus to feed them, to supply them and so on, involving 10-20 times that number of persons.

So, all this has to be built up like this, with a solid base, so that nobody is left unconnected with the bases and therefore weakened. That has been our general policy, which I think, has been proceeding more or less satisfactorily, in spite of all these difficulties that have taken place.

Now, it is clear that from the point of view of feeding alone, these areas in Ladakh cannot support large armies, either Chinese or ours or anybody else's, it just can't. Roughly speaking, 50 men require a thousand men for their support somewhere behind the scenes, to feed them etc. You can imagine how any large army can be supported. Maybe, I cannot say, a great country like the United States of America or the Soviet Union may be able to do it with, their vast resources, but certainly neither the Chinese Government nor any other Government can support large armies in this area.

It is not a question of large armies manoeuvring and crushing each other. It is a question of strong armed groups--armies, yes--relatively small groups going and either taking possession of a place or removing somebody from some place. That is, the whole strategy has to depend on that conception, but with strong bases behind them to support them. One has to do this with a strong base and logistics and food supplies and all that. So, all that has to be taken into

consideration.

As I said, I recognise the strong feelings in the House over these matters. We entirely share them, but the House will not expect the Government, feeling strongly as it does, nevertheless, to take some step which cannot be fully carried out. We are ready for it, we are perfectly prepared for it.

I do not think the last two years, with which I am dealing, have changed the situation to the advantage of the Chinese in these areas. If I may make a broad statement, I think the situation has broadly been changed progressively in our favour, not as much as we want it to.

It is a fact they are still in the areas they occupied, that is true, but progressively the situation has been changing, from a military point of view and from other points of view, in our favour, and we shall continue to take steps to build up these things, so that ultimately we may be in a position to take action to recover such territory as is in their possession.

I am sorry I took so much time, I did not intend to, but the matter, as you were pleased to say, will be discussed a few days later in the House.

An Hon Member; May I ask one small question of the Prime Minister? If the setting up of a base on our territory by the Chinese Republic, he does not think will lead to war; why should we be worried that destroying the base set up by them will lead to war,

The Prime Minister: It is not a question of leading to a war. We do not want a major war, of course. It is not small matter to have a war between two of the biggest countries in Asia. It is not a question of liking or disliking. It is a major historical fact that one gets entangled into when, whatever step we take, we have to be strong enough to pursue it to the logical end.

Every military administration has to think of that. It must be pursued to the logical end, and one has to be prepared for that, whether it is there or elsewhere in India, whether it is in Goa or whatever it is. A step to be taken knowing what the second, third, fifth, twelfth step should be. We should be prepared for all this. We do not take a step and then find that we are not prepared for something that follows.

Asked about the extent of the territory which has been freshly occupied by China, Shri Nehru said: There is no occupation of territory except in so far as you put a small group of 40 or 50 men in a particular point. That particular point is occupied and from that area they may exercise some control round about, but there is no other territory occupied at all.

The one place that I have mentioned where they have opened these check posts, about which we got to know in September last, is a place

on the banks of a river with the happy name of Chip Chap river. It is 17 miles southeast of our post which is Daulatbeg Oldi. This is connected by road to the previous post behind which is Jilga, which was established two years ago. So

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that the question of occupation of territory does not arise excepting, as I said, they have got a few soldiers sitting at one post, in a sheltered post, which has been created.

In reply to further question the Prime Minister said it is incorrect to say 1,000 or 500 sq. miles have been occupied. That is ridiculous, that is not true. Where they have occupied a particular point, because they have occupied that point, they can exercise some influence round about in those mountainous areas, but to draw a line and say east or west or north of it is occupied is not a correct statement. That is what I ventured to say in answer to the Hon. Member.

An Hon Member: It seems they set up some check post two years ago. How many miles are the new check posts from the old ones?

The Prime Minister: I cannot precisely say, but it may be 10 or 12 miles.

The Hon. Member: They have advanced 10 miles. It means  $10 \times 100 = 1000$  miles of the border.

The Prime Minister: you can also draw a line from our post of Daulatbeg Oldi, and say that we have already driven out the Chinese, because the line drawn would cover all that area. The area is an extraordinary area where our posts and their posts go in a zig-zag line to some extent; somewhere zig-zag, somewhere something else over that area where they have occupied and where our posts are increasing in number to control that situation.

CHINA USA INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Nov 28, 1961

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**Volume No**

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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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Prime Minister's Statement in Rajya Sabha on Chinese Activities in Ladakh

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The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Rajya Sabha on Nov 28, 1961 on Chinese activities in Ladakh:

I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Chairman, for allowing me to intervene at this stage. This morning my colleague, the Deputy Minister, laid on the Table of the House a book called White Paper No. V, containing notes, memoranda and letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China. I should like in a few words to explain certain recent developments there which have naturally and rightly caused apprehension in the minds of the public and Members of this House. There is a brief reference to this matter in the White Paper and I shall read it out. This is contained in a letter addressed by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Embassy of China in India. The letter is dated 31st October, 1961. It deals with many matters which the Chinese Government had raised, many objections they had taken, deals with them and rejects their protests. At the end of this letter, near the end, it is stated:-

"Reports received in August/September, 1961 show that the Chinese forces have spread even beyond the 1956 Chinese claim line in Ladakh to establish the following new posts, and that they have constructed roads to link these posts with rear bases."

These posts are described precisely: Post at E 78.12 N 35.19, that is one thing; the second Post at Nyagzu, and the third Post at Dambuguru. Then it goes onto say:

"These fresh instances of violation of Indian territory by the Chinese establish conclusively that the Chinese are guilty of further aggression against India and their protestations to the contrary are only a cloak to cover up these renewed incursions and aggressive activities".

Now, Sir, I have just read three posts. Sometimes we have referred, I myself have been guilty of that, to them as checkpoints. That of course is not a correct word. A checkpoint is usually a police post to check people coming and going. These are military posts just as our posts there are military posts. Two of these three posts are situated roughly along the international frontier between Tibet and Ladakh. These two are the Dambuguru and Nyagzu in the Kengles Khurnak Fort sector of Ladakh. As I said, I cannot be quite certain about the precise location, because in these mountain regions there is no marked boundary, but they are broadly on the international frontier, I repeat international frontier, not the new lines drawn by the Chinese or by anybody else. We think they are just on our side of the international frontier. Hence they have committed aggression. The importance of these two is not that they have led to any occupation of any further territory by the Chinese but that the mere fact that they have been built there is a sign of aggressive intent.

Now the third post belongs to a different category because that is definitely in our own territory, well within it. It was an extension

of the last post nearby which was called Tehsil Jilga which was established by the Chinese about a year

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and a half ago or two years ago, more than two years ago. So, this post has been established further inland, if I may use that word. That is a more serious matter because it is definitely a post right in the heart of the territory of the Indian Union. Now in the last two years this has been the development. I am referring to two years, before two years we have discussed this matter adequately here, and the position is fairly well known as to what it was then. During the last two years, so far as I know, these three posts have been established, two more or less on the international border, rather south--by south I mean south in the Ladakh sector--and this other one which is not very far from the Karakorum Pass of which I repeat there are two different categories. The important thing is this new post near the Karakorum Pass. Earlier and during this period specially we have also established a number of military posts along that frontier line. I do not propose to enumerate them, I do not think it will be quite right for me to do so, but one I shall mention, an important post which has been established at a place which is called Dauletbeg Oldi which is at the base of the Karakorum Pass at an altitude of 16,800 feet. It is an important post because of its location and otherwise too. Now the new Chinese post that has been established is 17 miles south-east of Dauletbeg Oldi. Information reached us early in September last about the establishment of this post. The only way we can get to know of this is by reconnaissances whether by land or by air, and we were informed then that this place had been build or was being built. These are of course small places, and suppose normally speaking they contain 30,40 or 50 men, all posts or out posts, because of difficulties in feeding, the distance difficulties and the rest. Small numbers of people are kept there. This is the major event that has happened, and it is a highly objectionable thing from our point of view. At the same time I should like to make it clear that the establishment of a post like this does not involve control of any large territory. Of course where it is established, it does involve control of that particular piece of land and roundabout it may control to some extent, but for the rest it does not involve any large territory as has been stated. I want to make that clear.

An Hon. Member: Can the Prime Minister tell us what the exact area of the new territory occupied by the Chinese is?

The Prime Minister: The exact area is the area of the post. There is no other area. They sit on a post. Now the influence of that post roundabout is not occupation, but its influence. They do not occupy any other territory, actual occupation. It is just that post, whatever it may be, a few hundred yards or so, but naturally a post has certain influence roundabout. How far round about depends upon many circumstances. It is not occupation, any other area is not occupied. This whole area of Ladakh is at the present moment developing into one criss-cross of military posts, that is our posts

and Chinese military posts. And as far our posts, I have mentioned one important one. We have a number of other new posts that we have put up, and this process is continuing. The establishment of a post involves not merely sending some men to sit in a particular place but fairly complicated logistic arrangements. Normally these posts have to be fed from the air, supplies have to be given to them from the air, and even those supplies have to be carried partly by air, partly to the rear base by roads where roads exist.

Now we have been, in the past two years specially, but even before that, building up our general military strength in these frontier areas. Originally even as long ago as ten or eleven years when this frontier appeared to us to become a live frontier after the Chinese had entered Tibet soon after the success of their revolution in China itself we realised that this frontier had become important, and so we planned to build up communications. We gave first priority at that time to the time to the North East Frontier Agency frontier. It seemed to us that that was possibly more in danger, and I think, if I may say so, that the development of the North East Frontier Agency has been rather remarkable, the spread of the administration there to the border, some roads that we have built and those posts, military posts or checkposts, being put all along the border, with the result that although our system of roads was by no means complete--we are building them there still--but all that border has been relatively well defended border and no real incursion has taken place or has been allowed to take place. In one relatively small matter there incursion did take place, and there was argument as to whom it belonged to; that was the village Longju which is right situated almost dead plum on the border, and there was argument as to whether it was on this side of the border or the other, and the Chinese occupied it. Later, last year they withdrew from it three or four miles right near there and we are about four or five miles from this side.

Although they withdrew from Longju, we did not occupy that. Chiefly, it was said that they had withdrawn because of an epidemic. Possibly, it was there but the real reason was, if we occupied that fact of occupation is not a very difficult one. But unless we can support that occupation in a

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variety of ways afterwards strongly, we may be put in an exposed position. The place itself has no value. I mean military value, and therefore, thus far we did not occupy that small village where practically nobody lives now. Apart from this, the whole of the northeast frontier was well protected because of the steps we had taken to put up these posts, etc. But the Ladakh side was not so well protected because it was more difficult for us to build--the distances were far greater, the mountains for higher and more spread out. But we had to put up some check posts and we are in the process of doing it. And in fact, it was an attempt to put up these posts that led two years ago to that conflict with the Chinese there who had come from

the other side. In the last two years special efforts have been taken to this end, to put up posts there, which involve the building up of rear bases, the building up of intermediate bases. There are the logistic requirements of those people who have put up there. Every road built there involves taking every single article necessary for it by air--big machines, small machines and the like. Every human being there has to be supplied with everything he requires--food, etc., by air, and there are many articles required. Take even the terrain. And the climate is furious and there is not wood available there. It is bare land. There are no trees at that height. So even for warming and heating, every thing has to be taken there. So, we had to build this up from base upwards which we have been doing, and I think the progress made has been rather creditable considering the difficulties. Our position has been strengthened all along that border and it is in the process of being strengthened.

So far as the roads are concerned, we took it out of the formal routine agencies like the P.W.D. because they were rather slow moving and created a new department in Defence for this road-building which takes the help of the P.W.D. and builds the roads itself. Because of the necessities of transport in these regions, we had to purchase a number of transport aircraft which would carry large loads; they have been very helpful. So, all this process has been going along during these years. Naturally, during the winter, all these building programmes are slowed down; in some areas they have to stop practically because in these areas which vary in altitude from 15,000 to 19,000 feet, it is extraordinarily difficult for any human being to go and work there in these regions. Nevertheless, the posts are continued to be put there even in the winter but the work is slowed down. In the so-called summer months there--five or six months in the year--work proceeds apace. In the course of this period, we have built up a fairly thorough base, important base, because we must have a base whatever step we take. If there are fifty men in a base, these fifty men have to be supported by hundreds of men behind the lines; there are logistic reasons transport and otherwise. Fifty men may have to be supported by thousands behind. So, we have to proceed in a sound and thorough way to strengthen our position and not merely take some adventurist action which may perhaps not be successful. That is the broad policy we pursue, we hope to pursue, we continue to pursue, and we hope to complete our system of roads before very long.

So, Sir, at the present moment, as I said the important thing that has happened on the Chinese side is this one particular military post which has been extended to the West towards the Karakoram Pass and which lies between the line of the Chinese claim of 1956 and the 1960 claim which is highly objectionable, and we have taken strong objection to it. And this creation of this post does not entail any large area going over because we have other posts which control these areas. That is the present position I must clear up. Naturally, our aim is to build up or strengthen those areas in every way, that is, in the front, in the intermediate places and in the rear, in the mountains, apart from the base further down, so that we can easily take any action that is required and with strength, and keep it up.

And normally speaking, we avoid any such action which may not be followed up by us because of our lack of material, etc. which we have to store up at every stage.

I may say that our post which I mentioned at the base of the Karakoram Pass-Douletbeg Oldi is about ten or twelve miles away from the Pass and the Chinese post which was probably put up during the last summer is about seventeen miles south-east of our post. There have been other incursions by the Chinese--that is patrols--and this White Paper which I have placed will show the number of protests made by us to the Chinese and by the Chinese to us; they go on protesting that we are sending our patrol because we have been constantly sending our patrols to those areas as we have every right to do in our areas. But since they claim it is their own, they go on protesting.

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POLAND

Indo-Polish Trade: Letters Exchanged

Trade talks between Poland and India concluded here today with an exchange of letters signed by Mr. Eugemiusz Leozykiski, Director of the Treaty Department, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Polish People's Republic, who led the Polish Trade Delegation, and Shri B. N. Adarkar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

The letters exchanged provide for the continuance in 1962 of the schedules of goods which will be available for export from and imports into India attached to the current Indo-Polish Trade Agreement, which will be in force till the end of 1962.

The Polish Delegation, which arrived in India in the last week of October, held a series of discussions with officials of the Government of India. The talks included a review of last year's trade and also the steps to be taken to develop trade between two countries to a much greater extent in the coming year.

It is anticipated that during 1962, trade between the two countries may increase appreciably. Commodities to be imported in India will

include machinery items and capital goods, power generating equipment, industrial raw materials, non-ferrous metal, newsprint, etc. The exports from India to Poland, on the other hand, will be engineering items, textile machinery, steel products, collapsible tubes, asbestos yarn and fibres, semi-products of pharmaceutical production, sports goods, handicrafts, tinned tropical fruits and juices, tinned fish and prawns, coir goods, etc. apart from other traditional items like tea, coffee, spices, etc.

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UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Cairo Joint Communique

On way back home from his visit to the U.S.A., Prime Minister Nehru broke journey in Cairo and held talks with President Nasser of the United Arab Republic and President Tito of the Yugoslav People's Republic on international problems. At the conclusion of their two-day talks a Joint Communique was issued in Cairo on Nov 20, 1961

The following is the text of the Joint Communique.

During a meeting in Cairo on the 18th and Nov 1@, 1961 which was held in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship, the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the President of the United Arab Republic and the Prime Minister of India had an exchange of views on international problems as well as on the events and trends in the international situation which have evolved of late, especially since the Conference in Belgrade.

They noted with concern that international tension is still persisting, event embracing new areas, and including an accelerated arms race and resumption of nuclear tests.

They agreed that the phenomenal technological advances made in recent years make the question of war or peace one of choice between total destruction of humanity and human civilisation and the securing of a fuller and happier life for all mankind by the application of the technological skills for peaceful purposes. They, therefore, reaffirm their unanimous resolve to concentrate their best efforts on the preservation of peace as the vital objective of their foreign policy and to increase their collective efforts and cooperation in the

interest of world peace and the progress of mankind. They emphasise in this connection the urgency of general and complete disarmament and appeal to all concerned to speed up the finalization of an agreement on this vital subject.

The two Presidents and the Prime Minister noted with satisfaction that efforts, particularly of non-aligned countries, despite the existence of tension and conflicts, contributed towards some improvement in the international situation and provided constructive approaches to questions like the appointment of an acting Secretary General and the resolutions on a moratorium on nuclear explosions on Africa as an atom free zone and on the immediate termination of the hunger strike of the Algerian leaders and others, etc.

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The two Presidents and the Prime Minister also viewed with satisfaction the signs that, in the dispute over Berlin, endeavours are being made to find a solution by negotiation and they hope that these endeavours will be successful.

In their discussions, due attention was paid to the economic problems of the world, with special reference to the necessity of general strengthening of economic cooperation and of intensifying economic relations among the developing countries as also with all other countries, including the countries affected by exclusive economic groupings in the world.

EGYPT USA YUGOSLAVIA INDIA ALGERIA GERMANY

**Date :** Nov 1@, 1961

## Volume No

1995

UNITED KINGDOM

Indo-British Loan Agreement Signed

An agreement for a credit of Rs. 6.67 crores (æ 5 million) from the British Government to the Government of India was signed in New Delhi on Nov 10, 1961 by Sir Paul GoreBooth, the British High Commissioner, and Shri L.K. Jha, Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs.

The loan is not attached to any particular project and can be used with immediate effect by India to pay for a broad range of imports from the United Kingdom. It is the third in the British series of

loans for the Third Plan towards which the British Government has so far promised Rs. 120 crores (æ 90 million) under the 'Aid India' consortium arrangements. It follows the loan agreements for æ 30 million (for mixed projects and development goods) and æ 10 million (for general balance-of-payments support) signed in May in fulfilment of this Third Plan commitment. During the Second Plan, Britain's assistance amounted to just over Rs. 107 crores (æ 80.5 million). Taken together with the Third Plan commitment, total British aid committed to date amounts to Rs. 227 crores (æ 170.5 million).

This latest æ 5 million credit is repayable over 25 years with a grace period of seven years--the first instalment will fall due on May 31, 1968. The rate of interest will be the same as that applied by the British Treasury to a loan for a comparable period from its domestic Consolidated Fund plus 1/4% management charge. The loan was made under the authority of Section 3 of the Export Guarantees Act 1949 and 1957.

I have been in India now as the representative of my Government for just over eleven months, and for the third time I find myself taking part in a loan signing ceremony in this room. I am glad, Sir, to be the agent of aid. I hope to continue to be so, subject only to the limitations of the performance of our economy back home in Britain.

The particular loan agreement we have signed this morning is in a form which makes it readily available for use in India's overseas payments. As I said, I believe on the last occasion that I was here, besides aid tied to particular projects, resources are also required in a form which can be applied where needed for reinforcing the economic move forward on a broad front. The character this instalment is of that kind.

By again setting a repayment term of twenty-five years my Government has confirmed its recognition of the need to avoid repayment arrangements which a developing country like India is likely to find burdensome in the short term. Also the first repayment on this loan will not be made until 31st May 1968 when you are well into your Fourth Plan, there being a grace period of seven years.

INDIA USA

**Date** : Nov 10, 1961

**Volume No**

1995

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru paid a visit to the United States early in Nov 01, 1961. During his stay in this country Shri Nehru had talks with President Kennedy for four days on various subjects. At the Conclusion of the talks a joint communiqué was issued in

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Washington on Nov 09, 1961

The following is the full text of the Joint Communiqué:

The President and the Prime Minister have had four days of especially pleasant and rewarding conversations. These began in Newport, Rhode Island, on Monday, were continued for several hours Tuesday morning with senior Indian and U.S. officials present, with further private discussions Wednesday, and a brief final meeting today. Subjects covered amount almost to a map of the troubled areas of the world. The problems of getting a peaceful settlement in Berlin, of securing the peace and liberties of the people of South-East Asia, the problems of control of nuclear testing and disarmament, of the Congo, on how to strengthen the United Nations, and of United States and Indo-Pakistan relations were among the topics. Prime Minister Nehru used the occasion to go deeply into the philosophic and historical background of Indian foreign policy. The President similarly went into the goals and objectives of American foreign policy as they have been moulded and shaped over the years.

The President and the Prime Minister examined in particular those areas where peace is threatened. They discussed the dangers inherent in recent developments in Berlin and in South-East Asia. Concerning Berlin, President Kennedy reaffirmed the United States' commitment to support the freedom and economic viability of the 2 1/4 million people of West Berlin and the President and the Prime Minister concurred in the legitimate and necessary right of access to Berlin. The President also assured the Prime Minister that every effort would be made to seek any solution of the Berlin problem by peaceful means, and underlined the importance of the choices of the people directly concerned.

With respect to South-East Asia, the President and the Prime Minister confirmed that it is the common objective of the United States and India that Laos be a genuinely neutral state, free of domination by any foreign power, and that each nation in the area have the opportunity to make its own choice of the course it will take in seeking to solve pressing economical and social problems under conditions of peace.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed India's efforts for the improved well-being of her people. The President reaffirmed the United States' interest in the success of this great effort.

They exchanged views on the desirability of a cessation of nuclear testing. The President referred in this connection to the recent resumption of tests by the Soviet Union which broke the previous moratorium and reaffirmed the United States unwillingness to accept a further uncontrolled nuclear test moratorium. The Prime Minister and the President agreed on the urgent need for a treaty banning nuclear tests with necessary provision for inspection and control.

The President and the Prime Minister stressed the high importance of measures to avoid the risk of war and of negotiations in this connection to achieve agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament.

India and the United States share in the fullest measure their common objective to develop the United Nations as the most effective instrument of world peace.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the United States and Indian contributions to United Nations operations in the Congo, which they regard as an illustration of how that body, even under extremely difficult conditions, can help bring about conditions for the peaceful resolution of conflict. Both the Prime Minister and the President strongly share the hope that as the result of the efforts of the Congo and the United Nations a peaceful and united Congo will be achieved. The President expressed his special appreciation of the role layed by the Indian soldiers in the Congo, who comprise more than one-third of the United Nations force there.

The Prime Minister and the President noted the cooperation and exchange of information between United States and Indian scientists in space science research. They agreed that this activity, which has the aim of peaceful exploitation of outer space for the benefit of mankind, could be usefully developed.

The Prime Minister and the President consider that their talks have been highly useful in the pursuit of their common objectives of an enduring world peace and enhanced understanding between the governments of India and the United States. They intend to keep closely in touch with each other in the months, and years ahead.

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USA INDIA GERMANY CONGO PAKISTAN LAOS

**Date :** Nov 09, 1961

**December**

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ARGENTINA INDIA USA ALGERIA KOREA CHINA

**Date :** Dec 01, 1961

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Vice-President's Speech at Banquet in honour of Dr. Frondizi

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Speaking at a banquet given in honour of His Excellency Dr. Arturo Frondizi, President of the Argentine Republic, at Rashtrapati Bhavan on Dec 04, 1961 the Vice-President, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, said:

Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen: It is a great happiness for us to have you and the member of your party with us. This is the first time that the Head of a Latin American State pays a visit to our country. There are several things in common between the South American States and ourselves. You also freed from colonial domination and you are now trying to build up your economy. We also recently attained our freedom and we are trying to build up our social economy and industrial development.

I was there in your country in 1954. I spent about three days in Buenos Aires. It was under a different administration. The changes that were affected show that people resist any kind of tyranny, political or spiritual. It may continue for a little while but it cannot last long and I am glad that you are now, as we are, under a democratic constitution. There have been many ties between your country and ours. You told me this evening that when I was there you were in prison and studied Gandhiji's autobiography. Many of my friends also did some reading when they had some enforced rest. I may tell you that Rabindranath Tagore was convalescing somewhere near Buenos Aires and there wrote a number of poems included under Puravi. It was dedicated to a great lady of your country, the Victoria Ocampo. He said there "To Vijaya". Vijaya is the Sanskrit word for victory. That is the word which he actually used.

In the last two years we had many cultural exchanges. Our little ballet troupe went there. You had an exhibition of paintings and miniatures and you had celebrations about Rabindranath Tagore's birthday centenary. In all these ways there were some contacts hitherto and those contacts are bound to grow hereafter. This Government has established two scholarships for Argentine nationals. That may be limited in character. I have no doubt in time to come this cultural exchange will increase and expand, thus fostering better understanding between our two countries.

You, yourself, Sir, are interested very much in improving trade relations with our country. I have no doubt as a result of your visit our trade will improve to mutual advantage. In the United Nations we are cooperating with each other. You made out that your foreign policy is governed by three main principles of international co-existence, equality of nations and independence for them and non-interference in other people's affairs and self-determination for all peoples. We are living today in very perilous times. The great powers which have got nuclear weapons at their disposal are unable to settle down in peace and friendship. It is not necessary for us to assume

that there are only two alternatives, death or defeat, suicide or surrender. It is possible for us to get to know people from whom we happen to be estranged today, understand their points of view and establish some kind of a cooperative order. The present approach which we are adopting of the arms race and nuclear developments are a threat to the peace of the world and we should to the best of our ability try to stop this arms race, this competition in nuclear weapons. That is the only way in which we can establish peace in this nuclear age. And in all these matters we stand together. You are against race prejudice. One of the most remarkable phenomena in Latin America is utter freedom from race discrimination. You have 20 million people in your country belonging to different racial stocks. They are living in perfect racial harmony. If that is extended on a world scale, one major cause of wars will be removed. And I think it that matter in our fight against colonialism, in our fight against race discrimination it will be possible for us to cooperate and work together in the United Nations.

We are also striving our best to adopt ourselves to the rhythm of the mechanical or of technological civilisation. These things are increasing in number. I was on a visit recently to some countries in Europe. I met the leaders of their Governments. They told me, "We are prosperous but are not happy". There is a great saying in the Upanishad which says: Man is not satisfied by wealth. You may go on accumulating your wealth, concentrate all your energies on the piling up of the comforts and conveniences of life but the unhappiness is due not to the poverty of inward life but to the utter absence of the inward life. It is necessary for us if we are true democrats to believe and adopt that we have a meaningful and purposeful life

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which we can lead apart from the angry recriminations, bickerings and manoeuvres of political or economic life. The only way to save the world from this malaise of soul which is becoming rampant, is to give value to the dignity of the individual, to make him believe that he had a private life of his own, that he is not merely a statistical unit but has a conscience, has imagination, has desire to seek truth, love, beauty and goodness. That sense will have to be regained.

You said to our people that in this technological age, we must mobilise the forces of spirit if man is to be saved. There again we are on agreement with each other.

We are very happy, Mr. President, that you were able to come here. We are only sorry that you are spending only four, days in a vast country like this where we have not only ancient ruins but modern achievements, four days must be regarded as much too short. I hope this will merely be a prelude to a longer visit which you may pay to our country.

I now propose, Your Excellencies, the health of the President of Argentina and the well-being of the Argentine people.

**Date :** Dec 04, 1961

## Volume No

1995

ARGENTINA

Reply of Argentine President

Replying, the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. Arturo Frondizi, said:

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Prime Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen:

The embrace that, through me, the Argentine people sends to the people of India reflects the fundamental feature of our era: the conscience of the world as a unity. The visit by the president of one of the young nations of America to one of the oldest nations of Asia is a symbol of such a unity. For the first time a President of the Argentine Republic travels to the other end of the planet to bring to India the message of admiration and affection of his people. This is not a protocol visit. It springs from the conviction that India and Argentina, in their condition of members of the universal community, need to increase and reaffirm their relationship within the framework of a world situation fraught with risks but also filled with opportunities. We live in a world that can and must elect between two extremes--the war of extinction or the universal victory over backwardness and poverty. Even the most optimistic of us, among whom I am to be counted, cannot entirely dismiss the first hypothesis. But we are sure that the other alternative is perfectly feasible if peoples are united for this great endeavour for human redemption and to achieve the great decisions that should ensure a just and lasting peace.

The people of India and the people of Argentina share the hope of a happy future for mankind. The danger of atomic destruction and the growing notion of economic and social interdependence of all nations have created this unitary universal conscience to which I have made reference. All peoples desire peace. All peoples understand that all nations, large and small, above their differences and rivalries, are obliged to explore new and ever more effective machineries of international co-operation. On these premises rests the confidence that I have come to India to transmit on behalf of the Argentine people.

It is important to point out that the greater support to that sense of international collective responsibility is being made by the new nationalities and the developing peoples. We contemplate the apparent paradox of a pushing internationalism promoted by a growing nationalism. The greater the maturity reached by the peoples in their national conscience, the greater their contribution to the strengthening of international community in their political, economic and cultural aspects. This is a solid guarantee for peace and co-operation. This will not be the result of an imposition elaborated within the circle of the great powers, as it used to be in the past, but it will come from an accord freely agreed upon by the individual sovereignty of all nations. In this free community, each nation keeps its personality, and the force of the whole is the sum of those national varieties. This is not a uniform world, ruled by one or several dominant wills. It is an association of states which are equal in rights, that is forced to preserve the self-determination of each of its members. Hence, international living together not only is not incompatible with the principle of national sovereignty, but on the contrary it is its direct and necessary effect.

The present composition of the United Nations reflects this new reality of the world. In it there are no longer any predominant powers or groups. Its decisions are the result of the deliberation and the agreement of all of its members. The existence of this democratic association of more than a hundred sovereign nations is a historical fact without any precedents, and it opens up endless possibilities for the future world.

In this international forum, each State acts in accordance with its national character and its own ideals and interests. The Argentine people

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have always respected the dignified and wise position of India and its valuable contribution to peace. This position answers to the historical circumstances of the national development of the Indian State and to the ancestral philosophy of a people educated in the love of peace and human fraternity.

Argentina moulds its international conduct in accordance with its tradition of respect to the norms of the International Law and faithful on every occasion to its condition as a member of the western and christian and free association of American states in the regional organism which unites them.

Each one in its sphere and each one in the way marked by their different origins and their different positions in the world problem can contribute to the strengthening of peace and the increase in international cooperation.

Concretely, they can join their efforts to help finding peaceful solutions to the great problems that today threaten the peace of the

world.

India and Argentina, also, can act together to influence the great powers urging them to reach an agreement over the universal and controlled disarmament and over the absolute banning of arms of massive destruction and the testing of nuclear devices. Both countries recognize the immense benefit which the whole humanity would derive if the huge resources which are absorbed by the arm race would be employed in productive investments.

All these problems have been the subject of the exchange of ideas which I had with His Excellency the Vice-President Dr. Radhakrishnan and with your Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, to whom I pay my warmest homage in the name of a country which admires his sacrifice and his genius as the leader of the historical movement for the liberation of his country.

It is not only the consideration of the problems of peace and disarmament that can make fruitful this visit. India and Argentina need to strengthen their ties because of the reasons vinculated to their material and spiritual interests.

This vast subcontinent of Asia which is India, inhabited by a fifth of the human race is engaged in the gigantic enterprise of completing its political sovereignty with the independent development of its economy. In this effort, its historical direction does not differ from the one followed by another important human community, which inhabits a continent discovered by the end of the fifteenth century by Christopher Columbus. Close to two hundred million people live in Latin America, from Mexico to Argentina. Its twenty different nationalities have different degrees of material and cultural development, but they face common problems that are similar, on their nature, to those of India and the other countries that are on their path to development.

These two great communities of the underdeveloped world, Latin America and India, are the most important of the non-communist political sector. The coordination of their policies at the world level, in order to foster their development, can be a vital factor in the struggle being fought by the underdeveloped countries.

Having in view only to give the general lines of that possible collaboration, I will recall the well-known premises of the problem of underdevelopment.

The first is the internal factor and it refers itself to the necessity of rebuilding the economical structure of the underdevelopment, that is, to surpass the condition of simple producer of raw materials and start the industrialization and exploitation of all the natural resources in function of the said industrialization.

The second refers to the external factor and consists in assuring the

free flow of capital, technology and commerce between the great industrial countries and the underdeveloped regions as well as to adequately furnish the international help--both financial and technical--to the nations under development. Both premises are necessarily inter-dependent because it is not possible to modify substantially the internal economic structure without reaching for the international financial resources and to the exchange without restrictions. This access is in itself, dependent on the fact that the internal structures should be apt to benefit from the international cooperation and to throw their products to the current of the world commerce at competitive prices.

Two big obstacles arise on the road towards economic development in the present state of the world's economy. The more important one is the artificial contraction of the markets of primary products, which acts against the capitalisation of exporting countries because of the increasing unfavourable trend of their foreign trade. The second one is the scarcity of the inflow of international capital, both in the form of direct investment and in the form of loans. Both obstacles exert a negative influence on national economies which still depend on their

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exporting capacity and which show very low levels of internal savings.

There is no doubt that the removal of these two negative factors would not be enough to solve the problem of underdevelopment. These external causes are contributing but not decisive factors. Economic development is a process essentially determined by the capacity of each people to convert it in the national cause, to plan it out adequately and to make the immediate sacrifices which may accelerate the achievement of long term benefits. But there is no doubt that external conditions can make the national processes less hard and less expensive. And it is also indisputable that the removal of external hindrances is not, and it must not be, greatest concessions by great powers but a necessity for its own stability within a world whose growth and pressures are creating a revolution in the old power relationships. The entrance of underdeveloped world in the world economy, as a dynamic partner, is a reality which is defeating any scheme trying to reproduce past practices. There is no other way out but the creation of a vast world cooperative system ensuring the uninterrupted growth of underdeveloped countries as well as that of industrial powers. The latter are exposed to a dangerous standstill if they do not understand that the expansion of interchange and of the flow of capital is essential to maintaining the rhythm of their own development.

We all know the preoccupation of the leaders of the United States of America because of the inability to increase the yearly index of growth of the gross national product, in the face of indices in Western Europe and the socialist countries and the European statesmen

know perfectly well that the rates achieved in the fast post-war recovery will not be easily maintained from now on. That is why we cannot understand the great Western powers' delay in revising their commercial and investment policies with the necessary scope and audacity to promote the rapid capitalization of marginal areas. The creation of a large open world market, with a growing purchasing capacity offers the organic solution to the crisis of growth of the capitalistic economy. On the other hand, we witness the repetition of discriminatory and protectionist agreements that led the world to the road ending in the second World War. It would seem that there is an effort to prove that those who stated that democracy is incapable of solving its contradictions are right. In any case, the great powers do not seem to understand the urgency of the changes that they must make in their international policies, on the field of economic cooperation and multilateral trade.

India is like Argentina, a country endowed with great material resources. She is making intelligent strenuous efforts to accelerate industrialisation and improve the standard of living of its people. It is benefiting from economic and technical cooperation lent from abroad, and she keeps relations of effective and profitable friendship with all the nations of the world. Her heroic prowess to consolidate an independent and united national state, despite the deep differences and the composition of its people are an example that history records with astonishment. She has even been able to overcome resentment towards the colonising power, to which she is still united by fraternal and mutually respectful bonds. The example of India, through her five thousand year old history, shows that a national spirit conquered all her invaders and her own religious racial differences in comparison, the national epic of the young Latin American republics is recent and modest. However, I will feel proud in telling the people of India that the peoples to whose community I belong are also fighting with energy to affirm their sovereignty and to get incorporated into the modern currents of human civilization. They are irrevocably committed to the process of developing their economy and assuring well-being and culture to all of their members.

I want to refer now to the material and spiritual relations between India and Argentina.

We must not exaggerate when we speak of increasing the interchange between two countries so far away geographically and with economies that have hardly begun to expand.

Nevertheless, we have to agree that it is necessary to exploit all possibilities of increasing this exchange. Facing the contraction of the traditional markets for our products, the countries in the process of developing should compensate this loss with the increasing of commerce among them. It is a wise foresighting measure, without inferring with a common front for the promotion of the non-restrictive multilateral commerce that is a must in the present world situation. We have explored these measures tending to increase our commercial

exchange during the discussions I hold with your Prime Minister.

Nothing should stop on the other hand the increase of our cultural relations. We belong to two different cultures, each one of them adds to the common heritage of mankind. I believe that the synthesis of the human culture cannot be done with the confusion of its different branches, but adding to reciprocal inter-exchange. This historical inter-exchange is present in the

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influence of the oriental culture in that of Europe and vice versa. Songs and dances of Northern Argentina have strong oriental roots. The Indians in that region of Argentina play a bamboo flute and from it get rhythms and melodies that easily can be taken for Asian folklore.

Our students in secondary schools recite the poems of the Vedas and of Ramayana and in our country we have paid our tribute to Rabindranath Tagore, your immortal contemporary poet whose works are widely known and published in Argentina, perhaps the widest in any other foreign country. Nevertheless, there is much to do in Argentina for the diffusion of the extraordinary Indian culture. I express the hope that we can conclude a treaty for cultural exchange, and to include in it reciprocal visits of students, professors and artists. We must facilitate also the touristical exchange, which is an excellent way to increase the knowledge of the people by the people

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The superlative virtues of Mahatma Gandhi together with the decision of the whole country to forget their legendary differences, gave independence to this Nation that gave such a valid contribution to the wisdom of mankind. Afterwards constituted a Democratic Republic, which believes in the philosophy of the freedom of the man, common to the Christian nations of the West. Argentina has celebrated its 150 years of independent life also within democracy and respect for human dignity. Our peoples believe in these essential values and fought for its preservation, even defying the greatest difficulties, because they would not have accepted to barter their freedom for their material security and well-being. They defend jointly this philosophy in their international action. They support equally the cardinal principles of self determination of the people and the peaceful settlement of international controversies. They are convinced that their political liberty needs to be supported by an effective economic sovereignty, which can only be reached through development. They also coincide with the idea that both political sovereignty and economic independence are mere instruments of a fate that ends in the spiritual and material redemption of man, in the betterment of the standard of living of peoples.

India and Argentina thus have a common programme of national achievements and international behaviour. Each longs to a regional

community where they are respected and listened to. They are members of the world organisation of the United Nations, where the influence of countries in development is more important everyday. Both nations are interested in contributing to the diminishment of tensions between the great powers, as a previous step towards disarmament and lasting peace. They can make this contribution to peaceful life because both exercise the indeclinable responsibilities of the international policy, which is not submitted to any dependence and which answers to the ideals and interests of the peoples and the international standards freely accepted by them.

In a world which is in danger of a war of extermination, India and Argentina, work peace and friendship among all the nations. In a world that struggles to shorten the abysmal difference between the most opulent and the poorest countries, India and Argentina, proclaim that an essential requisite for the preservation of peace and freedom is the international cooperation for the economic and social development of the two thirds of the world population.

This is the common task that our two countries can achieve in the international sphere. Allow me to repeat here what I had an opportunity of saying in Europe and the United States to their Statesmen and businessmen. Developing nations do not ask for a gift, nor are they ready to postpone their objectives for national development which do not allow of any delay. The urgency of meeting their demands does not come only from their needs but also from the correlative need the industrial countries have of creating rapidly the conditions of stability and growth of the non-communist world. This world faces a challenge which cannot wait and which will capitalise on our waverings. "For the cause of liberty, tomorrow is late", said President Kennedy when I urged him to put into practice without delay his wonderful programmes of "The Alliance for Progress". The friends of this noble country in which I find myself, know well the deep difference that exists between the little that is done today, but that is done, and the much that is promised for tomorrow and is not done. The people of Argentina know it also well. I wish that our exchange of ideas may serve to coordinate a movement that may convince the world that refuses to understand us, that tomorrow may be too late.

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen: By coming to this extraordinary country and meeting its illustrious leaders, I have achieved one of the greatest ambitions of my life.

I have got first hand knowledge of the wonderful realisations of the economic, scientific

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and social progress of India during the last decade of its life since independence. It is a scene that comforts and spurs the efforts of other countries. I will tell my countrymen this experience. I will tell them that we can count on the deep and sincere friendship of

this great people of which the Argentinians believe also to be sincere friends.

I am convinced that India and Argentina can do much in common, not only for our mutual interest, but also for the cause of all the developing countries struggling for the expansion and liberalisation of world exchange.

But, above all, I believe that India and Argentina have another contribution to make to the world, more essential than the material one. The spiritual values which inspire both the countries, spring from different origins but they are identical in their transcendent meaning. They recognise the primacy of the spirit over matter and the imperative of moral conduct. They exalt the beauty and harmony of divine creation. They declare the freedom of the human being. I am aware of the deep differences existing between the philosophical ideas of the world, between an oriental and an occidental nation. But I share the universal vision of Tagore when he says in one of his poems that "East and West are nothing more than alternate beating of the same heart."

I have felt this universal heart beating in India which has received me with such great generosity and affection. I am deeply grateful for this welcome in the name of the people of Argentina.

I raise a toast to the indestructible friendship of our peoples and for the health of the Vice-President and the Prime Minister.

ARGENTINA INDIA USA MEXICO CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC FRANCE

**Date :** Dec 04, 1961

## Volume No

1995

ARGENTINA

Nehru-Frondizi Joint Communique

At the conclusion of the talks between the President of the Argentin Republic, His Excellency Dr. Arturo Frondizi, and the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, the following communique was issued in New Delhi on Dec 07, 1961

In response to an invitation extended by the Government of India, His Excellency Dr. Arturo Frondizi, President of the Argentine Republic, accompanied by His Excellency Dr. Miguel Angel Carcano, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship and other officials, paid a visit to

India from December 4 to 8, 1961.

During this visit, the President had a friendly and informal exchange of views with the Vice-President and the Prime Minister of India on the current international situation and on questions of mutual interest to both countries.

The visit had a special significance because of the fact that it was the first that a Latin-American President, in the exercise of his mandate, has paid to India.

After long and exhaustive conversations, the President and the Prime Minister decided to leave a record of them in the following communique:

President Frondizi expressed his deep pleasure at the opportunity that this visit offered him to come in contact and to know personally the ancient culture and civilization of India. He declared that the Argentinian people have always respected the great influence exerted by India's valuable contribution in the cause of peace.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that even though the many problems confronting the world today were difficult and complex, it was not beyond human ingenuity to find appropriate solutions given the requisite measure of patience, tolerance and understanding on the part of all concerned. It was agreed that a settlement of the questions at issue through peaceful negotiations was more necessary than ever before in the world of today in view of the unprecedented progress of science and technology in the present century. The only alternative that the world is offered is a war of extermination or the universal victory over backwardness and poverty. The decision has to be made between using these vast advances in technology for forging weapons of tremendous destructive power, threatening the annihilation of humanity and human civilization or using these advances in technology for banishing poverty and disease and giving to all people a richer, fuller and happier life.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that it was imperative that there should be general and complete disarmament under an effective system of international control and inspection and that a comprehensive Treaty should be entered into by all Nations for that purpose as soon as possible. As a first step towards the elimination of armaments and particularly of nuclear armaments as well as towards building up of world confidence, it was necessary to have a treaty

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banning nuclear test explosions under adequate international control. Pending the conclusion of such treaty, it was essential that the States concerned should stop all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests.

They expressed their firm conviction that the indispensable requisite, to preserve peace, democracy and freedom consists in

economic and social development, which will contribute to raising the standard of living of all peoples. They agreed fully that this process in which the most advanced countries have the capacity and responsibility to act urgently and in an effective manner in order to establish in the world solid foundations for a lasting peace and better understanding between all the countries of the world.

In this regard, the President and the Prime Minister expressed their mutual appreciation for the efforts which are being made both in Argentina and in India in order to foster progress in their countries, and also declared their conviction that the coordination of their policies regarding international affairs may contribute effectively to success in the struggle of the under-developed countries.

Examining the problems affecting Latin America as a whole, they agreed that the influence of the Latin-American countries in the world affairs will increase to the extent that the economic and social development of these countries becomes more rapid. In this respect, it was emphasised that even though there may be different degrees of development, cultural and material, yet they have to face common problems which are similar to those of India and other developing countries.

The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their determined opposition to the continuance in any shape or form of colonial domination and of racial discrimination.

President Frondizi declared that Argentina is a Democratic Republic based on the philosophy of the freedom of man which is an essential characteristic of all the Christian nations of the West but that it still desires closer contact with other countries which even though they may possess a different cultural and spiritual ancestry, have the same essential objectives in exalting the permanent values of justice and the rule of law. In this regard, the President and the Prime Minister emphasised their opinion that all countries have an obligation to help in creating new and effective mechanisms of international cooperation and rise above their differences and rivalries.

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views on the prospects of increased collaboration between Argentina and India in the economic and commercial fields. They hoped that the Trade Agreement between the two countries for which negotiations were in progress would result in further development of the volume of commercial exchanges between the two countries to mutual advantage.

While pointing out that the cultural relations between Argentina and India are being developed in a progressive way, they agreed that it was necessary to make all efforts in order to develop them and to obtain a better knowledge and diffusion of their respective cultures. In this respect it was agreed to undertake the necessary studies

which may be finalised into agreements.

President Frondizi extended an invitation to the Prime Minister of India to pay a visit to Argentina. The invitation has been accepted.

ARGENTINA USA INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

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INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri C. S. Jha's Statement in the Security Council on Goa

Shri C. S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made a statement in the Security Council on Goa on Dec 18, 1961

The following is the text of the statement:

Mr. President, permit me, first of all, to thank the President and the Council for allowing my delegation to participate in the meetings of the Council.

For the present, I would make certain preliminary observations, reserving my right to speak in much greater detail at a subsequent meeting of the Council.

As I heard the representative of Portugal, I was reminded of another occasion in the Security Council, not very long ago, when the representative of Portugal, no doubt under instructions from his Government, launched a terrific tirade

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against some members of the Council, against the African peoples and African countries, for what he thought was great injustice, persecution, armed action against the Portuguese in respect of what he described as the Portuguese overseas province of Angola. He has talked in more or less the same strain today. But members of the Council will remember the reaction of the Portuguese representative at that time and will no doubt remember the record of Portuguese colonialism in all parts of the world, particularly in Africa, and will necessarily discount this statement in an appropriate manner.

Portugal has appeared before the Council as an aggrieved party, as a victim of aggression. It has its own points of view, and its point of

view is the point of view of a colonial Power of 400 years ago. No one who has listened to the representative of Portugal can have failed to observe that this is an echo of the past. He talks of aggression, he talks of India's having aggressed against Portuguese territories, he talks of the sovereign rights of Portugal and of the Charter of the United Nations in his letter of 18 December, 1961 to the President of the Council, as a result of which this meeting has been called.

The representative of the Soviet Union has already drawn attention to the completely unacceptable character of the expression "the sovereign rights of Portugal and...the Charter of the United Nations". Who gave Portugal sovereign rights over the part of India which it is occupying illegally and by force? Who gave Portugal that right? Not the people of India. Where do the Portuguese get these sovereign rights? And how dare they talk of the Charter of the United Nations when, since the very day of their admission, they have done nothing but flout the Charter and disregard every resolution of the General Assembly, even innocuous resolutions asking them to submit information in respect of their colonial territories? Mention of the Charter of the United Nations comes with all grace from their lips.

I would beg the Council to realise the fundamental implications of the question that is before it, because without that realization the Security Council would not be making a great mistake but would be perpetrating a fundamental injustice against the world of today, the world as we know it.

Now, these so-called sovereign rights of the Portuguese Government in Indian--what do they derive from? They derive from a naked, unabashed application of force, chicanery and trickery inflicted on the people of India 450 years ago. How did the Portuguese come to be in India? How did the British, for that matter, come to be in India? How did the French come to be in India, and the rest of the long line of aspirants from Europe who wished to dominate Asia and who did, unfortunately, dominate Asia, and later Africa? How did they come to be there? It was a process of pure and simple conquest. In the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, my country was subjected to a most insidious process of division, conquest and vivisection. When the colonial Powers came there, the representatives of those European Powers first came as traders. They were received hospitably by our people and by the rulers, who had a great deal of decency in them and who wanted to be hospitable to these emissaries coming from different countries. But soon the guests became the masters. They nibbled away at our territories; they set up ruler against ruler, people against people. They intrigued with Quislings--and unfortunately, the facility with which colonialism can raise Quislings is something truly remarkable. They started putting pressure on the principalities, the decaying principalities of those days, with armed forces and with superior armament. All this brought about the familiar process, the phenomenon so familiar in Asia and Africa of peoples being deprived of their rights, of their lands and of their freedom. Asia and Africa underwent the most ruthless process

of division, of vivisection, a process which not only impoverished them economically but practically emasculated them, corroded their souls, made them victims of corruption.

That is colonialism as we know it and that is how these colonial empires were established in my country, in other parts of Asia and in Africa. And what was the result? Bit by bit, European Powers established themselves. Certain of them were the most successful; towards the middle of the nineteenth century, just three European Powers had divided up everything that we had: England, France and Portugal. England, of course, had the largest share. France and Portugal were allowed to stay there by courtesy, because the British could certainly have thrown them out. They were allowed to stay there by the courtesy of the British, not by the consent of the Indians. And then we had the strange spectacle of Indian territories and Indian peoples being passed from one colonial Power to another--for do not forget, they also quarrelled among themselves--either as a dowry for the marriage of some princess or some members of the royal family, or as a quid pro quo in some treaty that was concluded in Europe for the settlement of some European dispute.

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That was the experience we have gone through. My country has never accepted and will never accept any legal, moral or ethical basis for the processes by which India became colonized, came under foreign domination; and if this colonial conquest, if the destruction of the integrity of India, if the vivisection of India was immoral and illegal ab initio, how can it be moral and legal today?--for today, let us not forget, we are living in the twentieth century and the greatest thing that has happened in this twentieth century is that no longer can colonialism be tolerated, whether in Asia, in Africa or in Latin America or anywhere else.

That is the situation with which we are faced. It must be realized that this is a colonial question. It is a question of getting rid of the last vestiges of colonialism in India. That is a matter of faith with us. Whatever anyone else may think, Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council, that is our basic faith which we can, not afford to give up at any cost. It was for that reason that soon after our independence in 1947--and I may add here, independence that was achieved in a peaceful process, in agreement with the British--soon after that we started negotiations with France for ending French colonialism in India. The negotiations took several years, it is true, but they were conducted in an on-the-whole friendly spirit, a spirit of give-and--take, and in 1954 we reached agreement with France with regard to the transfer of the administration of those territories the de facto transfer of the French possessions in India to the Republic of India. The deed of that transfer has not yet been made, but I have no doubt it will soon be realized because this whole arrangement was entered into on the basis of mutual understanding and in a Peaceful manner.

In 1949 we established diplomatic relations with Portugal. We sent a high-powered representative to Portugal, and soon after we started we approached the Portuguese Government with a request that they negotiate concerning the transfer of the Portuguese possessions in India. The answer was a categorical no, and it has remained a no all these fourteen or fifteen years. Every time an approach has been made it has been brusquely set aside. There has been an offensive rejection of all Indian overtures. The Portuguese not only refused to negotiate, but have invented the myth, the legal fiction, that these are parts of Portugal--an amazing hypothesis--and for many years they have pursued that legal fiction, in spite of the fact that the General Assembly categorically, in resolution 1542 (XV), has rejected that claim--I do not wish to read the text of that resolution, which is well known to all members of the Council--has rejected that claim and has laid down that the Portuguese sessions in-Africa and Asia, Goa being mentioned as one of those territories in Asia, are Non-self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter.

In spite of all that, for the Portuguese this is part of Portugal, and they have refused to negotiate. They have refused to talk on any other basis. Even in their reply to the Secretary General's letter a few days ago they say:

"As regards negotiations, the Portuguese Government has always expressed and confirms its readiness to negotiate with the Indian Union solutions for all the problems arising from the vicinity between the territories of the Portuguese State of India and those of, the Indian Union,, including international guarantee, to be given to the latter, that the Portuguese territory will not be utilised against the security of the Indian Union."

But that is not the point. The point is that this is a colonial territory which is a part of India--an inseparable part of India--and it must come back to India. The people of Goa must join their country in freedom and democracy.

That is the question. The question is not one of negotiating any agreement for co-existence. That is something which is completely against the famous resolution 1514 of the 15th session which says:

"Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories..... to transfer all powers"....

So the position is that the Indian Union has patiently, for fifteen years, been wanting to see the implementation of the irreversible processes of history. Because what the Portuguese are trying to do today is to stand against the tide of history, the rising tide of nationalism, of freedom in Asia and Africa; and if they find themselves in difficulties today it is they themselves who are to blame.

I have already said that this is a colonial question, in the sense

that part of our country is illegally occupied--occupied by right of conquest by the Portuguese. The fact that they have occupied it for 450 years is of no consequence because, during nearly 425 or 430 years of that period we really had no chance to do anything because we were under colonial domination ourselves. But during the last 14 years, from the very day when we became independent, we have not ceased to demand the return of the peoples under illegal domination to their own countrymen,

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to share their independence, their march forward to their destiny. I would like to put this matter very clearly before the Council: that Portugal has no sovereign right over this territory. There is no legal frontier--there can be no legal frontier--between India and Goa. And since the whole occupation is illegal as an issue--it started in an illegal manner, it continues to be illegal today and it is even more illegal in the light of resolution 1514--there can be no question of aggression against your own frontier: there can be no question of aggression against your own people, whom you want to bring into freedom.

That is the situation that we have to face. If any narrow-minded, legalistic considerations--considerations arising from international law as written by European law writers--should arise, those writers were, after all, brought up in the atmosphere of colonialism. I pay all respect due to Grotius, who is supposed to be the father of international law, and we accept many tenets of international law. They are certainly regulating international life today. But the tenet which says, and which is quoted in support of colonial Powers having sovereign rights over territories which they won by conquest in Asia and Africa is no longer acceptable. It is the European concept and it must die. It is time, in the twentieth century, that it died.

The representative of Portugal has spoken as if Goa were a complete paradise on earth, that nothing had happened there, that the people were all contented yet here were big fellows trying to bring them under submission. Nothing could be farther from the truth. During its 450 years Portugal has had to face more than twenty armed revolts in her Indian enclaves. Some of these were organized by Catholic priests themselves. All the revolts were brutally put down, and if one does not hear of the patriotic movement in Goa, if one has not heard of it except off and on, it is not because there is no such movement, but because the suppression has been so ruthless, so total, and because censorship has been so total that news has not been able to come out of Goa. And how can one expect a handful of people, after all, to fight perpetually against a mighty colonial Power, today the second largest colonial empire in the world? That is why the outside world has not heard much about it, but we in India know of it. We can feel it. They are our own people. One hundred thousand Goans are in Bombay. They are in touch with their own people. They exchange correspondence. The hundred thousand Goans in Bombay live happily, make money, and send money to their own people in Goa. They are

treated on all fours with--they have always been treated as--Indians, in all respects. There has been no distinction of any kind. They can join any of the services. In fact, many of them are distinguished civil servants, or distinguished officers in our army. We have never drawn any distinction between an Indian in Goa and an Indian in India.

That is the situation. This whole movement has gone on in spite of the terrific suppression exercised by the Portuguese. In 1954, nearly one thousand Goan Satyagrahis marched from India unarmed. That was a movement of passive non-resistance, of non-violent non-co-operation. They marched into Goa, and four hundred of them were just mown down by machine gun fire. It is not very easy for an unarmed people to walk into the mouths of machine guns. It requires courage. It requires great conviction. That is proof positive, if ever proof were needed, that the people of Goa want their freedom, have always wanted their freedom--their freedom as a part of the great mother land.

As I said earlier, we have been patient for fifteen years. We have tried our best to get the Portuguese to give up their colonial positions in India, to negotiate with us with regard to the transfer of these positions. They have turned a deaf ear.

It appears as though Powers friendly to Portugal have also counselled Portugal at times, although we do not know the full details. They tell us that. But it is quite possible that if those countries which today pretend to be shocked had used more influence with Portugal to persuade it to see the light there would not have been any reason for us and Portugal to have anything but the kind of relations we have with Great Britain and with France--because today we have good and friendly relations with those countries, although they were our colonial masters until some years ago. Had Portugal not received direct or indirect support, both moral and material, from the NATO countries, it would not have been as recalcitrant as it has shown itself to be. I am sorry to have to say this. But it is a fact that we are the victims of a peculiar combination of circumstances elsewhere which has delayed the completion of the freedom of India.

Coming now to the various letters that were cited by the representative of Portugal, our position is as it has been clearly stated in the three letters addressed to you and I will beg the members of the Council to read these letters. It is not India that has engaged in provocation; it is Portugal that has done so. Even the Portuguese cannot deny that they fired on one of our coastal

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steamers which was plying peaceful on a regularly scheduled service and that one of the officers was killed. They cannot deny that they fired on one of our fishing boats, killing one fisherman and damaging the boat. These were the first incidents that took place; these were the provocative acts which were followed by others, and the provocation has come from the Portuguese side. I want to impress that

on the members of the Council. Let them read the documents. As a matter of fact, even while they were telling our Secretary-General that they had given rigorous instructions that nothing provocative should be done on their side, in the early hours of the morning of 17 December--according to a cablegram I have just received--while the Secretary-General was appealing for a peaceful solution, a Portuguese colonialist force attacked Indian positions 400 yards into our territory and tried to destroy our police post at Nizampir, using grenades; machine-guns, and so forth. Our police were on patrol duty but returned upon hearing gun-fire and drove the attackers away. The attacking party left ammunition, including grenades, which all bear foreign marks. The post itself bears the marks of shots and grenade attacks. The attack was obviously a preliminary to the capturing of our Indian enclave.

This is the situation. The provocation was theirs; we have been the victims of provocation not only now but for the last fifteen years and perhaps, if we go back further in history, for the last 450 years. What are we to do in these circumstances? We have a public opinion which expresses itself in various ways. We have a very vocal parliament. Our people have been impatient. Our Government has been accused of being too soft toward this whole issue of ridding India of Portuguese colonialism. If we have had to take measures, it has been in order to protect the large Indian population in Goa which is today in revolt against the Portuguese. It is a fact that the Portuguese have withdrawn their civil administration into Panjim and the whole country has been left to anarchy and to lawless elements and to the mercies of the Portuguese soldiery.

And on our side we have 100,000 Goans and Indians who want to go into Goa peacefully to redeem their rights of freedom. This is the situation with which we have been faced. We have either to shoot down our own people or to let them be shot by Portuguese soldiers. We have shown immense patience. I think there are very few examples of such patience by any country in similar circumstances. We have had to take the minimum measures necessary in order to ensure law and order, in order to see that civil administration is restored in Goa.

With your permission, I should like to read the relevant parts of a proclamation issued by our Government on the morning of 18 December:

"To assist resistance movement, protect people from further Portuguese repression and restore law and order following the collapse of the colonial administration, they have instructions to use the minimum force necessary to protect the sanctity of all places of worship. Their primary task is to restore law and order and bring public services back to normal."

This is the objective of the Indian move. No. body can accuse my Government, through the years, of having any but peaceful intentions; we are a peaceful people. That does not need to be proved. Anybody who is not prejudiced or blind will admit that. But there are situations when the vindication of justice and freedom becomes of

paramount importance. Such is the situation which we now have to face, much against our wishes and very reluctantly.

The representative of Portugal mentioned that some Indian divisions, under the command of a Major General, have gone into Goa. Goa, which is a small territory of a little over 1,000 square miles, has concentrated 12,000 Portuguese soldiers. They have mined buildings inside Goa; they have mined the surrounding waters and they had a number of warships on the way which, thanks to the Government of the United Arab Republic, were not allowed to pass, according to our information, through the Suez Canal. If we took this action, it was because we had to take action of a substantial nature. How can we otherwise fight 12,000 soldiers who have made it quite clear that they will do everything in their Power, that they will adopt the scorched earth Policy, and that they will fight on to the last man? How are we to fight this concentration of soldiers which has the help of superior NATO weapons? NATO weapons have gone into Goa, there is no doubt about it. How are we to fight them? Therefore, we have had to take this measure with a sizable army, and that is why Major-General Chaudhuri has had to be put in charge of Indian forces to proceed into Goa.

I am sorry I have taken so much of the time of the Council, but I would again, repeat that the question the Council is facing has much greater and much deeper and much more fundamental importance than is apparent on the surface. It is a question of colonialism, it is a question of freedom.

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The representative of Portugal said that his Government is ready for negotiation. The Secretary-General in the letter made it clear, as do resolutions in accordance with the principles of the Charter and with the principles formulated by the United Nations--and the principles formulated by the United Nations are in a series of resolutions, notably resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1542 (XV).

If they were honest about it, if they had the regard for the Charter that they profess, they could have shown their willingness to negotiate on the basis of the principles formulated by the United Nations which the Secretary-General had put to them. But they have not done so. So they do not come to the Security Council with clean hands. We cannot accept the position that there is any legal frontier, that there can be any legal colonial frontier in our country or, for that matter, any country. India is one; Goa is an integral part of India. It is not Portuguese by any manner of means; it cannot be Portuguese. It has a population of about 600,000 or 700,000; 61 per cent of them profess the main religion of India, that is, Hinduism. About 31 per cent are Christians, but they are Indian Christians; and we have 12 million Christians in India. There are many Mohammedans; we have 45 million Mohammedans in India. We are a multi-religious State and they are all Indians. These people have the same language, the same ethnic traditions; they inter-marry. They are

the same people, they are part of our blood and flesh. To say that they are Portuguese is the greatest travesty that anyone could perpetrate on the world and on this Council.

This is not a question of aggression, this cannot be a question of aggression. If anybody says it is, he is going against the tide of history, he is going against the entire thesis of the United Nations today, he is going against the tide of world history and public opinion because colonialism can no longer be tolerated. There is no question that it is illegal and immoral. It was illegal in the beginning, it is illegal and immoral today, and that has got to be recognized.

The only thing that the Security-Council could do is to tell Portugal to vacate Goa, Daman and Diu, those three enclaves on the Indian continent, and to give effect to the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to the freedom of dependent peoples.

We have been regaled for the last three-quarters of an hour or more by the rantings of the representative of Portugal who, I suppose believes in using strong language and abusive language in place of arguments and reason. I am not going to follow his example. But if any proof was needed to convince the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and others who have spoken in a similar strain, whose thoughts have harmonized very remarkably on this occasion, that if there was any chance of negotiation with the Government whose representative who has spoken just now, I am sure that they would have learned the lesson.

The representative of Portugal, with whom I should like to deal first, has said many things and of course what he has said about Goa is not really strange to us. He said the same thing about Angola when that matter was before the Security Council some months ago. He drew the most rosy picture of Angola, of the integration, of the perfect harmony among races, of the great freedom that the Angolan people were enjoying, the complete equality that they were subjected to.

I would agree with the representative of Portugal that Angola is not on the agenda, but I am entitled to draw a parallel. I have got to expose here the entire monstrous Portugal colonialism that is getting hold of the world today. I would be failing in my duty if I did not draw parallels, whether the Portuguese representative likes it or not.

What I was going to say was that he drew the same rosy picture as to what was happening in Angola. What is happening in Angola today? I suppose he will again raise a point of order; therefore, let the Africans sitting here and the African members of the Council and others contemplate what is happening there. I would leave it at that.

That is the sort of integration he is talking about, that is the sort of freedom that exists in Portuguese colonies, and that is the freedom he talks of for the people of Goa. He tries to convince

us, that they are living in a paradise, that they have become members of the Supreme Court, ambassadors to some places and all that. But not two dozen ambassadors, not two dozen supreme court judges are equal to the freedom and the passionate yearning for freedom which has been consecrated in resolution 1514 (XV), which freedom belongs to each and every individual and all the dependent peoples of the world.

The United Kingdom Government did very well by us in their time. We Indians held the highest places, and the representative of the United Kingdom will agree that they held them with great distinction. They were members of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom, the

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highest judicial court But that was no substitute for freedom and independence. Surely to say that anything like that is really an answer to the passionate yearning for freedom is something which only the Portuguese representative can place before this Council.

It would take me a long time to answer the representative of Portugal. He has, as I said, tried to paint a rosy picture most of which were exaggerations, if not lies. To paraphrase Mark Twain, "if lies were lilies the representative of Portugal would be a landscape". I want to leave it at that.

The representative of Portugal has cited reports of foreign journalists. I have great regard for the profession of journalism. I think we all owe the Press a great debt of gratitude, certainly all of us who are in the United Nations, for the great work that they do for the dissemination of what happens in this world body, and for the educative influence that they have in the world. But I cannot take everything that comes from foreign journalists without a pinch of salt. We are having a lot of experience about that from the Congo and from elsewhere. I would again leave that matter at that. We are not going to be over impressed by what comes from some foreign journalists who go to Goa. We have always had that difficulty. We had it in 1954, we had it in 1955, we had had it on every occasion on which we had troubles. There have been quite a number of foreign journalists whose reports, I am sorry to say, have not been very objective. They have been biased and they have been anti-Indian.

The representative of Portugal said that two years ago there were more troops in Goa and today there are less troops; he is probably right there. But where have the troops gone? They have gone to Africa and they are doing their job there pretty thoroughly, too.

The whole trend of this statement of the representative of Portugal is that Goa is an integral part of Portugal, that India has no right of any kind over its territory which is now said to be Portuguese Overseas Territory. Time and again they have raised the same point. For the last fourteen years they have refused to understand the trend of history. The gap between Portugal and India is of thousands and

thousands of miles, the same gap as exists geographically between Goa and Portugal. That is the gap between our thinking. We live in different centuries. How can you expect negotiations with a country which has not understood the very essence of the times, which lives 300 or 400 years behind the times, which lives in a different age, a different era and has completely different concepts? And that is why, by sheer force and compulsion of circumstances, by the repeated rejections of our very reasonable demand for negotiations concerning the transfer of these colonial territories in the same way that the mighty British Empire transferred power to us peacefully--and I wish to pay a tribute to them as to the way they went out of India; and France did the same thing. That is what we have been asking of them.

But does the representative of the United States, when he talks of negotiations, think there is any chance of negotiations on the basis that the representative of Portugal puts before us? We have had an important statement by the representative of the United States. His statements are always important and we pay very great attention to them, But what has he told us? He says, "We are not concerned with the substance of the dispute." That is to say, the basic problem, Which is the colonial problem of Goa, does not interest him. Does not that statement show some kind of disregard, some kind of indifference, towards the motivations, the feelings of people, the great movement of our times, the yearning for freedom--the passionate yearning for freedom--and the various recitations that have been made in resolution 1514 of the General Assembly.

Other delegates have also said, "We are not concerned with the substance of the dispute." They say, "There must be a cease-fire. Indian armed forces must withdraw and there must be, negotiations," when they know that Portugal will not negotiate at all on the question of the transfer of these territories, which are Indian territories and whose people are Indian, to India. What is the implication of all this? We are bound to draw the conclusion that this means tacit support for the maintenance of the status quo, but that status quo is nothing else than Portuguese colonialism. I am sure that that cannot be the desire of the representative of the United States. Is he in favour of Portuguese colonialism in Goa? If he is, let him say so in so many words. He talks of double standards. He has said that the whole of our protestations of nonviolence are a mockery. These are harsh words, and I am sorry that he has used them. If I wished to go through the United Nations archives and were inclined to be polemical, I could really say a great deal; but I will resist the temptation and will let it go at that. However, I would urge that the double standards referred may be found in exactly what many delegations have said here "We are not concerned with the substance of the dispute. Cease-fire, and withdraw your forces." Of course, the Portuguese forces must

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remain there in their glory and majesty! We are to have negotiations with a country on a basis such as Portugal wants. This in our humble

opinion and in the opinion of many millions of people who will read of these things is, I am sorry to say having double standards--not what we are saying and doing.

Our position is clear. We are a peaceful country. I think we are the most peaceful country in the United Nations--one of the most peaceful, anyhow. Nobody can point a finger at us. We adhere to the Charter. We have proved it time and again. We are supporting all actions by the United Nations at considerable sacrifice, and we have made no secret of it. When the representative of Portugal quotes my Prime Minister--sometimes he is inclined to misquote him but we may let that go for the time being--all it means is that we have made no secret of the fact that we desire a peaceful solution, a peaceful transfer. The solution can only be by way of the transfer of these territories, the transfer of power and the return of these people under colonial domination to their motherland. That is the only possible solution. We have wanted it year after year for fourteen years and on every occasion it has been rejected. We have made no secret of it. The Prime Minister has said, it is true, "I want a solution of it by peaceful means, but if peaceful means fail then resort to force is not excluded." That is a perfectly straightforward point of view. We are criticized here by various delegations which say, "Why have you used force? The Charter absolutely prohibits force"; but the Charter itself does not completely eschew force, in the sense that force can be used in self-defence, for the protection of the people of a country--and the people of Goa are as much Indians as any other people. We cannot accept any other position.

If the use of force is a mockery, and many representatives have said that it is not internationally moral--if that is so, I would say that all freedom movements, all independent countries which have attained freedom through violent movements, should also come in that category. If fighting a colonial Power is immoral I am afraid the existence of many States around the table becomes immoral. The use of force, in all circumstances, is regrettable but so far as the achievement of freedom is concerned, when nothing else is available, I am afraid that it is a very debatable proposition to say that force cannot be used at all. What about the Latin American countries? Did they not gain their freedom by the use of force against the colonial Power? Was that immoral? Certainly not. Today they fill the United Nations. They do so with great dignity, and, if I may say so, make a tremendous contribution to our deliberations and to the peace and welfare of the world. Our position has been clearly stated by our Prime Minister: in the letter to the Secretary-General which has been made public, and in another letter that I have sent to him today and that I hope that he has received. The Prime Minister said to Press correspondents in New Delhi on 18 September:

"India has undertaken action in Goa, as there was no other alternative left to her. It was no pleasure to us to undertake armed action but the Portuguese left no choice open to us."

This is the situation. This is the circumstance in which we had to

have recourse to armed action, and this armed action is not an invasion. It cannot be an invasion because there cannot be an invasion of one's own country.

Many delegates have spoken in legal terms. I respect their point of view. I think they are juridically minded. We all are, but I think the representative of France said that, in stating that where it was a question of colonial domination we would not accept the sovereignty of a colonial Power--that there could be no international boundary created by colonists in the territory of a people--I was thereby contaminating the International Court of Justice. I really cannot understand this argument at all. I did say that many of the concepts of international law relating to colonial territories were laid down by European jurists who at that time were brought up in an atmosphere of colonial conquest. It was no fault of theirs. They were all very eminent people. But I have not said that we rejected international law. That is where I have been misquoted by the representative of Turkey. I have not said that we do not accept international law. I have said that we accept international law: we are governed by the tenets of international law, but that we cannot in the twentieth century accept that part of international law which was laid down by European jurists--though great men, great jurists whose contribution to law has been really remarkable specifying that colonies in Asia and Africa which were acquired by conquest conferred sovereignty on the colonial Power. That is no longer acceptable. International law is not a static institution. It is developing constantly. International law would be static, it would be dead driftwood, if it did not respond to the public opinion of the world. And it is responding every day, whether we like it or not. Resolution 1514, which has been referred to here and elsewhere very frequently, is the embodiment of that great leap forward in the public opinion of the world on these matters.

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There can be no getting away from that. Just as the process of decolonization is irreversible and irresistible, the embodiment of the principles in resolution 1514, which has been accepted by virtually every member around this table, is irresistible. One cannot go behind that now. That is the new dictum of international law. That is how international law is made, because it is not a dead institution but something that is developing all the time. It was in that context that I said that. It was never my intention to cast an aspersion upon, far less contaminate, the International Court of Justice.

The representative of Portugal has said that the International Court of Justice has pronounced as a fact the sovereignty of Portugal over Goa, I do not know where he got that from. The case that went to the International Court of Justice concerned Dadra and Nagar-Aveli, and even there it was said:

"The Portuguese relied on some treaty by Portugal as constituting a

transfer of sovereignty..."

I am reading from the judgement:

"From an examination of the various texts of that article placed before it, the Court is unable to conclude that the language employed therein was intended to transfer sovereignty over the villages to Portugal."

Thus, the International Court of Justice has not accepted Portuguese sovereignty. The position is very far from that.

We are told that there should be negotiations in order to achieve a solution, but no basis is mentioned. If it is the intention of those who suggest it that there be just negotiation with the Portuguese adhering to their position and not recognizing resolution 1514 (XV), then I am afraid no negotiation is possible, as no negotiation was possible during the past years. That is why the Secretary-General, in his communication, very wisely--if I may say so--addressed both parties, both the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of Portugal, and pleaded with both for negotiations in accordance with the principles of the Charter and--and this is the portion that has to be borne in mind--that the negotiations must be in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the principles formulated by the United Nations. Those principles are embodied in resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1542 (XV) and other decolonial resolutions of the General Assembly.

But that is not the position accepted by Portugal; the representative of Portugal made it quite clear that that has never been the intention and is not now. So, what have we to negotiate for? When anyone says that we have to negotiate in order to achieve a solution, it really means, in indirect terms, some kind of imprimatur to the perpetuation of Portuguese claims and colonialism, in Goa.

I could say a great deal more but the hour is late and I do not want to detain the members of the Council. I would only say this: I have read out the statement of the Prime Minister. The step that we have had to take was unavoidable; there was no recourse left to us; there was no choice open, to us. Our purpose was not annexation. We have gone into Goa to assist the freedom movement of Goa, to help the resistance movement of Goa. It is our people in Goa whom we have gone to help against Portuguese suppression. If the representative of Portugal says that there is no such movement in Goa, his intention is only to throw dust into the eyes of this Council. The movement is strong. The patriots have risen, and if they were not able to do more previously it was because they were ruthlessly suppressed. We have gone there for that purpose; they are our people. They must come back to the motherland.

Someone raised the question of self-determination. How can there be self-determination by an Indian in order to say that he is part of India or self-determination by an African to say that he is an

African, or by a Frenchman to say that he would remain a part of France?

There are instances when the question of self-determination can be raised in certain contexts. For example, when the question of Angola arose, we took the position that that was question of self-determination. That is one large unit where self-determination had to be exercised and when it comes, it will be exercised in favour of the independence of Angola. But there can be no self-determination of an Indian against an Indian. That really becomes meaningless. Of course, it is true that the wishes of the people of some State could be ascertained, but there is only one chance for them and that is to be free as part of their great motherland. There is no other basis on which there can be freedom for the people of India nor any other basis on which the people would like their freedom.

The draft resolution in question has just come; we have not yet had an opportunity to examine it thoroughly. This draft resolution, as I said, urges the parties to work out a permanent solution of their differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the principles of the Charter. What does that mean, permanent solution or their differences by peaceful means"? I am afraid the proponents of this resolution have not

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understood the whole problem. There are no differences there. There cannot be any differences. The only question is when and how, and why this territory of Goa should or should not become a part of the Indian Union. That is the only question. With all respect of those who moved this resolution, I very much fear that it has no basis in reality. This resolution does not take into account the very vital and tremendous forces that are crystallized in what goes by the name of the declaration on the freedom of colonial and independent peoples, resolution 1514 (XV). There is no comprehension of that in this draft resolution, and as I said taken together; we are bound to conclude that this only means a tacit approval of colonialism, of the perpetuation of Portuguese colonialism in Goa.

My Government is certainly strongly opposed to this draft resolution because we feel that it has no basis in reality or in justice and that it has no relation to the great movements and the vast tide of history which the United Nations itself has recognized in its numerous resolutions, notably resolution 1514 (XV).

INDIA PORTUGAL USA ANGOLA IRAN FRANCE INDONESIA CONGO TURKEY

**Date :** Dec 18, 1961

**Volume No**

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

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Shri C. S. Jha's Statement in Political Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

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Shri C. S. Jha, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Political Committee on Dec 07, 1961 on the peaceful uses of outer space:

On this item concerning the peaceful uses of outer space, I speak with some hesitation and humility, in the knowledge that the exploration of outer space has only begun and the potential of man's conquest of space and the consequences of this great spurt in human knowledge are yet to be fully grasped by most of us here, including my delegation. Nevertheless we are deeply conscious of the fact that a great new dimension has been added to man's knowledge, and it is our earnest hope that the conquest of outer space will be for the good of man.

If one may recall an earthly parallel, the achievements in outer space call to mind man's discovery of the New World on this planet at the end of the fifteenth century. That discovery, followed by others in the early sixteenth century, was, as Toynbee has observed, a result of a great increase in man's knowledge of our planet and of material power over physical nature. In that case, as Toynbee added, it was the result of a great technological discovery: how to navigate an ocean instead of having to hug the coasts of the inland seas of the Old World. But those discoveries had also a great effect on man's power, since he appropriated the resources of the Americans which he had now at his disposal for domination and conquest. In retrospect, historians think that much of the use of the discoveries of 500 years ago was for purposes not altogether worthy. Additional potential was provided for wars between local States of the Western world which were mainly within Western Europe and were just emerging from the Middle Ages. At the same time, Western man exported to the New World discovered by him two of his most "villainous and tragic institutions", to quote Dr. Toynbee--the institution of war and the institution of slavery.

Now that man has succeeded in his probe of the universe and has begun his journey into this new, mysterious and limitless world of outer space, one cannot help contemplating whether the mistakes of the past will be repeated or use will be made of this new and exciting prospect for the benefit of mankind. Will cosmic space be used, on the basis of international co-operation, for the welfare of mankind or will it become a new field for competitive conflict and "cold war" rivalries, a new additional medium for manoeuvring and carrying the diabolical weapons of war to hurtle death and destruction on peoples and continents of this planet? Contrariwise, one wonders whether jealousies, prejudices, conflicts and wars of this planet will be

carried to the world of outer space.

It is a curious and tragic factor of history that great inventions have often been the cause of conflict among nations and have been used for military purposes rather than for improving condition of life. Sometimes nations and States have undertaken the application of scientific and technological achievements in secrecy, each going his own way and without co-ordination with others, causing confusion, duplication and waste of effort; and it has taken many years and much effort to straighten resulting difficulties and to arrive at agreements and understandings based on international co-operation, for harnessing the

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fruits of Such achievements for the benefit of the international community.

Fortunately in the field of outer space there is hope for international co-operation from the very start. In the first place, the two great Powers which have pioneered the achievements in outer space, namely, the USSR and the United States, recognized from the very beginning the need for international co-operation for the peaceful uses of outer space. On 29 August 1957 the Western Powers made a specific proposal in the Disarmament Commission that a scientific committee be established to study:

"an inspection system which would make it possible to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes".

On 30 September 1957 the United States representative on the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Lodge, said:

"We propose as our next objective that means be designed to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be for exclusively scientific and peaceful purposes." (DC/PV. 62, page 11)

During the twelfth session of the General Assembly, the Western draft resolution on disarmament introduced in the Political Committee called inter alia for

"The joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes". (Resolution 1148 (XII)

This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 November 1957.

During the early part of 1958 both the United States and the Soviet Union expressed a desire to limit the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. This was brought out in the exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin. On 15 March 1958,

on the initiative of the Soviet Union, the item "The banning of the use of cosmic space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other Countries and international co-operation in the study of cosmic subjects" was included in the provisional agenda of the thirteenth session of the Assembly, and on 2 September 1958, on the initiative of the United States, the question of the "Programme of international co-operation in the field of outer space" was also placed on the agenda of the thirteenth session.

The narration of this sequence clearly shows the awareness of the United States and the Soviet Union to the urgent need for international co-operation in the field of outer-space, from the very beginning of the spectacular achievements which shook and thrilled the world.

It has often happened in the past that great scientific discoveries and inventions have been made during war-time, with the result that the use of these has been ab initio for war purposes. Subsequently it has proved extremely difficult to secure international co-operation for the diversion of their use from military to peaceful and beneficial purposes. The use of nuclear power is a striking example in this connexion. It is a fortunate circumstance that the discovery of outer space has come about at a time of peace. This makes peaceful international co-operation possible and practicable. The more this aspect of international co-operation is emphasized, the more avenues will be opened up for peaceful purposes, and the less will be the danger of the use of outer space for military purposes.

It seems to us that there are very favourable conditions for effecting international co-operation for the peaceful and scientific uses of outer space. But it must be said at the same time that, for reasons which I do not wish to discuss at this stage, four years have been lost since the first sputnik hurtled into space and begun its orbital journey around the earth. There is urgency to the problem of organizing international co-operation in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

In view of the great significance of the uses of outer space, it is only right that the United Nations, as the best forum for co-operative human activity, should be brought fully into the picture. We believe that the United Nations can do much to promote co-operation in this particular field. It was, therefore, with much satisfaction that my delegation viewed the adoption of resolution 1348 (XIII) in December 1958, and it was with optimistic hope that we co-sponsored and gave our support to resolution 1402 (XIV) and agreed to serve on the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which was set up under that resolution to devise international co-operation and to organize the holding of an international scientific conference.

It is a matter of disappointment to my delegation that for want of agreement on the various organizational aspects of the work of the

Committee between the two principal Powers, it was not possible for the Committee to meet and carry forward the work initiated in 1959 and the

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promise of international co-operation provided by the fruitful co-operation during the period of eighteen months covered by the International Geophysical Year. We were happy, therefore, that at last the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met a few days ago to prepare a brief report for the Assembly which would enable the discussion of the matter to take place and a further step to be taken.

We agree with many Members who have spoken before us that outer space is not a matter of concern only to great Powers. The exploration of outer space and the availability and application of knowledge and of the facilities derived from such exploration can greatly serve humanity in all parts of the globe. It is good to see that both of the great Powers most advanced in the field of outer-space exploration recognize and appreciate this. The potentialities of the use of outer space in the fields of weather prediction, radio communications and perhaps even weather control have been graphically described in the excellent statements by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. We have actually nothing to add in that connexion. We generally agree with the hopeful picture presented to us by those two delegations.

The fact remains, however, that for the time being only two great Powers are capable of reaching and exploring the farthest limits of outer space and of harnessing their knowledge for the benefit of man. International co-operation in this field means at this stage, therefore, primarily agreement and co-operation between those two great countries. We regard it as a token of faith, and we wish to pay tribute to them therefor, that they are willing to share their knowledge with others and to extend to nations and peoples everywhere the benefits of their discoveries and experiments.

Having said this, my delegation would like to say that we cannot ignore the possible dangers from the use of outer space for military purposes. There have been from time to time statements made by leaders in both the Soviet Union and the United States which indicate the stark reality of such dangers. Opinions, sometimes irresponsibility expressed in military and political circles, have even advocated the use of outer space for increasing military power. My delegation deprecates any such tendencies and intentions. We feel that outer space should be kept free from any kind of military use or adventure. We would welcome a declaration by all Powers, principally the two great Powers concerned, to keep outer space free from any military use. We have a splendid example of this in the Treaty of Antarctica, whereby twelve Powers, including the United States and the Soviet Union, have agreed to keep Antarctica free from military bases, nuclear experiments, etc. If Antarctica should be kept free

from military use, there is every reason in the world why outer space should be the subject of similar declarations or agreements. It would be a thousand pities if the deadly conflicts of the world were carried beyond earthly gravity into outer space. We think that this is dictated not merely by practical necessity and the need for survival; it is also a challenge to the international conscience. Here I might refer, with all respect, to the statement of the representative of the United States:

The military questions of space are closely entangled with the military questions of earth. We believe that they require urgent study as part of comprehensive negotiations for general and complete disarmament.' (A/C.1/PV.1210, page 16)

We cannot quite see the connexion between military questions on earth and military questions in outer space. The arsenals of destruction on earth are already saturated. One does not need to go into outer space. There is nothing, in our opinion, which need prevent the big Powers and others from declaring outer space to be free from all military considerations or use, even without waiting for a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In fact, in our view, any such declaration, to the extent that it eliminates the area of outer space, might make an agreement on general and complete disarmament easier. Furthermore, such a declaration would greatly facilitate and make possible the concentration of efforts on the task of international co-operation for the peaceful use of outer space.

I come now to the four-Power draft resolution A/C.1/L.301 placed before the Committee by the delegations of Canada, Australia, Italy and the United States. In the view of my delegation, this draft resolution contains many valuable suggestions. Indeed, we see nothing in this draft resolution to which one can take serious objection. We would, however, have preferred to see an agreed draft resolution co-sponsored among others, by the two great Powers which at present possess a virtual monopoly of knowledge and facilities in the exploration of outer space. At the same time, this is a field in which we feel that even contemplated principles cannot be defined, far less implemented, without a thorough study. All the details of international co-operation suggested in Parts C and D of the draft resolution are welcome, but even with respect to these, careful thought as regards organization and preparation

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of a suitable programme of co-operation may be necessary and might require a much more aspects, in consultation with various organizations and specialized agencies concerned, than is possible in this Committee during the short time available to it. One point that strikes us is that the outer space Committee should be made the focus and the mainspring for activities in international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

Having made these observations, we would like to add that if this

draft resolution or any variant of it is generally agreed to in the Committee, particularly by the two principal Powers concerned in this matter, we shall vote for it.

The keynote of this whole question is agreement. That has been the view of my delegation in the past and we think that no effort should be spared to secure agreement all around.

May I here take the liberty of making a few observations on Part A of the draft resolution. Paragraph 1 of Part A commends to States for their guidance in the exploration and use of outer space the following principles:

"(a) International law, including the United Nations Charter, applies to outer space and celestial bodies;

"(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law, and are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty or otherwise."

Both these parts are, of course, welcome particularly the second part of this paragraph. We entirely agree that the principles of the United Nations Charter, which are the highest expression of moral principles and truths, are universal and should appropriately be applicable to outer space. But are we sure that extension of international law, as we know it on earth, to outer space has not a somewhat limitative connotation? International law is based on the concept of the sovereignty of States and concepts of nationality. Are these the right concepts for outer space? When the day comes that men of various nations, through international co-operative efforts journey into outer space and to the other planets, the concepts of nationality, territorial affiliations, etc., should perhaps be forgotten and will indeed be out of place in outer space. There should be only one governing concept, that of humanity. One might feel, therefore that to transpose the whole of international law, as we know it here, and not merely certain principles, to celestial space might not be enough and not wholly suitable. International law may indeed need radical adaptation, conceptual or otherwise for application to outer space.

I should like to make it clear that I am not against paragraph 1(a) of Part A of the draft resolution, but these are a few observations that I would like to share, on behalf of my delegation, with the Committee.

As I said earlier, we have already lost valuable time. It is therefore most urgent to ensure that the consideration of this matter is not further delayed. It is essential that a committee on outer space be formed which should begin its studies as early as possible. We understand that negotiations are in progress between the principal Powers and we trust that an agreed composition for the committee on outer space will emerge, so that the Assembly can take an agreed

decision as to the constitution of a committee on outer space for future work.

We also feel that in view of the fact that action in regard to international co-operation will have to be taken principally by two or three Powers, and that this is a new field, the organization of the work of the committee should be such that its decisions and recommendations will commend the acceptance of all concerned.

It is obvious that resolutions adopted in the usual way, by majority vote, are not going to take us very far. At the same time, it does not seem practical to apply strictly the principle of unanimity, which means, in effect, a right of veto to every member of the Committee. We feel that there should be a new approach to this question of voting and other organizational aspects of the Committee on Outer Space. It does not seem to us necessary to have any voting at all. Decisions should be taken on the basis of consensus of opinion or views among members. It is the experience of all of us who have sat in Assembly Committees that it does not require a vote to find out whether a consensus of opinion exists or not. If there is a consensus, it should be possible for the Chairman to sum it up. If there is none, and there are important differences of views, then, in any report to the General Assembly, these should be adequately reflected. In the final resort, decisions can only be taken in the General Assembly and not by the Committee.

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INDIA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AUSTRALIA CANADA ITALY

**Date :** Dec 07, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri C.S. Jha's Statement in the Political Committee on Algeria

Shri C. S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Political Committee on Dec 16, 1961, on the question of Algeria: Mr. Chairman,

The war in Algeria has entered its eighth year and its cost in terms of human lives and suffering has been of such magnitude that it has become the greatest tragedy of our times. Nearly a million lives have been lost. Few peoples in the world have fought for their liberation with such bravery and determination, with such fortitude and

forbearance in the face of extreme suffering and heavy odds, as the Algerian people. Their long fight against colonial domination and suppression will for ever remain a shining example and inspiration to the freedom loving, peoples everywhere. The struggle of this brave people has evoked admiration and respect all over the world and has in blood, sweat and tears irrefutably established their rights to independence without any further delay.

There can no longer be any doubt that the only solution possible is that which is based on the principle of self-determination and independence for the Algerian people. Had France recognized the strength of the force of nationalism in Algeria earlier when the strife erupted, the ensuing tragedy would have been avoided. But France from the beginning turned a deaf ear to counsels which called for a solution of the problem on the basis of a distinct Algerian personality. It will be recalled that the Prime Minister of India in May 1956 put forward a five-point proposal for a negotiated settlement in Algeria of which one of the main elements was recognition by France of the national entity and personality of Algeria on the basis of freedom. Unfortunately, these counsels for moderation and a negotiated settlement did not prevail upon the French Government and as a result the war of liberation has dragged on for years.

We do not wish to minimize the difficulties which the French Government has had to face and continues to face in the solution of the Algerian problem. Not the least of these difficulties are those which are presented by the "ultras" in France, the extremists among the French colons and the French Army in Algeria. Together, they present a powerful combination of extremist and reactionary forces, determined to perpetuate French stranglehold over the Algerian people. Fortunately, this force is a minority and we can trust liberal opinion in France and General de Gaulle to deal with it and overcome it.

The Algerian problem can only be solved in accordance with the principles laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations and in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, namely, on the basis of the recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence and the need for guarantee to ensure the implementation of this right on the basis of respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria. Instead of fighting a war in Algeria, France must seek a negotiated settlement with the Algerian people on the basis of the principles. There can be no peace and co-operation between France and Algeria except on the basis of sovereign equality and independence of Algeria. Only a free Algeria can enter into a relationship of friendship and mutual benefit with France, founded on mutual respect for the sovereignty of the two countries.

During the last two years, there have been many indications of progress towards a solution. Ever since France in September 1959 discarded the fiction of 'l'Algerie Francaise' by recognizing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination, hopes of a

negotiated settlement have brightened. But every time hopes have sprung there have been setbacks, as for example the suspension or breakdown of negotiations at Evian in May and June and at Lugin, in June and July this year. This pattern has been recurring with a strange fatality. As soon as a step forward is taken there are reactionary forces in France and in Algeria which put spokes in the wheel of progress and push it backward. Amidst all the uncertainties, frustrations, prolongation of conflict and vacillation on the part of France, it is fortunate that President de Gaulle has emerged as a solid anchor of far-sighted statesmanship, because of which hope persists for a just and peaceful solution of the problem on the basis of Algerian independence. We wish to pay our sincere homage and tribute to President de Gaulle for his staunch adherence, through all the storms and vicissitudes, to the principles of self-determination and independence for Algeria.

My Delegation feels that what is necessary now is a strong and determined push by both parties to break through the differences which aborted the negotiations earlier this year. These appear to have been narrowed down to two main elements. One is the question of sovereignty over

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the Sahara and the other the status of the French minority in Algeria. In regard to the first, what is necessary is acceptance by France of the territorial reignty over that part of Sahara included in the territory of Algeria. We cannot countenance the possibility of detaching on the eve of independence parts of a territory which have been juridically recognized as a single entity. Fragmenting territories on one pretext or another is wrong in principle and goes against the various, resolutions adopted by the United Nations, principally, resolution 1514 (XV) on the declaration regarding the independence of colonial territories and peoples. The consequences of such a process can only be dangerous and harmful and create all sorts of problems between states. Indeed, any such process is a curtailment of independence and perpetuation of colonialism and neocolonialism. There can, therefore, be no solution of this problem other than on the basis of recognition of Algerian sovereignty over Algerian Sahara. Once this is done, it should be possible to work out co-operative arrangements with other interested states, including France, in order to exploit the resources and wealth of the region in question. We believe that the Algerian nationalists would not be averse to such arrangements.

As regards the question of the minorities in Algeria, one must, of course, recognize that there are nearly one million people of French origin in Algeria, who have made Algeria their home. Since Algeria is their homeland, they must be treated on the basis of equality with other citizens of Algeria. Their fundamental rights and freedoms should be respected, safeguarded and guaranteed. They should be given opportunity and facility for integration into the political, social and economic life of the community. At the same time it must be

recognized that a minority is a minority and must numerically speaking remain one. It cannot be made into a privileged class with higher rights than others. Indeed any attempt to do so in the long run is harmful to the minority itself as it encourages separation, impedes national unity and creates hatred and ill-will among peoples. We feel sure that the European minority problem in Algeria can be worked out, given goodwill on all sides. In this connection my delegation would like to utter a word of caution. There have been references to a partition of the territory if no solution of the problem is reached. In the view of my delegation, any partition of the territory in the face of bitter opposition by Algerian people would be most dangerous, would give rise to grave problems and be a permanent threat to peace in the area.

It is not the intention of my delegation to tell either party as to what should be done to reach a solution of these problems. There can be no solution except on the basis of give and take. It is fortunate that in the present context of the situation we have the necessary elements for a solution of the problems. On the one side, we have the statesmanship and comprehension of General de Gaulle and, on the other side, the desire of the enlightened and earnest leadership of the Provisional Government of Algeria to reach a reasonable and just solution of the problems involved. The gap between the two sides is not such that it cannot be bridged, even goodwill and understanding. Time is of the essence however, and any further delay would make the solution of the problems much more difficult. (It is our earnest hope that negotiations between the French and the Algerians would be resumed without further delay with a view to removing the last hurdles to Algerian independence and that Algeria, in the near future, would take its rightful and well-deserved place among the nations of the world.

INDIA ALGERIA FRANCE USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Dec 16, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri C. S. Jha's Letters to President of the Security Council on Portuguese Colonies in India

Shri C. S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, addressed two letters dated Dec 12, 1961 and 13, 1961, to the President of the Security Council on the Portuguese Colonies in India.

The following is the text of his letter, dated December 12, 1961:

I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency the following:

India became independent in August 1947 as a result of peaceful negotiations between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Indian leaders.

At the time of India's independence there were some French and Portuguese colonial possessions on the Indian continent. Government of India naturally hoped that these remaining vestiges of colonial rule on the Indian continent would soon disappear and that there would be a peaceful and orderly transfer of power.

Government of India, believing as they do, in the achievement of independence by colonial

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areas through friendly negotiations as the consequences of such peaceful transfer of power are beneficial both to the ex-colonial powers as well as to the newly independent peoples, initiated negotiations with the French and the Portuguese colonial powers for peaceful settlement of the question of these vestiges of colonial rule on the Indian continent.

As a result of friendly negotiations between Governments of India and France, the latter agreed to de facto transfer of the administration of French colonial areas on the Indian continent to the Government of India in October 1954. The Government of France are now initiating action to complete the formalities of de jure transfer of these ex-colonial territories to the Government of India.

The Government of India established a diplomatic mission in Portugal in 1949 and initiated friendly negotiations on the same lines as those being carried on with the Government of France for the peaceful transfer of Portuguese colonial territories on the Indian continent. The Government of Portugal, however, not only refused to discuss these matters with the Government of India, but declined even to contemplate the question of termination of its colonial rule in the odd areas on the Indian continent. The unfriendly and often offensive attitude of the Portuguese Government led to the end of these negotiations in 1953. The attempts at the prospects of a peaceful transfer of Portuguese colonial areas on the Indian mainland thus ended in failure.

Since then, the Portuguese rule in these foreign-administered pockets of Goa, Daman and Diu on the Indian mainland has been characterised by acts of repression and brutality. The people of the territories have no voice in the administration. There is complete suppression of political and public activity and there is total denial of civil liberties. Savage sentences are meted out to persons who demand civil liberties and freedom. Unarmed and peaceful demonstrators have been

killed in cold blood and prisoners have been tortured, maimed and killed. There have been, from time to time, violation of the border and incidents resulting therefrom. The Portuguese colonial pockets, both because of foreign domination and the repressive nature of the regime, continue to be constant irritants to the people of India.

As Your Excellency is aware, General Assembly in Resolution 1514 (XV) expressed its belief that the process of liberation was irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crisis, an end must be put to colonialism. The General Assembly further declared that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights, was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and was an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation. It declared that any attempt aimed at partial and total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country was incompatible with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the U.N. Another Resolution No. 1542 (XV) of the General Assembly recognised that the desire for independence was the rightful aspiration of the people under colonial subjugation. This resolution thus rejected the absurd fiction propagated by Portugal that Goa and other colonies were 'Provinces of Portugal'. The principles of these two resolutions, as Your Excellency is aware, were reaffirmed by the General Assembly during its current session in its resolution 1654 (XVI).

The Government of Portugal not only continued to flout the various resolutions of the United Nations and to maintain by force their oppressive regime in Goa, Daman and Diu and their other colonial areas but has taken aggressive action in Indian waters. Recently, on the 17th of November, 1961, Portuguese troops stationed on the island of Anjidiv fired on an Indian passenger ship. She plied her normal route which the shipping line has used for years. The Indian ship SABARMATI was fired upon without warning and the fire was directed at the engineers' mess room. One of the shots hit and wounded the Second Engineer of the ship. There is evidence to show that the shot was not from a rifle, but from a more formidable weapon. Once again, on the 24th of November, an Indian fishing boat returning from its normal fishing trip was fired upon from the same island. One of the bullets hit the fishing boat while another shot killed an Indian fisherman.

The Government of India have protested to the Government of Portugal through the Embassy of the U.A.R. against these acts of unprovoked aggression and wanton killing and wounding of peaceful Indian citizens engaged in their normal vocations.

Even now the Portuguese authorities have not desisted from such aggressive acts but continued their preparations and acts of aggression and violation of Indian territory. The Government of India have reliable reports that the Portuguese administration has intensified oppression and terrorism in its Indian possessions and has heavily augmented its armed forces. Attacks on Indian villages and citizens continue and the Portuguese

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forces are poised on the borders at various points to overawe and intimidate both the residents of the colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu and those living in the border areas on the Indian side. We have no troops on these borders. In view of these aggressive activities and preparations of Portugal the Government of India have been obliged to move units of the Indian armed forces to the vicinity of Goa. Even their presence has not served as a warning to the Portuguese who even as recently as the 10th December have continued to amass forces, practise repression, raid and fire on Indian villages penetrating deep enough into Indian territory.

Under instructions from my Government, I request Your Excellency to be good enough to have this communication circulated among the members of the Security Council.

The following is the text of Shri Jha's letter dated December 13, 1961:

Under instructions from the Government of India, I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency the following:

The Government of India have seen the text of a communication from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the U.N. addressed to the President of the Security Council dated the 8th of December referring to some alleged plans of the Government of India and their armed forces and some alleged incidents on the border. The Government of India have carefully investigated these allegations and have found them to be entirely baseless and malicious.

The communication from the Permanent Representative refers to movements of Indian naval units during the last few days. This allegation distorts the actual facts. As communicated in an early letter from this Mission, the position is otherwise. The Portuguese forces have attacked Indian merchant shipping on its normal and traditional course off the Indian coast. Indian fishermen engaged in their centuries-old vocation and plying their boats have been shot at and one of them killed. Portuguese warships "have been patrolling the Indian coast and one warship "Alfonso de Albuquerque" has been anchored at a distance of about a mile from the Indian coast. The wanton attacks by Portuguese forces on peaceful merchant shipping and fishing on the 17th and the 24th of November and the provocative patrolling of our coast by Portuguese warships have resulted in considerable concern and often panic among the peaceful rural residents on the Indian coast. In consequence and as a measure of caution, the Government of India were obliged to direct their naval ships to patrol the coast so that confidence may be restored among the civil population. It may be emphasised that it is the Portuguese forces who have wounded and killed Italian citizens. No injury, much less death, has been inflicted by Indian forces on Portuguese citizens, civil or military.

The Portuguese communication also alleges air Violations. There is no basis for these allegations. Reference has been made to aircraft bearing the markings "773" and "SD4". There are no Indian aircraft with these markings. On the other hand, it is Portugal that has been violating Indian air space repeatedly and indulging in provocative flights over our air. A Portuguese aircraft violated Indian air space at about 10 a.m. on the 4th of December near the village of Dodamarg and penetrated up to eight miles inside Indian territory. Another aircraft flew over one of the Indian naval ships on the high seas at 6.16 p.m. on the 6th of December, 1961.

The Portuguese communication also alleges that large Indian formations have been concentrated on the frontier. Here again, the truth is otherwise. As stated in the earlier letter of this Mission, heavy reinforcements have been pouring into the Portuguese colonies during the last three weeks and thousands of Portuguese troops and mercenaries have been stationed in Goa, Diu and Daman. In the enclave of Diu, where the total civil population is about 21,000, there is reportedly an armed contingent of some 2,700 men. This force is being further strengthened by additional men, vehicles and weapons. It is estimated that on an average, there is one armed man to every 30 men, women and children of the civil population of these colonies. Portugal has sent reinforcements by sea and air, curfew has been imposed and villagers have been thrown out of their homesteads en masse, e.g., from the village of Terekhol, to provide for accommodation for the newly arrived Portuguese troops. Vigorous and aggressive patrolling is undertaken on the border by motorised and heavily armed units obviously to intimidate peaceful residents.

The Portuguese authorities have not confined themselves only to these warlike preparations and postures. They have actually indulged in wanton attacks on villages inside the Union and in aggressive violations of the border. The following incidents are illustrative:

(1) Portuguese soldiers entered Indian territory at Dodamarg near Sawantwadi on the 5th of December and fired into the Indian village.

(2) One sergeant and six Portuguese soldiers entered Indian territory near Terekhol on

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the 8th of December and fired on an Indian police partol.

(3) Shots were fired by Portuguese soldiers on the 8th of December from the Goan village of Rawan across the border into the Indian Village of Aini.

(4) A unit of about 15 Portuguese soldiers armed with light machineguns and rifles entered Indian territory on the 9th of December and fired nearly 300 rounds into the Indian village of Talawadi, which is at a distance of over a mile from the border of Goa.

The Portuguese communication mentions an alleged incident of machine-gun firing in the village of Foquirpato. This is a complete invention and is presumably mentioned to cover many incidents of internal fighting occurring in Goa between Goan patriots and the alien soldiers of Portugal. For example, there was a skirmish in the Polem area on the 8th of December between Portuguese forces and Goan patriots.

The Portuguese allegations are complete fabrications and are obviously intended to cover the aggressive manoeuvres of Portugal. In actual fact, it is the colonial regime of Portugal which has attacked peaceful Indian citizens and commerce. Portugal, no doubt fears that world opinion as well as the will of the suppressed people to throw off colonialism will force her to leave her colonies in the immediate future. She, therefore, seeks to delay the inevitable end of her domination by false accusations against India.

I request Your Excellency to be good enough to have this communication circulated among the members of the Security Council.

INDIA USA FRANCE MALI PORTUGAL CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Date :** Dec 12, 1961

## Volume No

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INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri B. N. Chakravarty's Statement on Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

Shri B. N. Chakravarty, Member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Political Committee on Dec 13, 1961 on the reports of the United Nations Commission for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

At this stage, I shall confine myself strictly to the procedural aspects of the question. We have before us two draft resolutions. One of them, submitted by the Mongolian People's Republic and contained in document A/C.1/L.300, proposes to invite representatives of both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion of the Korean question without the right of vote. The other draft resolution, submitted by the United States of America and contained in document A/C.1/L.304, proposed to invite only the representative of the Republic of Korea to

participate without the right of vote in the discussion of the Korean question. The reason why the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not to be invited to participate is that that Government has not "unequivocally accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question, as has already been done by the Republic of Korea."

The amendments to the Mongolian draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Greece and Thailand in document A/C.1/L.306 propose a change in the operative paragraph of the Mongolian draft resolution by suggesting that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should "first unequivocally accept the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question as has already been done by the Republic of Korea".

The question which we have to consider is whether it is necessary or desirable to put any such conditions before inviting the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. So far we are aware, on the few occasions when non-Member States have been given the opportunity to speak before the Committees of the United Nations, no particular conditions have been imposed. We cannot therefore find any precedents in support of this suggestion.

If we examine the Charter, we find that Article 32 lays down the procedure when a State which is not a Member of the United Nations is invited to participate without vote in the discussions in the Security Council relating to a dispute to which it is a party. This Article, which applies only to the proceedings in the Security Council, stipulates that in such circumstances:

"The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations."

There are, however no similar provisions in regard to the participation of non-member States in discussions before the General Assembly or

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its Committees. A specific provision in regard to the Security Council proceedings and an absence thereof in regard to proceedings before organs other than the Security Council seem to indicate that the framers of the Charter did not think that conditions need normally be laid down for participation by non-Member States in discussions before these bodies.

In Article 35(2), it has been stipulated that:

"A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement

provided in the present Charter."

It can be seen that this clause applies only when a non-Member State itself wants to bring up a case before the General Assembly. But, even so, all that is needed is for that State to accept in advance the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter. Since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not brought up this matter before the General Assembly, this Article is not strictly applicable to the question at issue.

I should like to point out, however, that the obligations of pacific settlement appear to have already been accepted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Korean Armistice Agreement already contains formal and exact provisions for the maintenance of the cease-fire in paragraph 62, which lays down that:

"The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides."

I should like to emphasize the words "for a peaceful settlement".

There has been no indication so far that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea intends to violate the provisions of this agreement or to settle the dispute by force or violence. If the representatives of that Government now come before the United Nations, they will do so either with the object of effecting a settlement by peaceful means or to explain their own point of view. Otherwise, there is no point in their coming here.

The procedure for laying down conditions for participation in the Security Council is understandable, because the Security Council has the authority to take punitive action for the purpose of maintaining peace and security. The whole concept of the General Assembly, however, is that of diplomacy by conference. The Assembly and its Committees seek to achieve their objectives mainly by conciliation and mediation. Conciliation or mediation can be attempted only when all interested parties can be approached. For this reason, we have to encourage the parti-change in its attitude as a result of participation parties to a question under discussion.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea may have been recalcitrant in the past and may not have paid sufficient attention to the United Nations resolutions. But let us hope that there is always the possibility of a change in its attitude as a result of participation in this debated

It has been urged that what is required is that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should at least accept the jurisdiction and competence of the United Nations. This raises an important issue. We do not know whether the United Nations can or should encourage the proposition that an individual State or Government has the right to

accept or deny the competence of the United Nations. The jurisdiction or competence of the United Nations follows from the Charter. The decision whether the United Nations has jurisdiction or not rests entirely on the United Nations itself. An analogy has been sought to be drawn regarding parties to a suit agreeing to accept the jurisdiction of the court. The United Nations is of course not a court, but even in a court of law the parties certainly have the right to question the jurisdiction of the court. Here again, while the jurisdiction can be challenged, the decision whether there is jurisdiction or not rests in the court itself. My delegation therefore thinks that no conditions need be stipulated.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea may be invited to participate in the discussions without laying down any conditions. Let the representatives of that Government come here and make out their case, whatever that may be. It would be for the Members of the United Nations to consider whether they have any case at all to present. Let us see whether and, if so, on what grounds they question the competence of the United Nations. It will then be for the Members of the United Nations to decide whether the North Korean case can be sustained. If they come, we would at least know the views of both Governments, and the Members would be better able to explore the avenues of agreement, if there are any.

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If the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea participate in our discussions, there may be a possibility--I repeat, a possibility, not even a probability--of their being brought within the range of persuasion and agreement. If, however, the effort fails and the North Koreans are not agreeable to accepting a decision of the United Nations, we are no worse off. We have made no progress all these years and one more failure would then be added to our past efforts.

If both Governments participate, there is at least just a chance that we may be able to find a way out which would be acceptable to both the Governments of North Korea and South Korea. On the other hand, if both States do not participate it is, certain that we can make no progress whatsoever. By adopting the United States draft resolution or the amendments proposed by the Greece and Thailand, we would no doubt adhere to our previous decision, but we would thereby fail to make any progress towards the achievement, of the real objective of the United Nations, which is to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of unified, independent and democratic Korea.

No peaceful solution seems possible without the consent of the parties concerned. That is why my delegation considers it essential that both the Governments should be invited to participate in these discussions. My delegation will vote in the light of these views.

INDIA KOREA USA MONGOLIA GREECE THAILAND NORTH KOREA

**Date :** Dec 13, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Shri J. N. Khosla's Statement in Trusteeship Committee on South- West Africa

Shri J. N. Khosla, Member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, made the following statement in the Trusteeship Committee on Dec 01, 1961, on the question of South-West Africa:

MADAM CHAIRMAN

My delegation would like to associate itself with those who have, in this Committee during the last few days, paid tribute to the Chairman and Members of the "Committee on South-West Africa", which has prepared two valuable reports now under discussion. My delegation would also like to express its gratefulness to the Governments which offered their co-operation to the Committee during its tour of Africa. We do not, however, feel at all satisfied with the explanation given by the British Delegation for the suspension by the British Authorities of visas and facilities previously granted for the Committee's projected visit to Bechuanaland. The refusal on the part of the South African Government to co-operate with the Committee was most regrettable, being another instance of flagrant disregard of the General Assembly's resolutions No. 1568 (XI) and 1596 (X). Their threat to detain members of the Committee if they entered the territory or even South Africa, was to say the least, most provocative. Quibling now over the words "arrest" and "detain" is absurd. Even the South African Press itself jubilantly announced on the 8th of July that Mr. Louw had warned on the radio that if the Committee entered South-West Africa, it would be arrested and sent back to Bechuanaland.

My delegation would like to pay a tribute to the petitioners who despite difficulties, hardships and personal risks involved, have assisted South-West Africa's struggle for freedom. They have given us valuable information corroborating evidence already before us.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of South Africa has repeatedly criticized the report under discussion as containing "a number of blatantly false allegations" against his Government. To him, except South Africa, the whole world seems to be out of step. It was indeed gratifying to note that even the British delegate, Sir Hugh Foot, condemned in no uncertain terms the Government of South Africa about which he admitted he had no illusions, any longer.

Madam Chairman, it ill-becomes a member of the United Nations to criticize so bitterly and in such immoderate terms a United Nations Committee consisting of distinguished and honourable personalities representing several great nations of the world. In this case, the criticism is all the more reprehensible in view of the South African Government's own refusal to let this Committee see for itself the conditions in South-West Africa.

In the past, we have been familiar with the South African delegations' plea of domestic jurisdiction to evade international scrutiny of the violations of its obligations under the mandate. Since last year, it has found it convenient to seek shelter under the plea of sub judice rule. His legal arguments having been rejected during the last sessions by an overwhelming majority (67 to 1 with 11 abstentions) one might have hoped that Mr. Louw would not press them this year. To argue that because two of its members had instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice against the Union of South Africa, the United Nations was precluded from discussing

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the question of South-West Africa, is to argue that the General Assembly must for the time being abdicate from its political and moral responsibilities imposed on it by the Charter and the mandate, Such an argument is untenable. The International Court of Justice is adjudicating only on certain legal aspects of the problem, and not, indeed it cannot, on its social and political aspects. I need hardly labour this point further. Many delegations have fully answered the South African contention.

His Excellency, Mr. Louw has made a reference to Mr. Benegal Rao's statement in his support. If the distinguished Foreign Minister, himself a lawyer of high standing, had carefully examined Mr. Rao's statement, he would have had no difficulty in realising that Mr. Rao's remark in no way helps his case, nor was it made in the context in which he invoked it. We are glad, however, that the distinguished Foreign Minister has had the courage to call our attention to the proceedings of the International Court of Justice. Is he now prepared to guarantee that his government would accept the verdict of the Court, whatever it might be? Has he forgotten that his government has so far assiduously evaded the issue? May we remind him that on being questioned by the Representative of the United States in the last session of United Nations General Assembly, he refused to give an unequivocal answer? Again, during this session, did he really believe that his answer to my delegation's queries in this regard, was satisfactory? May we further remind him of his Government's total disregard of its obligations--legal and moral--which the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice given in 1950, and reiterated on 2 subsequent occasions clearly imposed on it. Would it not be pertinent for me, therefore, Madam Chairman, to ask the distinguished delegate of South Africa to explain to this Committee how he could legitimately take refuge behind the plea which is

blatantly incompatible with its own conduct? We agree with Mr. Callaghan, M.P., that Mr. Louw advances these arguments to dodge a debate, discussion and decision in the United Nations, rather like Satan quoting the Bible to his own ends.

For 15 years, Madam Chairman, we along with many others in the United Nations have been battling without success to secure for half-million people in South-West Africa their freedom to determine their own destiny. Year after year, in striking contrast with most other colonial powers, the Government of South Africa has remained impervious to our argument or appeal. My delegation has on many occasions in the sessions gone by, referred to Field Marshal Smuts, the noted South African Statesman, whose declarations and statements had often interpreted the hopes of that resurgence of a new attitude to things that marked the end of the first world war, Today, it is the irony of fate that we are discussing a territory--South-West Africa--where Marshal Smuts' successors by their utter disregard of the principles of the sacred trust of the mandate, of which he was an architect--have reduced their international obligations to mockery.

As far back as 1950, the International Court of Justice gave its opinion on the International status of South-West Africa, according to which the United Nations General Assembly could exercise its supervision as provided by the mandate. This meant that United Nations could examine petitions, hear oral evidence as well as receive annual reports which the South African Government as a mandatory was under obligation to transmit.

The International Court was categorical that South Africa could not act unilaterally to modify the international status of the territory placed under its mandate, even though the mandatory was not legally bound to place the territory under the trusteeship of the United Nations. In two subsidiary opinions in 1955 and 1956, the International Court of Justice reiterated that the supervisory functions of the League of Nations devolved on the United Nations.

South African, Madam Chairman, rejected the opinion of the Court, and, the arguments advanced by its representatives have been examples of intransigence and insincerity. This has been most unfortunate inasmuch as it has created a deep antagonism against a nation in the world organisation. My delegation is still hoping against hope, that South Africa will yet respond to the appeals of the international community and will abjure the "course of international illegality" that it has followed, and that this Committee may not have to take "collective measures" recommended by the Committee on South-West Africa after its careful and mature deliberations. Madam Chairman, if South Africa persists in following its ideology with regard to the Charter and the Mandate we shall have no option but to suggest to this Committee that a strong and immediate action should be taken. For, otherwise, the success of such an ideology would result in the triumph of fascist tendencies which are growing stronger amongst certain elements of the white population in that part of the world. The two reports of the Committee on South-West Africa show that South

Africa has proceeded far, along its dangerous `apartheid'

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policy, regrettably enough, even in the mandated territory of South-West Africa. All those who have appeared before the Committee have given expression to the serious disaffection that prevails in the territory. His-Excellency, Mr. Louw refuses to see the writing on the wall. How tragic it is that he has neither any constructive policy to offer nor is he prepared to face the facts!

Turning now to the conditions in South-West Africa, Madam Chairman, I may begin by quoting Mr. James Callaghan, who in the Parliament at Westminster on 15th December, 1960 describing the history of South-West Africa as "brief and bloody", said:

"It is fair to say that since 1949, South-West Africa has been virtually annexed to South Africa. The whole apparatus of a police state has been imported into this mandated territory. The system of apartheid has been imposed in its full rigour. Men and women have been alienated from the land which they have tilled.

"Citizens of South Africa have been denied the elementary rights of free men everywhere to have a share in their government. They have no opportunity of voting for their representatives. They have no representation. Certain people are told that they are regarded as representatives of the people of South-West Africa in the South African Parliament....."

"A year ago, there was a revolt at Windhoek..... Africans were killed, many were wounded and imprisoned. The whole history of the Mandate, particularly since the Nationalists took over, has been one of increasing oppression and slavery."

Madam Chairman, there is ample evidence to show that this unfortunate mandated territory has been treated as a domain reserved for the exclusive and merciless exploitation of the Afrikaner. The local population is denied all basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. They are kept in subjection by force. They are made to give in poverty and are denied education. Their movement is restricted and forced labour is the rule. The International Commission of Jurists has recently defined this system as legalised slavery. And yet, the distinguished Foreign Minister of South Africa has repeatedly denied all such charges. Obviously he believes in the fascist propaganda technique that the virtue of inexactitude is that, if repeated often enough and with sufficient solemnity, it assumes the appearance of truth. Is his Excellency Mr. Louw not aware that his government's orders continue to enforce discrimination, that the Administration acts in favour of the white employer, that the protection of the right of contract as understood in civilized countries is defined to the African, that the structure Of economic life is based on economic slavery of the African, that there is discrimination even in distribution of public benefits, major portion of the education

budget being spent on European children, and medical funds being reserved mainly for the welfare of the white community. Hunger, poverty and disease are rampant in the unfortunate territory. The distinguished Foreign Minister of South Africa in refuting the charge of gradual extinction of the indigenous population mentioned in the Committee's report, referred to the United Nations Demographic year book of 1960 to prove his case. Is he not aware of the fact that these figures are given to the United Nations by his own government? Is he not aware of the fact that child mortality in South-West Africa is abnormally high and expectancy of life very short, most Africans being condemned to live in slum sunder most unhygienic conditions. The South African Foreign Minister has not produced any evidence to show that his government is doing anything to control disease and death-rate. In these circumstances, how can he justify his Government's refusal to accept the assistance offered by World Health Organisation for alleviating the misfortunes that have affected African masses.

A couple of days ago, His Excellency, Mr. Louw was waxing eloquent about democratic government based on parliamentary system in civilized nations. Obviously, he had hopes of convincing this Committee that his country was ruled by a democratically elected Parliament. For those of us who know what democracy in South Africa means, it is not surprising that his government has denied rule of law to the mandated territory. According to Mr. J. Basson, the leader of South West Party, the Afrikaner is a hated person today, there is no end to the injustice of apartheid, people who for generations have been following a certain trade are now suddenly told by the Government that their jobs have been reserved for the Europeans. People who have lived for generations in certain parts have been told to move in a matter of few months, the government does not care where they may move, they have just been told to move.

Mr. Basson has predicted that December 10 riots in Windhoek would be a picnic compared to the trouble which may yet come. He adds:

"Today, for the first time, there are hundreds, who want to leave the country--even leading nationalists. In spite of hope for the future, there is nothing but fear today."

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I need hardly emphasise, Madam Chairman, how urgent it is for the United Nations to settle this grave problem of South West Africa. Writing from Windhoek, Mr. Lenord Ingalls, special correspondent of the New York Times, wrote on the 8th June, 1961:

"A sample of white opinion here in the Capital of the territory showed that some persons felt only the United Nations action would ensure political stability in South West Africa. Although South African Government has refused to admit the United Nations Committee to enter the territory, nearly everyone questioned here favoured the proposed visit....."

"Mr. Soyman (Mayor of Windhoek) said that the Windhoek Town Council had recently voted unanimously in favour of permitting the United Nations or other authorised bodies to investigate conditions here. Jack Levison, a business man, said that the South African Government's policy here should be changed both to end harsh laws and to provide improved housing and better educational facilities.

"Another business man said United Nations action to end South Africa's administration in South West Africa could not come too soon. The way they are handling things here, they deserve to lose this country' he commented bitterly."

The distinguished Foreign Minister of South West Africa, has an ingenious plan to secure a certificate for his government. He announced in this Committee the other day that his government will be inviting three former Presidents of the United Nations General Assembly to pay a visit to the mandated territory and to submit a report to the African Government on the conditions prevailing in that territory. He knows very well that the United Nations, under no circumstances, would regard this as a satisfactory solution. The distinguished British delegate is anxious to open up as many windows into South West Africa as possible. So are we. But, as a matter of principle we must reject any committee for this purpose, however distinguished its personnel might be, unless it is nominated by, and is responsible to the United Nations. If the South African Government is sincere in its offer, let it accept a commission of three Ex-Presidents of the United Nations, to be nominated by the Honourable President of the United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Louw should realise that the United Nations has an obligation towards the people of South West Africa and as such cannot accept any other position in this regard.

It has been strongly suggested not only by the Committee on South West Africa, but also by many members in this Committee, that the mandate should be terminated. Legally this would not be illogical, nor unjustifiable.

Article II of the mandate declares that:

"The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants."

Article III ordains that:

"The mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited and that no forced labour is used except for essential public work and services and then only for adequate remuneration."

Article V lays down further that:

"The mandatory shall ensure in the territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of public worship and shall allow all

missionaries, nationals of any States of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory, for the purpose of prosecuting their calling."

The record of the government of South Africa is notorious for the breach of its obligations under the Covenant. Then why not terminate the Mandate? The distinguished delegate of Mexico has advanced strong and learned argument in favour of termination. My delegation too, is as anxious as any one else here to terminate the alien misrule. We would be in favour of the termination of the mandate provided we could be assured that it would immediately lead to effective independence of the South West African people. The problem, however, is complicated and needs careful study. It is for this reason that the Committee on South West Africa has recommended:

"the General Assembly should undertake a study of the ways and means by which to terminate South African administration over the Mandated territory of South West Africa and to have that administration assumed directly or indirectly by the United Nations so as to ensure the institution of the rule of law and such democratic processes, reforms and programmes of assistance as will enable the Mandated Territory to assume the full responsibilities of sovereignty and independence within the shortest possible time."

We agree substantially with all the recommendations of the Committee. It has wisely suggested "urgent consideration by the Security Council, and other organs or sub-organs and Member States of the United Nations of all such measures or courses of action as may be required to ensure the effective implementation of the recommendations made or of any other decision of United Nations in the question of South West Africa".

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We feel also that United Nation's presence in South West Africa should be immediately instituted. I need hardly mention other recommendations with which we agree. We must, however, emphasise that the South African Government has no right to refuse assistance from the United Nations agencies. Is it so proud of the fact that there are today 10 graduates in the Territory that it finds UNESCO's assistance in educating the masses unnecessary? We do hope that the needs of these miserable people and their plight will give a sufficiently strong prick to the distinguished Foreign Minister's conscience and would make him realise the realities of their life.

There is one more point on which I would like to address myself to the United Kingdom delegate. As he knows, the mandate was vested by the League of Nations in His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa when South Africa was itself a member of the League of Nations like India, but not considered to be completely independent. Balfour Declaration came in 1926 and the Statute of Westminster II only in 1932. Now that the Union of South Africa has become a Republic, and in view of its

failure to discharge its responsibilities of the sacred trust, it would be incumbent upon His Majesty's government either to see that the Mandate is respected or to revoke it. It cannot be argued that the King accepted the mandate as the King of South Africa because at that time, the doctrine of the divisibility of the British Crown was not accepted and therefore the responsibility of the Britannic Majesty continues to exist in spite of seeming contradiction in the preamble of the Mandate.

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, I wish to repeat that, the Government of South Africa has proved to be utterly unfit to discharge its obligations defined in article 22 of the covenant of League of Nations and article 2--5 of the mandate which represent the very essence of sacred trust of modern civilization. The International Court of Justice has clearly stated that these obligations continued to exist, being independent of the League even after the League's demise. We must take immediate action. World opinion expects it.

INDIA USA SOUTH AFRICA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC NAMIBIA MEXICO

**Date** : Dec 01, 1961

## Volume No

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Reply to Lok Sabha Debate on Foreign Affairs

Replying to the debate on Foreign Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on the Dec 07, 1961, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru said:

Mr. Speaker, Sir, may I, to begin with, immediately, deal with the last sentence of Shri Bharucha's speech? Shri Nath Pai also referred to this matter about facts not being stated or kept back and the House not being informed. They referred to the letter, dated 31st October, which we sent to the Embassy of China here. In this letter, at page 53 of the White Paper, a number of instances are given. It says:

"Instances of recent Chinese intrusions into Indian territory are cited below."

Everyone of these is what is called a patrol coming over the border. There is a vast difference between patrols coming over--it is highly objectionable, but I do confess I quite fail to understand the force of this argument that everytime a patrol comes over. we should rush to Parliament and tell that 10 Chinese soldiers have been found

coming over the mountain border 80 yards or 100 yards. I am talking of the reference made to our letter of 31st October.

It talks about Suriah and says:

"In April 1960 Chinese military personnel posted at Khurnak Fort patrolled the Suriah area inside Indian territory.

"A Chinese survey party visited Suriah on June 25, 1960 and returned towards Khurnak Fort the same day.

"On October 13, 1960 two mounted Chinese soldiers were seen about 1 1/4 miles east of Hot Springs.

"Four Chinese soldiers were seen about five miles from Hot Springs in the second week of October, 1960.

"Sometime in May 1961, the Chinese intruded into Indian territory near Chushul.

"A Chinese patrol intruded into Indian territory near Dauletbeg Oldi sometime in the autumn of 1960."

All these are patrols.

What I mean to submit is that there is a certain relative importance of an event which should be put before Parliament. It sometimes so happens

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--I do not know if the House consider it wrong--that if a thing like this happens, my Ministry writes to the other Government without my knowing about it even. Of course, later on I know about it, but not then. Because, in an area of this type where patrolling is taking place, and hostile patrolling too, it is a frequent occurrence, whether it is on their side or on our side or on the Pakistan side, whatever it is.

It is not important enough for me merely to say that two or five or ten Chinese soldiers have been found patrolling there--it is important from our point of view, because that indicates the preparation for future activity; that is a different matter; therefore, it is important and we object to it and we try to stop it--but for me to inform the House every time a patrol is seen seems to me rather fantastic.

Now, it seems to me that this debate has been largely confined to the issues of Goa and China. I will not refer to the China matter, because we have discussed it at some length the other day--not because I consider it less important. I have said repeatedly that from the point of view of India I would go further and say, from the point of view of Asia--there is no matter, except one, which is of

greater and more profound significance than the trouble that we are having with China and their aggression on our border. It is of the most profound importance to us. I have repeated that. People seem to think that we attach little importance to it because we do not go about waving flags and taking out processions on this subject. I have mentioned it and I repeat it: it is of far more importance, whether you have one Goa or a hundred Goa--let me put it as strongly as I can--this is a far more important subject, except one subject. And that one is just a conflagration which will put an end to the world. Short of that, it is the most important thing that we have to deal with in the political field. Because, it is so important and of vital importance not only today, tomorrow or the day after, but it is going to govern the future of Asia and of India, I do not know for how long--may be decades, may be generations, I do not know. That depends on world developments, not only on us. So let us be clear about one thing. This is of the highest importance and it should be dealt with as a thing of the highest importance. Although I attach a great deal of importance, obviously, to their committing aggression on our territory,--we resent it; we should resent it and all that--it is even more important than that. It is a conflict of two of the greatest countries of Asia. We have to see it in the proper perspective, geographical perspective, historical perspective and try to understand it. Something very big has happened, which is not going to be set aside merely by our getting angry even though anger, may be justified. We have to plan for the future in perspective as to how to deal with a situation like this Which is of the most vital importance to us, to the future of Asia and of the world. We have to prepare for it.

An Hon. Member talks about priorities. There are priorities. But, there are no priorities between, let us say, a mouse and an elephant. There is no question of priorities between Goa and that place. The priority is always of the border in our consideration, in our minds, in the importance we attach to it. But, there is no question of priorities as if instead of dealing with Goa now, we should deal with the border. I am sorry, the Hon. Member's thinking is so extraordinary that it is difficult for me to grasp it. Of course, that is a matter not relating to this, in almost everything he thinks about, he seems to be perverted, and that is a basic thing.

We can isolate any problem and examine it. We ask, let us say, our Military headquarters to tell us their view of a certain problem, whether it is Goa or whether it is the Chinese on the border. They give their view. But, even then, if they are wise, having given their view of a particular thing, they give a larger viewpoint in relation to other matters: what will be the effect on other matters. So, we see a larger view-point. The larger view-point ultimately embraces sometimes, if it is big enough, the world. There is a world military situation, a world political situation. All these have to be done even by our military people and certainly by the civil people in charge of the military. In judging this, therefore, our general conception, our world view, the perspective in which we look at it, governs our thinking. I am prepared to accept that.

My thinking about this problem is of various kinds. One is my immediate angry reaction towards what China may do on our border. I am angry about it for a variety of reasons. Then, I consider it from another point of view, the Asian point of view. The first reaction remains. But, another reaction comes in. I consider it from the world point of view and other things. I hope I am not wrong, but I suspect that the Hon. Member basically objects to our policy of non-involvement.

As I was sitting here, I saw some press telegrams which have come today. We know this is about our communist friends and others--they dispose of a problem or dispose of a country by calling it imperialist. We have been called imperialists as individuals, and worse still, stooges of imperialists. We have been

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called that even by the, leaders of China about ten years ago. And this is sufficient answer. You throw that and everything is answered. Some other people dispose of a problem saying, communist, and everything is disposed of--this is communist. What made me think so was this. I was just reading one press telegram. Mr. Moise Tshombe who was in Paris till today was very angry at what the United States Government has done in regard to Katanga; they have supported the Congolese Government, and they have given them planes, Globemaster aircraft and others. So, because he was angry with them, he immediately said this; and I am reading from the press telegram:

The Katanga President, Mr. Moise Tshombe charged in a television interview here today..... "

that was in Brussels--

"...that there must be communists in the American State Department."

--of all places, the American State Department.

It shows a certain, shall I say, idea seizing hold of your mind, colouring your vision and your thinking in everything. You cannot think straight. That is the main difficulty, and that was what made me suspect that Shri M. R. Masani's mind is also coloured in such a way. It was coloured in every way. It was really so extraordinary, his balancing Goa and China. There is no question of balancing. Whether we go to Goa or not, it does not affect our frontier policy; it does not weaken our frontier policy; it does not delay our frontier policy; it has nothing to do with it. It is an independent thing, which can be thought of independently. Of course, if it had been a big affair, it might have affected, but as it is, it has not.

So far as Goa is concerned, it is so relatively small that we can isolate it from other problems and deal with it as we choose. But there is this basic thing. And what are we to do?

## GOA

An Hon. Member quoted what perhaps almost might be to him scripture, an article in The Hindustan Times. Rather, he quoted two scriptures; one is a statement by Gen. Cariappa, and the other an article in The Hindustan Times, stating, if I remember rightly, something about the elections having induced us to take some steps in regard to Goa. I am sorry that even The Hindustan Times could have stooped so low as to say that the Government, and I especially, should go about manufacturing a position in Goa, because there are elections. I really was astounded and amazed that such a thing should come into anybody's head. It would be, I say, little short of a crime for any responsible individual to play about with the country's future and present condition in this way. I do not wish to say anything more about it, but there it is.

But I should like the House to remember about this so-called timing of it; it is as if I have timed it, as if I had made the Portuguese fire on our merchant ships or on our fishermen and others. The fact of the matter is that the Goan situation has been a developing one. Fact after fact accumulates not only in India, but it is affected by things happening outside India; what has happened in Angola affects it very much; what is happening in Africa affects it. What is happening in the United Nations affects it. The United Nations charges Portugal with not giving news of its colonies, because Portugal says that they are not colonies but they are bits of Portugal; that is the explanation. However, all these factors go on accumulating, apart from the original fact that Goa is just Indian there is no doubt about it--and must become part of the Union of India. Apart from that, these factors go on accumulating. The United Nations makes a much more positive declaration in favour of the removal of colonial domination from every part of the earth's surface. Then, there are tremendous upheavals in Africa; they are tremendous; when the history of the present day is written, probably the most important chapter will deal with these upheavals in Africa which are changing the face of a good part of the world and affecting the rest of the world. All that happens. All that happens in regard to all colonies. Then, suddenly, Angola comes up and becomes a symbol of the worst type of colonialism, and the fact, the quite astounding fact that Portugal is now the biggest colonial power in the world comes up. All those facts condition our minds in regard to Goa too.

I did not go into all this background, but I did refer to the Seminar we had here in Delhi and in Bombay where many people from Africa came. We knew, as I stated, how their thinking was partly directed towards Goa, not because it was their own problem, but because they saw it was connected with the larger problem with which they were dealing.

All this happened, this piling up of our mental agony about Goa. Then comes news about extreme repression inside Goa. It is reported that there have been some bad torture cases and all that. Then comes this

firing on some fisherman, then a merchantship and later on Sawantwadi, across the border. All these things in an isolated way would irritate, would even anger. But if just

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one thing occurred in an isolated way, we would be angered, we might express our anger and go on to do something else. But all this has to be viewed in the context which has been built up in the country's mind, though these incidents become big and upset us and almost drive us over the verge.

I do not want to develop this argument in detail, but I do want to make the House feel how we have been feeling about Goa. As the House knows, we have been criticised for our restraint, call it lack of a spirit of adventure, lack of this or lack of that. So it became almost inevitable for us to take action; what action is another matter, because, as I said, it was aggression. If a soldier fires a gun by mistake, it does not matter. But this is a deliberate attack by a bigish gun on our ship. What is the reason for it in the mind of the Portuguese authorities. I do not know. Was it deliberate provocation to us to do something or not, I do not know.

Anyhow, all this, the Sawantwadi firing and large forces coming from Mozambique, made it quite inevitable for us to take steps. The least step is to send our ships, and some of our armed forces by land, to prevent this kind of thing happening right before our noses.

Now, as to what all this will lead to, I cannot at the moment say, except that ultimately it must necessarily lead to the liberation of Gee. But that is the ultimate thing. In between, what it leads to, I cannot say because it depends on many factors. If it is going to lead to that ultimately, then we must not take any step, any single step, without being prepared for the next step and the third step. That argument applies not only to Goa but to the border with China too. It is not the first step that counts; it is the last step that counts, in war as in anything. It is not a skirmish that counts but the winning of war that counts. So we have to make adequate preparations to this end, to be prepared for any emergency and any development.

Now, an Hon. Member laid great stress on the fact that we are not committing aggression but we shall only be acting on the defensive. True, in a sense, but there is aggression being committed against us all the time, and our meeting that aggression is the truest defence. You cannot draw in a case like that very fine lines. We are not crossing and going to another country to attack it; we are dealing with a place which according to us, belongs to us, must belong to us, and is a part of India. But it is perfectly true that in law it has been part of Portuguese territory.

Some people spoke about the virtues of adventure and a spirit of adventure. And it reminded me of something I had said already some 30 years ago. I have not said anything against adventure. I am all for

adventure; I have said, do not be adventurer, which means something entirely different. That is the difficulty, about using a foreign language. To be adventurer is not good at any time. To be venturesome, to be fearless and going in for adventure is normal unless it is rank foolish adventure; because adventure may be foolish or good. That is a different matter. But I do think that adventurer action is not just normal; and certainly not by any person in a responsible position in Government because he is not playing with his own. I am not playing with my life or my anything. I have no business to take vast risks for a great country like India. It is a tremendous responsibility to talk about being venturesome. I agree each individual should be. A person who loses the spirit of adventure is not much good.

I forget which Hon. Member read an extract or referred to a newspaper in England, Let me say that the newspaper is a very good newspaper as far as news is concerned, but it is a highly conservative newspaper. The trouble was that the reasoning and the thinking and even the language of the newspaper should fit in so much with the thinking and reasoning of Shri Masani and the Swatantra Party. It has not added really because it has come to this. In our public life the party which the Hon. Member represents does represent the viewpoint which is the Daily Telegraph's viewpoint. That is a fact whether it is in social policy or in political policy or international policy. It all fits in.

The Daily Telegraph also refers to the elections, and warned us not to have anything to do with Goa, warned us of the grievous and distant consequences. It was almost a threat; really the consequences were not so much in Goa but somewhere else. The Hon. Member is constantly telling us and warning us not to get tied up in Goa but devote all our energy in more worthwhile pursuits. As I pointed out, so far as the frontier in Goa is concerned, there is no question of overlapping or conflict or getting tied up anywhere.

#### TIBET

In regard to Tibet an Hon. Member referred to an old British treaty with Tibet. I wonder if he has read that old so-called British treaty. It was a treaty which, among other things laid

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down that as the routes were unsafe, till they were made by safe the Government there, we could keep 200 men here to guard our couriers and postmen and others, a few men in Lhasa, in Yangtse and Yatung. That was one part of the treaty. As soon as the routes were declared safe, then, we had to remove them. They were not an army of occupation; they were to protect our couriers. We had a telegraph system and it was to protect the telegraph system from marauders and others. In any event, quite regardless of whether a revolution took place in China and the Chinese came to Tibet or not, we have to remove those people after we became independent. It is not at all in keeping

with our aim that we should keep 200 people there; it is not good at all; they could not fight; they cannot carry on any major operation; they were there only as a kind of guards. And when the communist revolution came in and they started coming in there, obviously we had to remove them; we did not want them to be left there to be arrested and then march an army to release them. The whole thing could not be done; there is no question of doing it. The old Tibetan treaty lapsed by the efflux of time. We cannot stick to it.

The Hon. Members go on saying that we betrayed Tibet, we came away from there. There is no basis for saying so; I do not understand it. One can say things like a brave knight though we had to come away from there and there was no chance or possibility of our staying there unless of course we wanted to declare a war against China and send the whole of the Indian Army across the Himalayas which is beyond our desire or capacity. We had to bring back the 200 or 300 people we had there; we had to hand over the telegraph and postal system there; we could not run them if they were there. The only other change that took place--major change--was that instead of the British representative there, in future our representative was called the Consul General in Tibet. One thing we could have done perhaps and that was to say that we disapproved of all that had happened in Tibet; the Chinese are a bad people; we will have nothing with them. It is conceivable. We may have, after coming over to India, expressed ourselves strongly against the Chinese activities. Well, I do not think that it will be correct or right or proper in that context or in any context. Anyhow, it would have meant no difference to Tibet. To say that Tibet, by our action, fell to China and we could have checked China has manifestly nothing to do with relation to facts or reality.

Hon. Member will remember that we did accept a fact which had been there long before the communists came there, which the British had done before us whom we succeeded here--in regard to this policy, I mean. He pointed out about the suzerainty of China and Hon. Member read out from the book of Sir Charles Bell.

I have also had the good fortune of reading that book and a number of other books in connection with this. The Hon. Member may remember that when in a different context a similar situation arose, that is, in 1911 I think, when the 13th Dalai Lama was rushed out of Tibet, he came and took refuge in India. I think it was probably in Darjeeling. He went to the then Governor of Bengal, somewhere there and he hoped that they were friends; they were the British at that time. Sir Charles Bell writes; he came expecting us immediately to march an army to help him against the Chinese and when I told him that could not be done, they were not going to attack China on this issue, the poor man was struck dumb--the Dalai Lama. This is as far as my memory goes. The British Government wanted the Dalai Lama to have some strength and the Chinese Government not to come to our own borders; although the Chinese Government was then a very weak Government; even then they hesitated and they did not do anything. The Dalai Lama had remained here for a long time till the revolution broke out in

Peking--the first revolution--and because of that revolution their hold on Tibet collapsed. Then the Dalai Lama went back.

I am merely pointing out this. It is almost a repetition of history, 40 or 50 years ago, and this thing happened there, with one big difference: that what emerged now was a strong, powerful central Government in China, not with that confusion of the revolutionary period as 50 years ago.

There is one thing more. Shri Nath Pal referred to Himmatsinghji's report and asked what has happened to it. I sent for the papers; I cannot read the whole report, but I shall read the note on it, when the report was sent--not the report sent previously--

"The President has recently seen the report of the North and North-Eastern Border Defence Committee. He has asked for a note indicating the action taken on each of the committee's recommendations."

This note is dated in September, 1959. Another paragraph is:

"It will be seen that almost all the recommendations of the Border Defence Committee have been implemented. The only important

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recommendation which has not been fully implemented is with regard to the construction of certain roads."

In this connection, Some other paper should be seen, because subsequently, this was taken up. Indeed, as the Hon. Member knows, apart from the Border Committee, we took up this question in a bigish way just about then or a little later.

Some Hon. Members asked us not to be misled by the mirage of friendship with China, and asked us also not to keep on to the treaty; they further said that if we consider any treaty with China certain pre-conditions should be laid down about the vacate, etc. Some other Hon. Members went a little further and said that we should have no treaty, presumably even if they vacate or accept the condition we lay down.

It really is a question obviously not of accepting their proposal, but I would submit also not of merely saying 'No', because it has no meaning, but of replying in some conditional form; the conditions naturally would relate to their aggression, whatever it is--something like that. I cannot say now, because one has to give thought to it, because I do not know exactly what we will do. But when I had said that, I had some such thing in mind.

About this mirage of friendship with China, I do not know if the Hon. Member has concluded from the various discussions we have had, in the course of the last year or so or more than one and a half years, that we are overwhelmed with this image of a friendly China next to our

border. Obviously we are not. I am trying to explain my thinking on this subject. Quite apart from friendship or hostility, looking at it objectively, ten years ago, soon after the revolution, we came to the conclusion that our borders were going to be, well, threatened in some way. In what way, of course, we do not know. From that moment we had this picture, because national policies are often based on certain objective considerations apart from the views. The views may expedite a certain direction or delay it. But from that moment we had this in view.

This report of the Himmatsinghji Committee is dated soon after the Chinese Revolution and soon after I think the Chinese had come to Tibet in 1951, a year after, but long before any other development. They discussed it at length about this matter, about the fact of these new developments, on the border situation and they give their views. So these facts have long been before us. You may say and you may be right in saying, that we were overtaken by certain events, possibly; but we never doubted that these questions were arising and will arise in the future. And as I have said previously, we took steps too. Again you may say that the steps should have been more and more strong. We took Steps chiefly in the North-East Frontier Agency border and partly in Ladakh. But certainly we did not take all the steps we should have taken. It was very difficult for us to take all the steps because of various difficulties--terrain etc. We did take those steps. So the question of our losing all perspective, thinking of a friendly China sitting there and taking no steps is a wrong view, because from the very beginning we had been thinking of this regardless of Chinese friendship or not. The fact of a huge elephant of a country sitting near our border is itself a fact that we could not ignore, and a country which has a different policy and a country whose, even apart from communism, past history has been, whenever strong, one of expansion. After all, sometime or the other most of these countries round about us paid tribute to China. Burma paid tribute to them, Nepal paid tribute to China and they can easily twist that thing and say: "Well, you are subordinate to us". If you take that long period of several hundred years, all kinds of things have happened in history. So we were not at all complacent about China's presence near our border. We were constantly thinking about it.

Our thinking ran on two lines. One was that this was a reason to strengthen our country as rapidly as possibly, to strengthen it industrially. That is the real strength out of which armies come, out of which arms come, aeroplanes come and not merely by buying aircraft from America or Russia or England and training some people. That is superficial. Where you are thinking of the future in some perspective you have to think of building it yourself. So there is the importance of the Five-Year Plan, the importance of our developing our defence industry, our defence science. It was thought of in this connection that defence science is highly important, because it is science that gives rise to these things.

One of our Hon. Members on this side, on our side, suggested "scrap

the Five-Year Plan and-do this". If we scrap the Five-Year Plan we scrap India, we surrender to China the moment we scrap the Five-Year Plan because we have nothing left to face this menace not today or tomorrow or the day after but ten years, twenty years or thirty years. It is extraordinary.

The Hon. Member: What I said was, concentrate on the development of the border areas instead of other places.

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The Prime Minister: That may be a very desirable objective and that is being done. But I want to concentrate more on a thousand factories which produce goods, I want to concentrate on better agriculture, this, that and the other. As for the border areas, I referred to certain border areas. Certainly they can be developed. But if anyone imagines that we are going to develop these areas, let us say, in Ladakh, all I can say is that he or she is totally ignorant of where human beings normally live. If we ask people to go and settle down there they will be a tremendous burden on us to feed them and to keep them going. You cannot settle them there. May be, it is quite possible that some Tibetans can go and settle there. It is a possibility.

Because, they are used to these altitudes and this kind of life. Even they will find it difficult.

So, it is a question of looking at it from a long perspective. As Shri Sharma has mentioned it, one has to consider the relations of not today but what would be the relationship between India and China 50 years or hundred years hence. We must have a long-term perspective; we must not be swept away by the present. And when we have a long-term perspective, we have to see what it leads to ultimately and we must be prepared for it. We do not aim at war; we want to settle it otherwise because, in the long-term perspective, it would be disastrous for us, for China and, I think, for Asia, if for the next fifty years we live in hostility and enmity in the frontier all the time. We are both big countries. Neither country is going to be knocked down or knocked flat. So, if we go on, coming in the way of development with feelings of hatred and fear, it is so bad and it will reflect in so many ways in the world, taking even the shape of cold war which one wants to avoid.

Meanwhile, we have to deal with the situation as it is, and one can only deal with the situation by preparing for it in every way, so that whatever has to be done is done thoroughly and quickly. It is a simple equation. Any other way of looking at it would, I submit, be, if I may use the word again, adventurist.

There are one or two words and I am done. Much was said about the recognition of the provisional government of Algeria, Before that, I would like to refer to another thing. An Hon. Member asked why our Ambassadors in China or in Peking did not inform us about all these

developments. What developments? In Aksai Chin area? Well the simple answer is: because they did not know, and the further answer is they could not know. It is not possible for them or anybody to know except the select circles which might know. Normally news about things prevailing there come in a very very limited way; whatever the Government wants to give; there is no other way. And this particular thing taking place about 5,000 miles away from Peking, it is quite impossible for one to know unless the Government agencies put it out. We did get to know first of Aksai Chin area because it was published in a Chinese magazine. Immediately, our Ambassador drew attention to it. The Ambassadors we have sent to China ever since the rebellion have been top-ranking Ambassadors, because we attach importance to this position that was arising there and, so far, our best men have been sent there.

## ALGERIA

I confess that this question of the recognition of the Algerian Government has troubled us greatly, because our minds and hearts are with the Algerians fighting for their freedom. We have said so repeatedly. We have helped them in many ways, morally and otherwise, apart from resolutions, diplomatically and otherwise. It was not merely a question of legal flaw, although legally one normally does not recognise a Government that does not exist in its own territory. It is an emigre Government. It is recognized only in war time for special purposes. But the real difficulty was--we considered it several times--whether it would be more advantageous to Algerians if we recognize it or refrain from doing so. As we have said, we are thinking of it, we continue to think about it and a time may come when we will do it.

But in the last two years or so there have been constant talks between the Algerian national leaders and the French Government and always there has been hope that these will lead to some result. I still hope and I think it is quite conceivable and even probable that some agreement will be arrived at fairly soon to make Algeria free and independent. So I was informed too when I was passing through Paris recently. But I cannot guarantee because there have been so many slips in the past. This kind of a thing on the verge of taking place, a gesture because it would only be a gesture of saying that we recognise the provisional government, instead of helping them, may even come in the way. That is our thinking. We may be wrong or we may be right. We thought we may even come in their way. It will certainly come in our way to deal

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with this problem in any other way because then all the other approaches will be barred. Anyhow what I am trying to point out is this that we have felt very strongly the tremendous suffering and sacrifice of the Algerian people. In their straggle we have been wholeheartedly with them. We have expressed ourselves in this way everywhere, in diplomatic correspondence, in private talks, in the

United Nations, here and everywhere. As to this gesture of recognition, it might under certain circumstances do good and it might not. One balances these things arid in the balance we thought that it might do a little more harm to their cause than otherwise. That is why we did not do it.

An Hon. Member: Why not explain this position because there is a lot of misunderstanding on this point? Why it will harm them is a point which is not understood either by our people or by others.

The Prime Minister: I am sorry I cannot go into all these details. First of all, our approach in this matter to the French Government would not only be limited but ended. Our views and our approach has some value for them and for the reasons too. The French Government, I believe, attaches some value to our opinion; not that it follows us, but it does attach some value. That door is closed then. That itself is some loss for them.

#### CHINESE TREATIES WITH BURMA AND NEPAL

I will just refer to one thing more, because this matter comes up frequently, about the Chinese treaties with Burma and Nepal. They are independent countries. They do what they feel like doing. They have done something which we do not wholly like, certainly Nepal. So far as Burma is concerned in spite of our very close friendship with them--they consult us; consult each other--they thought in their context of things that they should arrive at that treaty with China about their border. Certainly, looking at it from that point of view it brought them some benefits. About that trijunction which was referred to they did not agree. It is true that they might have gone further and refused to have any treaty at all. But there is no agreement on that issue and the basic agreement, or rather the border agreement is based on the assumption and the acceptance of the crest of the Himalayas being the boundary line. That has always been our contention about our border with China, namely, that it is the watershed, which the Chinese have not accepted here. But in both the Burmese and the Nepalese cases they have accepted that contention and I do not see how they can deny and repudiate it, when the same principle has been applied to India. So these treaties except for the mere fact that they are having treaties with China which may be thought undesirable by some, are not harmful to us.

To some extent, they are advantageous to us and to some extent where they might be harmful, the matter has not been finally decided yet about the tri-junction.

Finally, I would say that we cannot afford to look at any matter today in an isolated way. They are all connected with each other and affect each other. India is not a small country. It is big and what India does has a certain effect on others. What India thinks also is respected and regarded by others. Therefore, in what we do and what we think, we have to be careful, also looking at the future perspective, and not get tied up today, which may in some way come in

the way of our progress in future.

USA CHINA INDIA PAKISTAN FRANCE CONGO BELGIUM CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC RUSSIA  
ANGOLA PORTUGAL MOZAMBIQUE BURMA NEPAL ALGERIA

**Date :** Dec 07, 1961

## Volume No

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Reply to Rajya Sabha Debate on Foreign Affairs

Replying to the debate in the Rajya Sabha on the international situation, on Dec 11, 1961, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, in the course of the last few hours, a large number of points have been touched upon. I shall endeavour to refer to them and give such information as is in my possession with regard to these various points. First of all, we will take up Goa, which has attracted the attention of most of the speakers today, as is natural. Not that Goa, as I have previously repeated, is a bigger problem than others that we face; for instance, our border problem in the North-East is a far bigger and a more important problem. Goa is, relatively speaking, a much smaller problem, and I doubt if anyone anywhere including in Portugal ever thought that Goa could continue indefinitely under the Portuguese sovereignty. It was a question of time as every one realised. Probably some Members may be right in saying that we gave too much time and were too patient but in matters involving military steps, so far as I am concerned and my Government

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is concerned, we are reluctant. All our conditioning, all our policy, has made us to be reluctant to take such steps. Not that there is any such question of high principles but it would not have fitted in with what we have often said about these questions, of settling problems by military means. Therefore, we were reluctant. But ultimately the situation became such that I have hinted at some of the factors which went into our thinking. Finally it was what happened in Goa itself but also other factors came in which compelled us, first of all, to take up the broad position in this matter that we could not rule out military measures in order to deal with this problem. Subsequently other things happened and recently quite a number of provocative steps have been taken by the Portuguese which have made it clear-that some more effective ways have to be found by us in dealing with the

situation. It was when this became clear to us that we gave directions to prepare for any possibility, to meet any possible emergencies that might arise, and forces were sent, some forces, and other steps were taken.

One Hon. Member on the opposite side complained of the upset in railway trains, etc., because these forces were sent there. At the same time he wanted us to take action militarily. Now, these two things do not quite fit in. One cannot move special railway trains with forces, with weapons, quietly in the dead of night or without interfering with normal traffic for a few days. We did not want to advertise this fact. It became quite inevitable to cause some inconvenience for a few days, which is over now, some days ago. So, we took steps to that end, to be prepared for any action, and in preparing for it, one has to take into consideration all kinds of possibilities. It is true that Goa is a small place, and compared to the strength of India, it does not count for much. But even a small problem has its many aspects, which make it bigger than it looks. Therefore, preparations have to be made to meet such a contingency arising. Even in Goa itself, the Portuguese have largely added to their armed forces, have brought some ships along too, got, I believe, some aircraft--where they got them from, I do not quite know--mined, and what is really extraordinary is their--deliberately or for some other reason--functioning in a most provocative way as if they just wanted us to take steps against them. Just one instance I will point out to you, a fairly recent one, which appeared partly in the press. This is a place called Terekhol on the Goan side of the border, a mile and a half away. On the 7th December, that is four days ago, some Portuguese soldiers came there and turned the people out of their houses, presumably because they wanted to occupy them, themselves being near the border. Whatever it was, these poor people, about 150 in number, were just turned out. They did not know where to go. They expressed a wish to come to India, that is, they felt like coming to India, and they sent word to the villagers on the other side of the border--it is only half a mile this side--asking them if they could come over. The Villagers said, yes, certainly you come. We welcome you. Now, learning of this move some Portuguese soldiers who had established themselves there, actually crossed our border, just a little bit, started firing right and left and exploded bombs just to frighten people. They made a lot of loud noise. Thereafter, some of our police forces there, guards, fired back and wounded one of the Portuguese soldiers who then retired in a hurry. Then on the 9th night, that is, 9-10th night, the Portuguese soldiery came back and arrested all the villagers--one hundred and fifty--of Terekhol on their side, and what is more, they train crossed our border slightly and started firing machine-guns again, I take it, to make such a noise and generally to frighten the people that they were punishing the Terekhol villagers whom they arrested for having thought of coming over to India--and they were trying to frighten our people on this border for having agreed to do that. I presume so. Again, I gather that last night or early this morning, there was some firing also by the Portuguese at a check-post of ours somewhere nearby. It is quite extraordinary. All this has not resulted in any heavy

casualties anyway but it has created some kind of an excitement on the border as it must. So, the position is one which is becoming more and more aggravated and when we were asked to protect these people, it is not right or proper for us to deny them our protection.

Another thing I might mention to the House that yesterday--so our information goes--the Overseas Minister in the Portuguese Government came to Goa and under pressure of events apparently he is going about making fairly large promises of some kind of autonomy that Portugal is prepared to give to Goa which they have thought of at no time previously. I do not know what this autonomy means. I believe the phrase used is 'frozen autonomy'. Whatever that might mean, I do not understand it. But whatever it may mean, it seems to be very frozen indeed. It is obvious that, the time has gone by for this kind of talk and nobody can possibly put their trust in them. But it is meant possibly to influence people in Goa or the

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Goans even outside Goa, in Bombay possibly, chiefly people in Goa, because people, in Goa have been getting more and more, well, distressed and unhappy about the conditions there and, have been hoping that the Portuguese would depart. So, possibly, it is meant for that but, as I said, the time has long gone by for this kind of vague talk. The only thing that really will go towards a solution of this problem is for the Portuguese administration itself to depart. I entirely agree with what Dr. Kunzru has said. It is not a question of our imposing ourselves on the people of Goa; it is the wishes of the people of Goa that should be uppermost. Quite apart from that, one thing we have always said and we attach importance to it that there should be no foreign out-posts on any corner of India, on the territory of India because that brings all kinds of complications and dangers to us. That we cannot tolerate. And, therefore, Portuguese domination cannot, in our opinion, continue there anyhow. For the rest, it is for the people of Goa and our Government and others to consider what steps should be taken for the future.

Now, as I see this position, I think it was Mr. Gurupada Swamy, who in a very eloquent speech demanded that I should tell him exactly what we were going to do, when we were going to do and in what manner we were going to do. If that is his idea of carrying on the Government and military operations, I regret to say that it is not mine. It is a most extraordinary position, approach to make to a complicated problem like this. Here is an extraordinary fact to which, I suppose, the Hon. Members' attention may be drawn at the present moment. If one reads the newspapers in Pakistan, they are supporting both Portugal and China as against India. It is an extraordinary thing that a country like Pakistan, tied up with all kinds of military alliances, presumably against China these alliances are, should support China when the question of India comes up. Off the other hand, Pakistan together with other countries have openly declared and very stoutly declared that they are against colonialism and imperialism, yet they support Portugal and call India an

imperialist power trying to impose its will on Portugal, may be on China too presumably. It shows how there is only one base for Pakistan's policy. That base is just dislike, or call it hatred of India. Everything else is secondary, minor, and everything that they think will help them in their propaganda or action against India is accepted by them regardless of their other policies whatever they might be. It really is quite extraordinary, this kind of, what shall I say, attitude, which has no basis in policy or principle. So, all these things have to be kept in mind, I need not spell out all these matters, but we have taken steps, we are taking steps be ready for these emergencies, and unless the situation improves out of recognition. I fear that we shall have to give effect to the step that we have had in mind.

One thing I should like to say. It really has deeply pained me and surprised me, this kind of charge which some eminent leaders have made that we have a kind of cooked up the Goa issue because elections are coming. Apart from complete lack of intelligence that that shows in a Government if you do that, I hope, however foolish occasionally we might have been, we do not wholly lack intelligence. I suggested it would be monstrous perversity for anybody who says so and it shows how this kind of election and electioneering and political thinking can pervert and upset the people's minds and make them incapable of straight thinking. How can you conceive-of it? Is it a pleasure to me or my colleagues, with all the tremendous normal burdens we carry, with the elections coming, to add to burdens, difficulties and problems, manifestly we would have done away with. Let it come at some other time when we have a little leisure to deal with it but there is no choice in spite of us and against all our thinking on the subject.

Now, meanwhile, as I said, there has been a good deal of mining round about Goa which is a very dangerous thing for our normal shipping even, and land-mines, of course, also.

Then one Hon. Member, asked me about some reference of mine to mediation about Goa. Perhaps I went a little further than I ought to have done when I talked about this matter in the sense that there was no formal offer of mediation from anybody. Some have appeared in the newspapers, that is, good offices being offered, not to us directly but in the air. There was vague talk by one or two countries. It is too vague for me to define it, but it tends to say if they could help they would try to help and it was just given on that occasion when I mentioned this. But I want to make it perfectly clear that there has been no such offer and no progress has been made in that respect anywhere. And anyhow, I do not myself see how such an offer could be helpful except in the sense that it can induce the Portuguese government to vacate Goa. Then of course, we welcome it gladly.

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There are a number of other points. But before I deal, with them, there is one other matter. I think somebody referred to what I said

in New York at a TV interview, I think about--as the Hon. Member said--Soviet colonialism. Now, I should like to remove any misunderstanding on that subject. I was asked a question as to why I did not condemn colonialism in the East European countries as I condemned imperialism and colonialism elsewhere. My reply was that to use the word "colonialism" in that respect was completely wrong, had no basis. Colonialism is a specific word which describes a specific type of government, of foreign domination plus economic exploitation. It grew up largely in the 19th century. Therefore, to apply that would be completely wrong. But I said there may be. I did not mention any country but I was dealing with a general proposition, some kind of domination or pressures which may be undesirable, if you like, but to call it colonialism was too wrong. That was my reply. Now, that apparently--I do not know how it appeared, in what form it appeared--the Hon. Member, who spoke about it, has been misled by that into thinking that I said something else.

## CONGO

An Hon. Member referred to the Congo situation and gave a brief account of what has happened there to which I have little to add and he criticised the policy of the U.K. and says that it was facing two ways. Perhaps Hon. Members may remember that when we discussed the situation in the Congo previously some months ago, I said that the difficulties that it had there were difficulties not so much caused by the situation there but by the fact that some important powers were not supporting the U.N. there. That was the main reason why the U.N. had got itself entangled there and it could not carry out its own Resolutions. Partly it was that reason which led to Mr. Rajeswar Dayal's ultimate withdrawal from there, his resignation and withdrawal. Now that fact has come out even more blatantly by the recent statements made by the two eminent Irishmen who were serving there, in a civil and in a military capacity, both, and that has pursued us throughout this business of coming to a decision in the Security Council and then not acting up to that decision or trying to undermine that very decision for which one had voted. It is very unfortunate but there it is. That, to some extent, may be said to apply not only to the Congo situation but to the Goan situation also, only to this extent--I am not hinting at the fact that somebody is doing something--but this thinking in two directions at the same time, realising that what the Portuguese have done in Angola especially, to some extent in Goa, is all wrong or saying that Goa must, of course, ultimately come to India and Portuguese colonialism must end but nevertheless also expressing the hope that nothing should be done to disturb the things as they are and allowing them to develop and then gradually, like a ripe apple, it will fall into your lap. Here are straightforward issues whether it is Goa or Angola. Angola has attracted more attention because there has been a regular massacre there, genocide or call it what you like. It is something horrible. Because of this, some countries, like the U.S.A., have either openly condemned this and voted against it in the U.N. but some other countries, even now, have abstained from doing so and sometimes even voted for Portugal.

## LAOS

An Hon. Member talked about Laos. What happened now in Laos was, whether it was Laos or Vietnam or Cambodia, the basic decision arrived at by the Geneva Conference seven years ago, was that their future lay only in their adopting an attitude of what is called neutrality, that is, not trying to tie up with any military bloc. That was obviously so because the moment any big military bloc came in, the other came in too and they fought and destroyed the country they were fighting for, fighting in rather. It is obvious. This succeeded largely, this policy, in Cambodia because the leaders of Cambodia were popular enough and strong enough to stick to this policy and not allow too much interference from outside. In Laos after many many difficulties, it seemed to be succeeding about two years ago when pressure was brought on the Control Commission, of which India was Chairman, to disband or end itself and go away. The pressure actually was brought by the then Government of which the Prime Minister was Souvanna Phouma, the so-called neutral leader today. Whether they use 'neutral' or not, I do not know but anyhow, he brought it and presumably he himself was under pressure from others to bring it. We felt that that was a dangerous move because these Commissions, I think, without doing anything spectacular, have been performing very important

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service and holding or preventing the position from deteriorating whether in Vietnam or here, So we pointed this out but obviously we could not continue if the Government of the country did not want us to continue. Ultimately it was agreed that the Commission should not be wound up but should adjourn indefinitely and be called back when need arose, Now it is odd--or rather it is not odd, it seemed to us natural--the moment the Commission came away, fighting in Laos started deteriorating. There was no connecting link left between the conflicting forces and this went on till it arrived at the stage of a crisis. There were coup d' etat, there and another Government came in but by a coup d' etat, not by the regular course or events and from the north the Pathet Lao forces marched down and all that happened. Ultimately the only way out was to get back the Commission and the Commission was sent for again and after some weeks or months of discussion, the Commission went back and naturally we went back--the Indian Chairman went back--with the Commission. At about the same time, the new Geneva Conference was held and they have been carrying on now for months and months. The people who went there in the hope of spending 2 to 3 weeks there have been there for 4 or 5 months. While I passed through Geneva, I met the leaders of the principal delegations, the American delegation, the British, the Soviet, the Indian and one or two others and they all complained and said: "We had come here and we are here for a few months and it goes on and on". Anyhow they were all of the opinion that so far as their work in the Conference was concerned, it was rapidly coming to a successful end and only minor points were left and now the next steps to be

taken were in Laos itself. In fact that also had been agreed to at the previous meeting of the three princes. They met at Zurich once and subsequently elsewhere. It had been settled first of all that Laos should definitely follow a neutral policy and not be tied up with any country; secondly, it should have a National Government, that is representing the various forces there; thirdly, that Souvanna Phouma should be the Prime Minister. One would have thought that this was a clear enough decision and the rest would be easy but for months what has happened is that attempts are being made to get the three princes together to meet in that little country of Laos to decide on the composition of the Government, the Prime Minister having been settled upon. Another step was taken I think--and I am not quite sure of the number I am mentioning but I think I am right--that is, a Government of 16-4 of one party, 4 of another and 8 of the so-called neutral group. That too was settled. Now all that remained was to pick out people for the composition so this 16 Member Government. They have not succeeded for months. Apart from not succeeding, they have not been able to meet to consider this question. It is obvious from this that some people or one of the Princes is coming in the way of that meeting. He just does not want to meet so that this might be considered, with the complaints and each side accuses the other. On grave possibility of the whole thing breaking down after all these months and months of labour, breaking down and then of course, after that, they revert to military way of settling it, that is, the armies marching against each other and then whatever may happen happens. That would be unfortunate, because the amount of labour that has been put in by the foreign countries at the Geneva Conference on Laos has been tremendous. Dr. Kunzru asked: What is our Commission there doing? Well, our Commission for Laos has been trying its utmost to get these people together, trying to get the three Princes together and to meet and do the other things that arise in this connection, because at the present moment, by and large, things have been peaceful, I mean, there has been no fighting, may be there are petty incidents here and there, but there is no major fighting. The Commission's job is to get a government established. It is not their direct job, but being there, they want to try to help them. Therefore, they travel and go up and down, sometimes going to this Prince and sometimes to the other and trying to induce them to meet, I think there is now some little hope that they might agree; but I am not at all sure that they will do so.

An Hon. Member: Is the International Control Commission free to move about and work in the same way as it could, before the adjournment two years ago?

The Prime Minister: I could not give a very precise answer to that question. But the difficulty is not lack of freedom of movement, but the lack of transport. When they want to go about, they want transport and they have to go by air and that transport is not there. So the difficulty comes in. And, therefore, they are not able to go. I have not heard of any impediments to their movement.

The Hon. Member: Is it not a fact that some months ago they were

prevented from going to certain areas?

The Prime Minister: Yes, I think some months back that did happen. Also there was

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another difficulty. When the Princes met or when some consultations took place, One or them wanted them to be present and they were agreeable, but the other side said, "No" and said it will not allow them to come and have consultations. So these difficulties have arisen.

An Hon. Member: Why are the three Princes not meeting together? What are the precise forces acting against them?

The Prime Minister: The three Princes, although they are cousins and half-brothers, as sometimes happens in the case of cousins and half-brothers, are very much opposed to each other. Apart from that, they represent three completely separate forces. The nominal government that is continuing is that of Boun Oum, but the man behind him is Gen. Phoumi Nosavan. They represent, broadly conservative forces there. On the other side there is Souvanna Phouma, who was Prime Minister two years ago and who is the proposed Prime Minister. He is the neutral Prince, supposed to be neutral. Then there is the third one--Souphanouvong--I hope I am right. And he represents the Pathet Lao. Now, the Pathet Lao are the continuing resistance force. They resisted the French and to some extent, the Japanese also. In the old days when they were resisting the Japanese, they were helped by their allies. Then they were expecting freedom after the war. In fact, the French had been sent out by the Japanese. But the French came back and I regret to say that they were helped in getting back, by the Indian army, I mean the British then used the Indian army to help the French to come back to South-East Asia. And then started the war, the internal struggle for independence and the Pathet Lao took the most prominent part. Now, the Pather Lao were a mixed lot. They were nationals struggling.

They were fighting. But there was a fair mixture among them of local Communists. How they became as such, I don't know. In the circumstances they got help from wherever they could and probably from China they got help. So the Pathet Lao is supposed to represent the pro-Communist element there. They are not all Communists. Of the other two, as I said, one is neutral and the other is conservative.

## VIETNAM

Now, with regard to South Vietnam, there also the same story was repeated, of resistance forces which resisted the French remaining over. It is a body continuing the resistance not in South Vietnam--it was captured by the French--but in North Vietnam. Ultimately, it led to the Victory of North Vietnam or Vietminh, over the French. You may remember the famous surrender at Dien Bin Phu, some seven or eight

years ago. It was as a result of that surrender that the Geneva Conference of 1954 was held and these agreements were made. There also essentially they were a nationalist force fighting for freedom, Out with a considerable mixture of Communist element. Their leader was Ho Chi Minh, who is the President now. He is undoubtedly Communist. He came to India, as you remember. At the same time, he has been considered by South Vietnam--by North and South--as a great nationalist leader also. He is very popular not only among the Communists, but among others also as a national leader. Therefore, all these complicating factors are there. When the Geneva Agreement was signed, it was with the French and South Vietnam Government which was the successor--government in the South, took up the position that they were not bound by the Geneva Agreement or by this Commission, and they did not cooperate with the Commission. They did not turn them out, but they treated them rather badly, or rather they allowed them to be treated badly. Once or twice crowds came and looted the property of the Commission and some Commissioners were given a beating and all that. That was several years ago. After that, they settled down, tolerating the Commission, not really cooperating, but they tolerated it. There is no doubt that the fact of the Commission being there has helped, to some extent, in keeping the peace and seeing, anyhow that the situation did not worsen.

Today, I suppose there are troubles occurring on both sides and the Commission has plenty of complaints and each side accuses the other, on the Vietminh, that is to say, on the North Vietnam side, the position they take up is this. They say, we are not creating trouble. It is the local people who are against their government; and I think there is a good deal of truth in it. They are not a large armed force, they are a guerilla force with arms. May be as Dr. Kunzru said, they are helped to arm themselves, may be from the North. We cannot definitely say. It may well be. In the South, that is to say in South Vietnam, the people have definitely and openly been armed by the American forces. There used to be a French force. It was left there even

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according to the Geneva Agreement. But they ultimately went away. They refused to stay on and some American forces came in. And this is one of the complaints of the North, that they should not have been replaced by others. So it is a highly complicated situation with which we cannot easily deal. The Commission did not have much authority to deal with it or much cooperation. We suggested that the first step to be taken was for the Commission to function properly and that they should get authority and also cooperation from both these governments. The other thing is that it was hinted at by Dr. Kunzru--the proper structure for the government in South Vietnam. It is too narrow, too rigid. It is rather difficult for me to go into all the details, because we are the Chairman of this Commission and as such many things come to our knowledge which it is best that we keep to ourselves, and we have to.

## U.K. IMMIGRATION BILL

Now, an Hon. Member referred to the Immigration Bill in the United Kingdom. So far as this Immigration Bill is concerned, the draft that did come to us later is so general and vague; there are no details in it. It really is giving authority, to whoever the officers might be to stop anybody from coming offending against the rules. It is said that in practice it is likely to be applied to people of colour. The biggest country which sends the biggest number of immigrants to the United Kingdom has been the West Indies. India and Pakistan have sent some. In fact we have tried to limit them. We definitely do not want our people to go there, more specially many of these people who do not know any language except normally Punjabi, and that is not of much help in England, and who are not acquainted with any custom, anything there, but because of their demand for labour there, they get good wages and they are employed. Then, social problems are created. We did not like this. So we have been discouraging them and, as the House probably knows, on this question of these people going-- they were so anxious to do so--the lure was so great that they used to pay thousands of rupees to people for forged passports. It was Rs. 8,000 in one case. So, so far as we are concerned, we limited this very greatly and, in fact, in the last year or two there have not been many. The figures are fairly big still but those figures include the students who, of course, are bona fide people and they anyhow go there, and some other bona fide persons. But the real immigrants who wants to go there to get some business have gone down very much so far as india is concerned--I do not know about Pakistan. But the West Indies still sends a large number of people, and it is true that, if you go to London now, you see these west Africans or Indians in large numbers all over London, and you can hardly go anywhere without seeing a few round about, so that our position in regard to this Immigration Bill broadly has been that we do not want to encourage our people to go there, but any step taken based on colour, whether in theory or even in practice, we object to, and as you know, it is not we only, but some other countries in the Commonwealth, who have taken strong exception to this. And there was the question of the Irish immigrants. Now the Irish people cannot be kept out on the basis of colour. That is one reason, I think, why there is no definition of who is to be kept out except that he should have a certificate of employment, or some such thing. But there is a strong demand, in England from certain more or less conservative groups that the Irish be also eliminated from coming. Others opposed this very much. So the position now is not a clear one, because the opposition to this Immigration Bill, even from the official Government Party there, is considerable, apart from the Opposition Parties.

## NEPAL

Now just one word about Nepal. Well, when we heard about the Lhasa-Nepal road, well, we did not like it; it opened out possibilities which were not desirable, apart from everything else, from the point of view of smuggling goods from India via Nepal to Tibet, goods we had forbidden the export of but which could go to Nepal. We pointed

this out to the Nepal Government, and there the matter stands. We cannot order them about in this matter, but to say that they have not consulted us is partly true and partly not so; that is, from time to time, they talk generally about these matters, but about these specific matters there was no reference to us, and as the Hon. Member who spoke about this matter said, there has been a good deal of anti-Indian propaganda in Nepal.

An Hon. Member: What about the Nepal-China Agreement?

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The Prime Minister: Well, I just referred to this. They have a Non-Aggression Pact: They have a right to enter into an agreement about their border, about various things. We did not like some parts of that Agreement and we pointed this out to them. But you must remember that we cannot bring extreme pressure to bear on these neighbouring countries of ours on something.

#### BURMA

Take Burma with whom we are very friendly, and they do not want to do anything which might injure our interests, and they try. But they are also keen on getting what they want themselves, apart from our interests. Now we cannot go out of the way and tell them: "You must not do this; you must not gain something to your advantage because something else is to our disadvantage". It is a difficult position to take up. We do not want to take up that position. Our questions did not arise at all there except in regard to a corner of the frontier, where the three countries are supposed to meet. We pointed this out to Burma at an earlier stage, and they kept it in mind, and they did not agree with the Chinese proposition, but ultimately they agreed not to what the Chinese said, but in a sense to keep this matter open, and they told them that this would be settled when there is an agreement between India and China about that issue, On the lines of that. So the Burmese Government went a good deal and tried their best to meet our position and our wishes in this matter. But there is one point I should like to put before you, that both the Nepalese and the Burmese border agreements are based on the border being the crest of the Himalayas. Now that is one of the principal points that we raised in determining our border, that it should be the watershed or the crest of the Himalayas. Even the MacMahon Line was based on that principle. Therefore to that extent the Burmese and the Nepalese border agreements with China have laid down a principle, which we have upheld all this time and which, if applied to the China-India border, would solve most of the argument, not entirely, but most of it. So in that sense those agreements are helpful to us.

Then an Hon. Member, talking about the China border, repeated something about not an inch should be given up.' I have no particular recollection of having used that word not an inch', but I may have done so. I know speeches I have delivered but I have no recollection of having said so, because it is a rhetorical phrase which has no

particular meaning except that we want to resist, we will not allow them. And for me to guarantee this kind of thing would be absurd. I can only guarantee one thing, that we object to something happening and we shall resist it; more than that I cannot say in a border like this, a 2,000 mile border, where somebody may take a step forward, where neither they can stop us, nor we can stop them, but broadly speaking, it is so that we do not wish to allow them to come at all, and we want to stop that. Now what happens, what has actually happened is that a few soldiers may creep in somewhere and put up some kind of camp there--not a camp strictly--they normally dig a kind-of-well--an underground shelter and go there and a few more come. It seemed difficult to stop them. We cannot stop them; we cannot police all the broad plains of Ladakh. They can come in there. It is only when they build something, a structure there, that it becomes apparent that they have built up something. And in regard to the three posts that I had mentioned previously, one near the Karakorum and two down south in Ladakh near the international border, now, of the two proposed down south they have repudiated one; they said: "We had not been there." Our own information is that they did go there but they have withdrawn from there, from that particular post. But they say they have not been there. They also say they have withdrawn from one or two other posts near Nyagzu. We objected to those two posts not because they come in our territory--they must just come a few hundred yards; it is not quite clear--but because, even if they have done it on the border or within the border we objected to it--they had put up a new post when they had said they would not but the other post in the north--but not far from the Karakorum--was a very definite post within our territory and therefore it has certain importance although it was in a sense overshadowed; not overshadowed but nearby was one of our major posts nearer the Karakorum to prevent any turning movement from there.

The Hon. Member asked me, 'Have our forces orders to resist or not?' Certainly, they have orders to resist completely. Somebody had said-- I think Acharya Kriplani in a public speech said or may be in Parliament--that

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definitely to his knowledge we had ordered them not to fire unless fired upon. Well, that is not correct. You must distinguish between a post that we have or a fighting group that we send and a reconnaissance party that we send. If we send a reconnaissance party, it is not to fight but to find out. They are small parties or small groups of five to six men; they find out and inform us of what the position is. We are constantly sending out such parties. If you read the Chinese letters, they are always complaining that we are doing it. The difficulty is that what we do we do not give much publicity to it. It is not proper; it helps the other side. What the other side does gets more publicity than what we do. If we send out reconnaissance parties, it has nothing to do with the Chinese border. It is the normal rule that the reconnaissance party finds out and does not get entangled; otherwise we would not know what is

happening. If we want to fight, we send a fighting party. Of course, if they are interfered with, they have to fight but in self-defence. The reconnaissance parties normally do not fight; they gather information, come back quickly and then report. Then one takes steps, whatever steps may be necessary. But it is quite wrong to say that they have orders not to fire or not to resist.

Then there was a question about shooting down aircraft which come here. We have orders that aircraft should be shot down but it is not very easy to shoot them down. These aircraft that are talked about cross--they have often crossed--a tiny stretch of our eastern border with Burma. Between Burma and Tibet there is a little bit of Indian border. Now, the Chinese authorities have maintained that they are not their aircraft and have told us to shoot them down. It is very difficult for us to find out whose aircraft they are. They are very high, sometimes above the clouds. We only have a glimpse and off it goes across; it is a small area. But some months back one of these aircraft got into trouble and was brought down near our border but by the Burmese in their territory. It turned out to be a Formosan aircraft going towards Tibet. Whether the others are also from Formosa or not, I do not know but this particular one was from Formosa. There was no doubt about it because it fell down. There is absolutely no question of our being soft to any aircraft that flies on our territory; it is our business to shoot it down if we can catch it but it is not always easy to catch it. If it is caught it should be brought down.

An Hon. Member referred to a map appearing in the October 1961 issue of the Geographical Magazine. I am informed that there is no such map in this issue at all. But in the September-issue--a month before--of the magazine there was a map and it showed our boundary line correctly according to us.

An Hon. Member: May I just point out that in the issue of October 1961 on page 540 there is the map.

The Prime Minister: I shall look it up again. I just got a note to this effect. I have not myself seen it. About these maps appearing at various places, we draw attention to these matters but it is very difficult for us to control all kinds of publishing houses in the world. In India we can and do but outside it is very difficult. We can draw their attention to any mistakes made.

Some Hon. Member mentioned about the U.K. Government generally showing favour to Portugal--the Foreign Minister of the U.K. visiting Lisbon, some naval ships visiting the Portuguese ports and so on. That is a fact; it created an unhappy impression not only here but in some quarters in England.

RHODESIA

I should like largely to associate myself with what an Hon. Member said about Rhodesia. One of the African leaders who has impressed me

most by his general peaceful attitude was Mr. Kaunda. He is a fine man. He went to England some months back. These people imagined that Africans were a sort of uncivilised people and barbarians and they were astonished to find a very highly civilized, decent, quiet individual inclined rather to Gandhisin than to anything else. Here was this man who had kept the people of Northern Rhodesia quiet and disciplined and what they do is to prevent him from going there. And immediately there is trouble there. He asked to go back to deal with the trouble but he was not allowed to go. Obviously, Northern or Southern Rhodesia cannot continue as some kind of offshoots of the Union of South Africa.

So far as the policy is concerned, I believe to the best of my knowledge I have said something about the matters referred to. May be I have forgotten something but I hope that Members will forgive me if I have lost count of some matter.

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#### DIFFICULT SITUATION

Anyhow it is clear that we are facing rather critical situations but that does not mean--and I do not agree with some Hon. Member who said that--because they are difficult situations therefore we must keep our mouths closed and eyes shut. That is not how a democratic country functions. That is perfectly true but at the same time a difficult international situation has to be met with a measure of unanimity and joint functioning, and I would like all Hon. Members here to feel that and not to exploit the position from the election or any other point of view. I am referring not to the Opposition only but to all parties in this House because it is undoubtedly a difficult situation. We need not get excited or worked up about it. In fact, when one has to face a difficult situation, it is all the more reason why we should be quiet about it and work without an excess of passion even though we may feel strongly. The strength we may have should be converted into action and cool thinking rather than merely excited slogans and the like. It is a difficult situation, there is no doubt about it, difficult not because of one particular matter, but the total picture. It is not only a difficult situation because of this and that here, but because of the world situation. Every country in the world, including the biggest countries, has to face very difficult situations. There is no country more powerful, more wealthy than the United States of America, but it is facing very difficult situations, if I may say so with respect, some because it has undertaken those burdens itself and some because of the position they have come to occupy. They cannot escape them.

#### ALBANIA

There is one small matter to which I would like to draw the attention of the House. It is a significant development which took place, the news of which came, I think, in this morning's papers, that is, the Soviet Union Government breaking off relations with Albania. Albania

is a very tiny country and the Soviet Union is a huge, very powerful country. It may normally mean nothing much, except that this is the pressure of the Soviet Union. But in the peculiar context of things that we have had it does mean a great deal. I do not wish to spell all these out. Hon. Members must realise it does not mean a very big shift in world positions and internal relations between the great countries. So, all these changes are happening and those of us or those people who take up rigid attitudes and imagine that the world is a rigid word of blocs, this and that and who cannot get out of this rigidity forget that in spite of these so-called isms and all that, the situation is a flexible one and a changing one. It cannot be described as something we seek to describe as a solid bloc of imperialists and colonialists sitting on one side and a solid bloc of communists sitting on the other. It is not so. Although there is an element of truth in that, it is not so really and in such a position there is a great deal of room for understanding and may be even affecting the course of events sometimes.

Some Hon. Members referred to my visit to the United States. Well, according to the Chinese press and Chinese leaders what we are doing here, many things, are due to the fact that we received orders from the United States Government to do them here. That is the way, it really surprises me, how this peculiar type of rigid mentality works. They cannot understand anything except in those grooves of thought that they are accustomed to. The language they use is such that, apart from the content of the language, having some pleasure in the use of language myself, it pains me to be thrown the same words again and again at me. The same phrases, the same words, they have lost all meaning by staleness of use. So, they think as if the attitude we are taking in regard to Goa is by orders from the State Department in America. Now, this is the attitude they take. The attitude we take about the border issue, is again 'supported by America'. May be supported by America--I do not know. In fact, it is rather odd that the United States Government has said very little about our China border issue. One or two persons have said it broadly, but on the whole they have not said much. In this connection, we are naturally interested, and I am not saying this as a debating point, in the attitude of the Communist Party of this country, which has been in some mental difficulty to adjust itself to these changing situations, and I have no doubt even in greater difficulty, now that this action has been taken by the Soviet Union against the Albanian Government. The fact is that the moment you tie yourself up with these cold war rigid attitudes, you slightly get out of touch with the living, throbbing changing world situation. We must have some basis, of course some principles on which we act.

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Each country has to think of its interests, its integrity, and so on. That is the first charge of any Government of a country. That is true. But together with that you have to see this world situation and not merely talk in terms of settling every problem quickly by some lathi way or the like because lathi is out of fashion now. We live in

an age of atom bombs. We do not possess it and we do not intend to have it. Nevertheless, the whole context of things has changed.

If I may go off to another aspect of this broad question, take the various economic ideologies which are so powerful today and which take the place of religious creeds and dogmas of the past. They excite the same passion. I have often wondered how far an economic ideology developed in the pre-industrial age would apply to the industrial age. I think it cannot, because the whole structure of economics changes. Now, to draw this analogy a little further--an economic ideology built up in the early industrial age, how far does it apply to the later one and how far do all these things apply in the atomic age and the jet age? After all ideologies depend on all manner of factors. If these factors are changing, the application of those changes must also change. Yes, broad principles must remain. Broad principles should remain. Take even the fact, one of the most powerful factors in the development of human thought in Europe was the French Revolution. Now, when the French Revolution came with its thundering tremendous noise and something, that on the one side frightened a number of people thoroughly. On the other hand, it was the light of dawn to millions and millions of people and even in our youth, speaking for myself, when as a boy I used to read about the French Revolution, I used to be very excited and very pleased--not with every act of the revolutionaries, but still generally speaking. Now, the French Revolution there was based entirely on the cry of 'Liberty, equality and fraternity'. Very good cries, but all those had no economic content. It was a political slogan and, of course, it was against landlords and the like. Although even at the time of the French Revolution the Industrial Revolution had begun, no one in the French Revolution thought of the Industrial Revolution. It was not apparent, although it was taking place in England. That is not surprising. But what is surprising is that fifty years later, or more than fifty years later, even as long after 1848, which is often called in Europe the year of revolutions, because all over Europe revolutions took place, the Industrial Revolution had advanced adequately. But all those revolutions in Europe in 1848 were based on the French Revolution of fifty years previously. People had not caught up ideologically to the changes in the physical environment, which the Industrial Revolution was bringing about. It shows how there is a gap always between our thinking and all that when facts are changing. Now, we are living in an age of extreme rapidity in which changes take place. Technological changes, technical changes and scientific changes affect our lives, which affect our productive process, which, again, affect the society in which we live and which must, therefore, affect our thinking in terms of social and economic problems. It seems to me obvious. Therefore, rigidity is to incline one way. I am inclined very powerfully, if I may say so, to the broad socialist appeal, to the fact that human beings should have equal chances, there should not be big differences and all that. That is one thing, a broad principle, which I think is inevitable and which is affecting the whole world. It is obvious today that capitalism, even though it still maintains the basic ideas of capitalism is very very different from the 19th century capitalism. They all change.

Social thinking is becoming a common factor all over the world whatever your party may be. So applying that to the political changes and others, we have to be wide awake. We have to be flexible. We have to stick to certain principles, certain ethical principles, and we have to stick to the interest, integrity and progress of our country and judge problems accordingly, and not like Sir Galahad or some people rush about lance in hand at anything we do not like. There are so many things in the world which I suppose many people do not like. No one likes everything, but one has to put up with many things till we can change them.

USA PORTUGAL INDIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PAKISTAN CHINA CONGO UNITED KINGDOM ANGOLA LAOS CAMBODIA VIETNAM SWITZERLAND JAPAN NEPAL BURMA SOUTH AFRICA ALBANIA

**Date :** Dec 11, 1961

## Volume No

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Speech initiating Lok Sabha Debate on Foreign Affairs

Initiating the debate on Foreign Affairs in the Lok Sabha on the Dec 07, 1961, the Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Mr. Speaker, Sir, we have recently been discussing in this House a very important aspect of our foreign policy and foreign commitments. Today I beg to move:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of

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India in relation thereto, be taken into consideration".

I shall endeavour, briefly I hope, to deal with some other matters, and some of the aspects of the international situation and our policy in regard to it.

Since I spoke in this House on foreign affairs a number of developments have taken place. I attended the Belgrade Conference. Later I paid a brief visit to Moscow and met the leaders of the Soviet Union Government there. Recently I have been to the United States and met the President of the United States and had talks with him. Later I went to Mexico. The Prime Minister of Japan visited

India and we had helpful talks with him. Only today the President of the Republic of Argentina left Delhi after a brief stay here.

I need not now refer to what happened at Belgrade because much has been said about it or to my subsequent talks in Moscow, Washington or elsewhere which were necessarily confidential talks. All I would say is that all these talks with leaders of great nations were friendly and cordial. We did not always agree about any particular matter but that did not affect the friendliness of our approach to each other. So far as we are concerned we profited by it and I think the other countries got to know more fully what our attitude was in regard to presentday problems.

The present-day problem, of course the major problem, far more important than anything else that we may deal with is the problem of war and peace which has become rather acute and reached a critical stage. I do not mean to say that there might be a war soon. But, nevertheless, the situation has deteriorated. In the main it is connected with the situation in Europe--Central Europe, Germany, Berlin. Then there is the question of disarmament and the question of stopping nuclear tests which are more or less connected. On the whole, while one may say that in some ways the situation has slightly improved in regard to these very vital questions, the German and the Berlin question, yet, the improvement has not been very considerable. One can say now that some advance has been made in regard to talks between the principal parties concerned about the German situation and Berlin. These talks have not resulted, as far as we know, in any agreement or any approach to an agreement. Nevertheless, the talks themselves are helpful in removing that state of high tension in which we have been living for some time.

#### DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTS

Connected with this matter is the whole question of disarmament and nuclear tests. It was, we think, very unfortunate and a distressing thing that nuclear tests were resumed in the Soviet Union and subsequently another kind of underground nuclear tests were resumed in the United States. Apart from the general question of disarmament about which the House may know and will remember that the United Nations passed a fairly comprehensive and strong resolution last year and both the Soviet Government and the United States Government have in their own language supported the idea of comprehensive disarmament, one would imagine that when this broad approach is so common it should not be too difficult to arrive at concrete steps to be taken. Yet, the fact is that the difficulty in arriving at the concrete steps is very considerable because behind the language of any resolution that is put up lie fears and apprehensions of the other party. It becomes almost a psychological question, how to get rid of these fears. One may say it is a kind of a vicious circle--the fears give rise to a certain situation and a certain situation gives rise to the fears. But the fact is, we have come up rather definitely against this basic question of this age, of this period at any rate, viz., whether we are going to have a nuclear war or not. It is

increasingly recognised that if there is a nuclear war, it may well mean the end of normal civilised life in the world. It may not kill everybody, but it will kill very large numbers of people, which are computed to run into hundreds of millions. It is quite alarming how calculations are made now as to how many hundred millions of people would be killed in the first few days of the war, which shows that the possibility of war is considered not to be ruled out. It may occur; it might occur, and probably will occur.

So, this problem has come up in its full enormity before the world now and no one quite knows definitely what the future will bring--war or utilisation of these tremendous resources for more peaceful purposes. Everybody talks about peace; every Government talks about peace and yet, behind their desire for peace and their words for peace, lie these dangers because of these fears, specially the fear that if a country takes any step, it may weaken it in the conflict if war comes and therefore, they must be ready.

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I do not know why this resumption of nuclear tests took place in Russia and it was followed up in the United States. But one would imagine that one reason at least for the resumption was pressures from the military or whatever they are called, war departments in these countries. Naturally thinking in military terms, they want more and more efficient weapons, even though these weapons may put an end to them also. It is also hoped that we might have the better weapon so that we might destroy the other party sooner before we are destroyed.

Yet, the major fact that comes out is first of all that there can hardly be a war confined to conventional weapons, I mean to say, major war. They are bound to go over to the nuclear weapons and once you go over to nuclear weapons, then there is no chance of limiting it. It is rather doubtful how it will end or whether it will end at all in the normal way, because from all calculations, the moment you reach the nuclear weapon stage in a war, destruction would be so tremendous and so widespread that organised activity in the countries affected will stop. Of course, military installations and the like will be attacked. Industrial installations will be attacked. Governmental offices will be attacked, so that practically organised activity will crumble down in that country. There will be isolated pockets of activity and this applies to the great nations. What would happen to the smaller countries can well be imagined, if they are attacked.

There can be no real victory in such a war. The most that we can say is that you can measure the quantum of defeat and disaster that a country suffers. The odd thing is that while this is recognised and while there is a genuine fear and dislike of war and the desire to avoid it, still all the preparations go on for war lest the other country might go ahead. What is worse, I think, is the atmosphere continues to be full of this talk of war, preparations for war and

the expectation of war. A war psychosis is thus built up, because the cold war techniques, the cold war methods necessarily lead to encouraging this war psychosis.

The matter is too big. I do not know if even the big Governments by themselves can solve it. It is something that has unfortunately gripped the public mind, which does not want war and yet expects it somehow to come sometime or other. So far as we are concerned, it is generally recognised that we stand for peace and we are against war. But obviously any capacity for us to do much is strictly limited. What we say is appreciated and often agreed to, but it does not make too much difference. And yet, it is not a question of we, but it is a question of the world community. There is no doubt that the world community, including every country big or small, is opposed to the idea of a war coming, individuals apart. Wherever one may go, one finds that.

One feels that the only real way to tackle this, apart from trying to solve some of the immediate problems that arise--come to some arrangement about the Berlin and the German question--the only other way is disarmament and disarmament on a big and comprehensive scale, because this business of disarming 25 per cent or 30 per cent does not help at all. Whether you have 500 atomic bombs with you or 300 atomic bombs, broadly speaking, the effect will be the same. Therefore, disarmament becomes very important if we are to continue and if the world is to continue more or less as it is.

As I have just said, the Soviet Government put forward certain very comprehensive proposals. The United Nations passed a resolution, if I may say so respectfully, a very good resolution last year. President Kennedy, addressing the United Nations this year, also put forward comprehensive proposals, not in detail, but broadly. If there is such a widespread opinion--if you go down to the common people, there is no doubt that there is this overwhelming opinion in favour of peace--why then can we not come to some conclusions and decisions? It is a difficult thing and I have no particular answer for that, except that we should go on hoping for the best that some concrete achievements may come later to the world.

In this connection, the United Nations, of course, has a very vital part to play, although even the United Nations taken as a whole cannot easily solve this problem. Take a problem like this which is normally the business of the United Nations; take disarmament. There is this danger that in that wide forum with over 100 nations represented and having their say, we do not come to grips with the subject. Fine speeches are delivered by everybody no doubt in favour of peace. In effect, there are two major countries that can play a really important role, i.e., the United States of America and the Soviet Union and the other big countries too, which can help in this process. Therefore, we have been of the opinion that the initial agreement should come by talks between them.

The moment they come to a big forum like the United Nations Assembly,

immediately it becomes difficult to have frank talks. It becomes a question of delivering speeches at each

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other, rather than exploring possibilities of a settlement. Therefore, we have been of the opinion that it should be dealt with in confidential private talks and after they can arrive at some broad settlement, then it should come up before the United Nations. The United Nations must come into the picture, but we feel this difficulty that if the United Nations deal with it ab initio more or less, then it may result in a vast number of speeches; and no progress made.

Apart from that, there are two other places of importance and where there is some danger of war-like developments: South-East Asia, Vietnam and Laos. We are naturally concerned with both Viet-Nam and Laos. Apart from the fact that they are not far away from us, they affect the peace of Asia; also because India is Chairman of the International Commission there. Therefore, we have a certain responsibility to shoulder.

#### LAOS

Now, in Laos there has been a curious position, repeatedly in the last few months. We have expected some decision, some agreement, something to happen. We come up very near agreement, and then something steps it. Apart from what is happening in Laos itself, there is the Geneva conference meeting. Now, from all accounts--and I had the advantage only recently of speaking at the Geneva airport twice, on my way to America and on my way back, to the leaders of the principal delegations there, that is the United States delegation, the Soviet delegation, the Canadian delegation and the British delegation and may be one or two others. And they all gave me to understand that they are getting on very well and they hoped to come to an agreement pretty soon, in the course of days--which is very hopeful news. And yet something comes in the way.

On the whole it may be said that the Geneva Conference has done well in spite of these difficulties, and the real obstruction now is in Laos itself, not in Geneva. The principles laid down in Geneva, broadly speaking, are good. And they are really a continuation of the old Geneva Conference. Everybody agrees and accepts the fact that Laos, as other countries there, must--I am using their language, not mine, I don't like this word--be neutral: that is, not aligned to any of the major groups or countries. Everyone agrees, for the very simple reason that if it is not immediately it becomes a battleground of the great powers, with all kinds of far-reaching consequences.

Everybody agrees that there should be a national government in Laos, "national" meaning not a narrow party government but representing, broadly speaking the major elements in Laos. Everybody has said it. Almost everybody agrees that the head of the national Government

should be Prince Souvanna Phouma who is supposed to represent the so-called neutral element in Laos and who was Prime Minister previously too. Now, one would imagine that great progress has been made in reaching this agreement. The three princes met, and they also agreed to various matters. And yet the next step of actually forming the national government, somehow, is not taken. In fact, efforts for the three princes to meet, to talk over it, do not succeed. They do not meet even, although they all live somewhere in this little country of Laos, and all kinds of conditions are put forward which are not acceptable to the other party even in regard to their meeting, and they do not meet: a very extraordinary situation. All that one can say is that some people are deliberately preventing any agreement to be arrived at there. Although all the major parties concerned have agreed--the major powers have agreed in Geneva--and even the princes at one time agreed in regard to it, still it does not come off. All I can say is, I hope it will come off. I do not know what more to say.

So far as we are concerned, we have been taking active interest in this matter and discussing it, as I said. When I went to Washington this was one of the matters to be discussed in Geneva, and I discussed it with the representatives of those major powers.

Next door, in Viet-Nam the situation is supposed to be much more difficult and critical. All these things have, of course, a long background. In Viet-Nam, as the House knows, there is an International Commission of which we are Chairman. But ever since the present government in South Viet-Nam came in, they have refused to recognise that Commission. They have tolerated it in the same sense that it is sitting in Saigon. But even that tolerance has been limited. Two or three years back the members of the Commission got a beating from a crowd there in their very rooms, not in the street, which was impossible unless it had some backing from the authorities there. So they made, in the last few years, the functioning of the International Commission there difficult. It has continued to function, because we realise

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that its ceasing to function would immediately bring about a very great deterioration in the situation there, leading not only to local war but something bigger. So we stuck on.

In Laos there was a Commission functioning, and it had done good work. Then it was asked to wind itself up. We pointed out that this will have bad consequences. Ultimately we had to agree. We could not remain there against the will of various authorities. But it was decided that it should not wind itself up but simply adjourn indefinitely and could be called again when necessity arose. It is an odd and instructive thing to say that the moment the Commission came away, that moment the situation in Laos began to deteriorate. It went on deteriorating, with factions and other things, one party helping one group and another foreign, outside party helping another group, with the result that they had ultimately to fall back on re-convening

that Commission.

Having committed the error of removing it, they had to go back and retrace their steps. Possibly, the situation in Laos would be far better if the Commission had remained there. But that was not to be.

#### VIET-NAM

In Viet-Nam the Commission has been functioning, but in a limited way: one of the reasons being that the South Viet-Nam Government has not given it its full recognition. Oddly enough, the presence of the Commission has been on the whole helpful to the South Viet-Nam Government I mean, it has prevented worse things happening there.

An Hon. Member: Will the Prime Minister tell us how the United States is openly saying, "We are going to send arms and military personnel as advisers?" Is it covered under the Geneva Agreement?

The Prime Minister: That is a doubtful point, a legally doubtful point I mean. I believe some part of it may be covered, some part not. But it has been discussed a good deal there, and there have been various opinions about it. But apart from the legal technicalities, the only way to treat these countries who want to avoid war is to treat them as neutral countries which should not be tied up with any big power group: because, if one power group functions, the other comes in too, and then you have war, and a war on an ever-increasing scale. That is recognised, recognised by almost every party.

The North Viet-Nam Government is accused of creating trouble all the time for the South Viet-Nam Government.

The North Viet-Nam Government accused the South Viet-Nam Government of creating trouble and doing many things which they should not do. There have been many unfortunate things. There was the abduction and murder of Col. Nam--a very bad show. There is no doubt there is a great deal of violence. Whether violence is committed by people locally situated, local groups or those who come from outside, it is not very easy for me to say; probably they are both. On the other hand, the South Viet-Nam Government has been considerably helped in so far as arms etc. are concerned. The North Viet-Nam Government may also have been helped, for aught I know. Of course, they have close contacts with the Chinese Government and the Soviet Government. I think it is true that material supplies, warlike supplies have been given to both parties. I do not think that men, that is, armed men, have gone to either side. But, supplies have gone. It is not quite clear how the situation should be dealt with. Negatively it seems to us quite clear that if there is intervention in any major degree there on the one side it is bound to lead to interventions on the other side. Therefore, poor Viet-Nam Government and the people will then become play-things of a major conflict which is bad. As I said, these are very complicated questions and it is rather very difficult for me to deal with them in this rather casual way.

Realising the importance of this, we have sent as Chairman of the Viet-Nam Commission one of our very able persons in the Diplomatic service, who has previously served there and knows the people there, Shri Parthasarathy. He has gone there. We have also sent a young and able lawyer Shri Mukhi, from here to help him in the work there, whether it is in the Commission or other work.

## CONGO

The other place about which I should like to say something is the Congo, there I cannot give

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any new information because newspapers have been giving fairly full information. At the present moment, military conflict is going on. It appears that the U. N. Secretary General has given permission for widening the activity of the U.N. forces there, and that yesterday or day before, they actually took air action against Katanga air-fields and elsewhere. The main problem there, at the present moment, is the revolt, if I may say so, of the Katanga Government and their desire to break completely with the Congolese Central Government. The U. N. Security Council and the Assembly have all agreed that the whole of the Congo should hold together and should not break up into bits which should be disastrous. As it is, the Congo has suffered a great deal. The attitude taken up by some of Katanga's leaders like Mr. Tshombe has been entirely opposed to it. Mr. Tshombe, as perhaps the House may know, has been connected in various ways with the killing of Mr. Lumumba and with other deals which are not creditable for any individual, especially a person in a responsible position. There was some fighting in the Congo in this Katanga province some time ago. Then, there was a kind of truce arrived at. That truce, according to our news, has been violated many times by the Katanga people. Now, this fighting has again begun there and some casualties have occurred, a few casualties in the Indian forces and some larger ones on the other side. I cannot, in this confused situation, give precise information to the House, anything to add to the news that appears in the newspapers.

But, one fact has appeared very recently in the last few days. The U.N. officer in Katanga, an Irish gentleman by name Dr. O'Brien, issued a statement only about four days ago, and day before yesterday, another Irishman, who was in command of the U.N. forces, Gen. Me Keown has supported Dr. O'Brien's statement. I must say, these statements, both of them, make very painful reading. To say that we were surprised at this statement would not be correct. Because, we have ourselves been feeling that this was happening there the whole of last year. Ambassador Dayal's experience there and ultimately his resignation--all that was due to all kinds of pressures being brought upon the U.N. by certain great powers. Now, as Dr. O'Brien says, his position became difficult and he specially protests against the fact that a Resolution is passed by the Security Council of the U.N. and voted upon by all the members of the U.N. and

that these persons who voted in favour of them, come and undermine the implementation of that resolution. One can now realise how difficult has been this Congo problem and the functioning of the U.N. in the Congo because of this way of functioning by big powers.

Now, it is obvious that the U.N. cannot run away from this problem. If it runs away, it is almost doomed. It will make it clear that it can deal with no problem and nobody will then care much what the U.N. says. It has to face the problem and solve it as far as possible, of course, by peaceful methods, but if force is necessary, by the application of force. There is no other way.

Mr. Tshombe departed from the Congo some time ago, and was in France and elsewhere. Apparently, he is trying to raise the financial wherewithal and other things to carry on his war against the United Nations.

#### ALGERIA

I might mention that in Algeria, again, it is difficult to say what is happening. But, it does appear that President De Gaulle is taking up a very strong attitude against his own rebels, that is, those who want a French Algeria, among whom are some leading officers in the French army and others. He has only recently, yesterday, I think, passed very strong measures against those who may aid and abet the O.A.S. organisation, French Algeria Organisation, which indicates that he proceeds and he hopes to settle the Algerian problem fairly soon. We hope so. Of course, we have been hearing this repeatedly. Gen. De Gaulle did make some efforts. It was difficult to find out where the efforts are going to lead to. If there was obstruction, then, he sometimes varied his policy somewhat. But, at the present moment, I believe he is anxious to find a solution as rapidly as possible and he has thrown the full weight of his Government against those who are coming in the way of that solution, I mean to say, on the French side.

#### GOA

Now, I come to the Portuguese possessions. In Angola, as everyone knows, horrible things have been happening, and I suppose they are continuing to happen. Then, there is Goa. Some time ago, not very long ago, there was a seminar

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held, not officially sponsored, but still we took part in it, and many important leaders of African parties and African groups came here. We welcomed this opportunity of meeting them and discussing the situation with them. And apart from the importance of Goa, and Goan freedom, to us--because it is a constant irritant, not only an irritant, but we have to suffer something in the nature of, I must say, humiliation from time to time at the hands of the Portuguese authorities there--during this seminar it came out that in the eyes

of the African leaders, and especially those struggling against Portuguese colonialism in Africa, Goa was playing an important part. They attach much importance to Goa and what happens in Goa, and to some extent, that is obvious.

The House knows that for about fourteen years now, we have shown--and it can only be called--exemplary restraint. Sometimes, many Members of this House have probably not been very happy about our policy, indeed, have criticised it for being so. Yet, taking everything into consideration, we carried on with that policy, feeling always that Goa must, had to, and must necessarily, come to India; there was no way out for Goa, and it was better if we did it peacefully, even though it might take a year or two longer. But it has taken fourteen years, and so far as we know, there has been no change of heart or change of mind or change of anything in the Portuguese attitude. And these feelings in regard to Goa have, because of Angola, become stronger everywhere.

And recently, as the House knows, there have been a number of incidents, each taken by itself not so big, but cumulatively, if you take them, fairly important and big, and it almost appears as if they were direct challenges to the Indian possession and to India, and challenges thrown out in an aggressive and insulting way. There have been the cases of twice firing across the sea, of Indian merchant men, Indian passenger boats, Indian fishermen, and these boats had been going up and down for years, and nothing had happened. And suddenly why this firing? The fishermen have been fishing for years. Why should they be suddenly attacked, and attacked not merely by an odd shooting from a carbine or something but by some biggish gun. Then, there has been firing recently, when some Portuguese crossed the Savantwadi border. There too, there has been firing. And internally, in Goa, according to our information, there has been intense repression recently and very bad treatment of persons in prison; many of them have been imprisoned in jail. And altogether, conditions in Goa have been even worse than previously; as it is, they were bad enough before. Also reports appear in the press about Portuguese Armed Forces being reinforced, Portuguese gun-boats and the like coming into those Goan waters. Altogether, a situation is being created which progressively becomes intolerable for us to submit to or to accept.

Because of this, we came to the conclusion--it was after all these firing incidents on our ships and others,--that we must take steps to prevent this kind of thing continuing. We cannot possibly accept the fact of those seas there being almost denied to our shipping and our fishermen. We must clear the waters and see that they are cleared. And we must be ready; and if we take any kind of a step like that, we must inevitably be ready to meet any development that might take place there, because it is always wrong to take a step and not follow it up.

Therefore, we decided to add to our forces, Armed Forces, round about Goa, and this has been and is being done. I cannot say what the

precise steps may be because that will depend upon circumstances. But what I can say is that we have been preparing for any contingency that might arise.

Now, because of this, various people and countries which had been long asleep about this problem, thinking that it did not matter, are suddenly waking up, and references are being made in other countries that on, they are prepared to help, give their good offices, as the phrase is, to finding some kind of a solution. What the solution envisaged is, I do not know.

As a matter of fact, in the course of the past few years, we have repeatedly drawn the attention of the other countries to this situation in Goa, and to the absurdity, anomaly, of Goa existing as an outpost of a foreign imperialism on our territory, and we cannot possibly continue tolerating it. We have referred to the fact that Portugal is a member of the NATO alliance, and undoubtedly, has profited because of that; apart from profiting physically, that is, in regard to arms etc., morally it has been strengthened by it. But this has produced little result. And, in fact, many things have happened, unconnected with India, but just raising or boosting the morale of the Portuguese present rulers.

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No other developments have taken place recently, internally in Portugal, which show that even the people of Portugal, long suffering as they have been, are getting a little tired of present conditions there. There was a famous incident of the Santa Maria, that big ship, which rebelled in the high seas.

So, this is the position. As I have said, we have always been reluctant, as the House knows, exceedingly reluctant to solve problems by this application of major force, not from a pacifist point of view but from the point of view of our whole approach to these problems, world problems, and we want to keep in line with our general policy. But I must say that Portugal and the Goanese problem and the Portuguese attitude to it, have been exasperating in the extreme. It has been difficult for us to restrain our feelings or the consequent activities. The House knows, it is not for me to say, how this Goan problem has been irritating us. Therefore, we felt that we should be perfectly prepared for any developments and consequences, and we have taken some steps to that end. What exactly will happen, I cannot say, at the present moment, because it depends on circumstances, on developments, for us to decide what we should do in the matter. But the present position is not to be tolerated. And as for friends who now wake up and make suggestions offering their good offices, we welcome good offices; but I should like to make it clear that obviously there can be no solution of the Goa problem except the Portuguese Government walking out of Goa.

PONDICHERRY

May I say something about the subject--it often comes up here--of Pondicherry, that is the de jure transfer of Pondicherry? In regard to Pondicherry, I hope that this long wait of seven years between the de facto transfer and the de jure transfer is going to end. I think the French Government have declared that they are taking legal steps to that end and introducing the necessary motions in the French Chamber of Deputies this month soon. And it is hoped that next month this will go to the Senate there and then this anomaly will cease.

## AFRICA

There are one or two factual statements I should like to make. We have appointed an Ambassador to Senegal. There are new countries now in Africa. The Ivory Coast would also be under his concurrent charge. He will also represent us in Upper Volta. Our High Commission in Ghana will also represent us in the Republic of Mali. He has already been accredited to Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. The High Commissioner in Nigeria will have concurrent representation in the Cameroons, Togoland and Dahomey.

Very soon, in fact day after tomorrow, the 9th December, Tanganyika becomes independent. We are happy about this. We are always happy when colonial territories become independent. In this particular matter, I should like to say that we particularly welcome the fact that Tanganyika is becoming independent under the able leadership of Mr. Julius Nyerere. Mr. Nyerere has shown in the last year or so not only his normal qualities, what one would expect in leaders like him, that is, his patriotism, his courage and all that, but a wide vision which is important in this ferment of Africa today.

It was just about the time that we had the last debate on foreign affairs that Mr. Jomo Kenyatta had been released after 9 years in prison and we had referred to this fact with considerable satisfaction. Ever since then, Mr. Kenyatta has been playing an important part in East African affairs, trying to bring about unity and all that. If I may say so with all respect, the part he has played enhanced his reputation not only in East Africa but in other parts too of Africa and elsewhere. May I add that Mr. Kenyatta has been having constitutional talks in London with the British Government?

In regard to Uganda, it has been announced that Uganda will attain self-government on the 1st March 1962, and complete independence on the 9th October 1962--a few months later.

One important development took place in West Asia about which the House knows, that is, the separation of Syria from the United Arab Republic. It is a matter of great importance for that region and for others too. It is not for me to praise or condemn any country, but I am happy that in this matter, very difficult matter, the United Arab Republic showed extraordinary restraint. We are only interested in the unity of these various countries and not in conflicts between the Arab countries, and we can only hope that this unity of the Arab

nations will be

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kept up, not only their unity but of other Asian countries too round about.

#### VISITS OF HEADS OF STATES

We are having tomorrow a visit from His Majesty the Paramount Ruler of Malaya, and about a week later we are having the President of the Soviet Union visiting India for some days. We are happy to have these visits.

Though there is much in these visits, I mean the official functions, banquets etc. which are becoming sometimes beyond our capacity to shoulder--to eat at so many banquets and all that--these contacts have a great value, because these eminent people from abroad do bring us nearer to their countries and they get an idea of our country. What is more, we have a chance of talking informally, apart from official statements.

Take the present visit of the President of Argentina, I think any person who followed even his speeches will have realised that they were not formal speeches, they were not only friendly speeches, but there was almost, if I may say so, some emotion behind them. He was emotionally affected by his visit to India, by the welcome he received here from the people. Generally this country which is far distant from Argentina, Latin America, is regarded as, shall I say, a land like that in the Arabian Nights or something like that, which was not real, half-naked, half mystical, half mixed with romance and all that. That is the kind of picture that people have had. Coming into touch with reality, of course, the mystical part and the romantic part go, but even the reality produces a good impression. It appears in the case of the President of Argentina that it has produced a very good impression on them and on us, by our meeting.

It has long been my desire to visit the Latin American countries, but I have not been able to fulfil it, except that I went to Mexico some time ago. I hope that I shall have the chance to visit Latin America because it is not only a very important part of our world, but it is growing in importance in every way, and in some ways the problems they face are similar to ours too, economic development and the rest. So, it is a very great pleasure for us to meet him and his party here and discuss various matters with them. We found that in a large number of matters there was agreement between us.

The Paramount Ruler of Malaya now represents a different part of the world near to us and yet very different in our outlook, in our policies; but, nevertheless, we are friendly to each other.

There have been some attempts to build up some kind of what may be called an Association of South East Asian States. We have had nothing

to do with it. But it was launched some months ago. The three signatories to this Association are Malaya, Phillipines and Thailand. The idea is to develop collaboration in economic, social and cultural fields, not military or political spheres. They are avoided.

So, I come back to what I began that all these changes are taking place. Everywhere some changes are coming. Some changes are good; some are not good. But the major problem of the age that we have to face is this problem of whether there is going to be a nuclear war or not. It is obvious that if such a thing occurs all the hopes and aspirations and objectives and ideals that we may have end. We suddenly jump into some kind of new world of violence, destruction and hatred. And, what will come out of it, it is difficult to say; but nothing good will come out of it--and a great deal of evil will.

USA INDIA YUGOSLAVIA RUSSIA JAPAN MEXICO ARGENTINA GERMANY LAOS SWITZERLAND UNITED KINGDOM CONGO CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC FRANCE ALGERIA ANGOLA PORTUGAL SENEGAL GHANA MALI GUINEA LIBERIA SIERRA LEONE NIGER NIGERIA CAMEROON KENYA UGANDA SYRIA OMAN THAILAND

**Date :** Dec 07, 1961

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister's Speech initiating Rajya Sabha Debate on Foreign Affairs

Initiating the debate on Foreign Affairs in the Rajya Sabha on Dec 11, 1961 the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Sir, I move

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration".

During the last two weeks or so, there have been several discussions in this House and the other House on some aspects of our foreign policy. I would like not to cover the same ground as far as it is possible because that is

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unnecessary and perhaps rather boring to the House. Apart from what they have heard here, they have had access no doubt to what I said in the other House. If necessity arises, I shall deal with any matter to which Hon. Members may refer in the course of their speeches. In

particular, we discussed the question of our border with China fairly fully the other day in this House and I am not going to deal with that question as such but there are two or three matters to which I should like to refer. One is the fact that in one of the replies of the Chinese Government, they have taken exception to the fact that while giving publicity to a large number of their letters, we have not published two or three of their communications and some reference to that has been made in the Indian press too, that is, derived from the Chinese objection. Well, Sir, we have received and, as a matter of fact, I am, with your permission, placing copies of these Chinese letters and replies, received subsequent to the publication of White Paper V on the Table of the House and it has possibly been handed over to the Rajya Sabha Secretariat. The reason for these not being included was a simple one that two or three of them are quite recent, received after the publication of our White Paper or when it was in the press; one or two others related to charges of violation of Chinese air space and these were under enquiry by us. Whenever these charges come, naturally we have to enquire. We have to send them to the Defence Ministry and to Air Headquarters and they enquire rather carefully so that our answer may be based on full information. Therefore, there was some delay in placing them on the Table of the House because we wanted to place those along with our answer. Now that the answer has been sent, it was sent two or three days ago in the course of the last week, two or three messages were sent to them— I am placing all these papers on the Table of the House. Hon. Members will find that they are in the main two kinds of communications received by us from the Chinese Government. In the main, they are charges of violation of their air space or even their land space, and in the main again, they consider our aircraft flying over our territory which happens to be controlled by them as a violation of their air space which we are totally unable to accept. This is the kind of argument and this applies to some land space too. Our patrols go there and they raise objection to the fact that they have come into what is Chinese territory. We do not accept that. Sometimes their charges are completely baseless as nobody has gone but sometimes it is a fact that our patrols have gone and they went there because it is our territory and we can send them wherever we want. We cannot accept the fact that it is their territory even indirectly. Now, Hon. Members will see these letters and papers which really do not raise any new point but rather in continuation of this verbal warfare that goes on. The first of these letters is dated, I think, October 7, and is about air space violation, as far as I remember. Now, may I say how we get these letters? They are handed over to our Embassy in Peking who usually send the substance of that or sometimes the whole of that by telegram following it up with the actual document received or rather the actual document plus a translation in English; the actual document is in Chinese. So, the receipt of the actual document is sometimes delayed by a few days because it comes through the Diplomatic Bag; although we have received a gist of it by telegram, a few days' delay occurs, and if it is a complaint of this type an enquiry may have to be made which takes a little more time because enquiry is not only here in the Defence Ministry but sometimes locally from the local posts, there.

As I said, there are two types of papers, one deals with these charges of violation of air space or land space which according to them belongs to them and according to us one which they have occupied illegally. The other is general charges of anti-Chinese campaigns here, press or others. Sometimes they object to what I have said and sometimes to the press, and to one thing in particular they took strong exception, the publication in "India News", which our Embassy there publishes, a little leaflets, pamphlet, of the resolution of the All-India Congress Committee, just the resolution about China.

Now, what happened was that the Chinese press published a distorted version of that Resolution, not the whole one, and there were comments on that in the Chinese press, strong comments against India and against our policy. Thereafter, our Embassy published the correct Resolution in their "India News" which again has a limited circulation, it is circulated to the Foreign Embassies in Peking and to some others. They took strong exception to this publication of the Resolution of the All-India Congress Committee in this "India News", and there are two letters dealing with that. They said, "You do not permit our Embassy in Delhi, or you object when they publish some thing of this kind, and yet you publish it." Well, Hon. Members will themselves read that and our reply to it.

Lately, in the last few days, apart from these letters, as our own press has referred to, there has been rather an intense anti-India campaign in the Chinese press. These campaigns there

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come on and go off as if one was turning a tap, they come and sometimes, after a few days of it, the tap is turned off and they stop. This is what is happening there. This was turned on and all the papers there suddenly came out with violent attacks on India. Now, those had been dealt with previously and no doubt will be dealt with but there is one aspect of it which grieves me very much. Policies may differ, even, differ very greatly as they do, but there are certain criteria of good conduct which till recent years were supposed to govern diplomatic relations. Unfortunately, the cold war has rather put an end to that but what grieves me is that a country like China which perhaps more than almost any other country has had a reputation for hundreds, and, if you like, even thousands of years in particular of extreme courtesy politeness, and, if I may use the word, cultured behaviour, should behave like this. They have done many good things and many bad things in their history but this reputation has persisted and it was to be expected because, as is often said, the two countries with this tremendous and long experience, continued experience of the past, have been India and China, and all these hundreds and thousands of years have conditioned these two countries. To see a country like that, famous for its cultured behaviour suddenly to forget all the lessons of its past and adopt this behaviour is painful. I am not referring to policies or isms or to anything of the kind; that is a different matter, but there are certain things which, I feel, are almost more important

than external policies that a country adopts. Surely what are isms and policies meant for? They are meant for the development of the individual, of the human being, of the country. That is the ultimate aim surely; otherwise, there will be no aim left at all except just conflict and when that aim itself is forgotten and something is done which goes against that basic aim of human society, then it is painful. And so, I have been grieved, and indeed, last year, in one of my communications to the Chinese Government, I brought this point out with force, politely but with some force, how the Chinese Government was playing false to its own history, its own traditions, its own great reputation, the Chinese people. Well, there it is.

## GOA

Now, Sir, the other matters are there; there are many matters all over the world but I do not propose to go into detail unless some Hon. Member asks me any particular point. I have little doubt that most Members are concerned with the development of the situation in regard to Goa. The past history of this subject is well known here. It is not for me to repeat it but in the near past many things have happened, in India, of course, in regard to Goa and outside Goa in relation to Portuguese colonies. To deal with the latter first, in the last few months, the situation in Angola has been distressing in the extreme so much so that the matter has caused some kind of a mental upheaval and many Members of the United Nations and many countries or some countries which even supported Portugal in the past, have dissociated themselves from this. Among these countries is the United States, and if I may say so, it was not an easy matter for the United States to do this because they are supposed to be allies in the NATO. Nevertheless, they did it. It shows the impression which was rapidly spreading all over the world that Portuguese policies are something rather special in the way of repressive colonialism. As the House knows, the Portuguese Government claim that they have no colonies at all. They have discovered a sovereign remedy for dealing with the colonial question by passing a resolution or Government decree saying that they are no longer colonies but that they are part of Portugal. Therefore, the colonies end. This is really a perfectly extraordinary and remarkable way of dealing with a question like this and they put forward that argument when we talk about Goa and they put forward that argument in regard to Angola. Therefore, they have no colonies at all. The United Nations General Assembly did not accept that and passed a strong resolution about it, and in particular demanded from them reports on their colonies which they had refused to give because they said that they are not colonies at all. Now, there has been this mounting situation in regard to the Portuguese possessions and today, oddly enough, Portugal is the biggest colonial power in the world by virtue of the size of her colonies. I gave that background because that background does affect people's thinking even in regard to Goa. Some weeks ago, this matter was brought out forcefully at a Seminar held in Delhi and subsequently in Bombay in regard to Portuguese possessions. It dealt with the whole area of Portuguese possessions and many eminent African leaders came to Delhi and Bombay to attend this Seminar, and

the way they looked at the Goan question not purely as a Goan question but part of the problem of Portuguese colonialism and almost connected with their own struggle under Portuguese colonialism in Africa did bring out this fact very powerfully. This was the background which undoubtedly affected the thinking of many people

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but it did not directly relate to the developments in Goa. Now, because of this general background as well as our experience for the last fourteen years with the Portuguese Government, I had said on more than one occasion that devoted as we were to the ways of peace and to the settlement of all problems by peaceful methods, in view of the attitude of the Portuguese Government and developments in Goa, we could not rule out the use of other methods or forceful methods in regard to Goa. Even so, I had always laid stress on the fact that we would try our utmost to get this problem solved peacefully.

I said so and although I must say that my hope for a peaceful solution became dimmer and dimmer, nevertheless, I did hope, Sir; so I thought that perhaps the new turn that had been taken in the world, and in the United Nations, even in their great ally, the United States, may induce them to change their rigid and highly obstructionist policy, that is the Portuguese Government. Nevertheless I still hope and because of that I went on laying stress on this fact of our peaceful settlement, not only because methods of peace are desirable but because any other methods leave a trail of bitterness behind, which is bad.

Now, in regard to the old French possessions in India, Chandernagore, Pondicherry, etc., although there has been delay in actually giving us de jure rights over that area, I mean the Pondicherry area--over Chandernagore of course we have had de jure rights--nevertheless, de facto possession was given to us, and that is a major thing, with the result that our relations with France have been kept at a fairly good level. In fact, the major thing, about these relations with France is not the French possessions in India, but Algeria, something which pains us. But generally speaking, looking at the future in perspective I have no doubt that the Algeria problem will be solved with the independence of Algeria, and I hope fairly soon. But the other fact which we are assured by our peaceful negotiations--and successful ones--about the French enclaves in India is that this has left a feeling of friendly relations with France, which I value very much, because it is not merely a question of this Government or that Government there. The French people have a very fine record in history, as all great countries have, good and bad of course, but broadly speaking, France has stood for freedom and liberty and all that goes with it, and we would infinitely prefer having these friendly relations with them--though we may differ even--than to have a trail of bitterness. Therefore we also said then and repeated often that we want to make Pondicherry a window for French culture, because we attach importance to French culture; it is one of the great cultures of the world, part of Western culture, but it has a special

aspect of it, which is typically French, the French language, a great thing. We wanted that and we have continued that policy.

Now we had suggested to the Portuguese Government the same approach. First of all we had not suggested it in any kind of formal communication, I mean, but this has been our declared policy often enough, that Goa should retain its individuality even when it joins the Indian Union. We would allow Goa retain its individuality, because not only that was the right thing but, I believe, it was desired by the people living in Goa, whatever it may be, whether it pertains to religion, to language, to a hundred and one customs that have grown up. But apart from everything else it is just the feeling of having an individuality. It must be remembered, as I said, for four hundred years or so, it has had a separate existence. That is to say we were not going to absorb it into a district or some such thing--it is a small area. That is what we had said. Of course, at a later stage, when the people of Goa want a change, it is up to them to change it, it is for them to decide, not for the Government of India to impose any decision on them, or for the neighbouring States. We thought that was right and just and also because it would enable us to bring about this transition in a friendly and co-operative way.

Now the Hon. Member asked me what is Portuguese culture. Well, I really do not know what it is, I know a good deal about the absence of culture in reference to Portugal, on the positive side at the present time I mean. In the past I could mention something the Portuguese had done, which is commendable, which shows a certain measure of--well, I would not use the word 'greatness' but anyhow--something creditable to them. But in the present they have been functioning as if they had completely refused to enter the twentieth century. Their thinking, their actions, everything belongs to not only the nineteenth century but to the remoter past, and that is the difficulty. It is a difficult thing to talk to them--we do not talk the same language--world pictures, world views are different. Anyhow it is about the past I am saying. But what I was aiming at was this. All along we have desired and worked for a peaceful settlement hoping

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that nothing else than the mere passage of time and the pressures that the world situation was creating would make them change. So far as one can see, it has not had it, these pressures had no great effect on them. But I cannot imagine I am leaving the question of Goa for the moment--I cannot imagine--let us take Angola now--that they can hold on to Angola for long. The whole of Africa is not only in ferment but almost in flames, and the idea that all the other imperialists will go away from Africa, and Portuguese Mozambique and Angola will remain, it seems to me a little difficult to accept. So also Goa. One and all, and almost everybody in Western countries, even friends of Portugal have talked to me--of course they were many eminent statesmen, the only argument that they put forward--I mean, 5 or 6 or 8 or 10 years ago--was to the effect that Goa was bound to come back to India. "Why are you in a hurry? It is bound to come.

Wait a little. Be patient. It is bound to come" they said. I am quoting this as coming from people who have been friends of Portugal in the Western countries. Other people said so but they, more definitely, and because of our own inclination to solve the problem peacefully we have acted with great restraint in spite of, as the House knows, the strong feelings in India, and the strong feelings in this House and the other House, and generally among the people of India. But apart from the last few years, when there has been mounting tension and mounting oppression in Goa, the last few months have seen particular developments of this kind, and we were feeling greatly distressed when to top all this came certain incidents--by themselves not very important but taken in this context they assumed a peculiar significance, and those incidents were the firings taking place from that island opposite Karwar, on Indian shipping, passenger ships, which had been passing all along on our waters, firing on our fishermen who have been fishing all along for a long time again, and one fisherman was killed, internally in Goa much greater repression and, according to the reports that we received, a degree of torture being applied to the people who were arrested. Then, almost daily, or every other day we receive reports of raids on our Indian territory, small raids but nevertheless raids on our Indian territory and shooting here and there--sometimes it hit somebody, sometimes not--but regular raids. Now all these things, conditioned as our mind was, as I told you, all these things brought matters to a crisis, and it seemed to us that we could not possibly tolerate these conditions continuing and the Portuguese Government feeling that they could do what they liked to terrorise the population there, and even terrorise the border areas on our side of the border.

We came to the conclusion soon after the firing on our ships that we must clear these waters and make them safe for our ships. It is the primary duty of the Government and we began to take steps to that end. But that seemed to us not quite enough and we did not quite know how the Portuguese would function, that is to say, how they would function, that is to say, how they would function within Goa or on our borders. So necessarily we had to take other steps to guard our borders, to strengthen our borders, so that we might be in a position to meet any challenge of the Portuguese or any new development, and we sent some forces, armed forces there and took other steps of this kind, being prepared for every kind of emergency. That is the position, Sir.

Our patience is certainly exhausted. Yet we still hope that either the Portuguese by themselves or by the advice of their friends, their allies--they have their allies in NATO and may be there are other alliances too--we hope, will desist from what they are doing and accept the natural culmination of all this which is their withdrawal from Goa. We can discuss the legalities and modalities later on but the physical handing over, as took place in Pondicherry, should be done.

Only yesterday again reports came to us of raid on some nearby villages outside their own territory. I should like to make it

perfectly clear because it is possible that charges will be made against us that these are not bona fide occurrences but some kind of trumped up charges. I can assure the House that we have gone into this matter and there are two kinds of things. One is clear unprovoked raids, small raids but nevertheless raids, into our territories. The other is something slightly different; that is, some people have gone into Goa from our side, not officially, not in an armed way, and they have got into trouble and sometimes they have given some trouble too. And thirdly within Goa itself there is some trouble happening for which we are not liable; it is the Portuguese policy that leads to that. That is the position, Sir. Obviously, these circumstances I cannot go into in greater detail but meanwhile it appears that the Portuguese Government have addressed the Secretary-General of the United Nations. They have complained about us and asked that to be circulated among Members and presumably it will be circulated. It is for us to consider whether we consider it worthwhile to send a

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refutation of the charges they have made. It has not come to us--this document--so far as I know, that has gone straight to the General Assembly. That is not--may I make it clear--a reference to the Security Council; it is just a paper to be circulated and if we think it necessary, we might send another paper to be circulated.

## CONGO

One other matter I shall briefly refer to--that is the Congo. In the Congo the United Nations authorities have exhausted their patience decided to clear up the streets and roads and main positions in Katanga, especially Elisabethville, and they decided that if this was not done, they would take military action. And they have done so. In this military action Indian forces are involved, Swedish forces and some others but in the main Indian forces. And from such accounts as we have received these forces have done their work with some thoroughness and have more or less cleared these places. The House may remember a very curious and significant statement that was made by Dr. O'Brien, the Irishman, working there who was supported by the Irish Commander of all the forces there. That was a very serious charge.

Now, it is interesting, in that statement of Dr. O'Brien he pays a special tribute to the Indian forces there and he said that there has been a regular campaign, a smear campaign, in regard to Indian forces. We must not be troubled by decent manner wherever they go. This kind of campaign which came out in some newspapers in England and some countries in the continent this campaign because we hold that our forces are functioning in a disciplined, orderly and of Europe was very painful although this was denied by some Governments but this statement of Dr. O'Brien who was functioning with them is certainly very pleasing to us. He is quite an independent person who had no reason to give us a certificate, if I may say so, about our

force. He has done so, and, what is more important, pointed out that the campaign was almost deliberately organised. Now, this is very unfortunate--the whole episode in the Congo. We function there as United Nations forces getting orders from the United Nations. We do not send orders to them. We get some news, not directly from our Commander--sometimes he may give us some news but not regularly--we get it from other sources, chiefly from New York, from our representative in the Security Council who is also a member of the Congo Advisory Committee. He sends us these news items as they come here and to some extent we get them from our Ambassador to the Congolese Republic. As far as I can see, there is no more to be done about it at this end except to carry on these operations and clear up all these obstacles and the difficulties that have arisen, the aim being an undivided Republic of Congo and the idea of secession of Katanga being put an end to.

INDIA USA CHINA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ANGOLA PORTUGAL FRANCE ALGERIA  
MOZAMBIQUE CONGO

**Date** : Dec 11, 1961

## Volume No

1995

### INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

#### Prime Minister's Speech intervening in Lok Sabha Debate on Goa

Intervening in the debate in the Lok Sabha on Dec 08, 1961., on a private Member's Resolution on Goa, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Sir, as an Hon'ble Member, pointed out, we have been discussing this matter fully in this House more than once, even during the last 12 or 13 days. Only yesterday, there was considerable discussion on this. So, I do not wish to cover the same ground or repeat what has already been said.

The Resolution as it is at present, about giving an ultimatum, I cannot accept, partly because, since this Resolution was drafted and notice of it was sent, things have happened and are happening and to bring in the idea, of ultimatum, would, I think, not be desirable. Personally, I do not like ultimatums. I do not say that they can never be given. Sometimes, perhaps. But, in the case of countries and others, an ultimatum is banging and shutting of the door. I am never agreeable to bang a door which, if open, might help in settling a question. Therefore, an ultimatum, I think, is not helpful, is not desirable.

As for intimating the wishes of India to the Portuguese Government or to others, I think it will be correct for me to say that notice of this fact that Goa is in India and should become part of the Union of India was given very clearly and firmly the day we became independent. From that moment, we have repeated this many times. Then, other things have happened which add to the weight and importance of that notice. In the United Nations, a Resolution has been passed in regard not to Goa, but in regard to all

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Colonies and therefore it applies to Goa, although I am aware that the Portuguese Government says, it is not a colony, it is a part of Portugal taking root in a corner of India. Nobody in this House, or for the matter of that outside this House, can be taken in by this fiction and this extraordinary approach. Goa is a colony, very much a colony and a bad colony. Therefore, all countries which have colonies were given notice by the U. N. Resolution to put an end to their colonial status. That was the second notice. Then, recently, all that has happened in the Portuguese possessions, colonies in Africa and elsewhere has also brought the day when Portuguese colonialism will end nearer and nearer. Therefore, the situation is a dynamic one. It is a moving one, not static. We should remain alert and take such steps as may be necessitated by changing circumstances. I cannot say what exact steps we may have to take at any time. I do not bar out any steps. But, I will repeat what I have often said before that to the end, whenever the end may come, we shall always hope to settle every problem like this or any other by peaceful methods of negotiation.

I realise that after all this experience, the last fourteen years' experience, it is a very brave and confident man who can say that such peaceful methods of negotiation can bring results, so far as Portugal is concerned; it is very difficult to say that. Nevertheless, one should never, as I said, close the door, while at the same time being prepared for such other steps as may become necessary from time to time.

We have recently taken steps to prepare in that way; it is not so much that we took the initiative, apart from the general initiative that we have taken in this matter, but in this particular matter, recently, it was not we who took the initiative but the Portuguese Government who by their aggressive policy have really compelled us to take action. The action that we have taken in effect is to be prepared for action; and we have done that, as the House knows. And we hope still that the Portuguese Government will be prepared to agree to put an end to this colonial status of Goa and depart in peace and friendship.

An Hon. Member: Is there any proof of such a thing on their side?

The Prime Minister: I do not know what the Hon. Member said. However,

we should continue to hope that that happens, because one thing is obvious, and it has always been obvious, that Portuguese domination of Goa cannot be a continuing feature of India or of anywhere else. As is bound to happen, it has always been a question of time, and I think that all the world will acknowledge that India, and the Government of India and the people of India have been very patient and restrained in this matter; so, that is the position.

May I say again what I have often said, and what we said in regard to the French possessions here too, that it is not our intention, when Goa becomes a part of the Union of India, to put an end to the individuality and personality of Goa? Goa is a fairly small enclave. In terms of Indian geography, it can well be a small part of a district of India. But, because of the past, because of many things that have grown up in India, and because in India we have welcomed the fact that India is a country of considerable variety, and we have preserved it, we are prepared, and we intend, to keep Goa's individuality, and keep it as a separate entity, in direct connection with the Central Government, and maintain its special features, whatever they may be, such as customs, culture, etc., as we did in the case of Pondicherry, till the people of Goa themselves want to change them. It will not be imposed on them. If they want to change them in future, of course, they can always change them. That is the future, as we envisage it, and I hope that that future will become the present fairly soon, at least not before long.

USA INDIA PORTUGAL

**Date :** Dec 08, 1961

## Volume No

1995

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Shri Krishna Menon's Speech intervening in Lok Sabha Debate on Foreign Affairs

Intervening in the debate in the Lok Sabha on Foreign Affairs on Dec 07, 1961, Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, the Minister of Defence, said:

Mr. Speaker, Sir, in the last two or three days a number of motions for adjournment have been tabled in this House on the question of Congo and Goa with a view to, as I understand it, elicit information. I was to have made a statement this morning, but when this debate was raised I thought it more convenient that I should speak at this time.

So far as Congo is concerned, the reference was mainly to the

incidents that are now taking place in Katanga and the participation of our troops therein with its consequences. What

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happened was that at the Elisavethville airport on 2nd December, 1961 some members of the Katanga gendarmerie, probably drunk, were restrained by the Indian personnel, who were responsible for law and order in that area, when they (the former) were molesting a Baluba woman. Thirty-one gendarmerie soldiers and 15 policemen were taken into protective custody by our troops. They were later returned to the Katangese authorities.

On the following day, the gendarmerie established a number of road blocks and positions and fired at random on the UN forces. An UN reconnaissance helicopter was shot at from Tshombe's palace and it had two bullet holes. There were no casualties in these incidents. At that time Mr. Smith, one of the UN representatives and Mr. Urquhart were taken by the police. Much before that, the UN representatives met the Katangese Foreign Minister Kimba and demanded immediate withdrawal of gendarmerie to their camps from all road blocks and asked him not to have any patrolling in the town except by unarmed police. The United Nations representatives made it clear that unless this was done the cease-fire would no longer remain effective and the UN would take all necessary measures to maintain law and order. This, I would like to submit, Mr. Speaker, is in conformity with the resolution passed recently in the Security Council. Kimba and Munongo both assured Mr. Smith that there would be no firing on the night of 3rd/4th December. They, however, gave no definite answer to the question of withdrawing all gendarmerie to their camps.

On 4th December the gendarmerie established more road blocks and constantly reinforced their position. Kimba was told that the deadline for the withdrawal of the road block established between the airport and headquarters of the Katanga Command was 18.00 hours after which the UN would take action. At 18.00 hours Kimba rang up to say that he was going to see a senior military officer on the spot to remove the road block.

The road blocks were still there at 08.00 hours on 5th December. It was clear that senior army officers of the Katangese force had no control over the situation. This is one of the features of the Congo situation. The Gorkha troops and some Swedes went into action at 14.30 hours on 5th December and cleared the road blocks. The Gorkhas suffered the following casualties in this action: one officer was killed and three Gorkha officers injured. The casualties on the other side were heavy but figures are not given.

The gendarmerie withdrew to the far side of the air-field and the UN consolidated their position. There was sporadic firing at Headquarters, Katanga Command, during the whole of 5th December by machine guns and mortars directed by the Belgians from surrounding villas. There were however no further UN casualties. Firing on the

Swedish Battalion and Gorkha road block during the night of 5th December continued. The Katangese aircraft dropped three bombs on Elizabethville airfield on December 5. There was again heavy mortar and automatic fire on Headquarters, Katanga Command by the Belgians on December 6 from houses in the vicinity. Most of the houses in this area have LMG and MMG's mounted on them. Our guns have since silenced two houses.

It was at that time that the Indian Air Force was called in to go into action in regard to these Katangese forces and they destroyed the opposing forces by both jet and transport aircraft. The fuel dump and the tower of the airport have been damaged. One bridge was also damaged. There have been no further reports. This is the position in Congo.

I would like to say that since the withdrawal of Mr. Mckoown, our Brigadier Raja has greater responsibilities to carry, and perhaps this occasion should not pass without my mentioning that--this is a matter on which some reference was made the other day--the Indian forces enjoy a high reputation in the whole of Congo and they have behaved with a remarkable degree of discipline that is expected of them. This applies not only to our combat troops but also others including our field ambulance, nursing officers and others.

With regard to Major Ajit Singh, he is known to be alive. He is in Jadotville, where you may remember an Irish officer was taken prisoner by the other side one time. I believe the UN force in this matter is acting with a degree of caution because it is actually in their hands. But with the turn of events in Katanga and the superiority of UN personnel and the new arrangement of Command, it is to be hoped that they will get him released very soon. That is the position in regard to Congo.

In this connection, some reference was made to our position with regard to reconstruction of the United Nations. I do not know whether it was directly said or not, but it was implied that we were giving support to what is called "Troika". Of course, "Troika" is a word which is differently interpreted at different times. The position of the Government of India had been

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first stated by the Prime Minister two years ago in the United Nations and afterwards carried out in a very big form, that we do not support "Troika" for the reason that we do not accept the division of the world into three parts and, what is more, so far as the Secretary-General is concerned, it goes contrary to the Charter. And, if I may so speak here with all modesty, no government or no delegation has made a greater contribution to the resolving of the deadlock with regard to Secretary-General. It is well recognised, and today we have, without the veto and without avoiding the appointment of a Secretary-General, a solution that has satisfied everyone for the time being.

Now we come to the position in regard to Portugal. First, I will give such facts as we have in this connection. On November 17, 1961, the Portuguese troops fired on an Indian passenger steamer S.S. Sabarmati while it was plying on her normal course between Karwar and Cochin. This resulted in injuries to the Second Engineer of the ship Mr. D'Penha. It was clear that the firing was deliberately directed at the Engineers' Mess. Indian ships have plied on this route for years and their right to do so has never been questioned. I raise this point to show that there is no question of territorial waters involved here unless there is a state of war. Before the firing was resorted to by the Portuguese troops no warning was given by the Portuguese. It was an unarmed passenger ship and was on its normal run. The firing was in broad daylight. All these points add to the provocation.

A few days later, on November 24, 1961, the Portuguese troops fired at an Indian fishing boat which was returning after its normal fishing trip off the Karwar coast. One of the bullets hit Mr. Kochrekar, who ultimately succumbed to his injuries. This action was again an unprovoked attack, without any justification in fact, on peaceful Indian nationals engaged in their traditional vocation which had been conducted without any interference for centuries.

Apart from these incidents, reports have been pouring in from different parts for the last two weeks of intensified firing activity, oppression and terrorism in Goa and of heavy reinforcements of Portuguese Armed Forces in the territory of India now held by that colonial power. There was a report a few days ago of 2,500 troops having been deployed along the Goa border, the significance of this being that it is in this area which has been sealed. There was also a report of a fleet of two Portuguese frigates standing at guard in Anjudev Island. When these frigates went there, the Indian Navy sent two frigates on Sunday, or a week ago; but our frigates have taken no hostile action; they were sent there for administration purposes.

Since then, there has been no offensive action taken against the fishermen as such, but there have been landings on the island. On December 1, there was a report that Portuguese warships reached Diu with 300 soldiers and that 2,000 troops from African and other places have also arrived. A few days ago, it was also reported that dawn-to-dusk curfew had been imposed and that anyone coming after the curfew hours would be shot at sight. There was a report that fresh reinforcements amounting to 700 Portuguese troops had arrived. Another report said that in Daman over 1,000 Portuguese soldiers had landed. There have been reports of warships and other ships arriving with arms and ammunition and fresh supplies of military stores. The Portuguese Armed Forces are thus poised near the border at various points in order to overawe and intimidate both the residents of Goa and those living in the border villages on the Indian side. Hit-and-run raids across the border already seem to have started. A raid in a village near Sawantwadi was reported two days ago. This is the position that obtains now.

Having said this, there are two or three other aspects of this matter to which I must make a reference. First of all, the view of the Swatantra party was represented here that in doing this, apart from all other considerations, we were fighting on so many diverse fronts which will weaken our resistance against other enemies, other opponents, and the authority of an ex-General of the Army was quoted. I confess, Mr. Speaker, that I did not consult an ex-General, but I have been advised by a serving General. But there has been no withdrawal of any effectives or any forces--by forces I mean even equipments--of any strength from any part which might be threatened from other quarters. This country cannot organise its army in such a way that there are no troop movements anywhere else. There are only two ways of doing this--either have troops all over the country, which will probably mean spending large sums of money and having millions of men, or have mobile forces which can be moved from one place to another. All these things have been taken into account in the movement of troops that has been made and only the minimum that is required is done and no more.

When all this is going on in Goa--and really, from the point of view of defence technically we are, perhaps, not concerned with other matters

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that have been raised; but we cannot isolate them--if as a result of these intimidations, major atrocities take place in the territory of Goa to our people and, what is more, these extend to our neighbouring places and there are some reprisals, for instance, in Dadra and Nagar Haveli which have come to us and so on, then neither this House nor this country can remain patient without arranging for defence.

At the present moment, the position of the Government is that there is no question of our going and liberating Goa. The question is that we shall not leave our places undefended, nor allow or leave it to chances in regard to any action they may take. It must also be remembered that the Portuguese also are not without notice in this matter. In the Security Council, the Portuguese attacked the Prime Minister for something he said about the use of force, if necessary. Though we have imposed upon ourselves a self-denying ordinance that we will never use force for this, that or the other, we have publicly stated that we will decide when, where and how to use force. This country has never abjured the use of force for the vindication of its rights wherever it thinks fit. So, there is no question of suddenly hitting or attacking. In fact, we very much regret this giving of a colour to this job that we are marching a liberation army into Goa. That is not the position.

AIR FORCE ALERTED

We are the aggressed and it has been going on for the last so many years. And what has been happening for the last one year, and

especially for the last few days, has been of a character that no Government with any sense of responsibility can keep quiet when its borders are being assailed. We have also reason to think that the Portuguese are not without air support; that is, as far as they propose to go. They are not without air support and, therefore, our Air Force has also been alerted. And I make no secret of this fact that if the Portuguese do try to do what the Katangans have done, they will get it hot as the Katangans did. There seems to be sufficient evidence to think that apart from 1,000 or 2,000 troops all over the place, they have elaborate provision of air-fields all over the place in these territories of Diu and Daman on the one hand and Goa on the other, and they are very much strategically adverse to us unless we are extremely careful about it. There the position of the Government of India is that it has deployed its troops in the necessary positions not only on the Goa border at the moment but wherever troops are required. If we are a small country, we would not be in this position. Our general life and our means of communications are not of a highly mechanised character where movement can take place quickly. We have a single railway track system and a large number of people have to be moved and many operations undertaken. Therefore, these things appear in the newspapers.

I am sorry that trains have been stopped, but they have all been restored. I wish people give as much publicity to the restoration as to the stoppage; but that is not being done. Anyway, this inconvenience is very much regretted. But, on the other hand, if notice had been given beforehand, the troubles would have been even more. We have no system of censorship in this country. We have a free press, we have free radio and a large number of newspapers. Anyhow, we have a large number of foreign correspondents here, some of them flying between Karachi and Goa and so on. I have not seen even one foreign correspondent, when he reports about the atrocities committed by us, report about the atrocities inside Goa. They are so concerned about popularising or publicising where we have departed from virtue. That standard of virtue they do not apply to themselves; not only to us. There have been no reports, as far as I know, of what has happened in Goa itself.

So, the position at the present moment is that these are precautionary measures, certainly of a sizeable character. But the point is that no Government with any sense of responsibility could sit quiet under these conditions when there is this kind of movement of troops. But suppose there was a large-scale action or some action by the air force or by sea. There have been news of a number of naval vessels and the mining of the land. In regard to sea, we do not know whether there is mining or not until we get there. But when mining operations are going on in one place, there is no reason why it cannot be equally done in another place.

Shri Masani may rest assured that Government is not thinking of push over operations. First of all, it is not thinking of any operations, and push over does not square with the other party; the other party is making too much preparations. We do not expect any push over

either. I think the House may feel satisfied that if, unfortunately, we are drawn into hostility.

(Interruptions).

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Therefore I can only say that any Government must reserve to itself, so long as it is a Government, the use of troops. As to the question of when, how and where, that has to be decided according to the proper circumstances.

A reference was also made to action that may be taken at the NATO or the Security Council or anywhere else. That is all a part of the offensive against us. After all, a number of people who are in military alliance with Portugal are there in the Security Council, but if it goes before the General Assembly, we know where we stand in this matter.

Before I conclude, I would like to say, since this reference has been made, that Portugal and South Africa are the only two countries who have voted against the resolution on colonialism. We should hope that the whole position of colonies has now reached juridically a different situation from what it was before. It is not a question of what we hold. We have the legal rights and so on. Secondly, in the face of overwhelming vote pressure spread over two or three years, she has also refused to conform to the United Nations' Charter in regard to informing the world about her self-governing dominions. On the top of it there is all that repression that is going on elsewhere. We are not taking reprisals for it.

If African troops are going to be shipped over to Goa to fight us and to contribute to the pressure on this side, a new situation arises. I would like to inform the House about conditions that prevail. As for the shooting at the merchant ships, may I say that this bullet that entered the ship was not a rifle bullet either; it was a military bullet. In the conditions of not only continued aggression of colonialism but of attack on this country, after all, we are not to be treated and continued to be attacked in this way. If there are any violations of our territory by land, sea or air, a new situation arises. No one can say with any authority that we are invading and the army is ready to go and liberate. Liberation must be accomplished by the people within. But when the people within accomplish the liberation, we cannot sit back if they are shot down, repressed and massacred. That is the reason for these movements.

USA CONGO INDIA OMAN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC LATVIA PORTUGAL PAKISTAN SOUTH AFRICA

**Date :** Dec 07, 1961

# Volume No

1995

MALAYA

## Vice-President's Speech at Banquet in honour of Paramount Ruler of Malaya

Speaking at a banquet given in honour of His Majesty the Yang-di-pertuan Agong, Paramount Ruler of Malaya, at Rashtrapati Bhavan on Dec 08, 1961, the Vice-President, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, said:

Your Majesties, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests: it is a great pleasure for us to have for the first time the Head of the independent State of Malaya. Malaya gained her independence in 1957 and this is the first time we are having the Paramount Ruler of Malaya with us. I should like to express to you, Sir, and to Her Majesty and the other members of your party our most cordial greetings and welcome. We have heard a great deal about Malaya, even those who have not visited that country. It is a beautiful piece of territory, streams, rivers, estuaries, thick jungles, and everybody talks about the beautiful landscape. A writer in 1927 speaking of Malaya writes: "There is no dust, no flies, no crows, no income-tax." But in 1948 you introduced income-tax. It only shows that you are modernising yourself rather rapidly. It is the meeting place of many peoples. You have today Malayas, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, Ceylonese, Dutch, Portuguese, British, etc. Well, it has been your endeavour to weld all these diverse elements into a unified whole. You are trying to build a nation out of all these heterogeneous factors. Malaya is a nation in the making. Nationality does not depend on religion, race, or customs and manners. It depends on community of ideals, certain basic political concepts, certain economic objectives and love of the soil in which you are born. You have been attempting to build a State, a single nation, out of these varied elements.

Even with regard to religion though you have declared yourself an Islamic State or Islam as the State religion, you have adopted an attitude of absolute toleration with regard to the different religions which prevail there. I have heard that you have contributed to the construction of a Buddhist temple, the Ramakrishna Mission at Penang, and your toleration has been reciprocated by the people and now that you are planning to have a national mosque there, non-Muslims, Hindus, Chinese, everyone have contributed to the construction of that mosque. Religious toleration has been your real ideal in

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spite of the fact that Islam is declared the State religion of the

country.

You have made a unique contribution to the constitutional process of the world.--The only instance so far as I know of a King who is elected and who functions only for a period of five years to be replaced by another who is elected again. I do not think you have this case in any other part of the world.

Your country is rich in natural resources, rubber, tea, spices, copra, arecanut, etc., but we cannot rest with these resources which have come down to us. Science and technology are making great progress. They may have synthetic rubber some day; they may produce even synthetic tin. We do not know; miracles happen. Therefore it is essential for any country if it wishes to live and survive in this competitive world to adopt the modern methods of science and technology. That is the only way in which we can keep ourselves alive.

I have heard many of your names and they suggest to me the large way in which your language got itself enriched by Indian ideas and Indian names. Your name, I am told here--I shall read it so that everybody will understand now--is Thantaramat Mahamulya Shri Paduka Bhagindra Yang di-pertuan Agong, Mahamulya, Paduka, Bhagindra--Bhagya Indra, Lord of Wealth. Her Majesty is Raja Permaisuri Agong. These things do indicate how much there have been contacts between your country and ours. That is why we feel when we meet you that we are not meeting a stranger, that we are not meeting someone who is unknown to us, we are meeting one who belongs to the great family of these parts.

Your ambition is to get other States, Singapore, Borneo, Sarawak, etc. into a larger Melanesia. You have our sympathies. The rise of such a State will contribute to the stability of South Eastern Asia and we wish you success in that attempt.

I want therefore to say by sentiment, by tradition, by common ideals and the objectives which we possess, our two countries are bound to each other.

It is therefore a great pleasure for me to ask my friends to drink to your health, to the health and well-being of the people of Melanesia and also Indo-Malayan friendship.

USA INDIA PAKISTAN UNITED KINGDOM REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

**Date** : Dec 08, 1961

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1995

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Reply of Paramount Ruler of Malaya

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Replying to Dr. Radhakrishnan's welcome speech, His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Paramount Ruler of Malaya, said:

Mr. Vice-President, Mr. Prime Minister, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Your gracious words of tribute to my country and my people, Mr. Vice-President, are for my Consort, the Raja Permaisuri Agong, and for me the Crown of an unforgettable day.

From the moment we landed at the Gateway of India in Bombay yesterday, and again today, setting foot for the first time in the capital of your great nation, we have felt the warmth and sincerity of your Government and people in bidding us welcome, and we appreciate deeply the friendship and solicitude you have extended to us, so beautifully expressed in the simple and grateful greeting of "Namaste".

Let me say at once that we are very happy indeed to be in India and to bring to you, the Government and people of India, the heart-felt good wishes of my, Government and people of the Federation of Malaya.

One of the rewarding pleasure of life is for everyone, I am sure, the happy anticipation of a joyful meeting between friends, and I have no hesitation at all in saying that my Consort and I have been looking forward for some time past to this opportunity, not only to visit India and to see and learn what we can, but also to strengthen the ties of fraternal goodwill and mutual confidence and trust which distinguish the close relations between your country and mine.

There is a quality of grandeur and greatness about India which never fails to rouse the respect and admiration of any thoughtful man who cherishes goodwill for mankind. This timeless land has an enduring capacity to awaken questions in an enquiring mind and heart, so much so that throughout the centuries many men have tried to discover without avail the essential element which generates the spirit of India. Even in the short time I have been here I have already felt this sense of inward challenge.

It was there this afternoon when I, as with so many others before me, stood like me, stood like a pilgrim at the shrine of Rajghat to pay my respects to the memory of one of the most noble and selfless men who ever lived, Mahatma Gandhi, whose life and work are held in honour not only by the people of India but by all

men everywhere. I am proud to have the opportunity of paying my personal tribute to his greatness and simplicity of soul.

Today also I have had the pleasure of meeting for the first time your renowned Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, who for the past fourteen years as the leader of India is, without question by any man, one of the great statesmen of this modern world.

Today also, Mr. Vice-President, I have made your acquaintance for the first time. For many years you have adorned your high office with great merit, adding not only to the prestige of your country, but also to your own remarkable reputation as a man of learning, both as scholar and a philosopher. I am happy indeed to be.

This afternoon I paid a visit to your revered President, His Excellency Dr. Rajendra Prasad, and I was very pleased at the opportunity to speak with him, although he is not well. I well recall his visit to my country in 1958, when he was the guest of honour of my beloved predecessor, the first Yang di-pertuan Agong, the late Tunku Abdul Rahman. His visit to the Federation of Malaya is well remembered by my people, not only for reasons inseparable from his distinction and responsibility as President of India for the past ten years, but also for the opportunity to show their personal esteem for a man of the people who is revered by the people.

His visit to the Federation of Malaya was also historic, because His Excellency was the first Head of State to pay my country the honour of making an official visit. It is most appropriate, therefore, and a circumstance which gives me particular pleasure, that I should make my first journey to another sovereign nation as Head of State to your great country of India.

The ties that link your country and mine are both old and new. The old ties stretch so far back in time and history that it is impossible to say with any precision when the first contacts were made. Certainly it is clear from archaeological discoveries that close links and association between the people of India and Malaya existed more than a thousand years ago. I have no doubt that future finds may well reveal that the cultural and commercial influences of ancient India reached Malayan shores many centuries earlier. Such a revelation surely will not be strange, seeing that India and Malaya are like two arms embracing the same ocean.

But setting aside the undoubted evidence of history, and the questions of commerce and custom, or the presence of many words of Indian origin in the Malayan languages, or the still-living spirit of the Ramayana in our songs and stories, there are in modern times even stronger relations and personal ties between our two lands.

Over the years many hundreds of thousands of people from India have gone to Malaya to live or work there either returning to their own country or settling down in Malaya as the land of their adoption, as they have done for some generations past, with the result that today

there are many thousands of Indians who are proud to call themselves citizens of the Federation of Malaya.

I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation in Malaya of the wisdom and farsightedness of your Government in consistently urging on those of my subjects who come from India, or whose families did so before them, that they should give their loyalty and love, their respect and devotion to Malaya.

I can rightly and fairly say that the Malayans of Indian descent today are making a splendid and constructive contribution to the peace and well-being, the happiness and prosperity of the Federation of Malaya.

The links of history in the past and the personal ties of today do not, however, complete the story of intimate understanding and association between India and Malaya. We in Malaya, as the newest free nation of Asia, owe an undying debt to the example and inspiration of India in the struggle for independence, and the rights of free men to be masters of our own destiny in our own lands. We in Malaya and you in India share the same feeling of pride in the achievements of sovereignty and the liberation of Asia.

Finally, yet, another link exists between us and that is the bond of association as free, equal and fraternal members of the Commonwealth, that remarkable and diverse company of many countries, races and creeds, so elastic in concept as to include without difficulty or distinction a Republic such as India and a Constitutional Monarchy like the Federation of Malaya.

Mr. Vice-President, may I once again express on behalf of my Consort and myself, our warmest appreciation of the welcome and hospitality of India, and the pleasure with which we are looking forward to seeing your country and meeting your people.

It is now my privilege to express to you, and to wish on behalf of the Government and people of the Federation of Malaya good health to

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your beloved President, and peace, prosperity and happiness to the Government and people of the Republic of India.

I give you now the toast of His Excellency the Vice-President of the Republic of India.

USA INDIA

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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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Prime Minister's Speech in Lok Sabha on Chinese Incursions into Indian Territory

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The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on Dec 05, 1961, while replying to the debate on the Chinese incursions into Indian territory:

Mr. Speaker, Sir, in accordance with the wish expressed by you, I have had a map or chart of this area placed in the Central Hall, and also--I am not sure if you have got it--a copy of the latest Chinese letter. If you would permit me to say, we have received a reply from the Chinese Government to our last protest note, which has been printed, our last protest note dated the 31st October, 1961. The date of the reply is 30th November, but it reached naturally two or three days later; that is the Peking date; it came to us about three days ago, I think. So, I should like to place this too on the Table of the House, to complete the record thus far.

The substance of the letter is that they have, of course, as usual, denied and repudiated the various charges that we had made against them; and they have said that their line of 1956 in the Chinese map was not changed; it was more or less the same in the 1960 map, and the difference was just minor, which is not correct, because that is a factual matter where you can see the differences. Just to draw the attention of the House to this matter, we pointed this out quite clearly in the report of the officials of the Government of India who met the Chinese officials; it has been dealt with there.

Then, they talk about our complaint about Chinese intrusions, more especially, about those three posts that I have mentioned.

In regard to one of them, Dambuguru, they deny the fact that they have got a post there. I have no doubt that they had it, and all I can conclude is that they have withdrawn it, as previously they withdrew another post near Demchok. For the rest, they say that at the other places they have been there all the time or for a long time.

Then they complain of the Government of India's stopping up military activity on the border and establishing new checkpost, and generally building up their military position along the border, not only there, but at Bara Hoti. Then they complain, denying our complaint, of Indian aircraft violating what they call Chinese airspace and state that the Chinese forces have been asked not to patrol within 20 kilometres on the Chinese side of the border. Then they sort of hint at the fact that if our military activities continue, they may have to take steps in defence by sending some troops across the MacMahon

Line. This is broadly what they have said.

May I add that in the map I have placed--it is a very good map, not merely a chart but a regular map--there are two or three lines marked, the international boundary, the Chinese side's 1956 claim and the 1960 map of the Chinese. They are three lines. Three or four places are marked in it. Our post at Dauletbeg Oldi is not printed there, but it is marked there. This is the only post we have marked. We have not marked the other posts that we have, as I stated the other day before the House. The three Chinese posts are, one on the Chip Chop river and the other two Dambuguru and Nyagzu. They are marked in this. We have not marked other posts; we did not think it was desirable for us to mark our posts on the map. As for the Chinese side's other posts, some are on the other side of the 1956 line. They are stated in the documents and can be easily traced.

I have welcomed this discussion in the House because I want these matters or any matters that may create doubts in the minds of Members of the House or the country to be elucidated, explained and clarified in this way. So I have welcomed it, and I have found in the course of the debate that a good deal requires clarification. I have been accused of many things, including confusion and lack of clarity. It is rather difficult for me to speak about my own capacity to be clear-minded. My own impression has been that a number of Members, chiefly on the opposite side of the House, have been singularly lacking in any clarity of thought or expression.

Now, some Hon. Members repeatedly said that I lacked clarity of thought. As I said, I cannot obviously be a judge of my own virtues and failings. Others have to judge; the House

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will have to judge. But this charge which Shri Naushir Bharucha repeated, about my desiring to suppress facts, is so patently wrong that I am amazed that anyone should make it unless he himself suffers from some confusion in thinking.

One thing that is correct in that charge--we dealt with it during the previous debates--is that when for the first time, the Chinese started building or using the Aksai Chin road, when we first heard of it, we were not quite sure. So we inquired into it. We sent our people to inquire into it. Some of our people were arrested and things happened. Then we sent a protest to them. That is correct. It may be I was wrong there, that at that time I did not bring this fact immediately before the House because we were inquiring and finding out what the Chinese Government's answer was.

Apart from this particular fact, we have kept this House informed of almost every scrap of paper that has been used in this connection. The book that I placed before on the Table of the House the other day, White Paper No. V, and the other four fat Volumes, contain every letter that has gone and every letter that we have received.

Naturally it is not possible or, I think, desirable for me to come to the House and tell them of every petty incident that occurs from time to time or of a protest made or a protest received. But every relevant thing has been stated.

Now, an Hon. Member said that even on the 20th November, I kept back facts. I have my own failings, but I am not an unmitigated fool and for anyone to suggest that on the 20th I kept back a fact and that on the 27th I should be exposed by the Hon. Member is a bit difficult to understand. How am I exposed by the papers I placed on the Table, which I knew I was going to place on the Table in a few days' time and which I said so? Am I going to keep back a fact which I know is coming up before the House at my instance? The fact of the matter is that in this matter of the fresh incursions, before I went to America, that is to say, just about the time we sent this last reply to the Chinese Government on October 31, we thought it was a very important matter and must be placed before this House.

And we decided to prepare this White Paper No. V. It has taken some time to prepare it, the House will see it. It is not produced in two days' time, and during this period it was being printed for being placed before the House. I returned from America in the forenoon of the 20th November. Almost immediately within an hour or an hour and half, I had to come to the House, and I came here. It was my intention to make a statement along with the White Paper as soon as it was ready, but the matter was raised as a motion for adjournment, and I made a brief statement then, and I said then that four or five days later I shall place the papers and make a statement. This is the position. So, to say that I deliberately kept back anything, when we are giving everything in this printed book, is rather wide of the mark.

In this book there are some references to our Ministry having written about some Chinese patrol being seen somewhere. It is for you to judge, for the House to judge, whether every incident of that type has to be reported immediately to the House, because these petty incidents are occurring sometimes; they have occurred and we take some action, we get some reply which comes up in a connected form before the House. It would be confusing for every letter that we write to be placed before the House immediately.

So, I do submit that there is a very great deal of misapprehension and misunderstanding about this matter, and I have ventured respectfully to treat this House, in regard to taking it into our confidence, more than is normally done in such matters. And I propose to continue to do so because the matter, as the Hon. Member Shri Asoka Mehta said, is one of profound importance. Nobody in this House can disagree with that description, and certainly not I or any Member of our Government. Indeed, if the House would remember, sometime back--I forget now--when speaking on this problem, on our border problem in this House and the events that had given rise to it, I laid the greatest stress on the importance of this matter to India, not only in the present but in the future, and I said this problem in

some shape or other might pursue us for a generation or more, and we could not consider it lightly or superficially. What happens on our border is a basic problem, it is a problem of historic importance. So that, nobody can charge me with not attaching enough importance to it. I think personally that it is more important basically for us than any other external problem.

So, I would beg the House at least to accept this statement of mine that we attach the greatest importance to it, and it is not a party matter, it is obvious; it is a matter of national importance, and I would have hoped that we should have all treated it as a national issue of the highest importance.

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A curious thing was said by one of the Hon. Members opposite, that we had hidden this fact, that some daily newspaper in Delhi had said that a meeting of officials of the External Affairs Ministry was held which decided to keep it dark in view of the elections. I have not seen it, but if it has appeared in any Delhi newspaper, this kind of thing really does little credit to that newspaper. I know of nothing, no meeting, and I have enquired about it in my Ministry. How could it be kept dark for months and months when it is obvious, it is patent, that the thing was being printed to be placed before the House? The whole thing is ridiculous. As for doing it because of the elections, I should have thought that there could be no more foolish thing from the point of view of the present Government than to do this; and if I may say so--and I say so with some hesitation and without meaning or implying anything--certainly the impression created on my mind has been that part of the heat generated on the other side is due to the very elections in the foreground. May or may not be so.

An Hon. Member asked the Government to resign on this issue and to face the electorate. Well, I am sorry to say I am not convinced by him, as I am seldom convinced by what he says. He demanded this on behalf of the people of India. Of course, I suppose that he is aware of the fact that, as a matter of fact this Government will cease to exist in a few months, elections will take place, and the people of India whom he represents so stoutly will be given full opportunity to decide who should form the next Government. I do not know, I may guess but I do not know, what their decision will be, and whatever it is it will be faithfully and loyally followed. But may I venture to say that we all represent, in a degree, the people of India, otherwise, we would not be here. But when Shri Braj Raj Singh stoutly talks on behalf of the people of India, I am reminded of an old story which has stuck in my mind almost from my childhood, of the three tailors of Tooley Street. The three tailors of Tooley Street issued a manifesto once, declaring "We the people of England, say this and that". It amused me when I heard of it first long ago, and somehow it suddenly came back to my mind listening to Shri Braj Raj Singh.

This is a matter of high importance, and I should like to deal with this matter in all seriousness. Basically, what has happened? A

certain aggression has taken place on our territory, and many other things backing it have happened or are happening. And how do we deal with it? First of all, what is the objective? Obviously, our objective can only be to get that aggression vacated. How do we get that aggression vacated?--by diplomatic means, by various measures, and ultimately, if you like, by war. Now, our policy is to get that aggression vacated fully and wholly. Our policy also is, and always has been in regard to every matter, to try every method, every peaceful method, to gain our objective.

It may be that the peaceful method is not successful. Even so, it is desirable to do that for two reasons; one because it is in consonance with our policy, internal and external; and, secondly, it should always be the necessary prelude to any other action.

I have again to refer--I regret to do so--to the Hon. Member. I am sorry; but I want to be quite clear that his thinking and mine are not the same in this matter because he says that we should go out and occupy 70 miles beyond the McMahon line and reach the Brahmaputra and the Mansarowar lake. He says that we should declare that our frontier is the Brahmaputra and includes the Mansarowar lake. We will not claim that frontier and we do not propose to claim that because it has no historical or other validity. What we claim we claim for adequate reasons pointed out in the Officials' Book.

One of the reasons I should like to state here which is a deeper reason because the Himalayas are not only a part of our territory but, if I may say so, they are part of our hearts and minds; and it is a deep injury to us if anything happens to them. It has been associated with the thinking of our race, our forbears for thousands of years; and our whole cultural tradition is tied up with it; our literature is tied up with it; our mythology is tied up with it. So far it is an essential part of us, something deeper or greater and more important than merely some territorial claim.

When some Hon. Members took exception to the fact when I have stated several times that this area is a bare mountain, very few people hardly dwell there, there are no trees etc., they seem to think that I am saying that to minimise the importance of this area. (Interruption). They are mistaken. But we must know the facts; and I do not understand how you arrive at the truth by minimising facts which are known to everybody else but we ourselves refuse to see them properly ostrich-like. The importance of it is very great for a variety of reasons and more especially for the reasons

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which I have just mentioned. But, nevertheless, the fact remains that this area is a most extraordinary area in the world so far as terrain is concerned. At that rate, no tree grows anywhere in this wide area, there may be some shrubs.

I was stating our policy about this vacation of aggression; and so

long as that aggression is not vacated, this basic trouble remains. This is a basic headache. How should we get that vacated? Always through peaceful methods. Apart from peaceful methods, there are pressure short of war; and then there is war

Now, I am free to confess to this House that my whole soul reacts against the idea of war anywhere. That is the training I have received throughout my life and I cannot easily get rid of it at the age of 72.

An Hon. Member: Except in Congo!

The Prime Minister: The Hon. Member's interjections are sometimes not relevant and at other times have little meaning. He says, Congo. He should know that Congo is an entirely different type of case where in our duty to the United Nations and to the emergent nations of Africa we undertook a responsibility which may involve us in warlike operations; but is not war all the same. (Interruption).

However, how can any person rule out war? Why do we keep our Army, Navy and Air Force? We keep them. But the fact is that first of all one should realise that our desire is to avoid it, but not to submit to any evil if the avoidance of that means submission. Therefore, even if we have to take that step, we take it certainly, for defence and certainly for the vacation of any aggression. Because when I say defence, it includes action against an aggressor. Obviously, aggression on our part would be if we cross our international borders outside; that is aggression. What we do inside our territory is defence. So, one cannot rule out war and we do not rule out war.

But, then, other facts come too, the factors which might broadly be called military factors. That is, when one takes a step, one does not take a step without being, so far as possible, quite prepared for success in that step, without adequately strengthening oneself in every way and that is what I call adventurist action.

The Hon. Member gave us instances--not very happy instances--of England joining the Second World War or France being defeated by Hitler. I do not quite know what the relevancy is to this. That is why I feel that the charge of confusion and all that may very well apply to some Hon. Members opposite.

However, the point is a very simple fact that if you have to take anything in the nature of military action it should be thoroughly prepared and strong action, and not action which may come back upon you if you do not succeed in it; and it may weaken your position. It is a simple proposition which is applicable in war. Of course, if sometimes one has to take action immediately because there is no escape from it, that is a different matter. So, we have followed this policy, aiming at the vacation of this aggression, at the same time, through peaceful means realising that we are not sure how far they will succeed. They may not; and I am not ruling out the possibility of their succeeding, because one must not go by what all the brave

words that are said in these communications to us by the Chinese Government. But other factors work also. Nevertheless we realise that that may not be brought about in that way. Therefore, we are taking all the steps that we can to prepare the ground for other methods to be employed.

Hon. Members will say that we are giving some information to the Chinese which will give them strength. But the fact of the matter is that we are dealing with a physical situation which was completely neglected for the last 100 years or more. And we are dealing with it pretty well, I think, administratively, militarily, building it up, preparing the ground for advance; we are advancing and we are putting up our posts, administrative centres and others. It is a neglected part and the whole of a hundred years are responsible for it. We started doing it ten years ago and did it fairly effectively in some parts of the frontier which is, remember, over 2,000 miles. In other parts we did something which, let us admit, was not adequate to stop this aggression. It is true--also--we say--that we did not expect this type of aggression from the Chinese, although we know right from the beginning that fundamentally the change in the situation in our borders was a historic change, that would affect our frontiers and bring danger to them. That is why we took it. We did not expect that danger to come in that particular place, especially Ladakh at that stage.

All this came because of various developments in Tibet. Anyhow, we have been taking these steps and Hon. Member says that we must jump into this fray in some other way without adequate preparation. I would submit

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that this is more from exuberance of his mind and excitement than from clear thinking. I find it a little difficult to follow the tortuous working of the Hon. Member's mind. I am talking about things about a hundred years ago. He talks about the British Government protecting Tibet all the time.

An Hon. Member: All the time Tibet was there to protect us: Tibet was looked after by the British. (Interruptions).

The Prime Minister: I do not understand what the Hon. Member is after. Some Hon. Members said that Tibet should not have been given up, as if it was our property to keep or give up. (Interruptions). I really cannot understand how else or what other policy we could have adopted. We could have adopted two policies. One was the one which we have adopted. The other also involved our walking out of Tibet. We were in Tibet not in any great armed force; we had a couple of hundred soldiers protecting the line, somewhere in Gangtok or Yangtse, just a few. They could not possibly remain there. It was an impossibility. We could not march our armies into Tibet. We had to come out of Tibet. There was no way and not all the power in the world could prevent that. That is admitted. Therefore, the objection

is, not of the step that we took but of the fact that we justified it by certain historical and political reasons. The step had to be taken; there was no doubt about it.

The objection, as the Hon. Member said, is that while the Chinese came there, we should have withdrawn such elements of forces we had there--we had to and the Chinese would have come in as they came in--but we should have registered our protest about their coming. Whether that protest would have been of the slightest help to us or to the Tibetans is another matter. (Interruptions.) I submit that I should like the Hon. Members opposite to think what exactly could we have done except if they think that we could have affected the fate of Tibet by condemning them in the United Nations or elsewhere.

An Hon. Member talks about the matters of conscience. There are many matters of conscience. If we enter into the field of conscience, we may lose ourselves because not much of what has been said here relates to our conscience. Many things happen in the world and in our borders. If we are looking at it from the point of view of India's interests, as we must naturally, from the point of view of doing the right thing, I regret to say that I am completely unrepentant about the policy we adopted towards Tibet. In practice, we could not have adopted any other policy except of course that foolish policy, policy of accepting what has happened and bewailing our lot.

I can very well understand Hon. Members feeling strongly on the Chinese incursion and aggression. I understand that. We all feel it. Only there is a difference in our expressions. We have to express ourselves, some of us at any rate connected with the Government, in a somewhat restrained way, because normally civilised Governments function in that way. We agree with the broad objective. There may be differences in the ways we reach the objective. I have analysed, pored over and listened carefully to some of the speeches made.

Then you have accused us, that we have allowed to create an atmosphere, and in spite of all this trouble, of China being right and reliable. I do not know how; in our usual attempt at being friendly with every nation, we have opposed and objected to many things done by other countries. But we have avoided, nevertheless, shouting loudly against them. That is our broad policy and I think it is a right policy. That does not mean this; that is, sometimes, people imagine that politeness is subservience. That is a sign, if I may say so, of some hidden fears in one's hearts and not a brave, straightforward attitude to the world. We are friendly with every country in the world including China, but we will fight China if necessary. That is the whole lesson that I have been taught during the last 40 or 50 years of my life by Gandhiji and others: always to be friendly and never to give in. That is how we have carried on our campaign. The gentlemen opposite perhaps have not had that training and therefore they cannot appreciate what I say. But I propose always to avoid saying or doing things which are unnecessarily offensive and which are not necessary. Sometimes an offensive thing has to be said, but ultimately, what I am aiming at is, either winning over the other

party or weakening the other party in its own opinion and in the world's opinion and in my own. This is the normal practice.

An Hon. Member referred to Panchsheel. Take this question of Panchsheel which the people seem to think is a kind of red rag to the bulls of the opposition, or anybody else. Gradually, Hon. Members are beginning to see and sometimes even say, as an Hon. Member said, that the principles of Panchsheel are quite good but they should not be applied to China. Now, if Panchsheel is good, it is good, and Panchsheel is a method of international relations which I

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think is essential, unless you have war, ultimately. You may have intermediate stages too.

If you say that China has not lived up to that, I entirely agree. Because China has not lived up to that, we are taking all these steps aimed at, and this situation has arisen. That is a different matter. But it is no good talking of Panchsheel. You might even say: "Truth is a good proposition, but it does not pay. Therefore, we lie all the time because somebody else is lying". I say that in the Panchsheel, the principles laid down are the only principles which a civilised society can have in its international affairs. The alternative leads to war. If you have war, there is no Panchsheel; then it is war. But there it is. That is completely right for us to adopt it here and elsewhere.

Our grouse is that China has broken its word, and in that sense betrayed its word. That is our grouse. But you seem to be annoyed at the mere fact that Panchsheel is mentioned or the five principles are mentioned; it is to our advantage that it is mentioned. I am only pointing out that they have broken their word.

As far as I remember, an Hon. Member said and most people said that they do not want war if possible. Of course, if it comes it cannot be helped. The Hon. Member does not even want us to break our diplomatic relations with China. What then? Not indulging in a campaign of slander--we do not want that--and instead of that, we exchanged notes which are sometimes strong notes, and we go on strengthening our position to deal with the situation whenever we think it is strong enough to be dealt with by us and not from a weak position.

Now, when we have arrived at this stage of preparation, etc.--we lay down the policy--the other matter goes inevitably into the hands of our military or air or defence advisers--the so-called experts. It is for them to decide what steps to take, naturally in terms of our broad policies, taking directions from us. But ultimately it is their decision and we have to follow that, we have been doing that and building up our strength from the base upwards. The roads that we decided to build and have built today to a considerable extent are over 2,000 miles, all roads in mountainous areas. Just imagine the task we have undertaken--2,000 miles, of roads--and we have built

them. A great deal depends on them, because without these roads, that basic build-up does not come into play.

I have talked about adventurist action. Adventurist action is taking some action without having a base to support. That is not fair to our men. They are brave and fine men, but it is not fair to put them in that position and not fair for the nation to take some action which cannot be supported and therefore which ends abruptly. So, that is the broad policy; the rest becomes a question of military tactics, strategy and the resources one has at one's disposal.

Some Hon. Members said, put the whole resources of the Five Year Plan there, which again shows an extraordinary lack of intelligence. If I get together all the engineers and others and dump them in Ladakh, what are they to do there? A variety of things are necessary. Material is necessary--this and that--which has to be carried by air. Every little screw is to be carried by air. So, more aircraft is necessary. We get new aircraft; we have got it. The moment new aircraft come, new airfields are necessary, because they are too heavy aircraft to be supported by the old airfields. So, there are a hundred and one aspects of things. One seems to think that India should rise as one man and sort of oppose it, and if I may add, be about as capable as one man. These are phrases may be for political meetings, but when we are considering this very dangerous and highly important situation, one has to plan and do things which will lead to success.

Take again the most extraordinary statement made by an Hon. Member that, according to his information, we have issued orders that none of our people are to fire unless fired upon. It is absolutely wrong. There are our military posts and obviously they are there to defend, to attack or do whatever the position may demand. Then, there are reconnaissance parties--usually small parties--whose objective is to gain information and report to us. If this small reconnaissance party gets involved in some trouble, we do not get the information and the main objective is denied. Where we want to fight, we fight; the posts fight and others fight. But so far as the reconnaissance parties, which may consist of 3, 4 or 5 persons are concerned, we have told them to concentrate on getting information and telling us about it. They do not go spreading about, 10 persons spreading about, to engage themselves in major warfare; that is writing them off, which is unfair to them and we do not gain. So, we must distinguish between reconnaissance, getting news whether publicly or secretly and fighting. These are obvious things which Members may perhaps forget.

Much was said about friendship with Burma, Nepal, etc. I do not think we have ever been

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quite so close friends with Burma as we are now. Does that mean that we are to dictate Burmese policy? Take Nepal even. Much has happened in Nepal, which we have not liked and we have expressed ourselves

about it. But we have not interfered, because we want to maintain their friendship. We are still continuing to help them. Some Hon. Members opposite have expressed themselves very strongly against the present regime in Nepal, which has irritated them. We have restrained ourselves although mildly we have said so and we are friends with Nepal still. It is true that things have happened there which are not to our liking and we have made it clear; we shall continue to make that clear. We cannot order about these things, because the mere act of doing that has the reverse consequences.

Broadly speaking, I think all these countries are in terms of quite close friendship with us. The Malayan King is coming here; the Malayan Prime Minister is coming here within a few days. The Hon. Member, Shri Asoka Mehta, should not attach too much importance to what a few students might have said to him in Rangoon or Singapore, I forgot, or someone else there in Singapore or Malaya.

Somebody said that we should not sponsor the Chinese case in the U.N. As a matter of fact, even last year, we did not sponsor it, but certainly we voted for it. Because that has nothing to do with China being good or bad. In fact, we think that unless China is in the U.N. we cannot proceed with disarmament or any major matter. There can be no disarmament, China being left out to arm. There are other reasons. It has nothing to do with our trouble with China. We shall deal with it.

Then, a number of statements by the Defence Minister were apparently not approved of by some Hon. Members opposite. But again I would submit that they do not seem to have read them before disapproving of them, apart from headlines or may be something else. He was on the eve of coming back to India. He was asked something at the New York airport. That very morning something had appeared in the newspapers; I had made a statement here on the 20th November and there were big headlines there. He was asked, what is this about? In relation to what was said in Parliament, he said, "I do not know the latest developments". He knew, of course, all the others. He said, he did not know what was happening just now. It was in relation to what happened in Parliament that morning that he said, "I do not know what the latest development there is". In relation to what happened in Parliament, he said, "I do not know if anything happened in the last day or two". The concept there was, large armies were facing each other in Ladakh, to which he said that there are no active hostilities of this kind going on, not "hostility", but "hostilities" going on in this way, i.e. largescale fighting.

An Hon. Member: Pardon me I am interrupting because the Defence Minister said that I have misinterpreted him. Actually, the words quoted in inverted commas are "active hostility" and not "hostilities". So, you will have to stick to that expression "active hostility" if you are quoting from the newspapers.

The Prime Minister: I do not know, but surely the newspaper is not more reliable than what I am telling him. Anyhow, it is immaterial.

He says that he used the word "hostilities". Nobody can be absolutely dead certain as to what was said, every word casually said when one is going to the airport. But the whole point was that the concept there was of large armies fighting, and he wanted to say that this kind of thing is not happening there now.

I was saying something about sponsoring China. Last year we did not sponsor it but we supported that, and that is our position this year too.

Well, Sir, there are many minor matters but the major position is this, and I hope that apart from our minor arguments that we throw at each other this question of our border and Chinese aggression there is of the most vital importance--I repeat--not only for India's integrity but for the future of Asia and of world peace. It is a matter of tremendous importance, and unless the world takes some other course in the next few years, which it might--I mean disarmament--and takes a vital turn, this will be one of the major trouble spots of the world, and we have to prepare ourselves not for today only but for tomorrow, the day after and years ahead. That is why anything that we want to do, we want to do with full preparation.

I think, as I said the other day, that we have improved our situation in the border very much in the last year and half. I do not say that it is as good as we want it to be, but it will become that good progressively, growing better and better, and our policy can only be to get this vacation by the Chinese forces from India's territory. We work to that end; and therein we all agree.

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Ultimately, if you analyse the situation, it becomes one of, possibly, some military tactics. We may differ on that. I may have some opinion, but I have to abide by the opinion of my military advisers. I know they are anxious to achieve results and they are working to that end. It is a difficult task. Anyhow it is no good saying that. When I say it is difficult task, the Chinese will think we are afraid. We are not afraid, we are not accustomed to be afraid of anything. But that does not mean that we should function without due care, due preparation and due thought. That is what we venture to do. And, we have to see it in the context of a developing world situation. It is bad enough here. But the developing world situation has to be kept in view. You cannot isolate it. We are trying to do that, and I think that in doing so we have served the cause of India. We hope--we are not without hope--that we shall be able to succeed in getting this land vacated through pressure, through other things, whatever they may be, and without engulfing the whole world in a major war. These things are connected with each other. We cannot isolate them. In effect, therefore, there is little difference, except for strong accusations here and there, in the approach to this question from any side of the House.

I think--you may say that I am to blame for that--that even though I,

right ten years ago, foresay these developments I, nevertheless, trusted--perhaps that is not the right word--I thought that the Chinese Government would not function exactly as it did later. It is true. You may say I was mistaken in feeling that way. But I think that all the time basing one's policy on suspicion is not also a good thing. Sometimes one may be mistaken as one was in this case. But the success we have had in our foreign policy the world over is because we have tried to keep every country a friend and succeeded in creating that impression. Rightly, it was not that China specifically was isolated from others. China was one of the countries we dealt with as a great country, a big country and a country which is our neighbour. We have to adopt that policy; there is no other way, though otherwise all the trouble would have come perhaps sooner or in a worse form.

Anyhow, Sir, we have to face the situation as it is, and we propose to face it stoutly and with courage.

An Hon. Member: A question which has been exercising the mind of all is what attitude Government is planning to take, intending to take with regard to the treaty with China which is about to lapse in June.

The Prime Minister: I am glad the Hon. Member has drawn my attention to this, because I wanted to mention it myself. Yesterday we received a communication from the Chinese Government pointing out that this treaty is expiring or will expire in a few months and the time for renewal of it ended. I think, day before yesterday, and suggesting that we should try, we should discuss the terms of a new treaty. That is what we received yesterday. We have naturally, sent no answer to it. Well, in the course of the next few days we shall send an appropriate answer.

CHINA INDIA USA TOTO CONGO FRANCE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BURMA NEPAL  
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

**Date :** Dec 05, 1961

## Volume No

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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Prime Minister's Speech in Rajya Sabha on Chinese incursions in Ladakh

Replying to the Rajya Sabha debate on Chinese incursions in Ladakh, on Dec 06, 1961, the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, I am grateful to the comments and even the

criticisms and the suggestions of the Hon. Members who have spoken. Yet, with all respect, may I say that apart from some remarks made by some Hon. Members, the debate has not helped very much in throwing light on the present situation and the problems we face there? It is not perhaps very easy to throw so much light, further light, because this matter has been discussed repeatedly and I find that some of the arguments used were almost the same that were used a year and a half ago and previously. Presumably, that signifies that there are no further arguments to put forward.

The position we are discussing is, if I may say so, broadly a limited one, that is to say, what has happened in the course roughly of the last year. I forget when we considered this matter last--may be it was about a year ago perhaps, or a little less. In considering these developments in these border areas, we have to remember that normally speaking, it is hardly possible for any marked movement to take place during what are called the winter months. Whether it is summer or winter, they become places where only hardened mountaineers can go; anyway they try to climb high mountains. Therefore

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it really means what is done there in the summer months--five or six months mostly when that movement takes place there.

Now, this matter was brought to the notice of Parliament, say, on the 20th November, the very day I returned from abroad. In fact, within an hour of my landing at Palam, I tried to come to Parliament. Before I had gone abroad--end of October--this had come to our notice--a little earlier--and we had sent that reply to the Chinese Government, dated the 31st October which is given in the White Paper. And we decided naturally to place all these papers and explain the new position to the two Houses as soon as they met. That is why we started getting the White Paper printed just then. I mention this because for some reason which I am unable to fathom, repeatedly I am accused of withholding information. And Shri Dahyabhai Patel quoted from some letter I wrote perhaps to Mr. Chou-En-lai or somebody, which is given in some old White Paper, to the effect that because of friendship with them, we had not placed certain facts before Parliament at a certain time.

Now, I have dealt with this matter pretty fully previously here in this House. This referred to the northern Aksai Chin area where the road was built. It took us some time to verify it and then we wrote to the Chinese Government and we wanted to wait for their reply before placing it. It was not this major incursion or aggression that has taken place a little later. We did that then, and we thought that we should know facts a little more first. It took us three months in getting the reply of the Chinese Government to the building of the Aksai Chin road. I may be wrong there, I might have acted incorrectly. I am prepared to admit my error on that particular matter in the early beginning, because we thought it better to find out what they said about it because that road is an old caravan

route. It had been used. But it is one thing to use a caravan route which had been used for centuries past. It is another thing to consider it your own and build a road. So, we did that. But after that incident came the Tibetan rebellion and then all kinds of new factors came in and that rebellion resulted directly in the occupation of the eastern part of Ladakh which is a major aggression that has taken place.

Since then--Shri Dahyabhai Patel admitted it--we had flooded this House and the other House with White Papers and a large number of other papers, correspondence, etc. We have put before this House, before Parliament, every little thing that we have been doing. We cannot obviously come here every day and say that a report has come, that a small patrol has been seen somewhere. That too comes up here, of course a little later, in the shape of the White Paper. But we cannot come up about these minor incidents that occur. We receive complaints from the Chinese of our patrols going, there, of our aircraft flying over their territory. It is complaint and counter-complaint and it has gone on. But I do submit, Sir, that we have put more facts about this in every single letter or Note that has been written before the House from time to time, and we propose to continue to keep Parliament fully informed. I do not think it is normally the custom in Parliaments in other countries to be kept informed like this of almost the day-to-day developments or month-to-month developments in matters involving the military situations and developments. Nevertheless, we thought it better to do that. And so, we decided to place all these facts before Parliament as soon as it opened. It so happened that I came back an hour before, and I could not get those papers ready. The matter came up before the House, in the other House, in another shape. I said that in four or five days' time I would make a statement which I did. In fact, I have placed this White Paper.

So the point we have been considering is what has happened in the course of the last year--that is a narrow issue--and if you like in that connection, what our broad policies are. I stated that what has happened in the course of the last year on the Chinese side was, so far as we know that three check-posts or military posts had been established. We cannot give the exact date, it is not possible. We can only say that it was not there on one day and later it was there on some other day when our reconnaissance party went there. Or, in other words, we got to know about it then. We heard about it in September--in the beginning or middle of September. And so, we mentioned these three posts--one, rather in the north, not far from the Karakoram and not far from an important post that we have--a long name, I forget it at the moment--and their post is on the Chipchop river about fifteen miles to east of our post and two posts in the southern region of northern Ladakh which we mentioned and which we said were round about the international frontier.

Now, I am sorry Dr. Kunzru is not here--he raised this point that I described this as of no great significance. I never said that at all. What I said was this. First of all, I had distinguished between the

northern Chipchop post and the two southern ones distinguished in the sense that the Chipchop post was well in advance

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of their previous post and therefore, it is a serious intrusion. The other posts, I had said, are not important in the sense that they are an intrusion because they are near the border, they are just across the international border. That we admit. But we objected to that also because the near-building of them, even on the international border, was objectionable. From our point of view, it was an aggressive act and it was quite contrary to the assurances they had given that they would not do any such thing. It was from that point of view. So, we made a difference.

The Chipchop border post was highly important from every point of view, while the other ones were important also but on a lesser degree. They are on the border and they did not involve much intrusion. Dr. Kunzru apparently got rather mixed up between what I said about the northern and southern posts. What I said about the southern posts, he thought, applied to the northern posts, which did not. Now, in the reply which the Chinese Government had sent, they have, of course, justified this but they have denied the fact of having one of the southern posts. They said, we have not got it. And probably they have not got it now. Probably, they have withdrawn from it just as they have withdrawn from one or two other posts. But in eastern Ladakh, near Demchok they have withdrawn during the last few months or so.

That has been happening. But the main thing was, which I described as the sign of aggressive intent, not the northern one but the southern one. Although it was right near the international border, the mere fact of building up roads seemed to us very wrong. But the northern one certainly is much more than a question of intent, and I entirely agree with Dr. Kunzru, the fact of certain roads being built, connecting it, is also of importance. It ties up with the system of defence or aggression, call it what you like. That is perfectly true and we recognise it.

Now, one word about building of roads. An Hon. Member has asked why they have built thousands of miles of roads on their side and we have not done so still. The broad answer to that question is that the terrain they have to pass through is far easier to build roads on than the terrain we have on our side. That is to say, there are broad plateaus, ups and downs. Roadmaking in Tibet, apart from the high mountains that come in, is merely pulling out trees and levelling and nothing else, no application of anything, because the moment it is levelled it is a road. Owing to extreme winter the ground is so hard that nothing more is done. We have ourselves built one airfield at least in these high regions in Ladakh which cost us at that time, I do not know, exactly Rs. 400. Practically nothing. It meant really sweeping the place and removing little boulders and stones and pulling out shrubs and it became an airfield, not a first class one

but good enough for use. So that road-making on the other side has been a very much simpler undertaking.

Then on our side we have to cross high mountain peaks, passes, up and down precipices. Hon. Members who have cared to see the photographs of some places--even the Himachal Pradesh roads that are being built--will realise the extremely hazardous nature of this road-making. That is one reason. I think we have proceeded fairly well with road-making in these mountains. The real difficulty has been that we have to take everything--I mean every machine, every screw has to be taken by air and that led, naturally, to our trying to acquire bigger transport planes, big ones to carry these things. We did that and matters have been progressing fairly well and I can assure Dr. Kunzru that it is not in an attempt to save a few crores of rupees that we have allowed, or we are going to allow, this to suffer.

But there is another fact. Apart from any temporary affair, in any major conflict anywhere with any country, our first and basic defence is the industrial position we hold behind it, what we are producing in the shape--I am not talking about other things--of war material and the rest but everything, whether it is aircraft, whether it is guns, whether it is other things. That is the basic thing. If one does not have it, one depends on external sources which are not very reliable and not forthcoming at the time. It is better, I have always held--and that has been the opinion of some of the highest military advisers that we get from abroad to advise us--it is better to have second class weapons which you produce yourself and have them in abundance than an improved weapon which you do not produce and which may be denied to you at the time of need and which may get out of order and you cannot put it right and then you are helpless. However, that is a matter of opinion.

Anyhow, the basic thing for defence is the Plans. All these Five Year Plans are basic for the defence of India. People seem to think that the Five Year Plans are something isolated from the defence of India. Some people in the other place said, "Oh, scrap the Five Year Plans and go in for defence" which showed how little

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understanding there is as to what is required for defence. All this is required--may be some odd thing or may not be--but whether we want an iron and steel factory, it is essential for defence. All that defence wants is steel. So, in building up defence, in building up the strength of India for protecting the security of India, building up this industrial apparatus is highly important. We may give a twist to the industrial apparatus so as to build more of defence. That is another matter. But essentially the things are common whether it is defence, or whether it is any kind of civil advance. So, as I said, in considering the position as it is, arising during the last year this has happened to the best of our knowledge and we consider it as a serious matter, not merely as an intention or intent but as something that has been done.

We have meanwhile also put up a number of posts, check-posts, military posts. It is not quite proper for me to give the exact locations of them except the one I have mentioned which is right near the Karakoram and which prevents any flanking movement from that side.

The position is that, when people ask how much territory they have taken over, committed aggression on,--the Chinese--and vaguely they say ten thousand miles, fifteen thousand miles or two thousand miles, it is difficult to say that because it is not occupied in the ordinary sense of the word, although it is true that a certain influence is exercised over a certain territory by these check-posts, and one may say that where there is a succession of check-posts, they are, in a sense, in possession of the territory behind them. That is so.

On the other hand, there are some check-posts which are like a zigzag. They are check-posts and it cannot be said that they have occupied that territory. I do not wish to make much of the facts. It really does not make very much difference. The point is how much strength they have to control that place because occupation there is not occupation of territory where people live. They are just mountains and other things and in that sense I had said that it was not correct that the building up of one check-post in the north--there is one in the north really, the other is on the frontier--had given them a larger area under occupation, but it has given them a stronger position in that area. That is correct.

Now, how are we to deal with these matters? Obviously we have to deal with them, whatever step we take, with some strength behind what we do and with the capacity to follow it up. It would be opposed to all intelligent military approaches--leave out any other--to jump into the affray without adequate preparation, adequate base-lines etc. Having decided our broad policy, the implementation of the policy, naturally, has to be carried out under expert military advice such as we have, and we have been following that. We have been trying to build, first of all, roads, secondly, camps, base camps, other camps, etc. and we propose to pursue this as fast and as efficiently as we can.

The Hon. Member, who moved this motion, loosely talked about--I am really surprised at the lack of understanding of the position. Many people talk about our populating this place, these areas, sending people from here and making them live there, a sort of warriors living there, ready to spring up at any intruder. Well, Mr. Jairamdas was good enough to describe something from his own experience on the N.E.F.A. side, people having to go up by ropes, leave out roads, but actually climbing a rope for hundreds of feet on mountain sides and on the Ladakh side. I doubt how many Members of this Hon. House can even sit there for an hour and a half or two. They will get hard breathing difficulty at 10,000 to 17,000 feet. That is the normal height we are functioning at, from 15,000 ft. to 19,000 ft.

As for taking people from here, from India, to live there, there will be very, very few. Unless you exercise some kind of authoritarian regime and push them there, keep them there by force of arms, it is very difficult to develop these areas. There is very little growth.

I might mention in this connection that for the first time in history we have at Leh succeeded, with the help of our scientists and botanists, to build a very fine farm there. People said that it could not be done but this we have done this last summer. It has been quite an achievement and it will help us in many ways and we propose to go on doing this. But, to imagine that we can populate that place is not a very helpful advice. What is, again our policy? Obviously, aggression having taken place, to vacate the aggression by whatever means are feasible to us. To begin with--and not only to begin with but even afterwards--to try every method, negotiation, etc. because, if your intention is war, even then you have to do this and at the same time to strengthen your position to meet any contingency, any development that might arise and for any steps that you have to take. That is the only policy anybody can pursue.

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Any policy of jumping in without that adequate preparation and background may be dangerous because such attempts, if they do not succeed, weaken one and cause much greater loss in morale, etc. That is the broad policy we are pursuing. I do not see any kind of peace in the frontier so long as all recognised aggression is not vacated. In this business of building up, one of the really outstanding achievements of our Government and more specially, of our defence apparatus has been the building up of defence industry, defence science, to a remarkably successful extent. Fortunately we have good scientists in Defence. Fortunately we have some fine technical people in our Defence, in our Ordnance and Defence Factories and it is that that is really giving the basic strength to the nation from the point of view of war and from the point of view of other things too. So, when people talk as Mr. Dahyabhai Patel loosely talks about our Defence Ministry or Minister, I regret to say that it simply shows that he does not know his subject at all. The progress made by our Defence Ministry in the last few years has been quite remarkable, as people who know say and the people who have come from abroad are astonished at what we have done and what we are doing. It is no good getting hold of some odd sentence here and there and hanging the whole argument on it without understanding the context.

Again Mr. Lal, who, I regret to say, did not bring any fresh idea or fresh thought at all into the debate, repeated what he might have said two years ago. He seems to object to our repeated professions of friendship with China. That surprises me, or perhaps it should not surprise me. The fact is that that is the normal way of addressing countries always--every country--unless you are at war with that country. The strongest thing you can say about a country is that that country is unfriendly or we are unfriendly to that country. In

diplomatic language, that is the strongest word we use. That is the word which precedes a war almost. Of course, nowadays I must admit, in these days of cold war, diplomatic language has undergone transformation and it has come down to abuses of the lowest kind often but one is always expressing--and honestly I hope expressing--the desire to be friendly. That does not mean that you take down your armour or weapon or live in a state of confidence that nothing could happen to you. It is absurd to combine the two things. The two have to be taken together. Always the attempt is at friendship and attempting to carry on, to keep ready for any hostility from anywhere.

Some Hon. Members talked about reorienting our policy. In a sense one is always reorienting policies, depending on facts, not only local facts--I mean facts on the frontier--but world facts too which are very important in a matter of this kind. We are always doing that to an extent, but I am not aware of any major thing which requires a major reorientation of our policy. That is a different matter.

Now many, or some of the Hon. Members said--I forget who did it but it has got into a favourite expression--that we have no friends in the world. Anything more ridiculously false is difficult to imagine. Our country has got more friendship in the world--I say so with all due respect to people who may hold a contrary opinion--than any country in the wide world. It is true that, if you measure that friendship by the amount of arms we get from them, we do not get any arms except what we buy because that is opposed to our policy and we are not going to do that but it is quite extraordinary, considering what we are--we are a relatively underdeveloped country, a poor country and militarily we are not too strong compared to the bigger countries--the amount of respect that we get and the friendly interest that is taken in our country is out of all proportion to the physical facts that normally condition this respect and friendship. So I am quite amazed at these charges being made by people who know nothing about the other countries of the world.

Mr. Dahyabhai Patel said that we have no friends in the United Nations, that we have become the most unpopular nation. I would submit to him that he might undertake some study of the situation before he speaks in this august Assembly on such matters about which he seems to know nothing.

Casually I say--it has no reference to this matter and I do not know what Mr. Pyare Lal may have said in his book but if it is a fact, I want to correct it here--that when we sent the Kashmir matter to the Security Council, I took Gandhiji's advice myself. I read out to him, as far as I remember, even the document we were sending and he approved of it. So to say that we sent it against his wishes is quite wrong and if Mr. Pyare Lal has said it, he is mistaken.

Just one or two words more. I do not think or imagine that there is hardly anybody in this House who disagrees with the basic position that I have given here. They may disagree with the emphasis here and

there. They may say that we must be quicker or faster--that is a different matter--except perhaps--I do not know--what the attitude of the Communist

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Party is in the country. What Mr. Bhupesh Gupta said was that the Communist Party is more or less in line with the country's sentiments. I am very glad to hear it. That has not been my information in the past. It is pretty well-known that the Indian Communist Party is rather split up on this issue, some siding with the more nationalist aspect of it and some siding with the more Chinese aspect of it, if I may use that word. It is a fairly well-known fact. If they are undergoing some sea change, I am very happy, but it is an important thing that in this matter, as I think some Members pointed out, in a matter of this kind, we may criticise each other in our minor aspects of policy but in the main, the country should hold together and pull together and so we build up a kind of psychological state of the nation which helps in bearing burdens and sharing difficulties. Some people say, imagine, that we must go out into the country with a raging campaign, presumably, for the coming war. I think that will be completely a wrong thing. This is the kind of thing which is sometimes done elsewhere which we criticise in other countries and which has led to the world to the brink of disaster today. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to follow the example of many other countries, great countries and small, who have learnt to live in this brink of atomic disaster and nuclear warfare. And although no one wants war, yet inevitably one drifts to a state of possible war. But even in considering our own problems, we can isolate them from the rest of the world. Having isolated them and considered them as such, we have to consider them in relation to the rest of the world. And the rest of the world is undergoing tremendous changes in arrangements and re-arrangements and all kinds of things. The major problem before us now is whether in the course of two, three, four or five years there is going to be a nuclear war or not. That is the big problem of a war which will destroy everything, which will affect every country, including India, even though we may not be joining any war. And so we have to see this problem in this context, because when we see it in that context it does make a difference, what China can do to us and what we can do to China.

In spite of some people thinking that we are isolated in the world--we may be isolated from the point of view of non-alignment and not being a party to some military alliance--there are other ways of contacts, close contacts and close friendships. And apart from any such ways, there are reactions. Is it imaginable that a war between India and China will remain confined to these two countries? It will be a world war and nothing but a world war. I am not saying that it need necessarily be a war between India and China. Other steps can be taken and may have some effect. But we have to think of every aspect, of every possible development and prepare for it, and avoid developments which may be very harmful not only to us but to the

world.

I hope, Sir, that the House will agree with this assertion of our position, that this aggression has taken place on our territory and we must do everything in our power to get that aggression vacated. We must try to use every diplomatic and all peaceful devices to that end, whatever they may be, that is to say, avoid war to that purpose, because war between India and China would be one of the major disasters of the world, for us and for the world, for it will mean world war. It will mean war which will be indefinite. We would not be able to limit it in time, because it will not be possible for China to defeat us and it will be impossible for us to march up to Peking across Tibet. These things are not done. Things function differently and for us to jump into such things would be the reverse of wisdom. If it is to be done, if it is forced upon on us, it is a different matter.

Therefore, we should be prepared and prepare as fast as we can and in the best way we can, keeping in view always the larger situation in the world and how it is developing and how that is affecting our own problems in India.

CHINA USA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC INDIA

**Date :** Dec 06, 1961

## Volume No

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Vice-President's Speech at Banquet in honour of Soviet President

Speaking at a banquet given in honour of His Excellency Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on Dec 15, 1961, at Rashtrapati Bhavan, the Vice-President, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, said:

Mr. President, Madam Brezhnev, Your Excellency, Ladies and Gentlemen: It is my great pleasure to extend to you and to your distinguished colleagues a very hearty welcome on behalf of the people and the Government of India. I spent a few years in the Soviet Union when your people were busy repairing the damages and restoring your lost things as you suffered in the last war twenty million casualties and a third of your country was overrun. You were busy in reconstruction of

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your society. After that on account of the great advances of science and technology you have raised yourselves from a relatively backward country, in the second decade of this century to the position of one of the most advanced nations of the world. What we call the space ships, the sputniks, etc., are a symbol of the great progress which you have made. We had the pleasure of welcoming Mr. Gagarin here and he and his wife made themselves very popular and won the admiration and affection of our people. You have also been of great assistance to us in building up our economy. The Bhilai project, the Heavy Machine project at Ranchi, the Oil Refinery at Barauni are some of these instances of Indo-Soviet collaboration. You are trying to build an economy of full employment, free medical relief and universal education. These are also the ideals which we have at heart. We agree with you in thinking that it is a Government's first duty to establish social justice in any country. Our trade with the Soviet Union is on the increase and in years to come we expect that it will still further go up. We have had cultural exchanges, and scholars and students go there, and your sportsmen, your artists and your scholars visit our country. As a matter of fact at the present moment we have here a ten-man gymnastic group from Armenia. They are there. So we are trying to encourage interchange of ideas and interchange of scholars. But all these things can be furthered, can be promoted if we are able to preserve peace in the world. It is a time of growing prosperity but also a time of diminishing security. We live in an atmosphere of fear and hatred, suspicion and jealousy. The climbup of civilisation is slow and difficult, the descent from it is easy and swift. We have to be particularly vigilant at a time like this when great nations are endowed with nuclear weapons and are facing each other. What is necessary is normalisation of the relations among the countries. Friendship is the thing which we want most in the present world. After all when we come to think of it, we find that there is not such vital differences as to justify any kind of military conflict between the great powers. We are all interested in the rapid industrialisation of our countries. We are also interested in establishing social justice. Even with regard to the roll of the individual I do not think that the differences are so great as sometimes we imagine. Marx pleaded for the liberation of the individual from economic determination. He felt that in a capitalist society, in an industrial society, man has not got the freedom to develop his possibilities fully. That is why he condemned it and pleaded for a socialist reconstruction of society. He said that he denied God because he believed in the potential divinity of man. Your condemnation of the cult of personality, your repudiation of repressive measures are all intended for safeguarding the liberty of the individual. We are working so hard for the purpose of building up human society where each human individual will have the liberty to grow to his fullest extent.

Only the other day I was reading the speech which your distinguished Prime Minister made to the Twenty-second Party Congress. He referred to an incident and a discussion that took place about the coat of arms which Russia should adopt. The first sketch contained a sword

and Lenin said: "Why a sword? The sword is a symbol of conquest. We want to repulse our invaders and defend our territory. We do not want to use force for conquest. Let us, therefore, drop the sword from our coat of arms." The hammer and sickle then took the place and that is what you have.

Your great call to the nations of the world that they must stop these armament races, that they must enter into economic competition, if any, that is in consonance with the ideas which Lenin himself professed and proclaimed. But the formulation of ideals is easy, the implementation of them is difficult. We know the right, we approve of it, but don't adopt it. We know the wrong, we condemn it, but we still pursue it. That is the tragedy of human situation. If, therefore, we are to avert that catastrophe, what we should do is to take our things seriously into account and try to transform, earnestly, vigorously and persistently to bring about a condition when the world will be free from wars. When our nerves are strained, we are irritated by every little noise. We become suspect and suspect all the dealings of people with whom we have differences. The time has come when we should break through this vicious circle of fear, suspicion, jealousy and distrust and get to terms, to understand one another and make the world a beautiful one which is possible for us to do and we can do it if we exert our utmost ability. Human history is determined by the decisions which men make. It depends on us what happens tomorrow or the day after. You as well as others have emphasized the significant role of the individual. I have no doubt, Sir, that the great leaders will exert their utmost. It is our humble hope that they will put the interest of humanity highest of all. They are the most paramount consideration that we have. I have no doubt that in your efforts for achieving peace, for overcoming the obstacles of fear, anger, hatred and jealousy, you will find us co-operating with you to the utmost extent to which we can.

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May I request you to convey to your Government and people our greetings and good wishes, our very best wishes for their progress and prosperity.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I now ask you to drink to the health of President Brezhnev and Madam Brezhnev and the people of the Soviet Union and Indo-Soviet friendship.

USA INDIA ARMENIA MALI RUSSIA

**Date :** Dec 15, 1961

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Reply of President of Soviet Union

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In his reply to Dr. Radhakrishnan's welcome speech, His Excellency Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., said:

Esteemed Mr. Vice-President, Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister, Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen:

First of all permit me to thank most profoundly our respected host Vice-President Dr. Radhakrishnan for the kind words, that he said about the Soviet Union, our Government and people.

It is for a short time yet, that we are staying on the Indian soil. But we have already felt, that hospitality is as characteristic of the Indian people, as it is of the Soviet people. From the first moment of our stay in India, we, if I may put it this way, found ourselves captured by your hospitality. This is the rare case when captivity is pleasant.

Our countries are maintaining sincere and friendly relations with each other and the reason for this is not only the historic traditions of the two nations' friendship; the traditions that had been forming throughout many centuries. There are other important factors, which determine the solidity of the friendship between the Soviet Union and India. Above all I have in mind the fact, that both our peoples advocate peace on earth.

The Soviet people devote all their strength to the implementation of historic decisions of the recent 22nd Congress of the Party, that are unparalleled in their concept and scope. It is necessary to have peace for the success of this enterprise. It is apparent that the preservation of peace is also necessary for the fulfilment of development plans of the national economy and the uplifting of the life-standard of the people, that have been adopted by the Republic of India.

It is here, in this coincidence of interests of Soviet and Indian peoples, in their common striving for peace and peaceful work, that we see the main force, that consolidates the friendship between our peoples. The Soviet Union and India are co-operating in the solving of the most important problems of the present international policy and above all such problems as the implementation of the principles of peaceful co-existence, elimination of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, the struggle for general and complete disarmament. It is therefore natural, that the relations between our countries are developing well.

When one recollects the events that led to such favourable results,

one thinks first of all about the year of 1955 when the Soviet people for the first time welcomed Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India and the Indian people accorded a hearty welcome to N. S. Khrushchev. These events led to a significant turn in the relations between the Soviet Union and India.

The following visits to India of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. S. Khrushchev, as well as the visits of other statesmen of the Soviet Union and the stay in the USSR of the Prime Minister Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, President Dr. Prasad, Vice-President Dr. Radhakrishnan and other prominent statesmen of India contributed to a further development of friendship and co-operation between our countries.

The relations between our States began receiving new content, becoming closer, more versatile and more fruitful. From year to year the trade turn-over expands, economic co-operation, scientific and cultural ties widen.

This has already produced favourable results for the strengthening of understanding and friendship between the Soviet and Indian peoples.

May this friendship develop and strengthen for the good of our peoples, for the benefit of the world peace.

May I propose a toast to the health of the President of the Republic of India Dr. Rajendra Prasad and wish him a speedy recovery, to the health of the Vice-President Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, to the health of Prime Minister of India Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.

I wish the people of India every success and prosperity.

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**Date :** Dec 15, 1961

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Soviet President's Speech at Banquet in honour of Dr. Radhakrishnan

Speaking at a banquet given by him in New Delhi on Dec 28, 1961, Vice-President of India, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., His Excellency Mr.

L. I. Brezhnev, said:

Esteemed Mr. Vice-President,

Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister,

Honourable Ministers,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Friends,

Permit me to extend here to you our sincere welcome.

Our fortnight's stay in friendly India, where we came on the kind invitation of the President of the Republic, esteemed Dr. Rajendra Prasad, is coming to an end. It gives me a great pleasure to meet all of you tonight on the eve of my departure for my Motherland.

A fortnight does not seem to be a long period of time. But owing to the hospitality of our hosts and the achievements of modern technology we have managed to see different places during this time--we have visited the north and the south, the east and the west of your vast and wonderful country. The impressions--vivid, various and unforgettable are so numerous, that it is absolutely impossible to tell about them in a short toast. And yet I would like to say now about the things which impressed us most.

First of all, it is the new India, which has freed itself from the ages--long foreign yoke and is marching now along the road of consolidation of its independence, development of national economy; and which took a firm stand among the peace-loving powers of the world.

It is the great freedom-loving people, who are jubilant over the final liberation of their motherland from colonial domination; the people--labourer, firmly resolved to use all its strength in order to do away with the accursed heritage of colonialism to liberate the country from the economic backwardness, to provide themselves with the worthy conditions of living as quickly as possible. These aspirations of the people which have freed themselves from colonial slavery, are manifested in absolutely everything, that we had the opportunity to see and to hear in India, wherever we were--it is with the scientists of Bombay, or the dockers of Madras, with the intellectuals of Calcutta or power plants workers in Neyveli or with the oil industry workers of Ankleshwar or public figures here, in the capital of India.

The spirit of independence and the atmosphere of peaceful creative work of the Indian people, who are overcoming with fortitude the big obstacles standing in their way--all that as much as new plants, oil-fields and educational establishments help to visualize the tomorrow of India.

Another impression of great importance that we are taking away leaving hospitable India is the warmth of the friendly feelings towards the Soviet country, the Soviet people with which are full the hearts of millions of Indian people as we felt since the first and till the last day of our stay here. Words full of emotions and smiles, enthusiastic, cries of hundreds of thousands of people welcoming the peace-loving policy of our country and the great creative work of the Soviet people--that is what we saw in India and what we shall not forget.

It can be said that the Soviet-Indian friendship is based on the firm foundation and on the determination of our both peoples to fight for the preservation of peace, for the triumph of the principles of peaceful co-existence in the relations among States.

I wish to say here that we had a number of meetings and conversations with the leaders of India--President Dr. Prasad, Vice-President Dr. Radhakrishnan, Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru and with other people on questions that are, as it is usually described, of common interest for both sides. I should think that Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. Vice-President who are present here will agree with me when I say, that these talks were very useful and sincere and cordial and that they, as I would like to hope, will contribute to a further understanding between our countries.

In the course of these conversations there was once again reaffirmed the closeness of the stands of both sides with respect to many of the most important international problems and, first of all, our unanimity in the main question, struggle for peace, against the threat of a new world war. It is an important factor in the contemporary world where the united efforts of the aggressive forces can secure a stable peace on the earth.

Dear friends,

Coming to the conclusion of my speech I would like once again to express on my own

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behalf and on behalf of all who are accompanying me our sincere gratitude to Mr. President, Mr. Vice-President and Mr. Prime Minister, as well as to the esteemed leaders of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society and to the representatives of central and local authorities in all cities and towns of your country, which we visited, our gratitude for the remarkable welcome and hospitality accorded to us on these days.

And finally one more extraordinary question.

Only three days remain before the beginning of the new year 1962. On the eve of a New Year it is customary to wish friends further

successes in work, to wish them health and happiness. Permit me also to wish all of you and in your person to the entire Indian people all the best in the coming 1962.

Let this year be a year of further consolidation of peace on our planet.

May I propose a toast to the Soviet-Indian friendship, to the great Indian people! To the health of the President of the Republic of India Dr. Prasad, to Vice-President Dr. Radhakrishnan, to Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:

To the health of all the Indian guests present here!

INDIA USA

**Date :** Dec 28, 1961

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1995

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Reply of Vice-President Radhakrishnan

Replying to the Soviet President, Dr. Radhakrishnan said:

Madam Brezhnev, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen: we are happy, Mr. President, that you and Madam and your distinguished colleagues were able to spend a few days in this country and see some parts of it. In fourteen days, in spite of modern methods of transport and communication, it is not always easy to see very much but we are glad that you saw some parts and you are pleased with the work that we are doing. We are glad that you yourself were able to feel the warmth and cordiality of our people for you and your people.

You brought to us a little of Russian atmosphere, the magic, the song, the dance and the acrobatic feats. What is it that we can offer you in return? We have given you to the best of our ability a little of Moscow weather. You have seen, Mr. President, for yourself the results of Indo-Soviet collaboration in some of our industrial projects. In the years to come we have no doubt that there would be more projects representative of this Indo-Soviet collaboration. We are interested not merely in the industrialisation of our country but we are trying for our rural development also. Those who have seen the pavillion in the Industries Fair, the Soviet Pavillion, would have noticed there ever so many devices and appliances which are useful in agricultural production and in domestic life.

You, Mr. President, referred to our common ideals, removal of poverty, unemployment, social misery, more important than all these the preservation of peace in this world. You referred to the theory of international co-existence. It is a doctrine which stems from our ancient traditions. It has been our policy to let other systems of thought, other forms of governments flourish according to their own genius without much interference with them. We do not wish to play the role of God so far as this world is concerned, dictating to everyone what they should do or should not do. We have no interest as you have no interest, I dare say, in exporting revolution or counter-revolution. That is the meaning of true co-existence. We have achieved a great deal; we command the earth and the creatures there; we are able to swim, do what we please in the waters; in the air also we are conquering with earth as the foot-stool. We are attempting to reach the stars. All these are revolutionary undertakings but more important revolution has to take place if the world is to be saved from the scourge of war. We have to fight the prejudices, the fears, the suspicions and the misunderstandings that dwell in the heart of man. It is said "love is blind". I may say hatred is blinder and so it should be our attempt to remove from our minds and hearts any traces of ill-will, bitterness and hatred for people. We can build a peaceful world, a world without wars only if we recognise our international responsibilities, our sense of human fellowship, sense of belonging to the human race, whatever may be the distinctive ways which we may adopt in thought and belief. It is that great revolution that has to be achieved if mankind is not to pass away from this world. And in that attempt, to remove misunderstandings and suspicions, I would like to assure you, Mr. President, of the whole-hearted spontaneous, enthusiastic co-operation of our people. I have been there in your country and I have known the eagerness

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for peace which your people have. And we also are interested in safeguarding peace, for whatever work we are doing today will be fruitful only if the world is saved from the scourge of war. So I wish to assure you on behalf of our Government and our people of our fullest sympathy with your attempts to work for peace.

You spoke to us about the New Year coming in two or three days. Yes, the New Year we always wish for peace and goodwill. It is not merely in one week that we have to do it, It has to be a perpetual task. We have to be ever vigilant; we have to be self-searching, scrutinising ourselves that we do not fall out of this course of peace and goodwill.

My dear President, I would like you to assure on behalf of our Government and people of our very best wishes for the future progress and prosperity of the Soviet nation, and I may assure you that our friendship which is based on fundamental principles and not temporary interests will also grow as the years pass.

I would now like to propose a toast for the wellbeing of the President, Madam Brezhnev, your distinguished colleagues, your people, Indo-Soviet friendship and world peace.

RUSSIA USA

**Date :** Dec 28, 1961

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1995

UNITED KINGDOM

Shrimati Lakshmi Menon's Statement on Immigration Control Legislation

In response to calling attention notices regarding the Immigration Control Legislation introduced by the Government of United Kingdom, Shrimati Lakshmi Menon, Deputy Minister of External Affairs, made the following statement in the Lok Sabha, on the Dec 04, 1961

As the House is aware, the British Government have introduced in their Parliament on the 2nd November, 1961, the Immigration and Deportation (Commonwealth Citizens) Bill which assume wide powers for restricting the entry of Commonwealth citizens into the United Kingdom, which has so far been free. The intention of the British Government to impose these restrictions was first conveyed to us in an Aide Memoire handed over to us on the 14th October, 1961. It was stated that British Immigration Officers would be given wide discretion in not allowing Commonwealth citizens entry into the U.K. and also to lay down conditions regarding the period of their stay. The entry of persons seeking work in the United Kingdom would be limited to those holding employment vouchers issued by the British authorities. Powers would also be assumed to deport Commonwealth citizens on conviction by a court of law.

The British proposals were considered by the Government of India and our preliminary views were conveyed to the British Government in an Aide Memoire dated the 28th October, 1961. We stressed the absence of previous consultation before taking the decision to impose very drastic curbs which would affect the considerable traffic of persons between India and the U.K., the likelihood of the restrictions resulting in discrimination between the various member countries of the Commonwealth on the basis of colour and the further possibility of the proposed restrictions rendering the position of a Commonwealth citizens even worse than that of citizens of non-Commonwealth countries. This matter has also been discussed by our Acting High Commissioner with the British Home Secretary in London.

As the House is aware, we ourselves are against illiterate or semi-literate Indians going to the United Kingdom or to any other country in search of employment. In fact, we have, for some years past, been exercising fairly severe restrictions against the issue of passports to such persons desiring to proceed to the United Kingdom. The British Government have, on the other hand, in some cases, allowed Indians, whose passports have not been

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endorsed by us for the United Kingdom, to land there.

The British Government have assured us that the restrictions which are now proposed to be imposed will not operate on the basis of colour. We hope that the actual operation of the restrictions the British Government may finally decide upon will bear out this assurance. The British Government have also assured us that those Indians who are already in the United Kingdom will not be affected by the proposed restrictive measures. We shall await the final form of the enactment and also study the administrative directions issued to British Immigration Officers. As seen at present, the arrangement proposed appears to be more cumbersome and unsatisfactory than that under a normal visa system applicable to foreigners. An intending Commonwealth visitor to the United Kingdom would not be certain whether he would, on arrival, be allowed entry into the U.K. and whether there will be any and if so what limitations on the period of his stay there.

As the House knows, no restrictions exist at present on British passport holders entering India freely, staying here indefinitely and obtaining employment. The Government of India may have to reconsider the present arrangement in this regard in the light of the new system that may be enforced by the British Government.

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USA UNITED KINGDOM INDIA

**Date :** Dec 04, 1961